M P JACKSON vs THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
- Court
- Kerala High Court
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
TH
TUESDAY, THE 17 DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026 / 26TH KARTHIKA, 1948
WA NO. 1385 OF 2026
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 03.07.2026 IN WP(C) NO.3275 OF
2026 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
M P JACKSON, AGED 73 YEARS
S/O M C PAUL, MAMPILLY HOUSE, IRINJALAKUDA, THRISSUR
DISTRICT, PIN - 680125
BY ADVS.
SRI.ARJUN RAGHAVAN
SHRI.T.R.HARIKUMAR
SMT.POOJA PANKAJ
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL OFFICE
BUILDING, SHAHID BHAGAT SINGH ROAD, MUMBAI, PIN -
400001
2 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, CO-
OPERATION (C) DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
3 THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES
JAWAHAR SAHAKARANA BHAVAN, DPI JUNCTION, THYCAUD P.O,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695014
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
4 THE IRINJALAKUDA TOWN CO-OPERATIVE BANK
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, TANA SOUTH,
IRINJALAKUDA, THRISSUR DISTRICT, KERALA, PIN - 680121
5 THE ADMINISTRATOR
IRINJALAKUDA TOWN CO-OPERATIVE BANK, TANA SOUTH,
IRINJALAKUDA, THRISSUR DISTRICT, KERALA STATE, PIN -
680121
BY ADVS.
SMT.SUMATHI DANDAPANI
SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI
SHRI.P.N.MOHANAN
SHRI.ARUN CHANDRAN, SPL.GP (CO-OPERATION)
THIS WRIT APPEAL WAS FINALLY HEARD ON 14.10.2026 ALONG WITH
WA.1585/2026, THE COURT ON 17.11.2026 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
TH
TUESDAY, THE 17 DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026 / 26TH KARTHIKA, 1948
WA NO. 1585 OF 2026
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 03.07.2026 IN WP(C) NO.3275 OF
2026 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
ST
APPELLANT/1 RESPONDENT:
THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL OFFICE
BUILDING, SHAHID BHAGAT SINGH ROAD, MUMBAI, PIN -
400001
BY ADVS
SMT.SUMATHI DANDAPANI
SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI
RESPONDENTS/WRIT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS 2 TO 5:
1 M P JACKSON, AGED 73 YEARS
S/O M C PAUL, MAMPILLY HOUSE, IRINJALAKUDA, THRISSUR
DISTRICT, PIN - 680125
2 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, CO-
OPERATION (C) DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
3 THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES
JAWAHAR SAHAKARANA BHAVAN, DPI JUNCTION, THYCAUD P.O,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695014
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
4 THE IRINJALAKUDA TOWN CO-OPERATIVE BANK
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, TANA SOUTH,
IRINJALAKUDA, THRISSUR DISTRICT, KERALA, PIN - 680121
5 THE ADMINISTRATOR
IRINJALAKUDA TOWN CO-OPERATIVE BANK, TANA SOUTH,
IRINJALAKUDA, THRISSUR DISTRICT, KERALA STATE, PIN -
680121
BY ADVS.
SHRI.P.N.MOHANAN
SHRI.ARUN CHANDRAN, SPL.GP (CO-OPERATION)
THIS WRIT APPEAL WAS FINALLY HEARD ON 14.10.2026 ALONG WITH
WA.1385/2026, THE COURT ON 17.11.2026 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
“CR”
COMMON JUDGMENT
Muralee Krishna, J.
W.A.No.1385 of 2026 is filed by the petitioner and
st
W.A.No.1585 of 2026 is filed by the 1 respondent in
W.P.(C)No.3275 of 2026 under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High
Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 03.07.2026
passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition. Since the
points to be decided in these writ appeals are the same, they are
heard together and are being disposed of by this common
judgment. For convenience of reference, the parties and
documents are referred to in this judgment as they were referred
to in the writ petition, unless otherwise stated.
