BHARAT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER vs NEELAM GORKHA
- Court
- Jammu and Kashmir High Court
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
CRM(M) No. 678/2021
c/w
CRM(M) No. 179/2025
Reserved on: - 02.11.2026
Pronounced on: - 17.11.2026
Uploaded on: - 17.11.2026
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced: - FULL
CRM(M) No. 678/2021
1. Sr. Superintendent of Police (SSP)
Jammu (the then) Shridhar Patil (IPS)
age 36 years
S/o Sh. Daulu Vishnu Patil at present
posted as SSP CI CID Jammu.
2. Cyber Crime Police Station through
Deputy Superintendent of Police (DySP)
(the then) Parupkar Singh age 32 years
S/o Bhupinder Singh at present posted as
SDPO Nagrota Jammu.
3. Station House Officer (SHO)
Janipur Police Station the then Naresh
Kumar age 40 years
S/o Mohan Lal Sharma.
...Petitioner(s)
Through:- Mr. Pawan Dev Singh, Dy. AG
V/s
Neha Chawla
M 25, Opp. Green Land Palace Butta Nagar
Lower Roop Nagar Jammu
…Respondent(s)
Through:- Mr. Arjun Chawla, Advocate
CRM(M) No. 179/2025
1. Bharat Bhushan, Age 55 yrs
2. Anuj Sajgotra, Age 50 yrs
Both Sons of Late Sh. Hardayal
R/o H. No. 84, Ward No, 5
Bishnah
…Petitioner(s)
Through:- Mr. Gagan Oswal, Advocate
V/s
Neelam Gorkha
W/o Guldev Raj Gorkha
R/o Ward No. 5 Bishnah
…Respondent(s)
Through:- Mr. Raja Mohit Bucha, Advocate
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. These petitions raise an important question concerning the scope of
revisional jurisdiction against an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate
First Class under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”), directing registration of a
First Information Report and investigation by the police. The
corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (hereinafter referred to as “BNSS”), is Section 175(3). The
principal question which falls for consideration is whether an order
passed by a Magistrate directing registration of an FIR and investigation
constitutes an interlocutory order, thereby attracting the statutory bar
contained in Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., corresponding to Section 438(2)
BNSS, or whether such an order, having finally disposed of the
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., possesses the characteristics of
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 2 of 27
an intermediate or final order and is, therefore, amenable to revisional
jurisdiction.
2. The controversy assumes significance in view of the divergent opinions
expressed by different High Courts. While the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in „ Father Thomas v. State of U.P.’ , 2011 Cri LJ
2278 , has held that an order directing investigation under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. is interlocutory and not revisable at the instance of a prospective
accused, a different approach has been adopted in several decisions of the
Bombay High Court, which recognise the maintainability of revision
against such orders.
3. The issue also requires consideration in the light of the principles laid
down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court concerning the distinction between
interlocutory, intermediate and final orders, the necessity of judicial
application of mind while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., and the extent to which the revisional jurisdiction can be
invoked to correct jurisdictional errors committed by a Magistrate.
4. The following questions, therefore, arise for determination:
(i) Whether an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing
registration of an FIR and investigation is invariably an interlocutory
order within the meaning of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.?
(ii) Whether the final disposal of an application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C., coupled with the consequences flowing from an
order directing police investigation, renders such an order revisable?
(iii) Whether the revisional court is competent to examine
allegations of lack of jurisdiction, non-application of judicial mind,
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failure to satisfy statutory prerequisites or disregard of statutory
safeguards while directing investigation?
(iv) Whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, was
justified in dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioners
solely on the ground of non-maintainability?
(v) What relief, if any, are the petitioners entitled to in the facts and
circumstances of the cases?
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents have vehemently opposed
the maintainability of the petitions and supported the orders passed by
the revisional courts. It is submitted that an order directing registration of
an FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is merely a step towards
commencement of police investigation and does not determine the rights
or liabilities of any party.
6. According to learned counsel, the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is essentially pre-cognizance in character.
The Magistrate, at that stage, neither adjudicates upon the guilt or
innocence of the persons named in the complaint nor determines any
substantive issue concerning their criminal liability. The order merely
enables the statutory investigating agency to investigate the allegations in
accordance with law.
7. Reliance has been placed upon the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad
High Court in „ Father Thomas v. State of U.P.’ , 2011 Cri LJ 2278 , in
support of the contention that an order passed under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. is interlocutory and that a revision petition against such an order
is expressly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 4 of 27
8. Learned counsel have also referred to the judgments reported as ‘Anurag
Bhatnagar & Anr. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.’, 2025 INSC 895
and ‘HDFC Securities Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.’ ,
AIR 2017 SC 61 . It is contended that a person against whom allegations
have been made does not acquire a right to participate in proceedings
merely because a direction for investigation has been issued, particularly
when neither cognizance has been taken against such person nor any
process has been issued.
9. It is further submitted that the registration of an FIR does not by itself
establish criminal liability. The investigation may ultimately result in
submission of a closure report or a police report under the applicable
statutory provisions. Consequently, the possibility of investigation or
arrest cannot transform an otherwise interlocutory order into a final or
intermediate order. Learned counsel, therefore, submit that the learned
revisional court has rightly declined to entertain the revision petition and
that no interference is warranted in exercise of the inherent or
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the
approach adopted by the revisional court proceeds upon an erroneous
understanding of the expression “interlocutory order”. It is contended
that an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. invokes the judicial
jurisdiction of the Magistrate for a specific relief, namely, a direction to
the police to register a case and investigate the allegations. The
Magistrate is required to determine whether the complaint discloses
commission of a cognizable offence, whether the statutory prerequisites
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 5 of 27
have been satisfied and whether the facts justify the exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction.
11. Once the Magistrate allows the application and directs investigation, the
principal relief sought in the application stands granted. Nothing further
remains to be adjudicated in respect of that prayer, although the
Magistrate may subsequently exercise such jurisdiction as the law
permits in relation to the investigation or police report.
12. It is, therefore, urged that the order conclusively determines the
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and cannot be treated as a
purely interlocutory order merely because it does not determine the
ultimate criminal liability of the persons named in the complaint.
Learned counsel further submit that the order has immediate legal
consequences. A person named in the complaint becomes exposed to the
coercive machinery of criminal investigation, including examination,
search, seizure and, where the statutory conditions are satisfied, arrest
without warrant. Such consequences, according to learned counsel,
demonstrate that the order is not merely procedural or incidental in
character.
13. It is further submitted that the power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is
judicial in nature and cannot be exercised mechanically. The Magistrate
must apply an independent judicial mind to the allegations, the
supporting material, the nature of the dispute and the necessity of police
investigation.
14. According to learned counsel, if an order directing investigation suffers
from a jurisdictional defect, manifest non-application of mind, non-
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compliance with mandatory statutory requirements or disregard of an
express legal prohibition, the revisional court must possess jurisdiction to
examine its legality, correctness and propriety.
15. Reliance has been placed upon the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay
High Court dated 10 April 2024, reported as ‘Arun P. Gidh Vs.
Chandraprakash Singh & Ors.’, 2024: BHC-AS:16833 , and upon the
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court regarding intermediate
orders and judicial application of mind.
16. In the connected petition concerning allegations against senior police
officials, it is additionally contended that the Magistrate directed
registration of an FIR without examining the statutory protections and the
question of sanction, wherever legally applicable. It is submitted that the
alleged absence of jurisdiction and disregard of mandatory safeguards
cannot be immunised from judicial scrutiny merely by describing the
direction for investigation as interlocutory.
17. Learned counsel, accordingly, pray that the impugned orders dismissing
the revision petitions as non-maintainable be set aside and the matters be
remitted to the respective revisional courts for consideration on merits.
Facts of CRM(M) No.179/2025
18. In CRM(M) No.179/2025, the petitioners have challenged the order
dated 03.06.2024 passed by the learned Munsiff, Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Bishnah, in the case titled Neelam Gorka v. Bharat Bhushan and
others , whereby an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was allowed
and the Station House Officer, Police Station Bishnah, was directed to
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 7 of 27
register an FIR. The petitioners have also challenged the order dated
28.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu,
whereby their revision petition against the Magistrate's order was
dismissed as non-maintainable on the ground that an order under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. is interlocutory.
