Parminder Kaur vs State Of Punjab

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

CRM-M-35010-2019 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH


CRM-M-35010-2019 (O&M)

Parminder Kaur ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and another ...Respondents

Sr. No. Particulars Details
1 The date when the judgment is reserved 12.11.2026
2 The date when the judgment is pronounced 17.11.2026
3 The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 17.11.2026
Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or full
4 Full
judgment is pronounced
The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full judgment, and Not
5
reasons thereof applicable

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA
Present:- Mr. R.S. Bajaj, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Ms. Ruchika Sabherwal, Senior DAG, Punjab.

None for respondent No.2.

MANISHA BATRA, J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.' ) for quashing of the order
dated 15.01.2018 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Court of learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Jalandhar in case FIR No.67 dated 20.06.2016
registered under Sections 420/34 IPC at Police Station Bhogpur, District
Jalandhar (Rural), whereby charges under Sections 406/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC' ) have been framed against the petitioner, as well
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as of the order dated 17.05.2019 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Court of learned
Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, whereby the revision petition filed by the petitioner
against the said order had been dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of disposal of this
petition are that the aforementioned FIR (Annexure P-4) was registered on the
basis of a written complaint submitted by respondent No.2-Gurnam Singh to
the Senior Superintendent of Police, Jalandhar (Rural) against the petitioner,
one Rajesh Puri (a Food and Civil Supply Inspector) and one Gurpal Singh
Dhillon, alleging therein that the petitioner had approached him for selling her
land measuring 8 kanals 9 marlas situated at Village Jalalabad. A written
agreement to sell was executed and the petitioner received a sum of Rs.11 lakh
at that time. The total sale consideration was stated to be Rs.20 lakh per acre
and the sale deed was to be executed on or before 05.04.2016. The complainant
claimed to have remained present before the Sub Registrar on 05.04.2016 but
the petitioner did not turn up for execution of the sale deed. It was further
alleged that the other two accused were proclaiming in public that they had
purchased the property from the petitioner. On these allegations, the
complainant sought registration of an FIR for the offences of criminal breach
of trust and cheating.
3. The complaint was inquired into by the then SHO, Police Station
Bhogpur. In his report dated 16.04.2016, he recorded that the petitioner had
executed an agreement to sell dated 03.03.2016 in favour of the complainant
before Sub Tehsil Bhogpur after receiving Rs.11,00,000/-, with Sarabjit Singh
and Jeet Singh Lambardar as attesting witnesses. He further recorded that the
petitioner did not come present on 05.04.2016 and had, in connivance with
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Gurpal Singh Dhillon, already executed a sale deed of the land in favour of
some other person. The petitioner did not appear in the inquiry. On the basis
of this report, the FIR was registered under Sections 420/34 IPC against the
petitioner and Gurpal Singh. Gurpal Singh was arrested on 23.06.2016 and was
released on bail on the next day. The petitioner was granted interim bail by the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar on 22.07.2016 and she
joined the investigation. Nothing was found against Rajesh Puri. After
completion of investigation, challan (Annexure P-10) was presented against
the petitioner and Gurpal Singh.
4. Vide order dated 15.01.2018 (Annexure P-5), learned trial Court,
on finding a prima facie case, framed charges under Sections 406/34 IPC
against both the accused. They filed separate revision petitions, which were
decided by learned Sessions Judge, Jalandhar by a common order dated
17.05.2019 (Annexure P-6). The revision petition of Gurpal Singh was allowed
and he was discharged, since there was no material connecting him with the
sale deed executed by the petitioner. The revision petition of the petitioner was,
however, dismissed. Learned Sessions Judge observed that the petitioner had
agreed to sell the land to the complainant vide agreement to sell dated
03.03.2016 and had received Rs.11 lakh as earnest money, but she executed a
sale deed dated 30.03.2016 regarding the same land in favour of Jeewan Puri,
wife of Ramesh Puri, for a consideration of Rs.13,80,000/-. It was further
observed that the question whether the petitioner had the intention to cheat the
complainant from the very inception could be ascertained only after evidence.
It was also noticed that the petitioner had not denied her signatures on the
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agreement to sell and had rather alleged that the same were obtained by
misrepresentation.
5. It may also be noticed that respondent No.2 had filed a civil suit
(Annexure P-1) for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated
03.03.2016 against the petitioner, which was instituted on 06.04.2016. In the
plaint, the sale consideration was stated to be Rs.26 lakh per acre. The
petitioner contested the suit by filing her written statement (Annexure P-2) and
issues were framed on 20.02.2018 (Annexure P-3). The suit has since been
dismissed with costs by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jalandhar vide
judgment dated 30.10.2023 (Annexure P-7).
6. Notice of motion was issued in the present petition on 27.08.2019
and respondent No.2 was impleaded as a party on the oral request of learned
counsel for the petitioner. Vide order dated 10.10.2022, the trial Court was
directed to adjourn the proceedings beyond the date fixed by this Court. The
interim order has continued since then. The State has filed a reply as well as a
status report dated 14.09.2024. No reply has been filed on behalf of respondent
No.2. On 12.11.2026, when the matter was finally heard, there was no
representation on behalf of respondent No.2 despite the matter having been
passed over twice. Hence, this Court has heard the arguments of learned
counsel for the petitioner and learned State counsel.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner is
a widow who has been made a victim at the hands of respondent No.2, who is
a travel agent operating from Bhogpur. It is further submitted that he had
agreed to send petitioner’s son Jaskaranjit Singh to America for a sum of Rs.22
lakh. However, the son of the petitioner was sent to Mexico, where he was
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CRM-M-35010-2019 (O&M) 5
detained in a camp. Respondent No.2 then demanded Rs.5 lakh for getting him
released. After receiving the said amount, he obtained the signatures of the
petitioner on two stamp papers and some blank papers on the pretext that the
same were required for the release of her son. These papers were later
converted into the alleged agreement to sell. The petitioner had moved a
complaint dated 08.04.2016 against respondent No.2, but no action was taken
on gthe same. Learned counsel has further argued that the petitioner had
already entered into an agreement to sell the same land with Jeewan Puri on
01.09.2014 and the sale deed was executed in pursuance thereof. Hence, there
was no occasion for her to enter into any agreement with respondent No.2 on
03.03.2016. It is next argued that respondent No.2 first availed of his civil
remedy and thereafter got the FIR registered only to put pressure upon the
petitioner. The dispute is purely civil in nature and the civil suit filed by
respondent No.2 has also been dismissed on merits. Learned counsel has also
argued that no ingredient of criminal breach of trust is made out, since no
property was ever entrusted to the petitioner. The Courts concerned have
passed the impugned orders in a mechanical manner and the continuation of
the proceedings is an abuse of the process of law. On these grounds, learned
counsel has prayed for setting aside of the impugned orders. To buttress his
arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the authority cited
as Radheyshyam and others v. State of Rajasthan and another, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 2311 .
8. Per contra , learned State counsel has opposed the petition by
relying upon the reply and the status report filed on behalf of the State. It is
argued that the petitioner was the owner of the land and had agreed to sell it to
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the complainant vide agreement to sell dated 03.03.2016 after receiving Rs.11
lakh as earnest money. However, instead of honouring the agreement, she
executed a sale deed regarding the same land in favour of Jeewan Puri, which
shows her intention to cheat the complainant from the very inception. Learned
State counsel has further argued that the petitioner has not denied her
signatures on the agreement to sell and a person is presumed to have signed a
document after understanding its contents unless fraud or misrepresentation is
proved. The plea of the petitioner that her signatures were obtained by
misrepresentation can be tested only during trial. It is further submitted that
only a prima facie case is to be seen at the stage of framing of charge and the
evidence cannot be evaluated at this stage. Hence, the Courts concerned have
rightly framed the charge. Even otherwise, the petition is not maintainable as
the petitioner has already availed the remedy of revision before the Court of
Sessions. Therefore, it is urged that the petition is liable to be dismissed.
9. This Court has heard the rival submissions at considerable length,
besides going through the material placed on record.
10. At the outset, it may be noticed that the petitioner has already
availed of the remedy of revision against the order framing charge, which has
been dismissed by learned Sessions Judge. A second revision at her instance is
barred under Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. However, this bar does not take away the
inherent power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another, (1997)
4 SCC 241 has held that, even after the dismissal of a revision by the Court of
Session, the High Court can interfere in exercise of its inherent power where it
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finds failure of justice or abuse of the process, though such power is to be
exercised sparingly. The relevant observations are as under:
“...The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide.
However, High Court must exercise such power sparingly
and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has
simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section
397(1). However, when the High Court notices that
there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial
mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not
correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to
prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of
justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness
committed by inferior criminal court in its juridical
process or illegality of sentence or order. ”
11. Reliance can also be placed upon Dhariwal Tobacco Products
Limited and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2009) 2 SCC 370 ,
wherein the same view has been reiterated. Hence, the present petition is
maintainable and the question is whether the present case calls for the exercise
of such power.
12. The FIR in question was registered under Sections 420/34 IPC.
However, learned trial Court has framed charge against the petitioner only
under Sections 406/34 IPC and no charge has been framed for the offence of
cheating. The co-accused of the petitioner has already been discharged. The
order under challenge is, thus, the order framing charge under Sections 406/34
IPC. At the same time, the trial Court has the power under Section 216 Cr.P.C.
to alter or add to the charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced.
Therefore, the first question is whether the material collected by the
prosecution, taken at its face value, discloses the ingredients of criminal breach
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of trust punishable under Section 406 IPC. Before the proceedings arising out
of the FIR can be quashed, this Court has also to be satisfied that the same
material does not disclose the offence of cheating punishable under Section
420 IPC.
13. The distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating has
been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Race Club (1940)
Limited and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2024) 10 SCC
690 . It has been held that criminal breach of trust requires entrustment of
property belonging to another person, whereas cheating requires a dishonest
intention at the very inception of the transaction. The two offences are mutually
exclusive and cannot coexist in respect of the same transaction on the same set
of facts. It has further been held that once there is a sale, Section 406 IPC goes
out of the picture. The relevant observations are as under:
“30. The distinction between mere breach of contract and
the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a
fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused
at the time of inducement should be looked into which may
be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the
subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of
contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for
cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time
when the offence is said to have been committed.
Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the
offence. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the
property must have been entrusted to the accused or he
must have dominion over it. The property in respect of
which the offence of breach of trust has been committed
must be either the property of some person other than the
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accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must
be of some other person. The accused must hold that
property on trust of such other person. Although the
offence, i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating
involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually
exclusive and different in basic concept. There is a
distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating.
For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of
making a false or misleading representation i.e., since
inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of
entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach
of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the
property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same.
Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or
dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver
any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot
co-exist simultaneously.
31. ... Once there is a sale, Section 406 of the IPC goes out
of picture. ...
43. ... Both offences are independent and distinct. The two
offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of
facts. They are antithetical to each other. ...”
14. Reference can also be made to Rikhab Birani and another v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2025 INSC 512 , wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court deprecated the failure to distinguish between a civil wrong in
the form of breach of contract and the offences under Sections 420 and 406
IPC. The relevant observations are as under:
“15. During the last couple of months, a number of
judgments/orders have been pronounced by this Court,
especially in cases arising from the State of Uttar Pradesh,
deprecating the stance of the police as well as the courts in
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failing to distinguish between a civil wrong in the form of
a breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard
to and violation of contractual terms; and a criminal
offence under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC, the
ingredients of which are quite different and requires mens
rea at the time when the contract is entered into itself to
not abide by the terms thereof.
*
21. ... "36. An offence under Section 406 of the IPC
requires entrustment, which carries the implication that a
person handing over any property or on whose behalf the
property is handed over, continues to be the owner of the
said property. Further, the person handing over the
property must have confidence in the person taking the
property to create a fiduciary relationship between them.
A normal transaction of sale or exchange of
money/consideration does not amount to entrustment.
Clearly, the charge/offence of Section 406 IPC is not even
remotely made out.”
15. Reference can also be made to S.N. Vijaylakshmi and others v.
State of Karnataka and another, 2025 INSC 917 , facts of which are quite
similar to those of the present case. In the said case, the complainant had filed
a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell and, soon thereafter,
an FIR under Sections 406 and 420 IPC was also registered. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the accused were not entrusted with the property,
since they were its owners with title. Hence, Section 406 IPC could not be
invoked. It was further held that, where the element of criminality is absent and
civil proceedings have already been instituted on the same issue, continuation
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of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the Court.
The relevant observations are as under:
“39. From a bare reading of Section 405 of the IPC,
criminal breach of trust would arise only in a situation
where the accused in any manner has been entrusted with
property, or with any dominion over property and
dishonestly misappropriates or converts the same to his
own use, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property.
Here, it is not a case where the accused were entrusted with
the subject property. The subject property belongs to them
and they had rights over it as owners with title. Thus, the
very foundation for invoking Section 406 of the IPC falls
to the ground.
*
42. Coming to the second question i.e., whether civil and
criminal proceedings both can be maintained on the very
same set of allegations qua the same person(s), the answer
stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to simultaneous civil
and criminal proceedings. If the element of criminality is
there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal case on the
same facts. The fact that a civil remedy has already been
availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient
ground to quash an FIR, as pointed out, inter alia, in P
Swaroopa Rani v M Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765 and
Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v State (Delhi
Admn.), (2009) 5 SCC 528. The obvious caveat being that
the allegations, even if having a civil flavour to them, must
prima facie disclose an overwhelming element of
criminality. In the absence of the element of criminality, if
both civil and criminal cases are allowed to continue, it
will definitely amount to abuse of the process of the Court,
which the Courts have always tried to prevent by putting a
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stop to any such criminal proceeding, where civil
proceedings have already been instituted with regard to the
same issue, and the element of criminality is absent. If
such element is absent, the prosecution in question would
have to be quashed. ...”
16. The judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in
Radheyshyam’s case (supra) is directly on the point. In that case, an advance
of Rs.11 lakh had been paid under an agreement to sell. On the refusal of the
owners to execute the sale deed, the purchaser lodged an FIR under Sections
420 and 406 IPC besides filing a suit for specific performance. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the amount paid towards the sale consideration was
not entrusted to the owners and that mere refusal to register the sale did not
amount to cheating. The relevant observations are as under:
“9. ... Mere non-registration of the sale or its refusal cannot
amount to cheating. The delivery of the advance payment
towards consideration was made in furtherance of an
Agreement to Sell and it is not the case of the respondent
that he was in anyway deceived or duped to make such
payments to the appellants. It is a civil dispute and gives
rise to the complainant's right to resort to the remedies
provided under civil law by filing a suit for specific
performance.
*
12. In the present case, the appellants were not entrusted
with any property by respondent no.2 - complainant. The
only delivery made was of part payment towards an
Agreement to Sell between the parties. The amount paid
towards consideration cannot be said to have been
entrusted with the appellants by respondent no. 2.
Additionally, merely because the appellants are refusing
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to register the sale, it does not amount to misappropriation
of the advance payment. Since there was no entrustment
of property, the offence of misappropriation of such
property and thereby criminal breach of trust cannot be
said to be made out.”
17. Coming to the facts of the present case, the entire case of the
prosecution, as reflected in the FIR, the inquiry report and the challan
(Annexure P-10), is that the petitioner agreed to sell her own land to the
complainant, received Rs.11 lakh as earnest money and later sold the land to
another person. The land always belonged to the petitioner and was never
handed over to her by the complainant to be held for him. The amount of Rs.11
lakh, even as per the complainant, was paid as part of the sale consideration
under the agreement to sell. Nothing in the prosecution material shows that this
amount was handed over to the petitioner to be held for the complainant or to
be dealt with in a particular manner on his behalf. The payment was, thus, made
in the course of an ordinary transaction of sale and did not create any fiduciary
relationship between the parties. However, this should not as the money paid
as earnest can never be the subject of entrustment. The finding is confined to
the material collected in the present case, which does not show entrustment of
any property to the petitioner within the meaning of Section 405 IPC.
Therefore, in view of the law laid down in Delhi Race Club's case (supra) ,
Rikhab Birani's case (supra) , S.N. Vijaylakshmi's case (supra) and
Radheyshyam's case (supra) , the very foundation of the charge under Section
406 IPC is missing.
18. With due respect, the Courts concerned have not dealt with the
essential ingredient of entrustment, which is the foundation of an offence under
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Section 406 IPC. The order framing charge (Annexure P-5) merely records that
a prima facie case under Sections 406/34 IPC is made out, without identifying
the property allegedly entrusted to the petitioner. Learned Sessions Judge,
while upholding the charge, observed that the intention of the petitioner to
cheat the complainant from the very inception could be ascertained only after
evidence. Such consideration pertains to the offence of cheating and cannot
take the place of the requirement of entrustment. Hence, the approach of the
Courts concerned is not in consonance with the law laid down in Delhi Race
Club's case (supra) .
19. Coming to the offence of cheating, the dishonest or fraudulent
intention has to exist at the time when the promise or representation is made.
A mere failure to keep a promise or a subsequent breach of contract does not
amount to cheating. In the present case, the complaint of respondent No.2 does
not allege any false representation made by the petitioner at the time of the
agreement to sell dated 03.03.2016. His grievance is that the petitioner did not
turn up on 05.04.2016 and that the land had been sold to another person. The
inquiry report and the challan (Annexure P-10) proceed on the same footing.
On the date of the alleged agreement, the petitioner was admittedly the owner
of the land and the sale deed in favour of Jeewan Puri was executed only
thereafter on 30.03.2016. In S.N. Vijaylakshmi's case (supra) also, the owners,
after entering into an agreement to sell with the complainant, had taken money
from a third party for transferring the same property and had conveyed it to
one of the accused. Even so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 420
IPC was not attracted. As in Radheyshyam's case (supra) , it is not the case of
the complainant that he was deceived into paying the earnest money. Thus, on
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the prosecution's own case, the allegations disclose at best a breach of the
agreement to sell and not a dishonest intention at the inception of the
transaction.
20. Another aspect of the matter may also be noticed. Respondent
No.2 had availed of his civil remedy by filing a suit for specific performance,
which was instituted on 06.04.2016 itself, a day before his complaint to the
police. The suit has been dismissed with costs vide judgment dated 30.10.2023
(Annexure P-7). As per the said judgment, the plaintiff could not produce his
passbook to show payment of Rs.11 lakh to the petitioner. The two attesting
witnesses of the agreement did not appear for their cross-examination and their
examination-in-chief was not read in evidence. In his cross-examination, the
plaintiff admitted that an agreement to sell dated 01.09.2014 had already been
executed between the petitioner and Jeewan Puri regarding the same land. He
has not sought any relief against the sale deed executed in favour of Jeewan
Puri.
21. It is also relevant to notice that the co-accused of the petitioner
has already been discharged by learned Sessions Judge, there being no material
connecting him with the sale deed in question. Nothing was found against
Rajesh Puri during the investigation either. The prosecution material does not
disclose participation of any other person with the petitioner in furtherance of
a common intention. Hence, Section 34 IPC is also not attracted. The petitioner
has been facing these proceedings since the year 2016, whereas the allegations,
even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the ingredients of the offences
alleged against her. Allowing such proceedings to continue would serve no
useful purpose and would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
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22. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution material, taken at its face value, does not disclose
the commission of the offence punishable under Section 406 IPC or under
Section 420 IPC by the petitioner. Consequently, the order dated 15.01.2018
(Annexure P-5) framing charge under Sections 406/34 IPC against the
petitioner and the order dated 17.05.2019 (Annexure P-6) dismissing her
revision petition cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the present petition is
allowed. The impugned orders dated 15.01.2018 and 17.05.2019 are set aside
and all the proceedings arising out of FIR No.67 dated 20.06.2016 registered
under Sections 420/34 IPC at Police Station Bhogpur, District Jalandhar
(Rural) are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.
23. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand disposed of.


17.11.2026 (MANISHA BATRA)
Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
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