2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the
th
petitioner is the former President of the 4 respondent Urban Co-
operative Bank. The definition of an Urban Co-operative Bank is
provided under Section 2(ta) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies
Act, 1969, wherein it is defined as a society registered under the
Act having its area of operation in the urban areas and which
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
undertakes banking business with the licence obtained from the
th
Reserve Bank of India. After finding that the functioning of the 4
st
respondent is not satisfactory, the 1 respondent, invoking its
power under Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (the
‘Act’ for short), issued a direction (AID-All Inclusive Direction)
th
restricting the operations of the 4 respondent, vide Ext.P3 order
dated 29.07.2025, which is to be in force from 30.07.2025 for a
period of six months (till 30.01.2026). After the issuance of Ext.P3
st
order, a request was made before the 1 respondent seeking
permission to sell the Non-Banking Assets (NBAs) as soon as
st
possible, to which it was replied by the 1 respondent that Ext.P3
order do not prohibit the Bank to sell/auction any of its mortgaged
properties. Actions were thereafter being initiated to sell of the
th
mortgaged properties so as to improve the position of the 4
st
respondent bank. However, without any further notice, the 1
respondent issued an order of supersession removing the Board
of Directors and appointing an administrator invoking powers
under Section 36AAA read with Section 56 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949, vide Ext.P5 order dated 07.10.2025.
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Therefore, the petitioner filed the writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs;
“i) to issue a writ of certiorari, or order, or direction, or any
other appropriate writ, calling for the records leading to the
issuance of Exhibit-P5 and quash the same;
ii) to declare that principles of natural justice are to be read
into the provisions of Section 36AAA read with Section 56 of
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949;
st
iii) to issue a writ of mandamus directing 1 respondent the
restoration of the elected managing committee forthwith.”
st
2.1. The 1 respondent filed a counter affidavit dated
27.02.2026 in the writ petition, opposing the reliefs sought for and
producing therewith Exts.R1(a) to R1(c) documents. To the
st
counter affidavit filed by the 1 respondent, the petitioner filed a
st
reply affidavit dated 10.03.2026. Again, the 1 respondent filed
an additional counter affidavit dated 29.05.2026 to the reply
affidavit filed by the petitioner.
2.2. After hearing both sides, the learned Single Judge, by
the impugned judgment, dismissed the writ petition, repelling the
challenge against Ext.P5 order, and at the same time, directed that
st
if the 1 respondent wants to continue Ext.P5 order after
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06.10.2026, the same shall be done only in consultation with
respondent No.2.
2.3. In the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge
considered the following questions:
“1. Whether an opportunity of hearing is to be given before
passing an Order of supersession under Section 36AAA of
the Banking Regulation Act?
2. Whether consultation with the Registrar of Co-operative
Societies is sufficient compliance for consultation with the
State Government as mandated under the Proviso to
Section 36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act?
3. Is it permissible for the Respondent No.1 to supersede
the Managing Committee elected by the General Body of the
Respondent No.4 without recourse to the provisions under
the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules made
thereunder?”
2.4. As far as question No.1 is concerned, by referring to
the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sandeep S. Ghandat
v. Reserve Bank of India [ 2024 SCC Online Bom 3584] , the
learned Single Judge found that the managing committee of
respondent No.4, including the petitioner are not entitled to get
an opportunity of personal hearing before passing Ext.P5 order
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and therefore that question is answered in negative and in favour
of respondent No.1. As far as question No.2 is concerned, by
referring to proviso to Section 36AAA(1) of the Act and the
judgments of the Apex Court in Babu Verghese and Others v.
Bar Council of Kerala [(1999) 3 SCC 422] , OPTO Circuit
India Limited v. Axis Bank and Others [(2021) 6 SCC 707],
and State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Sanjay
Nagayach [(2013) 7 SCC 25] the learned Single Judge found
that when proviso to Section 36AAA(1) of the Act provides for
mandatory consultation with the State Government, any order
passed without such consultation is to be held unsustainable.
