Pritpal Singh vs Gajjan Singh

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

CM-9076-C-2017 in/and
RSA-3721-2017 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CM-9076-C-2017 in/and
RSA-3721-2017 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 21.11.2026
Pritpal Singh
… Applicant/Appellant
Versus
Gajjan Singh
... Non-applicant/Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Present:- Mr. Priyanshu, Advocate for
Mr. G.S. Sindhu, Advocate
for the applicant/appellant.
Mr. Tushar Sharma, Advocate
for the non-applicant/respondent.
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VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J . (Oral)
CM-9076-C-2017
1. The present application has been filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, seeking condonation of 158 days’ delay in filing the
accompanying appeal.
2 . Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant submits that the
accompanying appeal raises substantial grounds and is likely to succeed on
merits, the averments and grounds urged therein being relied upon as an
integral part of the present application. It is further contended that the
appellant is an illiterate person and was unaware of the prescribed period
of limitation for preferring an appeal before this Court. It was only upon
subsequently coming in contact with counsel practising before this Court
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that he was apprised of the prescribed period of limitation of 90 days.
Upon acquiring such knowledge, the applicant/appellant immediately
collected the requisite documents and approached counsel for institution of
the appeal. It is, thus, submitted that the delay of 158 days occasioned in
filing the appeal was neither intentional nor deliberate, but arose solely on
account of the circumstances explained hereinabove. Learned counsel
further contends that refusal to condone the delay would deprive the
appellant of an opportunity to have the appeal adjudicated on merits,
thereby causing irreparable loss and prejudice. Accordingly, a prayer has
been made for condonation of the delay of 158 days in filing the
accompanying appeal.
3. Notice of the application was issued to the
non-applicant/respondent, who contested the prayer for condonation of
delay, terming the explanation furnished by the applicant-appellant as
untenable. It was contended that ignorance of law cannot constitute
sufficient cause. The non-applicant/respondent pointed out that the
certified copy of the judgment dated 05.11.2016 was applied for on
08.11.2016, prepared on 16.11.2016 and delivered on 29.11.2016. It was,
therefore, contended that the applicant had knowledge of the judgment and
could have ascertained the available remedy and limitation from his
counsel. Reliance was placed upon State of Punjab and Others vs.
Sawinder Pal Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine P&H 16195 , and dismissal of
the application with costs was sought.
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4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and, with their
able assistance, having meticulously examined the paper-book, this Court
proceeds to consider the prayer for condonation of delay in the backdrop of
the statutory framework governing limitation and the principles of law
settled by judicial pronouncements. Section 3 of the Limitation Act
mandates dismissal of every suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred
or made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, irrespective of whether
limitation has been set up as a defence. Section 5, however, confers upon
the Court a discretionary power to admit an appeal or application beyond
the prescribed period, provided the applicant satisfactorily demonstrates
that sufficient cause prevented him from approaching the Court within the
period of limitation.
4.1. The expression “sufficient cause” is required to be construed
judiciously, keeping in view the need to advance substantial justice while
simultaneously preserving the discipline imposed by the law of limitation.
Although a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach may be warranted to
facilitate adjudication on merits, such liberality cannot dispense with the
applicant’s obligation to furnish a cogent, bona fide and satisfactory
explanation accounting for the delay. The discretion vested in the Court
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is neither unfettered nor exercisable
as a matter of course; its invocation must be governed by sound judicial
principles and informed by the peculiar facts and circumstances of each
case.
4.2. The scope and contours of the discretionary jurisdiction under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, together with the governing principles for
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its exercise, have been authoritatively delineated by the Supreme Court in
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy
Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286 . The relevant exposition contained in
paragraphs No.9 to 26 of the said judgment, which comprehensively
elucidates the principles governing condonation of delay, is reproduced
hereunder:–
“9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down
that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made
after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed
even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to
the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the
Limitation Act.
10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is
reproduced here-in-below:-
“3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive),
every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and
application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as
a defence.”
