Jasjeet Singh vs State Of Punjab And Others

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CWP-22652 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-22652 of 2023
Constable Jasjeet Singh
......Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others
......Respondents
Sr. No. Particulars Details
1. The date when the judgment is reserved 19.08.2026
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 02.09.2026
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 02.09.2026
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or full judgment is pronounced
5. The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full Not applicable
judgment, and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Argued by: -Ms. Rakhi Sharma, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr. Siddharth Sandhu, AAG, Punjab.
NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. Instant petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of
certiorari for quashing of order dated 28.04.2016 (Annexure P-9),
passed by Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala, vide which
punishment of temporary forfeiture of one year sanctioned service for
annual increment was imposed and period from 08.06.2015 to
01.09.2015 was ordered to be suspension period of the petitioner; order
dated 04.05.2017 (Annexure P-10), passed by Deputy Inspector
General of Police, Patiala Range, Patiala, vide which the appeal
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CWP-22652 of 2023
preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 28.04.2016 was
rejected; order dated 26.03.2018 (Annexure P-11), passed by Inspector
General of Police, Zonal-1, Punjab, Patiala, vide which the revision
petition preferred by the petitioner was rejected; order dated 02.05.2023
(Annexure P-13), passed by Inspector General of Police, Patiala Range,
Patiala, vide which the application of the petitioner for setting aside the
suspension period and for fixing full salary and for resuming the
service forfeited temporarily for one year, was dismissed and order
dated 12.07.2023 (Annexure P-15), vide which the application of the
petitioner for fixing seniority on the basis of Basic Proficiency Test-
2016 was rejected. Further prayer has been made for issuance of a writ
in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents to restore/release
all the benefits including full salary/increments for the suspension
period from 08.06.2015 to 01.09.2015; directing the respondents to
consider the case of the petitioner for entitling him for
promotion/seniority at par with the Constables/employees entitled for
seniority after passing the Basic Proficiency Test-2016, as the
petitioner was deprived of his right to appear in the said test vide order
dated 10.02.2016 (Annexure P-20), passed by respondent No.5, on the
ground of pendency of departmental inquiry as well as FIR No.37 dated
08.06.2015 registered under Sections 223, 224, 225, 148, 149 IPC and
Sections 25, 27/54/59 of Arms Act at Police Station Khalchian, District
Amritsar (Annexure P-2), in which, the petitioner was declared
innocent.
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CWP-22652 of 2023
2. Brief facts of the case, as have been pleaded in the petition
are that the petitioner joined the Punjab Police as a Constable on
14.10.2011. On 08.06.2015, the petitioner, along with Head Constable
Gurdeep Singh (officer in charge) and Head Constable Gurjant Singh,
was deputed to escort undertrial prisoner Bhupinder Singh alias Sonu
@ Kangla from Nabha Jail to the District Courts at Amritsar. After the
prisoner was produced before the Court, the police party was returning
to Nabha. On the way back, 8-9 persons armed with deadly weapons,
intercepted the police vehicle at gunpoint, forcibly removed the
prisoner from police custody; snatched the police weapons and
escaped. The petitioner had no prior connection or connivance with the
escaping accused. However, FIR No.37 dated 08.06.2015 under
Sections 223, 224, 225, 148, 149 IPC and Sections 25, 27/54/59 of
Arms Act was registered at Police Station Khalchian, District Amritsar,
against petitioner along with Head Constable Gurdeep Singh (officer in
charge) and Head Constable Gurjant Singh. The petitioner along with
other officials, on their involvement in the aforesaid case was
suspended w.e.f. 08.06.2015, vide order dated 20.06.2015 (Annexure
P-3) and departmental proceedings were initiated against them. In a
separate inquiry dated 28.01.2016 (Annexure P-16), conducted by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Investigation, Amritsar Rural, the
petitioner was found innocent. The report recorded that the petitioner
had objected to travelling in a private vehicle and that the escape