Therefore, that question is answered in the negative and in favour
of the petitioner. As far as the third question is concerned, the
learned Single Judge found that when there is a clear provision as
Section 36AAA of the Act, providing for supersession of the Board
of Directors of the Co-operative Banks, the Co-operative Bank
cannot claim any immunity from the proceedings initiated under
the Banking Regulation Act on the ground that it has been working
under a democratic setup provided under the Kerala Co-operative
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Societies Act. Therefore, the third question is answered by the
st
learned Single Judge in the affirmative and in favour of the 1
respondent. Though question No.2 was answered by the learned
Single Judge in favour of the petitioner, the learned Single Judge
refused to set aside Ext.P5 order by giving certain reasons in
paragraph 22 of the judgment, which reads thus;
“22.In view of the answer to Question No.2, in normal case,
the Petitioner is entitled to succeed in this Writ Petition. But
Ext.P5 order is dated 07.10.2025 and the same has been
implemented by the Administrator taking charge of the
management of the Respondent No.4 immediately. The
Petitioner, who was the President of the Respondent No.4,
has chosen to file this Writ Petition only on 27.01.2026. The
Petitioner could not secure any interim order in his favour.
Even after the filing of the Writ Petition, the Administrator
appointed by the Respondent No.1 continued the
management of the Respondent No.4. Now the
Administrator appointed by Respondent No.1 has been
conducting the management of the Respondent No.4 for the
last nearly nine months. The Administrator is appointed for
a period of one year which would expire on 06.10.2026.
Hence, I am of the view that it is not in the public interest
and in the interest of the Depositors and the Respondent
No.4, to set aside Ext.P5 order at this distance of time. It is
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
not desirable to restore the Managing Committee back to
the management of Respondent No.4 at present. Hence, I
am not inclined to exercise my discretion under Article 226
of the Constitution of India in favour of the Petitioner”.
2.5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid conclusion arrived at
by the learned Single Judge, even after finding that Ext.P5 order
was passed without consultation with the State Government as
provided under the proviso to Section 36AAA(1) of the Act, the
petitioner filed W.A.No.1385 of 2026, contending that the learned
Single Judge ought to have set aside Ext.P5 order and granted the
reliefs sought in the writ petition. At the same time, being
aggrieved by the finding of the learned Single Judge that it was
mandatory to have consultation with the State Government before
st
issuing Ext.P5 order, the 1 respondent filed W.A.No.1585 of 2026.
3. On 28.09.2026, we heard Sri.Arjun Raghavan, the learned
counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner in W.A.No.1385 of 2026,
Smt.Sumathi Dandapani, the learned Senior Counsel for the
st
appellant - 1 respondent in W.A.No.1585 of 2026 and Sri.Arun
Chandran, the learned Special Government Pleader for the State,
and reserved the appeals for judgment.
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4. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that
after finding that Ext.P5 order dated 07.10.2025 was issued by
st
the 1 respondent without conducting mandatory consultation
nd
with the 2 respondent, the learned Single Judge ought to have
set aside the said order. Entry 45 of List-I (Union List) of the
Constitution of India provides for Banking, and Entry 32 of List-II
(State List) provides for the incorporation, regulation and winding
up of cooperative societies. Therefore, the regulation and
management of a Uni-State Co-operative Bank was never within
st
the domain of the 1 respondent. The State Government
mentioned under the proviso to Section 36AAA of the Act could
only mean the Secretary to the concerned Government
Department. Therefore, the consultation claimed as made by the
st
1 respondent with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies cannot
be accepted as compliance with the proviso to Section 36AAA(1)
of the Act. The learned counsel further submitted that when a
statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it can
st
be done in that manner alone. The 1 respondent cannot have its
own interpretation of the consultation mentioned in the proviso to
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Section 36AAA(1) of the Act. It is further argued by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the learned Single Judge ought to
have set aside Ext.P5 on the ground of violation of principles of
natural justice. In support of his argument, the learned counsel
relied on various judgments of the Apex Court, which we will
consider in the later part of this judgment.
