Rameshchand Parashar vs Gaurishankar Parashar

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

1 F.A.No. 143/2004
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
FIRST APPEAL No. 143 of 2004
CNR No.: MPHC030071122004
RAMESHCHAND PARASHAR
Versus
GAURISHANKAR PARASHAR
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Appearance:
Shri Rohit Bansal - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Akshat Kumar Jain- Advocate for respondent no. 3.
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RESERVED ON: 26/10/2026
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON : 17/11/2026
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J U D G M E N T
Appellant has filed this appeal under Section 96 of CPC challenging
th
the judgment and decree dated 01/04/2004 passed by 4 Additional District
Judge (Fast Track), Shipvuri in Civil Suit No.10-A/2003, whereby, suit for
declaration of share, partition and separate possession filed by respondents
no.1 to 9 has been decreed.
2. For purposes of convenience, respondents no.1 to 9 shall be referred
to as 'plaintiffs' and appellant and respondents no.10 to 17 shall be referred
to as 'defendants' as per their respective status in the civil suit. Further, the
suit property in this order would mean the house and the appurtenant land
situated at village Bairad, Pargana Pohri, District Shivpuri.
3. It is not in dispute in this case that one Devilal had four sons namely-
Bhagwanlal, Gangadhar, Rajaram & Ramcharan. Plaintiffs are the legal
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2 F.A.No. 143/2004
heirs of Ramcharan, while defendants no.1 to 5 are the legal heirs of
Rajaram and defendants no.6 to 9 are the legal heirs of Gangadhar. It is
further not in dispute that Bhagwanlal died issueless and his wife
predeceased him. It is also no more in dispute that the plaintiffs and
defendants constitute a joint Hindu family being legal heirs of Gangadhar,
Rajaram and Ramcharan. The dispute in this case is with regard to the suit
property which admittedly belonged to Bhagwanlal.
4. Plaintiffs filed the present suit inter-alia alleging that since
Bhagwanlal Parashar died issueless, the suit property fell equally to the
share of Gangadhar, Rajaram and Ramcharan. It is their case that defendant
no.1- Ramesh Chand showing himself to be the adopted son of Bhagwanlal,
illegally got his name mutated in the records of Gram Panchayat over the
suit property vide order dated 30/11/2009. The plaintiffs raised objection to
their mutation, upon which vide order dated 27/07/2001, mutation of
defendant no.1 was cancelled. It is averred by plaintiffs that defendant no.1
is claiming exclusive ownership over the suit property being adopted son of
Bhagwanlal.
5. It was also averred that the defendant no.1 filed a suit for eviction
against UCO Bank, which was a tenant in the suit house. Plaintiffs made an
application under Order I Rule 10 CPC seeking their impleadment in the
suit. The application was rejected by Trial Court on 29/08/2002 extending
liberty to the plaintiffs to file a separate suit for declaration of their rights in
the suit property. Accordingly, the present suit was filed by plaintiffs on
22/3/2003 praying for a declaration that being joint owner-in-possession of
the suit property, they are entitled to 1/3rd share therein. Plaintiffs also
prayed for a decree for partition and separate possession of the suit property.
6. Plaintiffs averred in the paint that Bhagwanlal also left behind certain
agricultural lands which have been apportioned equally between Rajaram,
Ramcharan and legal heirs of Gangadhar to which defendant no.1 did not
raise any objection, which falsifies his claim of being adopted son of
Bhangwanlal. It is their case that defendant no.1 did not challenge
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3 F.A.No. 143/2004
cancellation of his mutation over the suit property which also goes to show
that he was not adopted son of Bhangwallal.
7. Defendants no.2, 6, 7, 8 & 9 filed their written statement admitting
the plaintiffs' claim over the suit property. In addition, they also claimed
that they are also entitled to equal share in the suit property.
8. Defendant no.1 filed his written statement denying the plaint
averments. In substance, it was his case that he is the adopted son of
Bhagwanlal and therefore is the exclusive owner of the suit property. The
defendant claimed that he is in possession of the suit property for more than
40 years without any objection from the plaintiffs and other defendants. He
further averred that the agricultural land of Bhangwanlal was illegally
mutated in the name of Rajaram, Ramcharan and legal heirs of Gangadhar
without information to him. On coming to know about the same, he has
challenged their mutation and the proceedings are pending. He further
averred that the Gram Panchayat illegally cancelled his mutation over the
suit property without giving any notice to him. As per his case, mere
cancellation of his mutation over the suit property does not effect his rights
over the suit property. Defendant no.1 thus denied the plaintiffs claim over
the suit property and asserted himself to be the exclusive owner-in-
possession of the suit property.