occurred due to the negligence of the other officials. The report was
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CWP-22652 of 2023
approved by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Amritsar Rural. In
the departmental proceedings, charge sheet (Annexure P-4) was issued
against the petitioner, to which detailed reply (Annexure P-5) was filed
by the petitioner. After concluding the inquiry, final inquiry report
dated 26.11.2015 (Annexure P-6) was submitted against the petitioner,
whereby the petitioner was held guilty. In pursuance to the said inquiry
report, show cause notice dated 03.03.2016 (Annexure P-7), along with
copy of the inquiry report, was issued to the petitioner by the punishing
authority i.e. respondent No.5. A detailed reply (Annexure P-8) to the
said show-cause notice was submitted by the petitioner. Thereafter,
vide order dated 28.04.2016 (Annexure P-9), the Senior Superintendent
of Police, Patiala, imposed the punishment of temporary forfeiture of
one year's sanctioned service for the purpose of annual increment and
period from 08.06.2015 to 01.09.2015 was ordered to be treated as
suspension period only. The petitioner's appeal and revision against the
punishment order dated 28.04.2016, were dismissed vide orders dated
04.05.2017 (Annexure P-10) and 26.03.2018 (Annexure P-11) by
respondents No.4 and 3 respectively. The petitioner was also denied
the opportunity to appear in the Basic Proficiency Test, 2016, on the
ground that a departmental inquiry and criminal case were pending
against him. Subsequently, vide judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 19.12.2022 (Annexure P-18), passed by the Court of
learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Baba Bakala Sahib, two
companions of the petitioner i.e. Head Constable Gurdeep Singh
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CWP-22652 of 2023
(officer in charge) and Head Constable Gurjant Singh were convicted
and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years with fine
of Rs.2,000/-, under Section 223 IPC. The petitioner was kept in the
Column No.2 of the challan and he was not summoned as an accused
and no finding of guilt was recorded against him. After the conclusion
of the criminal proceedings, the petitioner approached the competent
authorities for reconsideration of the punishment, restoration of
increments and consideration of his claim for promotion. His
applications were rejected vide orders dated 02.05.2023 (Annexure P-
13) and 12.07.2023 (Annexure P-15), passed by respondents No. 3 and
2, respectively. Hence, the present petition.
3. Respondents have filed reply by way of affidavit of
Harwant Kaur, PPS, Superintendent of Police, Headquarter, Patiala, on
behalf of the respondents, stating therein as under: -
“8. That in reply to Para No.8 of the petition, it is
submitted that aggrieved by the punishment order dated
28-04-2016 passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police,
the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy
Inspector General of Police, Patiala Range, Patiala. After
carefully examining the appeal of the petitioner, while
considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
appeal of the petitioner was rejected by the Deputy
Inspector General of Police, Patiala Range, Patiala vide
order dated 04-05-2017 (Annexure-P-10) as well as
revision filed by the petitioner to the Director General of
Police, Punjab, Chandigarh was also rejected after due
consideration of the same by the competent authority vide
order dated 26-03-2018 (Annexure-P-11).
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9. That in reply to Para No.9 of the petition, it is
submitted that the detailed submissions made in para
no.8(supra) of the reply on merits may kindly be read as
reply of this para and the same are not repeated herein for
the sake of brevity.
10. That the contents of Para No.10 of the petition are
incorrect, and hence denied. It is further submitted that the
respondent No.3 had passed a detailed speaking order
while rejecting revision petition of the petitioner.
However, it is submitted that the Director General of
Police, Punjab, Chandigarh has issued instruction vide
letter No. 3208/E-1 dated 11-03-2011 and Standing Order
No. 12/2010, wherein directions has been issued that those
employee who have been awarded any major punishment
preceding 03 years, they are not eligible to appear in
Basic Proficiency Test (B-1 Test) and if any departmental
enquiry/Vigilance enquiry or criminal case is pending and
the charges have been framed against them and the
employee having less than 03 years service are not eligible
to appear in the Basic Proficiency Test (B-1 Test).
It is pertinent to mention here that as per office
record at that time one department inquiry was pending
against the petitioner, as well as case FIR No.37 dated 08-
06-2015 u/s 223,224,225,148,149 IPC and 25,27 of Arms
Acts was registered at Police Station Khalchian District
Amritsar. Therefore, the departmental inquiry was
initiated against the petitioner by the then Senior
Superintendent of Police, Patiala vide order
No.3180-88/Steno-1 dated 20-06-2015. Copy of Charge
Sheet was supplied to the petitioner by the inquiry officer,
who duly received the same on 09-10-2015 and the inquiry
officer had proved the charges against him on 26-11-2015
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in the Departmental inquiry. So, the petitioner was not
eligible to appear in Basic Proficiency Test, which was
conducted in the year 2016. In this regard detailed order
dated 10-02-2016 (Annexure P-20) has been passed by the
Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala. It is also
admitted that the application submitted by the petitioner
was rejected by the respondent No.2 and 3 vide order
dated 02-05-2023 (Annexure P-13) and order dated 12-
07-2023 (Annexure P-15).
11. That in reply to Para No.11 of the petition, it is
submitted that the detailed submissions made in para
no.10 (supra) of the reply may kindly be read as reply of
this para and the same are not repeated herein for the
sake of brevity.
12. That the contents of Para No.12 of the petition are
incorrect, hence denied. It is further submitted that the
detailed submission made in para no.10 (supra) of the
reply may kindly be read as reply of this para and the
same are not repeated herein for the sake of brevity only.
13. That the contents of Para No.13 of the petition are
incorrect, hence denied. It is further submitted that the
petitioner was a member of escort party to produce the
accused-Bhupinder Singh in the learned Court at Amritsar
and while returning back, the accused escaped from the
escort party including the petitioner, therefore, above
noted case was registered at Police Station Khalchian,
District Amritsar. Therefore, the petitioner cannot escape
from his liability. Before passing the order of punishment
against the petitioner, the proper due process was duly
followed by the punishing authority and the petitioner was
held guilty by the inquiry officer.
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14. That the contents of Para No.14 of the petition are
incorrect, hence denied. It is further submitted that the
detailed submission made in para no.3 and 4 of the
preliminary submissions of the reply may kindly be read as
reply of this para and the same are not repeated herein for
the sake of brevity.
15. That in reply to Para No.15 of the petition, it is
submitted that departmental proceedings are entirely
different from the Criminal case registered against an
employee and whether an employee is convicted or
acquitted in the criminal case, even then also
departmental proceedings are binding upon the employee.
However, reproduction of Rule 16.3 of the Punjab Police
Rules, 1934 is a matter of record. In the judgment dated
19.12.2022 (Annexure P-18), the co-accused of the
petitioner have been duly convicted by the learned trial
court. Therefore, the petitioner being a member of escort
party cannot escape from the departmental proceedings,
which has been duly conducted as per procedure laid
down.
16. That in reply to Para No.16 of the petition, it is
submitted that the petitioner cannot escape from the
departmental proceedings for his negligence, which has
been duly conducted as per procedure laid down. The
detailed position has been given in foregoing paras of this
reply.
17. That in reply to Para No.17 of the petition, it is
submitted that the petitioner cannot escape from the
departmental proceedings for his negligence, which has
been duly conducted as per procedure laid down. Rules
reproduced are a matter of record. The detailed position
has been given in foregoing paras of this reply.
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CWP-22652 of 2023
18. That the contents of Para No.18 of the petition are
incorrect, hence denied. It is further submitted that an
accused cannot use a private vehicle for conveyance,
which means, accused-Bhupinder Singh had preplanned to
escape from the police custody and the escort party
including the petitioner were fully responsible for the
same.”
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the
authorities failed to take into consideration that during investigation in
case FIR No.37 dated 08.06.2015, petitioner was found innocent and it
was on that count that he was kept in column No.2. She has further
contended that the impugned order of punishment dated 28.04.2016
(Annexure P-9), passed by respondent No.5 – Senior Superintendent of
Police, Patiala, is against the principles of natural justice, as he was not
given an opportunity of personal hearing before passing the order. She
has further submitted that two police officials were found guilty by the
trial Court and were convicted, whereas, petitioner was never
summoned by the trial Court, therefore, impugned order of punishment
is liable to be set aside.
5. Per contra, learned State counsel has defended the
impugned orders passed by the authorities by contending that
departmental proceedings are different from criminal proceedings. He
further submitted that the punishment has been imposed upon the
petitioner after following due procedure of law. He further submitted
that there is considerable delay in filing the present petition as the last
statutory revision petition was rejected vide order dated 26.03.2018
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(Annexure P-11). Therefore, instant petition filed by the petitioner
warrants no interference by this Court and is liable to be dismissed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
7. Admittedly, FIR No.37 dated 08.06.2015 was registered
against the petitioner and two others police officials on account of
escape of undertrial Bhupinder Singh alias Sonu @ Kangla from police
custody. Though, petitioner was kept in column No.2, while two other
police officials were found guilty and convicted by learned trial Court,
vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.12.2022.
However, in departmental proceedings, vide order dated 28.04.2016
(Annexure P-9), passed by Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala,
punishment of temporary forfeiture of one year sanctioned service for
annual increment was imposed and period from 08.06.2015 to
01.09.2015 was ordered to be treated as suspension period only of the
petitioner; vide order dated 04.05.2017 (Annexure P-10), passed by
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Patiala Range, Patiala, appeal
preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 28.04.2016 was
rejected; vide order dated 26.03.2018 (Annexure P-11), passed by
Inspector General of Police, Zonal-1, Punjab, Patiala, revision petition
preferred by the petitioner was rejected; vide order dated 02.05.2023
(Annexure P-13), passed by Inspector General of Police, Patiala Range,
Patiala, application of the petitioner for setting aside the suspension
period and further relief was rejected and vide order dated 12.07.2023
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(Annexure P-15), application of the petitioner for fixing seniority on
the basis of Basic Proficiency Test-2016 was rejected.
8. The record indicates that disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against the petitioner in respect of the alleged negligence. The
petitioner was informed of the allegations, was afforded an opportunity
to submit his explanation/defence, and the competent authority
considered the material available on record before arriving at its
conclusion. The prescribed procedure was followed at the relevant
stages, and the petitioner was given adequate opportunity to put forth
his case. Petitioner has failed to point out any procedural lapse on the
part of the disciplinary authority.
9. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner
that name of the petitioner was kept in column No.2 in the FIR,
therefore, he should not have been punished by the department, is not
acceptable, as criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings
operate in different fields and require different standard of proof. The
object of a criminal prosecution is to determine whether the accused
has committed an offence punishable under the criminal law, whereas
departmental proceedings are concerned with the conduct of an
employee and the question whether such conduct amounts to
misconduct or dereliction of official duty warranting disciplinary
action. In State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 , the
Supreme Court recognized that there is no absolute bar against
simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings. Likewise, in
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Nelson Motis v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711 , it was held that the
nature and scope of a criminal case is different from those of
departmental disciplinary proceedings and that an order in the criminal
proceedings does not, by itself, conclude the departmental proceedings.
The said principle has subsequently been reiterated by the Supreme
Court. Further, the conviction of other two co-accused of the petitioner
is in no way helpful to the petitioner, as he was already in column
No.2, rather he was a member of the escort party, therefore, he cannot
escape from departmental proceedings.
10. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not an appellate jurisdiction over the findings recorded
by the disciplinary authority. The scope of judicial review in
disciplinary matters is limited. The Court is primarily concerned with
the decision-making process and not with re-appreciating the evidence
as if it were exercising appellate jurisdiction. Interference may be
warranted where the proceedings have been conducted in violation of
statutory rules or principles of natural justice; where the authority
lacked jurisdiction; where the finding is based on no evidence; or where
the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct. No
such exceptional circumstance has been established in the present case.
