M/S JATADHARI RICE MILL AND ANR vs PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK, ARMB MURSHIDABAD AND ANR

Court
Calcutta High Court

17.11.26


CO.136 of 2026


M/s Jatadhari Rice Mill & Anr.
D/L
Sl-11
Ct.04
(Samar)
Vs.
Punjab National Bank, ARMB, Murshidabad & Anr.


Mr. Rishav Das,
Ms. Rinka Chakraborty,
Mr. Samrat Acharya,
….for the Petitioners.
Mr. Tapas Paul,
Mr. Pritam Ray,
….for the respondents.


1. Affidavit of service filed in Court today is
taken on record.
2. The petitioners assail an order dated June 29,
2026 passed by the learned Debts Recovery
Tribunal Siliguri whereby their interim













application being I.A. No. 824 of 2025 filed in
connection with SA 171 of 2024 was rejected.
By the order dated June 29, 2026 the
Tribunal disposed of two interim applications
being I.A No. 823 of 2025 and I.A. No. 824 of
2025 filed in connection with SA 171 of 2024.
3. The petitioner no. 1 (hereafter “the
petitioner”), a partnership firm, has availed of
certain credit facilities from the erstwhile
Oriental Bank of Commerce (which was
subsequently merged and integrated with the
opposite party no. 1).
4. Certain properties were mortgaged by the

2
petitioner and its partners for securing the
credit facilities availed of by the petitioner.
5. The petitioner has allegedly defaulted in
repayment of the credit facilities whereupon;
the opposite party no. 1 (hereafter “the bank”)
has initiated measures under the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 for recovery of the amount
due and owing from the petitioner. In the
process the bank proceeded to sell the
secured assets in auction.
6. Challenging the steps taken by the bank
under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act inter alia
for selling the secured asset in acution, the
petitioners have approached the Tribunal by
filing an application under Section 17 of the
2002 Act which has been registered as a SA
171 of 2024.
7. In connection with the said application, the
petitioners took out two interim applications
being IA 823 of 2025 and IA 824 of 2025.
8. IA 823 of 2025 had been filed seeking
production of all original documents
pertaining to the loan account and the
SARFAESI proceedings and also the original
postal receipt, track reports, demand notices,
possession notices and all other documents

3
relied upon by the bank in its written
objection and additional written objection for
verification and inspection.
9. IA 824 of 2025 had been filed seeking a
direction upon the bank’s authorized officer to
appear before the tribunal and “to adduce
evidence” .
10. The petitioners’ application in IA 823 of 2025
has been allowed by the Tribunal. However, IA
824 of 2025 has been rejected.
11. Feeling aggrieved thereby the petitioners have
approached Court by filing the present
revisional application.
12. Mr. Das learned advocate appearing for the
petitioners submit that the order impugned
should be set aside inasmuch as, the learned
Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the
issues raised by the petitioners cannot be
effectively adjudicated without affording the
petitioners an opportunity to cross-examine
the bank’s authorized officer.
13. It has been next submitted by Mr. Das that
the bank has failed to produce the documents
indicating affixation of sale notice on the
secured asset prior to sale thereof and that
the bank has issued the notice of sale to a
dead person.
14. It is further submitted that the veracity of the

4
averments made by the bank in the affidavit
can be tested only if the deponent thereof is
permitted to be cross-examined by the
petitioners.
15. Mr. Das next submits that the postal receipts
and the postal track report which pertain to
the sale notice issued for a failed sale which
had been undertaken earlier in point of time
and not the sale which has been impugned
before the Tribunal in SA 171 of 2024 have
been produced by the bank as evidence of
issuance of sale notice in respect of the
second sale.
16. Mr. Das further contends that the bank has
taken an incorrect stand in its affidavit. He
submits that while the bank has averred that
it has followed procedure prescribed by the
2002 Act, the bank has actually not done so
and as such cross-examination would be
required.
17. Mr. Das relies on an unreported decision of a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Roma Roy Vs. Indian Overseas Bank,
Siliguri Branch (CO 74 of 2024 decided on
May 16, 2024) to buttress his contention the
cross-examination should be allowed.
18. Mr. Roy, learned advocate appearing for the
bank submits that the present revisional

5
application should not be entertained
inasmuch as the petitioners have an effective
alternative remedy before the Debts Recovery
Appellate Tribunal. It is next submitted that,
in any case, the petitioners have not made out
any extra-ordinary case justifying their prayer
for cross-examination of the bank’s
authorized officer and that being so such
prayer has rightly not been entertained by the
Tribunal.
19. Heard learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties and considered the material
on record.
20. The present revisional application does not
merit entertainment for more reasons one.
21. Firstly, it is noticed that the while order
impugned was passed on June 29, 2026, the
revisional application has been filed on
August 17, 2026. In terms of 2002 Act an
appeal against an order passed by the Debts
Recovery Tribunal under section 17 of the
2002 Act can be lodged before the Appellate
Tribunal under Section 18 thereof within 30
days from the date of receipt of the order of
the Tribunal. Nothing has been mentioned in
this revisional application as to why has the
petitioner approached this Court beyond the
time prescribed for preferring appeal before

6
the Appellate Tribunal.
22. While it is true that there is no period of
limitation prescribed for filing an application
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
yet, it is well settled that such application
should be filed within a reasonable time and if
there is delay, the same should be
appropriately explained. When an order of a
Tribunal which is amenable to a statutory
appeal before an Appellate Tribunal is
challenged, the time within which appeal
could have been preferred should be taken to
be the reasonable time within which the
discretionary constitutional remedy under
Article 227 can be resorted to.
23. In the case of A.V. Venkateswaran,
Collector of Customs, Bombay v.
Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, reported at
A 1961 SC 1506 the Hon’ble Supreme Court
had, albeit in the context of a writ petition

under Article 226 held that “If a petitioner has
disabled himself from availing himself of the
statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing
so within the prescribed time, he cannot
certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground
for the Court dealing with his petition under
Article 226 to exercise its discretion in his
favour.”

7
24. Although, present revisional application has
been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, there is no reason why
the same principle cannot be applied here as
well when the plenary constitutional power of
the High Court is being invoked despite
availability of alternative remedy.
25. Secondly, the order impugned is neither one
without jurisdiction, nor has it been passed in
derogation of the principles of natural justice
nor has the same been demonstrated to be
suffering from perversity. That being so, there
is no reason for this Court to entertain the
revisional application on merits.
26. Thirdly, even otherwise, as righty contended
by the Bank the petitioners have not been
able to demonstrate any extraordinary case
wherefor cross examination would be
necessary in the present factual matrix.
27. The petitioners’ assertion that the bank has
issued notice in the name of a dead person
and that the bank has used the postal receipt
and postal track records pertaining to an
earlier failed sale in order to support its claim
of issuance of notice in respect of the present
sale cannot be a ground to seek cross
examination. The truth can always be
ascertained from the documents that have

8
been produced by the bank by way of
affidavit. If the dates of the notices and/or
postal receipts/track reports indicate that the
same have not been issued in accordance
with the 2002 Act and the Rules framed
thereunder, the Tribunal would pass
appropriate orders. Further, the Tribunal has
already allowed the petitioners’ application
seeking production of the original documents
for the petitioners’ inspection. The same can
definitely be examined by the Tribunal as
well. Thus there is sufficient scope for the
Tribunal to reach the truth and to decipher as
to whether the procedure prescribed under
the 2002 Act and the 2002 Rules has been
followed by the bank or not. Cross-
examination, in such case would not be
required.

28. As regards Mr. Das’s contention that the
bank has taken a stand that it followed the
procedure prescribed the 2002 Act and the
Rules while actually it has not, is concerned,
the same can also be thrashed out by the
Tribunal on the basis of the documents
produced before the Tribunal by the parties.
For such purpose too, cross-examination
would not be necessary.
29. Insofar as the unreported decision in the case

9
of Roma Roy (supra) is concerned, the same
was rendered in the facts of the said case
where an original application in which the
Tribunal was required to determine the debt
due was under consideration and evidence on
affidavit had been tendered by the Bank.
Such is not the case here, where the
application is being decided on the basis of
the documents annexed to the petition and
the written objection thereto.
30. It must be noted that, the scheme of
the 2002 Act, being summary in nature, does
not ordinarily contemplate the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses. In such
context the following observations of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union
of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Assn.
reported at (2002) 4 SCC 275 23 deserve
notice:
23 . In other words, the Tribunal has the power to
require any particular fact to be proved by affidavit,
or it may order that the affidavit of any witness
may be read at the hearing. While passing such an
order, it must record sufficient reasons for the
same. The proviso to Rule 12(6) would certainly
apply only where the Tribunal chooses to issue a
direction on its own, for any particular fact to be
proved by affidavit or the affidavit of a witness
being read at the hearing. The said proviso refers
to the desire of an applicant or a defendant for the
production of a witness for cross-examination. In
the setting in which the said proviso occurs, it
would appear to us that once the parties have filed

10
affidavits in support of their respective cases, it is
only thereafter that the desire for a witness to be
cross-examined can legitimately arise. It is at that
time, if it appears to the Tribunal, that such a
witness can be produced and it is necessary to do
so and there is no desire to prolong the case that it
shall require the witness to be present for cross-
examination and in the event of his not appearing,
then the affidavit shall not be taken into evidence.
When the High Courts and the Supreme Court in
exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 and
Article 32 can decide questions of fact as well as
law merely on the basis of documents and
affidavits filed before them ordinarily, there should
be no reason as to why a Tribunal, likewise,
should not be able to decide the case merely on the
basis of documents and affidavits before it. It is
common knowledge that hardly any transaction
with the bank would be oral and without proper
documentation, whether in the form of letters or
formal agreements. In such an event the bona fide
need for the oral examination of a witness should
rarely arise. There has to be a very good reason to
hold that affidavits, in such a case, would not be
sufficient.

Nahar Industrial
31. Then again in the case of
Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and
. .
Shanghai Banking Corpn reported at

(2009) 8 SCC 646 the Hon’ble Supreme Court
:
held thus
86. The Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot pass a
decree. It can issue only recovery certificates. [See
Sections 19(2) and 19(22) of the Act.] The power of
the Tribunal to grant interim order is attenuated
with circumspection. [See Dataware Design Labs
(P) Ltd. v. SBI [(2005) 127 Comp Cas 176 (Ker)] ,
Comp Cas at p. 184.] Concededly in the proceeding
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal detailed

11
examination, cross-examinations, provisions of the
Evidence Act as also application of other provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure like interrogatories,
discoveries of documents and admission need not
be gone into. Taking recourse to such proceedings
would be an exception. Entire focus of the
proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal
centres round the legally recoverable dues of the
bank.
32. In such view of the matter, the aforesaid
decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court cannot be come to the aid of the
petitioner.

33. For all the reasons aforesaid, the order
impugned does not call for any intereference.
34. It is noticed that the SARFAESI application
filed by the petitioners has been pending for
more than two years. The Tribunal is
requested to dispose of the same as
expeditiously as possible and preferably
within a period of six months from the next
date fixed without granting unnecessary
adjournment to either of the parties.
35. With the above observations, CO. 136 of 2026
stands disposed of. There shall be no order
as to costs.
36. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if
applied for, be supplied to the parties subject
to compliance with all requisite formalities.

(Om Narayan Rai, J.)