Director General Of Married Accommodation Projects (Dgmap) vs Rds Project Limited
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~20
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 05.05.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 473/2024, I.A. 44506/2024 (Stay) & I.A.
44507/2024 (Delay of 25 days in filing the petition)
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF MARRIED ACCOMMODATION
PROJECTS (DGMAP) .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shashank Garg, Senior
Advocate along with Mr.
Hussain Taqvi, Senior Panel
Counsel and Ms. Aadya Anta,
Advocate.
versus
RDS PROJECT LIMITED .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Asha Jain Madan,
Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1. The present Petition, filed on 01.10.2024 under Section 34 of
1
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , seeks to challenge the
2
Arbitral Award dated 29.04.2024 as well as the Corrected
3
Arbitral Award dated 06.06.2024 passed by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal.
2. At the outset, Ms. Asha Jain, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Respondent, raises a preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the present Petition on the ground that the same is
1
Act
2
Original Award
3
Corrected Award
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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barred by limitation.
3. In furtherance of the said objection, learned counsel for the
Respondent submits that the Application under Section 33 of the Act,
preferred by the Petitioner seeking correction of the Original Award
before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, was itself filed beyond the
statutory period of thirty days prescribed under Section 33(1) of the
Act.
4. Learned counsel contends that once such an application came to
be filed by the Petitioner beyond the prescribed period, the learned
Arbitral Tribunal had already become functus officio , and
consequently, the Corrected Award would be rendered non-est in the
eyes of law.
5. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance is placed upon
the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Geojit Financial
4
Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav , particularly the conclusory
observations contained in Paragraph No. 35 thereof, which read as
follows:
“ 35. We summarize our conclusion as under: —
(i) Where an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act has not
been filed, the legislature was conscious enough to state that it
would be the date of the receipt of the award which would
earmark the commencement of limitation for an application for
setting aside of an award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996
Act. Whereas, in the case where an application under Section
33 of the 1996 Act has been filed, the legislature was
conscious enough to lay down that it would be the date of
disposal of such request or application, that would be the
starting point for calculation of limitation.
(ii) Where such an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is
filed, irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal upon
considering such application, either makes or does not make
any correction or modification or choose to render or to not
render an additional award in terms of Section 33 of the Act,
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1811
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
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1996, the starting point for the period of limitation for
challenging the same under Section 34 as per sub-section (3)
would be the date of disposal of such application under Section
33 by the arbitral tribunal, as the long as the application
under Section 33 of the 1996 Act had been filed within
prescribed period of limitation under sub-section (1)
thereto AND with notice to the other party . Any other
interpretation to the contrary, would do violence to plain and
unambiguous language used in Section 34 sub-section (3) of
the Act, 1996.
(iii) In the aforesaid scenario, neither the date of passing of the
original award or date of receipt of the same by the party nor
the date of receipt of the corrected award or date of receipt of
the decision of the arbitrator disposing the application under
Section 33 of the 1996 Act is of any significance. What is of
significance, under Section 34 sub-section (3) of the Act, 1996
is the date on which the application or request under Section
33 came to be disposed by the arbitral tribunal.
(iv) In the same breath, where a request is made under Section 33
of the 1996 Act, it is immaterial for the purpose of
computation of limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3)
whether such request fell within the purview of the said
provision or not. What is material is only that such request was
made in the manner delineated under Section 33 i.e., it fulfilled
the twin conditions of being made; (I) “ within thirty days from
the receipt of the arbitral award ” and (II) “ with notice to the
other party ” stipulated therein.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6. Learned counsel for the Respondent accordingly submits that
once the Corrected Award is rendered legally unsustainable and non-
est in the eyes of law, the limitation for filing the present Petition
would necessarily have to be reckoned from the date of receipt of the
Original Award.
7. Learned counsel for the Respondent, in this regard, further
contends that the Original Award admittedly came to be received by
5
the Directorate General of Married Accommodation Project on
01.05.2024, and therefore, the present Petition, having been filed on
01.10.2024, which is beyond the prescribed period of 3 months and
5
DGMAP
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
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further condonable period of 30 days under Section 34(3) of the Act,
is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation.
8. In this regard, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to Clause 8 of the
6
Notice Inviting Tender , which formed an integral part of the
contractual agreement executed between the parties and specifically
designated the DGMAP as the “ Accepting Officer ” for the purposes of
the contract. Clause 8 of the NIT reads as follows:
“ 8. The Director General, Married Accommodation Project,
Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi-110011 will be Accepting
Officer hereinafter referred to as such for the purpose of this
contract.”
9. Learned counsel for the Respondent accordingly submits that,
once the NIT itself recognises the DGMAP as the competent authority
under the contractual arrangement between the parties, the receipt of
the Original Award by the DGMAP on 01.05.2024, which fact is
undisputed, must be treated as the relevant date for the purposes of
computation of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act. It is further
contended that the application, subsequently filed under Section 33(1)
of the Act, seeking correction of the Original Award was instituted on
03.06.2024, which was beyond the statutory period of thirty days
prescribed under the said provision.
10. Consequently, according to the Respondent, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal had by then become functus officio and was rendered devoid
of jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon the said application.
11. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the filing of the
belated application under Section 33(1) of the Act could neither
extend nor postpone the commencement of limitation under Section
6
NIT
Signature Not Verified
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
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34(3) of the Act, which, according to the Respondent, began to run
from the date of receipt of the Original Award by the DGMAP,
namely , 01.05.2024.
12. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner contends that the relevant date for commencement of
limitation for the purpose of Section 33(1) application would not be
01.05.2024 but 03.05.2024, being the date on which the Original
7
Award was allegedly received by the Contract Section Team A2 ,
i.e. , the Section dealing with the arbitral proceedings.
13. Learned counsel further submits that the Contract Section of the
DGMAP was the authority directly concerned with the arbitral
proceedings and competent to take decisions in relation thereto, and
therefore, the limitation for Section 33(1) application must be
reckoned from the date on which the said authority received the
Original Award, i.e. , on 03.05.2024.
14. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance is placed by the
learned counsel for the Petitioner on the Judgement of the Hon‟ble
8
Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tecco Trichy , particularly
Paragraph Nos. 8 to 10 thereof, wherein the Apex Court observed that
receipt of an arbitral award by an officer having no nexus with the
arbitral proceedings would not trigger limitation and that the relevant
date would be the date on which the Award is received by the
authority directly concerned with the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings. The relevant portion of the said judgement reads as
under:
“ 8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-Section (5) of
7
Contract Section
8
2005 (4) SCC 239
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
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Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of
substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that
the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning
of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the
party, to be effective, has to be "received" by the party. This
delivery by the arbitral tribunal and receipt by the party of the
award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an
application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30
days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional
award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an
award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy
of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as
also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry
of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated
from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the tribunal and
the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in
the arbitral proceedings.
9. In the context of a huge organization like Railways, the copy of
the award has to be received by the person who has knowledge of
the proceedings and who would be the best person to understand
and appreciate the arbitral award and also to take a decision in the
matter of moving an application under sub-Section (1) or (5) of
Section 33 or under sub-Section (1) of Section 34.
10. In the present case, the Chief Engineer had signed the
agreement on behalf of Union of India entered into with the
respondent. In the arbitral proceedings the Chief Engineer
represented the Union of India and the notices, during the
proceedings of the Arbitration, were served on the Chief Engineer.
Even the arbitral award clearly mentions that the Union of India is
represented by Deputy Chief Engineer/Gauge Conversion,
Chennai. The Chief Engineer is directly concerned with the
Arbitration, as the subject matter of Arbitration relates to the
department of the Chief Engineer and he has direct knowledge of
the arbitral proceedings and the question involved before the
arbitrator. The General Manager of the Railways has only referred
the matter for arbitration as required under the contract. He cannot
be said to be aware of the question involved in the arbitration nor
the factual aspect in detail, on the basis of which the arbitral
tribunal had decided the issue before it unless they are all brought
to his notice by the officer dealing with that arbitration and who is
in-charge of those proceedings. Therefore, in our opinion, service
of arbitral award on the General Manager by way of receipt in his
inwards office cannot be taken to be sufficient notice so as to
activate the Department to take appropriate steps in respect of and
in regard to the award passed by the arbitrators to constitute
starting point of limitation for the purposes of Section 34(3) of the
Act. The service of notice on the Chief Engineer on 19.3.2001
would be the starting point of limitation to challenge the award in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
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the Court.”
15. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, in view of the aforesaid
decision, therefore, submits that since the competent authority
entrusted with taking decisions in relation to the arbitral proceedings
was the Contract Section, therefore the period of limitation for section
33(1) application must necessarily be computed from the date on
which the said Contract Section of the DGMAP received a copy of the
Award, which, according to him, was on 03.05.2024.
16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, in order to substantiate the
said date, further places reliance upon the internal Entry Register to
contend that the Award was placed before the Contract Section only
on 03.05.2024.
17. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that, arguendo ,
assuming that the Application under Section 33 of the Act was filed
beyond the prescribed period of 30 days, the same would not render
the proceedings non-est , particularly in view of the fact that no
objection in this regard was raised before the learned Arbitral Tribunal
at the relevant stage.
18. Learned counsel therefore submits that such conduct would
amount to a deemed waiver within the meaning of Section 4 of the
Act. In support thereof, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
9
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in NDMC v. S.A. Builders , particularly
Paragraph Nos. 53 and 54 thereof, which read as under:
“ 53. As per sub-section (1) of Section 33, within 30 days from the
date of receipt of the arbitral award, a party with notice to the other
party, may request the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any computation
errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a
similar nature occurring in the award. Further, if the parties agree, a
party with notice to the other party, may request the Arbitral
9
2025 (7) SCC 132
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
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Tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the
award. The period of 30 days contemplated under sub-section (1)
may stand extended to another period of time if agreed upon by the
parties. Therefore, ordinarily the time-limit for correction of errors
or for interpretation of a specific point or part of the award is 30
days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award. However, the
limitation of 30 days can be waived for another period of time, if
agreed upon by the parties. Question for consideration is what
would be the contours of the expression “ unless another period of
time has been agreed upon by the parties ”, as appearing in sub-
section (1) of Section 33.
54. Sub-section (7) of Section 33 clarifies that correction or
interpretation of arbitral award or passing of additional arbitral
award would attract Section 31 of the 1996 Act as discussed supra.
Therefore, the language of sub-section (1) of Section 33 makes it
abundantly clear that the period of 30 days as provided in Section
33(1) is not an inflexible period. If the parties agree, the said period
can be extended.”
19.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner, in the backdrop of the
foregoing submissions, contends that the application filed under
Section 33(1) of the Act was maintainable and in accordance with law.
It is therefore submitted that the limitation for filing the present
petition under Section 34 of the Act would commence only from the
date on which the Corrected Award came to be passed by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal, namely , 06.06.2024.
20. According to the Petitioner, in view of Section 34(3) of the Act,
the period of limitation for instituting the present Petition is liable to
be reckoned from the said date. Consequently, it is contended that the
present petition, having been filed within the maximum permissible
period of three months and the further condonable period of thirty
days contemplated under Section 34(3) of the Act, is well within
limitation and therefore maintainable.
ANALYSIS & DECISION:
21. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
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BHATIA
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the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material
available on record and the Judgements put forth across the bar.
22. At the outset, for the sake of clarity and convenience, this Court
deems it appropriate to set out a tabulated chart containing the
undisputed chronology of material dates, indicating the sequence of
proceedings along with the corresponding dates thereof. The same is
as under:
Event Date
Original Award Rendered 29.04.2024
Original Award received by DGMAP 01.05.2024
Original Award received by Contract Section 03.05.2024
Filing of Section 33 Application 03.06.2024
Corrected Award Rendered 06.06.2024
Filing of the present Section 34 Petition 01.10.2024
23. In light of the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the
parties, the preliminary objection raised by the Respondent with
respect to limitation requires adjudication on two interconnected
aspects.
24. First, whether the Corrected Award dated 06.06.2024 was in
accordance with Section 33 of the Act and second, depending upon
the answer to the aforesaid issue, what would constitute the relevant
date for commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act.
25. Accordingly, the crucial question that falls for consideration, in
pursuance of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
Respondent, is whether the Corrected Award is rendered non-est in the
eyes of law on the ground that the said Application was preferred
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BHATIA
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beyond the prescribed period of thirty days contemplated under
Section 33(1) of the Act. Section 33(1) is reproduced hereinunder for
ready reference:
“33. Correction and interpretation of award; additional award.
- (1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award,
unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the
parties—
(a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral
tribunal to correct any computation errors, any clerical or
typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature
occurring in the award;
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other
party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation
of a specific point or part of the award.”
26. The language employed in Section 33(1) of the Act is plain and
unambiguous. An application seeking correction or interpretation of
an Award is required to be filed within a period of thirty days “ from
the date of receipt of the Award ”. The provision, however, permits
extension of the said period only where another period of time has
been agreed upon by the parties.
27. The contention of the Petitioner is that the Original Award was
received by the Contract Section of the DGMAP only on 03.05.2024,
which is contended to be the competent authority since the Contract
Section was allegedly directly concerned with the relevant arbitral
proceedings.
28. The aforesaid contention, in the considered opinion of this
Court, is untenable in law.
29. A perusal of Clause 8 of the NIT unequivocally demonstrates
that the DGMAP itself was designated as the „ Accepting Officer ‟
under the Contract executed between the parties. The Contract further
clearly reflects that it was executed by the Joint Director (Contracts)
for and on behalf of the DGMAP. The pleadings before the learned
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BHATIA
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Arbitral Tribunal, have been instituted by and in the name of the
DGMAP, and the present Section 34 Petition has, in fact, been signed
by the DGMAP himself and not by any delegated official or the
Contract Section, thereby reflecting the DGMAP‟s central and
authoritative role in relation to the Contract in question.
30. The aforesaid circumstances, when considered cumulatively,
unmistakably establish that the DGMAP itself was the competent and
decision-making authority governing the contractual relationship
between the parties at all material stages, including the execution,
administration, and conduct of proceedings arising therefrom.
31. Therefore, the reliance by the Petitioner on the Judgment of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Tecco Trichy ( supra ) is clearly not
applicable in the present factual matrix and thus clearly
distinguishable. In the said case, the Award had been received by the
General Manager of the Railways, who was not directly concerned
with the conduct of the arbitral proceedings and whose role was
confined merely to referring the disputes to arbitration.
32. In distinction thereto, as discussed hereinbefore, in the present
case, the Contract itself expressly designates the DGMAP as the
“ Accepting Officer ”. Consequently, the DGMAP, being the very
authority recognized under the Contract, cannot subsequently contend
that he lacked awareness of the relevant arbitral proceedings and that
the Contract Section was the only authority concerned with the said
proceedings.
33. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that it stands well-established that the “receipt of the
award” , as contemplated under the Act, was on 01.05.2024, i.e. , the
date on which the Original Award was admittedly received by the
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BHATIA
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DGMAP.
34. Once the date of receipt of the Award is taken to be 01.05.2024,
the Application under Section 33(1) of the Act ought to have been
filed on or before 31.05.2024. Admittedly, the said Application came
to be filed only on 03.06.2024 and was therefore beyond the
prescribed statutory period.
35. At this stage, the alternate contention of the Petitioner that there
existed a deemed waiver to object, in terms of Section 4 of the Act, of
the limitation period of 30 days as under Section 33(1) of the Act, and
consequently the expression, in Section 33(1) of the Act, “unless
another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties” assumes
importance and requires careful adjudication.
36. The aforesaid contention, to the effect that since no objection
with respect to the limitation of Section 33 Application was taken
before the learned Arbitrator, the same would be deemed to have been
waived, in the considered opinion of this Court, is wholly
misconceived and untenable in law.
37. A plain reading of Section 4 of the Act demonstrates that the
provision operates within a limited and specific sphere. It applies to
situations where a party, despite having knowledge of either a
derogable provision of the Act or any non-compliance with a
requirement under the arbitration agreement, nevertheless proceeds
with the arbitral proceedings without raising a timely objection
thereto. In such circumstances, the consequence contemplated under
Section 4 is merely a deemed waiver of the right to subsequently
object to such non-compliance. Section 4 of the Act is reproduced
herein under for ready reference:
“4. Waiver of right to object . - A party who knows that—
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BHATIA
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( a ) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate,
or
( b ) any requirement under the arbitration agreement, has not been
complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating
his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay or, if a
time-limit is provided for stating that objection, within that period
of time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to so object.”
38. In the present case, once the Application under Section 33(1) of
the Act was filed beyond the prescribed statutory period of thirty days,
the learned Arbitral Tribunal had already become functus officio in
respect of the Award in question. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the
learned Arbitral Tribunal to entertain such Application stood
extinguished by operation of law itself.
39. Section 4 clearly contemplates that the waiver would operate
during the pendency of the arbitration and not post the conclusion.
This is apparent by the use of the words, “ …and yet proceeds with the
arbitration… ” in Section 4.
40. In such circumstances, mere absence of objection on the part of
the Respondent before the learned Arbitral Tribunal cannot be
construed as resuscitating or bringing back to life a concluded
proceedings without strictly following the statutory mandate of
Section 33 of the Act. This would amount to conferring jurisdiction
upon the learned Arbitral Tribunal contrary to the statutory scheme of
the Act. Jurisdiction that stands exhausted by operation of law cannot
be revived by acquiescence, silence, or implied waiver.
41. A bare perusal of Section 33 of the Act makes it evident that the
only manner in which the period prescribed under Section 33(1) of the
Act could have been extended was through an agreement between the
parties stipulating another period of time. The provision itself
expressly contemplates that an Application seeking correction or
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BHATIA
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interpretation of an Award is to be filed within thirty days from the
date of receipt of the Award “unless another period of time has been
agreed upon by the parties” .
42. In the considered opinion of this Court, the expression “. .agreed
upon by the parties ”, by its very nature, postulates a conscious,
unequivocal, and bilateral consensus ad idem between the parties for
extension of the prescribed timeline. Such an agreement cannot be
inferred by implication, assumption, acquiescence, or mere conduct,
unless the same clearly demonstrates a mutually accepted intention to
extend the stipulated period. In the present case, it is not even the
Petitioner‟s contention before this Court that there existed any express
or implied agreement of such nature between the parties.
43. Furthermore, the use of the expression “ has been agreed ” also
carries significance, inasmuch as it indicates that the agreement
contemplated under the provision must exist prior to the filing of the
application concerned and cannot be created retrospectively or
subsequent to the institution of such proceedings.
44. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that
absent a prior agreement as between the parties with respect to the
time for filing of the Section 33 Application, the filing of the same
before a Tribunal, which after rendering the Award, had become
functus officio , would be rendered non-est .
45. Further, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Geojit Financial
Services (supra) has itself recognised that an Application under
Section 33 of the Act filed beyond the prescribed statutory period
would not extend the period of limitation under Section 34(3) of the
Act, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is what is being
sought by the Petitioner. Upon the expiry of the statutory period, the
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BHATIA
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learned Arbitral Tribunal becomes functus officio and any correction
carried out thereafter, if not carried out strictly in terms of Section 33,
would be rendered legally unsustainable.
46. This Court is also of the considered opinion that the reliance
placed by the Petitioner on the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in NDMC v. S.A. Builders ( supra ) is misconceived and, in fact,
operates contrary to the case sought to be canvassed by the Petitioner.
47. A perusal of Paragraph Nos. 53 and 54 of the said Judgment,
which have been relied upon by the Petitioner, would reveal that the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court itself has recognized that although the period
of limitation of 30 days is not inflexible, any extension thereto can
arise only where “another period of time has been agreed upon by the
parties” . The said Judgment, therefore, reinforces the requirement of a
bilateral agreement, explicitly indicating consensus ad idem between
the parties for extension of the prescribed timeline and does not
support the proposition that such extension can be inferred by
implication, acquiescence, silence, or absence of objection under
Section 4 of the Act.
48. In the present case, no material whatsoever has been placed on
record to demonstrate the existence of any express agreement or any
act indicating a prior consensus ad idem between the parties extending
the statutory period prescribed under Section 33(1) of the Act.
Consequently, the reliance upon NDMC v. S.A. Builders ( supra ) does
not advance the case of the Petitioner.
49. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Application under Section 33(1) of the Act
was barred by limitation. Consequently, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
had become functus officio in relation to the Award in question, and
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BHATIA
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therefore, lacked jurisdiction to entertain or allow the said
Application.
50. The Corrected Award dated 06.06.2024, having been rendered
pursuant to a time-barred Application under Section 33(1), is
accordingly rendered legally unsustainable and non-est in the eyes of
law.
51. Accordingly, the only Award legally sustainable and operative
between the parties is the Original Award dated 29.04.2024, which
stood admittedly received by the DGMAP, being the competent
authority to receive the same, on 01.05.2024.
52. Having held that the Original Award is the only operational and
existent Award between the parties, which stood received on
01.05.2024, the only surviving question is whether the present
Petition, which seeks the setting aside of the Original Award, is barred
by Limitation.
53. In terms of Section 34(3) of the Act, a Petition seeking the
setting aside of an Arbitral Award is required to be preferred within a
period of three months from the date on which the party making the
application had received the Arbitral Award, with a further
condonable period of thirty days upon sufficient cause being shown.
54. Admittedly, the present Petition came to be filed only on
01.10.2024, i.e. , beyond not only the prescribed period of three
months but also beyond the further condonable period of thirty days
contemplated under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act.
55. It is trite law that the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3)
of the Act is strict and mandatory in nature and that upon expiry of the
additional condonable period of thirty days, this Court is rendered
devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the Petition.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
19:17:25
O.M.P.(COMM.) 473/2024 Page 16 of 17
56. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
present Petition is clearly barred by limitation and is liable to be
dismissed on the said ground alone.
57. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
58. No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MAY 05, 2026/tk/DJ
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:11.05.2026
19:17:25
O.M.P.(COMM.) 473/2024 Page 17 of 17