st
5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1
respondent (appellant in W.A.No.1585 of 2026) argued that,
though the proviso to Section 36AAA(1) of the Act, after the
amendment to Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949,
which was inserted with effect from 01.04.2021, provides for
consultation with the State Government for superseding the Board
of Directors of the Cooperative Bank mentioned in that Section,
the Act is not specific as to who represents the State Government
st
for the said consultation. The 1 respondent issued Ext.R1(b)
letter dated 08.08.2025 to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies
requesting his comments under the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 36AAA of the Act read with Section 56 of the Act, which
was replied to as per Ext.R1(c) letter dated 14.08.2025 by the
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
Registrar of Cooperative Societies. In that reply, it is not
mentioned that the consultation stated in the proviso to sub-
section (1) of Section 36AAA of the Act is not with the Registrar
of Cooperative Societies. Under Section 3 of the Kerala Co-
operative Societies Act, 1969, the State Government has
appointed the Registrar of Cooperative Societies as the
administrative head and vested with all powers relating to
registration, management, and dissolution of Cooperative
Societies. Therefore, the consultation with the Registrar of
Cooperative Societies is effective consultation with the State
Government, he being the agent for this specific purpose. The
learned Senior Counsel further argued that the statutory
interpretation of purposive law dictates that a law should be
interpreted in a way that achieves its intended purpose. Under
Section 56(zg) of the Banking Regulation Act, by way of
amendment, it was clarified that the reference made in Section
49-B of the Act to the Central Government, for the purpose of
change of name, shall be construed as a reference to the Central
Registrar or Registrar of Cooperative Societies under the law under
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
which the Cooperative Bank is registered. Applying the same
principles, the reference to State Government shall be construed
as a reference to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies of the
concerned State. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies under
Section 32 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act has the power
of supersession of the committee of the Cooperative Society after
an inquiry done by himself. Similarly, in the case of Cooperative
Banks under Section 74A of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act,
st
on requisition made by the 1 respondent, the Registrar is
mandated to issue an order of supersession of a Cooperative Bank
st
and appoint an Administrator for the period specified by the 1
respondent. Therefore, carrying out consultation with the State
Government is a futile exercise when a competent authority to
take appropriate action in the case of Cooperative Societies and
Cooperative Banks is the Registrar. If the exercise, as directed by
the learned Single Judge, is not completed within 06.10.2026,
there will be a vacuum in the interregnum period between
06.10.2026 and the completion of the process directed in the
impugned judgment.
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
6. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted
that as per Sections 2(p) and 3 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies
Act, 1969, the Registrar is an officer appointed by the
Government. The powers of the Registrar therefore cannot be
equated with those of the Government. As per Section 83(1)(j)
of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, against the order
made by the Registrar, an appeal will lie to the Government. The
learned Special Government Pleader further pointed out Section
101 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, whereby the
power to exempt any society or any class of societies from the
provisions of the said Act was given to the Government.
Therefore, according to the learned Special Government Pleader,
the consultation mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 36AAA of the Act shall be with the Government and not
with the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies.
7. After the appeals were reserved for judgment, on
09.10.2026, the appellant in W.A.No.1585 of 2026 filed a memo
dated 08.10.2026, producing therewith a copy of the order dated
06.10.2026 issued under Section 36AAA of the Banking Regulation
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
Act, extending the supersession for a further period of one year
with effect from 07.10.2026. The said memo reads thus;
“1. It is humbly submitted that the above writ appeal was
filed being aggrieved by the impugned Judgment of the
Learned Single Judge wherein it was held that the process
of consultation as laid out in proviso to Section 36AAA of the
BR Act has to be done with the Secretary of the State
Government and that the consultation with the Registrar of
Co-operative Societies cannot be equated to consultation
with the State Government for the purpose of statutory
compliance of the Section 36AAA and the further direction
that any renewal or extension of the supersession and
appointment of Administrator in future with respect to the
4th respondent bank shall be after conducting consultation
with the State Government.
2. The term of supersession and the period of appointment
of the administrator was expiring on 06.10.2026. Though
the above writ appeal was heard and reserved for Judgment
by this Hon’ble Court no interlocutory orders were passed
staying the operation of the impugned judgment. Under
such circumstances, a vacuum with respect to the
administration of the Bank would arise upon expiry of Ext.P7
order and therefore the appellant has taken steps in
compliance with the Judgment of the Learned Single Judge
in the impugned Judgment since the same still vogue as no
orders of stay was passed by this Hon’ble Court. Accordingly
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consultation was carried out with the State Government vide
communication bearing no. CO.DOS.DSD.No.S4907/ 10-01-
011/2026-2027 dated 30.09.2026 seeking the comments, if
any, as per proviso to Section 36AAA.
3. As the State Government did not submit any reply as
comments to the consultation, the appellant on exercising
the powers under Section 36AAA has passed an order of
Supersession extending the period of supersession for a
further period of one year with effect from 07.10.2026. A
copy of the order of supersession dated 06.10.2026 bearing
no.TVM.DOS.SED.No.WS479/12-04-158/2026-2027 is
produced herewith for the perusal of this Hon’ble Court
along with this memo.”
8. In view of the filing of the above extracted memo by
the appellant in W.A.No.1585 of 2026, the appeals were posted as
‘to be spoken to’ on 14.10.2026 and we heard the learned Senior
Counsel/Counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned
Special Government Pleader.
9. We have perused the pleadings and materials on record
and appreciated the rival submissions made at the Bar. As far as
the question whether an opportunity of hearing is to be given
before passing an order of supersession under Section 36AAA of
the Act is concerned, there is no dispute between the parties on
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the finding of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment
based on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sandeep S.
Ghandat [2024 SCC Online Bom 3584] and that of the Apex
Court in Sandeep S. Ghandat [2026 SCC Online SC 1755],
th
that the managing committee of the 4 respondent including the
petitioner are not entitled to get an opportunity of the personal
hearing before passing Ext.P5 order.
10. From the pleadings in these writ appeals and from the
arguments addressed at the Bar, the points to be considered in
these writ appeals are, (i) Whether the learned Single Judge erred
in holding that there is no statutory consultation with the State
Government before Ext.P5 order as provided under the proviso to
sub-section (1) of Section 36AAA of the Banking Regulation Act
and Ext.R1(b) consultation with the Registrar of Cooperative
Societies cannot be equated with the consultation with the
Government mentioned in the Act?, (2) Whether the learned
Single Judge went wrong in dismissing the writ petition after
finding that Ext.P5 order was issued without the statutory
compliance of consultation with the State Government?
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11. As far as the first point is concerned, it is appropriate
to extract the relevant portions of Section 36AAA of the Banking
Regulation Act, which reads thus;
“36-AAA. Supersession of Board of directors of a multi-State
co-operative bank. - (1) Where the Reserve Bank is satisfied
that in the public interest or for preventing the affairs of a
multi-State co-operative bank being conducted in a manner
detrimental to the interest of the depositors or of the multi-
State co-operative bank or for securing the proper
management of the multi-State co-operative bank, it is
necessary so to do, the Reserve Bank may, for reasons to
be recorded in writing, by order, supersede the Board of
directors of such multi-State co-operative bank for a period
not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order,
which may be extended from time to time, so, however, that
total period shall not exceed five years.
Provided that in the case of a co-operative bank registered
with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies of a State, the
Reserve Bank shall issue such order in consultation with the
concerned State Government, seeking its comments, if any,
within such period as the Reserve Bank may specify.”
12. The reading of the aforesaid portion of Section
36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, as extracted above,
makes it clear that an order of supersession of a Cooperative Bank
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
st
can be made by the 1 respondent only after consultation with the
concerned State Government. Then the point to be answered is
whether the consultation mentioned in the proviso to sub-section
(1) of Section 36AAA of the Act can be said to be complied with
st
by the consultation made by the 1 respondent with the Registrar
of Cooperative Societies by issuing Ext.R1(b) letter dated
08.08.2025. It is relevant to note at this juncture some of the
judgments of the Apex Court pertaining to interpretation of the
words used in a statute.
13. In Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma
[(2013) 11 SCC 451] , the Apex Court, in the appeals preferred
against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of
Jammu and Kashmir in SWP No.1393 of 1999 and judgment and
order in LPA No.275 of 2002 on the issue of challenge raised
against the seniority list among the Assistant Commandants in
the Border Security Force, held thus;
“Addition and subtraction of words
27. The court has to keep in mind the fact that, while
interpreting the provisions of a statute, it can neither add,
nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “ A verbis
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
legis non est recedendum ” means, “from the words of law,
there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted
by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible
to omit any part thereof. The court cannot proceed with the
assumption that the legislature, while enacting the statute
has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing
that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there
is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the
statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend ,
or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have
been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases
but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an
Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory
provisions, cannot add words to a statute, or read words
into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal
reading of the same produces an intelligible result. (Vide
Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar [(1953) 1 SCC
167 : AIR 1953 SC 148], Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State
of Bombay [AIR 1959 SC 459], M. Pentiah v. Muddala
Veeramallappa [AIR 1961 SC 1107], Balasinor Nagrik Coop.
Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya [(1987) 1 SCC 606
: AIR 1987 SC 849] and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu
Ramulu [(2001) 7 SCC 71] , SCC pp. 78-79, para 13.)
28. The statute is not to be construed in light of certain
notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what
the legislature is expected to have said, or what the
legislature might have done, or what the duty of the
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
legislature to have said or done was. The courts have to
administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible
for the court to twist the clear language of the enactment in
order to avoid any real or imaginary hardship which such
literal interpretation may cause.
29. In view of the above it becomes crystal clear that under
the garb of interpreting the provision, the court does not
have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it
would not amount to interpretation, but legislation .”
(underline supplied)
14. In Sanjay Nagayach [(2013) 7 SCC 25], while
considering the legality of an order passed by the Joint
Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, Sagar Division, Sagar,
Madhya Pradesh, superseding the Board of Directors of
District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Panna without
previous consultation with Reserve Bank of India, as
provided under the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the
Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, the Apex
Court held thus;
“23. The mere serving a copy of the show-cause notice on
RBI with supporting documents is not what is contemplated
under the second proviso to Section 53(1). For a meaningful
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
and effective consultation, the copy of the reply filed by the
Bank to the various charges and allegations levelled against
them should also be made available to RBI as well as the
action proposed by the Joint Registrar, after examining the
reply submitted by the Bank. On the other hand, RBI should
be told of the action the Joint Registrar is intending to take.
Only then, there will be an effective consultation and the
views expressed by RBI will be a relevant material for
deciding whether the elected Board be superseded or not.
In other words, the previous consultation is a condition
precedent before the forming of an opinion by the Joint
Registrar to supersede the Board of Directors or not.
24. This Court in Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.)
Assn. v. Union of India [1993 Supp (1) SCC 730 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 252 : (1993) 23 ATC 788], has laid down six
propositions while examining the meaning of the expression
“consultation”. We may add one more proposition that when
the outcome of the proposed action is to oust a
democratically elected body and the expression used is
“shall not be passed without previous consultation”, it is to
be construed as mandatory. Reference may also be made to
the judgments of this Court in RBI v. Peerless General
Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. [(1987) 1 SCC 424 :
(1987) 2 SCR 1] , State of J&K v. A.R. Zakki [1992 Supp (1)
SCC 548 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 427 : (1992) 20 ATC 285] ,
Gauhati High Court v. Kuladhar Phukan [(2002) 4 SCC 524
: 2002 SCC (L&S) 555] , Andhra Bank v. Andhra Bank
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
Officers [(2008) 7 SCC 203 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 403]”.
(underline supplied)
15. In Babu Verghese [(1999) 3 SCC 422] , in a special
leave to appeal filed against the judgment of this Court holding
that the term of the Kerala Bar Council will be treated as having
been extended by the Bar Council of India before the expiry of its
original term, the Apex Court held thus;
“31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the
manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any
statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all.
The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor
v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch D 426 : 45 LJCh 373] which was
followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor
[(1936) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253] who stated as under:
“Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a
certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not
at all.”
32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao
Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. [AIR 1954 SC 322 :
1954 SCR 1098] and again in Deep Chand v. State of
Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 1527 : (1962) 1 SCR 662] . These
cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court
in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh [AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964)
1 SCWR 57] and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case
[(1936) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253] was again upheld.
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
This rule has since been applied to the exercise of
jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a
salutary principle of administrative law”.
(underline supplied)
16. In OPTO Circuit India Ltd [(2021) 6 SCC 707] , the
Apex Court, while considering the issue of freezing of bank account
of the appellant therein, held thus;
“14. This Court has time and again emphasised that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner,
then it has to be done in that manner alone and in no other
manner. Among others, in a matter relating to the
presentation of an election petition, as per the procedure
prescribed under the Patna High Court Rules, this Court had
an occasion to consider the Rules to find out as to what would
be a valid presentation of an election petition in Chandra
Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad [ Chandra Kishore Jha v.
Mahavir Prasad , [(1999) 8 SCC 266] and in the course of
consideration observed as hereunder : (SCC p. 273, para 17)
“ 17 . … It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a
statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular
manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no
other manner.”
Therefore, if the salutary principle is kept in perspective, in
the instant case, though the authorised officer is vested with
sufficient power; such power is circumscribed by a procedure
laid down under the statute. As such the power is to be
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
exercised in that manner alone, failing which it would fall foul
of the requirement of complying with due process under law.
We have found fault with the authorised officer and declared
the action bad only insofar as not following the legal
requirement before and after freezing the account. This shall
not be construed as an opinion expressed on the merit of the
allegation or any other aspect relating to the matter and the
action initiated against the appellant and its Directors which
is a matter to be taken note of in appropriate proceedings if
at all any issue is raised by the aggrieved party”.
(underline supplied)
17. In Anurag Kumar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand
[(2016) 9 SCC 426] , in the appeals filed against the judgment
of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital by which a direction
was issued to restrict the selection of Assistant Prosecuting
Officers only to the number of posts that were advertised, the
Apex Court held thus;
“16. Judicial discretion can be exercised by a court only
when there are two or more possible lawful solutions. In any
event, courts cannot give any direction contrary to the
statute or rules made thereunder in exercise of judicial
discretion. It will be useful to reproduce from Judicial
Discretion (1989) by Aharon Barak which is as follows:
“Discretion assumes the freedom to choose among
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
several lawful alternatives. Therefore, discretion does not
exist when there is but one lawful option. In this
situation, the Judge is required to select that option and
has no freedom of choice. No discretion is involved in the
choice between a lawful act and an unlawful act. The
Judge must choose the lawful act, and he is precluded
from choosing the unlawful act. Discretion, on the other
hand, assumes the lack of an obligation to choose one
particular possibility among several.”
(underline supplied)
18. It is true that in Ext.R1(c) reply, the Registrar of
st
Cooperative Societies did not mention as to with whom the 1
respondent has to consult as provided under the proviso to sub-
section (1) of Section 36AAA of the Act. But from of
the perusal
Ext.R1(c) reply, it can be seen that it was specifically stated in that
reply that in the light of the statutory framework in the Act, the
permission of the concerned Registrar of Cooperative Societies is
st
not a legal requirement for the 1 respondent to proceed with the
supersession of the Board of Directors of the Co-operative Bank
concerned. One cannot expect that when a letter is addressed to
the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, seeking his comments,
which he is not legally obliged to give, has to reply to that letter
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
clarifying as to who is the authority for giving the comments
st
mentioned in the statute. It is the duty of the 1 respondent to
act in accordance with the provisions of the statutory framework,
st
and the 1 respondent cannot put the blame upon the Registrar
st
of Cooperative Societies for not enlightening the 1 respondent as
to the proper person to be consulted, in Ext.R1(c) reply. The
principles stated in the aforementioned judgments would make it
clear that when a statute prescribes a particular act to be done in
a particular manner, the same has to be done in that manner alone
and a convenient meaning cannot be given to the same. Merely
for the reason that under Section 56(zg) of the Banking Regulation
Act, the reference to Central Government was directed to be
construed as Central Registrar or Registrar of Cooperative
Societies, the same meaning cannot be pressed into service as far
as Section 36AAA of the Act is concerned, for the simple reason
that if that was the intention of the law makers, there was no
difficulty to carry out those amendments to Section 36AAA also.
Therefore, we find no illegality in the finding of the learned Single
Judge that the consultation with the State Government mentioned
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in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 36AAA of the Act is not
the consultation with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The
method of appointment of the Registrar of a Co-operative Society
defined under Section 2(p), as provided under Section 3 of the
Kerala Cooperative Societies Act,1969, the power given to the
Registrar under Section 32 of the said Act, and the appeal
provisions under Section 83 of the said Act also fortify the
contention of the petitioner as well as the Government that unless
the Registrar of Cooperative Societies is specifically appointed by
the Government to have consultation in the matter of supersession
of the Cooperative Bank, such an interpretation is not possible.
19. Now the only point remaining is whether the direction
given by the learned Single Judge to continue the order of
supersession till the period mentioned in Ext.P5 order is violative
of natural justice and any interference is needed on the same? In
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd v. Ananta
Saha [(2011) 5 SCC 142] , the Apex Court, in an appeal,
preferred against the judgment and order passed by the Calcutta
High Court wherein the issue was pertaining to the punishment
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
order of dismissal from service as well as the disciplinary
st
proceedings against the 1 respondent therein, held thus;
“32. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is
not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would
not sanctify the same. In such a fact situation, the legal
maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus is applicable,
meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the
superstructure falls.
33. In Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. [(2000) 8 SCC 395 : 2001
SCC (L&S) 13 : AIR 2000 SC 3243] this Court observed that
once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential
acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically
and this principle of consequential order which is applicable
to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is equally
applicable to administrative orders. (See also State of
Kerala v. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam [(2001) 10 SCC
191] and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath
Narichania [(2010) 9 SCC 437 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 808 :
AIR 2010 SC 3745] .)” (underline supplied)
20. The principle stated in the above-mentioned judgment
of the Apex Court is that once the basis of a proceeding is gone,
all consequential acts, actions and orders would fall to ground
automatically. But in the instant case, as noticed by the learned
Single Judge, the Administrator had taken charge consequent to
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
Ext.P5 order dated 07.10.2025 immediately. But petition
the writ
was filed only on 27.01.2026. Even after filing the writ petition, no
interim order was secured by the petitioner, and the impugned
judgment was pronounced on 03.07.2026. Several acts would
have been done by the Administrator during this period, which
cannot be reversed or, in other words, the things cannot be
reverted to the stage of appointment of the Administrator. At this
distance of time, on the principle of equity and public interest,
the learned Single Judge was right in not exercising the discretion
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to unsettle the
settled matters. Moreover, the learned Single Judge rightly
st
directed that if the 1 respondent wanted to continue Ext.P5 order
after 06.10.2026, the same shall be done only in consultation with
nd
the 2 respondent. We find no illegality or impropriety in the
aforesaid finding of the learned Single Judge. Though the
appellant in W.A.No.1585 of 2026 has now issued an order dated
06.10.2026 extending the period of supersession for a further
period of one year with effect from 07.10.2026, it will have no
independent legs to stand, since admittedly, the consultation with
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W.A.Nos.1385 and 1585 of 2026
the State Government, as found above, was not completed,
though the appellant vide communication dated 30.09.2026
sought comments of the State Government.
In the result, the writ appeals stand dismissed. However,
since the period of the Administrator appointed by virtue of Ext.P5
order expired on 06.10.2026, and the present extension order
dated 6.10.2026 was also issued without completing the
consultation with the State Government as mandated under
Section 36AAA of the Act, there will be a vacuum till the
completion of the consultation with the State Government for
extending Ext.P5 order as directed in the impugned judgment, we
deem it appropriate to direct maintenance of status quo for a
period of one month from the date of this judgment, and we order
accordingly.
Sd/-
ANIL K.NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
sks MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE
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APPENDIX OF WA NO. 1385 OF 2026
RESPONDENT ANNEXURES
ANNEXURE R4(a) true copy of the e key business figures of
the fourth respondent bank
ANNEXURE R4(b) true copy of the Central Act No.39/2020 dated
29.09.2020
ANNEXURE R4(c) true copy of the amended Act.No.9/2024 dated
07.06.2024
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APPENDIX OF WA NO. 1585 OF 2026
RESPONDENT ANNEXURES
Annexure R4 (a) The key business figures of the bank
Annexure R4 (b) true copy of the Central Act No.39/2020 dated
29.09.2020
Annexure R4 (c) true copy of the amended Act.No.9/2024 dated
07.06.2024