Rishipal Bansal vs Narender Aggarwal & Anr.

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on : 28.10.2026
Pronounced on : 18.11.2026
Uploaded on : 18.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010047202024
+ FAO 48/2024, CM APPL. 7900/2024
RISHIPAL BANSAL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Mukesh Kr. Dral, Mr. Sonu
Kirar and Mr. Rohan Aggarwal,
Advocates

versus

NARENDER AGGARWAL & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sanjay S. Chhabra and Mr.
Himanshu Sharma, Advocates

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed assailing the order dated
08.12.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-02, North-
West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi , in CS DJ No. 56/2021 , whereby
the plaint filed by the appellant/plaintiff seeking specific performance
of the Agreement to Sell dated 05.10.2019 (hereinafter the “Agreement
to Sell”) was ordered to be returned for presentation before the Court of
competent jurisdiction.
2. Briefly stated, the appellant instituted the underlying suit seeking
specific performance of the Agreement to Sell executed between the
parties in respect of land measuring 19 (K) and 9 (M) situated at
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 1 of 9

Village Sultanpur , Tehsil and District Sonipat , Haryana (hereinafter the
“suit property”). It is the appellant’s case that a total sale consideration
of Rs.95,00,000/- was agreed upon, out of which a sum of
Rs.15,00,000/- was paid to the respondents/defendants as part
consideration money.
3. The appellant claims that despite the respondents having agreed
to execute the sale deed within the stipulated period of 6 months, they
failed to do so. Consequently, after issuance of a legal notice dated
08.12.2020, which was served upon the respondents on 09.12.2020 as
per the delivery report, the appellant instituted the underlying suit for
specific performance before the Trial Court at Delhi .
4. The Trial Court, while considering the question of territorial
jurisdiction, noted that although the parties had agreed upon the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi in the Agreement to Sell,
the suit property was situated in Haryana . It was further noted that the
suit was one for specific performance of an agreement to sell
immovable property, along with consequential relief. Holding that the
suit was covered by Section 16 CPC and that the proviso thereto was
not applicable, the Trial Court directed return of the plaint for
presentation before the competent Court.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the impugned
order has been passed without appreciating the proviso to Section 16
CPC. He contends that both parties are residents of Delhi and that the
Agreement to Sell was also executed at Delhi . He further submits that
Clause 19 of the Agreement to Sell specifically confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Courts at Delhi in respect of disputes arising out
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 2 of 9

of the agreement. It is also contended that the relief sought in the suit is
primarily one of specific performance of the agreement, which can be
entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the respondents. In
support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance on Sidharth
1
Choudhary v. Mahamaya General Finance ; Karan Mahendru & Anr.
2
v. Vatika Plantations (P) Ltd. ; Dr. Ramesh Chander Munjal & Ors. v.
3
Dr. Suraj Munjal & Ors. ; Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daulat &
4 5
Anr. ; and Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. . He
also relies upon Section 39 CPC to contend that a decree passed in
respect of immovable property situated outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court can be transferred to the competent Court for
execution.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in support of the
impugned order, places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court
6
in Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd. & Ors. , and
submits that the proviso to Section 16 CPC would not be attracted in a
suit seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable
property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court
concerned, particularly where consequential relief of possession is also
sought. It is contended that the parties cannot, by agreement, confer
jurisdiction upon a Court which otherwise lacks territorial jurisdiction
under Section 16 CPC.

1
1999 (50) DRJ 479
2
2004 (74) DRJ 570
3
CS(COMM) 22/2021, decided on 13.04.2022
4
(2001) 7 SCC 698
5
(2013) 9 SCC 32
6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3584
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 3 of 9

7. This Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf of
the parties and perused the record.
8. The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether the
Courts at Delhi would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit
for specific performance of the Agreement to Sell, when the property
forming its subject matter is situated in Haryana .
9. The Supreme Court, in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF
7
Universal Ltd. & Anr. , while dealing with a suit for specific
performance of an agreement and delivery of possession of a plot
situated in Haryana , examined the scope of the proviso to Section 16
CPC. The relevant paragraphs from the said decision are reproduced
hereunder:-
“ 16. Section 16 thus recognises a well-established principle
that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum
where such res is situate. A court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the property is not situate has no power to deal with
and decide the rights or interests in such property. In other words,
a court has no jurisdiction over a dispute in which it cannot give
an effective judgment. The proviso to Section 16, no doubt, states
that though the court cannot, in case of immovable property situate
beyond jurisdiction, grant a relief in rem still it can entertain a suit
where relief sought can be obtained through the personal
obedience of the defendant. The proviso is based on a well-known
maxim “equity acts in personam”, recognised by the Chancery
Courts in England. The Equity Courts had jurisdiction to entertain
certain suits respecting immovable properties situated abroad
through personal obedience of the defendant. The principle on
which the maxim was based was that the courts could grant relief
in suits respecting immovable property situate abroad by enforcing
their judgments by process in personam i.e. by arrest of the
defendant or by attachment of his property.
…
18. The proviso is thus an exception to the main part of the
section which in our considered opinion, cannot be interpreted or

7
(2005) 7 SCC 791
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 4 of 9

construed to enlarge the scope of the principal provision. It would
apply only if the suit falls within one of the categories specified in
the main part of the section and the relief sought could entirely be
obtained by personal obedience of the defendant.
19. In the instant case, the proviso has no application. The
relief sought by the plaintiff is for specific performance of
agreement respecting immovable property by directing Defendant
1 to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and to deliver
possession to him. The trial court was, therefore, right in holding
that the suit was covered by clause (d) of Section 16 of the Code
and the proviso had no application.
20. In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant that the parties had agreed that the Delhi Court
alone had jurisdiction in the matters arising out of the transaction
also has no force. Such a provision, in our opinion, would apply to
those cases where two or more courts have jurisdiction to entertain
a suit and the parties have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of
one court. ”

10. It is apposite to refer also to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Rohit Kochhar ( supra ), wherein the Supreme Court examined the scope
of Section 16 CPC and the applicability of its proviso in the context of
a suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning
immovable property situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Court concerned. The Supreme Court, after considering the nature of
the relief sought and the requirement of execution and registration of
the sale deed, held that the proviso to Section 16 would not be attracted
where the relief cannot be entirely obtained through the personal
obedience of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the Court. The
said decision also reiterates that parties cannot, by agreement, confer
jurisdiction upon a Court which otherwise lacks territorial jurisdiction.
The relevant paragraphs from the said decision are reproduced
hereunder:-
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 5 of 9

“ 18. The Court held that a suit for specific performance and
delivery of possession was covered under clause (d) to Section 16
of the CPC and thus the parties, even by agreement, cannot confer
territorial jurisdiction on a court within whose territory the subject
matter is not situated.
…
20. Thus, even if the suit for specific performance is
decreed without a specific decree for transfer of the possession of
the suit property, the same can be enforced only when the trial
court directs the defendants to convey the suit property to the
plaintiff by getting a sale deed registered with respect to the suit
property, as it is only after registration that the transfer of title
would take place from the defendants to the plaintiff. The
registration of the sale deed in the present case would have to take
place at Gurugram as the suit property is situated there. The sale
deed is not sought to be registered at Delhi and the implication of
the grant of specific relief would be that the trial court will have to
direct the defendants to move out of Delhi and go to Gurugram to
get the sale deed registered. As rightly held by the Division Bench
of the High Court, such a relief cannot be obtained entirely by the
personal obedience of the defendants as the defendants will have to
go to the jurisdiction of another court to get the decree executed.
21. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court in
the impugned order that the proviso to Section 16 would be
applicable to a case where the relief sought by plaintiff can be
obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, that is,
the defendant has not to go out of the jurisdiction of the court at all
for the purpose of the grant of relief. However, since the present
case would require the defendants to go to Gurugram for the
purpose of execution of the sale deed, hence the proviso to Section
16 of the CPC will not be applicable. ”

11. The aforesaid position is required to be considered in the context
of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant.
12. In Sidharth Choudhary ( supra ), this Court held that the proviso
to Section 16 CPC could be invoked where the relief sought was to
direct the defendants, who were carrying on business within Delhi , to
execute and present the sale deed for registration. The said decision,
however, preceded the subsequent authoritative pronouncement of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 6 of 9

Supreme Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi ( supra ), and the decision
in Rohit Kochhar ( supra ). Further, the facts of the present case involve
a claim for consequential delivery of possession of the property situated
in Haryana . The aforesaid decision, therefore, cannot assist the
appellant.
13. Likewise, in Karan Mahendru ( supra ), this Court considered the
question of territorial jurisdiction in the context of the reliefs claimed
therein, including an alternative claim for recovery of money. The said
decision, also being prior to Harshad Chiman Lal Modi ( supra ) and
Rohit Kochhar ( supra ), cannot prevail over the law subsequently
declared by the Supreme Court on the scope of Section 16 CPC.
14. The reliance placed on Dr. Ramesh Chander Munjal ( supra ) is
also misplaced. The said decision dealt with a suit involving multiple
immovable properties situated within the territorial jurisdiction of
different Courts and examined the applicability of Sections 16 and 17
CPC, including the reliefs capable of being obtained through personal
obedience of the defendant. Notably, the said decision was not rendered
in a suit for specific performance, and it distinguished the view taken
by the Division Bench of this Court, which has since been affirmed in
Rohit Kochhar ( supra ). The present case, on the other hand, concerns a
suit in respect of a property situated in Haryana and does not involve
properties situated within the jurisdiction of different Courts so as to
attract Section 17 CPC.
15. Insofar as Adcon Electronics ( supra ) is concerned, the Supreme
Court therein considered whether a suit for specific performance
simpliciter , without a prayer for possession, would constitute a suit for
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 7 of 9

land for the purposes of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The said
judgment was rendered in the context of the Letters Patent and the
nature of the relief claimed therein. The present case involves a
consequential prayer for delivery of possession of the suit property. In
any event, the decision in Adcon Electronics ( supra ) has been
considered in Rohit Kochhar ( supra ), which examines the question of
territorial jurisdiction under Section 16 CPC in the context of a suit for
specific performance.
16. The judgment in Swastik Gases ( supra ) also does not advance
the appellant’s case. The Supreme Court therein held that parties may
agree to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon one of two or more Courts
which otherwise possess jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The said
judgment does not lay down that parties can confer jurisdiction upon a
Court which otherwise lacks it. Thus, Clause 19 of the Agreement to
Sell, providing for exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi , cannot
override the mandate of Section 16 CPC.
17. The appellant’s reliance on Section 39 CPC is equally misplaced.
The said provision deals with the transfer of a decree for execution and
does not confer territorial jurisdiction upon a Court to entertain a suit in
the first instance.
18. In the present case, the suit property is admittedly situated in
Haryana . The reliefs sought includes specific performance of the
Agreement to Sell and delivery of possession of the suit property. The
execution and registration of the sale deed, as well as the consequential
relief of possession, concern the immovable property situated outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi . The reliefs, therefore,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 8 of 9

cannot be said to be entirely obtainable through the personal obedience
of the respondents within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi .
19. Consequently, merely because the parties reside in Delhi , the
Agreement to Sell was executed in Delhi , or Clause 19 thereof provides
for exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi , the Courts at Delhi
cannot be vested with territorial jurisdiction contrary to Section 16
CPC.
20. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rohit
Kochhar ( supra ), this Court finds no infirmity in the impugned order
directing return of the plaint for presentation before the Court of
competent jurisdiction.
21. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.
22. The pending application is also disposed of in the above terms.


(MANOJ KUMAR OHRI)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 18, 2026
na
Signature Not Verified
Digitally SignedPREM
MOHAN CHOUDHARY
Signing Date:18.11.2026
22:54:22
FAO 48/2024 Page 9 of 9