19. The case set up by the petitioners is that they have been in possession of
a shop running under the name and style of M/s National Medical Hall,
situated near Sub-District Hospital, Bishnah, Jammu, since the year
1993. According to them, petitioner No. 1 initially obtained the shop on
rent from the late husband of the respondent, namely Guldev Raj Gorkha,
through a registered rent deed which is stated to have been misplaced.
20. It is pleaded that after the death of Guldev Raj Gorkha in February 2006,
petitioner No.1 executed a fresh rent agreement dated 08.06.2007 with
the respondent for a period of three years. Upon expiry of the said
agreement, the petitioners allegedly continued in possession with mutual
consent and continued to operate their business under the requisite drug
licence while regularly paying rent, municipal taxes and electricity
charges. The petitioners allege that commencing from 15.11.2023, the
respondent and her sons started threatening them with forcible
dispossession and required them to vacate the premises by 25.11.2023.
21. Apprehending forcible eviction, the petitioners instituted a suit for
permanent prohibitory injunction titled Bharat Bhushan and others v.
Neelam Gorka and others . By an interim order dated 20.11.2023, the
competent civil court restrained forcible dispossession. The said order is
stated to have been implemented with police assistance on 24.01.2024.
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 8 of 27
Subsequently, by judgment and decree dated 08.05.2024, the civil court
directed that the petitioners should not be evicted from the premises
except in accordance with due process of law.
22. It is further alleged that on 09.03.2024 and 10.03.2024, the respondent
and her sons forcibly entered the shop, abused the petitioners and
assaulted petitioner No. 2. On the basis of the complaint lodged in that
regard, FIR No. 0027/2024 dated 10.03.2024 was registered for offences
stated to be punishable under Sections 447, 441, 323 and 34 IPC. The
respondent thereafter filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
before the learned Munsiff, JMIC, Bishnah. By order dated 03.06.2024,
the learned Magistrate allowed the application and directed the SHO,
Police Station Bishnah, to register an FIR. Aggrieved by the said order,
the petitioners preferred a revision petition before the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Jammu. The revisional court, by order dated 28.02.2025,
declined to entertain the revision on the ground that the order directing
registration of an FIR was interlocutory and, therefore, not amenable to
revision. The petitioners have approached this Court contending that the
revisional court failed to appreciate the distinction between a purely
interlocutory order and an intermediate order, and consequently declined
to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law.
Submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner in Neha Chawla's
Case
23. In Neha Chawla's petition , learned counsel for the petitioners contended
that the impugned order had the effect of directing the registration of an
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 9 of 27
FIR against senior police officials who had no role in recording the
information or conducting the investigation. It was submitted that, in the
absence of the requisite statutory sanction, neither an inquiry nor an
investigation could be initiated against a police officer.
24. It was further argued that where an order is passed without jurisdiction,
without application of judicial mind, mechanically, in disregard of
statutory safeguards, or without satisfying the conditions precedent for
directing an investigation, its legality cannot be sustained merely on the
ground that it only directs the recording of information and registration
of an FIR, leaving the persons concerned to participate in the subsequent
process of law.
25. Learned counsel further emphasised the importance of the revisional
remedy as a safeguard against jurisdictional errors, procedural
irregularities and mechanical exercise of judicial discretion ,
particularly where the impugned order may adversely affect the rights of
the persons concerned.
26. Heard both the Counsels. Before examining the rival submissions, it
would be appropriate to notice the statutory scheme governing the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the limitations
imposed upon revisional jurisdiction. Section 156 Cr.P.C. empowers the
officer in charge of a police station to investigate a cognizable offence
without an order of the Magistrate. Sub-section (3) empowers a
Magistrate competent under Section 190 Cr.P.C. to order such
investigation. The jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is exercised
at the pre-cognizance stage. It enables the Magistrate to direct police
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 10 of 27
investigation in cases where the allegations disclose a cognizable offence
and the circumstances justify recourse to the investigating agency.
27. However, the existence of jurisdiction to direct investigation does not
dispense with the obligation to exercise judicial discretion. The
Magistrate is required to examine the allegations and supporting material
and satisfy himself that the circumstances warrant an order under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. confers revisional powers upon
the High Court and the Sessions Judge to call for and examine the record
of proceedings before an inferior criminal court for satisfying themselves
as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order and the regularity of the proceedings. Sub-section (2) of Section
397, however, expressly excludes the exercise of revisional powers in
relation to interlocutory orders passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or
other proceeding. The corresponding provision under the BNSS is
Section 438(2). The legislative object underlying the prohibition is to
prevent fragmentation of criminal proceedings through repeated
challenges to purely procedural orders and to ensure that criminal
investigations and trials are not unnecessarily obstructed.
28. Nevertheless, the legislature has not defined every order passed during
the pendency of criminal proceedings as interlocutory. The nature of an
order must be determined with reference to its substance, effect and the
legal consequences which follow from it. It is also necessary to notice
that the BNSS has introduced additional procedural requirements under
Section 175(3), including consideration of the application supported by
an affidavit, such inquiry as the Magistrate considers necessary, and the
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submissions of the police officer concerned. These safeguards underscore
the judicial character of the exercise, though they cannot retrospectively
govern an order passed on 03.06.2024 under the Cr.P.C.
29. Since the Magistrate's order in CRM(M) No.179/2025 was passed before
the commencement of the BNSS on 01.07.2024, its legality must be
examined with reference to the statutory provisions applicable on the
date of the order, subject to the relevant saving and transitional
provisions.
30. The distinction between interlocutory and final orders has received
authoritative consideration from the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Amar
Nath v. State of Haryana , (1977) 4 SCC 137. The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court explained that the expression “interlocutory order” occurring in
Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. must be given a restricted meaning. Orders which
are merely procedural or temporary and do not decide or substantially
affect the rights of the parties ordinarily fall within the prohibition. The
Court also recognised that orders affecting valuable rights or deciding
important aspects of criminal proceedings cannot necessarily be
characterised as interlocutory merely because they are passed before the
conclusion of the proceedings.
31. The principle was further elaborated in Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra , (1977) 4 SCC 551 , wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
recognised that the classification of criminal orders is not confined to two
mutually exclusive categories of final and interlocutory orders. An order
may not finally terminate the entire criminal proceeding and yet may
possess sufficient finality in relation to a particular issue to take it outside
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the category of a purely interlocutory order. Such orders are commonly
described as intermediate orders.
32. The distinction assumes importance because the statutory prohibition
under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. is directed against purely interlocutory
orders and not necessarily every order passed before the final conclusion
of criminal proceedings. In Girish Kumar Suneja v. Central Bureau of
Investigation , (2017) 14 SCC 809 , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court reiterated
the distinction between final, intermediate and interlocutory orders and
explained that an intermediate order may be amenable to revision
notwithstanding the bar applicable to interlocutory orders. A relevant
consideration is whether acceptance of the objection raised against the
order would bring the proceedings, or the relevant part thereof, to an end.
This test, however, must be applied in the context of the nature and stage
of the proceedings concerned.
33. Thus, the mere fact that an order does not determine guilt or innocence
cannot by itself conclusively establish that it is interlocutory. Equally, the
mere fact that an application has been disposed of does not automatically
render every order passed thereon revisable. The determination
necessarily involves an examination of the nature of the jurisdiction
exercised, the issue decided, the effect of the order and the statutory
scheme within which it operates.
34. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Father Thomas v. State
of U.P. , 2011 Cri LJ 2278 , directly considered whether an order passed
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. directing registration of an FIR and
investigation was amenable to revision at the instance of a prospective
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 13 of 27
accused. The Full Bench answered the question in the negative, holding
that such an order is interlocutory and that revision against it is barred by
Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The reasoning underlying the decision is that an
order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is passed at the pre-cognizance stage
and does not determine the rights of the prospective accused. It merely
directs the police to perform their statutory function of investigating a
cognizable offence. The Full Bench further held that a person named in
the complaint does not acquire a right to be heard before the Magistrate
merely because an application seeking investigation has been filed.
35. The decision draws a distinction between an order directing investigation
and an order taking cognizance or issuing process against an accused. In
the former case, the criminal law is merely set in motion, whereas in the
latter, the judicial process proceeds against the accused. The Full Bench
nevertheless recognised that appropriate proceedings invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court may be available against an
FIR in exceptional circumstances, subject to the principles governing
interference with criminal investigation. The judgment, therefore,
represents a clear exposition of the view that the direction for police
investigation is an ancillary step which does not determine the criminal
liability of any person and is consequently interlocutory.
36. This view cannot be disregarded merely because the direction for
investigation may have serious practical consequences. At the same time,
the existence of a contrary judicial approach necessitates examination of
the precise legal basis upon which such orders have been treated as
revisable.
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37. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Arun P. Gidh v.
Chandraprakash Singh and others , decided on 10.04.2024, reported as
2024: BHC-AS:16833 , considered the scope of revisional interference
with an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the consequences
of setting aside such an order after registration of an FIR. At the outset,
an important distinction concerning the scope of that judgment must be
noticed. The Full Bench did not undertake a fresh and conclusive
determination of the larger question whether every order under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. is revisable. It expressly declined to enlarge the scope of
the reference to decide that question, while recognising the settled line of
Bombay High Court precedents treating such orders as revisable. The
Full Bench referred to the principles laid down in Madhu Limaye and
observed that the expression “interlocutory order” is not invariably the
converse of a final order. There may exist intermediate orders which,
although not final, do not fall within the statutory bar against revision.
The Full Bench also recognised the significance of the fact that, once a
Magistrate directs investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the
particular application seeking such direction stands disposed of, although
the criminal process may thereafter continue in accordance with law. The
Court proceeded to consider the consequences of revisional interference
at different stages of the investigation and prosecution. It recognised that
where the investigation remains pending, the revisional court may, within
the limits of its jurisdiction, pass appropriate orders concerning further
proceedings pursuant to the Magistrate's direction.
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38. However, where the investigation has culminated in submission of a
police report and the competent court has taken cognizance, an order
setting aside the original direction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. does not
automatically invalidate the resultant prosecution. The distinction is
founded upon the independent statutory character of police investigation
and the subsequent judicial proceedings. Once a prosecution has
progressed beyond the stage of investigation, its legality must be
examined with reference to the statutory provisions and principles
applicable to that stage. The Bombay High Court judgment thus
recognises revisional jurisdiction within its established precedential
framework, but also emphasises that the consequences of revisional
interference depend upon the stage reached by the criminal proceedings.
39. It would, therefore, be inaccurate to read the judgment as laying down an
unrestricted proposition that every direction for registration of an FIR can
be challenged in revision or that the setting aside of such direction
necessarily results in quashing the FIR, charge-sheet or subsequent
prosecution. Nevertheless, the reasoning in the judgment concerning the
distinction between interlocutory and intermediate orders provides an
important perspective for examining the controversy arising in the
present petitions.
40. The question assumes a further dimension in view of the judicial
precedents of this Court. A Full Bench of this court in „ Manohar Nath
Sher v. State of J&K’ , 1980 KLJ 1 , considered the meaning and scope
of an interlocutory order for the purposes of revisional jurisdiction. The
Full Bench explained that interlocutory orders are ordinarily procedural
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steps taken during proceedings to facilitate their eventual adjudication. It
also recognised the importance of determining whether acceptance of an
objection would bring the proceedings to an end. The principles stated in
Manohar Nath Sher are relevant to the interpretation of the statutory
prohibition against revision, although that decision did not specifically
decide the revisability of an order directing investigation under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C.
41. Subsequently, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Satpal Sharma v.
Pawan Singh Rathore , JKJ Online 65812 , examined the precise
question whether an order directing registration of an FIR under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. is interlocutory. After considering Manohar Nath Sher ,
Father Thomas and other authorities, the learned Single Judge held that
an order directing investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is
interlocutory in nature and is not amenable to criminal revision. The
learned Single Judge reasoned that the order merely sets the investigative
process in motion and neither finally nor provisionally determines the
criminal liability of the prospective accused.
42. The decision in Satpal Sharma and prior to that in 2014 JKJ (HC)351
are directly relevant and constitutes a precedent of a coordinate Benches
of this Court. Judicial discipline requires that such a precedent be
followed unless it is distinguishable, has been displaced by a binding
decision of a superior court, or the matter is referred for reconsideration
by a larger Bench. The contrary reasoning of another High Court,
however persuasive, does not by itself authorise a coordinate Bench of
this Court to overrule the decision in Satpal Sharma (supra). The proper
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course, if substantial reasons exist for doubting the correctness of the
earlier view, is to refer the question before a larger Bench.
43. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Anurag Bhatnagar and another v. State
(NCT of Delhi) and another , 2025 INSC 895 , decided on 25.07.2025,
examined the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and
the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an order
directing registration of an FIR. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court reiterated
that the Magistrate is required to apply an independent judicial mind to
the material placed before him and that an order directing investigation
must reflect the requisite judicial satisfaction. The Court also considered
the importance of approaching the police authorities before invoking the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate. However, it clarified that a procedural
irregularity does not necessarily render an order without jurisdiction,
particularly where no miscarriage of justice has resulted.
44. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court further emphasised that the High Court's
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution is discretionary. The existence of a minor procedural defect
does not compel interference where the complaint discloses a cognizable
offence and the investigation has progressed to submission of a charge-
sheet.
45. The judgment thus establishes that the exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is judicial in nature and that the legality of the
Magistrate's order may be examined in appropriate proceedings.
Significantly, however, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was not directly
CRM(M) No. 678/2021 c/w CRM(M) No. 179/2025 Page 18 of 27
deciding whether a criminal revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is
maintainable against such an order at the instance of a prospective
accused. The decision, therefore, cannot be treated as having
conclusively resolved the specific conflict concerning revisability. It is
relevant to the standards governing the Magistrate's exercise of
jurisdiction and the scope of the High Court's extraordinary powers, but
the question concerning the statutory bar under Section 397(2) requires
separate consideration. The judgment also demonstrates that a distinction
must be maintained between the existence of a legal defect, the
availability of a particular remedy and the appropriateness of granting
relief in the circumstances of the case.
46. HDFC Securities Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 SC 61 , is an
important Hon‟ble Supreme Court decision concerning the limits of
judicial interference in criminal investigations. The Court held that the
High Court was justified in refusing to quash the investigation because
the challenge was premature and the circumstances did not warrant the
extraordinary exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The judgment establishes
that the mere initiation of criminal investigation does not ordinarily
justify intervention under Section 482 CPC . There too issues were
entirely different.
47. The principal argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that an
order directing investigation finally disposes of the application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and, therefore, cannot be classified as
interlocutory. There is considerable force in the submission that the
nature of an order must be determined by examining the particular
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jurisdiction exercised by the Magistrate and the consequences of the
decision. However, final disposal of an application is not, by itself, the
conclusive test of revisability. The Court must distinguish between the
termination of an application seeking a particular procedural direction
and the termination of the criminal proceeding itself. An order may
finally dispose of an application and yet be interlocutory in relation to the
larger proceeding of which it forms a part. Conversely, an order which
does not finally determine criminal liability may nevertheless decide an
important question of jurisdiction or a substantial legal right and thereby
acquire the character of an intermediate order.
48. The test of finality, therefore, cannot be applied mechanically. It must be
examined whether the order merely facilitates the continuation of
proceedings or determines a distinct issue having independent legal
significance. In the case of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.,
the Magistrate is required to decide whether the allegations disclose a
cognizable offence and whether the circumstances justify a direction for
police investigation. The judicial determination of these matters
culminates in either granting or refusing the relief sought. Once
investigation is directed, the Magistrate ordinarily ceases to deal with
that particular application, although further proceedings may arise upon
receipt of the police report or in exercise of other powers conferred by
law.
