SURABHI YADAV vs UNION OF INDIA

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CGHC010272562023 2026:CGHC:45686

Digitally signed by
YOGESH TIWARI
Date: 2026.10.29
17:43:56 +0530
YOGESH
TIWARI
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 22.09.2026
Order Delivered on : 29.10.2026
WPC No. 3837 of 2023
Surabhi Yadav D/o Shri Shiv Shankar Yadav Aged About 31 Years R/o
Kamlashree Apartment Sarkanda Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - Union of India Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resource
Development 1, West Block, Rama Krishna Puram, New Delhi. 110066,
(University Grants Commission) (Conformant of Autonomous State
Upon College And Measures For Maintains of Standards In
Autonomous Colleges) Regulations, 2018)
2 - University Grant Commission Through Its Secretary Bahadur Shah
Zafar Marg, New Delhi, 110002
3 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Higher
Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralayay, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar,
Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Registrar Atal Bihari Vajpayee University, Old High Court
Building Tikarapara, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, New Add. Badi Koni,
Bilaspur Ratanpur Road In Front of Police Thana Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
5 - The Principal Government Bilasa Girls Post Graduate College
(Autonomous Body), Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
6 - Dr. S.R. Kamlesh Principal- Government Bilasa Girls Post Graduate
College, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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7 - Dr. Jyoti Rani Singh (Government Representative) C/o Government
Bilasa Girls Post Graduate College, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
8 - Dr. M.S.K. Khokhar (Retired) (Nominated Government
Representative) C/o Government Bilasa Girls Post Graduate College,
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
9 - Dr. Harish Kedia (Nominated Government Representative) C/o
Govenment Bilasa Girls Post Grduate College, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
10 - Dr. H.S. Hota (University Representative) C/o Through Registrar-
Atal Bihari Vajpayee University, Old High Court Building, Tikarapara,
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
11 - Dr. V.K. Sharma (College Representative) C/o Government Bilasa
Girls Post Graduate College, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Avinash K. Mishra, Advocate
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, Advocate
For State/Respondents
No.3 & 5
: Dr. Arham Siddiqui, Panel Lawyer
For Respondent No.4 : Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. By filing the present petition, the petitioner calls in question the
legality, validity and propriety of the resolution dated 06.03.2023
(Annexure P/1) issued by respondent Nos.5 to 11, styled as the
“Governing Body” of respondent No.5-Institution, whereby the
petitioner’s request for restoration/correction of her name and
identity in the academic records has been rejected, despite the

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undisputed documentary record, the judgment and decree dated
24.02.2022 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Bilaspur, and the earlier order dated 03.11.2022 passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.2521/2022. The
petitioner also calls in question the consequential inaction of the
respondent authorities in correcting and issuing her academic
documents in her legally restored original name, thereby seriously
prejudicing her prospects of employment and livelihood. The
petitioner has sought for following reliefs:-
“ 10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to direct the respondent no. 5 to prepare and
put the desire documents/mark sheet/degree/
diploma with their seal and signature before the
respondent no. 4, the respondent no. 4 may
kindly be also direct to put their endorsement
and issue the same without wasting any further
time.
10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to direct the respondent no. 1 and 2 to
reconsider the Recognition of institution of
respondent no. 5 in the light of grounds
mentioned in this petition, particularly in ground
urge in para 9.3 and 9.6.
10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to issue structure against the respondent no. 3
for his failure in administration upon respondent
no. 4 and 5.
10.4 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased

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to direct the Respondent no. 1 to 3 and the
Respondent no. 5 to 11 to pay compensation
as deem fit by this honorable court to the
petitioner either independently or jointly within
stipulated period towards her harassment and
spoil of carrier.
10.5 That in the light of the averment made
above the respondent no. 3 may kindly be
direct to initiate suitable departmental
proceedings/action against respondent no. 5 to
11.
10.6 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to grant any other relief, as if may
deem fit and appropriate.
10.7 Cost of the petition may also be given. ”
2. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell are that the petitioner is a
permanent resident of Bilaspur and belongs to the “Other
Backward Class”, possessing duly issued and verified caste and
domicile certificates from the competent authorities. She
completed her High School Examination in the year 2009 and
Higher Secondary Examination in March, 2011, in which her name
was consistently recorded as “Surabhi Yadav, D/o Shri Shiv
Shankar Yadav”, with her mother’s name recorded as Smt.
Sulekha Yadav. On 12.04.2012, the petitioner got married to Shri
Rajik Ahmed Ansari according to Muslim rites and customs,
whereafter, as a consequence of her marriage and matrimonial
circumstances, she came to be known as Suhana Ansari.

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Thereafter, in the year 2013, she obtained admission in
respondent No.5-Institution, an autonomous institution recognized
by the competent authorities and affiliated to respondent No.4-
University. She thereafter successfully completed B.Sc. (Home
Science) during 2013-16, M.Sc. (Home Science – Human
Development) during 2016-17 and Post Graduate Diploma in
Guidance and Counselling during 2018-19.
3. During the period of her studies from 2013 to 2019, the petitioner
was a regular student of respondent No.5 and all her academic
records, including the marksheets and degree certificates relating
to her B.Sc. and M.Sc. courses, were issued in the name of “Smt.
Suhana Ansari, W/o Rajik Ahmed Ansari”, while her mother’s
name was reflected separately. However, in the Post Graduate
Diploma certificate issued in the year 2019, respondent No.5
made wholly inconsistent and erroneous entries, describing the
petitioner as “Ku. Suhana Ansari, Father/Husband of Rajik Ahmed
Ansari”, while simultaneously mentioning the name of her
biological mother, Smt. Sulekha. Thus, even according to the
records of respondent No.5 itself, the petitioner’s identity was
recorded differently at different stages, without any lawful basis or
consistent procedure.
4. Unfortunately, the petitioner’s matrimonial relationship did not
subsist and, by judgment and decree dated 24.02.2022 passed by
the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bilaspur in Civil Suit

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No.447-A/2021, her marriage dated 12.04.2012 with Shri Rajik
Ahmed Ansari was declared nullified. Consequent upon the said
judicial declaration and restoration of her status and identity, the
petitioner resumed her original name and identity as “Surabhi
Yadav, D/o Shri Shiv Shankar Yadav” in her Aadhaar Card, caste
certificate, domicile certificate, bank records and other
governmental documents. Thereafter, being a qualified person and
seeking employment for securing her future and livelihood, she
applied for various Government posts; however, the existence of
inconsistent names in her educational records became a serious
impediment and, in certain instances, resulted in rejection of her
candidature at the threshold.
5. Having no effective remedy, the petitioner approached respondent
authorities and submitted applications dated 17.05.2022 and
20.05.2022 seeking correction/restoration of her name in the
academic records. Upon failure of the authorities to take
appropriate action, she was constrained to approach the Court by
filing W.P.(C) No.2521/2022, wherein this Court, by order dated
03.11.2022, directed the petitioner to submit a detailed
representation along with the relevant documents and further
directed respondent No.4 to decide the same in accordance with
law within the stipulated period. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner
submitted her detailed representation and respondent No.4, by
communication dated 24.11.2022, directed respondent No.5 to
examine the matter and take necessary action. However, instead

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of resolving the issue on the basis of the petitioner’s undisputed
documents and the decree of the competent Family Court,
respondent No.5 constituted/relied upon the so-called “Governing
Body”, which ultimately rejected the petitioner’s claim by resolution
dated 06.03.2023, now impugned in the present petition.
6. The petitioner contends that the impugned resolution is wholly
arbitrary, contrary to the documentary record and beyond the
jurisdiction vested in the Governing Body under the applicable
UGC Regulations governing autonomous colleges. The
petitioner’s grievance is not founded upon any claim for creation of
a new identity, but upon correction and restoration of her original
identity, which stands established by her pre-marriage educational
records, Government-issued identity documents and the judgment
and decree of the competent Family Court. The impugned action
has caused continuing prejudice to the petitioner’s educational
and employment prospects and has effectively deprived her of a
fair opportunity to secure her livelihood. The petitioner has,
therefore, invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
seeking appropriate directions for correction and issuance of her
academic documents, consequential action against the erring
authorities and such other reliefs as may be warranted in the facts
and circumstances of the case.
7. Mr. Avinash K. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, would submit that the impugned resolution dated

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06.03.2023 passed by the so-called Governing Body of
respondent No.5-Institution is wholly arbitrary, illegal, contrary to
the undisputed documentary record and unsustainable in law.
Learned counsel would submit that the controversy in the present
case is essentially confined to correction/restoration of the
petitioner’s identity in her academic records, and there is no
dispute whatsoever with regard to the identity of the petitioner. The
petitioner had originally been recorded in her school and
educational records as “Surabhi Yadav, D/o Shri Shiv Shankar
Yadav”, and the said identity is duly borne out from her High
School and Higher Secondary School certificates. It is submitted
that, after her marriage on 12.04.2012, her name came to be
changed in her matrimonial circumstances to “Suhana Ansari”,
and respondent No.5 itself accepted the said change and
permitted the petitioner to pursue her higher studies under the
changed name. Thus, the respondent-Institution cannot, after
having accepted and acted upon the changed name for several
years, now take an inconsistent stand and refuse to restore the
petitioner’s original identity when the matrimonial relationship itself
has subsequently been brought to an end by a decree of the
competent Family Court.
8. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner’s case is
fortified by the judgment and decree dated 24.02.2022 passed by
the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bilaspur, pursuant to
which the matrimonial relationship of the petitioner with Shri Rajik

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Ahmed Ansari stood legally brought to an end. Consequent upon
the said judicial determination, the petitioner resumed her original
identity as “Surabhi Yadav, D/o Shri Shiv Shankar Yadav”, which
has thereafter been duly reflected in her Aadhaar Card, domicile
certificate, caste certificate, bank records and other Government
documents. Learned counsel would submit that the petitioner
thereafter approached the concerned educational authorities with
a legitimate request that her academic records also be brought in
conformity with her legally restored identity. The petitioner initially
submitted representations dated 17.05.2022 and 20.05.2022, but
despite the same, no effective action was taken, compelling her to
approach the Court in W.P.(C) No.2521/2022. The Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court, by order dated 03.11.2022, directed
consideration of her representation in accordance with law.
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted a detailed
representation before the competent University authority, which
forwarded the matter to respondent No.5; however, instead of
resolving the issue in accordance with the documents and the
direction of this Court, the respondent authorities ultimately
rejected the petitioner’s claim by the impugned resolution dated
06.03.2023.
9. Learned counsel would then submit that the plea raised by the
respondents regarding availability of an alternative remedy before
the Students’ Grievance Redressal Committee of the University
Grants Commission is wholly misconceived and cannot defeat the

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maintainability of the present writ petition. It is submitted that the
respondents have placed reliance upon the UGC notification dated
11.04.2023 and the University Grants Commission (Redress of
Grievances of Students) Regulations, 2023 (for short, ‘2023
Regulations’) ; however, the petitioner had already completed her
courses much prior thereto, having been admitted to respondent
No.5-Institution in the year 2013-14 and having completed her
B.Sc., M.Sc. and Post Graduate Diploma courses during the
subsequent academic sessions. Learned counsel would contend
that neither the notification dated 11.04.2023 nor the Regulations
relied upon by the respondents contain any provision giving them
retrospective operation so as to create an alternative statutory
remedy in respect of a grievance arising out of academic records
and events which had already occurred several years prior
thereto. Therefore, the respondents cannot rely upon a
subsequent regulatory mechanism to non-suit the petitioner in the
present proceedings.
10. Learned counsel would further contend that, even otherwise, the
grievance raised by the petitioner does not fall within the
categories of grievances contemplated under the said UGC
mechanism so as to compel her to avail such alternative remedy.
Drawing attention to the relevant provisions defining the nature of
student grievances, learned counsel would submit that the notified
categories principally relate to matters such as admission or
refusal of admission, irregularity in admission, withholding of

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documents, demand of money, reservation, scholarship, conduct
of examinations, amenities, refund of fees, discrimination, denial
of quality education, harassment or victimisation and decisions
contrary to statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations or guidelines.
According to learned counsel, the petitioner’s case is materially
different, inasmuch as she is seeking correction/restoration of her
own name and identity in academic certificates on the basis of
pre-existing educational records, public documents and a decree
passed by a competent court, coupled with the subsequent
Government Gazette notification recognising the
change/restoration of her name. It is therefore submitted that the
alternative remedy relied upon by the respondents is neither
efficacious nor applicable to the peculiar grievance raised in the
present case.
11. Learned counsel would also assail the reasoning adopted by the
respondent-Institution in the impugned resolution on its own
merits. It is submitted that respondent No.5 had itself accepted the
petitioner’s changed name at the time of her admission and
throughout the course of her studies and had issued her various
academic documents in the name of “Suhana Ansari, W/o Rajik
Ahmed Ansari”. Having done so, respondent No.5 cannot now
contend that the petitioner’s request for restoration of her original
name is impermissible. More importantly, learned counsel points
out that the Post Graduate Diploma certificate issued by
respondent No.5 contains an inherently contradictory and

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erroneous description of the petitioner, wherein she has been
shown as “Ku. Suhana Ansari, Husband/Father of Rajik Ahmed
Ansari”, though Rajik Ahmed Ansari was in fact her husband and
Smt. Sulekha was her biological mother. Thus, the very records
relied upon by the respondent-Institution demonstrate that the
mistake in the academic record is attributable to the Institution
itself. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner cannot be made
to suffer throughout her life on account of an erroneous entry
made by the educational authority, particularly when her true
identity is established by contemporaneous records and official
documents.
12. Placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Jigya Yadav (Minor) through Guardian/Father Hari Singh
Yadav v. Central Board of Secondary Education, (2021) 7 SCC
535, learned counsel would submit that the Supreme Court, while
considering the question of change/correction of particulars in
educational certificates, has recognised the distinction between
correction of particulars on the basis of public documents and a
subsequent change of name by choice. Learned counsel would
particularly rely upon paragraph 194 and the directions issued
therein, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where a
request for change in the educational certificate is sought to be
made consistent with public documents such as a birth certificate,
Aadhaar card, election card, etc., the educational authority may
entertain such request, subject to reasonable procedural

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safeguards such as affidavit, prescribed fee, public notice or
publication in the Official Gazette, as may be applicable. Learned
counsel would submit that the ratio of the said judgment squarely
supports the petitioner’s claim, since her request is not founded
upon a mere assertion or an afterthought but is supported by her
earlier educational records, Government-issued identity
documents, the judgment and decree of the competent Family
Court and the Government Gazette notification recording her
name as “Surabhi Yadav”.
13. It is lastly submitted by learned counsel that the respondents,
being public authorities and educational institutions governed by
statutory and regulatory requirements, cannot act contrary to the
official records and notifications issued by the competent
Government authorities. Learned counsel would submit that the
State Government itself issued notification dated 28.04.2023
recognising the petitioner’s name as “Surabhi Yadav”, and the
respondent authorities are bound to take cognizance of such
official declaration rather than perpetuate an inconsistent identity
in the petitioner’s academic certificates. It is further submitted that
the back side of the marksheets and certificates issued by the
respondent-Institution itself provides a mechanism for correction of
errors in marksheets, including correction on payment of the
prescribed charges after expiry of the stipulated period. Therefore,
even on the Institution’s own stated procedure, there was no
absolute prohibition against correction of the petitioner’s academic

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records. Learned counsel would submit that the impugned
resolution, instead of facilitating correction of an apparent and
demonstrable error and bringing the academic records in
conformity with the petitioner’s legally recognised identity, has
resulted in grave prejudice to her, particularly as she is a qualified
person seeking employment and her inconsistent academic
identity has the potential to obstruct her candidature for public
employment. It is, therefore, urged that the impugned resolution
dated 06.03.2023 be quashed and the respondents be directed to
correct and issue the petitioner’s academic records in accordance
with her legally established identity and the applicable law.
14. On the other hand, Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.2-University Grants Commission (for
short, “UGC”), would oppose the submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioner and submit that the UGC has
been constituted under the University Grants Commission Act,
1956, which was enacted with the object of making provisions for
coordination and determination of standards in universities and for
matters connected therewith. Learned counsel would submit that
under the statutory scheme of the UGC Act, the Commission has
been entrusted with the duty to take such steps as it may deem
necessary for the promotion and coordination of university
education and for determination and maintenance of standards of
teaching, examination and research. It is further submitted that
Section 26 of the UGC Act confers upon the Commission the

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statutory power to frame regulations in respect of the matters
enumerated therein and, therefore, the regulations framed by the
Commission in exercise of its statutory powers are binding upon
the institutions governed by the regulatory framework of higher
education. According to learned counsel, the UGC is not the
authority which has issued the impugned resolution against the
petitioner and, therefore, its role in the present proceedings is only
regulatory in nature.
15. Learned counsel would further submit that respondent No.2 has
been impleaded as a formal party and is not a contesting
respondent in the present proceedings. It is contended that no
substantive relief has been sought against the UGC with respect
to the petitioner’s academic records or the impugned resolution
dated 06.03.2023. The actual grievance of the petitioner,
according to learned counsel, is against respondent No.5-
Institution and the concerned University authorities, who are
responsible for maintenance and correction of the petitioner’s
academic records. Therefore, the UGC cannot be held responsible
for any alleged irregularity or discrepancy committed by
respondent No.5 in issuing the petitioner’s marksheets, degree or
diploma certificates. Learned counsel would submit that merely
because the UGC has been impleaded as a party, no liability can
be fastened upon it in the absence of any specific statutory or
administrative act attributable to the Commission.

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16. Learned counsel would next submit that the writ petition is liable to
be dismissed on the ground of availability of an efficacious
alternative remedy under the 2023 Regulations. It is submitted that
the aforesaid regulatory mechanism has been introduced with the
object of providing an appropriate forum for redressal of
grievances of students in higher educational institutions and for
resolving difficulties faced by students in such institutions. Learned
counsel would contend that if the petitioner is aggrieved by any
decision of the educational institution which, according to her, is
contrary to the applicable statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations
or guidelines, she has an appropriate remedy under the grievance
redressal mechanism prescribed by the UGC. It is, therefore,
submitted that instead of directly invoking the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of this Court, the petitioner ought to have approached
the competent grievance redressal forum constituted under the
2023 Regulations. On this ground alone, according to learned
counsel, the present petition deserves to be dismissed or the
petitioner ought to be relegated to the statutory/regulatory
alternative remedy available to her.
17. Learned counsel would further submit that the UGC has, in fact,
taken steps to facilitate resolution of the petitioner’s grievance. He
would draw attention to the communication dated 02.12.2023
issued by respondent No.2 to the Registrar, Atal Bihari Vajpayee
Vishwavidyalaya, Bilaspur, whereby the University was requested
to take appropriate steps in the light of the order dated 03.11.2022

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passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C)
No.2521/2022 and to resolve the grievance of the petitioner in
accordance with the relevant law, rules and ordinances. It is
therefore contended that the UGC has neither remained inactive
nor acted against the petitioner; rather, it has already
communicated with the concerned University and called upon it to
take appropriate action in accordance with law. Thus, there is no
occasion to issue any further direction against respondent No.2 in
the present proceedings. Learned counsel would submit that the
petitioner cannot seek any adverse order against the UGC when
the Commission itself has already directed the concerned
University to examine and resolve the grievance in accordance
with law.
18. Learned counsel would also rely upon the judicial precedents
dealing with alteration or change of names in educational records.
Referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Board
of Secondary Education of Assam v. Md. Sarifuz Zaman, 2003
Supp (6) SCR 1273 , as followed by this Court in Anup Kumar
Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, W.P.(C) No.1612/2015,
learned counsel would submit that a person does not possess an
indefeasible or absolute right to seek alteration of his or her name
in academic records. According to learned counsel, academic
certificates and educational records are maintained in accordance
with the applicable rules and regulations, and any alteration
therein must necessarily conform to the procedure prescribed by

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the competent educational authority. It is therefore submitted that
the petitioner cannot claim correction of her academic records as
a matter of absolute right merely on the basis of her subsequent
change or restoration of name, particularly when such correction is
sought after considerable lapse of time and after completion of the
academic courses.
19. Learned counsel would further submit that the reliefs sought by the
petitioner against respondent Nos.1 and 2 are wholly
misconceived. Drawing attention to the prayer clause, it is
submitted that the petitioner has sought a direction to respondent
Nos.1 and 2 to reconsider the recognition of respondent No.5-
Institution in the light of the allegations made in the writ petition.
According to learned counsel, the question of recognition of the
Institution is entirely distinct from the petitioner’s individual
grievance concerning correction of her name in academic records.
Even assuming, without admitting, that any irregularity has
occurred in the petitioner’s academic documents, such alleged
irregularity cannot constitute a ground for reconsideration or
cancellation of the recognition granted to the Institution. Learned
counsel would, therefore, submit that the prayer seeking
reconsideration of the recognition of respondent No.5 is wholly
unwarranted, uncalled for and beyond the scope of the
controversy involved in the present writ petition.
20. Learned counsel would lastly submit that the prayer seeking

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compensation from respondent Nos.1 to 3 and 5 to 11 is equally
unsustainable insofar as respondent No.2 is concerned. It is
contended that the UGC neither issued the academic certificates
in question nor passed the impugned resolution dated 06.03.2023
and, therefore, no act of omission or commission giving rise to any
claim for compensation can be attributed to respondent No.2.
Learned counsel would submit that, being essentially a formal and
regulatory party, the UGC cannot be saddled with any liability for
the alleged harassment, loss of employment opportunity or other
consequences pleaded by the petitioner. It is further submitted that
since the answering respondent is not contesting the factual
controversy between the petitioner and the concerned educational
authorities, it has consciously refrained from filing a detailed para-
wise reply, while reserving its right to place an appropriate
response on record if circumstances so require. Learned counsel
would, therefore, pray that the writ petition, insofar as the reliefs
sought against respondent No.2 are concerned, be dismissed and
respondent No.2 be discharged from any liability in the matter.
21. Dr. Arham Siddiqui, learned counsel appearing for respondent
Nos.3 and 5/State, would oppose the submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioner and submit that the present
petition, as framed, is wholly misconceived and does not disclose
infringement of any legally enforceable right of the petitioner so as
to warrant exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel

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would submit that the petitioner is essentially aggrieved by the
resolution dated 06.03.2023 passed by the Governing Body of the
autonomous institution, whereby her request for restoration of her
name in the academic records has been declined. According to
learned counsel, the decision has been taken by the competent
body after considering the relevant material and in accordance
with the rules and regulations governing the autonomous
institution. It is, therefore, contended that no jurisdictional error,
perversity, arbitrariness or violation of any statutory provision has
been demonstrated by the petitioner which may justify interference
by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
22. Learned counsel would further submit that respondent No.4-
University, by communication dated 03.01.2023, had already
clarified the position to the petitioner that there was no provision
under the applicable Bye-laws or provisions governing Atal Bihari
Vajpayee Vishwavidyalaya, Bilaspur, for changing the name of the
petitioner in the academic records. Since the petitioner had
pursued her studies in an autonomous college, the University had
specifically informed her that the matter was required to be
considered by the concerned autonomous institution. It is
submitted that the University, therefore, neither refused to consider
the petitioner’s grievance arbitrarily nor acted contrary to law;
rather, it directed the petitioner to approach the competent
authority having jurisdiction over the academic records in
question. Learned counsel would submit that the subsequent

21
decision taken by the autonomous institution was thus within the
framework indicated by the University itself and cannot be
characterised as an arbitrary or unauthorised exercise of power.
23. Learned counsel would then submit that the Governing Body of
respondent No.5-Institution, in its meeting held on 06.03.2023,
considered the petitioner’s request and found that there was no
enabling provision in the applicable ordinance or rules permitting
alteration of the petitioner’s name in the academic records or
issuance of an amended marksheet. It is submitted that the
petitioner had herself furnished her examination forms in the name
of “Suhana Ansari, W/o Rajik Ahmed Ansari” for the Bachelor of
Home Science examinations for the academic sessions 2013-14,
2014-15 and 2015-16. After she successfully appeared in and
cleared the said examinations, the marksheets were accordingly
issued in the same name. Likewise, while appearing for the Post
Graduate Diploma in Guidance and Counselling examination in
the year 2018-19, the petitioner again furnished her name as
“Suhana Ansari”, and the academic record was prepared and
issued accordingly. Learned counsel would therefore contend that
the entries in the academic records were not made unilaterally or
without the petitioner’s knowledge; rather, they were based upon
the particulars furnished by the petitioner herself in the
examination forms.
24. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner cannot,

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after voluntarily furnishing a particular name in her examination
forms and completing her courses under that name, seek
issuance of fresh or amended academic certificates merely
because her personal circumstances subsequently changed.
According to learned counsel, the academic records of an
educational institution are required to faithfully reflect the
particulars furnished by the candidate at the relevant stage and
cannot be altered dehors the applicable rules and regulations. It is
submitted that the petitioner’s subsequent restoration of her earlier
name in Government identity documents or other records does
not, by itself, confer an indefeasible right to compel the
educational institution to alter certificates already issued in
accordance with the particulars furnished by her at the time of the
examinations. Learned counsel would therefore contend that the
impugned resolution cannot be said to be either arbitrary or illegal
merely because the petitioner seeks a different identity in her
academic records at a subsequent stage.
25. Learned counsel would also submit that the reliance placed by the
petitioner upon her marriage, subsequent dissolution thereof and
restoration of her original name does not alter the legal position
insofar as the academic certificates are concerned. It is submitted
that the respondent authorities do not dispute the petitioner’s
personal status or the judgment and decree passed by the
competent Family Court; however, such decree does not
automatically authorise alteration of academic records in the

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absence of a provision under the governing rules permitting such
alteration. Learned counsel would contend that the question
before the respondents was not whether the petitioner was entitled
to use her original name for future purposes, but whether an
educational institution could retrospectively alter the name
recorded in certificates which had already been issued on the
basis of examination forms submitted by the petitioner herself.
According to learned counsel, in the absence of a specific
enabling provision, the Governing Body was justified in declining
the request.
26. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner has
sought to attribute mala fides, arbitrariness and high-handedness
to the respondent authorities without placing any cogent material
establishing such allegations. It is submitted that the decision
dated 06.03.2023 is a reasoned decision taken by the competent
Governing Body after consideration of the petitioner’s claim and
the applicable regulatory framework. The mere fact that the
decision is adverse to the petitioner cannot constitute a ground for
holding that the authorities acted with mala fide intention or
beyond jurisdiction. Learned counsel would therefore submit that
the petitioner has failed to establish any perversity or patent
illegality in the decision-making process warranting interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
27. Learned counsel would lastly submit that the relief sought by the

24
petitioner for reconsideration of the recognition of respondent
No.5-Institution is wholly disproportionate and has no nexus with
the grievance raised in the present petition. It is contended that an
individual dispute relating to correction of a name in academic
records cannot, by itself, furnish any basis for reconsideration or
withdrawal of the recognition granted to an autonomous
educational institution. Similarly, the claim for compensation
against the respondent authorities is stated to be wholly
unsupported by any established wrongful act or actionable liability
attributable to them. Learned counsel would submit that, after
considering the petitioner’s case and the material available on
record, the authorities have acted within their jurisdiction and in
accordance with the applicable rules. The petitioner, therefore, has
failed to make out any ground for grant of the reliefs sought, and
the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
28. Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.4-Atal Bihari Vajpayee University, opposes the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the
answering respondent is essentially a formal party, as the
substantive grievance of the petitioner arises out of the resolution
dated 06.03.2023 passed by the Governing Body of respondent
No.5-autonomous college. He submits that the petitioner had been
admitted to respondent No.5 in the year 2013 and, the said
institution having autonomous status, its academic, financial and
general administrative affairs are governed by its own Governing

25
Body. Referring to the UGC notifications dated 12.02.2018 and
03.04.2023, learned counsel submits that the authority to conduct
examinations, declare results and issue marksheets, migration
certificates and other academic documents vests with the
autonomous college, whereas the role of the parent University is
substantially confined to conferring the degree in respect of the
autonomous college. It is, therefore, contended that respondent
No.4 has no authority to effect any change in the name recorded
in the marksheets or other academic documents issued by
respondent No.5, and no effective relief in that regard can be
granted against the answering respondent.
29. Learned counsel further submits that respondent No.4 has, in fact,
duly complied with the order dated 03.11.2022 passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.2521/2022 by
forwarding the petitioner's representation to respondent No.5 on
24.11.2022 and thereafter communicating to the petitioner, vide
letter dated 03.01.2023, that the issue concerning change of name
in the academic records of the autonomous college falls within the
domain of respondent No.5. He further submits that, in any event,
the petitioner has an efficacious alternative mechanism under the
University Grants Commission (Redressal of Grievances of
Students) Regulations, 2023, and therefore the writ petition,
insofar as it seeks any relief against respondent No.4, is not
maintainable. On these premises, learned counsel submits that no
cause of action survives against respondent No.4 and the petition,

26
to the extent it seeks any direction against the answering
respondent, deserves to be dismissed.
30. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
and have perused the pleadings, the documents placed on record,
the impugned resolution dated 06.03.2023 passed by the
Governing Body of respondent No.5, the communications issued
by respondent No.4-University, and the other material available on
record.
31. Before proceeding to consider the rival submissions, it would be
apposite to notice the governing legal position, which has a direct
bearing upon the controversy involved in the present writ petition.
32. The issue of correction or change of particulars in educational
certificates is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court, in Jigya
Yadav (supra) considered in detail the distinction between a
request for “correction” and a request for “change” in educational
records and examined the permissible extent to which an
examining or educational authority may alter the particulars
appearing in certificates already issued. The Supreme Court, while
balancing the sanctity and finality of educational records with the
genuine need of an individual to have his or her identity correctly
reflected, rejected an approach which would render alteration of
such records wholly impossible merely because the examination
had already been conducted or the result had already been
declared. The Court specifically held that administrative efficiency

27
cannot be elevated to such a level as to make it practically
impossible for a person to alter his or her identity in educational
certificates where the change is otherwise genuine and legally
permissible.
33. In paragraph 194 of Jigya Yadav (supra), the Supreme Court
specifically dealt with a request for “change” of particulars and
noticed two broad situations: first, where the change is sought on
the basis of public documents such as a birth certificate, Aadhaar
card, election card or other authentic records, so that the
educational certificate may be brought in conformity with such
documents; and second, where the change is on account of an
acquired name by choice at a subsequent point of time. In respect
of the former category, the Supreme Court held that genuine
public documents cannot simply be ignored by the educational
authority and that the request for alteration may be entertained
subject to reasonable safeguards, including affidavit, indemnity,
prescribed fees, public notice or Gazette publication, surrender of
the original certificate and an appropriate endorsement or
disclaimer, wherever necessary. Thus, the law declared by the
Supreme Court does not recognise an absolute prohibition against
correction or change in educational certificates after declaration of
the result; rather, it requires the competent authority to examine
the genuineness of the request and adopt a reasonable regulatory
mechanism. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

28
“ CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS TO
CBSE
192. Although we have discussed the broad
issues canvassed before us, in the ultimate
analysis the real dispute requiring resolution is
about the nature of correction or change, as
the case may be, permissible to be carried by
the CBSE at the instance of the student
including past student. As noted earlier,
broadly, two situations would arise.
193. The first is where the incumbent wants
“correction” in the certificate issued by the
CBSE to be made consistent with the
particulars mentioned in the school records.
193.1 As we have held there is no reason for
the CBSE to turn down such request or attach
any precondition except reasonable period of
limitation and keeping in mind the period for
which the CBSE has to maintain its record
under the extant regulations. While doing so, it
can certainly insist for compliance of other
conditions by the incumbent, such as, to file
sworn affidavit making necessary declaration
and to indemnify the CBSE from any claim
against it by third party because of such
correction. The CBSE would be justified in
insisting for surrender/return of the original
certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as
the case may be) issued by it for replacing it
with the fresh certificate to be issued after
carrying out necessary corrections with
caption/annotation against the changes

29
carried out and the date of such correction. It
may retain the original entries as it is except in
respect of correction of name effected in
exercise of right to be forgotten. The fresh
certificate may also contain disclaimer that the
CBSE cannot be held responsible for the
genuineness of the school records produced
by the incumbent in support of the request to
record correction in the original CBSE
certificate. The CBSE can also insist for
reasonable prescribed fees to be paid by the
incumbent in lieu of administrative expenses
for issuing fresh certificate.
193.2 At the same time, the CBSE cannot
impose precondition of applying for correction
consistent with the school records only before
publication of results. Such a condition, as we
have held, would be unreasonable and
excessive. We repeat that if the application for
recording correction is based on the school
records as it obtained at the time of
publication of results and issue of certificate
by the CBSE, it will be open to CBSE to
provide for reasonable limitation period within
which the application for recording correction
in certificate issued by it may be entertained
by it. However, if the request for recording
change is based on changed school records
post the publication of results and issue of
certificate by the CBSE, the candidate would
be entitled to apply for recording such a
change within the reasonable limitation period
prescribed by the CBSE. In this situation, the

30
candidate cannot claim that she had no
knowledge about the change recorded in the
school records because such a change would
occur obviously at her instance. If she makes
such application for correction of the school
records, she is expected to apply to the CBSE
immediately after the school records are
modified and which ought to be done within a
reasonable time.
193.3 Indeed, it would be open to the CBSE to
reject the application in the event the period
for preservation of official records under the
extant regulations had expired and no record
of the candidate concerned is traceable or can
be reconstructed. In the case of subsequent
amendment of school records, that may occur
due to different reasons including because of
choice exercised by the candidate regarding
change of name. To put it differently, request
for recording of correction in the certificate
issued by the CBSE to bring it in line with the
school records of the incumbent need not be
limited to application made prior to publication
of examination results of the CBSE.
194. As regards request for “change” of
particulars in the certificate issued by the
CBSE, it presupposes that the particulars
intended to be recorded in the CBSE
certificate are not consistent with the school
records. Such a request could be made in two
different situations. The first is on the basis of
public documents like Birth Certificate,

31
Aadhaar Card/Election Card, etc. and to
incorporate change in the CBSE certificate
consistent therewith. The second possibility is
when the request for change is due to the
acquired name by choice at a later point of
time. That change need not be backed by
public documents pertaining to the candidate.
194.1 Reverting to the first category, as noted
earlier, there is a legal presumption in relation
to the public documents as envisaged in the
1872 Act. Such public documents, therefore,
cannot be ignored by the CBSE. Taking note
of those documents, the CBSE may entertain
the request for recording change in the
certificate issued by it. This, however, need
not be unconditional, but subject to certain
reasonable conditions to be fulfilled by the
applicant as may be prescribed by the CBSE,
such as, of furnishing sworn affidavit
containing declaration and to indemnify the
CBSE and upon payment of prescribed fees in
lieu of administrative expenses. The CBSE
may also insist for issuing Public Notice and
publication in the Official Gazette before
recording the change in the fresh certificate to
be issued by it upon surrender/return of the
original certificate (or duplicate original
certificate, as the case may be) by the
applicant. The fresh certificate may contain
disclaimer and caption/annotation against the
original entry (except in respect of change of
name effected in exercise of right to be
forgotten) indicating the date on which change

32
has been recorded and the basis thereof. In
other words, the fresh certificate may retain
original particulars while recording the change
along with caption/annotation referred to
above (except in respect of change of name
effected in exercise of right to be forgotten).
194.2 However, in the latter situation where
the change is to be effected on the basis of
new acquired name without any supporting
school record or public document, that request
may be entertained upon insisting for prior
permission/declaration by a Court of law in
that regard and publication in the Official
Gazette including surrender/return of original
certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as
the case may be) issued by CBSE and upon
payment of prescribed fees. The fresh
certificate as in other situations referred to
above, retain the original entry (except in
respect of change of name effected in
exercise of right to be forgotten) and to insert
caption/annotation indicating the date on
which it has been recorded and other details
including disclaimer of CBSE. This is so
because the CBSE is not required to
adjudicate nor has the mechanism to verify
the correctness of the claim of the applicant.
195. In light of the above, in exercise of our
plenary jurisdiction, we direct the CBSE to
process the applications for correction or
change, as the case may be, in the certificate
issued by it in the respective cases under

33
consideration. Even other pending
applications and future applications for such
request be processed on the same lines and
in particular the conclusion and directions
recorded hitherto in paragraphs 193 and 194,
as may be applicable, until amendment of
relevant Byelaws. Additionally, the CBSE shall
take immediate steps to amend its relevant
Byelaws so as to incorporate the stated
mechanism for recording correction or
change, as the case may be, in the certificates
already issued or to be issued by it. ”
34. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position and the principles
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jigya Yadav (supra),
the principal question that arises for consideration in the present
writ petition is whether respondent No.5-Institution was justified in
rejecting the petitioner’s request for restoration/correction of her
name and parentage in the academic records solely on the ground
that no specific provision exists under the applicable rules or
ordinances permitting such alteration, without duly considering her
original educational records, the judgment and decree dated
24.02.2022 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Bilaspur, and the subsequent public and governmental documents
recognising her restored identity. The further question is whether,
in the absence of an express prohibition under the applicable
rules, the Institution could decline the petitioner’s request
altogether without examining the genuineness of her claim and the
possibility of effecting the requisite correction subject to

34
reasonable procedural safeguards.
35. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid question
deserves to be answered in favour of the petitioner. The reason is
not merely that the petitioner seeks a change of name in an
academic certificate, but that the peculiar facts of the present case
demonstrate that the request is founded upon a complete and
legally established chain of identity. The petitioner was originally
known as “Surabhi Yadav, D/o Shiv Shankar Yadav”, with her
mother’s name recorded as Smt. Sulekha Yadav. Her educational
records prior to marriage, including her Class 10 and Higher
Secondary records, consistently reflected the said identity.
Thereafter, upon her marriage with Rajik Ahmed Ansari on
12.04.2012, she adopted the name “Suhana Ansari W/o Rajik
Ahmed Ansari” and pursued her higher studies under that name.
Therefore, the entry in the subsequent college records was not an
unexplained or fabricated identity but a name which the petitioner
had adopted during the subsistence of her matrimonial
relationship.
36. The material on record further establishes that the matrimonial
relationship itself came to an end through a judicial process. The
competent Family Court, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No.447-A/2021, by
judgment and decree dated 24.02.2022, declared the marriage
between the petitioner and Rajik Ahmed Ansari to be nullified.
Thereafter, the petitioner restored her original identity as “Surabhi

35
Yadav D/o Shiv Shankar Yadav”. Significantly, such restoration
was not confined to a self-serving declaration made before
respondent No.5. The petitioner has placed on record subsequent
public and governmental documents in which her original name
and parentage have been restored, including her Aadhaar and
other identity records, and the State Government notification dated
28.04.2023. The request, therefore, is supported by a judicial
decree and contemporaneous public records and cannot be
characterised as a mere attempt to obtain a fresh identity or to
alter academic records for an extraneous purpose.
37. There is yet another circumstance which materially distinguishes
the present case from an ordinary application seeking a
subsequent change of name. The petitioner is not seeking to
erase her academic history or to create a new educational identity.
She seeks that her academic records be brought in conformity
with her legally restored identity and with the identity under which
she had pursued her education prior to her marriage. The
academic record itself would remain intact; the course undertaken,
year of admission, year of passing, subjects, marks and
qualification would remain exactly the same. The only alteration
sought is with regard to the name and parentage by which the
petitioner is identified. Consequently, there is no question of any
alteration in the substance or validity of the qualification obtained
by her.

36
38. The objection of respondent No.5 that the petitioner herself had
filled the examination forms in the name “Suhana Ansari W/o Rajik
Ahmed Ansari” is also not sufficient to justify an absolute refusal. It
is true that an educational institution is ordinarily entitled to rely
upon the particulars furnished by a student at the time of
admission and examination and cannot be expected to undertake
an independent inquiry into every personal circumstance of a
student. But that principle cannot be converted into a permanent
embargo against correction when subsequent circumstances,
supported by legally admissible and reliable documents, establish
that the identity of the person has changed or has been restored.
The Supreme Court in Jigya Yadav (supra) has specifically
recognised that a request for change may arise even after
publication of the result and that a complete prohibition on such
alteration would be disproportionate.
39. The stand of the respondents also proceeds on an unduly
technical interpretation of the absence of an express provision
permitting change of name. The Governing Body, in the impugned
resolution dated 06.03.2023, has essentially reasoned that since
there is no specific provision in the ordinance or rules for changing
the name or issuing an amended marksheet, the request cannot
be accepted. Such an approach, in the peculiar facts of the
present case, cannot be sustained. The absence of a specific
procedural provision does not necessarily amount to a substantive
prohibition. At the highest, it indicates the necessity of devising a

37
reasonable procedure and insisting upon appropriate safeguards
before making the alteration. An educational authority, which is
entrusted with maintaining authentic academic records, cannot
decline to consider a genuine claim merely because its rules are
silent as to the precise procedure to be followed.
40. The distinction between absence of a rule prescribing a procedure
and existence of a rule prohibiting the relief is fundamental. The
respondents have not been able to point out any statutory
provision, ordinance, regulation or binding rule which expressly
prohibits the correction/restoration of a candidate's name in a case
where the request is supported by a competent court decree and
public documents. What has been relied upon is only the absence
of a provision enabling the Governing Body to change the name.
Such silence cannot, by itself, be elevated into a prohibition,
particularly when the consequence of such interpretation would be
to perpetuate in the official academic record an identity which the
competent judicial and governmental authorities have
subsequently recognised as no longer representing the petitioner's
present legal identity.
41. Equally significant is the fact that the petitioner had approached
the authorities promptly after the decree of the Family Court. She
submitted applications dated 17.05.2022 and 20.05.2022 seeking
correction/restoration of her name. She thereafter approached the
Court in W.P.(C) No.2521/2022, which was disposed of on

38
03.11.2022 with a direction to submit a detailed representation and
for its consideration in accordance with law. Pursuant thereto, the
petitioner submitted her representation, which was forwarded by
respondent No.4-University to respondent No.5. Thus, this is not a
case where the petitioner slept over her rights for an indefinite
period and subsequently sought alteration of records after
decades. The chronology demonstrates that the petitioner acted
after obtaining the judicial declaration concerning her matrimonial
status and sought consequential correction of her public and
academic identity.
42. The stand of respondent No.4-University also supports the
conclusion that the ultimate decision-making authority with respect
to the marksheets and certificates issued by the autonomous
college is respondent No.5. Respondent No.4 has specifically
stated that, in view of the autonomous status of respondent No.5,
the power to conduct examinations, declare results and issue
marksheets and other certificates rests with the autonomous
college. Respondent No.4, therefore, cannot be directed to alter a
document which it did not issue. However, the fact that respondent
No.5 possesses the requisite administrative control over its
academic records cannot simultaneously become a ground for
refusing to exercise that authority in a fair, reasonable and legally
sustainable manner.
43. The plea regarding availability of an alternative grievance

39
redressal mechanism under the 2023 Regulations also does not
persuade this Court to decline interference in the present case.
The petitioner had already approached the Court in W.P.(C)
No.2521/2022, pursuant to which her representation was directed
to be considered. The authorities thereafter took a final decision
through the impugned resolution dated 06.03.2023. The
controversy before this Court is thus not merely an unaddressed
grievance but the legality of a specific administrative decision
which proceeds on an erroneous understanding of the scope of
the Governing Body's power. Moreover, the respondents have not
demonstrated that the alternative mechanism constitutes an
efficacious remedy for the precise relief sought by the petitioner
against an autonomous college's academic records in the peculiar
circumstances of the present case.
44. The plea of autonomy of respondent No.5 also cannot be
accepted as an answer to judicial review. Autonomy of an
educational institution is intended to facilitate academic
excellence, institutional efficiency and independent administration;
it does not confer immunity from the requirements of fairness,
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. An autonomous institution,
while exercising its academic and administrative powers, remains
subject to constitutional discipline. The mere fact that a decision is
taken by a Governing Body does not make such decision immune
from scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution. Where the
decision is founded upon an erroneous legal premise, namely, that

40
absence of a specific rule necessarily constitutes a prohibition
against correction, this Court is competent to interfere.
45. It is also necessary to bear in mind that educational certificates are
not documents existing in isolation. They are relied upon by a
person throughout his or her public and professional life for
admission to further courses, employment, verification of identity,
public appointments and numerous governmental and private
purposes. An incorrect or inconsistent name in such records can
consequently create serious practical difficulties. The Supreme
Court in Jigya Yadav (supra) recognised precisely this need for a
balanced mechanism which preserves the integrity of educational
records while permitting genuine correction or change on fulfilment
of reasonable safeguards.
46. The recent judicial application of the principles in Jigya Yadav
(supra) also demonstrates that educational authorities cannot treat
the declaration of a result as an absolute point of no return. In
Sahil Arsh v. National Medical Commission & Ors., decided
on 04.02.2026, the Delhi High Court, while applying the principles
declared by the Supreme Court in Jigya Yadav (supra), reiterated
that a blanket prohibition against correction after declaration of
results is impermissible and that administrative efficiency cannot
be used to make alteration of identity in educational certificates
practically impossible. Though the said decision is of a High Court
and is referred to only as persuasive authority, its reasoning is

41
consistent with the binding principles laid down by the Supreme
Court.
47. The present case stands on an even stronger footing. Here, the
petitioner does not seek alteration on the basis of a mere personal
assertion. There exists a contemporaneous documentary trail
beginning with her original school records, followed by the name
adopted after marriage, the judicial decree dated 24.02.2022
concerning the matrimonial relationship, subsequent restoration of
her original name in public documents and the Government
notification dated 28.04.2023. These circumstances provide
sufficient safeguards against impersonation, fraud or creation of a
second academic identity. The respondents have not alleged that
the petitioner is a different person, nor have they disputed the
authenticity of the Family Court decree or the public documents
relied upon by her.
48. There is, moreover, an internal inconsistency in the academic
record itself which reinforces the need for correction. While the
petitioner's B.Sc. and M.Sc. records describe her as “Suhana
Ansari W/o Rajik Ahmed Ansari”, the record relating to the Post
Graduate Diploma in Guidance and Counselling is stated to
describe her as “Ku. Suhana Ansari Husband/Father of Rajik
Ahmed Ansari”, while the mother's name is shown as Sulekha.
Thus, even if the respondents' argument that the particulars
furnished by the petitioner must ordinarily be reproduced is

42
accepted, the record concerning the Post Graduate Diploma does
not faithfully reproduce even the particulars said to have been
supplied by the petitioner. The erroneous description of Rajik
Ahmed Ansari as the petitioner's father, when he was her
husband, cannot be justified merely by invoking the sanctity of
academic records. Preservation of an erroneous entry is not the
same thing as preservation of the sanctity of an academic record.
49. This Court is conscious that academic records must ordinarily be
maintained with a high degree of certainty and stability. Courts
ought not to permit educational certificates to be altered casually
or on the basis of vague claims. Such caution is necessary to
prevent fraud, impersonation and manipulation of academic
credentials. However, the solution to that concern is not to impose
an absolute prohibition. The appropriate course is to verify the
supporting documents and, wherever necessary, impose
reasonable safeguards. This is precisely the balance struck by the
Supreme Court in Jigya Yadav (supra).
50. An important aspect of the matter, which cannot be overlooked, is
that the petitioner’s original educational records prior to her
marriage consistently recorded her name as “Surabhi Yadav”. The
mark sheet of the Class X examination conducted in the year 2009
by the Board of Higher Secondary Education, Delhi, records her
name as “Ku. Surabhi Yadav”, whereas the mark sheet of the
Class XII examination conducted in the year 2011 by the

43
Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education, Raipur, also records
her name as “Surabhi Yadav”. These contemporaneous
educational records constitute significant documentary evidence of
the petitioner’s original identity and ought to have been duly
considered while examining her subsequent request for
restoration of her name in the academic records maintained by
respondent No.5-Institution. Although the petitioner furnished her
name as “Suhana Ansari” after her marriage, that circumstance, by
itself, did not absolve the Institution of its obligation to examine the
subsequent documentary evidence and the legal developments
forming the basis of her request for restoration of her original
identity.
51. The discrepancies in the academic records further reinforce the
necessity of such examination. The marksheets relating to the
B.Sc. Home Science and M.Sc. Home Science courses do not
consistently reflect the petitioner’s mother’s name, whereas the
Post Graduate Diploma in Guidance and Counselling certificate
records her mother’s name as “Smt. Sulekha”. These
inconsistencies indicate that the academic records require careful
scrutiny rather than an outright refusal to consider the petitioner’s
request. The Institution ought to have examined the original
educational records, the particulars furnished at the time of
admission and examination, the judgment and decree of the
competent Family Court and the subsequent governmental
documents before arriving at a decision. The sanctity of academic

44
records undoubtedly requires that alterations be made only upon
proper verification; however, such sanctity cannot be invoked to
perpetuate discrepancies without examining whether they can
lawfully be corrected.
52. In Jigya Yadav (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
examining the relationship between an individual’s identity, dignity
and the right to change or retain one’s name, recognised that a
person’s name constitutes an important element of individual
identity and that the expression of such identity is protected under
the Constitution. The Court emphasised that an individual’s
identity cannot be viewed merely as an entry in official records,
divorced from the person’s dignity, freedom of expression and right
to be recognised in accordance with law. In this context, while
referring to the observations made in Navtej Singh Johar v.
Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
explained the significance of individual identity and the freedom of
a person to exercise control over his or her name. The relevant
observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“124. In fact, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of
India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, the Court noted how
the core existence of an individual is not
exemplified by her outer characteristics but by
her inner self-identification. In the context of
natural identity of an individual, this Court in
Navtej Singh Johar had noted that: (Navtej
Singh Johar case, SCC pp. 74-75, para 5)

45
"5. The natural identity of an individual
should be treated to be absolutely
essential to his being. What nature gives
is natural. That is called nature within.
Thus, that part of the personality of a
person has to be respected and not
despised or looked down upon. The said
inherent nature and the associated
natural impulses in that regard are to be
accepted. Non-acceptance of it by any
societal norm or notion and punishment
by law on some obsolete idea and
idealism affects the kernel of the identity
of an individual. Destruction of individual
identity would tantamount to crushing of
intrinsic dignity that cumulatively
encapsulates the values of privacy.
choice, freedom of speech and other
expressions. It can be viewed from
another angle. An individual in exercise of
his choice may feel that he/she should be
left alone but no one, and we mean, no
one, should impose solitude on him/her."
(emphasis supplied)
25. Identity, therefore, is an amalgam of
various internal and external Yucluding
acquired characteristics of an individual and
name can be regarded as one of the foremost
indicators of identity. And therefore, an
individual must be in complete control of her
name and law must enable her to retain as
well as to exercise such control freely "for all

46
times". Such control would inevitably include
the aspiration of an individual to be
recognised by a different name for a just
cause. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
provides for a guaranteed right to freedom of
speech and expression. In light of Navtej
Singh Johar62. this freedom would include the
freedom to lawfully express one's identity in
the manner of their liking. In other words,
expression of identity is a protected element
of freedom of expression under the
Constitution.
126. Having recognised the existence of this
right, the essential question pertains to the
rights that flow due to the change of name.
The question becomes vital because identity,
as stated above, is a combination of diverse
set of elements. Navtej Singh Johar62 dealt
with "natural identity" and here we are dealing
with name, which can only be perceived as an
"acquired identity". Therefore, the precise
scope of right and extent of restrictions could
only be determined upon deeper examination.
127. To begin with, it is important to explain
what we understand by this right to change of
name as a constituent element of freedom of
expression of identity. Any change in identity
of an individual has to go through multiple
steps and it cannot be regarded as complete
without proper fulfilment of those steps. An
individual may self-identify oneself with any
title or epithet at any point of time. But the

47
change of identity would not be regarded as
formally or legally complete until and unless
the State and its agencies take note thereof in
their records. Afterall, in social sphere, an
individual is not only recognised by how an
individual identifies oneself but also by how
his/her official records identify him/her. For, in
every public transaction of an individual,
official records introduce the person by his/her
name and other relevant particulars. ”
53. In the light of the aforesaid judicial precedents, it is quite evident
that an individual’s name is an integral component of identity and
that educational authorities cannot adopt an inflexible approach to
a genuine request for correction or change of name merely
because the relevant rules do not expressly prescribe a procedure
for such alteration.
54. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it
is apparent that the petitioner’s claim is not founded upon a mere
unilateral assertion or an attempt to create a new academic
identity. Her original name, “Surabhi Yadav”, stands recorded in
her pre-marriage educational certificates; her subsequent adoption
of the name “Suhana Ansari” was associated with her matrimonial
relationship; and the judgment and decree dated 24.02.2022
passed by the competent Family Court, followed by the
subsequent governmental documents and notification dated
28.04.2023, provide the basis for her request to restore her
original identity in the academic records. Furthermore, the

48
inconsistencies appearing in the certificates issued by respondent
No.5-Institution lend additional support to the necessity of a proper
examination of her grievance. In these circumstances, the
Institution was required to consider the petitioner’s request in the
light of the documentary evidence and the principles laid down in
Jigya Yadav (supra), while ensuring the authenticity of the
records and the prevention of any possibility of fraud or misuse.
The mere absence of an express enabling provision could not, by
itself, constitute a sufficient ground for rejecting the request
without considering whether the requisite correction could be
effected subject to reasonable safeguards. The impugned
resolution dated 06.03.2023, having declined the petitioner’s
request without appropriately addressing these material
considerations, cannot be sustained in its present form.
55. The respondents are, therefore, justified to the limited extent that
they cannot be compelled to alter the academic record without
verification or compliance with reasonable procedural safeguards.
But they are not justified in rejecting the petitioner's request
outright merely because no express provision has been found in
the applicable ordinance for such alteration. The impugned
resolution dated 06.03.2023, therefore, fails to apply the correct
legal standard. It treats the absence of a prescribed procedure as
an absolute prohibition and, in doing so, fails to consider the
overwhelming documentary material placed by the petitioner in
support of her request.

49
56. In the considered opinion of this Court, the power to maintain
academic records necessarily carries with it the ancillary obligation
to maintain them accurately and to provide a reasonable
mechanism for correcting an entry which, in the light of
subsequent legally recognised events and authentic public
documents, no longer correctly represents the identity of the
person concerned. Such an interpretation neither undermines
institutional autonomy nor opens the floodgates for arbitrary
alteration of academic certificates. On the contrary, it preserves
the credibility of academic records by ensuring that they
correspond with the legally established identity of their holder.
57. It is also clarified that the Court is not directing the respondents to
obliterate the historical fact that the petitioner pursued her courses
during the relevant period under the name “Suhana Ansari W/o
Rajik Ahmed Ansari”. The direction is only to provide a lawful
mechanism whereby her academic records may reflect her
restored legal identity as “Surabhi Yadav D/o Shiv Shankar Yadav,
Mother Sulekha Yadav”, with such endorsement, annotation,
affidavit, Gazette/public notice, surrender of original documents or
other reasonable safeguards as may be considered necessary in
accordance with the principles laid down in Jigya Yadav (supra).
This safeguards both interests: the historical integrity of the
academic record and the petitioner's right not to be permanently
burdened with an identity which she has lawfully ceased to use.

50
58. Consequently, the impugned resolution dated 06.03.2023 passed
by the Governing Body of respondent No.5 cannot be sustained in
law and is hereby quashed and set aside. Respondent No.5 is
directed to reconsider and process the petitioner's request for
restoration/correction of her name in all academic records,
marksheets, certificates and other documents issued by it,
including the records pertaining to B.Sc. Home Science, M.Sc.
Home Science/Human Development and Post Graduate Diploma
in Guidance and Counselling, in accordance with the principles
laid down by the Supreme Court in Jigya Yadav (supra). The
petitioner shall furnish all original documents and such affidavit,
indemnity, Gazette publication/public notice, prescribed fee or
other reasonable safeguards as may lawfully be required by
respondent No.5. Upon verification and satisfaction regarding the
identity of the petitioner, respondent No.5 shall issue the
corrected/revised academic documents or an appropriate
endorsement/certificate reflecting the petitioner's name as
“Surabhi Yadav D/o Shiv Shankar Yadav, Mother Sulekha Yadav”.
59. Since respondent No.4-Atal Bihari Vajpayee University has itself
taken the stand that, owing to the autonomous status of
respondent No.5, the issuance and correction of marksheets and
other academic certificates fall within the domain of respondent
No.5, no independent direction for alteration of the marksheets is
required against respondent No.4. However, respondent No.4
shall extend all consequential cooperation and endorsement, if

51
required under the applicable UGC framework or University
procedure, so that the correction lawfully effected by respondent
No.5 is duly reflected in the University's records and in the degree
or other University document, wherever such endorsement is
administratively necessary. The entire exercise shall be completed
expeditiously, preferably within a period of six weeks from the date
of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
60. It is made clear that the respondents shall not reject the
petitioner's request merely on the ground that there is no specific
provision in the existing ordinance/rules authorising change of
name after declaration of the result. If any procedural requirement
is considered necessary, the same shall be communicated to the
petitioner in writing and she shall be afforded reasonable
opportunity to comply with it.
61. As regards the petitioner's prayer seeking reconsideration of the
recognition/status of respondent No.5 and for initiation of
departmental or other proceedings against the concerned
authorities, this Court finds no sufficient material, in the facts of the
present case, to issue such sweeping directions. The principal
grievance of the petitioner stands redressed by quashing the
impugned resolution and directing reconsideration/correction of
her academic records in accordance with law. Likewise, the prayer
for compensation does not warrant separate adjudication in the
absence of material establishing a legally compensable loss

52
attributable to any deliberate or mala fide conduct of the
respondents.
62. Before parting, it is necessary to emphasise that this order should
not be understood as laying down that every request for alteration
of name in educational records must necessarily be accepted.
Educational authorities are entitled, and indeed duty-bound, to
protect the sanctity of academic records and to insist upon cogent
documentary proof and reasonable safeguards. What is
impermissible is a blanket refusal founded solely upon the
proposition that once a result is declared, the academic record can
never thereafter be corrected or brought in conformity with a
legally established identity. The controlling principle is one of
balance: the integrity of academic records must be protected, but
such integrity cannot be preserved by perpetuating a
demonstrably erroneous or legally outdated identity when the
applicant produces reliable and authentic material establishing the
correction sought. This is the balance mandated by the Supreme
Court in Jigya Yadav (supra).
63. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed . The
resolution dated 06.03.2023 passed by the Governing Body of
respondent No.5 is quashed and set aside. Respondent No.5 is
directed to process and effect correction/restoration of the
petitioner's name in her academic records in the manner indicated
hereinabove, subject to reasonable verification and procedural

53
safeguards, and respondent No.4 shall extend consequential
cooperation wherever required.
64. It is further directed that, while issuing the corrected/revised
documents, respondent No.5 shall ensure that the correction does
not result in any alteration whatsoever in the petitioner's course,
year of admission, examination, marks, division, qualification or
other academic particulars. The correction shall relate only to the
identity particulars of the petitioner. If considered administratively
necessary, the respondents may retain an appropriate internal
record of the earlier name under which the petitioner had pursued
her studies, so that the continuity and authenticity of the academic
record remain fully verifiable.
65. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh

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HEAD-NOTE
An educational institution cannot reject a genuine request for
correction/restoration of a candidate’s name merely because no specific
rule permits alteration after declaration of results. Where the identity is
supported by authentic educational and public documents, the authority
must consider correction subject to reasonable verification and
safeguards.