9. After taking oral and documentary evidence from both the sides,
learned Trial Court decreed the suit vide impugned judgment and decree
dated 1/4/2004. Plaintiffs no.1 to 5 and defendants no.6 to 9 have been
declared entitled for 1/3rd share in the suit property with a further decree of
partition and separate possession. Challenging the same, present appeal is
filed by defendant no.1.
10. Learned counsel for defendant no.1 firstly raised an objection with
regard to valuation of the suit property. Referring to paragraph 13 of the
plaint, he argued that the total valuation of the property is mentioned as
Rs.1,05,000/-, wherein, the plaintiffs claimed their 1/3rd share. It is further
averred in this paragraph that valuation of the plaintiffs 1/3rd share in the
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4 F.A.No. 143/2004
property is Rs.35,000/- and accordingly Rs.4,000/- was paid towards Court
fees. Learned counsel submitted that under Section 6 of Civil Courts Act
read with Section 7(vi-a) of the Court Fees Act, the suit was required to be
valued at plaintiffs' share in the suit property i.e. at Rs.35,000/-. However,
in order to avoid filing of suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Class I, plaintiffs
have valued the suit at Rs.1,05,000/- and filed it before the Court of
Additional District Judge. Learned counsel submitted that over valuation of
the suit has deprived the defendant from his valuable right of second appeal.
Learned counsel further submitted that the objection regarding valuation
was raised by defendant by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC. Learned Trial Court vide order dated 9/12/2003 postponed decision on
the said issue at later stage after trial.
11. Learned counsel then referred to para 10 of the impugned judgment
and submitted that the Trial Court has illegally held that the suit is properly
valued. This decision of the Trial Court is contrary to Section 6 of the Civil
Courts Act and Section 7(vi-a) of the Court Fees Act. Learned counsel then
submitted that under Section 15 of CPC, the suit is required to be filed in
the lowest Court having jurisdiction. Thus, the plaint was liable to be
returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for its presentation in the appropriate
Court. In support of his submission, he relied upon the Apex Court decision
in the case of Nandita Bose v. Ratanlal Nahata, reported in (1987) 3 SCC
705 and that of this Court in the case of Kusuma Rathore (Smt.) Vs.
Sharad Sharma, reported in 2013 (1) MPWN 62 (Para 5 and 17).
12. Learned counsel then raised objection that the suit was barred by
limitation. It is his submission that defendant no.1 claiming suit property
being adopted son of Bhagwanlal had earlier filed an eviction suit against
UCO Bank. Plaintiffs filed an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC,
which was rejected and taking shelter of rejection of their application,
plaintiffs filed the present suit. As per his submission, Bhagwanlal died in
year 1988 and the cause of action for filing the suit arose immediately upon
the death of Bhagwanlal. Learned counsel then referred to paragraphs 5, 10,
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5 F.A.No. 143/2004
12 & 14 of the statement of plaintiff- Gauri Shankar (PW/1) and submitted
that this witness has admitted that the dispute about the suit property is
going on for 10 to 15 years. He submitted that the limitation for filing a suit
for declaration is three years under Section 58 of the Limitation Act. He
thus, submitted that the suit was apparently barred by limitation and the
Trial Court erred in holding the suit to be within limitation.
13. On merits, learned counsel submitted that the factum of his adoption
is repeatedly pleaded in written statement filed by defendant no.1. He then
referred to para 2 to 4 & 9 of the statement given by defendant no.1 as
DW/1, wherein, he specifically made statement about his adoption by
Bhagwanlal. This statement of defendant is supported by defendant witness
Harishankar (DW/2) in para 1 & 2 of his statement. Learned counsel then
referred to para 9 & 13 of the statement given by PW/1- Gauri Shankar
Parashar and para 4 of the statement given by Hazarilal (PW/2) to say that
this witness did not specifically deny averments of adoption of defendant
no.1.
14. Learned counsel then argued that the documents filed as Ex. D/5 &
D/6 also supported the fact that defendant no.1 was adopted by Bhagwanlal.
