Priya Akshay Bardapurkar vs M/S Jpa Easy Trde Pvt. Ltd. Through Authorized Representative Lalit Rathee

CRM-M-62242-2026 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH


148
CRM-M-62242-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 02.11.2026

Priya Akshay Bardapurkar ...Petitioner

Versus

M/s JPA Easy Trade Pvt. Ltd. through Authorized Representative Lalit
Rathee
...Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEERJA K. KALSON

Present:- Mr. Vaneet Mittal, Advocate
for the petitioner.

NEERJA K. KALSON, J.

1. The petitioner has approached this Court under Section 528 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482
Cr.P.C.), seeking quashing of the summoning order dated 14.05.2026
(Annexure P-1), passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rohtak,
in Criminal Complaint No. NACT-2118-2025, titled ‘M/s JPA Easy Trade
Pvt. Ltd. v. Priya Akshay Bardapurkar’, instituted under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the NI Act'),
along with the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.
2. The genesis of the present case lies in a complaint instituted by
the respondent-company through its authorised representative, Lalit Rathee.
As per the complainant's version, the petitioner and her husband, Akshay
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Vilas Bardapurkar, who is stated to be a Director of M/s Planet Marathi
Service Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai, met the complainant in the year 2024. Thereafter,
the petitioner is stated to have sought a friendly loan of Rs 89,00,000 for
family requirements and the business needs of her husband. It is asserted that
a substantial portion of the amount was received in the account of the company
of the petitioner's husband, while some amount was received by the petitioner
in cash. The complainant further claims that the petitioner repaid Rs 5,00,000,
leaving an outstanding amount of Rs 84,00,000, towards discharge of which
she issued cheque bearing No. 061762 dated 01.06.2025 (Annexure P-4),
drawn on ICICI Bank, Mumbai. Upon presentation, the cheque was
dishonoured on 13.08.2025, 20.08.2025 and 27.08.2025 (Annexures P-5 to P-
7), with the endorsement “Payment stopped by drawer”. A statutory demand
notice dated 25.09.2025 (Annexure P-8) was thereafter issued, to which the
petitioner submitted a reply dated 07.10.2025 (Annexure P-9). The respondent
subsequently instituted the complaint, culminating in the impugned
summoning order dated 14.05.2026 (Annexure P-1).
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned
order has been passed in disregard of the mandatory requirement prescribed
under Section 225 BNSS (corresponding to Section 202 Cr.P.C.),
notwithstanding that the petitioner is a resident of Mumbai, beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate at Rohtak. It is submitted that
the learned Magistrate was required to postpone issuance of process and
undertake an inquiry for determining whether sufficient grounds existed for
proceeding against the petitioner. It is further argued that the petitioner was
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not afforded an opportunity of hearing before taking cognizance, as
contemplated under the first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS. Learned
counsel also disputes the existence of any personal legally enforceable
liability, submitting that the underlying financial transaction substantially
concerns the company of the petitioner's husband.
4. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the
paper-book, the principal grievance raised is that the drill of Section 225
BNSS (erstwhile Section 202 Cr.P.C.) was not followed before issuance of
process against the petitioner, who resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the learned Magistrate. The following question, therefore, arises for
consideration of this Court:
“Whether the drill of Section 225 BNSS is mandatory to be
followed in complaints instituted under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the accused resides
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate?”

5. The answer to the aforesaid question requires an examination of
the statutory scheme governing the institution of complaints and issuance of
process. Section 210 BNSS (corresponding to Section 190 Cr.P.C.) deals with
cognizance of offences, whereas Section 223 BNSS (corresponding to Section
200 Cr.P.C.) provides for examination of the complainant and witnesses.
Section 225 BNSS (corresponding to Section 202 Cr.P.C.) regulates
postponement of issuance of process and the inquiry contemplated at that
stage. Depending upon the outcome of such consideration, the Magistrate may
dismiss the complaint under Section 226 BNSS (corresponding to Section 203
Cr.P.C.) or issue process under Section 227 BNSS (corresponding to Section
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204 Cr.P.C.).
6. At this juncture, it would be apposite to reproduce Section 225
BNSS in its entirety:
225. Postponement of issue of process.—
(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an
offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has
been made over to him under section 212, may, if he thinks fit,
and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place
beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone
the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into
the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police
officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of
deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding:
Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made,
(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence
complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or
(b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court,
unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have
been examined on oath under section 223.
(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he
thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath:
Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence
complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he
shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and
examine them on oath.
(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a
person not being a police officer, he shall have for that
investigation all the powers conferred by this Sanhita on an
officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest
without warrant.”
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7. A careful reading of the provision reveals that the legislature has
employed the expressions “may, if he thinks fit” and “shall” in
contradistinction to each other. While postponement of issuance of process
ordinarily rests in the discretion of the Magistrate, the legislature has made
such postponement obligatory where the accused resides beyond the territorial
limits of the Court. The discretion concerning whether an inquiry should be
undertaken thus gives way to a statutory obligation, though the manner of
conducting such inquiry remains governed by the nature of the complaint and
the material available.
8. The legislative history of the provision is equally instructive. The
requirement of a mandatory inquiry in respect of an accused residing beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate was introduced into Section 202
Cr.P.C. by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005, and has
been retained in Section 225 BNSS. The amendment was intended to address
the mischief of persons residing at distant places being summoned in criminal
complaints without adequate preliminary scrutiny. Its object is to interpose a
measure of judicial caution before criminal process is issued, without
requiring the complainant to establish the charge at the threshold.
9. The aforesaid legislative object also invites application of the
mischief rule of statutory interpretation. The rule requires the Court to identify
the defect which the earlier law failed to remedy and to construe the amended
provision in a manner which suppresses that mischief and advances the
legislative remedy. In Dr. Lokesh B.H. and others v. State of Karnataka and
another, 2026 INSC 784 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the relevance
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of this principle. The expression “shall” in Section 225 BNSS must, therefore,
receive its intended effect. At the same time, the provision cannot be stretched
to insist upon a separate or repetitive exercise where the requisite judicial
scrutiny has already been undertaken in substance.
10. The mandatory character of the safeguard has received
authoritative recognition from the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Dhanuka
and others v. Najima Mamtaj and others, (2014) 14 SCC 638 , and Abhijit
Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar and another, (2017) 3 SCC 528 .
The inquiry contemplated by the provision is directed towards ascertaining
whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against an accused residing
beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. It is neither a substitute for trial nor
an occasion for adjudicating upon the ultimate guilt or innocence of the
accused.
11. The applicability of this requirement to complaints under Section
138 of the NI Act is no longer res integra. In In Re: Expeditious Trial of
Cases under Section 138 of N.I. Act , 1881, (2021) 16 SCC 116 , the
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the requirement
of an inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. in cheque-dishonour complaints and
reconciled the same with the procedure contemplated under Section 145 of
the NI Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid judgment, issued
the following directions, which deserve reproduction:
“24. The upshot of the above discussion leads us to the following
conclusions:
1. The High Courts are requested to issue practice
directions to the Magistrates to record reasons before converting
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trial of complaints under Section 138 of the Act from summary
trial to summons trial.
2. Inquiry shall be conducted on receipt of
complaints under Section 138 of the Act to arrive at sufficient
grounds to proceed against the accused, when such accused
resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
3. For the conduct of inquiry under Section 202 of
the Code, evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant
shall be permitted to be taken on affidavit. In suitable cases, the
Magistrate can restrict the inquiry to examination of
documents without insisting for examination of witnesses.
4. We recommend that suitable amendments be made
to the Act for provision of one trial against a person for multiple
offences under Section 138 of the Act committed within a period
of 12 months, notwithstanding the restriction in Section 219 of
the Code.
5. The High Courts are requested to issue practice
directions to the Trial Courts to treat service of summons in one
complaint under Section 138 forming part of a transaction, as
deemed service in respect of all the complaints filed before the
same court relating to dishonour of cheques issued as part of the
said transaction.
6. Judgments of this Court in Adalat Prasad (supra)
and Subramanium Sethuraman (supra) have interpreted the law
correctly and we reiterate that there is no inherent power of Trial
Courts to review or recall the issue of summons. This does not
affect the power of the Trial Court under Section 322 of the Code
to revisit the order of issue of process in case it is brought to the
court’s notice that it lacks jurisdiction to try the complaint.
7. Section 258 of the Code is not applicable to complaints
under Section 138 of the Act and findings to the contrary in
Meters and Instruments (supra) do not lay down correct law. To
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conclusively deal with this aspect, amendment to the Act
empowering the Trial Courts to reconsider/recall summons in
respect of complaints under Section 138 shall be considered by
the Committee constituted by an order of this Court dated
10.03.2021.
8. All other points, which have been raised by the
Amici Curiae in their preliminary report and written submissions
and not considered herein, shall be the subject matter of
deliberation by the aforementioned Committee. Any other issue
relating to expeditious disposal of complaints under Section 138
of the Act shall also be considered by the Committee.”
(Emphasis supplied)

12. The aforesaid pronouncement leaves no manner of doubt that the
inquiry contemplated under Section 225 BNSS remains mandatory even in
complaints under Section 138 of the NI Act where the accused resides beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate. The Constitution Bench has,
however, recognised that such inquiry may be conducted on affidavit evidence
and, in suitable cases, confined to examination of documents. The requirement
is, therefore, one of substantive judicial scrutiny and not of adherence to any
particular procedural form.
13. It follows that a Magistrate is not required to institute a separate
proceeding or expressly label the exercise as an inquiry under Section 225
BNSS. Where the complaint, affidavit and accompanying documents have
been judicially examined for determining whether sufficient grounds exist for
proceeding, the statutory requirement may stand satisfied. Conversely, the
mere presence of material on record cannot, without more, establish that the
requisite consideration has taken place.
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14. It is in the light of the aforesaid principles that the impugned
summoning order dated 14.05.2026 (Annexure P-1) requires examination.
The relevant portion thereof reads as under:
“One CW namely Lalit Rathee being
Director/Partner/authorized signatory of M/s JPA Easy Trade
Pvt. Ltd. is present and examined as CW1. He tendered his
affidavit Ex. CW1/A alongwith documents C1 to C10 in his
evidence and closed the preliminary evidence. His statement to
this effect has been recorded separately.
Argument on the point of summoning of accused has
been heard.
In his preliminary evidence complainant stated that
the accused in discharge to pay his liability had issued cheque
bearing No. 061762 dated 01.06.2025 Ex. C1 amounting to Rs.
84,00,000/- which was drawn in ICICI Bank Ltd. Mumbai. On
presentation, the said cheque was dishonored by the bank vide
return memos dated 13.08.2025, 20.08.2025 and 27.08.2025 Ex.
C2 to Ex. C4, with remarks ‘Payment stopped by Drawer’.”

The learned Magistrate thereafter referred to the statutory
demand notice and accompanying documents, recorded that a prima facie
offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act was made out, and
directed issuance of summons to the petitioner.
15. The impugned order undoubtedly reflects examination of CW-1
and consideration of the cheque, its dishonour and the statutory demand
notice. These circumstances cannot be overlooked merely because the order
does not expressly refer to Section 225 BNSS. The question, however, is
whether the proceedings disclose the judicial scrutiny contemplated by that
provision before issuance of process against the petitioner, whose residence
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at Mumbai placed her beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the learned
Magistrate.
16. The distinction is of some significance. Recording preliminary
evidence and conducting the inquiry contemplated under Section 225 BNSS
are not necessarily two separate exercises; they may well be undertaken
together. Nevertheless, the statutory inquiry requires consideration of whether
sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against an out-of-jurisdiction accused.
The existence of material capable of supporting such satisfaction must be
distinguished from the judicial exercise through which that satisfaction is
reached.
17. In the present case, the learned Magistrate proceeded from
recording the preliminary evidence to concluding that the ingredients of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, were prima facie
disclosed. However, the impugned summoning order does not indicate any
discernible consideration of the fact that the petitioner is a resident of
Mumbai, Maharashtra, which is admittedly beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rohtak. The requirement of an
inquiry under Section 225 BNSS assumes significance in such circumstances.
The mere recording of preliminary evidence, without an application of judicial
mind to the necessity and object of the statutory inquiry, cannot by itself
establish compliance with the legislative mandate.
18. In the considered opinion of this Court, the requirement
contemplated under Section 225 BNSS is mandatory where the accused
resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate. The
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legislative mandate, reinforced by the authoritative pronouncements of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, leaves no room for dispensing with such inquiry.
However, the manner of conducting the inquiry remains flexible and may, in
appropriate cases, be confined to examination of the affidavit evidence and
documents already available on record. What is indispensable is that the
learned Magistrate must undertake the requisite judicial scrutiny to ascertain
whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against an accused residing
beyond the territorial limits of the Court. The safeguard is one of substance
rather than form, and its compliance must be discernible from the proceedings
preceding the issuance of process.
19. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,
this Court finds that the exercise reflected in the impugned summoning order
dated 14.05.2026 (Annexure P-1) does not sufficiently demonstrate
compliance with the mandatory requirement under Section 225 BNSS. The
infirmity does not arise from the absence of an express reference to the
provision, but from the absence of discernible judicial consideration of the
statutory safeguard before issuance of process against the petitioner, who
resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate.
Accordingly, the matter warrants reconsideration at the appropriate stage.
20. Consequently, the present petition is partly allowed. The
impugned summoning order dated 14.05.2026 (Annexure P-1), passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rohtak, in Criminal Complaint No.
NACT-2118-2025, under Section 138 of the NI Act, is hereby set aside. The
matter is remitted to the learned trial Court for fresh consideration in
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accordance with Section 225 BNSS .The learned Magistrate shall be at liberty
to consider the affidavit evidence and documents already available on record
and, if deemed necessary, undertake such further inquiry as is permissible in
law. Thereafter, a fresh order on the question of issuance of process under
Section 227 BNSS shall be passed upon independent judicial consideration of
the material, preferably within six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified
copy of this order.
21. It is clarified that the complaint itself has not been quashed and
all questions concerning the merits of the allegations, including the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or other liability, shall remain open for
consideration at the appropriate stage. The learned trial Court shall proceed
independently, uninfluenced by any observations made herein concerning the
merits of the controversy.
22. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

02.11.2026 (NEERJA K. KALSON)
Atul JUDGE


Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether reportable Yes/No
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