Ravindra Kumar Tripathi vs B.R. And Others

Court
Allahabad High Court

Reserved On 02.11.2026
Delivered On 19.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - B No. - 8915 of 1990
Ravindra Kumar Tripathi
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Board of Revenue and others
…..Respondent(s)
Along with :
1. Writ - B No. 11590 of 1991:  
Ravindra Tripathi
Versus
Board of Revenue and others
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : A. Kumar, Ashok K Pandey,
Devansh Misra, R. Asthana,
Rajendra Jaiswal, Shrish Kumar
Jaiswal
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Asok Bhushan, Haider Zaidi, K.N.
Tripathi, Neeraj Tripathi, S.C.
Court No. - 51
HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.
1. Heard Sri Rakesh Pande, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Devansh
Misra; Sri V.K. Jain as well as Sri Deepak Jain, Advocates, learned
counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos.
1, 2, 3 and 7 and Sri Arvind Srivastava, learned counsel for the heirs of
respondent No. 4 and for respondent No. 6.

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WRIB No. - 8915 of 1990
2. These two writ petitions have been filed by the same petitioner,
who was the auction purchaser of the property in question. Both
petitions arise out of the same recovery proceedings and the auction sale
of House No. 84/59, Anwarganj, Kanpur. They concern successive
stages of the same dispute and are, therefore, being decided by this
common judgment.
3. The first writ petition, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8915 of 1990,
principally assails the order dated 29.03.1990 passed by the
Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur, setting aside the auction sale,
as well as the consequential proceedings before the Board of Revenue.
The second writ petition, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11590 of 1991,
assails the subsequent order dated 10.01.1991 passed by the Board of
Revenue in Revision No. 42 (Sale) of 1989-90, whereby the petitioner's
challenge to the Commissioner's order was rejected.
4. Since the controversy in both petitions is founded upon one
auction transaction, the facts and the legal questions are being
considered together. For convenience, the petitioner, Ravindra Kumar
Tripathi, shall be referred to as the “auction purchaser”; respondents 4
and 6, who questioned the auction sale, shall be referred to as the
“objectors”, wherever necessary.
5. The dispute relates to House No. 84/59, Anwarganj, Kanpur,
which was proceeded against for recovery of dues payable to Jal
Sansthan, Kanpur. The amount sought to be recovered was stated in the
pleadings to be approximately Rs.17,635.58, apart from the applicable
collection charges. The recovery proceedings culminated in the auction
of the property.
6. The record and the pleadings disclose that an earlier auction had
been proposed for 16.05.1989. Respondents 4 and 6 had submitted
objections on 11.05.1989 in relation to that proposed auction. The
auction did not take place on the said date.
7. Thereafter, a fresh notice/proclamation was issued on 02.12.1989
and the auction was conducted on 18.12.1989. The petitioner

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WRIB No. - 8915 of 1990
participated in the auction and emerged as the highest bidder for a sum
of Rs.1,90,000/-. The auction purchaser's case is that he deposited the
requisite amount and complied with the conditions applicable to the
auction.
8. The sale was confirmed by the Commissioner, Kanpur Division,
by order dated 31.01.1990. The sale certificate was issued on
02.02.1990. In pursuance of the confirmation, possession of the property
was delivered to the auction purchaser on 13.02.1990. The auction
purchaser relies upon the possession memorandum/delivery report and
the presence of witnesses and police authorities at the time of delivery.
His case is that, after confirmation and delivery of possession, the sale
stood completed in accordance with the statutory procedure.
9. The objectors, however, questioned the auction proceedings. An
objection seeking to set aside the auction sale was filed on 22.02.1990. A
separate application seeking condonation of delay was filed on
28.02.1990. The objectors asserted, inter alia, that the fresh proclamation
had been issued on 02.12.1989 and the auction was held on 18.12.1989,
without allowing thirty days to elapse; that the property had not been
properly described; that the boundaries mentioned in the sale
proclamation, handbills and posters did not correspond with the actual
boundaries; and that the area of the property had not been mentioned.
10. The record also contains a report of the Additional District
Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), dated 18.02.1990, which refers to
discrepancies in the boundaries stated in the sale proclamation, handbills
and posters, omission of the area of the property from the sale material,
and the fact that the auction had taken place on 18.12.1989, only sixteen
days after the fresh notice dated 02.12.1989.
11. The chronology of the report is relevant. It was prepared pursuant
to a complaint dated 17.02.1990 made by Om Prakash Singhania
alleging an attempt by certain persons to dispossess him from the
property. The report, therefore, preceded the objection dated 22.02.1990
and the application for condonation of delay dated 28.02.1990. It cannot