He took this Court through the findings recorded by learned Trial Court in
para 11 onwards and submitted that the findings regarding adoption
recorded by Trial Court are perverse and based upon misreading of
evidence. Learned counsel thus submitted that the judgment and decree
passed by Trial Court is liable to be set aside and the suit filed by plaintiffs
deserves to be dismissed.
15. Refuting the submissions made by appellant's counsel, learned
counsel appearing for plaintiffs supported the impugned judgment and
decree. On the question of valuation of the suit, he submitted that defendant
no.1 failed to bring on record any material to show the actual valuation of
the property. He thus, submitted that the objection raised with regard to over
valuation of the suit is not based upon any evidence, and therefore, not
acceptable. He further submitted that when no prejudice is caused to the
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6 F.A.No. 143/2004
opposite party on account of alleged over valuation of suit, the impugned
judgment and decree is not liable to be interfered with in this appeal. In
support of his submission, he placed reliance upon the Apex Court decision
in the case of Kiran Singh and Ors Vs. Chaman Paswan and Ors.,
reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 .
16. On the question of limitation, it is the submission of plaintiffs counsel
that the cause of action for filing of suit for partition arose when the share in
the property is denied to plaintiffs. As per his submission, merely because
defendant no.1 remained in possession of the suit property, would not give
rise to a cause of action for filing the suit for partition. He further submitted
that PW/1- Gauri Shankar Parashar specifically stated that they were not
aware about claim of defendant no.1 to be adopted son of Bhagwanlal till
filing of suit which is evident from para 13 of his statement. As per his
submission, the cause of action for filing the suit arose when they were
denied impleadment in the eviction suit by the Trial Court giving liberty to
them to file a separate suit for declaration of their share. As per him, the
limitation for filing present suit is 12 years under Section 110 of the
Limitation Act.
17. On merits of the case, learned counsel submitted that even though,
defendant no.1 claimed to be adopted son of Bhagwanlal, there are no
sufficient pleadings in this regard. As per his submission, except making a
bald statement of his adoption, defendant failed to plead about time and
place of his adoption as also the ceremonies which were performed while
adopting him. He further referred to paragraph 2 of the statement of DW/1
to say that the biological parents of defendant no.1 were not even present at
the time of adoption and no adoption can take place in absence of biological
parents. In support of his statement, learned counsel placed reliance upon
the Apex Court decision in the case of Rahasa Pandiani v. Gokulananda
Panda, reported in (1987)2 SCC 338 and Moturu Nalini Kanth v. Gainedi
Kaliprasad, reported in (2024)16 SCC 78 . In support of his submission
regarding adoption of defendant no.1, he also referred to provisions of
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7 F.A.No. 143/2004
Sections 6 & 11 of the Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.
18. Learned counsel then referred to documents marked as Ex. P/10 &
P/11, wherein, Bhagwanlal made a complaint against defendant no.1, which
goes to show that their relationship was not cordial. He then referred to para
10 of the plaint, wherein, specific averment is made with regard to
complaint made by Bhagwanlal. In addition, he referred to para 7 of the
statement of PW/1, wherein, he stated about the strained relationship of
Bhagwanlal with defendant no. 1.
19. Learned counsel also referred to para 11 of PW/1 to explain about his
statement of dispute pending since 15 to 20 years. Plaintiffs witness PW/2-
Hazarilal, in para 1 of his statement stated that last rites of Bhagwanlal were
performed by Ramcharan, of which there is no evidence in rebuttal. It is his
contention that if defendant no.1 was the adopted son of Bhagwanlal, the
question of performing his last rites by Ramcharan would not have arisen.
20. Learned counsel further argued that even after adoption, the name of
father of defendant no.1 is mentioned as Rajaram in all his identity cards.
He submitted that defendant no.1 was aged about 10 years when he was
allegedly adopted. After about 8 years, his voter ID card has been made
which also shows name of his father as Rajaram and not Bhagwanlal. The
factum of adoption is also not established in view of statement given in para
3 & 4 of DW/2, who happens to be the maternal uncle of defendant no.1.
Even the brothers of defendant no.1, who deposed as DW/3 & DW/4, have
denied factum of his adoption by Bhagwanlal.
21. Learned counsel thus submitted that the findings recorded by Trial
Court is based upon proper appreciation of evidence as per his statement in
absence of adoption of defendant no. 1 by Bhagwanlal, plaintiffs and
defendants are entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit and Trial Court has not
committed any mistake in giving such a declaration. He thus prayed for
dismissal of the appeal.
22. Considered the submissions of learned counsel for parties and
perused the records.
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8 F.A.No. 143/2004
23. It is no more in dispute that Bhagwanlal, Gangadhar, Rajaram &
Ramcharan are the sons of Devilal. Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of
Ramcharan, while defendants no.1 to 5 are the legal heirs of Rajaram and
defendants no.6 to 9 are the legal heirs of Gangadhar. It is also not in
dispute that Bhagwanlal died issueless and his wife predeceased him. Thus,
in normal course of succession, the suit property left behind Bhagwanlal, is
to be apportioned among his remaining brother namely- Gangadhar,
Rajaram & Ramcharan or their legal heirs equally in 1/3rd share. The
dispute arose when defendant no.1 claimed himself to be the adopted son of
Bhagwanlal and thus exclusive owner of his suit property.
24. Before adverting to respective cases of parties, it is profitable to refer
to the legal position laid down by Apex Court in relation to proof of
adoption. In the case of Rahasa Pandiani vs. Gokulananda Panda,
(1987)2 SCC 338 , the Apex Court held as under:
"4. Before we advert to the relevant circumstances we consider
it appropriate to advert to a note of caution sounded by this
Court as early as in 1958 in Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai [AIR 1959
SC 504 : 1959 Supp 1 SCR 698] . We can do no better than to
quote the relevant passage from the judgment of Kapur, J.:
“As an adoption results in changing the course of
succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights
and transferring properties to comparative strangers or
more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to
support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of
fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion
for doubting its truth. Failure to produce accounts, in
circumstances such as have been proved in the present case,
would be a very suspicious circumstance. The importance of
accounts was emphasised by the Privy Council in Sootrugun
v. Sabitra [(1834) 2 Knapp 287] ; in Diwakar Rao v.
Chandanlal Rao [1916 ILR 44 Cal 201(PC)] ; in Kishorilal
v. Chunilal [(1908) 36 IA 9] ; in Lal Kunwar v. Charanji Lal
[(1909) 37 IA 1, 7] and in Padamlal v. Fakira Debya [AIR
1931 PC 84 : 35 CWN 465 : 60 MLJ 619 : 131 IC 758] . ”
25. When the plaintiff relies on oral evidence in support of the claim that
he was adopted by the adoptive father in accordance with the Hindu rites,
and it is not supported by any registered document to establish that such an
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9 F.A.No. 143/2004
adoption had really and as a matter of fact taken place, the court has to act
with a great deal of caution and circumspection. Be it realized that setting
up a spurious adoption is not less frequent than concocting a spurious will,
and equally, if not more difficult to unmask. And the Court has to be
extremely alert and vigilant to guard against being ensnared by schemers
who indulge in unscrupulous practices out of their lust for property. If there
are any suspicious circumstances, just as the propounder of the will is
obliged to dispel the cloud of suspicion, the burden is on one who claims to
have been adopted to dispel the same beyond reasonable doubt. In the case
of an adoption which is not supported by a registered document or any other
evidence of a clinching nature if there exist suspicious circumstances, the
same must be explained to the satisfaction of the conscience of the court by
the party contending that there was such an adoption. Such is the position as
an adoption would divert the normal and natural course of succession.
Experience of life shows that just as there have been spurious claims about
execution of a will, there have been spurious claims about adoption having
taken place. And the court has therefore to be aware of the risk involved in
upholding the claim of adoption if there are circumstances which arouse the
suspicion of the court and the conscience of the court is not satisfied that the
evidence preferred to support such an adoption is beyond reproach.
26. Again in the case of Moturu Nalini Kanth vs. Gainedi Kaliprasad,
(2024)16 SCC 78 , the Apex Court held as under:
"39. Much earlier, in Kishori Lal v. Chaltibai [Kishori Lal v.
Chaltibai, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 54 : AIR 1959 SC 504] , a 3-
Judge Bench of this Court held that, as an adoption results in
changing the course of succession, it is necessary that the
evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all
suspicions of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave
no occasion for doubting its truth. On facts, the Bench found
that no invitations were sent to the brotherhood, friends or
relations and no publicity was given to the adoption,
rendering it difficult to believe.
40. In Govinda v. Chimabai [Govinda v. Chimabai, 1967 SCC
OnLine Kar 144 : AIR 1968 Mys 309] , a Division Bench of
the Mysore High Court observed that the mere fact that a deed
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10 F.A.No. 143/2004
of adoption has been registered cannot be taken as evidence of
proof of adoption, as an adoption deed never proves an
adoption. It was rightly held that the factum of adoption has to
be proved by oral evidence of giving or taking of the child and
that the necessary ceremonies, where they are necessary to be
performed, were carried out in accordance with shastras. "
27. The defendant no.1 has filed his written statement. At more than one
places, except stating that he is the adopted son of Bhagwanlal and is
exclusive owner of his properties, no details are pleaded as to the time and
place of adoption, the ceremonies performed at the time of adoption etc. The
important ceremony of giving and taking in adoption is also not pleaded.
The learned counsel for plaintiffs is therefore, right in submitting that the
written statement is lacking necessary pleading regarding adoption.
28. The defendant no.1 (DW/1) stated in para 2 of his statement that
ceremony of his adoption took place in village Toriya in 1957 when he was
10-12 years old. This was told to him by Bhagwanlal himself in 1997. The
defendant stated that, at the time of adoption, his mama- Harishanker, fufa-
Shyamlal, bhua- Harkunwar were present. He did not state about presence
of his biological parents without whom no adoption could have taken place.
Further, there is no cogent evidence regarding ceremony of giving and
taking in adoption.
29. As per Section 11(vi) of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, to
constitute a valid adoption, the child to be adopted must be actually given
and taken in adoption by the biological parents or guardian concerned with
intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its
adoption. Thus, proving the ceremony of giving and taking is the must as
held by Apex Court also in the case of Moturu Nalini Kanth (supra).
Harishanker (DW/2) who is stated to be the witness of adoption, and the
only witness of adoption examined, did not state about ceremony of giving
and taking.
30. In all his identity cards, including the voters list, the name of father of
defendant no.1 is mentioned as Rajaram and not Bhagwanlal. As per his
own saying, the defendant no.1 was aged about 10 years when he was
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11 F.A.No. 143/2004
allegedly adopted. After about 8 years, his name must have been included in
voter list wherein also his father's name mentions Rajaram and not
Bhagwanlal. Pertinently, voter list was prepared after at least 8 years of
adoption and, therefore, name of Bhagwanlal ought to have been stated
instead of Rajaram. This also casts doubt about defendant's adoption by
Bhagwanlal. Pertinently, the brothers of defendant no.1, who deposed as
DW/3 & DW/4, have denied factum of his adoption by Bhagwanlal.
31. Thus, the negative finding recorded by trial Court regarding adoption
of defendant no.1 is found to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence
available on record. The same does not warrant interference by this Court in
this appeal.
32. Next comes the objection regarding over-valuation of suit by plaintiff.
The learned counsel for defendant no.1 laboured hard in convincing this
Court for dismissal of suit on account of its over-valuation. To appreciate
his submissions, Section 11 of Suits Valuation Act, 1887, needs to be
considered, which reads as under:
“11. Procedure where objection is taken o appeal or revision
that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional
purposes.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882), an objection that by
reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or
appeal a Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court
which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal
exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be
entertained by an Appellate Court unless—
(a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or
before the hearing at which issues were first framed and
recorded, or in the lower Appellate Court in the memorandum
of appeal to that Court, or
(b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded
by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over-valued or
under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation
thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or
appeal on its merits.
(2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in
clause (a) of sub-section (1), but the Appellate Court is not
satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in clause (b) of that
sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the
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12 F.A.No. 143/2004
determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall
dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of
jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower Appellate
Court.
(3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate
Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those
materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal
under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the
hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or
frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional
evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court
competent to entertain the suit or appeal.
(4) The provisions of this section with respect to an Appellate
Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a
Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 622 of
the Code of Civil Procedure or other enactment for the time
being in force.
(5) This section shall come into force on the first day of July,
1887. "
33. The issue was considered by Apex Court in the case of Kiran Singh
(supra) , as under:
"7. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in Section
578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an objection that a court
which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised it
by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, should not be
entertained by an appellate court, except as provided in the
section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections could
be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting
of the section has come in—and deservedly—for considerable
criticism; but amidst much that is obscure and confused, there
is one principle which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is
that a decree passed by a court, which would have had no
jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or
undervaluation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for
the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction
based on overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with
under that section and not otherwise. The reference to Section
578, now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section
is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall
be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects
mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the
case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section
99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits,
when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a
result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to
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13 F.A.No. 143/2004
avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that
objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation
or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate
court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the
section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and
no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or
undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance
with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial
jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that
no objection as to the place of suing should be allowed by an
appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent
failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted
in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to
pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and
99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same,
namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the
merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be
reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in
failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to
treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as
technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court,
unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention
of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the
District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot
be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act .”
34. Thus, for rejecting a plaint on the ground of over-valuation,
conditions enumerated in clause (a) & (b) of Section 11(1) must co-exist. In
other words, an objection as to over-valuation of suit cannot be accepted
unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Even though, clause (a)
is found to be satisfied in this case, however, clause (b) is not found
satisfied in the fact situation of this case. Further, by virtue of sub-section 2,
if the appellate court has before it the materials necessary for the
determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, the appeal shall be
disposed of on merits ignoring the defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first
instance. As discussed above, there is sufficient material available on record
to decide the lis on merits and, therefore, the suit is not liable to be
dismissed on account of its over-valuation.
35. The defendant's counsel relied upon Nandita Bose (supra) . However,
the said judgment is basically interprets Section 15 of CPC which provides
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14 F.A.No. 143/2004
for filing of suit in the Court of lowest jurisdiction. The same is not
disputed. However, the question is as to whether an over-valued suit is
required to be dismissed in the facts and circumstances of the case. He also
relied upon Kusuma Rathore (supra) of this Court. However, this was an
order passed on application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and, therefore, this
judgment would not apply in the facts of this case.
36. The learned counsel for defendant submitted that because of over-
valuation of suit, the same was filed before the Court of District Judge
resulting in depriving the defendant of his right of second appeal before this
Court. The right of appeal is no doubt a substantive right, and its deprivation
is a serious prejudice; but the appellants have not been deprived of the right
of appeal against the judgment of the subordinate court. The law does
provide an appeal against that judgment to this Court, and the plaintiffs have
exercised that right. Therefore, at this stage after lapse of 26 years, that too
when lis has been adjudicated on merits, it is not in the interest of justice, to
reject or return the plaint on the ground of over-valuation of suit. The
contention of defendant's counsel is therefore, not acceptable.
37. The other objection raised by defendant's counsel is about the
limitation. As per his submission since Bhagwanlal died in year 1988, the
cause of action for filing the suit arose. He also submitted that plaintiff-
Gauri Shankar accepted in his statement that dispute between them and
defendant arose 10-15 years ago. He thus submitted that the suit is barred by
limitation.
38. The present is a suit for declaration of share, partition and separate
possession. The limitation is thus governed by Article 110 of Limitation Act
and the cause of action for filing such suit arises when the exclusion
becomes known to the plaintiff. Therefore, mere death of Bhagwanlal does
not give rise to cause of action for filing of present suit. Further, long
possession of defendant no.1 over the property is also not a cause of action
for filing suit. It is only when the plaintiff's excluded from the property, the
cause of action for filing suit arose. The plaintiffs have averred that the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JAI PRAKASH
SOLANKI
Signing time: 11/18/2026
10:05:38 AM

15 F.A.No. 143/2004
cause of action for filing this suit arose, when the defendant no.1 filed
eviction suit against tenant- UCO Bank claiming ownership over the suit
property and they were denied impleadment in such suit by the Court
granting them liberty to file separate suit claiming their right in property.
There is no reason to disbelieve the facts so stated.
39. So far as statement of Gauri Shankar accepting that dispute between
them and defendant arose 10-15 years ago is concerned, it is seen that the
dispute was existing even when Bhagwanlal was alive. As per Ex. P/10 &
P/11, Bhagwanlal himself made report against defendant no.1 to the Police.
Therefore, on line statement of PW/1 in para 14, it cannot be ascertained
that the cause of action arose 14-15 years back. The dispute referred in this
para does not show exclusion from property giving rise to cause of action
for filing suit. Thus, the objection regarding limitation raised by defendant's
counsel is also not accepted.
40. In view of discussion made above, the judgment and decree dated
th
1/4/2004 passed by 4 Additional District Judge (Fast Track), Shipvuri in
Civil Suit No.10-A/2003, is just and proper based upon proper appreciation
of evidence and does not warrant interference in this appeal. The appeal
fails and is dismissed accordingly.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
jps/-
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: JAI PRAKASH
SOLANKI
Signing time: 11/18/2026
10:05:38 AM