State Of U.P. Thru. Its Prin. Secy. Revenue Lko. And 2 Others vs Krishna Kumar Yadav

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 674 of 2026
State Of U.P. Thru. Its Prin. Secy. Revenue Lko.
And 2 Others
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Krishna Kumar Yadav
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : C.S.C.
Counsel for Respondent(s) : D.K. Singh Chauhan
Court No. - 1
HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
HON'BLE MANJIVE SHUKLA, J.
(Order on C.M.Application No.1 of 2026; Application for
Condonation of Delay)
1. Heard.
2. The special appeal has been filed by the State on 27.10.2026
challenging therein the judgment and order dated 30.04.2026 passed
by learned Single Judge in Writ-A No.4211 of 2026 (K rishna Kumar
Yadav vs. State of U.P. and others ).
3. As per reporting of the Registry of this Court, the special appeal
has been filed with a delay of 118 days. The limitation for filing
special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court
Rules, 1952 is thirty days vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules, 1952
read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act,
1963.
4. We have perused the affidavit filed in support of the application
seeking condonation of delay in filing the special appeal.
5. The judgement impugned is dated 30.04.2026. After passing of the
impugned order/judgment, the respondent-petitioner submitted a
representation for compliance on 15.05.2025. Thereafter on
06.07.2026 the Directorate of Consolidation sought a legal opinion
from the office of learned Chief Standing Counsel which was then

SPLAD No. 674 of 2026
2
received on 22.07.2026. The matter was further examined at the
Directorate level and a proposal for filing an appeal was sent to the
State Government only on 02.09.2026 that was a good one and half
month after receiving the legal opinion. The file then moved between
the Department of Revenue and the Department of Justice for
obtaining necessary approval. The Department of Justice gave its
permission to file a Special Appeal only on 17.09.2026. The aforesaid
permission was communicated to the Directorate of Consolidation on
06.10.2026 and this itself shows that no urgency was shown from the
appellants and ultimately the appeal was then filed on 27.10.2026
i.e. after more than a month from the date of permission granted to
file the appeal.
6. From what has been noticed here-in-above, all that it means is that
the file kept traveling from one office to another and except for the
correspondence having been taken place, there is no plausible
explanation. In fact, after the legal opinion was rendered by the
learned Chief Standing Counsel on 22.07.2026, where was the
question for the matter to be examined at the Directorate level, that
too, for more than a month.
7. The law in respect of condonation of delay in filing the Special
Appeals is very clear that there must be bona fide efforts on the part
of the appellants regarding filing of the special appeal, however, in
this case in spite of the State having knowledge of the period of
limitation prescribed, no serious efforts were made, what to say of
bona fide efforts for filing the Special Appeal.
8. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that any appeal or
any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the
appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within
such period. The phrase 'sufficient cause' occurring in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 means that if the appeal or the application
could not be preferred within the prescribed period of limitation for
bona-fide reasons which constitute sufficient cause, the Court
concerned can condone the delay in filing the appeal or application,
as the case may be, but if the bona-fide reasons are absent and
proper explanation for delay has not been offered, then the 'sufficient
cause' would not be there and therefore, the application filed under

SPLAD No. 674 of 2026
3
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay is
bound to be rejected.
9. The vague averments made in the affidavit and the lame excuse
for delay given for seeking condonation of delay in filing the special
appeal, when tested on the anvil of the decision of Hon'ble the
Supreme Court rendered in the Case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs.
Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine 1969 wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay
and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme
Court, do not constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay.
Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma
(Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a
loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The
expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not
to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control.
Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or
casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation
law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be
construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while
preserving the discipline of limitation. The Courts are not to be
swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious
appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in
pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona-fide, plausible, and
consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards
condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual
approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. We are of the
opinion that these latter observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
apply on all its fours to the facts of this case. The appellant/applicant
has not acted with reasonable diligence, nor is the explanation
offered by him plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct.
There is negligence, want of good faith and a casual approach on his
part for the reasons already noticed hereinabove. Preference of such
special appeal with inordinate delay certainly prejudices the rights of
the respondents under the judgment impugned herein. Therefore, this
is also a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in view of the
judgment in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra).
10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts
must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for

SPLAD No. 674 of 2026
4
condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is
placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient
cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding
within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying
case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into
the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries
between preliminary procedural questions and substantive
adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny.
The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine
whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the
applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of
"sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the
merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion
based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success
in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case
may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a
weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out.
This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the
law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is
designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by
Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered
at the stage of delay condonation that it risks prejudicing the mind of
the court against one party even before the matter is substantively
heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may
inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent
adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands
that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more.
Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.
11. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether
there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier
decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision
of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in
(2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial
sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of
condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning.
At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of

SPLAD No. 674 of 2026
5
W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1
SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in
(2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether
the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the
provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown
by the courts would also remain the same. The law, as it presently
stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is
unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an
exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private
parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for
delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on
the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court
has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of
Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal
Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj
Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is
equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in
essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities
cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State
must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do
otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that
the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red
tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as
grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably
accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of
course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of
limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in
litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including
paragraph 214 and onwards.
12. Having considered the recent decision of Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra), apart from the fact
that the delay in filing the special appeal is inordinate, the explanation
offered is only a ruse and a sham explanation, the same is not at all
satisfactory.
13. For all the reasons indicated here-in-above, we do not find it a fit

SPLAD No. 674 of 2026
6
case for condoning the delay in filing the special appeal, therefore,
relying upon the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of
Shivamma (Dead) (supra), we reject the application for condonation
of delay in filing the special appeal, consequently, the special appeal
also stands dismissed.
November 2, 2026
akhilesh/-
(Manjive Shukla,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
AKHILESHWAR KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench