Babu Lal vs Neelam Kumar Modi
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 14.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010233012026
+ RC.REV. 180/2026
BABU LAL .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pratyush Chirantan & Mr.
Abhishek Bajpai, Advocates.
versus
NEELAM KUMAR MODI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Akhil Mittal, Mr. Sunil
Mittal, Mr. Vineet Kumar
Mishra, Ms. Shayna Dass
Pattnayak & Ms. Riddhi Jain,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition has been filed under
1
the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ,
2
assailing the Order dated 25.03.2026 passed by the learned
Additional Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis Hazari
3
Courts, Delhi in RC ARC No.315/2025, titled as “Neelam Kumar
Modi v. Babu Lal” , whereby the Application filed by the
1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
learned ARC
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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Petitioner/tenant seeking leave to defend the Eviction Petition under
Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act was dismissed
and an Order of eviction was consequently passed in favour of the
Respondent/Landlord in respect of Shop bearing Municipal No.
1069, Ground Floor, Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006,
4
admeasuring approximately 5.80 sq. metres .
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Respondent instituted the Eviction Proceedings by filing
5
the Eviction Petition dated 22.05.2025 claiming himself to be the
owner and landlord of the subject premises and pleading his bona fide
requirement thereof for commercial purposes. It was his case that he is
a senior citizen and has been engaged in the jewellery business for
several decades.
3. The Respondent pleaded that he had purchased the subject
premises from the erstwhile owner, M/s J.R. Bashesharnath H.U.F.,
through its Karta, Sh. Kishan Lal, vide registered Sale Deed dated
6
11.04.2013 , and that the Petitioner was already in occupation as a
tenant of the erstwhile owner. Upon acquisition of the property, the
Respondent claimed to have stepped into the shoes of the erstwhile
landlord and thereafter collected rent from the Petitioner.
4. The Respondent further pleaded that the subject premises is
situated on the ground floor in a prominent commercial market at
Maliwara, Chandni Chowk and is particularly suited for the jewellery
business. The requirement pleaded was not merely for the
Respondent's own use but also in the context of settling the business
4
Subject premises
5
Eviction Petition
6
Sale Deed
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BHATIA
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interests of his grandson, Mr. Gokul Modi, who, according to the
Eviction Petition, had completed a course in diamonds and intended to
establish an independent business in the jewellery/diamond trade. The
Respondent asserted that the existing accommodation available to the
family was insufficient and that the subject premises was
commercially suitable for the proposed requirement.
5. The Petitioner entered appearance and sought leave to defend
7
vide Application seeking leave to defend dated 25.06.2025 . The
principal objections raised before the learned ARC included a
challenge to the Respondent's ownership and the landlord-tenant
relationship, an objection to the correctness of the site plan, a
challenge to the genuineness and evidentiary value of the rent receipts,
a denial of the bona fide requirement and an assertion regarding
availability of alternative accommodation.
6. The learned ARC, after considering the Eviction Petition, the
Leave to Defend Application, the Reply dated 30.10.2025 and the
Rejoinder dated 09.01.2026, found that no triable issue had been
disclosed. The learned ARC held that the landlord-tenant relationship
stood established; that the bona fide requirement pleaded by the
Respondent was genuine; and that the Petitioner had failed to disclose
any reasonably suitable alternative accommodation which could
defeat the Respondent's claim. The Leave to Defend Application was
accordingly dismissed and the Eviction Order followed.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Order, the present Revision Petition
has been preferred. Though the memorandum of Revision contains
several averments, the challenge, as canvassed before this Court,
7
Leave to Defend Application
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BHATIA
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essentially rests upon three principal grounds: first , an alleged
discrepancy between the site plan depicting the subject premises as
rectangular and the competing site plan relied upon by the Petitioner
depicting the premises as L-shaped; second , the contention that the
rent receipts relied upon by the Respondent bear the signatures of Mr.
Kishan Kumar and Mr. Shiv Kumar and not of the Petitioner, i.e., Mr.
Babu Lal; and third , the assertion that the learned ARC failed to
properly consider the availability of alternative accommodation
particularly with respect to the ground floor of the Property bearing
8
number 1072, Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi .
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the site plan
filed by the Respondent does not correctly depict the subject premises
and that the discrepancy in its shape and dimensions goes to the root
of the eviction proceedings. It is argued that the learned ARC failed to
appreciate that the Petitioner had placed a competing site plan on
record and, despite the resulting dispute regarding the identity and
extent of the tenanted premises, proceeded to pass the Eviction Order
without resolving the same.
9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the rent
receipts relied upon by the Respondent do not bear the signatures of
the Petitioner, Mr. Babu Lal, but are stated to have been signed by Mr.
Kishan Kumar and Mr. Shiv Kumar. According to the Petitioner, such
receipts cannot establish either the payment of rent by him to the
Respondent or the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between
the parties. It is therefore contended that the very foundational
8
Property bearing No. 1072
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BHATIA
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ingredient of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC
Act remained in dispute and constituted a triable issue.
10. On the question of alternative accommodation, learned counsel
for the Petitioner submits that the Respondent owns and/or has access
to other properties, particularly the properties bearing Nos.1067, 1070,
1071 and 1072, Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, as also another property
bearing No.932, Kucha Kabil Attar, Chandni Chowk. It is contended
that the learned ARC failed to properly appreciate the material placed
on record concerning these properties, and in particular, the property
bearing number 1072, and mechanically accepted the Respondent's
assertion that no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation was
available.
11. Per Contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, however, supports the Impugned Order in its entirety and
submits that the present proceedings are confined to the limited
revisional jurisdiction exercisable by this Court under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. He submits that the Petitioner is
seeking a reappreciation of the evidence. He submits that this Court,
while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, is not required to re-
appreciate the material on record or undertake a fresh examination of
the merits of the case as an appellate court. It is submitted that unless
the Impugned Order suffers from any jurisdictional error, material
irregularity, perversity or patent illegality warranting interference in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction, no interference is called for.
12. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.
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BHATIA
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ANALYSIS:
13. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and, with their able assistance, perused the relevant documents as also
the Impugned Order.