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WRIB No. - 8915 of 1990
be described as a report called for on the basis of those subsequent
applications. Its contents may be considered for the matters actually
examined therein, but its origin and purpose must be kept distinct from
the subsequent objection proceedings.
12. By order dated 29.03.1990, the Commissioner, Kanpur Division,
set aside the auction sale. The Commissioner took note of the alleged
irregularities in the proclamation and conduct of the auction, including
the short interval between the fresh proclamation and the auction and the
discrepancies in the description and boundaries of the property. The
order proceeded upon the objection having been entertained
notwithstanding its presentation after the prescribed period, with the
benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act being invoked.
13. Aggrieved by the Commissioner's order, the auction purchaser
approached the Board of Revenue in revision. During the pendency of
the revision, the petitioner filed the first writ petition. The auction
purchaser thereafter pursued Revision No. 42 (Sale) of 1989-90 before
the Board of Revenue.
14. The auction purchaser also relies upon the civil suit instituted by
him, being Suit No. 216 of 1990, and the interim order dated 20.02.1990
passed therein. His case is that the civil court had protected his
possession and that the subsequent revenue proceedings and orders were
being used to disturb possession already delivered to him. The objectors,
on the other hand, assert that possession was restored to them pursuant to
the Commissioner's order and the subsequent proceedings.
15. By order dated 10.01.1991, the Board dismissed the revision and
upheld the Commissioner's decision setting aside the auction sale. The
Board also dealt with the consequences of setting aside the sale,
including refund of the amount deposited by the auction purchaser with
interest and the need for a fresh auction after proper description of the
property.
16. The second writ petition has been filed questioning the aforesaid
revisional order dated 10.01.1991. Thus, while the first writ petition

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WRIB No. - 8915 of 1990
challenges the Commissioner's order, the second writ petition challenges
the final revisional order of the Board of Revenue affirming the
Commissioner's decision.
17. Learned counsel for the auction purchaser/petitioner submits that
the property was proceeded against for recovery of dues payable to Jal
Sansthan, Kanpur, and that the recovery was undertaken under the U.P.
Land Revenue Act, 1901. The auction purchaser contends that the
property is situated within the municipal limits of Kanpur and in an area
to which the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950,
does not apply. The governing provisions are, therefore, those of the
Land Revenue Act, 1901, and not the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952.
18. It is submitted that the provisions of the Land Revenue Act
dealing with recovery and auction sale, including Sections 163 to 177,
continued to operate in areas outside the application of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The fact that
corresponding provisions were omitted, superseded or rendered
inapplicable in areas governed by the latter Act does not mean that the
corresponding provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1901 stood repealed
for all areas.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to R.S. Vaish v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in 1968 ALJ 106, and to the Full
Bench decision in Ram Swaroop and another v. Board of Revenue, U.P.
at Lucknow and others, reported in 1990 All LJ 924, in support of the
distinction between areas governed by the two enactments and the
continued operation of the Land Revenue Act, 1901 in areas to which the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 does not apply.
20. It is further submitted that the statutory procedure for sale of
immovable property is contained in Sections 163 to 171 of the Land
Revenue Act. It is emphasised that no application under Section 172 was
filed by the objectors within thirty days of the auction, nor was any
application under Section 173 filed within the prescribed period. The

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WRIB No. - 8915 of 1990
auction was held on 18.12.1989. The statutory period of thirty days,
calculated from the date of sale, expired on 17.01.1990. The objection
was filed only on 22.02.1990, after the sale had already been confirmed
on 31.01.1990 and possession delivered on 13.02.1990.
21. Learned counsel submits that the objectors' reliance upon the date
of the sale certificate is misconceived. The period prescribed by Sections
172 and 173 runs from the date of sale and not from the date on which
the sale certificate is issued or possession is delivered. The statutory
period cannot be calculated from 02.02.1990 or 13.02.1990.
22. It is further submitted that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction
to entertain an objection filed after expiry of the statutory period and,
more particularly, after the sale had been confirmed under Section 174.
The Commissioner could not, by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, reopen a sale which had already attained finality under the special
statutory scheme.
23. Learned counsel places reliance upon the principle that review is
not an inherent power and must be conferred by statute. Reliance is
placed upon Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji,
(1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath
Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao
Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457; Major Chandra Bhan Singh v.
Latafat Ullah Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 321; Harbhajan Singh v. Karam
Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641; and Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management
of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, (1987) 4 SCC 525.
24. Reliance is also placed upon the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in State of West Bengal and others v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., Civil
Appeal No. 7407 of 2012, decided on 06.02.2026, reported as 2026
INSC 132, in which the Supreme Court reiterated that a quasi-judicial
authority cannot exercise review jurisdiction unless such power is
conferred by statute. It is urged that the Commissioner's order dated
29.03.1990, though styled as an order deciding an objection, in

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substance reopened and nullified the earlier final confirmation of sale
without any statutory authority to review or recall that confirmation.
25. Learned counsel also refers to Smt. Parvinder Kaur v. Board of
Revenue, U.P., Lucknow and others, 2022 (2) ADJ 561, and to Than
Singh v. State of U.P. and others, Writ-B No. 462 of 2019, decided on
04.09.2019, in support of the proposition that a delayed objection to an
auction sale cannot, merely by condonation of delay, defeat the statutory
finality attaching to a confirmed sale. It is submitted that although those
decisions arose under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Rules, the statutory scheme embodied in Sections 173 to 175 of the Land
Revenue Act is materially similar.
26. On the merits of the alleged irregularities, the auction purchaser
submits that the sale was conducted by the competent authorities, the bid
amount was accepted, the sale was confirmed and possession was
delivered. The objectors had earlier been aware of the recovery
proceedings and had filed objections against the proposed auction of
16.05.1989. The subsequent failure of the objectors to take recourse to
the statutory remedies within time cannot be converted into a ground for
reopening the concluded sale.
27. It is further urged that the alleged discrepancies in boundaries and
omission of the area, even if assumed to be irregularities, fall within the
class of claims expressly covered by Sections 173 and 175, Land
Revenue Act. Such claims cannot be entertained after expiry of the
statutory period. A mere assertion of fraud or misrepresentation cannot
convert every irregularity in the proclamation or conduct of sale into
fraud so as to defeat the statutory bar.
28. Learned counsel for the auction purchaser also disputes the
allegations regarding the value of the property and the extent of
investment made therein. It is submitted that the property was occupied
and its actual condition and possession were relevant to the price fetched
at auction. The objectors cannot rely upon an asserted market value,
without proof, to establish fraud or substantial injury. The auction

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purchaser further asserts that he invested substantial sums and undertook
negotiations with persons occupying the premises after obtaining
possession.
29. Learned counsel appearing for respondents 4 and 6 submits that
the auction proceedings were vitiated by material irregularities and that
the Commissioner rightly set aside the sale. The property was attached
for recovery of dues payable to Jal Sansthan, Kanpur. The objectors had
earlier filed objections on 11.05.1989 against the auction proposed for
16.05.1989. The auction did not take place on that date and a fresh notice
was issued on 02.12.1989.
30. It is submitted that the authorities nevertheless proceeded to
auction the property on 18.12.1989, without waiting for thirty days from
the date of the fresh proclamation. The objectors contend that the
mandatory requirement of Section 164 of the Land Revenue Act was not
complied with.
31. Learned counsel further submits that the sale proclamation,
handbills and posters did not correctly describe the property. The
boundaries stated therein were different from the actual boundaries, and
the area of the property was not mentioned. The property comprised a
substantial area, with buildings, plant, machinery and other
constructions. According to the objectors, the omission of the area and
the incorrect boundaries materially affected the price fetched at auction.
32. The objectors rely upon the report of the Additional District
Magistrate dated 18.02.1990, which records the discrepancies in the
description and boundaries of the property and the short interval between
the proclamation and the auction. It is submitted that the report supports
the conclusion that the auction was not conducted in accordance with the
statutory requirements.
33. It is further submitted that the objectors came to know of the
alleged illegal auction only after it had taken place and immediately
approached the authorities. The objection dated 22.02.1990 was
accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay under