49. The question is whether such disposal possesses sufficient finality to take
the order outside the category of a purely interlocutory order. This
question cannot be answered merely by describing the direction as a pre-
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cognizance order, nor can it be resolved solely by pointing to the disposal
of the application. The reasoning adopted in Father Thomas places
emphasis upon the nature of the investigative process and the absence of
adjudication concerning the rights of a prospective accused. The contrary
approach places emphasis upon the judicial determination of the
application, the legal consequences of the direction and the availability of
revisional correction of jurisdictional errors. Both approaches proceed
from recognised principles governing criminal revision, but differ in their
application to the particular nature of an order under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. The controversy, therefore, is not merely semantic. It concerns
the extent to which a judicial direction authorising police investigation
can be examined by a revisional court before the criminal process has
advanced to the stage of cognizance.
50. The petitioners have placed considerable emphasis upon the
consequences which may follow from registration of an FIR, including
exposure to investigation, examination by the police, search, seizure and
possible arrest. It is undoubtedly correct that the registration of an FIR
may have serious consequences for a person named therein. Criminal
investigation is an exercise of statutory authority and may involve
interference with individual liberty, reputation and privacy. Nevertheless,
the registration of an FIR does not, by itself, authorise arrest in every
case. The power of arrest is regulated by statutory conditions and the
safeguards recognised by the Supreme Court.
51. Equally, an order directing investigation does not constitute a judicial
determination that the person named in the complaint has committed an
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offence. The investigating agency is required to examine the allegations
objectively and collect evidence both supporting and contradicting the
accusation. The consequences of investigation, therefore, cannot alone
determine whether the Magistrate's order is interlocutory or intermediate.
They are relevant considerations, but must be examined along with the
nature of the jurisdiction exercised and the legal effect of the order.
52. At the same time, the seriousness of the consequences reinforces the
necessity of ensuring that the Magistrate exercises jurisdiction lawfully
and applies judicial mind before directing investigation. The statutory
scheme cannot be interpreted to permit arbitrary or mechanical orders
merely because they are passed at the pre-cognizance stage. The question
is not whether such orders are subject to judicial scrutiny at all, but
whether revision is the legally permissible mode of such scrutiny.
53. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in „ Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar
Pradesh’ , (2015) 6 SCC 287 , emphasised that applications under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be entertained mechanically and that the
Magistrate must exercise judicial discretion with due care and
circumspection. The Court highlighted the importance of compliance
with the statutory procedure, including the requirement of approaching
the police authorities, and the necessity of supporting applications under
Section 156(3) with an affidavit.
54. In „ Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa’ , (2013) 10 SCC 705 , the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court considered the exercise of jurisdiction under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. in the context of allegations against public servants and
the applicable statutory requirements. These decisions establish that the
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Magistrate is not expected to act as a mere forwarding authority. The
direction for investigation must result from an independent judicial
assessment of the allegations and the statutory conditions governing the
exercise of jurisdiction.
55. The judicial exercise, however, does not require the Magistrate to
conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence or determine whether the
allegations will ultimately result in conviction. The satisfaction required
at this stage is distinct from the satisfaction necessary for framing a
charge or recording guilt. The Magistrate must ascertain whether the
allegations disclose a cognizable offence, whether the application has
been presented in accordance with the applicable procedure and whether
the circumstances justify police investigation.
56. Where allegations are directed against public servants, the Court must
additionally examine whether any special statutory provision,
requirement of prior approval or sanction, or other legal restriction
applies to the proposed investigation. The question whether a particular
act is protected by a statutory provision must be determined with
reference to the nature of the alleged act, the office held by the person
concerned, the applicable statute and the stage at which the protection
operates.
57. It would, therefore, be incorrect to formulate an absolute proposition that
no investigation can ever be directed against a police officer without
prior sanction. Equally, the Magistrate cannot disregard a statutory
prohibition or mandatory prerequisite where the law expressly requires
its compliance. These considerations are relevant to the legality of an
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order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. They do not, however, automatically
resolve the separate question whether such legality can be examined in
revision. The existence of a jurisdictional defect and the maintainability
of a particular remedy are distinct legal questions. A revisional court
must first possess jurisdiction to examine the order before it can exercise
that jurisdiction to correct an error.
58. The analysis undertaken hereinabove reveals that the question concerning
the revisability of an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has generated
divergent judicial opinions. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court
in Father Thomas has categorically held that such an order is
interlocutory and that revision at the instance of a prospective accused is
barred. The Bombay High Court, on the other hand, has followed a line
of precedents recognising revisional jurisdiction against such orders. Its
Full Bench decision dated 10.04.2024 has clarified the scope and
consequences of revisional interference, while expressly declining to
reopen the larger issue of maintainability. This Court, in Satpal Sharma ,
has taken the view that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is
interlocutory and not revisable.
59. The decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath , Madhu
Limaye and Girish Kumar Suneja require the expression “interlocutory
order” to be construed in a manner which preserves the distinction
between purely procedural orders and intermediate orders determining
substantial questions. The subsequent decision in Anurag Bhatnagar
reiterates the judicial character of the exercise under Section 156(3)
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Cr.P.C. and the necessity of applying judicial mind, although it does not
directly determine the revisability of such an order.
60. The question which consequently arises is whether the reasoning adopted
in Satpal Sharma requires reconsideration in the light of the distinction
between interlocutory and intermediate orders and the legal effect of the
final disposal of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. This Court
is conscious that a coordinate Bench cannot disregard or overrule an
earlier decision merely because another interpretation appears preferable.
Judicial discipline and certainty in the administration of justice require
adherence to the established principles governing precedents.
61. At the same time, where a substantial question of law arises and the
existing precedent requires reconsideration, the proper course is to seek
an authoritative determination by a larger Bench. The controversy is not
confined to the present petitioners. Orders under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
are frequently passed by Magistrates, and uncertainty concerning the
availability of revisional remedies may result in inconsistent approaches
by the subordinate criminal courts. The issue also has continuing
relevance under Section 175(3) BNSS, although the additional
safeguards introduced by that provision and the applicable transitional
provisions must be independently considered. In these circumstances, it
would be appropriate that the question be examined by an appropriate
larger Bench so that a consistent and authoritative legal position may
emerge.
Questions proposed for reference
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62. Accordingly, the following questions are proposed for consideration by
an appropriate larger Bench:
(i) Whether an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. directing registration of an FIR and investigation is
necessarily an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section
397(2) Cr.P.C., or whether such an order may constitute an
intermediate order amenable to revisional jurisdiction?
(ii) Whether the fact that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. finally
disposes of the application seeking police investigation is a relevant
or determinative consideration in deciding its revisability?
(iii) Whether the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Amar
Nath v. State of Haryana , Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra
and Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI have not been considered by this
Court in Satpal Sharma v. Pawan Singh Rathore , decided on
17.12.2020.
(iv) Whether an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. alleged to suffer
from lack of jurisdiction, non-application of judicial mind or
violation of a mandatory statutory safeguard can be examined in
revision, or whether the aggrieved person must seek relief through
the inherent or extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court?
(v) If such an order is held revisable, what is the permissible scope of
revisional interference at the stages before registration of an FIR,
during investigation, and after submission of a police report or
taking of cognizance?
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(vi) To what extent, if any, do the additional statutory safeguards
introduced by Section 175(3) BNSS affect the character and
revisability of orders passed under that provision, having regard to
Section 438(2) BNSS?
63. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the question concerning the revisability of an order directing
registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. requires authoritative
consideration, particularly in light of the existing decision of a coordinate
Bench of this Court and the divergent judicial approaches adopted
elsewhere. The matter involves a substantial question of law concerning
the interpretation of the statutory bar against revision and the distinction
between interlocutory and intermediate orders. This Court, therefore,
considers it appropriate to place the matter before Hon'ble the Chief
Justice for consideration of its reference to an appropriate larger Bench.
64. Accordingly, it is ordered as follows: The Registry shall place the record
of CRM(M) No.678/2021 & CRM(M) No.179/2025 before Hon'ble the
Chief Justice for appropriate orders regarding constitution of a larger
Bench to consider the questions formulated in paragraph 62 as above.
( Sanjay Parihar )
Judge
JAMMU
17.11.2026
Akhil Dev
Whether the order is speaking? : Yes
Whether the order is reportable? : Yes
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