14. Before dealing with the individual grounds, it is necessary to
delineate the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to
Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. The jurisdiction is supervisory and
not appellate. The High Court is required to examine whether the
order of the learned Rent Controller is according to law and whether
the decision-making process suffers from an error apparent, illegality
or material irregularity. The revisional jurisdiction does not authorise
a wholesale re-appreciation of the material as if this Court were
exercising appellate jurisdiction.
15. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
9
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
10 11
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua
has emphasised that the proviso to Section 25B(8) confers a restricted
revisional jurisdiction and that the High Court is not expected to
substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller by
undertaking a roving inquiry. The exercise, therefore, is not to
determine whether another view of the material is theoretically
possible, but whether the conclusion reached by the learned ARC is
one which is legally sustainable on the material before it. The relevant
9
(1998) 8 SCC 119
10
(2014) 9 SCC 78
11
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra)
read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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17. It is within this limited but meaningful supervisory jurisdiction
that the three objections raised by the Petitioner against the Impugned
Order fall for consideration.
I. SITE PLAN
18. The first ground of challenge relates to the site plan of the
Subject Premises. The Petitioner contends that whereas the site plan
filed by the Respondent depicts the Subject Premises as rectangular in
shape, the site plan relied upon by the Petitioner depicts it as L-
shaped. According to the Petitioner, this discrepancy raises a dispute
regarding the actual identity and configuration of the tenanted
premises and, therefore, constitutes a triable issue warranting leave to
defend.
19. In this regard, it would be apposite to notice the findings
recorded by the learned ARC in the Impugned Order while dealing
with the aforesaid objection. The relevant observations read as under:-
“16. Firstly, it is contended that the site plan filed by the petitioner
does not reflect the actual position of the premises. However,
barring some differences, identity and extent of the tenanted
premises as shown by the petitioner and the respondent in the
counter site plan are the same. Moreover, it is trite to state that
there is no requirement of the landlord to set out exactly what area
is required in terms of giving measurement. Reliance in this regard
is placed upon the order of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in RC
Rev. No. 224/2023, Sharad Jain Vs. Jayanti Jain Prasad, dated
28.01.2025. ”
20. The contention, however, does not merit acceptance. A
discrepancy in the depiction of a premises in a site plan cannot, by
itself, constitute a triable issue. The relevant enquiry is whether the
alleged discrepancy creates any genuine uncertainty regarding the
identity or extent of the premises in respect of which eviction is
sought, or otherwise has a material bearing on the landlord's claim. In
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BHATIA
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the present case, the answer is clearly in the negative. The Subject
Premises has consistently been identified as Shop No.1069, Ground
Floor, Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, and its approximate area of
5.80 square metres has also been specified. More importantly, the
Petitioner himself claims to be in possession of the very premises
from which eviction is sought and has not suggested that the
Respondent is seeking possession of any premises other than Shop
No.1069. The dispute is therefore not as to “which premises” is the
subject matter of the proceedings, but as to the precise manner in
which its physical configuration has been graphically represented.
21. The Petitioner has, in fact, failed to demonstrate what
substantive consequence flows from the alleged difference between a
rectangular and an L-shaped depiction. There is no assertion, much
less any material, to establish that the Respondent has sought
possession of any area beyond the tenanted premises or that the
competing depictions represent two materially different premises. In
the absence of any such consequence or prejudice, the mere existence
of differently shaped site plans cannot be elevated into a triable issue.
A site plan is intended to facilitate identification and appreciation of
the premises; it cannot be treated as an independent substantive
requirement, divorced from the actual identity of the property and the
rights asserted therein.
22. This approach is consistent with the decision of this Court in
12
Rajender Kumar Pahuja v. Anup Narain Gaur , wherein the Court
examined the alleged discrepancy in the site plans in the context of
whether it had any substantive bearing upon the identification and
12
2025 : DHC : 7617
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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suitability of the premises, rather than treating the existence of
competing depictions as sufficient, in itself, to warrant leave to
defend. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“14. Qua the Site Plan filed by the respondent, interestingly, the
very same petitioner has admitted the very same Site Plan in the
replies filed in two other eviction petitions being E.No.46/2019 and
E.No.27/2018 under Section 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Act
respectively inter se the very same parties, which has been
categorically observed by the learned ARC as well. The petitioner
cannot, thus, be allowed to blow hot and cold, and plead contrary
to his own earlier taken stand. Even otherwise, and as correctly
pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondent, the
learned ARC has still, for the sake of arguments, proceeded to
consider the contrary Site Plan(s) filed by the petitioner, and held
that, keeping in view the subsequent Partition, Relinquishment and
Sale Deeds, all of which were duly signed and registered, the
division of possession amongst the respondent and his brother and
sister was undoubted, and hence any inconsistencies, if there, were
immaterial. Further, it was held that there were no material
concealments in the Site Plan, since, even if the petitioner’s best
case is taken, some space on the first floor or the mezzanine of the
leased out adjacent shop, were also held to be irrelevant for the
purposes of the respondent’s eviction petition based on the
evidence on record. This Court does not find anything illegal/
unreasonable in the above findings of fact, and no case to interfere
with the same, at this stage, is made out.
15. In any event, it must be borne in mind that the respondent was
required to identify the subject premises as also give a Site Plan,
but it was not incumbent upon him to give the exact Site Plan
under such circumstances. Once it was established that the
respondent was the landlord of the subject premises, of which he
was admittedly not in possession, the issue of minor consistencies
in the Site Plan, if any, fades into insignificance. More so, as held
13
in Shakuntala Devi v. Mohan Das , even the non-filing of site
plan may not be fatal to the case of a landlord, depending on the
facts and circumstances of the case.
16. Therefore, the said issue qua the Site Plan filed by the
respondent is discarded.”
23. The fact that the Petitioner placed his own site plan on record
does not, by itself, alter the position. The Petitioner’s act of filing a
13
2024:DHC:9368
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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site plan merely places a rival depiction before the Court; it does not
convert every difference between the two depictions into a triable
issue. The Court must examine whether the alleged difference has
legal or factual consequence. In the present case, none has been
demonstrated.
24. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, the
Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any uncertainty or
ambiguity regarding the subject premises, any enlargement of the area
for which possession is sought, or any other consequence flowing
from the alleged discrepancy. The objection, therefore, remains
confined to the form of depiction and does not raise any issue
requiring adjudication at trial. The learned ARC was consequently
justified in declining to treat the alleged discrepancy in the site plans
as a triable issue. Upon an independent consideration of the record,
this Court finds no reason to take a different view.
II. RENT RECEIPTS AND LANDLORD-TENANT
RELATIONSHIP
25. The second ground of challenge concerns the rent receipts
relied upon by the Respondent. The Petitioner contends that the
receipts do not bear his signatures, but are stated to have been signed
by Mr. Kishan Kumar and Mr. Shiv Kumar. On this basis, it is argued
that the receipts do not establish the existence of a landlord-tenant
relationship between the Respondent and the Petitioner and that the
learned ARC ought to have treated the issue as a triable one.
26. The learned ARC also examined the Petitioner's objection
concerning the rent receipts and the alleged absence of a landlord-
tenant relationship between the parties. The findings recorded in the
Impugned Order on this aspect are reproduced hereinbelow:—
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BHATIA
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“ LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
9. As far as the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned, the
respondent has disputed the same. It is contended that the
respondent has never paid rent to the petitioner. It is further stated
that the documents relied by the petitioner regarding ownership of
property are not valid. However, the respondent has himself stated
to be the tenant in the demised premises. Therefore, the respondent
being a tenant cannot challenge the title of the original landlord or
his successor in interest. In this regard it is necessary to mention
the law laid down in the judgment titled as Rajender Kumar
Sharma vs. Smt. Leela Wati reported as 155 (2008) DLT 383 ,
the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that:
“...It is settled law that for the purpose of section 14 (1)
(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed
to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of
Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more
than a tenant. In this case, the landlady had placed on
record the documents by which she became owner. The
attornment given by the erstwhile landlord in her favour
as well as an admission made by the tenant by filing
petition under section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act
acknowledgement the landlordship of landlady. Thus, the
conclusion arrived at by the ARC regarding ownership
and relationship of landlord and tenant were based on
sound legal position and the cogent material before it....”
10. Hence, the objection with respect to title deeds of petitioner
also does not amount to any triable issue as imperfectness of title
does not bar a petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. In this regard,
it is important to bear in mind the principle laid down in the case of
Sh. Bharat Bhushan Vs. Arti Techchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247
which is as follows: -
“The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation
governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be
distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises
was let out by a person and after his death, the premises
has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the
tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a
beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the
tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the
premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit
impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the
Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner
after the death of the original owner.”
11. The principle is very clear that once a tenant always a tenant.
The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his
successor-in-interest. Therefore, the said contention that the title
documents are not valid, is of no assistance to the respondent. The
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BHATIA
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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad
Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 had held that:
“...13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that where a
person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the
landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title
of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will
give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship
of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle
of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the
said section.
12. The principle is very clear that once a tenant always a
tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his
successor-in-interest. Further, the law in this regard has been
elaborately dealt with in the case of Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti
Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT 450 the Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi held:
“......... The imperfectness of the title of the premises
cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under
section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can
be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not
vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has
been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the
Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A
tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after
vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the
premises. ”
13. Thus, a tenant is stopped from challenging the ownership
or denying the title of the landlord without vacating the
premises. No interpleader suit is stated to have been filed by the
respondent. Also, the tenant has no locus to challenge the transfer
of ownership in favour of the landlord. It is also pertinent to note
that the law does not require any attornment as a pre-requisite on
the part of the tenant for affirming the title of the landlord. It is
well settled that if the transfer of the landlord's title is valid, even if
the tenancy is not attorned in favour of the transferee, the lease
continues. Thus, a transferee of the landlord's rights, steps into the
shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the
transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. Thus,
attornment in favour of the new landlord is unnecessary to confer
validity to the transfer of the landlord's rights and there is no such
statutory requirement. Reference may be made to the case of
Hajee K. Assainar vs. Chacku Joseph AIR 1984 Ker 113 .
Hence, the said contention is devoid of merits. 14. Accordingly, it
can be stated that the petitioner is the owner/landlord of the
tenanted premises and the respondent is the tenant in the said
premises. Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties in the present case, stands
established.”
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BHATIA
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27. The submission advanced by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner before this Court, however, proceeds by examining the rent
receipts in isolation from the pleadings of the parties. The material on
record has to be appreciated as a whole. The Respondent's specific
case is that the Petitioner, Mr. Babu Lal, was the tenant in the subject
premises and that the rent was being tendered on his behalf by his
brothers, Mr. Kishan Kumar and Mr. Shiv Kumar. Significantly, the
Petitioner has not set up any positive case explaining his possession of
the Subject Premises in any capacity other than that of a tenant. The
objection, therefore, merely questions the identity of the person who
signed the individual rent receipts; it does not, by itself, establish that
the Petitioner was not the tenant.
28. There is an obvious distinction between the person who
physically tenders or acknowledges payment of rent and the person in
whose capacity the tenancy is held. The mere fact that rent receipts
were signed by family members cannot, without further material, lead
to the inference that the tenancy itself was held by those family
members or that the Petitioner had no landlord-tenant relationship
with the Respondent. The relevant enquiry is whether the material on
record, read cumulatively, discloses a prima facie tenancy between the
parties. In the present case, the Petitioner has not pointed to any
document or circumstance establishing that the tenancy stood in the
name of either Mr. Kishan Kumar or Mr. Shiv Kumar, nor has he
identified any person whom he asserts to be the actual tenant in his
place.
29. The objection assumes still greater significance when viewed
against the nature of the proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act. At the stage of considering an application for leave to
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defend, the tenant is required to disclose facts which, if proved, would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order. A dispute
which merely rests upon the fact that a rent receipt was signed by
another person, without disclosing how that circumstance negates the
Petitioner's own status as tenant, does not meet that threshold.
30. The same conclusion follows from the Petitioner's failure to
furnish any coherent alternative explanation for his continued
occupation of Shop No.1069. If the Petitioner was not the tenant, as is
sought to be suggested, it was incumbent upon him to disclose the
basis upon which he was occupying the premises and the person under
whose tenancy he claimed such possession. A bare challenge to the
signatures appearing on rent receipts, in the absence of such an
explanation, does not transform the existence of the tenancy into a
triable issue.
31. The position in law is also settled that, for the purposes of
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord is not required to
establish title in the manner required in a civil suit for declaration of
title. It is sufficient if the landlord establishes a title better than that of
14
the tenant. In Rajender Kumar Sharma v. Leela Wati , this Court
held that a tenant cannot raise a bald denial of the landlord's
ownership without disclosing the person whom he asserts to be the
actual owner. The principle is equally relevant here that a mere denial
of the landlord-tenant relationship, unsupported by any positive case
as to the Petitioner's status in the premises, cannot by itself constitute
a triable issue. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
14
2008 SCC OnLine Del 1085
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BHATIA
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“ 11. The tenant in this case denied relationship of landlord and
tenant and the ownership of the landlady despite the fact that it had
admitted this relationship by filing two petitions under Section 27
of Delhi Rent Control Act. Where a tenant denies ownership of
landlord, he is obliged to disclose who was owner/landlord and to
whom rent was being paid. The tenant made preposterous claims in
respect of accommodation available with the landlady and included
in this the areas which were not owned and not in possession of the
landlady. He included second floor of the property which was
owned by some other person and was in possession of other
person. He included adjoining property which was not owned by
landlady and was owned by other persons. Thus, the affidavit filed
by the tenant was shown to be false by the landlady on the basis of
documents placed by it. No Rent Controller is supposed to grant
leave to defend to the tenant on the basis of a false affidavit and
false averments and assertions. Such affidavit should be out rightly
rejected by the Rent Controller. Only those averments in the
affidavit are to be considered by the Rent Controller which have
same substance in it and are supported by some material. Mere
assertions made by a tenant in respect of landlord's ownership of
other buildings and in respect alternate accommodation are not to
be considered sufficient for grant of leave to defend. If this is
allowed, the whole purpose of Section 25-B shall stand defeated
and any tenant can file a false affidavit and drag a case for years
together in evidence defeating the very purpose of the statute. The
Rent Controller is thus not precluded from considering the material
placed before it by the landlord in response to leave to defend to
show that the tenant's assertions and averments were totally false.”
32. The same principle also finds support in Attar Singh v.
15
Tahoora Khwaja , wherein this Court, relying upon Praladh Singh
16
Rekhi v. Smt. Bhawani Devi , cautioned against permitting
proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) to be converted into an occasion
for the tenant to raise disputes which do not materially bear upon the
landlord's entitlement to seek eviction. The principle is apposite here.
A dispute regarding the manner in which rent was acknowledged,
without any substantive material displacing the Petitioner's status as
tenant or establishing a competing right in the premises, cannot by
15
2012 SCC OnLine Del 4088
16
(2004) 113 DLT 137
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itself defeat the Respondent's claim or constitute a triable issue. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 12. In Praladh Singh Rekhi v. Smt Bhawani Devi (2004) 113
DLT 137, a bench of this Court while dealing with a similar
objection and on the concept of ownership in proceedings under
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA had noted as follows:
“..The proceedings under the said Act cannot be converted
and utilized by a tenant to prevent eviction merely on the
ground that he seeks to cast doubt on the title of the
property which has been inherited when there is really no
one else claiming right to the property.”
33. In the present case, the Respondent has also placed reliance
upon the registered Sale Deed dated 11.04.2013 under which he
claims to have acquired the subject premises from the erstwhile
owner. The Petitioner has not demonstrated any superior title or any
independent right of possession in himself. Thus, even if the rent
receipts are considered separately from the other material, the
Petitioner has failed to show how the fact that they were signed by Mr.
Kishan Kumar and Mr. Shiv Kumar creates a genuine dispute
regarding his own tenancy.
34. The objection, therefore, does not go to the existence of the
tenancy in any meaningful sense. At its highest, it raises a question
regarding the manner in which rent was tendered or acknowledged on
particular occasions. That circumstance, without more, cannot
displace the Respondent's case regarding the Petitioner's tenancy or
constitute a fact which, if proved, would disentitle the Respondent
from seeking eviction.
35. The learned ARC was, therefore, justified in declining to treat
the objection concerning the signatures on the rent receipts as a triable
issue. Upon an independent consideration of the pleadings and
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material on record, this Court finds no infirmity in that conclusion and
no basis for interference in revisional jurisdiction.
III. ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION
36. The third and final contention raised by the Petitioner is with
respect to property No.1072. It is contended that the said property is
lying vacant and is available to the Respondent and, therefore,
constitutes reasonably suitable alternative accommodation for the
commercial requirement pleaded in respect of the Subject Premises.
According to the Petitioner, the availability of Property No.1072 itself
belies the bona fide requirement of the Respondent.
37. Since the principal challenge raised by the Petitioner concerns
the alleged availability of Property No. 1072 as alternative
accommodation, it is necessary to notice the findings recorded by the
learned ARC upon consideration of the pleadings and material placed
before it. The relevant portion of the Impugned Order reads as
under:—
“ ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION
21. With regard to the plea of alternative accommodation, it is
contended by the respondent that the petitioner already has
alternative accommodation suitable for his projected bonafide
requirement. It is contended that the petitioner has alternative
accommodations in the form of i) property bearing no. 1070,
Maliwara Chandni Chowk, Delhi (ii) property bearing no. 1071,
Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi (iii) property bearing no. 1072,
Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi and (iv) property bearing no.
932, Kucha Kabil Attar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi. However, it is a
well settled proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind
of the property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule
out the benefit of 14(1)(c) of D.R.C. Act. The property available
with the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable
property. In M M Quasim vs Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC
36 , the Apex Court has held that the landlord does not have an
unfettered right to choose the premises but merely showing that the
landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession may not
be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim if the vacant premises
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were not suitable for the purpose for which he required the
premises. Furthermore, it is the prerogative of the landlord to
determine which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to
state that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of
landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison
with tenanted premises, wherefrom the landlord is seeking
eviction. It is pertinent to note here the judgment of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, Civil Appeal
No. 9444 of 2016 where it was stated by the Hon'ble Court that
requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no
other “reasonably suitable accommodation”. Therefore, there has
to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement
being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably
suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along
with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord
and not the tenant.
22. In the present case, as far as properties bearing no. 1070, 1071
and 1072, Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006, petitioner has
already mentioned that they were disclosed in his eviction petition.
The petitioner owns the aforesaid properties and is in occupation of
the same. Per contra , no material has been placed by the
respondent to show that the said properties are lying vacant. Hence,
the said property cannot be said to be available to the petitioner for
denial of the claim of the tenanted premises. Thus, no triable issue
arises on this account.
23. As far as contention with respect to alternative accommodation
in the form of another property situated at property bearing no.
932, Kucha Kabil Attar, Chandni Chowk, Delhi , the petitioner has
categorically stated that he has no concern with the said property.
No material has been produced by the respondent as well to show
that the said property belongs to the petitioner. Reference is made
to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of
Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del 13026 ,
wherein it was held as under: -
“18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend
controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the
ground of the landlord, though at the time of requirement
having alternate premises, having not used the same and
instead having commercially exploited the same, the
tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b)
the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said
premises were vacant and available for use at the time of
pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said
premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement; and
(e) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by
sale or letting and support the said pleas with material on
the basis whereof such pleas will be proved.”
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24. However, bald averment has been made without placing any
material on record which would result in a triable issue qua the
suitability of the said purported alternative accommodations.
Evidently, as per record the respondents have not filed any
document to substantiate his plea. The photographs of said
properties showing closed rooms/properties cannot prove that the
properties belong to the petitioner. As discussed above, the
alternative must be reasonably suitable in comparison to the
tenanted premises from the perspective of the landlord to entail
denial of claim of landlord. Therefore, no triable issue arises in
this regard as well.
25. Furthermore, it is also pertinent to note that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6
SCC 30 has held for availing leave to defend a mere assertion by
the tenant is insufficient. Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act creates a
presumption in favour of the landlord regarding bona fide
need , which is rebuttable only with substantive material
capable of raising a triable issue . It was further held that the
burden of proof is on the tenant to demonstrate, with cogent
evidence, that the landlord's requirement is not genuine. The
Court also reiterated the settled principle of law that leave to
defend should not be granted on mere asking but when the
pleas and contentions raise triable issues.
26. Further, in the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm
Prem Machinery 2000 SC 534 , it was observed as under: -
“It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See: Prativa
Devi (Smt.) v. T.K. Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the
case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the
tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it
was suitable and it cannot be faulted.”
27. Even otherwise, it is the prerogative of the landlord to
determine which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to
state that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of
landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison
with tenanted premises, wherefrom the landlord is seeking
eviction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court
have repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of
the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the
landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute
owner of his property and is the best person to decide which
property is to be utilized in what way. The respondent cannot
dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize his property. The
landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their specific
requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not
within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the
landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the
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tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from prescribing
any standard or guidelines for the landlord's choices (residential or
commercial). Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Delhi High Court in case of Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj &
Ors., RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Therefore, the said
contention is a bald averment and without any particulars of any
purported alternative accommodation, does not amount to any
triable issue.
28. Hence, I find that the respondent has failed to raise any
triable issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation as
well. ”
38. It is pertinent to mention here that the contention that the
learned ARC failed to consider the availability of alternative
accommodation does not find support from the record itself. The
Respondent, in the Eviction Petition itself, had disclosed Property
No.1072 as well as the other properties owned/available to him and
had specifically explained their respective status and use.
39. Thus, this is not a case where the Respondent sought to
suppress the existence of any other property and, consequently,
invited an adverse inference on that account. The learned ARC, upon
consideration of the pleadings and material placed before it, examined
the properties relied upon by the Petitioner and recorded its findings
on their availability and suitability. The challenge, therefore, is not
one of non-consideration of the relevant material, but essentially seeks
a different appreciation of the same material.
40. More importantly, the Petitioner's submission proceeds on the
assumption that the mere existence or alleged vacancy of another
property is sufficient to constitute alternative accommodation. Such an
approach does not accord with the statutory requirement under Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. What is required to be shown is the
existence of accommodation which is reasonably suitable for the
particular requirement pleaded by the landlord. Suitability is not an
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abstract concept. The question of suitability has to be necessarily
assessed having regard to the nature of the requirement, the intended
use, location, commercial utility and other attendant circumstances.
41. In the present case, the requirement pleaded by the Respondent
is specifically commercial in nature. The Subject Premises is a
ground-floor commercial shop situated in Maliwara, Chandni Chowk,
and the Respondent has pleaded its requirement in the context of the
jewellery business and the proposed commercial activity of his
grandson, who, according to the Eviction Petition, has undergone
specialised training in the diamond trade. The location and character
of the Subject Premises are, therefore, not incidental considerations
but form part of the commercial suitability for which the premises is
sought.
42. Against this factual backdrop, the Petitioner has not placed any
material to demonstrate that Property No.1072, even assuming that it
is presently vacant, constitutes reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation for the specific requirement pleaded by the
Respondent. Vacancy, by itself, does not establish suitability. Nor can
the Court presume, merely because another premises may be vacant,
that it is equally suitable for the proposed commercial use or that the
landlord must necessarily utilise that premises instead of the premises
from which possession is sought.
43. The Petitioner's approach is to treat the mere existence of other
portions/properties as sufficient to defeat the eviction claim. That is
not the statutory test. A property cannot become “reasonably
suitable” merely because it bears the same ownership or is physically
proximate. Its suitability must be assessed in relation to the precise
need pleaded. The Petitioner cannot simply aggregate every property
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standing in or associated with the Respondent's family and, without
examining its actual possession and use, characterise the aggregate as
“alternative accommodation” . This is precisely where the Petitioner's
case fails to cross the threshold from assertion to material.
44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr.
17
Mahesh Chand Gupta , has recognised that the question of bona fide
requirement and suitability of accommodation has to be examined in
the context of the landlord's requirement and that the Court ought not
to substitute its own assessment of the accommodation required by the
landlord. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“12. A perusal of Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has
imposed restrictions on the recovery of possession of any premises
by a landlord from a tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to
the contrary. However, an order for recovery of possession is
permissible on one or more of the specified grounds. One such
ground is the premises let for residential purposes being required
bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or
for any member of his family dependent on him. What is a bona
fide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words “need” and
“require” both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within
demanding fulfilment. “Need” or “requirement” qualified by the
word “bona fide” or “genuine” preceding as an adjective — is an
expression often used in rent control laws. “Bona fide or genuine
need” of the landlord or that the landlord “genuinely requires” or
“requires bona fide” an accommodation for occupation by or use
for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression
is often employed by rent control legislation draftsman. The two
expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same
meaning.