A mere assertion of procedural irregularity, without identifying the
particular mandatory requirement which was violated and the prejudice
thereby caused, cannot furnish a ground for exercising the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. As regards the quantum of
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punishment, the impugned order records that the competent authority,
after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, imposed the
penalty of forfeiture of one year’s sanctioned service for the purpose of
annual increment. The punishment imposed is one prescribed under the
applicable service/disciplinary framework. There is nothing on record
to suggest that the authority acted for an extraneous purpose, with mala
fide intention, or in a manner wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the misconduct established against the petitioner. The power of
judicial review does not extend to substituting the Court’s own view
regarding the appropriate punishment merely because another penalty
might also have been possible. The disciplinary authority is ordinarily
the appropriate authority to determine the penalty, subject to the limited
parameters of judicial review. Unless the punishment is so
disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court, interference
is not warranted. In the present case, the impugned order cannot be
said to be arbitrary or without application of mind. The competent
authority considered the matter in accordance with the applicable
procedure and imposed the penalty after affording the petitioner an
opportunity of being heard. The petitioner has not been able to establish
violation of any mandatory procedural safeguard or any denial of
reasonable opportunity.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh
and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1723 has
held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal to examine the merits
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of the findings recorded in a departmental inquiry and the power of
judicial review is confined to examining whether the inquiry was
conducted by a competent authority in accordance with the prescribed
procedure and whether the principles of natural justice were followed.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others
v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015(1) SCT 5 , while considering the scope of
interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has
held as under: -
“13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-
appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise
of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether :
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural
justice in conducting the proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
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e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed
to admit the admissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the
finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i). re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted
in accordance with law;
(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.
(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii). go into the proportionality of
punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra
Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
Supreme Court 1723 , many of the above principles have
been discussed and it has been concluded thus :
"7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
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court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it
is not the function of the High Court in a petition for
a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where
the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode
of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled
themselves from reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and the
merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on
similar grounds. But the departmental authorities
are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the
sole judges of facts and if there be some legal
evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a
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matter which can be permitted to be canvassed
before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ
under Article 226 of the Constitution."
15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra
Venkata Rao, (1975)2 SCC 557 , the principles have been
further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as
follows :
"21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this
Court. Two propositions were laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao . First,
there is no warrant for the view that in considering
whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct
charged against him, the rule followed in criminal
trials that an offence is not established unless
proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule
be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the
High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not competent to declare the order of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal
under Article 226 over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against
a public servant. The Court is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
Second, where there is some evidence which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry
has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
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support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High
Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to
the evidence and the merits of the case or by
allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if
the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole
judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence
on which their findings can be based, the adequacy
or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which
can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board,
representing the Union of India, New Delhi v.
Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not
interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary
authority unless the finding is not supported by any
evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person
could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan
Singh case this Court held that the High Court
exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings
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of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the
respondent was instrumental in compelling the shut-
down of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on
May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry
Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that
the respondent led a group of strikers and
compelled them to close down their compressor
could not be accepted at its face value. The General
Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee
on that point. The General Manager accepted the
evidence. This Court said that it was open to the
General Manager to do so and he was not bound by
the conclusion reached by the committee. This
Court held that the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary authority should prevail and the High
Court should not have interfered with the
conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The
Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or
tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence
are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a
writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording
the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence,
or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence
which has influenced the impugned finding. Again
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if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on
the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or
inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the
inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan .
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the
entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The
High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from
the aspect that the High Court does not correct a
finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not
sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present
case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot
be scanned by the High Court to justify the
conclusion that there is no evidence which would
justify the finding of the Tribunal that the
respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal
gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible
for the High Court to say that no reasonable person
could have arrived at these conclusions. The High
Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the
evidence and then rejected the evidence as no
evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
should not do."
These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the
living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in
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State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2
SCC 491 . To quote the unparalled and inimitable
expressions:
"4. .... in a domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian
Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are
logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It
is true that departmental authorities and
Administrative Tribunals must be careful in
evaluating such material and should not glibly
swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under
the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is
not necessary to cite decisions nor text books,
although we have been taken through case-law and
other authorities by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is objectivity,
exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations
and observance of rules of natural justice. Of
course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or
arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of
judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such
finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot
be held good. ..."
13. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force and others v.
Abrar Ali, 2017(1) SCT 682 , wherein it has been held as under: -
“8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the
High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he
fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without
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assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary
Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which
could have been availed by the Respondent if he was
really suffering from illness. It was further held that the
delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a
local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into
the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of
evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence
is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in
2011(2) S.C.T. 782 : 2011(3) Recent Apex Judgments
(R.A.J.) 28 : (2011) 4 SCC 584 , this Court held as
follows:
"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led
in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground
that another view is possible on the material on
record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly
held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with
findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries,
except where such findings are based on no
evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The
test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at
such conclusion or finding, on the material on
record. The courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of
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natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary,
capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India, 1996(1) S.C.T. 617 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44, Union of
India v. G. Ganayutham, 1997(4) S.C.T. 214 :
(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806, Bank
of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, 1999(3) S.C.T.
669 : (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036
and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil. "
The said view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others v.
Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021(1) SCT 285 and in the said judgment it
has been held as under: -
“23. The power of judicial review in the matters of
disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the
departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or
Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by
limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors
leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case
on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier
examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V.
Venuaopalan, 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government
of T.N. and Another v. A. Rajapandian, 1995(1) SCC 216
and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this
Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Others,
1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under:-
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"13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate
authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not
relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed
before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v.
H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p.
728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the
evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is
perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued."
24. It has been consistently followed in the later decision
of this Court in Himachal Pradesh State Electricity
Board Limited v. Mahesh Dahiya, 2017(1) SCC 768 and
recently by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin
Kumar v. Union of India and Others, 2020(9) SCC 471 .
25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of
the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-
making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It
is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure
fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in
any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode
of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
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consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the
face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial
review cannot be extended to the examination of
correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as
a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the
alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is
to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was
held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of
natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the
findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and
authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of
fact or conclusion.
27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not
the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of
enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree
with the findings recorded by the former, in case of
disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the
reasons for disagreement and after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his
own findings if the evidence available on record be
sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the
enquiry officer for further enquiry.
28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable
to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only
requirement of law is that the allegation against the
delinquent must be established by such evidence acting
upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and
with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the
gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is
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true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the
finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry
proceedings.
29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its
jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article
136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry
proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity,
i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or
where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and
with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so
long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to
be sustained.”
14. Furthermore, this petition falls flat on the ground of
limitation as well inasmuch as statutory revision petition of the
petitioner against the punishment order was rejected by the revisional
authority, vide order dated 26.03.2018 (Annexure P-11), whereas
instant petition has been preferred in the year 2023, i.e. after a lapse of
more than five years.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary and
others : 2009 (2) SCT 24 , while referring to the issue of delay and
laches, had held as follows:-
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or
omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
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taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prasad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (AIR 1970
Supreme Court 769) . Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by
this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, (AIR
1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (AIR 1969
Supreme Court 329) , Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates
to the remedy."
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in
relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent
that what has been stated as regards that Article would
apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N Bose
v. Union of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470) that no
relief can be given to the petitioner who without any
reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article
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32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article
32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this
that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this
Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in
petitions filed after inordinate delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987
Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of
its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”
16. A Division Bench of Supreme Court recently in ‘Mrinmoy
Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others’ 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 has
held that High Court ought to dismiss petition on the ground of delay
and laches where there is no explanation of delay. An applicant who
approaches the Court belatedly or in the other words sleeps over his
rights for a considerable period ought not to be granted the
extraordinary relief by writ Courts. Delay defeats equity. High Court
may refuse to invoke its writ jurisdiction if laxity on the part of
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applicant has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are
made to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. Multiple communications
cannot create cause of action. The relevant extracts of the judgment are
reproduced as below:
“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal
of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the
considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been
non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have
been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself.
An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in
other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable
period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not
to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts.
This Court time and again has held that delay defeats
equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should
be born in mind by the High Court while exercising
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the
applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of
action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently
to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and
caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching
the writ court is explained which would appeal to the
conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be
gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come
the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad
circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the
extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and
circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a
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straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The
ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court
depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain
in which the facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no
fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it
has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time
same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials
would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the
cause of action which has had a natural death. In such
circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone,
the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to
be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty
of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the
petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ
courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent
litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that
there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while
exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the
High Court will have to necessarily take into
consideration the delay and latches on the part of the
applicant in approaching a writ court.”
17. In view of the abovesaid discussion and the settled legal
position of law, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is
hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
02.09.2026 JUDGE
R.S.
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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