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and
application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal,
we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in
context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if
the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after
the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of
the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the
dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the
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Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no
objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or
referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation
upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond
limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions
are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation
Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in
Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it
is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal
within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are
conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after
the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it
within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the
appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature
and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based
upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise
due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not
adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the
applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and
rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on
the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a
substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a
strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi
(Dead) by LRs. and Ors., it has been observed that different
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provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction,
as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case
liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while
construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows
that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing
Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of
the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation
is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the
mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of
the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance
between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the
matters of condoning the delay. 16. Generally, the courts have
adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase
‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of 1 (2007) 11 SCC 285 the
Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts
to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors., this Court in
advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for
‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain
every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal
to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter,
it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial
justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations
and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned.
Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is
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adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for
not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for
exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The
phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause
for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a
matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking
aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient
cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on
the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an
appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and
this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder
treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may
proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And
Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even
after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an
appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary
jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite
establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may
refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the
party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
Ors., it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption
from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of
hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when
mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not
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properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to
condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and
Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5 wherein while observing, as
above, this Court further laid down that if some person has
obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when
the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the
benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage
simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,
where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the
delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation
of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its
discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court
should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an
informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency
of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial
law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as
‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial
justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok
Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered while dealing with the application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, this
Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in
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Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also
observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of
the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law
as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on
equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid
decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which
equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal
approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph
12 reads as under:-
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it
is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide
paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
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the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:-
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
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substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation
Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary
in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter,
it does not mean that others are also entitled to the
same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause
shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
5. In the present case, the applicant-appellant cannot absolve
himself of the responsibility to exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing
his legal remedies. No cogent, bona fide or legally sustainable explanation
has been furnished to account for the delay of 158 days. The mere plea of
illiteracy and lack of awareness regarding the prescribed period of
limitation, without any further explanation demonstrating due diligence or
circumstances genuinely preventing timely recourse to the appellate
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remedy, cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient cause under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
5.1. The Supreme Court, in Rajneesh Kumar & Another vs. Ved
Prakash, 2024 INSC 891 , while considering the question of condonation
of delay attributed to the negligence of counsel, authoritatively held that a
litigant owes an independent duty to remain vigilant about his own rights
and the judicial proceedings initiated at his instance. Even assuming
negligence on the part of the advocate, the entire responsibility for
prolonged inaction cannot be shifted upon counsel, thereby enabling the
litigant to disown the engagement and seek indulgence of the Court. The
Supreme Court, while relying upon its earlier decision in Salil Dutta vs.
T.M. & M.C. Private Ltd., 1993(2) SCC 185 , reiterated that there is no
absolute rule permitting a litigant to disown the acts or omissions of his
counsel at will and seek relief on that basis. The Court accordingly
declined to condone the delay of 534 days.
5.3. The applicant-appellant is required to demonstrate reasonable
diligence and furnish a cogent, bona fide and satisfactory explanation for
the delay, so as to bring the case within the ambit of sufficient cause
contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Upon an overall
assessment of the explanation furnished and the material available on
record, this Court finds that the applicant-appellant has failed to
satisfactorily account for the delay or establish circumstances warranting
exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in his favour. Consequently, the
explanation tendered does not meet the statutory threshold of sufficient
cause for condonation of delay.
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5.3. The judgment cited by learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the non-applicant-respondent, namely Sawinder Pal Singh’s case (supra),
has a direct bearing on the controversy involved in the present case. The
relevant observations therein, elucidating the principles governing the
exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, are
reproduced hereunder:–
128. When it comes to condonation of delay, the length of delay is
immaterial, and what matters is the acceptability of the
explanation. A short delay may still warrant dismissal if
unsupported by sufficient cause, whereas even a long delay may
be condoned if justified by circumstances demonstrating bona
fides.
129. Delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence. In
certain cases, unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud,
miscommunication, or bona fide mistake may stretch over long
periods, yet remain excusable if they are explained with candour
and supported by material. Conversely, an unexplained delay of
even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate disregard of
statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to
indulgence.
130. The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with
sufficiency of the cause. The law are independent and diverse
factors. Hence the extent of delay should not determine whether
the cause is sufficient or not. Section 5 of the Limitation Act
does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the
delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter,
acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for
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condoning the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length
of the delay.
131. The decisive factor is the adequacy of the cause shown, not the
length of delay. What is critical is whether the party seeking
condonation acted with reasonable diligence during the
prescribed period and whether the reasons advanced
demonstrate a genuine inability to file within time. Thus, the
test is qualitative rather than quantitative.
132. This is not to say that the length of delay is irrelevant. A long
delay naturally casts a heavier burden on the applicant to furnish
cogent, credible, and convincing explanations. The proof
required becomes stricter in proportion to the delay. The longer
the time elapsed, the stronger the justification that must be put
forth. Hence, length is instructive in determining the degree of
scrutiny, but it is not determinative of the outcome.
133. The length of the delay functions as a contextual indicator but
not a determinative factor. It alerts the court to the degree of
rigour required in examining the explanation, yet the ultimate
focus remains on whether "sufficient cause" has been shown.
The doctrine thereby preserves both the integrity of statutory
timelines and the imperative of doing justice in deserving cases.
134. Thus, in exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act the courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction
must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and
a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former
case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a
relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach
but in the latter case, no such consideration may arise and such a
case deserves a liberal approach. No hard-and-fast rule can be
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laid down in this regard. The court has to exercise the discretion
on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the
expression "sufficient cause", the principle of advancing
substantial justice is of prime importance.”
6. In view of the legal principles governing the exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is
evident that the sufficiency of cause must be determined on the basis of
the quality, credibility and adequacy of the explanation furnished, rather
than merely by reference to the length of the delay. The period of delay, in
itself, is neither decisive nor determinative; the paramount consideration is
whether the explanation offered is cogent, bona fide and satisfactorily
accounts for the intervening period of inaction. While a substantial delay
may be condoned where supported by a convincing and satisfactory
explanation, even a relatively short delay may not warrant indulgence in
the absence of sufficient cause. The liberal and justice-oriented approach
underlying Section 5 cannot, however, be invoked to condone unexplained
negligence, prolonged inaction or an evident lack of due diligence. In the
present case, the applicant-appellant has failed to furnish a satisfactory,
consistent and continuous explanation accounting for the delay of 158
days. The grounds advanced, even upon their cumulative consideration, do
not satisfy the statutory threshold of sufficient cause so as to warrant
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court.
6.1. Consequently, this Court finds that the applicant-appellant has
failed to discharge the statutory burden of establishing sufficient cause for
condonation of 158 days’ delay in filing the accompanying appeal. The
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application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is, accordingly,
dismissed .
RSA-3721-2017
1. The applicant-appellant has failed to establish sufficient cause
warranting condonation of the inordinate delay of 158 days in filing the
accompanying appeal. Upon a careful and considered appraisal of the
pleadings and the material available on record, this Court finds that the
application seeking condonation of the aforesaid delay is devoid of merit
and, accordingly, stands dismissed by a separate, reasoned order of even
date.
2. In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings recorded
hereinabove, the main appeal is also dismissed in limine as being barred
by limitation. The applicant-appellant’s failure to furnish a cogent, bona
fide and satisfactory explanation accounting for the substantial delay
disentitles him to any further indulgence. The dismissal necessarily
follows from the statutory mandate governing limitation and the settled
principle that the discretionary jurisdiction to condone delay cannot be
exercised in the absence of sufficient cause, particularly where the
explanation tendered fails to satisfactorily account for the material period
of inaction.
3. In view of the final disposal of the main appeal, all pending
miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.

( VIRINDER AGGARWAL )
21.11.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
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