SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL vs SCHOOL TRANSPORT CORPORATION

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 5 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

PRESENT


THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR


COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO.67 OF 2024


BETWEEN:

1. SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL



NAGANAYAKANAKOTE

SAMETHANAHALLI POST

WHITEFIELD, BANGALORE - 560 067



A SCHOO RUN BY NATURE'S

ACADEMY OF EDUCATION

A REGISTERED TRUST HAVING ITS
Digitally
signed by
PAVITHRA N
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka

REGISTERED OFFICE AT FLAT NO.SIG 806

GOLDEN BLOSSOM APARTMENT
KADUGODI, BANGALORE - 560 027
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN
B. BALKRISHNA REDDY

2. NATURE'S ACADEMY OF EDUCATION
A REGISTERED TRUST HAVING ITS REGISTERED
OFFICE AT FLAT NO.SIG 806
GOLDEN BLOSSOM APARTMENT
KADUGODI, BANGALORE- 560 027

2

REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN
B. BALKRISHNA REDDY
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. V. MANJUNATH PRASAD, ADV. FOR
SRI. HARSHA KUMAR GOWDA H. R., ADV.)

AND:

1. SCHOOL TRANSPORT CORPORATION
NO.6, AZEEMA BUILDING, A V ROAD
KALASIPALYAM
BANGALORE - 560 002
REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER
SHIVAPRASAD

2. MUKESH KUMAR SINGH
S/O BIRANDRA KUMAR SINGH
MANAGING TRUSTEE OF
SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL
R/AT FLAT NO. SIG 806
GOLDEN BLOSSOM APARTMENT
KADUGODI
BENGALURU - 560 067

3. B BALAKRISHAN REDDY
MANAGING TRUSTEE OF
SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL
WHITEFIELD BRANCH
SAMETHANAHALLI POST
NAGANAYAKANAKOTE
BANGALORE - 560 067

4. AUROBINDA NANDA
S/O BINDU PRASAD NAIDU
TRUSTEE OF SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL
R/AT 177
RAINBOW

3

JUNNASANDRA VILLAGE
CARMELRAM POST
SARJAPURA ROAD
BANGALORE - 560 035


5. B RAGHUNATHA REDDY
S/O B. SUBBA REDDY
TRUSTEE OF SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL
R/AT Q.11
CHAITANYA SAMARPAN
SEGGAHALLI
KADUGODI
HOSKOTE ROAD
BANGALORE - 560 067

6. SMT SARASWATHI
W/O B RAGHUNADHA REDDY
TRUSTEE OF SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL
R/AT Q.11
CHAITANYA SAMARPAN
SEGGAHALLI
KADUGODI
HOSKOTE ROAD
BANGALORE - 560 067

7. SMT DHARITRI MISHRA
W/O AROBINDA NANDA
TRUSTEE OF SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL
R/AT 177
RAINBOW
JUNNASANDRA VILLAGE
CARMELRAM POST
SARJAPURA ROAD
BANGALORE - 560 035

8. SMT SEEMA SINGH
W/O MUKESH KUMAR SINGH

4

TRUSTEE OF SHRIRAM GLOBAL SCHOOL
R/AT FLAT NO. SIG 806
GOLDEN BLOSSOM APARTMENT
KADUGODI
BENGALURU - 560 067
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. AKSHAY KUMAR JAIN, ADV. FOR R1;
SRI. SHARAN B. TADAHAL, ADV. FOR R2 & R8;
SRI. RAMA R. IYER AND SRI. MAHADEVA SWAMY D.M., ADV. FOR
R4 & R7;
R3-SERVED;
V/O DATED 01.08.2025, NOTICE TO R5 & R6 ARE DISPENSED
WITH)

THIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
13(1-A) OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015, PRAYING TO
ALLOW THE ABOVE APPEAL, SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE DATED 01.04.2023, PASSED BY THE LXXXIII ADDL. CITY
CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE, IN COM.O.S. NO.
359/2019.

THIS COMAP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 28.10.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR

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CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)
This Commercial Appeal is filed under Section 13(1-A)
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, challenging the
judgment and decree dated 01.04.2023 passed by the
LXXXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at
Bengaluru City ('Commercial Court' for short) in
Com.O.S.No.359/2019, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff
was partly decreed with costs and defendant No.1 was
directed to pay a sum of Rs.35,41,040/- to the plaintiff with
interest at 9% per annum from the date of suit till
realisation.
2. We have heard Shri. V. Manjunath Prasad,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants, Shri. Akshay
Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1,
Shri. Sharan B. Tadahal, learned counsel appearing for
respondents No.2 and 8 and Shri. Rama R. Iyer, learned
counsel appearing for respondents No.4 and 7.
3. The appeal has been filed on 19.02.2024 with a
delay of 261 days. I.A.No.1/2024 is filed seeking

6

condonation of the said delay. In the affidavit filed in
support of the application seeking condonation of delay, it is
stated that appellant No.1 – School is run by appellant No.2
– Trust and that, owing to inter se disputes amongst the
Trustees, proceedings in O.S.No.982/2018 were pending
concerning the administration of the School. It is stated that
appellant No.2 had not been arrayed as a defendant in
Com.O.S.No.359/2019 and its Chairman had not been
served with summons and was therefore unaware of the
pendency of the suit. It is further stated that he came to
know of the impugned judgment and decree only on
12.10.2023, when the Amin/Process Server of the
Commercial Court informed the security guard of the School
that an attachment warrant had been issued. Thereafter, on
making enquiries, an application for certified copies of the
judgment and decree was filed and the copies were received
on 25.11.2023. It is stated that, on coming to know of
Execution Petition No.412/2023 filed by respondent No.1,
the appellants entered appearance therein on 16.12.2023
and sought time to file objections. It is further stated that

7

efforts were thereafter made to negotiate with respondent
No.1, but no settlement could be arrived at, necessitating
the filing of the present appeal. It is further submitted that
the appellants have a good case on merits and if the delay in
filing the appeal is not condoned, the appellants would be
put to great hardship and injury.
4. The learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.1 contends that even assuming that the appellants came
to know of the impugned judgment only on 12.10.2023,
they had entered appearance in Execution Petition
No.412/2023 on 16.12.2023 and yet did not prefer the
appeal until 19.02.2024, for which period no satisfactory
explanation has been offered. It is further contended that
the plea that appellant No.2 had not been arrayed as a party
or served with summons in Com.O.S.No.359/2019 cannot be
accepted and that the proceedings had been permitted to go
ex parte despite service. The inter se disputes among the
Trustees and the proceedings in O.S.No.982/2018 are stated
to be wholly extraneous to the question of limitation and
incapable of constituting sufficient cause for the delay. The

8

further plea that attempts were being made to negotiate
with respondent No.1 is also contended to be an
afterthought and such negotiations could neither suspend
the period of limitation nor justify the delay in approaching
the Court. It is further contended that, having regard to the
object of the Commercial Courts Act of ensuring expeditious
resolution of commercial disputes, delay in filing a
commercial appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of
course. Placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. and Another v.
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 910 , it is contended that the delay in preferring
the present appeal is inordinate and that no sufficient cause
has been shown for its condonation.
5. We have considered the contentions advanced
and perused the averments made in the affidavit. The Apex
Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources
Department) v. Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors (P) Ltd reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 , has
clearly held that sufficient cause for condonation of delay

9

must be assessed in the context of the statutory object of
speedy resolution of disputes. The Apex Court held the
following:-
"58. Given the object sought to be achieved under
both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act,
that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays
beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself.
Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a
loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale
claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. LAO , has held : (SCC
pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word “sufficient” is
“adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances
existing in a case, duly examined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious
man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means
that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation

10

of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose.

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar this
Court explained the difference between a “good
cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that
every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is
complied with on a lesser degree of proof than
that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should
be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot
be imputed to the party concerned, whether or
not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be
decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible.
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.’ The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse

11

of time become stale. According to Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more
of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.’
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense
of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of
what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have been
lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or
laches.
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka this Court held that judicially
engrafting principles of limitation amounts to
legislating and would fly in the face of law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of
the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach
the court on time condoning the delay without
any justification, putting any condition

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whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
x x x x x
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and
the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section
37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116
and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days
or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a
party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in
mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite
party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what
may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or
laches."
6. The Apex Court, in Postmaster General v.
Living Media India Ltd reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 ,
held that ordinary movement of files through administrative
channels, without a reasonable and acceptable explanation
showing bona fide efforts, cannot constitute sufficient cause.
Government departments and their instrumentalities are
equally bound by the law of limitation and must pursue their
remedies with diligence. Further, in Jharkhand Urja

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Utpadan Nigam Ltd' s case (supra) while considering delay
in an appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts
Act, the Apex Court reiterated the obligation of a litigant and
its counsel to monitor the proceedings and take timely steps
to obtain the judgment. The Apex Court declined to interfere
with the refusal to condone the delay of 301 days in filing
the commercial appeal.
7. Further, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v.
Karnataka Housing Board reported in 2025 INSC 1104,
while considering condonation of delay in a second appeal,
the Apex Court held that a party invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act must explain the course of events from the
commencement of limitation until the actual filing of the
appeal. The inquiry is therefore not confined to a bare
explanation for the days falling after the prescribed period
has expired. The Court clarified that the length of the delay
may be relevant, but the acceptability of the explanation is
decisive. The Court also recognised that “sufficient cause”
must be assessed on the facts of each case and that a
justice-oriented approach remains available where the

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explanation genuinely warrants it. It was held that
administrative lethargy or laxity cannot itself constitute
sufficient cause.
8. In the instant case, the impugned judgment and
decree were passed on 01.04.2023, whereas the present
appeal came to be filed only on 19.02.2024. It is the
contention of the appellants that the Chairman of appellant
No.2 – Trust came to know of the impugned judgment and
decree only on 12.10.2023. The certified copies were
obtained on 25.11.2023 and the appellants entered
appearance in Execution Petition No.412/2023 on
16.12.2023. However, the appeal was preferred only on
19.02.2024. There is no satisfactory explanation for the
delay thereafter. The inter se disputes amongst the Trustees
and the pendency of O.S.No.982/2018 do not furnish
sufficient cause for the delay, particularly after the
appellants had acquired knowledge of the impugned
judgment and decree. The plea that efforts were being made
to negotiate with respondent No.1 also cannot justify the

15

delay, since such negotiations do not suspend the period of
limitation.
9. In the above view of the matter, we are of the
opinion that the appellants have failed to establish sufficient
cause for condonation of the delay. The material on record
also does not disclose due diligence on their part in pursuing
the appellate remedy. Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2024 seeking
condonation of delay is dismissed . Consequently, the
appeal is also dismissed .
All pending interlocutory applications shall stand
disposed of.

Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(K.S.BHARATH KUMAR)
JUDGE


PN