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Section 5 of the Limitation Act, filed on 28.02.1990. The objectors
contend that the delay was sufficiently explained and that the
Commissioner was competent to entertain the objection.
34. Learned counsel appearing for respondents 4 and 6 places reliance
upon the Full Bench decision in Ram Swaroop and another v. Board of
Revenue, U.P. at Lucknow and others, 1990 All LJ 924. It is submitted
that the Full Bench held that proceedings before the Commissioner
under Rule 285-I of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Rules, and the corresponding proceedings under Sections 173 and 174 of
the Land Revenue Act, are judicial in nature and that the Commissioner
acts as a Revenue Court while deciding such objections. It is urged that
the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings before a Court and that
the Commissioner was, therefore, competent to consider the application
for condonation of delay.
35. The objectors also rely upon Bairam v. State of U.P., 2021 (3) ADJ
623, and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, (2000) 3
SCC 581, to contend that no Court or Tribunal can be regarded as
powerless to recall an order obtained by fraud or misrepresentation of
such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. It is
submitted that the irregularities in the present auction were not merely
technical, but amounted to fraud and misrepresentation.
36. It is further urged that the Commissioner was justified in setting
aside the auction even after confirmation, because the sale itself had
been conducted in breach of the statutory provisions. According to the
objectors, a harmonious reading of the provisions relating to objections
to auction sales and the provision preserving a civil suit on the ground of
fraud shows that an objection based on material irregularity and
misrepresentation can be entertained even after confirmation.
37. The objectors support the order dated 29.03.1990 passed by the
Commissioner and the subsequent order dated 10.01.1991 passed by the
Board of Revenue. They submit that the Board rightly affirmed the
Commissioner's findings and directed that the amount deposited by the

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auction purchaser be refunded with interest and that the property be put
to auction afresh after its area, boundaries and other particulars were
properly specified.
38. In view of the pleadings, the orders under challenge and the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the following
questions arise for consideration:-
(i) Whether the recovery and auction proceedings concerning the
property in question were governed by the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901,
or by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and the
Rules framed thereunder?
(ii) Whether the auction held on 18.12.1989 was conducted in
compliance with the statutory requirement contained in Section 164 of
the Land Revenue Act?
(iii) Whether the objection dated 22.02.1990, filed after the auction and
after confirmation of sale on 31.01.1990, could be entertained under
Section 173 of the Land Revenue Act by condoning the delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
(iv) Whether, after confirmation of sale under Section 174 and issuance
of the sale certificate and delivery of possession, the Commissioner
could reopen the concluded sale on an objection founded on material
irregularity or mistake in the publication or conduct of the auction?
(v) Whether the order dated 29.03.1990 can be sustained as an exercise
of an inherent power to recall an order obtained by fraud or
misrepresentation?
(vi) Whether the subsequent order dated 10.01.1991 passed by the Board
of Revenue calls for interference?
39. The first question is not a disputed factual issue. The property in
question, House No. 84/59, Anwarganj, Kanpur, was situated in an area
excluded from the operation of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land

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Reforms Act, 1950. The proceedings were, therefore, governed by the
U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901.
40. It is necessary to clarify this aspect because certain submissions
and some of the authorities cited by the parties refer to Rule 285-I and
Rule 285-K of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules,
1952. Those Rules govern recovery proceedings in areas to which the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 applies. They do
not govern the present property.
41. The fact that provisions of the Land Revenue Act were omitted,
amended or rendered inapplicable in areas governed by the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not mean that the
corresponding provisions of the Land Revenue Act ceased to exist or
operate throughout the State. The two statutory regimes have to be
applied according to their respective territorial and subject-matter fields.
42. In the present case, the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1901,
which governed recovery by attachment and sale of immovable property,
continued to operate. In particular, Sections 163 to 177, including
Sections 172, 173, 174 and 175, were applicable to the auction in
question. The provisions of Sections 172 to 177 cannot be treated as
having disappeared from the statute book merely because a different
statutory procedure applied to areas governed by the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
43. The reliance placed by the auction purchaser upon R.S. Vaish
(supra) and the observations in Ram Swaroop (supra) concerning the
distinct fields of operation of the two enactments are relevant to this
limited extent. The present case must, however, be decided under the
express provisions of the Land Revenue Act and not by mechanically
importing the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Rules.
44. Sections 163 to 171 of the Land Revenue Act provide the
procedure for sale of immovable property in recovery proceedings.
Section 163 requires the Collector to issue a proclamation of the

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WRIB No. - 8915 of 1990
intended sale, specifying the property to be sold, the arrears for which it
is to be sold, the time and place of sale and such other particulars as may
be necessary. A copy of the proclamation is also required to be served
upon the defaulter.
45. Section 164 provides that every sale under the relevant Chapter
shall be conducted by the Collector or an Assistant Collector specially
appointed for the purpose. It further provides that no such sale shall take
place until after the expiration of at least thirty days from the date on
which the proclamation was issued. The Collector may, from time to
time, postpone the sale. Section 170 requires a fresh proclamation in the
circumstances specified therein, including a sale after postponement
under Section 164.
46. Sections 167 and 168 deal with the deposit and payment of the
purchase money by the successful bidder. Section 171 requires the sale
to be reported to the Commissioner. These provisions form part of the
statutory procedure and have to be read together.
47. Section 172 provides a remedy to the person whose property has
been sold, enabling such person to apply within thirty days from the date
of sale to have the sale set aside upon making the deposits specified in
that section. The provision also makes it clear that a person who applies
under Section 173 is not entitled to invoke Section 172.
48. Section 173 provides a separate remedy to apply to the
Commissioner for setting aside the sale on the ground of material
irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting it. Such application
must be made within thirty days from the date of sale. The provision
further requires the applicant to establish that substantial injury was
sustained by reason of the irregularity or mistake. Thus, the existence of
an irregularity, by itself, is not sufficient to set aside a sale under Section
173; the statutory requirement of substantial injury must also be
satisfied.
49. Section 174 provides that, on expiry of thirty days from the date
of sale, if no application under Section 172 or Section 173 has been

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made, or if such application has been made and rejected, the
Commissioner shall pass an order confirming the sale. If an application
under Section 173 is made and allowed, the Commissioner shall set
aside the sale. The section expressly provides that every order passed
thereunder shall be final.
50. Section 175 provides that, if no application under Section 173 is
made within the time allowed, all claims founded on irregularity or
mistake in publishing or conducting the sale shall be barred. The section,
however, preserves the right to institute a suit in the Civil Court for
setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud.
51. Section 176 provides for refund of the purchase money, with such
interest as the Commissioner may determine within the statutory limit,
where a sale is set aside under Section 174. Section 177 provides that,
after confirmation of the sale, the Collector shall put the purchaser into
possession and grant a certificate of purchase, which is deemed to be a
valid transfer of the property.
52. The statutory scheme thus contemplates a sequence: proclamation
and sale in accordance with Sections 163 to 171; the remedies under
Sections 172 and 173 within thirty days from the date of sale;
confirmation under Section 174; the bar under Section 175; and delivery
of possession and grant of certificate under Section 177. The provisions
are intended not only to protect the defaulter against an irregular sale but
also to ensure certainty and finality once the statutory period has expired
and the sale has been confirmed.
53. The fresh proclamation/notice is stated to have been issued on
02.12.1989 and the auction was held on 18.12.1989. The interval
between the two dates was sixteen days. The requirement under Section
164 is that the sale shall not take place until after the expiration of at
least thirty days from the date on which the proclamation was issued.
54. On the dates disclosed by the pleadings, the auction was held
before expiry of the period prescribed by Section 164. The fact that an
earlier auction had been proposed for 16.05.1989 and that the objectors

