SRI RAMESH vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

- 1 -


R


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026


BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7408 OF 2026


BETWEEN:

SRI RAMESH
S/O RADHAKRISHNA
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.26
TH
13 MAIN ROAD, MARIYAPPANAPALYA
K.P.AGRAHARA, MAGADI ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 026
(NOW IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY AT CENTRAL PRISON
IN C.T.P NO. 13324 BENGALURU)
…PETITIONER










(BY SRI DILRAJ ROHIT SEQUEIRA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY K.P. AGRAHARA POLICE STATION
BENGALURU CITY
REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDINGS
BENGALURU - 560 001.


Digitally
signed by
PADMAVATHI
B K
Location:
High Court of
Karnataka

- 2 -


2. STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF HOME
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY.

3. CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT
CENTRAL PRISON
PARAPPANA AGRAHARA
BENGALURU - 560 100.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I)

THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 R/W 427 OF THE CR.P.C,
PRAYING TO DIRECT THE RESPONDENT JAIL AUTHORITIES THAT
THE SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT IMPOSED ON THE PETITIONER
BY THE LVI ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU
CITY CCH-57 IN S.C.NO.1171/2019 AND S.C.NO.1359/2016 SHALL
RUN CONCURRENTLY INSTEAD OF CONSECUTIVELY U/S.427 OF
CR.P.C.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 13.08.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

- 3 -


CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioner is before the Court seeking the following
prayer:
“WHEREFORE, the petitioner most humbly prays that this
Hon’ble Court may be pleased to Direct the Respondent Jail
Authorities that the sentences of imprisonment imposed on the
Petitioner by the LVI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru City CCH-57 in S.C.No.1171 of 2019 in S.C.No.1359
of 2016 shall run concurrently instead of consecutively under
Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. pass such other orders as this
Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice and
equity.”


2. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -

2.1. For the issue that is brought before the Court it is
necessary to take a little walk in history to the crimes registered
against the petitioner. The petitioner, 25 years of age, gets
embroiled in a crime in Crime No.82 of 2016 for offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC. The petitioner is taken to
judicial custody. The Police after investigation file a charge sheet.
The matter is now pending consideration in S.C.No.1359 of 2016 for
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC.

- 4 -


2.2. In the year 2019, the petitioner gets embroiled in
another crime of threatening of witness in S.C.No.1359 of 2016.
This, now becomes proceedings for offences punishable under
Sections 195A and 506 of the IPC. Since the other case was
pending consideration before the Court of Sessions and this arose
out of the same, the concerned Court registers S.C.No.1171 of
2019.

2.3. On 19-08-2022 the petitioner gets convicted of the
offence punishable under Sections 195A and 506 of the IPC,
pending trial in S.C.No.1359 of 2016 and is sentenced to undergo 5
years simple imprisonment for each of the offences. The petitioner
was already in judicial custody. Therefore, the detention already
undergone by the petitioner was given a set off and the sentence in
both the offences was directed to run concurrently.

2.4. On 06-01-2023 comes the conviction in the first case i.e.,
S.C.No.1359 of 2016 where the petitioner is convicted and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 5
years for offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. The period of

- 5 -


detention undergone by the accused during the trial was also given
set off as obtaining under Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. On
15-11-2023 the sentence in the second case get completed in
S.C.No.1171 of 2019. As per the custody certificate appended to
the petition, the petitioner has undergone 3 years 9 months and 8
days in S.C.No.1359 of 2016 and 6 years 7 months and 1 day in
S.C.No.1171 of 2019. The petitioner has spent 10 years and 4
months inside the jail as on the date since 03-06-2016. The present
petition is preferred seeking a direction that the sentences of
imprisonment imposed on the petitioner in both the cases to run
concurrently instead of consecutively as obtaining under Section
427 of the Cr.P.C.


3. Heard Sri Dilraj Rohit Sequeira , learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha , learned
State Public Prosecutor-I appearing for the respondents.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
contend that subsequent case – S.C.No.1171 of 2019 – was an
offshoot of the first case which had occurred when the petitioner

- 6 -


was an under trial prisoner. He would seek to place reliance upon
the judgment rendered by the coordinate Bench in CHAY@SOMA@
RAJESH AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA – Criminal
Petition No.12023 of 2023 decided on 06-02-2024 . He would
contend that both the cases investigated by K.P.Agrahara Police
Station involving the same accused person and they were tried
within 5 months window.

5. Per contra, the learned State Public Prosecutor appearing
for the respondents would vehemently contend that the two
offences are distinct. They have occurred in a 3 months’ gap. In
such circumstances, it cannot be said that it arises out of the same
allegation. Threatening the witness was a separate offence which
happens 3 years after the petitioner comes out on bail. Therefore,
he would seek dismissal of the petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.

- 7 -


7. The afore-narrated facts are all a matter of record. They
would not require any iteration. The issue is whether the benefit of
concurrent sentence under Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. can be
granted to the petitioner. It, therefore, becomes necessary to
notice Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. It reads as follows:
“
427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for
another offence .—(1) When a person already undergoing a
sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent
conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such
imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the
expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously
sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent
sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence:

Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to
imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of
furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence,
sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to
the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence
immediately.

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the
subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous
sentence.”

Section 427 mandates that when a person is already undergoing a
sentence, is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment
or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment for life shall commence

- 8 -


at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been already
sentenced.

8. The interpretation of Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. need not
detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter.

1
8.1. The Apex Court in MOHD ZAHID v. STATE , has held as
follows:
“.... .... ....


17. Thus from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the
principles of law that emerge are as under:

17.1. If a person already undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment, such subsequent term of imprisonment would
normally commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to
which he was previously sentenced.

17.2. Ordinarily the subsequent sentence would
commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment
unless the court directs the subsequent sentence to run
concurrently with the previous sentence.

17.3. The general rule is that where there are
different transactions, different crime numbers and cases
have been decided by the different judgments,
concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under Section
427CrPC.


1
(2022) 12 SCC 426

- 9 -


17.4. Under Section 427(1)CrPC the court has the
power and discretion to issue a direction that all the
subsequent sentences run concurrently with the previous
sentence, however discretion has to be exercised
judiciously depending upon the nature of the offence or
the offences committed and the facts in situation.
However, there must be a specific direction or order by
the court that the subsequent sentence to run
concurrently with the previous sentence.”

Several High Courts have considered the purport of Section 427
Cr.P.C.

8.2. The High Court of Gujarat in SENAUL v. STATE OF
2
GUJARAT has held as follows:
“.... ... ....
19. The general principle is that the sentence
should take effect immediately on conviction and the
same cannot be postponed. Section 427 Cr.P.C. appears
to be carving out an exception to the general principle
governing execution of sentences when awarded by a
Court of law. Sub-section (1) of Section 427, reproduced
above, provides that a person who is already undergoing
a sentence of imprisonment and is sentenced on a
subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment
for life, then such imprisonment or imprisonment for life
is to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment, to
which he is previously sentenced. This principle,
however, is subject to the exceptions carved out in the
Section itself and it is to the effect that “unless the Court
directs that subsequent sentence shall run concurrently
with such previous sentence” (emphasis supplied). The
scheme of the Section, thus, is that a person already

2

2018 SCC OnLine Guj.2290

- 10 -


undergoing a sentence if sentenced to differ subsequent
imprisonment, then that subsequent imprisonment is to
commence only on the expiry of the previous sentence, unless
both the sentences are ordered to run concurrently. Section 31
of the Code of Criminal Procedure also enacts the rule that
sentences are to run consecutively unless the Court directs that
these should run concurrently. This Section, however, relates to
those cases where a person is convicted at one trial of several
offences and different/several sentences are awarded to him.
Section 427 Cr.P.C. on the other hand, enacts a rule where a
person already undergoing the sentence is sentenced to
imprisonment in a different trial.”


8.3. A coordinate Bench of this Court in AMBARISH S
3
KAPADIA v. STATE has held as follows:
“ 6. It is to be noticed that the petitioner in the instant
case had made a plea before the XXI Additional City Civil &
Sessions Judge & Principal Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore City
in Cr. A. No. 430/2007, for the sentence passed in the appeal to
run concurrently with the earlier sentences of imprisonment.
The plea, however was rejected by the Special Court, which held
that the same could not be countenanced as no such provision
was available in law. It further held that the charges against the
appellant in each of the cases was of distinct criminal acts and
that the same cannot be clubbed together to give the benefit of
concurrent running of the sentences. The Special Court also
took into account the criminal background of the petitioner and
held that the same did not warrant the granting of such relief to
the petitioner. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by
Special Court, the petitioner has approached this Court.

In so far as the decision relied upon by the Counsel for
the petitioner in Arjun Ram v. State of Rajasthan [[2016] 1 WLN
481.] decided by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court
on 19-01-2016, is concerned, it is laid down as follows:—


3

2016 SCC OnLine Kar 7456

- 11 -


“We are of the considered opinion that to meet the ends
of justice and to rectify the gross error the powers under
Section 482 of the CrPC. can be exercised, if Court
arrives at a conclusion that the Trial Court, Appellate
Court or the Revisional Court, as the case may be, failed
in completing the circuit of justice while invoking or not
invoking the discretion vested with it as per Section 427
CrPC. The Court while doing so must keep in mind all
necessary ingredients and precedents which are to be
taken into consideration to exercise the discretion as per
Section 427 of the CrPC.”

Though the Division Bench has held that the use of the
inherent power under Section 482 CrPC is justified for an order
under Section 427 CrPC, such power can only be exercised if the
Trial Court, Appellate Court or the Re-visional Court has failed in
its duty in securing the ends of justice, which would again be
subject to consideration of the facts and circumstances of the
case.

It cannot be said that the Court below in the present case
has failed in its duty to ensure justice to the petitioner while
rejecting the plea of the petitioner. The Special Court in Cr. A.
No. 430/2007 while rejecting the petitioner's plea, has taken
into consideration all the relevant circumstances and observed
that the charge against the petitioner in each of the charge
sheets was a distinct criminal act and that the same cannot be
clubbed together. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be given the
benefit as sought for by him.

The Special Court has also observed the background of
the petitioner who has been convicted under 6 different cases,
which would indicate that the petitioner is a habitual offender. It
is apposite here to refer to a Judgment of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana in the case of Jang Singh v. State of Punjab
[ILR (2007) 2 P&H 550.] , wherein it was observed that:—

“It may also have to be kept in view that if principle of
concurrency is applied in cases where the offender is
habitual, it may repel the very basic and normal rules as
laid down in Section 427 CrPC. If such principles are
universally applied unmindful to such consideration of
the offender being habitual, then it may lead to hostile
discrimination negatively because then it would amount

- 12 -


to giving similar treatment to a normal as well as a
habitual offender.”

Further, the Counsel for the petitioner has also relied
upon three judgments of this Court, where it has exercised its
inherent power in passing the orders directing concurrent
running of sentences. However, the facts in each of the cases
are considerably different from the facts and circumstances as in
the present case.

In the case of Vazeer Ahmed Salik v. State by CBI [ Crl.
P. No. 7868/2015, decided on 22/3/2016.] , in the petitioner
was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under 5 different
cases for seven to ten years in each of the cases for offences
punishable under various Sections of the IPC. The petitioner
therein had already undergone imprisonment for a period of 14
years. He was aged about 72 years and if this Court had not
passed an order under Section 427(1) of the Code for the
sentences to run concurrently, the petitioner would have had to
undergo imprisonment for a total period of 35 years, which
would have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice as he
would have to undergo imprisonment till his death.

In the case of Sunil Kumar v. State of Karnataka [ Crl. P.
No. 6346/2015, decided on 10/12/2015.] , the petitioners were
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under seven different
cases. They were under judicial custody for a period of 7 years.
This Court observed that if the sentences were to run
consecutively, they would have to undergo imprisonment for a
total period of 3 9 years, as if they were serving a major
punishment for life. Therefore, to prevent such miscarriage of
justice, the various sentences of imprisonment were ordered to
run concurrently.

In the case of Vadiraja v. State [ Crl. P. No.6974/2015,
decided on 23/11/2015.] , the petitioner was convicted and
sentenced to serve imprisonment by the Sessions Court in three
different cases for offences punishable under Sections 392 and
413 IPC for a term of 7 years for each case. However, on appeal
before this Court the sentence was modified by reducing the
period of imprisonment to 5 years. The petitioner therein filed a
separate application under Section 482 praying for the
sentences to run concurrently. This Court took into

- 13 -


consideration the fact that the petitioner was a poor person who
had the responsibility of maintaining his family. The Court thus
considered it appropriate to exercise the inherent power and
give effect to Section 427(1) and thereby ordered the different
cases to run concurrently.

Section 482 CrPC being an extraordinary power, cannot
be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a
Subordinate Court of its powers. However, in the instant case,
the Court below has exercised its powers reasonably and has
provided sufficient reasons for the exercise of its discretion.

Therefore, the refusal of the Court below to direct the
sentences to run concurrently with the previous sentence cannot
be said to have caused any miscarriage of justice.

In Rajendra B. Choudhari v. State of Maharashtra
[2007 Cri. LJ 844.] , which has been relied upon by the
respondent, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court,
expressing its opinion with regard to the exercise of
discretionary power under Section 427 has stated thus:

“However, the Court has to be cautious in
exercising such a power and has to ensure that
the deterrent effect of the sentence is not lost.
The sentences should not be directed to run
concurrently if to do so would make the
sentences ineffective or the crime
inconsequential. If several sentences are allowed
to run concurrently the crime may go
unpunished.”

Reliance is also placed on M.R. Kudva v. State of A.P.
[(2007) 2 SCC 772.] , wherein it is laid down that when sub-
Section (1) of Section 427 has not been invoked for the
concurrent running of the sentences either in the original case
or in the appeal, a separate application for the same cannot be
made before the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC. It
was laid down that the High Court could not have exercised its
inherent jurisdiction in a case of this nature as it had not
exercised such jurisdiction while passing the judgment in
appeal.

- 14 -


It was also observed with reference to Mohd. Akhtar
Hussain v. Asst. Collector of Customs [(1988) 4 SCC 183.]
, that if a given transaction constitutes two offences
under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have two
consecutive sentences . It was, however, opined that it would
be proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences; but at
the same time it was held that the rule would have no
application if the facts constituting the same offences are quite
different.

In the present case, there is no error of law apparent on
the face of the record, nor can it be said that the order of the
Trial Court has led to any miscarriage of justice.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
... ... ... ...

8. In the above background, it is relevant to notice
Section 427(2) of the CrPC, which reads as under:

“When a person already undergoing a
sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a
subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term
or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence
shall run concurrently with such previous
sentence.”

The meaning of a sentence of imprisonment
for life is no longer res integra . In the case of Gopal
Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1961
SC 600.] , the Apex Court has laid down that a
sentence of imprisonment for life must prima facie
be treated as a sentence of imprisonment for the
whole of the remaining period of the convicted
person's natural life unless commuted or remitted
by the appropriate authority. In such a situation the
question of a subsequent sentence running
consecutively does not arise and consequently, the
subsequent sentence, irrespective of whether the
sentence is an imprisonment for life or an
imprisonment for a specific term can only be
superimposed upon the earlier sentence of life
imprisonment and certainly not added to it.”

- 15 -



8.4. The High Court of Bombay in RAJENDRA v. STATE OF
4
MAHARASHTRA has held as follows:
“.... .... ....


6. Lastly, it is contended that the Magistrate ought to
have directed that the sentences imposed in these trials should
run concurrently with the previous sentence, in view of section
427 of the Code. According to learned counsel, it is permissible
for this Court to give such a direction to meet the ends of
justice. Section 427 of the Code confers discretionary
power on the Court to direct the sentence of
imprisonment on a subsequent conviction to run
concurrently with the previous sentence, if the accused is
already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. This
power has to be exercised at the time of awarding
subsequent sentence by the trial Court and can be
exercised by the High Court while dealing with appeal or
revision. Incidentally, the question arises whether in
absence of appeal or revision, the direction sought for
can be given by the High Court by invoking inherent
powers available under section 482, Criminal Procedure
Code. The High Court cannot exercise its inherent power
under section 482 of the Code to direct the subsequent
sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence.
The inherent power of the High Court can be exercised only to
give effect to the orders passed under the Code or to prevent
miscarriage of justice. It is not obligatory for the trial Court to
direct in all cases that the subsequent sentence shall run
concurrently with the previous sentence. The order passed by
the trial Court without having recourse to section 427 is
perfectly legal and enforceable. Thus, refusal of the Magistrate
to direct the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the
previous sentence cannot lead to causing miscarriage of justice.
Therefore, in such a situation, there can be no justification for
exercising inherent power of the Court as there is no necessity
to exercise the jurisdiction to give effect to any order passed

4

2006 SCC OnLine Bom 934

- 16 -


under the Code or to prevent miscarriage of justice. In this view
of the matter it is not open to this Court to exercise its inherent
power to direct the subsequent sentence to run concurrently
with the previous sentence. At this stage, we deem it necessary
to observe that though it is not obligatory on the learned
Magistrate to direct subsequent sentence to run concurrently
with the previous sentence, it is the duty of the prosecutor to
bring to the notice of the Court that the accused is already
undergoing earlier sentence so that, the final order can be
passed by the Magistrate after consideration of relevant factors.
While dealing with the aspect of the exercise of inherent powers
by High Court, similar view is taken by Full Bench of Delhi High
Court in the matter of Gopal Dass v. The State , reported in AIR
1978 Delhi 138. In para No. 7 of the report it is observed that:

“……………. The inherent powers of the High Court
inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the
judicial set up in a State. The inherent powers of the
High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to
be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing
in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with
the object of achieving the above-said three results. It is
for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the
contours of the inherent powers of the High Court which
are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to
afford relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising
inherent powers it has to be borne in mind that this
power cannot be exercised in regard to matters
specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code.
(See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab , AIR 1960 SC 866).
This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by
the Supreme Court recently in PalanioappaGounder v.
State of Tamil Nadu , (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 SC
1323. Therein examining the scope of section 482 it was
observed that a provision which saves the inherent
powers of a Court cannot override any express provision
in the statute which saves that power. Putting it in
another form the Court observed that if there is an
express provision in a statute governing a particular
subject there is no scope for invoking or exercising the
inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to

- 17 -


apply the provisions of the statute which are made
advisedly to govern the particular subject-matter.”

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

8.1.1. The Apex Court in MOHD ZAHID holds that general
rule is that where there are different transactions, different crime
numbers and cases have been decided by different judgments,
concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under Section 427 of the
Cr.P.C.

8.2.1. The High Court of Gujarat in SENAUL holds that
general principle cannot become a universal application. Section
427 carves out an exception to the general principle governing
execution of sentences. Unless the Court directs the sentences to
run concurrently, despite the fact that both of them are arising out
of the same incident, the Court would not interfere.

8.3.1. The coordinate Bench of this Court in AMBARISH S
KAPADIA holds that power under Section 482 can be exercised for
interpretation of Section 427, only if there is flagrant abuse by a
subordinate Court of its powers.

- 18 -


8.4.1. The High Court of Bombay in RAJENDRA holds that
concurrency should not be so directed where it would render the
sentence ineffective or leave a crime unpunished.

9. On the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex
Court and that of different High Courts, if the facts in the case at
hand would be noticed, the benefit of Section 427 would not
become applicable to the petitioner. The issue in the case at hand is
whether the petitioner who has been convicted and directed to
undergo term sentence in previous trial is entitled to the benefit of
running the sentence concurrently.

10. The second crime he gets involved is in the year 2019 and
the trial gets completed fast. He is convicted on 19-08-2022. This
crime itself was registered 3 years after the earlier registration of
crime. 5 months thereafter another order of conviction come out
where he was awarded imprisonment for life. Without much ado ,
the interpretation of Section 427 of the Cr.P.C., cannot benefit the
case of the petitioner, as they have not happened simultaneously.
They may be springing out of one solitary case, though not stricto

- 19 -


senso, but the cause of action is entirely different. Therefore, the
benefit of concurrent sentencing under Section 427 of the Cr.P.C.,
will not become applicable to the case of the petitioner.


11. For the aforesaid reasons, finding no merit in the petition,
the petition stands dismissed.




Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE


BKP