13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean
“in good faith : genuine”. The word “genuine” means “natural : not
spurious : real : pure : sincere”. In Law Dictionary , Mozley and
Whitley define bona fide to mean “good faith, without fraud or
deceit”. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of
mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity
contemplated by “requires” is much more higher than in mere
desire. The phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative
17
(1999) 6 SCC 222
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intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is
not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in
the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest
desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict
a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the
premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle
him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any
setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the
landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully
withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. The
judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord
and then ask the question to himself — whether in the given facts
substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can
be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the
positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the
landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case,
positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court
drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the
landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext
for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court
certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the
court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for
the premises or additional premises by applying objective
standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one
accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall
be respected by the court.The court would permit the landlord to
satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the
landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court
would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of
the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation
must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short,
the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a
practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach
either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded
against.
14. The availability of an alternative accommodation with the
landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of
the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual
relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation,
suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation,
may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to the bona fides of
the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available
premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such
circumstance would enable the court drawing an inference that the
need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the
landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another
principal ingredient of clause ( e ) of sub-section (1) of Section 14,
which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable
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residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied.
Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as
available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not
occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need.
The landlord may convince the court that the alternative residential
accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the
same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the
landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist.
Needless to say that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial
of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously
in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the
landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the
landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While
considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in
view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family
members, their style of living, their habits and the background
wherefrom they come.
16. As to impact of availability of another vacant accommodation
with the landlord it was held in Damodar case [AIR 1960 MP 345
(FB)] that it must satisfy the test of suitability for satisfying the
need of the landlord.
18. In M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma [(1981) 3 SCC 36 :
AIR 1981 SC 1113] this Court has held (vide para 18) that the
landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises
but merely showing that the landlord has some other vacant
premises in his possession may not be sufficient to negative the
landlord's claim if the vacant premises were not suitable for the
purpose for which he required the premises. This Court cautioned
that the court must understand and appreciate the relationship
between the legal rules and necessities of life.
20. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(1998) 8
SCC 119] this Court has held that the Rent Controller should not
proceed on the assumption that the landlord's requirement is not
bona fide. When the landlord shows a prima facie case a
presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide is
available to be drawn. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the
landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without giving
possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question
of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite
unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord
could have adjusted himself.”
45. The principle assumes significance in the present case. This
Court is not required to determine whether Property No.1072 could, in
some theoretical sense, be put to commercial use. The relevant
enquiry is whether the Petitioner has shown that the said property is a
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reasonably suitable alternative for the precise commercial requirement
pleaded by the Respondent. No such material has been placed on
record. The Petitioner has, therefore, failed to move beyond a mere
assertion of availability and establish the existence of an alternative
accommodation which would answer the statutory test.
46. The Petitioner's argument, in substance, also seeks to require
the Court to determine which of the Respondent's premises ought to
be utilised for his commercial requirement. Such an exercise is
impermissible. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar v.
18
Firm Prem Machinery & Co. , has recognised that the landlord is
ordinarily the best judge of his requirement and that the suitability of
accommodation has to be considered in the context of the landlord's
proposed use. The requisite portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“10. The learned Single Judge of the High Court while formulating
the first substantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the
plaintiff landlord admitted that there were a number of plots, shops
and houses in his possession. We have been taken through the
judgments of the courts below and we do not find any such
admission. It is true that the plaintiff landlord in his evidence stated
that there were a number of other shops and houses belonging to
him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and
shops were not vacant and that the suit premises is suitable for his
business purpose. It is a settled position of law that the landlord is
the best judge of his requirement for residential or business
purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See
Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC 353] .) In the case in
hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the
suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it
cannot be faulted.”
Similarly, in Raghunath G. Panhale v. M/s Chaganlal Sundarji &
19
Co. , the Court has clarified that bona fide requirement is not to be
18
(2000) 1 SCC 679
19
(1999) Supp. 3 SCR 629
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equated with an absolute or compelling necessity. The requisite
portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 6. The word “reasonable”, in our view, connotes that the
requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a
mere desire. The word “requirement” coupled with the word
reasonable means that it must be something more than a mere
desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire
necessity ( Aitken v. Shaw [1933 SLT 21] , Nevile v. Hardy
[(1921) 90 LJ Ch 158 : 1 Ch 404] ). A reasonable and bona fide
requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one
hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other
end. It may be a need in praesenti or within reasonable proximity
in the future. The use of the word “bona fide” is an additional
requirement under Section 13(1)( g ) and it means that the
requirement must also be honest and not be tainted with any
oblique motive.
7. The above principles have been laid down in various decisions
of this Court and we shall refer to a few of them which are relevant
to the issue before us. It was stated in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad
Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 273] that the reasonable requirement
postulates an element of “need” as opposed to a mere “desire or
wish”. It was also pointed out that if it was indeed a case of a
reasonable need, the same could not be diluted by characterising it
as only a mere desire. It was stated: (SCC Headnote)
“The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept
in mind but not so as to make even a genuine need as nothing but a
desire .”
(emphasis supplied)
It was also held that the language of the provision cannot be unduly
stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult
for the landlord to get possession. If more limitations are imposed
upon the landlord holding property, it would expose itself to the
vice of unconstitutionality ( Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar [(1987) 1
SCC 204] ). The construction of the relevant statutory provision
must strike a just balance between the right of the landlord and the
right of the tenant. In Bega Begum case [(1979) 1 SCC 273] the
landlords adduced evidence to show that they wanted to augment
their present income by starting a hotel business. This was treated
as a genuine need and it was held that it could not be equated with
a mere desire. This Court observed that “the Act does not
completely overlook the interest of the landlord”. In Mattulal v.
Radhe Lal [(1974) 2 SCC 365] a like principle was laid down
stating that the test was not a subjective but an objective one and
that the court was to judge whether the need of the landlord was
reasonable and bona fide. This Court held that the Additional
District Judge in that case was wrong in thinking that the landlord
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who wanted to start an iron and steel business, had to produce
proof of preparations for starting his new business, such as making
arrangements for capital investment, approaching the Iron and
Steel Controller for the required permits etc. This Court held that
the above circumstances were “wholly irrelevant” and observed:
(SCC p. 374, para 13)
“It is difficult to imagine how the respondent could be expected to
make preparations for starting the new business unless there was a
reasonable prospect of his being able to obtain possession of the
Lohia Bazar shop in the near future.”
47. In these circumstances, even if the Petitioner's assertion
regarding the vacancy of Property No.1072 is taken at its highest, the
same does not disclose a triable issue. The Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate, through cogent material, that Property No.1072 is, as a
reasonably suitable premises, actually available to the Respondent for
his use for the specific commercial requirement pleaded. The
objection, therefore, remains at the level of assertion and does not
cross the statutory threshold necessary to warrant leave to defend.
48. Accordingly, the finding of the learned ARC on this aspect does
not suffer from any non-consideration of relevant material or from an
erroneous application of the statutory test. Upon scrutiny of the
reasoning adopted by the learned ARC and the material considered by
it, this Court finds no basis to displace the conclusion reached by the
learned ARC. The objection regarding alternative accommodation is,
therefore, rejected.
IV. BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT
49. The aforesaid discussion also brings the Court to the
foundational question as to whether the requirement pleaded by the
Respondent is bona fide under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. In
this regard, it would be apposite to notice the findings recorded by the
learned ARC on the aspect of bona fide requirement. The relevant
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observations in the Impugned Order read as under:—
“18. Secondly , it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the
need of the petitioner is not bonafide as family of the petitioner is
already part of his business. However, it is pertinent to note that a
person cannot be expected to sit idle and reach a state of starvation
before his need is considered bonafide. Reliance in this regard is
placed upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chaganlal Sunderji & Co. AIR
1999 SC 3864 wherein it was observed that
“A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor
reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get
possession of his premises for establishing a business.”
19. Further, I also find it relevant to refer to the case of Smt. Phool
Kumari & Ors. Vs. Sh. Shyambir Tyagi RCR No. 318/2013
dated 01.10.2014 , wherein the landlord sought possession of the
tenanted premises on the ground that he was unemployed and
needed the premises to open a shop. The tenant denied that the
landlord was unemployed. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi upheld
the order of the Ld. Trial Court and observed that no triable issue
was raised which warrant that the application for leave to defend
be allowed.
Hence, the said contention is of no assistance to the respondent. It
is a matter of common knowledge that litigation can continue for
many years and therefore, the petitioners or their children or their
grandchildren cannot expect to remain idle during the said period.
From the record, it is clear that though the present petition was
instituted in the May 2025, it is only in March 2026 that the leave
to defend has reached the stage of order. Therefore, for these
months, it would be unjust to expect the petitioners or their
children or their grandchildren to remain idle and reach a state of
starvation. Moreover, even if eviction order is passed, petitioners
cannot obtain the possession of the premises till six months in view
of Section 14(7) of the DRC Act. It is also pertinent to mention that
in a society like ours, parents often see it as their moral obligation
to settle even their adult children and make them economically
independent. Therefore, the present petition filed by the petitioner
for the bonafide requirement of providing space to his
grandchildren for commercial requirement cannot be said to be
malafide. Hence, no triable issue arises in this regard. 20. Hence, I
find the petitioner has been able to establish his Bonafide
requirement for the tenanted premises. ”
50. The answer, upon an independent consideration of the material
on record, has to be in the affirmative. The Respondent has not
pleaded a vague or speculative desire to obtain possession of the
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BHATIA
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subject premises. The requirement is stated in the context of his
longstanding involvement in the jewellery business and the proposed
use of the premises for the advancement of the same business,
including the establishment of an independent commercial activity by
his grandson, who, as pleaded, has undergone specialised training in
the diamond trade.
51. The nature of the requirement is therefore intrinsically
connected with an existing commercial activity and is not founded
upon a remote or uncertain eventuality. The Respondent has disclosed
the person for whose benefit the premises is required, the nature of the
proposed business and the reason why the subject premises is
considered suitable for such use. Nothing has been brought on record
by the Petitioner to demonstrate that the pleaded requirement is a mere
pretext devised for securing the Petitioner's eviction.
52. The expression “bona fide requirement” does not contemplate
a requirement which must rise to the level of an absolute necessity
before the landlord can seek eviction. It is necessary to reiterate that
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra), has
explained that the requirement must be genuine and honest, and that
the Court is not expected to substitute its own perception of the
landlord's requirement for that of the landlord. The test is whether the
need pleaded is real and bona fide , and not whether the Court would
have made the same commercial choice in the circumstances.
53. The principle assumes particular relevance where the
requirement is for carrying on or expanding business. In Raghunath
G. Panhale (supra) the Supreme Court has recognised that bona fide
requirement for business purposes cannot be reduced to a requirement
arising only when the landlord is left with no other conceivable
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option. A landlord is entitled to establish or expand a business, and the
Court cannot insist upon a standard of compelling necessity which the
statute itself does not prescribe. The requisite portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“9. Next comes the decision of this Court in A.K. Veeraraghava
Iyengar v. N.V. Prasad [AIR 1994 SC 2357] . In that case, this
Court observed that the need was bona fide and that the tenant
failed to adduce any evidence against the “experience of landlord,
his financial capacity and his readiness and willingness to start
jewellery shop”. In Vinay Kumar v. District Judge,
Ghazipur [1995 Supp (2) SCC 586] it was contended for the tenant
that the son of the landlord whose requirement was pleaded, was in
government service and, therefore, he could not have any bona fide
need to start a private practice as a doctor. This contention was
rejected. In Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni [(1998) 3 SCC 341] it
was observed that in the light of the factual position in that case,
“when the landlady says that she needs more accommodation for
her family, there is no scope for doubting the reasonableness of the
requirement”. It was held that the circumstances of the case raised
a presumption that the requirement was bona fide and that “tenant
has failed to show that the demand for eviction was made with any
oblique motive”. It was held that in the absence of such evidence
by the tenant, the presumption of the bona fide need stood
unrebutted. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
[(1998) 8 SCC 119] it was again observed that the court should not
proceed on the assumption that the requirement of the landlord was
not bona fide and that the tenant could not dictate to the landlord as
to how he should adjust himself without getting possession of the
tenanted premises.It was stated in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan
[(1996) 5 SCC 353] and in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders
and Agencies [(1996) 5 SCC 344] that the landlord was the best
judge of his requirement.In Sheela Chadha v. Dr Achharaj Ram
Sehgal [1990 Supp SCC 736] it was held that the landlord had the
discretion to determine his need. See also in this connection the
judgment of this Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr Mahesh Chand
Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]. In Raj Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi
Zubaida Khatun [(1997) 11 SCC 411] this Court had even stated
that it was not necessary for the landlord to state in the pleadings,
the nature of the business he proposed to start.
11. It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate court had
clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of “need or
requirement” to be equivalent to “dire or absolute or compelling
necessity”. According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently
lost his job on account of the lockout or if he had not resigned his
job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of
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livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order
for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper
test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor
reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get
possession of his premises for establishing a business. The manner
in which the courts have gone into the meaning of “lockout” in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appears to us to be nothing but a
perverse approach to the problem. One cannot imagine that a
landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for
the unknown and uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he
resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty.
Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back
one's premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job
and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long-drawn
litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain
himself, that would not be an indication that the need for
establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable
requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict
the tenant. It is not necessary for the landlord to adduce evidence
that he had money in deposit in a bank nor produce proof of funds
to prove his readiness and willingness as in a suit for specific
performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property. So far
as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery
business was one which required extraordinary expertise. It is,
therefore, clear that the entire approach of both the courts was
absolutely wrong in law and perverse on fact. Unfortunately the
High Court simply dismissed the writ petition filed under Article
227 stating that the findings were one of fact. That is why we think
that this is an exceptional case calling for interference under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”
54. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the Respondent's case bears
the necessary indicia of bona fide requirement. The proposed use is
neither fanciful nor unrelated to the Respondent's existing commercial
background; the beneficiary of the proposed use has also been
identified; and the subject premises is a commercial shop situated in
the very market in which the Respondent's business interests are stated
to operate. The requirement, therefore, has an internal coherence
which is wholly inconsistent with the suggestion that it is merely a
device to secure the Petitioner's eviction.
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55. It is also significant that the Petitioner has not placed any
material suggesting that the Respondent's pleaded requirement is
motivated by any collateral consideration. The challenge is essentially
directed towards the availability of other premises and the manner in
which the Respondent proposes to utilise the subject premises. Those
objections, however, do not establish that the underlying requirement
itself is not genuine. Once the requirement is found to be honest and
connected with a legitimate commercial purpose, the tenant cannot
insist that the landlord must first establish an absence of every other
possible commercial arrangement.
56. The Court must also remain conscious of the limited scope of
enquiry at the stage of leave to defend. The question is not whether the
Petitioner can imagine an alternative manner in which the
Respondent's commercial affairs could be organised, but whether the
material placed by the Petitioner discloses facts which, if proved,
would disentitle the Respondent from obtaining eviction. No such
material has been demonstrated in the present case.
57. Consequently, the bona fide requirement pleaded by the
Respondent cannot be characterised as either artificial or speculative.
The learned ARC was justified in accepting the Respondent's
requirement as bona fide , and scrutiny of the material relied upon by
the learned ARC does not disclose any circumstance warranting a
contrary conclusion. The Petitioner has, therefore, failed to raise any
triable issue on this foundational ingredient of Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act.
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CONCLUSION:
58. Having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court finds
that the challenge raised by the Petitioner does not disclose any
circumstance warranting interference with the order passed by the
learned ARC. The objections raised before this Court, whether
considered individually or cumulatively, fail to disclose any fact
which would, if established, disentitle the Respondent from obtaining
an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
59. More importantly, this is not a case where the learned ARC
proceeded on an erroneous understanding of the statutory
requirements or failed to consider a material aspect having a bearing
on the outcome. The objections raised by the Petitioner were
examined in the context of the pleadings and material placed on
record. Upon scrutiny of the decision-making process and the
reasoning adopted by the learned ARC, this Court finds the
conclusions reached therein to be legally sustainable.
60. The revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8)
of the DRC Act is supervisory in nature and cannot be invoked merely
to substitute another possible view for a conclusion which is otherwise
supported by the record. Interference would be warranted where the
order under challenge suffers from an error of law, perversity, material
irregularity or failure to consider material having a bearing on the
adjudication. In the present case, no perversity, material irregularity or
error of law has been demonstrated.
61. It is equally necessary to keep in view the object underlying the
summary procedure prescribed under Section 25B of the DRC Act.
The provision contemplates an expeditious determination of eviction
petitions founded on bona fide requirement and, consequently, the
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right to defend cannot be invoked merely by raising every conceivable
dispute against the landlord's case. The tenant must disclose facts
which have a real bearing on the landlord's entitlement to seek
eviction and which, if ultimately established, would furnish a defence
to the eviction claim. A distinction must therefore be drawn between a
contention which merely seeks to question some aspect of the
landlord's case and a defence which strikes at one or more of the
essential requirements of Section 14(1)(e). It is only the latter which
can furnish a basis for granting leave to defend.
62. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Petitioner has failed to
disclose any triable issue which could have warranted the grant of
leave to defend and the present Revision Petition is consequently
dismissed. Consequently, the Impugned Order dated 25.03.2026
passed by the learned ARC in RC ARC No.315/2025 does not warrant
any interference. The Eviction Order passed in respect of Shop
No.1069, Ground Floor, Maliwara, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006,
admeasuring approximately 5.80 sq. metres, is accordingly affirmed.
63. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
64. The Respondent shall be entitled to seek execution of the
Eviction Order in accordance with law, subject to the statutory
protection under Section 14(7) of the DRC Act, if still applicable.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/ma
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BHATIA
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