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had submitted objections on 11.05.1989 does not, by itself, dispense with
the requirement of Section 164 in respect of the fresh proclamation dated
02.12.1989. The earlier proposed sale did not take place. Once a fresh
proclamation was issued, the statutory period applicable to that
proclamation had to be observed.
55. The Board of Revenue also noticed the short interval between the
fresh notice and the auction. The Additional District Magistrate's report
dated 18.02.1990 similarly records that the auction took place before
expiry of thirty days from the fresh proclamation. On this aspect, the
material placed on record indicates non-compliance with Section 164.
56. The alleged discrepancies in the boundaries and omission of the
area of the property from the proclamation and related publicity material
also raise a question of compliance with Section 163, which requires the
property proposed to be sold to be specified. A sale proclamation must
describe the property with sufficient clarity to identify the subject of the
sale and to enable prospective bidders to assess what is being offered.
57. The omission of the area and the alleged discrepancy in
boundaries are not matters which can be dismissed as necessarily
inconsequential. They may constitute material irregularities in
publication or conduct of the sale, depending upon the evidence and
their effect upon the sale. The report dated 18.02.1990 and the order of
the Board refer to these features.
58. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the auction purchaser's
submission that the auction was entirely free from procedural
irregularity. The record discloses a substantial question regarding
compliance with Sections 163 and 164 of the Land Revenue Act.
59. This finding, however, does not conclude the controversy. The
existence of an irregularity in the publication or conduct of the sale and
the authority to entertain an objection to that irregularity after the
statutory period are distinct questions. The latter has to be answered in
the light of Sections 173, 174 and 175.

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60. The auction took place on 18.12.1989. The period of thirty days
prescribed under Section 173 of the Land Revenue Act, calculated from
the date of sale, expired on 17.01.1990. No application under Section
173 had been filed by that date. The objection seeking to set aside the
sale was filed only on 22.02.1990, followed by an application for
condonation of delay on 28.02.1990. In the meantime, the sale had
already been confirmed by the Commissioner on 31.01.1990, the sale
certificate was issued on 02.02.1990 and possession was delivered to the
auction purchaser on 13.02.1990.
61. The objectors rely upon the Full Bench decision in Ram Swaroop
(supra) to contend that the Commissioner acts as a Revenue Court while
deciding objections under Sections 173 and 174 of the Land Revenue
Act and that the Limitation Act is consequently applicable. The Full
Bench did hold that the Commissioner exercises judicial functions while
deciding such objections and that the orders passed in those proceedings
are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue.
62. The decision in Ram Swaroop (supra) has to be read in the context
of the statutory provisions and the questions considered therein. The
auction purchaser has relied upon B.K. Electronics Wires v. Additional
Commissioner, Meerut Region, 1990 All LJ 1087, which considered the
statutory limitation under the Land Revenue Act and held that the period
prescribed under Sections 172 and 173 could not be extended by
invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The subsequent decision in
Shri Chhotak v. Board of Revenue and others, Writ-B No. 29100 of
1995, decided on 16.12.2022, notices the distinction between the
statutory provisions considered in B.K. Electronics Wires (supra) and the
Full Bench ruling in Ram Swaroop (supra). In particular, Shri Chhotak
(supra) explains the continuing effect of the view in B.K. Electronics
Wires concerning Section 172. It would not be appropriate to read Shri
Chhotak (supra) as having conclusively decided every question
concerning the applicability of Section 5 to an application under Section
173.

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63. The decisions in Smt. Parvinder Kaur (supra) and Than Singh
(supra) were rendered in the context of Rules 285-I and 285-K of the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. Those Rules do not
directly govern the present property. Their reasoning concerning the
effect of confirmation of sale and a subsequent delayed objection may,
however, be considered by way of analogy, while the present
controversy must be determined under Sections 173 to 175 of the Land
Revenue Act.
64. It is not necessary in the present case to pronounce upon the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to every application
under Section 173. Even assuming in favour of the objectors that Section
5 could be invoked for considering a delayed application under Section
173, such invocation would not, by itself, confer upon the Commissioner
an unrestricted power to reopen every sale which had already been
confirmed under Section 174. The effect of condonation has to be
examined in the context of the statutory scheme, the stage at which the
application was presented, the order of confirmation already passed and
the conditions prescribed by Section 173.
65. Section 174 requires the Commissioner to confirm the sale on
expiry of thirty days from the date of sale where no application under
Section 172 or Section 173 has been made, or where such application
has been rejected. It further declares every order passed thereunder to be
final. Section 175 bars claims founded on irregularity or mistake in
publishing or conducting the sale where no application under Section
173 is made within the time allowed, while preserving the right to
institute a civil suit for setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud.
66. The provisions have to be read harmoniously. They provide a
statutory period within which the sale may be questioned on grounds of
irregularity or mistake, and thereafter provide for confirmation and
finality. The Commissioner is undoubtedly a Revenue Court for the
purpose of deciding an application under Section 173, as held in Ram
Swaroop (supra). That judicial character, however, does not confer an

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unrestricted power to disregard the finality prescribed by Section 174 or
the bar contained in Section 175. Nor does the mere filing of an
application for condonation of delay, without a legally sustainable order
on that application and a consideration of the statutory requirements,
automatically undo a confirmation already made.
67. The objection filed by respondents 4 and 6 was founded
substantially upon the short interval between the fresh proclamation and
the auction, the alleged discrepancy in the boundaries and omission of
the area of the property. These are grounds of irregularity or mistake in
publishing or conducting the sale, falling within the subject matter of
Section 173. No application under that section had been filed within
thirty days of the sale. Nor had the objectors invoked Section 172 by
making the deposits contemplated therein. The objection was filed only
after the sale had been confirmed.
68. The subsequent application for condonation of delay could not, in
the circumstances of the present case, be treated as an objection pending
when the sale was confirmed on 31.01.1990. The confirmation had
already taken place after expiry of the statutory period, in the absence of
any application under Section 172 or Section 173 then pending before
the Commissioner. The Commissioner was, therefore, required to
address not merely the explanation for delay, but also the legal effect of
the intervening confirmation under Section 174 and the statutory
consequences which had followed from it. The mere fact that the
objection was subsequently entertained did not dispense with that
examination.
69. The next question is whether the Commissioner's order dated
29.03.1990 can be sustained as an exercise of original jurisdiction under
Section 173 or whether, in its legal effect, it amounts to reopening the
earlier order of confirmation. An application under Section 173 filed
within the prescribed period invokes the original statutory jurisdiction of
the Commissioner to examine whether the sale is liable to be set aside
for material irregularity or mistake, subject to proof of substantial injury.

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Such an application is not a review of the confirmation order, since the
statutory period for confirmation has not yet expired.
70. The present case stands on a different footing. When the objection
was filed on 22.02.1990, the sale had already been confirmed on
31.01.1990, the sale certificate had been issued on 02.02.1990 and
possession had been delivered on 13.02.1990. There was no application
under Section 173 pending before the Commissioner when the sale was
confirmed. The order dated 29.03.1990, by entertaining the subsequent
objection and setting aside the confirmed sale, thus operated in substance
to reopen or undo the earlier order of confirmation and the statutory
consequences flowing from it.
71. The principle that the power of review is not inherent and must be
conferred by statute is well settled. In Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra) the
Supreme Court held that the power of review is not inherent in an
authority and must be conferred by law. The same principle has been
reiterated in Kalabharati Advertising (supra) and Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta
(supra). The principle is also reiterated in State of West Bengal and
others v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
72. The Land Revenue Act does not confer upon the Commissioner a
general power to review an order of confirmation passed under Section
174. The fact that the subsequent proceeding was styled as an objection
under Section 173 cannot, by itself, answer the question whether the
Commissioner had jurisdiction to undo a confirmation already made.
The Commissioner was required to identify and exercise a legally
available statutory power, and to address the effect of the prior
confirmation and the statutory consequences under Sections 174 and
177. The impugned order does not satisfactorily undertake that exercise.
It cannot, therefore, be sustained merely by treating the subsequent
objection as an ordinary exercise of original jurisdiction under Section
173.
73. The objectors have also sought to sustain the Commissioner's
order by describing the irregularities in the auction as fraud and

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WRIB No. - 8915 of 1990
misrepresentation. They rely upon United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
(supra) and Bairam (supra). There is no dispute with the principle that a
Court or Tribunal may recall an order obtained by fraud or by
misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of
the adjudication. Such an exceptional power is, however, distinct from a
general power of review.
74. The principal grounds recorded for setting aside the sale in the
present case are the short interval between the fresh proclamation and
the auction, the alleged discrepancy in the boundaries and omission of
the area of the property. These grounds, as pleaded and dealt with in the
impugned order, are grounds of irregularity or mistake in publishing or
conducting the sale and fall within the express subject matter of Section
173. The Commissioner's order does not record a specific finding that
the auction purchaser procured the confirmation order by fraud or
misrepresentation of such a nature as would justify an exceptional recall.
75. The distinction between irregularity and fraud is material. Section
175 itself preserves the right to institute a suit in the Civil Court for
setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud. The statutory preservation
of such a remedy cannot be read as permitting the Commissioner to
convert a time-barred objection founded on irregularity into an
unrestricted proceeding for recall. The report dated 18.02.1990 may
support the existence of procedural irregularities, but it does not, by
itself, establish that the auction purchaser procured the confirmation
order by fraud. The disputed assertions regarding the market value and
area of the property likewise cannot, without a specific finding supported
by material, be treated as proof of fraud.
76. The statutory consequences of confirmation are provided in
Sections 174 and 177. After confirmation, the Collector is required to put
the purchaser into possession and grant a certificate of purchase, which
is deemed to be a valid transfer of the property. In the present case,
confirmation, issuance of the sale certificate and delivery of possession
had all taken place before the objection dated 22.02.1990 was filed.

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These circumstances reinforce the legal consequences flowing from the
confirmation, though the decisive consideration remains the statutory
finality and bar under Sections 174 and 175.
77. The Board of Revenue, by order dated 10.01.1991, affirmed the
Commissioner's decision. The Board noticed the short interval between
the fresh proclamation and the auction, the alleged discrepancies in the
boundaries and omission of the area of the property. These matters were
relevant to examining compliance with Sections 163 and 164. However,
the Board failed to address the legal consequence of the fact that the sale
had already been confirmed before the objection was filed. It also failed
to distinguish between a timely proceeding under Section 173 and a
subsequent attempt to undo a confirmation already made, without
adequately examining the statutory basis for doing so.
78. The Board did not record a specific finding of fraud of the nature
necessary to sustain an exceptional recall of the confirmation order. Its
decision to affirm the Commissioner's order, without adequately
addressing the statutory finality under Section 174 and the bar under
Section 175, is therefore unsustainable. The consequential directions for
refund of the auction amount and for conducting a fresh auction were
dependent upon the decision setting aside the sale and cannot survive
once that decision is quashed.
79. It is clarified that this judgment does not approve the failure of the
auction authorities to observe the period prescribed by Section 164 or the
deficiencies in the description of the property noticed in the record. The
conclusion is confined to the jurisdictional effect of the delayed
objection, the prior confirmation of sale under Section 174 and the
absence of a sustainable basis in the impugned orders for undoing that
confirmation. Any claim founded on fraud may be pursued by way of a
civil suit, if otherwise maintainable under Section 175 of the Land
Revenue Act and in accordance with law. No opinion is expressed on the
merits of any such claim.
80. Both writ petitions are allowed.

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81. The order dated 29.03.1990 passed by the Commissioner, Kanpur
Division, Kanpur, setting aside the auction sale of House No. 84/59,
Anwarganj, Kanpur, and revisional order dated 10.01.1991 passed by the
Board of Revenue in Revision No. 42 (Sale) of 1989-90, affirming the
order of the Commissioner, are hereby quashed.
82. It is made clear that this judgment shall not preclude any party
from pursuing a civil suit founded on fraud, if otherwise maintainable
under Section 175 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and in
accordance with law. No opinion is expressed on the merits of any such
claim.
83. The parties shall bear their own costs.
(Arun Kumar, J.)
November 19, 2026
Ranjeet Sahu
Digitally signed by :-
RANJEET SAHU
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad