The New India Assurance Company Ltd., Lucknow Thru. Officer In Charge vs Usha Devi And Others
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
AFR
Reserved on : 13.10.2026
Pronounced on : 18.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 1 of 2024
The New India Assurance Company Ltd., Lucknow Thru.
Officer in Charge
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
Usha Devi and others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Dinesh Kumar,
Counsel for
Respondent(s)
: Rajesh Trivedi,
Court No. - 20
HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.
1. The judgement is being structured in the following
conceptual framework :
I Introduction
II Factual Matrix
III Submissions of learned Counsels for the
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parties before this court
A. Submissions of learned counsel for
the appellant-Insurance company.
B. Submissions of learned counsel for
the respondents-Claimants.
C. Submissions of learned counsel for
the appellant-Insurance Company in
rejoinder.
Analysis
A. Issues for adjudication
IV
a. Adjudication of issue No.(i)
b. Adjudication of issue No.(ii)
c. Adjudication of issue No.(iii)
Determination of Just Compensation to
which claimants-respondents are
entitled.
V
VI Conclusion and Directions
2. Heard Sri Dinesh Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellant-Insurance Company as well as Sri Rajesh
Trivedi, learned counsel for the respondents-claimants
and perused the record.
I. Introduction :
3. The instant First Appeal From Order under Section 173
of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 has been preferred by the
appellant-Insurance Company against the judgment and
award dated 25.09.2023 passed by the Motor Accident
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Claim Tribunal, Bahraich in M.A.C.P. No.262/70/2019
(Usha Devi Vs. The New Indian Assurance Company Ltd.
and another) awarding compensation of Rs.20,95,000/-
by fixing liability upon the appellant-Insurance Company
along with interest at the rate 7% p.a. from the date of
filing of the claim petition.
II. Factual Matrix :
4. On 25.05.2019 at around 02.30 P.M., one Suresh
Chandra Misra was going on his motorcycle and when he
reached near Vijya Bank at that point of time, a car
(bearing registration no. UP 40 AK 5407), which was
being driven in a rash and negligent manner dashed into
the motorcycle of Suresh Chandra Misra and as a result
of collusion the rider of the motorcycle sustained serious
injuries. He was taken to the District Hospital, Bahraich
where he succumbed to his injuries during the treatment.
5. The punchnama and postmortem examination of the
body of the deceased was conducted and after cremation,
the accident was reported to the Police and the First
Information Report (FIR) was lodged in the concerned
police station with regard to the accident. After
conducting the investigation, the Police submitted the
charge sheet before the competent court against the
owner of the offending vehicle.
6. Thereafter the claimants preferred the claim petition
under Section 166 read with Section 140 of the Motor
Vehicle Act, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
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Bahraich, claiming compensation of Rs.42,70,000/- along
with interest at the rate of 9% p.a.
7. The written statements were filed before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal by the appellant-Insurance
Company as well as by the owner of the offending vehicle
wherein they denied the averments made in the claim
petition.
8. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal had framed the
issues for adjudication on 22.01.2020 and after going
through the pleadings as well as perusing oral and
documentary evidences adduced by the parties, the
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the deceased Suresh
Chandra Misra, who was going on his motorcycle and
when he reached near the Vijya Bank he was hit by the
offending vehicle which was being driven in a rash and
negligent manner and because of the injuries sustained in
the accident, the deceased was seriously injured and
thereafter succumbed to his injuries during the course of
treatment. The Tribunal further held that the offending
vehicle was duly insured by the Insurance Company and
the driver of the offending vehicle was having a valid and
effective driving license at the time of the accident.
9. Looking into the age, earning capacity and other
relevant factors, the Tribunal vide its judgment and award
dated 25.09.2023, awarded a compensation of
Rs.20,95,000/- along with interest at the rate of 7% per
annum.
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10. Being aggrieved by the judgement and order as well
as award passed by the Tribunal, the appellant-Insurance
Company has assailed the same by means of the instant
appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.
III. Submissions of learned Counsels for the parties
before this court
A. Submissions of learned counsel for the
appellant-Insurance company:
11. Sri Dinesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company submitted
that the number of the offending vehicle was not
mentioned in the F.I.R. and the offending vehicle was
planted later on just to get compensation amount from
the appellant-Insurance Company.
12. Secondly, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance
Company submitted that amount of compensation as
awarded by the Tribunal is on very higher side. He further
submitted that the age of the deceased at the time of
death was 49 years and at the time of death, he was
engaged in the business of building materials. He further
submitted that in the absence of any documentary proof,
it cannot be considered that he had the income of
Rs.400/- per day and hence, the Tribunal has fixed a
notional income which is quite on higher side without any
proper proof.
13. He further submitted that since the deceased was 49
years of age as stated in the claim petition, the Tribunal
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ought not to have used the multiplier of 15 but should
have used the multiplier of 13 as per the ratio laid down
in the matter of Smt. Sarla Verma & others v. Delhi
Transport Corporation & others, reported in (2009) 6
SCC 121 .
14. He lastly submitted that the Tribunal has overlooked
the settled laws and awarded amount of compensation on
very higher side. Therefore, the same has to be reduced
to just and fair.
B. Submissions of learned counsel for the
respondents-Claimants :
15. Per contra, Sri Rajesh Trivedi, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents-claimants
submitted that the accident is not in dispute. It is not
disputed that the offending vehicle was being driven in a
rash and negligent manner. It is further submitted that
just because the number of the offending vehicle was not
mentioned in the F.I.R., it would not disentitle the
claimants from getting the compensation.
16. With regard to the quantum of compensation, he
further submitted that the Tribunal while assessing the
notional income has awarded Rs.400/- per day which is
apparently just and fair.
17. He further submitted that the age of the deceased
was 40 years as per the postmortem report on which the
Tribunal has relied while applying the multiplier of 15 and
the same is rightly applied as per the ratio of Smt. Sarla
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Verma (supra) which was further followed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matter of National Insurance Co.
v. Pranay Sethi, reported in (2017)16 SCC 680.
18. He further submitted that the Tribunal has only
awarded a future prospects of 25% and the same ought
to have been awarded at 30% as per the applicable Rules
of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998. To
buttress his argument he has placed reliance on the
judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila
Shukla, reported in (2021) 20 SCC 800.
19. He further submitted that the Tribunal while awarding
the compensation under the head of conventional heads
has not followed the ratio laid down in the matter of
National Insurance Co. vs Pranay Sethi, reported in
(2017)16 SCC 680 and Magma General Insurance
Company Ltd vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and
others, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 130.
20. He further submitted that the Pranay Sethi (supra)
was pronounced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
year 2017, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
clearly stated that the value of compensation under the
conventional head would increase by 10% on every three
years. In this case the award was passed on
25.09.2023, accordingly (10% + further 10%) increased
amount ought to have awarded under the conventional
head.
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21. He further submitted that there are six claimants
(mother, wife and four children), and as per Nanu Ram
(supra), each of the claimants are entitled to get the
amount under the head of loss of consortium.
22. He further submitted that the compensation
awarded by the Tribunal is neither just nor fair and,
therefore, warrants enhancement in the interest of
complete justice. He further contended that, since the
quantum of compensation has been challenged by the
appellant-Insurance Company, this Court has ample
power under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
to enhance the compensation even in the absence of a
cross-appeal or an appeal seeking enhancement filed by
the claimants. In support of his submissions, he placed
reliance upon a judgment passed by this Court in the
matter of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Reeta and 4
others, reported in neutral citation – 2026:AHC-
LKO:67492.
C. Submissions of learned counsel for the
appellant-Insurance Company in rejoinder :
23. Learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance company
vociferously opposed the oral objections with regard to
the quantum of compensation raised by the respondents
and submitted that no appeal seeking enhancement of
compensation has been filed by the claimants /
respondent, and hence they are not entitled for any
enhancement. He further contended that the claimants /
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respondents cannot seek any relief in the present appeal
filed by the Appellants-Insurance Company.
24. He further submitted that this court has no power to
enhance compensation amount even if the same seems
to be inadequate. He further submitted that the claimants
herein, has not filed any appeal seeking enhancement of
compensation and hence not entitled for any
enhancement. To buttress his arguments he has placed
reliance upon a judgement dated passed by this court in
the matter of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation
v. Mohd. Kasim Faruki and others, (First Appeal
From Order No.74 of 2007).
25. He further placed reliance upon a judgement passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Mohammad Masood v. The New India Assurance Co.
Ltd., reported in 2025 INSC 1179, wherein, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court refused to add future prospects, as raised
by the claimant, on the ground that the appeal had been
filed by the Insurance Company and not by the claimants.
IV. Analysis
26. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
A. Issues for adjudication :
27. The issues involved in this appeal for adjudication are
as follows:
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i. Whether the liability can be fixed to an offending
vehicle whose registration number is not mentioned
in the F.I.R. ?
ii. Whether the compensation awarded by the
Tribunal is just and in accordance with the settled
principles of law governing motor accident claim
cases ?
iii. Whether if the awarded compensation is found
to be unjust, can this Court, in an appeal preferred
by the Appellant-Insurance Company, enhance the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal, in absence
of any appeal preferred by the claimants seeking
enhancement of compensation ?
28. The grounds and arguments raised by the parties are
dealt in seriatim.
a. Adjudication of issue No.(i)
29. As far as the first issue is concerned which is as to
whether the liability can be fixed to an offending vehicle
whose registration number is not mentioned in the first
information report. It is argued that there was no
mention of registration number of the offending vehicle in
the first information report. To adjudicate this point of
issue, this court deems it apt to delve into certain
observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with
regard to absence of details in first information report in
its various judgements.
30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of CBI v.
Tapan Kumar Singh, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 175,
has clearly held that the first information report is not an
encyclopedia, which must disclose all facts and details.
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An informant may lodge a report about the commission of
an offence though he may not know the name of the
victim. He may not even know how the incident occurred.
The true test is whether the information furnished
provides a reason to suspect the commission of an
offence for which the police concern is empowered under
criminal code to investigate. The relevant para is
extracted as under :
"20. It is well settled that a first information report is
not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts
and details relating to the offence reported. An
informant may lodge a report about the commission
of an offence though he may not know the name of
the victim or his assailant. He may not even know
how the occurrence took place. A first informant
need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be
able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the
offence committed. What is of significance is that the
information given must disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and the information so lodged
must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect
the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage
it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the
information given suspects the commission of a
cognizable offence, and not that he must be
convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has
been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the
basis of information received, that a cognizable
offence may have been committed, he is bound to
record the information and conduct an investigation.
At this stage it is also not necessary for him to
satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the
information. It is only after a complete investigation
that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or
otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the
information does not furnish all the details he must
find out those details in the course of investigation
and collect all the necessary evidence. The
information given disclosing the commission of a
cognizable offence only sets in motion the
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investigative machinery, with a view to collect all
necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in
accordance with law. The true test is whether the
information furnished provides a reason to suspect
the commission of an offence, which the police
officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of
the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option
but to record the information and proceed to
investigate the case either himself or depute any
other competent officer to conduct the investigation.
The question as to whether the report is true,
whether it discloses full details regarding the manner
of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
allegations are all matters which are alien to the
consideration of the question whether the report
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
Even if the information does not give full details
regarding these matters, the investigating officer is
not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and
discover the true facts, if he can."
(emphasis added)
31. In the matter of Kuncham Lavanya and others Vs.
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. and
another , reported in 2025 INSC 452, the Hon’ble
Supreme court has also held that the F.I.R. is not
expected to be an encyclopedia. The Court reiterated that
the mere fact that an FIR initially refers to an unknown
vehicle is not, by itself, fatal to a claim arising out of a
motor vehicle accident. The identity of the offending
vehicle may subsequently be established during
investigation or through other reliable evidence. The
relevant para is extracted as under:
"17. The very fact that the case was registered
against an unknown vehicle initially would indicate
that the offending vehicle was not identified.
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However, since an FIR is not expected to be
encyclopaedic and is only for the purpose of putting
into motion criminal law such that thorough and
full-fledged investigation by the police ensues, it is
the duty of the investigating agency to find out the
identity of the culprit which in the present case
would be the offending car and driver and take
action in accordance with law. Thus, the mere fact
that initially the FIR records the vehicle as unknown
would not be fatal for the prosecution/claimants to
later come up with the specific identity of the
vehicle/driver, with the obvious caveat that the
connection of the accident with the said vehicle has
to be based on cogent and reliable evidence…"
(emphasis added)
32. Similarly, in the matter of Sithara N.S v. Sai Ram
General Insurance Company , reported in 2025 INSC
452, it has been clearly held by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court that an FIR is not an encyclopedia and omissions at
the initial stage may not be a factor for determination.
The relevant para is extracted as under :
"This Court is conscious of the settled legal position
that in cases of motor vehicle accidents, the standard
of proof required is that of preponderance of
probabilities. It is also well settled that the absence
of vehicle registration number in the FIR or complaint
lodged immediately after the accident is not, by
itself, fatal to the claim. An FIR is not an
encyclopedia and omissions at the initial stage may
not be determinative. However, the claimants must
establish the specific identity of the vehicle/driver,
with the caveat that the connection of the accident
with the said vehicle must be established through
cogent and reliable evidence"
(emphasis added)
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33. In view of the above dicta, there is no force in the
argument raised by the appellant that the registration
number of the offending vehicle was not mention in the
first information report. First Information Report cannot
be said to be an encyclopedia and omissions at the initial
stage may not be a factor to reject the claim petition. The
Insurance Company cannot take such plea to avoid its
liability. Accordingly, issue no.(i) is decided in negative
against the appellant-Insurance Company.
b. Adjudication of issue No.(ii)
34. Issue no.(ii) is as to whether the compensation
awarded by the Tribunal is just and in accordance with
the settled principles of law governing motor accident
claim cases.
35. With regard to notional income as assessed by the
Tribunal at Rs.400 per day, this court feels that the same
is perfectly justified and does not call for any
interference. The Tribunal has rightly assessed the
notional income of the deceased as the claimants failed to
establish the alleged monthly income of ₹ 25,000/-
through reliable and cogent documentary or oral
evidence. The GST records were unauthenticated, the
relevant business accounts and transaction records were
not produced. Further, the deceased's wife (PW-1) also
failed to substantiate the nature, duration and actual
earnings of the business. Therefore, in the absence of
reliable evidence establishing higher income, the Tribunal
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rightly adopted Rs.400/- per day as a reasonable and just
assessment of the deceased's income.
36. With regard to multiplier, the Tribunal has considered
the age as per the postmortem, in absence of any other
document. Even the Hon’ble Supreme COurt in the
matter of Sunita v. Vinod Singh, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 586 , while applying multiplier has considered
post-mortem as a scientific assessment of the age of the
deceased. The relevant para is extracted as under :
“11. The amount arrived at by the High Court of the
monthly income being Rs. 5,819/- (Rupees Five
Thousand Eight Hundred and Nineteen) as against
the claim of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand)
appears to be on the lower side as the total earning
of the deceased from family pension itself ought to
have been considered which itself would come to
Rs. 5,137/- (Rupees Five Thousand One Hundred
and Thirty-Seven) to which the notional wages as a
home maker had to be added, which we find is
reasonable as has been taken by the High Court at
Rs. 2,500/-(Rupees Two Thousand Five Hundred).
Thus, the monthly income would come to Rs.
7,637/- (Rupees Seven Thousand Six Hundred and
Thirty-Seven), which we are inclined to round off at
Rs. 7,000/- (Rupees Seven Thousand). Coming to
the multiplier factor which is dependent on
the age, there is sufficient indication that the
deceased was aged about 45 years as per the
Post-Mortem Report which is a scientific
assessment of the age of the deceased. The
purported discrepancy in the age with regard to
that of the claimant and the deceased is erroneous
for the reason that when the claim was filed,
appellant no. 1 was aged about 30 years and a
difference of 15 years between the daughter-in-law
and the mother-in-law cannot be said to be totally
devoid of reality given the contextual and prevalent
societal norms in vogue at the time of marriage of
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the deceased which could have been at least 25 to
30 years prior to her death i.e., in or about the
1970s. Moreover, in the absence of material
indicating to the contrary, there is no inhibition to
accept the age of the deceased as per the Post-
Mortem Report. Thus, we are inclined to grant her
the benefit of multiplier of 14 taking her age as 45
years. With regard to the loss of love and
affection, Pranay Sethi (supra) grants Rs. 40,000/-
(Rupees Forty Thousand) per head with escalation
of 10% every three years for loss of consortium
which has been interpreted in Magma General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC
130 to include spousal, parental, and filial
consortium. Thus, there being five claimants the
amount shall be [Rs. 48,000/- × 5] which comes to
Rs. 2,40,000/-(Rupees Two Lakhs and Forty
Thousand) payable under the head of loss of love
and affection.”
(emphasis added)
37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pranay
Sethi (supra) followed the ratio of Sarla Verma
(supra). The relevant para of Sarla Verma (supra) is
extracted as under :
“42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be
used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the
table above (prepared by applying Susamma
Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 335] ,
Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362] and Charlie
[(2005) 10 SCC 720 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1657] ),
which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for
the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years),
reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-
17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-
15 for 36 to 40 years , M-14 for 41 to 45 years,
and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two
units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55
years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65
years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”
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(emphasis added)
38. In view of the above dictum, since the age of the
deceased at the time of accident as per postmortem
report was 40 years accordingly, the Tribunal has rightly
applied the multiplier of 15 while computing the award.
39. In view of the above, there is no merit in the
arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant-Insurance Company. Now, to examine whether
the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal
is Just, this court deems it apt to examine the heads
under which the learned counsel for the respondent-
claimants drawn attention of this court.
40. The learned Counsel raised objection with regard to
Future prospects as awarded by the Tribunal.
41. This court would like to delve into the prevailing
compensation Rules. The relevant provisions of Rule 220A
of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules 1998, which was
amended on 26.09.2011, is quoted hereinbelow:-
“ Rule 220A. Determination of compensation. .
…
(3) The future prospects of a deceased, shall be
added in the actual salary or minimum wages of the
deceased as under
(i) Below 40 years of age: 50% of the salary,
(ii) Between 40-50 years of age: 30% of the
salary.
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(ii) More than 50 years of age: 20% of the
salary.
(iii) When wages not sufficiently proved: 50%
towards inflation and price index......"
42. With regard to the future prospects, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Pranay Sethi (supra),
has held as under :
“59.3. While determining the income, an addition of
50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased
towards future prospects, where the deceased had
a permanent job and was below the age of 40
years, should be made. The addition should be
30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to
50 years. In case the deceased was between the
age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%.
Actual salary should be read as actual salary less
tax.
59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on
a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the
established income should be the warrant where
the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An
addition of 25% where the deceased was between
the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the
deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years
should be regarded as the necessary method of
computation. The established income means the
income minus the tax component.”
(emphasis added)
43. In the present case, the age of the deceased at the
time of accident was 40 years and he was engaged in the
business of building materials. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Pranay Sethi (supra) has awarded
a 25% of the income as a future prospects in case the
deceased being self employed and was between the age
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FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
of 40 to 50 years, but as per the rules of Uttar Pradesh
Motor Vehicle Rules 1998, which was amended on
26.09.2011, it should be 30% of the income. This
position was clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the matter of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila
Shukla, reported in (2021) 20 SCC 800 , wherein it has
been held as under :-
“10. If an indicia is made available in the form of a
statutory instrument which affords a favourable
treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi [National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC
680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri)
205] cannot be taken to have limited the operation
of such statutory provision specially when the
validity of the Rules was not put under any
challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where
the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years
as stated in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3
SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] cannot be
taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing
principle available in the statutory regime, it was
only in the form of an indication. If a statutory
instrument has devised a formula which affords
better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument
must be allowed to operate unless the statutory
instrument is otherwise found to be invalid.”
(emphasis added)
44. In view of ratio laid down in the matter of Urmila
Shukla (supra) the benefits of Rule 220A of U.P. Motor
Vehicle Rules, 1998 as amended in 2011 would be
applicable in the present case, and since the age of the
deceased was 40 years, the future prospects of 30% of
the income ought to have been granted to the claimants
by the Tribunal.
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45. As far as the compensation awarded under the
conventional head are concerned, the Tribunal has
awarded Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate, Rs.15,000/-
towards funeral expenses and Rs.40,000/- under loss of
consortium, which is contrary to the ratio laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pranay
Sethi (supra) as well as Nanu Ram (supra).
46. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pranay
Sethi (supra), has clearly held that the amount which
has been quantified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the
same should be enhanced on percentage basis in every
three years and the enhancement should be @ 10% in a
span of every three years. The relevant para is extracted
as under:-
“52. … Therefore, we think it seemly to fix
reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable
figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of
estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses
should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000
respectively. The principle of revisiting the said
heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit
should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We
think that it would be condign that the amount that
we have quantified should be enhanced on
percentage basis in every three years and the
enhancement should be @ 10% in a span of
three years.”
(emphasis added)
47. Coming to the question of consortium payable to each
claimant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter
of Nanu Ram (supra) has awarded Rs.40,000/- to each
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claimants towards loss of consortium. The relevant
portion reads as under:-
" 21. …..In legal parlance, “consortium” is a
compendious term which encompasses “spousal
consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial
consortium”. The right to consortium would include
the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace
and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his
family. With respect to a spouse, it would include
sexual relations with the deceased spouse:
[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013)
4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014)
1 SCC (L&S) 149]
21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined
as rights pertaining to the relationship of a
husband-wife which allows compensation to
the surviving spouse for loss of “company,
society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the
other in every conjugal relation”. [Black's Law
Dictionary (5th Edn., 1979).]
21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the
child upon the premature death of a parent,
for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection,
society, discipline, guidance and training”.
21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the
parents to compensation in the case of an
accidental death of a child. An accident leading
to the death of a child causes great shock and
agony to the parents and family of the deceased.
The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child
during their lifetime. Children are valued for their
love, affection, companionship and their role in the
family unit.
22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting
changing norms about the status and worth of
actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over
have recognised that the value of a child's
consortium far exceeds the economic value of the
22
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
compensation awarded in the case of the death of a
child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to
be awarded compensation under loss of consortium
on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the
parents is a compensation for loss of the love,
affection, care and companionship of the deceased
child.
23. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation
aimed at providing relief to the victims or their
families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where
a parent has lost their minor child, or unmarried
son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be
awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial
consortium. Parental consortium is awarded to
children who lose their parents in motor
vehicle accidents under the Act…..”
24. The amount of compensation to be awarded as
consortium will be governed by the principles of
awarding compensation under “loss of consortium”
as laid down in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 :
(2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] .
In the present case, we deem it appropriate to
award the father and the sister of the
deceased, an amount of Rs 40,000 each for
loss of filial consortium.
(emphasis added)
48. The aforesaid principle was subsequently affirmed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of New India
Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Somwati, reported in (2020) 9
SCC 644 , wherein the award of consortium to each of the
claimants was upheld.
49. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, since
there are six claimants (Mother, wife and 4 children) in
the present case. Mother is entitled to get Rs.40,000/-
23
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
under loss of filial consortium, wife is entitled to get
Rs.40,000/- under loss of spousal consortium and
children are entitled to get Rs.40,000/- each under loss
of parental consortium. The Tribunal, therefore, erred in
awarding only Rs.40,000/- under the loss of consortium.
50. In the present case, the accident occurred in the year
2019, whereas the judgement and award was passed on
25.09.2023. Since the judgment in Pranay Sethi (supra)
was pronounced in the year 2017, it would, therefore, be
appropriate to enhance the amounts awarded towards
loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses,
as quantified in accordance with the ratio laid down in
Pranay Sethi (supra), by 10% for every three-year
period from the date of the judgment in Pranay Sethi
(supra). Accordingly, loss of consortium comes to
(Rs.40,000/- + 10% of Rs.40,000/- = Rs.44,000/-) after
first three years and thereafter (Rs.44,000/- + 10% of
Rs44,000/- = Rs.48,400/-). Similarly, the loss of estate
comes to Rs.18,150/- and funeral expenses comes to
Rs.18,150/-.
51. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this court finds that
the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is not just and
fair as per the settled principles if law. Accordingly, issue
no.(ii) is decided against the appellant-Insurance
Company.
c. Adjudication of issue No.(iii)
52. Now a question arises for consideration before this
court vide issue no.(iii) is as to whether, if the awarded
24
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
compensation is found to be unjust, can this Court, in an
appeal preferred by the Appellant-Insurance Company,
enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, in
absence of any appeal preferred by the claimants seeking
enhancement of compensation.
53. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 gives
paramount importance to the concept of 'just and fair'
compensation. It is a beneficial legislation which has been
framed with the object of providing relief to the victims or
their families. Section 168 of the MV Act deals with the
concept of 'just compensation' which ought to be
determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness
and equitability. It is also essential to note that in the
scheme of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, the burden of
awarding the compensation is imposed upon the Tribunal
in terms of the mandate of Section 168, which reads as
under:
“ 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal. - (1) On
receipt of an application for compensation made
under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after
giving notice of the application to the insurer and
after giving the parties (including the insurer) an
opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the
claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims
and, subject to the provisions of [section 163] may
make an award determining the amount of
compensation which appears to it to be just and
specifying the person or persons to whom
compensation shall be paid and in making the
award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount
which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or
driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by
all or any of them, as the case may be:
25
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver
copies of the award to the parties concerned
expeditiously and in any case within a period of
fifteen days from the date of the award.
(3) When an award is made under this section, the
person who is required to pay any amount in terms
of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of
announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal,
deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner
as the Claims Tribunal may direct.”
54. Although the determination of compensation can
never be arithmetically exact or perfect, an endeavor
should be made by the Court to award just and fair
compensation irrespective of the amount claimed by the
claimants. In the matter of Sarla Verma (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“"Just compensation" is adequate compensation
which is fair and equitable, on the facts and
circumstances of the case, to make good the loss
suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money
can do so, by applying the well settled principles
relating to award of compensation. It is not
intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of
profit.”
(emphasis added)
55. It is also essential to note the procedure and powers
of the claims tribunal, which are enumerated in Section
169 of the Motor Vehicle Act, which reads as under:
“ 169. Procedure and powers of Claims
Tribunals. - (1) In holding any inquiry under
section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to
any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow
such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
26
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of
a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on
oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses
and of compelling the discovery and production of
documents and material objects and for such other
purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims
Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all
the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this
behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of
adjudicating upon any claim for compensation,
choose one or more persons possessing special
knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to
assist it in holding the inquiry.
(4) For the purpose of enforcement of its award,
the Claims Tribunal shall also have all the powers of
a Civil Court in the execution of a decree under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as if the award were
a decree for the payment of money passed by such
court in a civil suit.”
56. It is also essential to note that the appeals are
prescribed against the award of a Claims Tribunal to the
High Court under section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act,
1988. Although the nature and procedure to be followed
in exercise of jurisdiction to be exercised by the Claims
Tribunal is prescribed under Section 169, the procedure
to be followed by the High Court in appeals is silent in the
Act and even in the Rules framed by the State of Uttar
Pradesh, namely, The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules,
1998.
57. With regard to the power of Appellate Court, Section
107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred as ‘CPC’), provides as under :
27
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
“107. Powers of appellate Court. -(1)
Subject to such conditions and limitations as may
be prescribed, an appellate Court shall have power-
(a)to determine a case finally;
(b)to remand a case;
(c)to frame issues and refer them for trial;
(d)to take additional evidence or to require
such evidence to be taken.
(2) Subject as aforesaid, the appellate Court shall
have the same powers and shall perform as nearly
as may be the same duties as are conferred and
imposed by this Code on Courts of original
jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.”
58. On bare reading of sub-section (2), it is clear that the
appellate court have same power and duties as conferred
by the Code on the courts of original jurisdiction in
respect of suit instituted therein. The powers and duties
of appellate court are co-extensive with that of Civil Court
unless stated otherwise by the statute governing the
cause.
59. It is also well settled law that the appeal is a
continuation of original suit or proceeding rather than a
fresh or independent action. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the matter of Malluru Mallappa v. Kuruvathappa ,
(2020) 4 SCC 313, has reiterated the same principle of
law and held that the first appellate court is required to
address itself to all the issues and decide the case by
giving reasons. The relevant para is extracted as under:
28
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
“ 13. It is a settled position of law that an appeal is
a continuation of the proceedings of the original
court. Ordinarily, the appellate jurisdiction involves
a rehearing on law as well as on fact and is invoked
by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a
valuable right of the appellant and therein all
questions of fact and law decided by the trial court
are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first
appellate court is required to address itself to all
the issues and decide the case by giving reasons.
The court of first appeal must record its findings
only after dealing with all issues of law as well as
fact and with the evidence, oral as well as
documentary, led by the parties. The judgment of
the first appellate court must display conscious
application of mind and record findings supported
by reasons on all issues and contentions [see :
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3
SCC 179, Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC
756, B.M. Narayana Gowda v. Shanthamma, (2011)
15 SCC 476 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 619, H.K.N.
Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243, Sri
Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy
Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259.]”
(emphasis added)
60. Since, it is settled that the appeal is a continuation of
the suit. Thus, this appeal filed by the appellant
challenging the impugned judgement and award passed
in claim petition is also continuation of lis and even if the
claimants have not filed the separate appeal seeking
enhancement, this Court is empowered to enhance the
compensation if it is found that the Tribunal has not
awarded just and fair compensation.
61. It is the statutory obligation of the Tribunal and the
Courts to do complete justice to the parties and award
‘just compensation’, there is no restriction to enhance the
29
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
compensation in appropriate case even in absence of any
cross-appeal or an appeal seeking enhancement of
compensation.
62. Order XLI of the CPC, also lays down the general
provisions governing appeals before the High Court.
Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC confers wide powers upon
the appellate court to pass such decree or order as the
case may require. Before proceeding further, this Court
deems it appropriate to look into the provisions of Order
XLI Rule 33 of the CPC, which is reproduced herein-
under:
" 33. Power of Court of Appeal .—The
Appellate Court shall have power to pass any
decree and make any order which ought to have
been passed or made and to pass or make such
further or other decree or order as the case may
require, and this power may be exercised by the
Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part
only of the decree and may be exercised in favour
of all or any of the respondents or parties, although
such respondents or parties may not have filed
any appeal or objection [and may, where there
have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or
more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised
in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an
appeal may not have been filed against such
1
decrees] :
[Provided that the Appellate Court shall not
make any order under section 35A in pursuance of
any objection on which the Court from whose
decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or
2
refused to make such order.] "
1 Ins. by Act 104 of 1976, s. 87 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).
2 Ins. by Act 9 of 1922, s. 4, which under s. 1(2) thereof, may be brought into force in any State by the State
Government on any specified date. The Act has been brought into force in Bombay, Bengal, U.P., Punjab,
Bihar, C.P. Assam, Orissa and Tamil Nadu.
30
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
63. From bare reading of Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC, it is
clear that the appellate courts are empowered to pass
whatever order it thinks fit and proper to do complete
justice, not only between the appellant and the
respondent but also between one respondent and another
respondent. It empowers the appellate court not only to
give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or
dismissing the appeal, but also to give such other relief to
any of the respondent as the case may require.
64. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mahant
Dhangir v. Madan Mohan, reported in 1987 Supp SCC
528 , has explained the provisions of Order XLI Rule 33
C.P.C. in following words :
“The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide
enough to determine any question not only
between the appellant and respondent, but also
between respondent and co-respondents. The
appellate court could pass any decree or order
which ought to have been passed in the
circumstances of the case. The appellate court
could also pass such other decree or order as the
case may require. The words “as the case may
require” used in Rule 33 of Order 41 have been put
in wide terms to enable the appellate court to pass
any order or decree to meet the ends of justice.
What then should be the constraint? We do not find
many. We are not giving any liberal interpretation.
The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraint
that we could see, may be these: That the parties
before the lower court should be there before the
appellate court. The question raised must properly
arise out of the judgment of the lower court. If
these two requirements are there, the appellate
court could consider any objection against any part
of the judgment or decree of the lower court. It
may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true
that the power of the appellate court under Rule 33
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FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of
judicial discretion to determine all questions urged
in order to render complete justice between the
parties. The court should not refuse to exercise that
discretion on mere technicalities.”
(emphasis added)
65. In the matter of Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra,
reported in (2010) 10 SCC 458, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under :
"18. The provision of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC is
clearly an enabling provision, whereby the appellate
court is empowered to pass any decree or make
any order which ought to have been passed or
made, and to pass or make such further or other
decree or order as the case may require. Therefore,
the power is very wide and in this enabling
provision, the crucial words are that the appellate
court is empowered to pass any order
which ought to have been made as the case may
require. The expression “order ought to have been
made” would obviously mean an order which justice
of the case requires to be made. This is made clear
from the expression used in the said Rule by saying
“the court may pass such further or other order as
the case may require”. This expression “case”
would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this
power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict
or a prohibition clamped by law."
(emphasis added)
66. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for
consideration in several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court as well as various High Courts. Commenting on this
power, Mulla (Civil Procedure Code, 15th Edn., p.
2647) observed that this Rule is modeled on Order 59
Rule 10(4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature of
32
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
England, and Mulla further opined that this rule gives the
court ample power to make the order appropriate with a
purpose to do complete justice between the parties.
67. Apart from the above, there can be situation from the
other side of lens, where the Insurance Company files an
appeal challenging the award granted by the Tribunal, the
Claimant without filing a cross appeal or cross objection
possesses the right to defend the amount which has been
granted by the Tribunal. The Two Judges Bench of
Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered this aspect in the
matter of Ranjana Prakash v. Divl. Manager, reported
in (2011) 14 SCC 639, wherein it was held as under :
“7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33
of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an
appellate court to pass any order which ought to
have been passed by the trial court and to make
such further or other order as the case may
require, even if the respondent had not filed any
appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted
to the appellate court to enable it to do complete
justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the
Code can however be pressed into service to make
the award more effective or maintain the award on
other grounds or to make the other parties to
litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but
cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief.
For example, where the claimants seek
compensation against the owner and the insurer of
the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only
against the owner, on an appeal by the owner
challenging the quantum, the appellate court can
make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay
the compensation, along with the owner, even
though the claimants had not challenged the non-
grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it
may.
33
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum
of compensation, irrespective of who files the
appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is
to examine the facts and by applying the relevant
principles, determine the just compensation. If the
compensation determined by it is higher than the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High
Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants
and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer.
Similarly, if the compensation determined by the
High Court is lesser than the compensation
awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will
dismiss any appeal by the claimants for
enhancement, but allow any appeal by the
owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot
obviously increase the compensation in an appeal
by the owner/insurer for reducing the
compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation
in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement
of compensation.”
(emphasis added)
68. While addressing a case where the bench of Bombay
High Court has declined to grant enhancement of
compensation on the ground that the claimants fail to file
cross appeal, the Three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Surekha v. Santosh,
reported in (2021) 16 SCC 467 ; Civil Appeal No. 476
of 2020 , had set aside the High Court’s refusal to
enhance the compensation and awarded enhanced and
just compensation to the claimants. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court clearly observed that it is a well-settled principle of
law that, while dealing with claims for compensation
arising out of motor accidents, the Court should not
adopt a hyper-technical approach. The primary duty of
the Court is to ensure "just compensation" which is to be
34
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
awarded to the affected person or claimants. The relevant
para is extracted as under :
“Leave granted. This appeal takes exception to the
judgment and order dated 4-1-2019 [Shriram
General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Surekha, 2019 SCC
OnLine Bom 12] passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in First
Appeal No. 2564 of 2016, whereby the High Court,
even though agreed with the stand of the
appellants that just compensation amount ought to
be Rs 49,85,376 (Rupees forty-nine lakhs eighty-
five thousand three hundred seventy-six only),
however, declined to grant enhancement merely on
the ground that the appellants had failed to file
cross-appeal.
2. By now, it is well-settled that in the matter of
insurance claim compensation in reference to the
motor accident, the court should not take
hypertechnical approach and ensure that just
compensation is awarded to the affected person or
the claimants.
3. As a result, we modify the order passed by the
High Court to the effect that the compensation
amount payable to the appellants is determined at
Rs 49,85,376 (Rupees forty-nine lakhs eighty-five
thousand three hundred seventy-six only), with
interest thereon as awarded by the High Court."
(emphasis added)
69. Also, in the matter of The Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. V. Sardar Singh & Ors., (SLP (C) No(s). 14319
of 2020), the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently on
22.05.2026 affirmed the judgment passed by the Delhi
High Court, wherein the High Court enhanced the award
in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company, despite
there being no cross-appeal or cross-objection filed by
35
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
the claimants/family members. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court while affirming the decision of the High Court has
opined as under :
"…..payment is under a beneficial legislation and
thus, the court should not test it from a purely
technical point of view but rather, from a human
angle for determining the quantum of
compensation which ultimately, the court grants to
the family of the victim."
(emphasis added)
70. A similar issue was raised before this court in the
matter of New India Assurane Co. Ltd. v. Neelam
Jaiswal, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine All 85, wherein
the issue before the Court was whether, in an appeal
preferred by the Insurance Company on a ground other
than the quantum of compensation, and in the absence of
any cross-appeal or cross-objection by the claimants, this
Court held that it would be justified in enhancing the
amount of compensation in exercise of the powers
conferred under Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The said issue was considered in detail
by this Court with reference to the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, and, upon such consideration,
this Court ultimately held as under:
“28. There is another angle to look at the aforesaid
situation. In the decision relied upon by the learned
counsel for the respondents in the case of Resha
Devi (supra) it would be seen that the appeal had
been preferred by the Insurance Company. The
submission of the learned counsel for the Insurance
Company is noted in paragraph-4 of the judgment
of the Division Bench and from the perusal whereof,
it would indicate that the question before Hon'ble
36
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
the Division Bench as raised by the Insurance
Company was on quantum; inasmuch as it had
been contended that the multiplier as adopted by
the tribunal was on the higher side and the
compensation accordingly was excessive.
29. It is in the aforesaid circumstance, where the
question of quantum was before the Division Bench
and in such circumstance considering the fact that
the Division Bench found that the award was on the
lower side had applied the power under Order 41
Rule 33 CPC and has enhanced the award by adding
non-pecuniary damages. Thus, it would be seen
that the facts before the Division Bench were
completely different; inasmuch as the issue of
quantum was before the High Court specifically
raised by the Insurance Company and as an appeal
is a continuation of the proceedings and the tribunal
is required to hold an inquiry to ascertain the
compensation which is just and fair, hence in the
aforesaid circumstances where the Division Bench
came to be conclusion that the Insurance Company
was contending that the award was excessive, but
it found that it was on the lower side, hence in
order to do substantial justice despite the claimants
did not file a cross appeal the Division Bench
exercised its power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC
and enhance the same.”
(emphasis added)
71. Even in the matter of New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. v. Anil Kumar, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine All
3226, this court has held as under :
“22. The complexion would change where a party
(other than the claimant) assails the award solely
on the ground of quantum of compensation before
the Appellate Court and the claimant who has a
right of filing a cross objection but he does not file
any cross-objection or cross appeal. In such a
situation whether the Appellate Court is only
37
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
required to assess and examine the appeal within
the limited parameters as urged by the appellants
assailing the award on quantum or is it open for the
Appellate Court, if during hearing of the appeal. It
finds that the compensation has not been
appropriately granted by the Tribunal then whether
it can grant such higher compensation than the one
which has been granted by the Tribunal and which
is already assailed and under challenge before it in
appeal.
*
25. This Court would be failing in its duty if it did
not notice a recent decision of the Apex Court in
context with the powers conferred on the Appellate
Court under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC and Order 41
Rule 33 CPC in Saurabh Jain v. A.B.P. Design, 2021
SCC OnLine SC 552 wherein the issue was whether
the superior Court could consider an adverse
finding even where a cross objection has not been
filed and it was held as under:—
“27. On a perusal of the above authorities, it
is evident that the principle stipulated in
Order XLI Rule 22 of CPC can be applied to
petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution
because of this Court's wide powers to do
justice under Article 142 of the Constitution.
Since the principle in Order XLI Rule 22 of
the CPC furthers the cause of justice by
providing the party other than the “aggrieved
party” to raise any adverse findings against
them, this Court can draw colour from
Order XLI Rule 22 CPC and permit objections
to findings.
28. From the above it has been established
that it not necessary that a challenge to the
adverse findings of the lower court needs to
be made in the form of a memorandum of
cross-objection. In the present case, we note
that the appellant had raised an objection to
the jurisdiction of the Trial Court for
38
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
entertaining the suit on the ground that an
injunction and declaratory relief could not
have been given. Although the Trial Court
passed a decree in favour of the appellant, it
had decided against the appellant on the
question of jurisdiction. This finding was not
challenged by the appellant before the High
Court in the form of a memorandum of cross-
objection. The judgment of the High Court
makes no mention that a plea of lack of
jurisdiction was taken by either the appellant
or the MDA. Before this Court, the appellant
has not filed the counter-affidavit it had filed
before the High Court. Thus, the conclusion
that emanates from the record before us is
that the ground of jurisdiction was only raised
by the appellant before the Trial Court and not
before the High Court. In effect then, this
Court would have to adjudicate on a plea,
which did not form a part of the decision of
the High Court in challenge before us.
29. With regard to new grounds being raised
before this Court in a special leave petition
under Article 136, we note that under Order
21 Rule 3(c) of the Supreme Court Rules,
2013, SLPs are to be confined to the pleadings
before the court whose order is challenged.
However, with the leave of the Court,
additional grounds can be urged at the time of
the hearing.
——————————
*—————
32. In Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran
Mar Marthoma 17 as well, a three Judge
bench of this Court entertained an objection
as to maintainability of the suit under
Section 9 of the CPC, despite the plea not
having been raised before the courts below.
The Court observed that the plea of a bar or
lack of jurisdiction can be entertained at any
39
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
stage, since an order or decree passed
without jurisdiction is nonest in law.
——————————
*—————
…..34. Based on the position of law, we find it
just to allow the appellant to raise the ground
of jurisdiction before us. Allowing the ground
to be raised would not require the submission
of additional evidence since it is a pure
question of law and strikes at the heart of the
matter. We shall now turn to the merits of this
argument.”
26. From a gainful reading of the propositions as
has been noticed in the decisions considered
hereinabove, apparently, what can be culled out is
the fact that once the issue of
compensation/quantum has been raised by any
party before the Appellate Court, then the Appellate
Court becomes duty bound to ascertain as to
whether the compensation has been adequately
and justly awarded or not. The entire ethos behind
consideration of a claim petition under the Motor
Vehicles Act is grant of just and fair compensation.
This is to be seen in the context that in the given
facts and circumstance, the compensation should
not be meager but at the same time it should not
also be a bonanza for the claimants. Within these
two outer perimeter, it is the duty of the Tribunal
and so also for the Appellate Court to adjudge the
issue of quantum with a correct lens and
perspective so that the claimants are awarded just
and fair compensation which is pragmatic and close
to reality.
27. In the spotlight of the above considered
decisions, this Court is of the clear opinion that
where an appeal is preferred by any party, other
than the claimants, assailing the quantum on
whatever ground, in such a case, even though, the
claimant may not have filed a cross objection or a
separate appeal for enhancement, yet, it is the duty
40
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
of the Appellate Court to see that the compensation
as awarded by the Tribunal is just and fair. While
determining the same, even if, the Appellate Court
comes to the conclusion that the amount granted
by the Tribunal is less, it has all the jurisdiction to
grant fair and just compensation by enhancing the
award even in absence of any cross objection for
the reason that the appellant who is before the
Court has already raised the issue of quantum and
considering the arguments/contentions of the
appellant, the Appellate Court is to arrive at its own
independent finding regarding quantum which may
then even grant a higher sum than granted by the
Tribunal. In such situation, it is not open for the
appellant to state that the amount cannot be
enhanced as no challenge has been made to the
award. What needs to be seen is the fact that it is
the quantum of award which is under challenge and
that has to be decided and in a befitting case, the
Appellate Court can invoke the powers in its
repository to pass such orders to grant just and fair
compensation.”
(emphasis added)
72. This court also in the matter of United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Sunita Devi; reported in
2026 AHC 103621 ; (FAFO No.2223 of 2016), has
taken the same view with regard to awarding ‘just
compensation’ to the claimants, even in the absence of a
cross-appeal or cross-objection. The relevant para is
extracted as under :
“19. Thus for all the reasons recorded above, I am
inclined to follow the judgment of this Court in the
case of New India Assurance Company Limted vs
Anil Kumar (Supra) and thus, I have no hesitation
in rejecting the contention of the Counsel for the
appellant that in absence of a cross appeal, this
Court cannot enhance compensation as essentially
the appellate court is also bound to exercise its
41
FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
powers in a summary manner to award “just
compensation” which is the mandate of Section 168
of the Motor Vehicle Act.”
(emphasis added)
73. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of
the considered view that there is no legal embargo
against enhancement of compensation by the Court.
Rather, the mandate of law is to ensure that the
claimants are awarded ‘just compensation’ in accordance
with the applicable statutory provisions and settled
principles of law. In discharge of such mandate, the Court
is empowered to enhance the compensation awarded,
where the amount as determined by the Tribunal is found
to be inadequate or not in accordance with law, and also
not in sync with the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in its various judgements. Such exercise
of jurisdiction is legally permissible even in the absence
of an appeal or cross-objection preferred by the
claimants, particularly in view of the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surekha (supra).
74. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohammed Masood (supra) as relied upon by the
learned counsel for the Appellant is clearly distinguishable
on facts as well as in law. A careful perusal of the said
judgment reveals that the observation sought to be relied
upon by the Appellant is merely an incidental observation
and does not constitute the ratio decidendi . It is pertinent
to note that the question concerning the scope, ambit
and exercise of the statutory power conferred under the
relevant provisions of the statute was neither directly in
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FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
issue nor examined or adjudicated upon by the Hon’ble
Court. In particular, the judgment does not undertake any
discussion or interpretation of the statutory provisions
governing the exercise of such power, nor does it lay
down any authoritative proposition of law in that regard.
Therefore, the said observation cannot be construed as a
binding declaration of law on the issue presently under
consideration. Similarly, the other judgement of this court
in Mohd. Kasim Faruki (supra) as relied by the counsel
for the appellant is also distinguishable.
75. Therefore, it is clear that where an appeal is
preferred by the Insurance Company challenging the
award, the claimants are not precluded from contending
that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal does not
constitute ‘just compensation’ as per law. The mere
absence of an appeal or cross-objection on the part of the
claimants cannot operate as a legal impediment to the
Court determining and awarding just compensation in
accordance with law. Once the correctness and adequacy
of the award are brought under consideration in the
appeal and even if the claimants have not specifically
raised the issue with regard to enhancement of
compensation, the Court is duty-bound to examine
whether the compensation awarded conforms to the
statutory mandate and, if found deficient, the Court is
duty-bound to enhance the same so as to ensure that the
claimants receive ‘just compensation’ as per law.
76. Thus, there being no merit in the arguments
advanced by the appellant-Insurance Company, Issue No.
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FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
(iii) is answered in negative and decided in favour of the
Claimants/respondents.
V. Determination of Just Compensation to which
claimants-respondents are entitled :
77. It is well settled that the Courts are bound to award
just and reasonable compensation. Therefore, this Court
cannot turn a blind eye to the objection raised by the
respondents/claimants, particularly when the grounds
raised by them for enhancement of compensation have
sufficient merit.
78. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid, the impugned
judgment and order dated 25.09.2023 as well as award
passed by the Tribunal in M.A.C.P. No.262/70/2019 is
modified to the following extent:
Amount
Awarded by
the Tribunal
Amount
Modified by
In
accordance
Head
this Court
with
Annual
Income (A)
Rs.400 x 30 x
Rs.400 x 30 x
12 =
Rs.1,44,000/-
12 =
Rs.1,44,000/-
Future
Prospects
(% ) (B)
25% of A
30% of A
As per
Urmila
Shukla
(supra) and
Rule 220A of
U.P. M.V.
Rules, 1998.
=Rs.36,000/-
=Rs.43,200/-
Deduction
towards
personal &
living
=Rs.45,000/- =Rs.46,800/-
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FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
expenses
( 1/4) [C =
1/4 of A+B]
Multiplier
applied(D)
15 15 As per Sarla
Verma
(supra)
Loss of
dependency
after
multiplier
[E=D X (A+B-
C)]
=
Rs.20,25,000/-
=
Rs.21,06,000/-
Conventional Head
Funeral Rs.18,150/-
Rs.15,000/-
Expenses (F)
Loss of Estate Rs.18,150/-
Rs.15,000/-
(G)
Loss of
Consortium
(H)
= Rs.48,400 x 6
= Rs.2,90,400/-
As per
Pranay Sethi
(supra) and
Nanu Ram
(supra)
= Rs.40,000/-
/
Loss of love
and affection
Total
Compensation
Rs.20,95,000/- Rs.24,32,700/-
Interest 7% 7%
VI. Conclusion and Directions
79. The Tribunal, while computing the amount payable in
terms of this judgment, shall adjust the amount, if any,
already paid to the claimants.
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FAFO No. - 1 of 2024
80. With the above modification, the instant appeal is
disposed off.
81. The Tribunal while providing the amount in terms of
this judgment shall adjust the amount, if any, already
paid/ provided to the appellants/claimants. It is further
directed to the concerned Tribunal to disburse the amount
of compensation directly into the respective Bank account
of the claimants in the same proportion as has been
apportioned in favour of them in accordance with terms
of the award. The Tribunal shall ensure that the amount
payable to each of the claimants is safely credited in their
Bank account.
82. The statutory amount of Rs.25,000/- deposited by
the appellant before this Court shall be transmitted
forthwith to the concerned Tribunal towards adjustment
against the amount of compensation payable by the
appellant/claimant, if the same has already not been
transmitted.
83. Before parting with this case, this court places on
record its deep appreciation for the remarkable
assistance rendered by Mr. Utkarsh Shukla, Research
Associate.
(Prashant Kumar,J.)
November 18, 2026
Arjun/-
Digitally signed by :-
ARJUN PRASAD
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench