Yashna Exports Pvt. Ltd.& Ors. vs Raisina Bhatia
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 08.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 29.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010000051995
+ CS(OS) 1459/1995
YASHNA EXPORTS PVT. LTD.& ORS. .....Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sindhwani, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sanjay
Dua, Advocates.
versus
RAISINA BHATIA .....Defendant
Through: Mr. Alok Singh, Advocate for
Applicant in I.A. 10738/2026
Mr. Praveen Kumar, Advocate,
Mr. Suman Raj, Advocate, Mr.
Shivam Arora, Advocates for
applicant.
CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J.
I.A. 10738/2026 (under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Sections 47
and 151 CPC, seeking declaration that compromise decree dated
20.09.2002 is null and void, and for impleadment and stay of
further proceedings in Execution Petition)
1. By way of this judgment, this Court shall decide the
application bearing I.A. 10738/2026 , filed under Order XXIII Rule 3
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 1 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
read with Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
[hereafter „ CPC ‟], seeking a declaration that the compromise decree
dated 20.09.2002 is null, void and non est , and also seeking
impleadment of the applicant and stay of further proceedings in the
Execution Petition.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
2. The present application has been filed by the applicant, Ms.
Sangeeta Bhatia, wife of late Sh. Sanjay Bhatia, and daughter-in-law
of late Ms. Raisina Bhatia, who was the original defendant in the
present suit, i.e., CS(OS) 1459/1995. The applicant is seeking a
declaration that the decree dated 20.09.2002, on the basis of which
the present suit was disposed of, is null and void and not binding
upon her, having been obtained by fraud and without authority.
3. As per the averments made in the application, the present suit
was filed by the plaintiffs for specific performance of an alleged
Agreement to Sell dated 07.01.1994, allegedly executed by the
defendant, Ms. Raisina Bhatia, with respect to her undivided 31.25%
share in the property bearing no. 21 & 21A, Tughlak Road, New
Delhi. The suit was decreed by this Court in terms of a compromise,
vide judgment and decree dated 20.09.2002. It is averred that the
compromise decree dated 20.09.2002, though passed when Ms.
Raisina Bhatia was still alive, is non est , having been obtained on the
basis of an alleged non-existent registered General Power of Attorney
dated 17.09.2002 and a Special Power of Attorney dated 20.09.2002,
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 2 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
allegedly in favour of one Ms. Veena Suneja. At another place in the
application, it is averred that the decree under execution has been
obtained on the basis of a non-existent Special Power of Attorney
allegedly in favour of Ms. Sunita Suneja. It is further averred that Ms.
Raisina Bhatia neither contested any case nor gave any Special Power
of Attorney or vakalatnama in favour of any person, and that the
Special Power of Attorney relied upon for recording the compromise
is forged and fabricated, and therefore, the very foundation of the
compromise decree is illegal and non-existent in the eyes of law.
4. It is stated that the applicant is one of the legal heirs of Ms.
Raisina Bhatia, who expired on 23.07.2011 and was residing with the
applicant till her demise, and therefore, the applicant is directly
affected by the decree and the subsequent execution proceedings. Ms.
Raisina Bhatia was survived by three sons and one daughter, i.e., Sh.
Sanjay Bhatia, Sh. Gaurav Bhatia, Sh. Sandeep Bhatia and Ms.
Rupika Sagar. Sh. Sanjay Bhatia, the eldest son of late Ms. Raisina
Bhatia and the husband of the applicant, expired on 31.12.2016.
5. It is further stated that I.A. 6501/2024 was filed in the present
suit by one Sh. Om Prakash Arora for recall/setting aside of the
judgment and compromise decree dated 20.09.2002, which was
dismissed vide judgment dated 29.07.2024. It is stated that the
applicant, along with all the legal heirs of Ms. Raisina Bhatia, had
been impleaded in CS(OS) 162/2020, titled Om Prakash Arora v.
Meenakshi Sardana & Ors. , which pertains to an undivided 6.25%
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 3 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
share in the same property; however , all the legal heirs of late Ms.
Raisina Bhatia were deleted from the said suit vide order dated
24.02.2026, on the statement made by the present plaintiffs that they
had purchased the share of Ms. Raisina Bhatia during her lifetime. It
is stated that the applicant engaged her present counsel on
09.03.2026, who enquired about the said case, and that the applicant
thereafter filed I.A. 6794/2026 seeking impleadment therein. It is the
case of the applicant that it was only on 17.03.2026 that she came to
know about the other cases decided or pending in the name of her late
mother-in-law, Ms. Raisina Bhatia, as a party, which has led to the
filing of the present application.
6. Relying upon the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. : (2007) 4 SCC 221 , it is
stated that it is a settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree
obtained by fraud is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law, and can
be challenged at any stage, including in execution proceedings. It is
also stated that the execution proceedings arising out of the said
decree are not maintainable against the applicant, inasmuch as she is
not a judgment debtor, is in independent possession of the property,
and the property sought to be proceeded against does not form part of
the estate of the deceased judgment debtor; and that the applicant is a
necessary and proper party for complete and effective adjudication of
the present dispute, whose rights cannot be adjudicated in her
absence.
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 4 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
7. Accordingly, by way of the present application, the following
reliefs have been sought:
“A) Declare that the Compromise Decree dated 20.09.2002 is
null, void and non est, having been obtained by fraud and
without authority;
B) Implead the Applicant as a necessary party in the present
proceedings;
C) Take on record the objections filed by the Applicant under
Section 47 of the CPC;
D) Stay further proceedings in Execution Petition No.
399/2014 during the pendency of the present application;
E) Pass any other order or orders in favor of the Applicant as
this Hon‟ble Court may deem fit & proper in the facts &
circumstances of the present Case.”
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
8. The learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs,
while opposing the present application, submits that the compromise
decree dated 20.09.2002 was passed in terms of I.A. 8524/2002,
which was a joint application filed by the plaintiffs and the defendant
Ms. Raisina Bhatia, in the suit for specific performance filed by the
plaintiffs. Ms. Raisina Bhatia had appeared before this Court, in
person, on 20.09.2002, and had received before this Court itself the
balance sale consideration of Rs. 2.24 crores. She had thereafter
made a statement, inter alia , to the effect that she had thus received
the entire sale consideration of Rs. 3.60 crores. The possession and
keys of the suit property were also delivered by her to the plaintiffs in
the Court itself, and she had prayed for passing of a decree for
specific performance as per the settlement arrived at between the
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 5 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
parties. The learned senior counsel has drawn the attention of this
Court to the statement made by Ms. Raisina Bhatia in the Court on
20.09.2002, which has been signed by her as well as by her counsel,
and it is stated that the decree dated 20.09.2002 was passed in terms
of the settlement and the statements made by the parties.
9. It is further submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that Ms.
Raisina Bhatia passed away on 23.07.2011, i.e., nearly nine years
after the passing of the decree, but she had never challenged the
decree on any ground, nor had she ever claimed any right in the
property in question. It is stated that Ms. Raisina Bhatia was survived
by three sons and a daughter, none of whom had challenged the
decree, and that the sale consideration has remained with the family.
One of the sons of Ms. Raisina Bhatia, i.e., Sh. Sanjay Bhatia, who
passed away on 31.12.2016, also never challenged the decree in his
lifetime. The present application has been filed by Ms. Sangeeta
Bhatia, wife of late Sh. Sanjay Bhatia, after about 24 years of the
passing of the compromise decree, is thus manifestly barred by
limitation. It is pointed out that, in a stark paradox, the sale
consideration continues to be retained by the family of Ms. Raisina
Bhatia.
10. The learned senior counsel further argues that the challenge to
the decree on the grounds that Ms. Raisina Bhatia had not contested
the case, had given no Special Power of Attorney, and had not given
any vakalatnama for the case, is based on downright falsehood and is
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 6 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
contrary to the record. It is stated that Ms. Raisina Bhatia had filed
her written statement and also an amended written statement, and had
contested the suit from 1995 to 2002; that she had filed her
vakalatnama , which is on record; that she had herself signed the
compromise application and the accompanying affidavit, and not
through any Special Power of Attorney or attorney; and that she had
personally appeared before the Court on 20.09.2002, had made and
signed her statement in terms of the settlement, and had herself
received the sale consideration amount.
11. It is also contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that merely by
claiming to be a successor-in-interest, the applicant cannot claim a
fresh period of limitation or a better right. It is stated that the right
which the present applicant seeks to assert was not available, at this
stage, even to the original defendant, for want of any ground, reason
or cause of action, and also on account of being patently time-barred,
and that inheritance does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. In
this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Imdad Ali v. Keshav Chand : (2003) 4 SCC 635 , wherein it
was held that a person by reason of inheritance or assignment does
not derive any better title than his predecessor. He also relies on the
decision of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. Wasan Singh :
2019:DHC:4178 , wherein, following the aforesaid judgment, it was
held that a successor-in-interest cannot claim rights better than his
predecessor.
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 7 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
12. The learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs also
argues that the reliance placed by the applicant on Section 44 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 [hereafter „ TPA ‟] and on the decision
in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden : (1990) 2 SCC
117, is also misconceived, for the following reasons:
(i) There is no undivided joint family living in the property, which is
a pre-requisite for invoking Section 44 of the TPA. It has already
been held in the present suit itself, vide judgment dated 29.07.2024
(paragraph 31), that the whole suit property contains four bungalows
and an independent bungalow was in possession of Ms. Raisina
Bhatia, who, having an independent possession of a part of the suit
property, cannot be said to be in a joint undivided household with the
other legal heirs and co-owners of the suit property; and again in
paragraph 33, that there is no common occupation and there cannot
be any disruption of the undivided household which is protected
under Section 44 of the TPA.
(ii) A similar argument based on the judgment in Dorab Cawasji
Warden ( supra ), raised earlier by one Sh. Om Prakash Arora, was
rejected in paragraph 34 of the aforesaid judgment.
(iii) It is an admitted fact that a part of the property is on rent and has
been in possession of the tenants, as noted in paragraph 19 of the
aforesaid judgment. There being a tenant in the property already, the
application of Section 44 of the TPA is ruled out, since the provision
pre-supposes a family dwelling house, and the letting out of a part of
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 8 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
the property negates the character of the property as a dwelling house
belonging to an undivided family.
(iv) The recourse to Section 44 of the TPA, if at all, was available to
the other co-owners/co-sharers, and not to Ms. Raisina Bhatia or her
successors, as she had herself delivered possession in the Court.
(v) The applicant has herself not shown whether she is, or ever was,
dwelling in the suit property. Rather, in the affidavit filed with the
present application, her address is at Vasant Kunj, and not at the suit
property. The applicant thus cannot claim the suit property to be a
dwelling house so as to invoke Section 44 of the TPA.
13. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant , on the
other hand, argues that the suit property, i.e., 21 & 21A, Tughlak
Road, New Delhi, had devolved by decree dated 13.01.1975 upon
four sisters, including Ms. Raisina Bhatia, the predecessor-in-interest
of the applicant, at 25% each, which later became 31.25% upon the
intestate death of Ms. Prem Madden on 11.01.1988. It is argued that
the suit property has never been partitioned by metes and bounds and
has remained a dwelling house of an undivided family, and that a suit
for partition filed in the year 2020 is pending as CS(OS) 162/2020. It
is stated that the applicant, being the widow of late Sh. Sanjay Bhatia,
son of the defendant late Ms. Raisina Bhatia, who was a co-owner, is
by intestate succession deemed to be in joint possession. It is argued
that the plaintiffs had filed a suit for specific performance of the
Agreement to Sell dated 07.01.1994, and not a suit for partition; that
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 9 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
prayer (c) of paragraph 46 of the plaint had sought actual vacant
possession only of the portion of 1540 sq. yds. in the defendant‟s
own possession, and only symbolical possession of the rest, which
was held by tenants (the Statesman and Play House School);
however, the compromise decree purports to hand over “actual,
physical and vacant possession” of the entire 31.25% share, including
the tenanted portion, which is a relief never prayed for. It is stated
that the applicant was never arrayed as a party, and thus never had
any knowledge of the proceedings.
14. It is further argued that the decree in question is null and void,
as it has been passed in the teeth of Section 44 of the TPA and
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It is argued that a
decree, even by consent, cannot grant relief beyond the pleadings and
the prayer, and that a decree in excess of jurisdiction is a nullity, open
to challenge in execution, placing reliance on Trojan & Co. v.
Nagappa Chettiar : AIR 1953 SC 235 , Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima
Mandal : (2008) 17 SCC 49 1, Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan : AIR
1954 SC 340 , and Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash
University : (2001) 6 SCC 534 ; and that clause (v) of the compromise
goes beyond prayer (c) of the plaint and is void to that extent. It is
further argued that the decree is non est , being based on a
compromise which is unlawful, being in the teeth of Section 44 of the
TPA, which provides that a transferee of a share in a dwelling house
of an undivided family, who is not a member of the family, cannot
claim joint possession or common enjoyment, and his only remedy is
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 10 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
partition, as held in Dorab Cawasji Warden ( supra ), Ghantesher
Ghosh v. Madan Mohan Ghosh : (1996) 11 SCC 44 6, and
Sidheshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubneshwar Prasad : AIR 1953 SC 487.
It is contended that the expression “undivided family” is not confined
to a Hindu joint family, and that the letting out of a part of the house
or the absence of some members does not alter its character.
15. It is also argued on behalf of the applicant that Order XXIII
Rule 3 of the CPC requires the Court to be satisfied that a
compromise is lawful, as held in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi :
(1993) 1 SCC 581 and Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh :
(2006) 5 SCC 566 , and that clause (v) of the compromise, whose
object was to place a company, a stranger to the family, in joint
possession of a family dwelling house in the teeth of Section 44 of
the TPA, is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
and no lawful decree can rest on it. It is contended that the remedy
against such a decree is to challenge it by way of a recall application,
as held in Pushpa Devi Bhagat ( supra ), Navratan Lal Sharma v.
Radha Mohan Sharma : 2024 INSC 970 , and Geeta Bai v. K. Arjun
Singh : SLP (Civil) No(s).20008-20010/2026 . By way of an
additional affidavit, reliance has also been placed on the decision of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra
Chaudhary : 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1255 , to contend that a
compromise decree cannot be sustained unless the party affected had
given express authority to the person signing on his or her behalf, and
that mere delay, even of decades, cannot be invoked to perpetuate an
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 11 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
illegality.
16. It is further argued that the judgment dated 29.07.2024 passed
in I.A. 6501/2024 is distinguishable on facts and does not apply to
the present application, since the application of Sh. Om Prakash
Arora was dismissed on the ground that he was a stranger and an
outside purchaser of a 6.25% share, who was admittedly not in
possession of any part of the suit property. It is contended that the
status of the applicant differs materially, since (a) she is a family
member and a co-owner by inheritance, deemed to be in joint
possession, and Section 44 of the TPA shields her, as its disability
operates upon the stranger-transferee, and the reasoning which
defeated Sh. Om Prakash Arora, i.e., that no family member had
come forward, is absent in the present case; (b) she was not a party
and was never served, and the observations regarding “four
bungalows”, “independent possession” and “no common occupation”
were made for a limited purpose and do not bind her, the dwelling
house remaining undivided with CS(OS) 162/2020 pending; and (c)
the additional ground that the decree exceeds prayer (c) of the plaint
was neither raised by, nor available to, Sh. Om Prakash Arora, who
claimed a different share from a different co-owner.
17. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that
the applicant was never served in the suit or in the execution
proceedings; that her husband, late Sh. Sanjay Bhatia, whom the
decree holders had treated as a legal heir, expired on 31.12.2016, and
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 12 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
thus a dead person was “served” by publication in the year 2018; and
that the amended memo of parties of the year 2023 omits the
applicant and gives her address as C-9/9331 instead of C-9/9330,
Vasant Kunj. It is submitted that the applicant first learnt of the
decree in March, 2026 and moved promptly, and that time runs from
the date of discovery under Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act,
1963, read with Article 137 thereof. It is further argued that
EX.APPL.(OS) 900/2014, which was allowed on 16.02.2024
(condoning one day‟s delay in re-filing EX.P. 399/2014), does not
bind the applicant, who was not before the Court, and that on the
decree holders own chronology, the execution petition returned on
18.09.2014 was re-filed on 09.10.2014, returned again, and finally re-
filed on 03.11.2014, after the expiry of twelve years under Article
136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is argued that an illegality does
not become legal by lapse of time. Lastly, it is submitted that the
judgments relied upon by the decree holders/plaintiffs are not
applicable to the facts of the present case, as the applicant is not
claiming a better right than her predecessor, and is only bringing to
the notice of this Court the fraud and illegality perpetrated by the
decree holders over the last three decades.
18. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of both
the parties, and has perused the material available on record.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
19. In the present case, the record of the captioned-suit reveals that
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 13 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
Ms. Raisina Bhatia had engaged a counsel by executing the
vakalatnama dated 01.10.1995 in favour of Dr. Surat Singh &
Associates, Advocates, which, inter alia , also authorised her counsel
to compromise the case. She had filed her written statement dated
13.10.1995 and had contested the suit for about seven years, during
which period issues were also framed on 09.08.2001. On 13.09.2002,
the learned counsels for both the parties informed the learned Joint
Registrar that the compromise between the parties had been finalised.
Thereafter, a joint application under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with
Section 151 of CPC dated 18.09.2002, i.e., I.A. 8524/2002, was filed,
which bears the signatures of Ms. Raisina Bhatia herself as well as of
her counsel, and is supported by her own affidavit, attested by the
Oath Commissioner of this Court.
20. Pertinently, on 20.09.2002, Ms. Raisina Bhatia appeared
before this Court in person, and her statement was recorded on
solemn affirmation. The said statement, which bears her signature as
well as the endorsement of her counsel, Ms. Mamta Rani, Advocate
for the defendant, reads as under:
“STATEMENT OF SMT. RAISINA BHATIA WIFE OF
LATE SHRI BRIJ RAJ NARAIN BHATIA AGED 59
YEARS, RESIDENT OF 21-A, TUGHLAK
LANE/TUGHLAK ROAD, NEW DELHI ON S.A.
I am the Defendant in the present suit, which was instituted by
the Plaintiffs praying for a decree for specific performance of
the Agreement to sell dated 7.1.1994 for the property involved
in the suit, which is 31.25% share in 21, Tughlak Road, New
Delhi.
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 14 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, I have arrived at a
settlement with the Plaintiffs in terms of which the suit
property would be sold to the Plaintiffs for a sale
consideration of Rs.3.60 crores. A sum of Rs.36 lacs towards
part payment was received in the year 1994 from the Plaintiffs.
Subsequently, I also received an amount of Rs. one crore by a
pay order dated 17.9.2002. I have also received a sum of
Rs.1,49,493/- through a pay order dated 17.9.2002 towards part
sale consideration of the aforesaid property. In terms of the
settlement arrived at it was also agreed to that I would also
receive an amount of Rs.2.24 crores in Court today as set out in
the application, which is filed under Order 23 Rule 3 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and after going through the same
and satisfied myself, I have put my signatures on the
application. My advocate has also signed the said application.
In support of the contentions made in the application, I have
also sworn an affidavit, which is annexed to the application. I
pray that a decree in terms of the settlement be passed in
favour of the Plaintiffs decreeing the suit for specific
performance of the agreement to sell as the property
already stands sold to the Plaintiffs. I also deliver the
possession of the suit property effective from today.
However, I or my nominee may be allowed to take goods,
which are lying in the suit premises within seven days from
today.
I have now received three pay orders bearing No.689408 for
an amount of Rs.40,50,000/- drawn on Citi Bank; No.000188
for an amount of Rs.95,10,000/- and No.000186 for an amount
of Rs.88,40,000/- drawn on Standard Chartered Bank total
amounting to Rs.2,24,00,000/- which are received by me.
I undertake that I would execute the remaining documents in
terms of the settlement arrived at.”
(Emphasis added)
21. Upon recording the statements of the parties, this Court (Dr.
Mukundakam Sharma, J.) had passed the following order on
20.09.2002:
“The present suit is instituted by the Plaintiffs against the
Defendant seeking for a decree of specific performance,
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 15 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
injunction and mesne profits/damages and also for delivery of
possession of the suit property to the Plaintiffs. The suit was
filed in respect of the 31.25% in the property bearing No.21,
Tughlak Lane/Road, New Delhi on the basis of the agreement
to sell dated 7.1.1994. The Defendant entered appearance but
during the pendency of the suit, the parties have arrived at an
amicable settlement out of court in terms of which a joint
application has been filed under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC.
I have gone through the averments made in the said
application and the terms and conditions of the settlement
arrived at between the parties and I find the same to be
bona fide and lawful. The averments made in the application
are supported by affidavits filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs and
also by the Defendant. The joint application is also signed by
the counsel appearing for the parties as also by the parties.
The said application is marked Ex.C-1. Three pay orders for
an amount of Rs.2.24 crores stand paid today in court and
key of the suit premises has also been handed over to Mr.
K.L. Suneja by the Defendant Smt. Raisina Bhatia in the
Court. Possession of the suit property also is handed over to
the Plaintiffs, which is accepted by Plaintiff No.4 on behalf
of the Plaintiffs. However, it is made clear that the Defendant
or her nominees shall be permitted to take out the goods from
the suit premises within seven days from today and no
obstruction or impediment shall be created by the Plaintiffs or
by any of their servants or agents.
In terms of the aforesaid observations/directions and the
settlement arrived at between the parties, the suit stands
decreed in terms of the settlement arrived at between the
parties. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present
suit, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
The joint application exhibit C-1 shall form part of the decree.
The parties shall be bound by this order.”
(Emphasis added)
22. Thus, it is evident from the record that the defendant in the
present suit, Ms. Raisina Bhatia, had herself appeared before this
Court and had given her statement on oath regarding the sale of her
share to the plaintiffs. Her statement bears her signature as well as the
CS(OS) 1459/1995 Page 16 of 28
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:29.10.2026
19:07:59
endorsement of her counsel. She had further received an amount of
Rs. 2.24 crores before this Court itself, the remaining sale
consideration having been received by her earlier, thereby receiving
the entire sale consideration of Rs. 3.60 crores. She had also handed
over the keys and possession of the suit premises in the Court.
Clearly, the compromise decree was passed only after the concerned
Bench of this Court had gone through the terms of the settlement and
had recorded satisfaction that the same was bona fide and lawful, and
that the joint application had been signed by the parties themselves as
well as by their counsel. The own statement of the defendant Ms.
Raisina Bhatia records that she had put her signatures on the
compromise application “after going through the same and satisfied
myself”, which leaves no manner of doubt that the settlement was
entered into by her voluntarily and with full knowledge of its terms.
23. In the above background, this Court is of the view that the law
with regard to the binding nature of a compromise decree is well
settled. In Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh ( supra ), the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“12. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of
Order 23 can be summed up thus:
xxx xxx xxx
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid
and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed
the consent decree , by an order on an application under the
proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent
decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court
which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of
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it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event,
the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider
and decide the question as to whether there was a valid
compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is
nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the
seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree
depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or
compromise on which it is made. ...”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In the present case, as noted above, the compromise was
entered into by Ms. Raisina Bhatia voluntarily, was signed by her
personally, was affirmed by her on oath before this Court, and was
recorded by this Court after due satisfaction. In such circumstances,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the applicant has no right
to contest the compromise decree. The applicant has not claimed any
right independent of Ms. Raisina Bhatia, and claims only as one of
her legal heirs, being her daughter-in-law. It is the claim of the
applicant that Ms. Raisina Bhatia was living with her till her demise.
Even if this is presumed to be true, the fact that Ms. Raisina Bhatia
was living with the applicant till her demise would not confer upon
the applicant any right to claim the property or to challenge the
settlement, when Ms. Raisina Bhatia had herself appeared before this
Court and entered into a voluntary compromise, which was recorded
by this Court. A legal heir steps into the shoes of the deceased, and
cannot claim any right better than the one which the deceased herself
possessed. In this regard, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Imdad Ali v.
Keshav Chand ( supra ) has held as under:
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“14. ……A successor-in-interest of a tenant holds his tenancy
right subject to rights and obligations of his predecessor. He
does not and cannot claim a higher right than his predecessor.
It is now well-settled that a person by reason of inheritance
or assignment does not derive any better title than his
predecessor , and, thus, the right which the original tenant did
not possess cannot be passed on to his successor.”
(Emphasis added)
25. This Court also finds that the averments of the applicant that
Ms. Raisina Bhatia neither contested any case nor gave any
vakalatnama or Special Power of Attorney, and that the compromise
decree was obtained on the basis of a forged or non-existent General
or Special Power of Attorney in favour of Ms. Veena Suneja or Ms.
Sunita Suneja, are unmerited. It is material to note that the
compromise was not recorded on the basis of any power of attorney;
it was signed by Ms. Raisina Bhatia herself and was affirmed by her
personally before this Court. The General Power of Attorney and the
Special Power of Attorney referred to in clauses (vii) and (viii) of the
compromise application were instruments executed by Ms. Raisina
Bhatia herself in favour of the nominee of the plaintiffs, as part of the
settlement, to facilitate the execution and registration of the sale deed
and the mutation of the property, and a copy of the General Power of
Attorney was annexed to the joint application itself. These
instruments were thus a consequence of the compromise, and not its
foundation. Further, the present application filed by the applicant
does not disclose any particulars of the alleged fraud. It is settled law
that a plea of fraud must be pleaded with full particulars, and general
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allegations, however strongly worded, do not amount to an averment
of fraud [Ref: Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai : AIR 1951 SC 280 ].
While there can be no quarrel with the proposition laid down in A.V.
Papayya Sastry ( supra ) that a decree obtained by playing fraud on
the Court is a nullity, the said principle can come to the aid of a
litigant only when fraud is shown to exist. In the present case, the
record of this Court itself belies the allegation of fraud.
26. Another important aspect of the matter is that none of the legal
heirs of Ms. Raisina Bhatia have ever challenged the settlement. Ms.
Raisina Bhatia herself never challenged the settlement during her
lifetime, though she lived for nearly nine years after the passing of
the decree. Her son, Sh. Sanjay Bhatia, who was the husband of the
applicant, lived for more than fourteen years after the decree, i.e., till
31.12.2016, and he too never challenged the same. None of the other
legal heirs of Ms. Raisina Bhatia have challenged the settlement
either. In these circumstances, the applicant, who is the daughter-in-
law of Ms. Raisina Bhatia, cannot be permitted to challenge the
settlement now, after about 24 years, when her own husband, who
was the son of Ms. Raisina Bhatia, never chose to challenge it.
27. A similar situation arose before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi v. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi :
2025 INSC 517 , wherein the sons of a party to a consent decree had
sought to assail the same. Rejecting the challenge, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court observed that the father of the appellants, who was
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the party to the consent decree, never did so, and rather admitted the
consent decree and never questioned its validity. It was further
observed that if the father had no grievance against the consent
decree, how could the appellants therein be allowed to challenge the
same at a later stage. The said observations apply with full force to
the present case. For reference, the relevant observations are
extracted hereunder:
“12. ……Thus, even if we accept the contention of the
appellants that their father was coerced by his brothers and
father (appellants‟ grandfather) to enter into a compromise,
which led to the passing of the consent decree, a fresh suit is
still not a valid remedy. In that situation, the appellants‟ father
should have 9 filed a recall application before the Court that
had passed the decree. The appellants‟ father has never done
so! Moreover, he had admitted the consent decree and never
questioned its validity.
13. Additionally, the appellants' argument that the suit property
is not a joint family property but was purchased by their
grandmother in the name of the appellants‟ father and that he is
now trying to deprive the appellants from the suit property as
their relations have turned sour, is of no help to them. This is
because if the appellants‟ grandmother had purchased the suit
property in the name of the appellants‟ father, and it is not a
part of the ancestral property then in that case it would be the
property of the appellants‟ father as of now, since he is alive,
and he is at full liberty to dispose of the same as per his wishes.
Be that as it may, if the father of the appellants has no
grievance against the consent decree, then we are unable to
understand how the appellants can be allowed to challenge it.”
28. Even otherwise, the right to apply, if any, to set aside the
compromise accrued to Ms. Raisina Bhatia on 20.09.2002 itself,
when she was present before this Court with full knowledge of the
compromise and the decree. The period of three years prescribed
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under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 began to run against
her from that date. The expression „applicant‟ under Section 2(a) of
the Limitation Act, 1963 includes “any person from or through whom
an applicant derives his right to apply”, and Section 9 thereof
provides that once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or
inability to make an application stops it. Thus, succession does not
furnish a fresh starting point of limitation to the applicant. Nor can
the applicant take the benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act,
1963, since Ms. Raisina Bhatia was herself the author of the
compromise, and there was no fraud which was concealed from her
and which was required to be discovered. It is also not without
significance that the entire sale consideration of Rs. 3.60 crores
received by Ms. Raisina Bhatia has neither been refunded nor offered
to be refunded; the applicant cannot be permitted to approbate and
reprobate, by retaining the benefit of the compromise on the one hand
and seeking to avoid it on the other [Ref: R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal
Dhir : (1992) 4 SCC 683 ].
29. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant has also placed
reliance on the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Krishna
Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary ( supra ), to contend that a
compromise decree can be reopened even after a lapse of several
decades. However, this Court is of the opinion that the said decision
is of no help to the applicant. In that case, the compromise in a
partition suit had not been signed by the party concerned (defendant
no. 5), whose consent had been recorded only through his counsel,
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without any express authorisation, and his legal heirs had alleged that
the decree had been obtained by fraud and without his consent. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that, in the absence of the signature of
the party and of any express authority in favour of his counsel, the
voluntary consent mandated by Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC was not
established and the compromise was contrary to law; and it was in
those peculiar facts that the delay of about 25 years was not permitted
to defeat the challenge. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court itself observed
that “It is not in all cases that such large delay can be set aside.” In
the present case , no such ground can be seen. Ms. Raisina Bhatia had
herself signed the compromise, sworn an affidavit in support thereof,
personally appeared before this Court, made a statement on oath, and
received the sale consideration before this Court. There is neither any
absence of consent, nor any want of authority, nor any material even
remotely suggesting fraud. Therefore, the said decision cannot be
pressed into service to reopen a compromise decree after about 24
years.
30. The contention of the applicant that the compromise is
unlawful being in the teeth of Section 44 of the TPA is also without
merit. Section 44 of the TPA does not prohibit a co-owner from
transferring his or her share in a dwelling house; its second paragraph
merely provides that a transferee who is not a member of the family
shall not be entitled to joint possession or common enjoyment of a
dwelling house belonging to an undivided family, and relegates such
a transferee to the remedy of partition. The provision is a shield in the
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hands of the other members of the family who have not parted with
their share, to prevent the intrusion of a stranger into the family
residence, as is also evident from the decision in Dorab Cawasji
Warden ( supra ), wherein the suit had been filed by the non-
transferring co-owner. Such a protection cannot be invoked by the
transferor herself, who has voluntarily delivered possession after
receiving the entire sale consideration, or by those claiming through
her. Ms. Raisina Bhatia had herself delivered possession of the suit
premises to the plaintiffs in the Court. Further, as per the plaint, she
was in actual and exclusive possession of a distinct portion of about
1540 sq. yds. of the suit property, other portions being in the
occupation of tenants. This Court, in its judgment dated 29.07.2024,
has also found that an independent bungalow was in her possession
and that there was no common occupation. The applicant also has
placed no material on record to show that she ever resided in the suit
property, her own address, as well as the address of Ms. Raisina
Bhatia as recorded in her death certificate filed by the applicant,
being at C-9/9330, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi. The compromise,
therefore, cannot be termed as void under Section 23 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872, or as „unlawful‟ within the meaning of the
Explanation to Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC.
31. Similarly, the contention that the decree travels beyond prayer
(c) of the plaint is also misconceived. Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC
itself mandates that the Court shall pass a decree in accordance with a
lawful compromise “whether or not the subject-matter of the
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agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-
matter of the suit”. The principle that a Court cannot grant relief
beyond the pleadings governs the adjudication of a contested suit,
and not a decree founded on the agreement of the parties themselves.
In any event, clause (v) of the compromise, which refers to delivery
of possession “as agreed upon vide the terms of the agreement to sell
dated 7th January, 1994”, is to be read along with clause (vi), which
refers to “the said portion”, clause (ix), which requires the tenants,
namely the Statesman and Play House School, to “attorn to the
plaintiffs”, and clause (x), which refers to “the portion of which the
defendant has agreed to give physical and vacant possession”. Read
as a whole, the compromise provided for actual physical possession
only of the portion in the occupation of Ms. Raisina Bhatia, and for
attornment of the tenants in respect of the tenanted portions, which is
entirely consistent with prayer (c) of the plaint. The decisions in
Kiran Singh (supra) and Dhurandhar Prasad Singh (supra) deal
with decrees suffering from an inherent lack of jurisdiction, which is
not the case here.
32. This Court is also of the view that the reliance placed by the
applicant on Geeta Bai v. K. Arjun Singh ( supra ) is also misplaced.
In that case, a compromise decree had been passed in a suit for
partition of coparcenary property without impleading a daughter who
had an independent share in the property and was a necessary party,
and it was in those circumstances that the decree passed behind her
back and that of her legal heirs was held to be a nullity. In the present
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case, the suit was one for specific performance of an agreement to
sell executed by Ms. Raisina Bhatia in respect of her own share; she
was herself the defendant, she contested the suit and thereafter
compromised it, and the applicant claims only through her. The
decree was, therefore, not passed behind the back of the person
through whom the applicant claims. It is also well settled that in a
suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the necessary
parties are the parties to the contract or their legal representatives
[Ref: Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal : (2005) 6 SCC 733 ].
33. In view of the foregoing discussion, since no right as claimed
by the applicant has accrued in her favour, the applicant can neither
seek impleadment nor challenge the compromise decree in the
execution proceedings on the ground that the decree is null, void and
non est . Even otherwise, the present suit stood disposed of by the
decree dated 20.09.2002, and there is no pending lis in the suit in
which the applicant can be impleaded. As regards the objections
under Section 47 of CPC, it is noted that the applicant has also filed
EX.APPL.(OS) 578/2026 and EX.APPL.(OS) 579/2026 in EX.P.
399/2014, which are pending before the learned Executing Court.
The contentions regarding service upon the legal representatives of
the judgment debtor, the order dated 16.02.2024 condoning the delay
in re-filing the execution petition, and the alleged bar of limitation
under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, pertain to the
execution of the decree and do not touch upon its validity, and are
matters for the learned Executing Court. However, it is well settled
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that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree, and
“between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree
according to its tenor” [Ref: Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai
Abdul Rehman : (1970) 1 SCC 670 ]. Since this Court, being the
Court which recorded the compromise, has found the compromise to
be lawful and the decree to be valid and binding, the plea that the
decree is null and void cannot be re-agitated by the applicant under
the garb of objections under Section 47 of CPC. Consequently, the
prayer for stay of further proceedings in EX.P. 399/2014 also does
not survive.
CONCLUSION
34. To conclude, Ms. Raisina Bhatia had herself appeared before
this Court, made a statement on oath, received the sale consideration
before this Court and delivered possession of the suit property, and
the compromise decree dated 20.09.2002 was passed after the learned
Judge recorded his satisfaction that the settlement was bona fide and
lawful. The applicant, who claims only as a legal heir of Ms. Raisina
Bhatia, cannot claim any right better than her. Neither Ms. Raisina
Bhatia during her lifetime, nor her son, i.e., the husband of the
applicant, nor any of her other legal heirs, ever challenged the
settlement, and the applicant cannot be permitted to do so after about
24 years. The decision in Krishna Kumar Ojha ( supra ) does not
come to the aid of the applicant, and her other contentions are also
devoid of merit.
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35. In view of the above, the present application stands dismissed .
36. It is, however, clarified that EX.APPL.(OS) 578/2026 and
EX.APPL.(OS) 579/2026, pending in EX.P. 399/2014, shall be
considered by the learned Executing Court in accordance with law, in
light of the findings returned hereinabove insofar as the validity of
the compromise decree dated 20.09.2002 is concerned.
37. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
OCTOBER 27, 2026/zp
TS
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