Victim X vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 16193 of 2026
Victim X
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 2 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Pankaj Kumar Shukla, Satish Kumar
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C.
A.F.R.
Reserved on 20.05.2026
Delivered on 23.10.2026
Court No. - 40
HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
HON'BLE GARIMA PRASHAD, J.
(Delivered by Hon’ble Garima Prashad, J.)
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Manish Goyal,
learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Sri Sandeep Kumar
Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-
respondents.
2. This petition raises a short but important question concerning the
validity of a condition imposed by a welfare scheme meant for child
victims of sexual violence. Entry 7 of Annexure 1 to the Uttar Pradesh
Rani Lakshmi Bai Mahila Evam Bal Samman Kosh Rules, 2015 requires
three documents for financial assistance: the FIR, the charge-sheet and
an injury report indicating penetrative sexual assault. The petitioner’s
claim has been rejected because the third document was not available.
3. The Court is, therefore, called upon to determine whether production
of such an injury report can validly be made an indispensable condition

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for relief; whether the condition defeats the rehabilitative object of the
Scheme and violates Article 14 of the Constitution; and, if so, whether it
may be struck down even though no specific declaration to that effect
has been sought in the writ petition.
4. The petitioner is a minor victim who has approached this Court
through her mother as her next friend. She seeks release of the financial
assistance payable under the Uttar Pradesh Rani Lakshmi Bai Mahila
Evam Bal Samman Kosh Rules, 2015, hereinafter referred to as “the
State Scheme”.
5. The incident is stated to have taken place on 28.01.2024, when the
victim was eight years old. Case Crime No.64 of 2024 was registered on
07.03.2024 at Police Station Shahganj, District Jaunpur, under Sections
376-AB, 120-B, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with
Sections 5(m) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012, hereinafter referred to as “the POCSO Act”.
6. The victim was taken for medical examination on 08.03.2024. The
doctor recorded that consent was not given for the particular
examination relating to penetrative sexual assault. Consequently,
although a record of the medical examination is available, no injury
report of the kind contemplated by entry 7 could be prepared.
7. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet dated
20.03.2024 was submitted under the provisions mentioned in the FIR, as
also under Sections 19 and 21 of the POCSO Act. The accused was
arrested and the criminal trial is pending.
8. The petitioner applied for financial assistance under entry 7 of
Annexure 1 to the State Scheme. The entry applies to aggravated
penetrative sexual assault punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act
and provides assistance of Rs.3,00,000. The first instalment of
Rs.1,00,000 is payable within fifteen days and the remaining amount of
Rs.2,00,000 within one month of the filing of the charge-sheet.

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9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the FIR and the
charge-sheet both invoke Sections 5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act. The
victim was also produced for medical examination. Her claim could not,
therefore, have been rejected merely because the particular examination
was not conducted for want of consent and, as a result, no injury report
indicating penetrative sexual assault was available.
10. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of a coordinate Division
Bench in Victim X in FIR No.048 of 2025 v. State of U.P. and others,
Writ-C No.12085 of 2025, 2026:AHC-LKO:2981-DB, decided on
14.01.2026. It is submitted that the Division Bench has already held that
the injury report need not contain a positive finding of penetrative injury
and that the Steering Committee cannot conduct a parallel inquiry into
the truth of the allegation.
11. Sri Manish Goyal, learned Additional Advocate General, submits that
the State Scheme is an independent welfare measure. It operates
separately from the compensation which may be awarded under Section
33(8) of the POCSO Act and Rule 9 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Rules, 2020. Entitlement under the State Scheme must,
therefore, be determined strictly in accordance with the conditions
prescribed by it.
12. The State has placed on record the decision of the District Steering
Committee dated 02.01.2025 together with the online response dated
27.04.2026. The Committee rejected the petitioner’s claim because the
victim had not consented to the particular examination for penetrative
sexual assault and, consequently, no injury report indicating such assault
was available.
13. According to the State, entry 7 expressly requires three documents.
Production of an injury report indicating penetrative sexual assault is as
essential as production of the FIR and the charge-sheet. It is submitted
that the earlier Division Bench judgment only dispenses with the
requirement of a visible physical injury; it does not dispense with
production of an injury report itself.

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14. The learned Additional Advocate General lastly submits that the writ
petition seeks payment under the State Scheme but does not expressly
challenge the validity of the documentary condition contained in entry 7.
In the absence of such a prayer, it is submitted, the Court should not
examine or strike down any part of the Scheme.
15. The central question is whether the requirement of an injury report
indicating penetrative sexual assault, as an absolute condition of
eligibility, bears a rational nexus with the object of the State Scheme or
is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore,
liable to be struck down. The effect of the victim not consenting to the
relevant medical examination, resulting in the absence of the injury
report, also falls within this examination.
16. The nature and purpose of the State Scheme emerge from Rule 4(a),
which reads:
“(a) It will ensure monetary and medical relief to women/girl child who
are victims of heinous crime, and therefore require immediate relief.
This Fund is also to be used for the maintenance, education and
reconstructive health of such victims as well as maintenance and
education of minor children of such victims, if the situation warrants.
The list of instances where monetary compensations and other reliefs
will be available and procedures therein, is at Annexure 1.”
The language of Rule 4(a) leaves no doubt that the Scheme is a social-
welfare measure. Its purpose is to provide immediate monetary and
medical relief and to support the maintenance, education, health and
rehabilitation of victims of heinous offences. Every condition in
Annexure 1 must, therefore, further this purpose and cannot be applied
in a manner which frustrates it.
17. Relief under the State Scheme is in addition to compensation
available under the POCSO Act. Section 33(8) of the POCSO Act
empowers the Special Court to award compensation for physical or
mental trauma and for immediate rehabilitation. Rule 9 of the POCSO
Rules, 2020 permits interim compensation after registration of the FIR,

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while Rule 9(6) expressly preserves relief available under any other
Central or State scheme. The existence of one remedy does not exclude
the other.
18. Since the petitioner’s entitlement and the constitutional challenge
arise directly from entry 7 of Annexure 1 to the State Scheme, the
relevant entry is reproduced below:
To whom
Section of
Punishment
Amount of
Stage of
Pre-requisites
S. No.
compensation
IPC/Special Act
provided
compensation
payment
for payment
payable
1. 1,00,000
₹
within 15 days
FIR, injury
as the first
Section 6,
report
instalment; 
POCSO Act
indicating
Not less than
Victim 3,00,000
₹
2. balance
7.
(aggravated
penetrative
10 years
2,00,000
₹
penetrative
sexual assault,
within one
sexual assault)
and charge-
month of filing
sheet.
of the charge-
sheet.
19. Entry 7 thus requires three documents: the FIR, an injury report
indicating penetrative sexual assault, and the charge-sheet. Each
performs a distinct function. The FIR contains the first account of the
alleged offence. The charge-sheet reflects the conclusion reached by the
investigating agency upon the material collected during investigation.
The medical or injury report places the available medical findings before
the authority.
20. None of the three documents constitutes a judicial determination that
the alleged offence has been committed. Even in a criminal trial, an
accused cannot be acquitted merely because an injury report is absent or
because the available report does not record a penetrative injury. The
case must be decided upon the totality of the evidence. It would,
therefore, be anomalous to make the same report an absolute condition
for preliminary monetary relief under a social-welfare scheme,

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particularly when the FIR discloses the offence and the investigation has
resulted in a charge-sheet under the relevant provisions of the POCSO
Act.
21. The State is undoubtedly entitled to prescribe a fair procedure for
identifying eligible claims and protecting public funds. The scrutiny
contemplated by a welfare scheme must, however, remain consistent
with its purpose. A procedural safeguard may assist the authority in
identifying a claim; it cannot be converted into a barrier which excludes
an otherwise eligible victim for reasons unrelated to the object of the
Scheme.
22. The FIR in the present case alleges that the accused inserted a finger
into the victim’s private part and thereafter placed his penis in her
mouth. If proved, the first allegation would fall within Section 3(b) and
the second within Section 3(a) of the POCSO Act. Following
investigation, the police found sufficient material to submit a charge-
sheet under Sections 5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act.
23. Section 3 of the POCSO Act shows that penetrative sexual assault is
not confined to an act which must necessarily leave a visible physical
injury. It includes penetration to any extent, insertion of an object or
body part, manipulation causing penetration and specified oral acts.
Medical evidence may support the allegation, but the statutory offence
does not depend upon the presence of a demonstrable bodily injury.
24. The distinction between penetrative sexual assault and penetrative
injury is well settled. In Dalip Kumar alias Dalli v. State of Uttaranchal,
Criminal Appeal No.1005 of 2013, decided on 16.01.2025, the Supreme
Court cautioned that “Bodily injuries are not necessary to prove sexual
assault.” The Court recognised that victims may respond differently to
trauma and that the law cannot demand a uniform physical or
behavioural response.
25. The principle was reiterated in Lok Mal alias Loku v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No.325 of 2011, decided on 07.03.2025. The
Supreme Court held that the absence of injuries upon the private parts of

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the victim is not invariably fatal. The allegation must be assessed from
the entire evidence and in the factual setting of each case.
26. An injury report may, therefore, be relevant without being
conclusive. Its evidentiary value cannot be enlarged to the point where it
becomes the exclusive means of recognising penetrative sexual assault.
A positive medical indication is not indispensable even for proof of the
offence at trial; much less can it become the sole gateway to immediate
rehabilitative assistance.
27. A coordinate Division Bench of this Court considered a related,
though not identical, issue in Victim X in FIR No.048 of 2025. In that
case, an injury report was available but did not disclose any penetrative
injury. The Division Bench held that the Scheme requires the FIR, the
injury report and the charge-sheet to be present, but the Steering
Committee cannot undertake a further inquiry into the allegation or
refuse monetary relief merely because the injury report does not record
an injury. The relevant observations read:
“Our reading of the said provision of the Scheme is that for granting
benefit to the victim, the three documents, that is, the FIR, the injury
report and the charge-sheet should be present…As long as the FIR and
the charge-sheet indicate the offence under Section 4 of the POCSO
Act, no further investigation is required to be carried out by the
Steering Committee and the Steering Committee cannot conduct a trial
and come to a contrary finding that since there is no injury indicated in
the injury report, the compensation is not payable.”
28. The above judgment thus establishes that an available injury report
need not positively record a physical injury caused by penetration. It also
establishes that the Steering Committee cannot conduct a parallel trial or
reject a claim merely because the medical report does not corroborate
penetration through a visible injury.
29. The present case takes the issue a step further, though in a different
factual setting. In the earlier case, an injury report was available but did
not disclose any penetrative injury. Here, the relevant examination was

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not conducted for want of consent and, consequently, no such injury
report was prepared. The question that remains to be examined is
whether production of that report can still be insisted upon as an
indispensable condition for monetary relief when its absence is the result
of a choice expressly protected by law.
30. The question of consent must be considered with reference to the law
governing medical examination. Section 27(1) of the POCSO Act
applies Section 164-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to the
medical examination of a child. Section 164-A(7) expressly provides:
“Nothing in this section shall be construed as rendering lawful any
examination without the consent of the woman or of any person
competent to give such consent on her behalf.”
The same protection has been expressly retained in Section 184(7) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which reproduces the
requirement in identical terms. The continuity between the two
enactments affirms that consent is not a procedural formality but an
indispensable safeguard governing the medical examination of a victim.
31. The significance of consent in the medical examination of a survivor
of sexual violence was recognised by the Supreme Court in Lillu alias
Rajesh and another v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 643. While
holding the two-finger test to be violative of the survivor’s rights, the
Supreme Court observed:
“Rape survivors are entitled to legal recourse that does not re-
traumatize them or violate their physical or mental integrity and
dignity. They are also entitled to medical procedures conducted in a
manner that respects their right to consent.”
The Court further held that medical procedures must not amount to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and that the privacy, physical
integrity and dignity of the survivor must be protected. The decision thus
recognises that a medical examination is intended to assist the survivor
and the administration of justice; it cannot become another source of
compulsion or trauma.

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32. The issue arose more directly in Sachindra Priyadarshi v. State of
NCT of Delhi through the Chief Secretary, Criminal Revision Petition
No.454 of 2024, decided on 12.08.2025. In that case, the prosecutrix had
submitted to a medical examination but declined its internal component.
The accused sought discharge on the ground that the allegation lacked
medical support in the absence of such examination. Rejecting the
contention, the Delhi High Court held that the requirements of Section
164-A stood satisfied once the prosecutrix had undergone medical
examination. It further observed that a conviction may rest upon her sole
testimony if it is of sterling quality and that, at the stage of charge, her
statement containing specific allegations of sexual assault was sufficient
to proceed to trial. The Court concluded:
“The refusal to undergo internal medical examination does not
materially affect the case at the stage of framing of charges.”
33. These principles apply with even greater force to a claim for
immediate rehabilitation. If the governing law protects the refusal of
consent and the criminal case does not fail merely because an internal
examination was not conducted, the same refusal cannot be treated as
sufficient reason to exclude the victim from a welfare scheme.
34. A mandatory injury-report condition places the victim in an
impermissible dilemma: either submit to the particular examination or
lose the financial assistance intended for her rehabilitation. The first
choice may compromise the bodily autonomy which the law protects;
the second may deny support at the stage when the victim is most
vulnerable. A welfare scheme cannot indirectly compel what the
governing statute prohibits from being done without consent.
35. The validity of the impugned condition must now be tested against
Article 14 of the Constitution. If entry 7 is applied literally, it divides
victims alleging the same offence into two classes: those for whom an
injury report is available and those for whom it is not. The latter class
may include a victim who does not consent to the relevant examination,

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one who is examined after physical signs have disappeared, or one who
alleges an act which may not ordinarily leave a visible injury.
36. Victims falling in both classes may have suffered the same offence,
undergone the same trauma and require the same immediate care and
rehabilitation. The availability of an injury report does not determine the
seriousness of the allegation, the credibility of the victim or her need for
monetary relief. Indeed, even in a criminal trial, the accused cannot be
acquitted merely because an injury report is unavailable or because the
available report does not disclose a penetrative injury. The allegation has
to be determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole. A document
which is not indispensable for adjudicating criminal liability cannot
reasonably be made a mandatory condition for preliminary relief under a
social-welfare scheme.
37. The constitutional test was recently restated by the Supreme Court in
Kulsum Nisha v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2026 INSC 617. The
Court held that, to withstand scrutiny under Article 14, a classification
must be founded upon an intelligible differentia, and that differentia
must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It
further held that State action which is arbitrary, irrational or capricious is
equally vulnerable under Article 14. Applying this test to an eligibility
condition in a welfare scheme, the Court must examine whether the
condition has a rational nexus with the object of the scheme or whether,
in its operation, it defeats that very object.
38. Rule 4(a) shows that the State Scheme was framed to ensure
immediate monetary and medical relief to women and girl children who
are victims of heinous offences and to support their maintenance,
education, health and rehabilitation. The availability of an injury report
has no rational connection with any of these needs. Once the FIR
discloses the relevant offence and the investigation has resulted in a
charge-sheet under Sections 5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act, exclusion
solely because an injury report is unavailable does not further the object
of the Scheme. Rather, it frustrates that very object.

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39. Where the report is unavailable because consent to the relevant
examination was not given, the State cannot treat the exercise of a choice
protected by procedural law as a ground for withholding the benefit
under the Scheme.
40. A procedural condition in a social-welfare scheme cannot be
permitted to become more important than the substantive benefit which
it was meant to facilitate. In Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of
India, 2023 INSC 524, the Supreme Court recognised that regulations or
guidelines which dilute or defeat welfare legislation and constitutional
principles may be struck down to preserve the object of the legislation.
The principle applies equally where a subsidiary condition excludes the
intended beneficiaries and renders the promised relief inaccessible.
41. The production of an available medical record may legitimately
assist the Steering Committee. The constitutional defect lies in making
an injury report indicating penetrative sexual assault an indispensable
condition of eligibility. Such a report may be unavailable for reasons
beyond the victim’s control. Its absence neither disproves the allegation
nor diminishes the need for immediate monetary, medical and
rehabilitative support.
42. The distinction created by the impugned condition, therefore, bears
no rational nexus with the object of the State Scheme. It excludes
otherwise eligible victims for reasons unrelated to their need for relief,
penalises the exercise of a choice protected by law and makes the
operation of the Scheme dependent upon a medical document which
may not lawfully or practically be available. The condition is
consequently manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
43. The requirement of an “injury report indicating penetrative sexual
assault” is severable from the remainder of entry 7. The entry remains
complete and workable by requiring the FIR and the charge-sheet.
Where a medical or injury report is available, it may be placed before
and considered by the authority; its absence, however, cannot operate as

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an absolute bar to monetary relief. The impugned documentary condition
is, accordingly, declared unconstitutional and is struck down.
44. On the third question, the absence of a specific prayer seeking that
declaration does not prevent this Court from granting effective relief.
Ordinarily, relief must be founded upon the pleadings so that the
opposite party is not taken by surprise. In the present case, however, the
rejection rests entirely upon the impugned condition; the State has
produced the relevant decision and defended the mandatory character of
that condition; the parties have addressed the Court upon its legality; and
no further evidence is required. The constitutional issue thus arises
directly from the cause brought before the Court.
45. Article 226 confers wide power upon the High Court to mould relief
so that a legal injury is effectively remedied. In Dwarka Nath v. Income
Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 81, the Supreme Court explained that the
jurisdiction is expressed in comprehensive terms to enable the High
Court to ‘reach injustice’ wherever it is found. In Nur Islam and others v.
State of Assam and others, 2025 INSC 1506, while relying upon Ramesh
Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, (2008) 14 SCC 58, and Vashist
Narayan Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2024) 11 SCC 785, the Supreme
Court reiterated that a writ court may mould relief according to the
demands of justice and that “justice cannot be forsaken on the altar of
technicalities”. A mere direction to reconsider the petitioner’s claim
without removing the invalid condition would leave the cause of
rejection untouched and render the remedy ineffective.
46. The FIR and the charge-sheet in the present case invoke Sections
5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act. The petitioner, therefore, satisfies the
surviving mandatory requirements of entry 7. The decision of the
District Steering Committee dated 02.01.2025, as communicated through
the online response dated 27.04.2026, is quashed. The writ petition is
allowed. 
47. The State-respondents are directed to release financial assistance of
Rs.3,00,000 to the petitioner under entry 7 within ten days from the date

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of this judgment. The amount shall be deposited in the protected bank
account maintained for the victim or dealt with under any other lawful
arrangement made by the competent court to safeguard the interests of
the minor. 
48. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. There shall be no
order as to costs.
(Garima Prashad,J.) (Saral Srivastava,J.)
October 23, 2026
Sachin Mishra
Digitally signed by :-
SACHIN MISHRA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad