M/S. PALTRONICS ALLIED INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD.,BHUBANESWAR vs STATE OF ODISHA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
WA/1448/2026
ODHC010837802026
2026:OHC:293-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026
CNR No. ODHC010837802026
M/s. Paltronics Allied Industries Pvt. …. Appellant
Ltd.
-Versus-
State of Odisha and others …. Respondents
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Mishra, Sr. Advocate &
Mr. Subir Palit, Sr. Advocate
assisted by
Mr. N. Dadhichi &
Mr. T. Mishra, Advocates
For Respondents : Mr. Debasish Tripathy,
Addl. Government Advocate
CORAM:
HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
J U D G M E N T
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
th
Date of Judgment: 12 November, 2026
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HARISH TANDON, CJ.
1. The instant appeal arises from a judgment dated 09.10.2026
passed by the Single Bench in W.P.(C) No. 33186 of 2025 by which
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 1 of 32
the order dated 22.07.2025 passed by the Additional District
Magistrate, Bhubaneswar in OLR Appeal No. 15 of 2024 was set
aside and the matter was relegated to the said authority with liberty to
file an application for condonation of delay to be decided at the first
instance before the said appellate authority undertakes an exercise of
deciding the matter on merit.
2. In course of hearing of the instant appeal two seminal issues
arose with regard to the competence of the appeal under Section 58 of
the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960 (“OLR Act”, for short) at the
behest of the Tahasildar assailing the order passed by the Additional
Tahasildar and whether the plea of fraud without there being any
foundation laid in the appeal can be permitted to be raised.
3. At the very outset we must record that those pleas do not
appear to have been raised before the Single Bench nor the findings
and reasons written in the impugned judgment on its bare look appears
to have been decided therein. The first and foremost question that
arose before us is whether the question of locus standi of the
Tahasildar in preferring an appeal under the aforesaid provision can be
gone into as a pure question of law.
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 2 of 32
4. The counsels were invited to address the aforesaid issue taken
for the first time in the instant appeal to ascertain whether such point
raised for the first time in the instant appeal can be entertained and/or
gone into. A prelude to the litigation is succinctly narrated in pursuit
of determining the said question becomes inevitable not only as a plea
of demur, but determination of such question as a pure question of law
raised for the first time without there being any specific objection
taken either before the appellate authority or the Single Bench.
5. It is undisputed that the land admeasuring an area of Ac.5.00
decimals pertaining to Plot No. 309/1694 under Khata No. 474/5 of
Mouza-Patia in Bhubaneswar was originally demised unto one Tejpal
Singh, Proprietor of M/s. Paltronics Allied Industries by the State in
W.L. Case No. 1019/1979 upon execution of a lease deed duly
registered on 13.12.1979. The Record of Right was also corrected in
favour of said Tejpal Singh as Sthitiba n status disclosing the nature of
the land as Patita . Subsequently, the said proprietorship concern was
incorporated and all the assets and liabilities of the proprietorship
concern were transmitted into a company and the Record of Right was
also duly corrected and recorded as such.
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 3 of 32
6. The said Tejpal Singh was inducted as one of the Directors of
the said company and on the application made by the company,
Mutation Case No. 7114 of 2022 was initiated and the Additional
Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar allowed the conversion of the land from
Patita Kisam to Homestead Kisam under Section 8A of the OLR Act
by passing an order dated 30.04.2022. Undisputedly, the conversion
fees was deposited by the appellant company and the said order of
conversion was subsequently approved and affirmed by the Sub-
Collector, Bhubaneswar leading to correction of the Record of Right
in favour of the appellant.
7. Interestingly the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar challenged the said
order of conversion before the Additional District Magistrate,
Bhubaneswar which gave rise to registration of OLR Appeal No. 15 of
2024 without accompanying application for condonation of delay. The
Additional District Magistrate, Bhubaneswar allowed the said appeal
on 22.07.2025; thereby set aside the order of conversion dated
30.04.2022. The appellant challenged the said order by filing the writ
petition before the Single Bench and the said writ petition was
disposed of solely on the ground that whether the said impugned order
is not legally sustainable in absence of any application for
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 4 of 32
condonation of delay by taking shelter under Section 17 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
8. Since a plea is taken whether the Tahasildar is competent or
has a locus standi to challenge the order of the Additional Tahasildar
by filing an appeal under Section 58 of the said Act, the appearing
counsels are at variance. According to the counsel for the appellant
such point being a pure question of law can be raised for the first time
in the instant writ appeal, but the counsel for the respondent-State
contended that the plea not taken before the authority nor in the writ
petition filed before the Single Bench, cannot be permitted to be
agitated for the first time.
9. It is undisputed that the Right of Appeal is a statutory right
and in the event the statute does not provide such right, it cannot be
assumed. Section 58 of the Act provides a right of Appeal to any
person aggrieved by an order under any of the sections mentioned
therein before the prescribed authority. Section 58 of the OLR Act
imbibed within the fold of Section 8A and there is no misnomer that
the right of appeal is reserved and preserved under the said provision.
The said section is quoted as under:
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 5 of 32
“58. Appeal - (1) Any person aggrieved by an order
passed under any of the following sections may prefer
an appeal to the prescribed authority, namely:
Sections 4, 8-A, 9(4), 10, 12(2), 15, 16, 17, 18,
19(1)(c), 20, 21, 22(1), 22-A(5), 23(2), 23-A, 27, 28,
34-A, 35, 36-A, 36-C, 42, 45-B (1), 52, 55-A, 56-B
and 57-B (4).
(2) The procedure of filing and disposal of appeals
shall be as may be prescribed.
(3) Any tenant aggrieved by an order passed under
Section 27, Section 35 or Section 36-A (other than an
order dismissing the case for default or non-
prosecution) prior to the date of commencement of the
Orissa Land Reforms (Second Amendment) Act, 1975
may, if he has not preferred an appeal as provided in
sub-section (1), prefer the same within one year from
the said date.”
10. Rule-42 of the Odisha Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965
provides a forum of appeal in the following:
“42. An appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 58 -
An appeal under Section 58 shall lie to –
(1) The Sub-divisional Officer or an officer specially
appointed by Government in this behalf who is suitable
for appointment as Sub-divisional Officer if the order
appealed against was passed by a Revenue Officer
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 6 of 32
below the rank of a Sub-divisional Officer and is
against any order other than an order passed under
Sections 22, 23 and 23-A of the Act and any appeal
against any such order pending on the date of
commencement of the Orissa Land Reforms (General)
(Amendment) Rules, 1980 shall be transferred to the
Sub-divisional Officer for hearing and disposal.
(2) The Additional District Magistrate of the District or
an Officer specially appointed by Government in this
behalf who is suitable for appointment as Additional
District Magistrate if the order appealed against was
passed by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of
Sub-divisional Officer or against an order passed under
Sections 22, 23 and 23-A :
Provided that any such appeal pending on the date of
commencement of the Orissa Land Reforms (General)
(Amendment) Rules, 1980 shall be heard and disposed
of as if the said rules had not come into force.”
11. Section 63 of the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960
engulfed within itself the applicability of the provisions of the
Limitation Act by way of specific reference in relation to an
appeal or the revision filed before the competent authority.
However, it restricts the applicability of certain provisions of
the Limitation Act thereby eliminating the other provisions of
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 7 of 32
the Limitation Act and, therefore, it can be reasonably inferred
that the provisions contained in the Limitation Act in its
entirety is not applicable. Before we proceed further it would
be apposite to quote the provision contained under Section 63
of the said Act, which runs thus:
“63. Limitation.
(1) The State Government may, by notification from
time to time for sufficient reasons, extend the period of
limitation provided under second proviso to sub-
section (2) or the second proviso to sub-section (5) of
Section 4 or under Section 36-A by such further period
as they deem proper, so, however, that the total period
of extension shall in no event exceed two years.
(2) Every appeal or application for revision under this
Act unless specifically provided elsewhere in the Act
shall be filed, within a period or thirty days from the
date of the order against which such appeal or revision
is preferred. The provisions of Section 4, 5, 12 and 14
of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to the
filing of such appeal or application for revision.”
12. Sub-section 2 of the said Section 63 encompasses the
applicability of Sections 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the said Limitation Act,
thereby keeping the other provisions of the Limitation Act outside the
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 8 of 32
purview of the said appeal. It is no longer res integra that the
legislature may imbibe an Act to apply while legislating another Act
by way of a reference, thereby the applicability of such Act can be
clearly envisioned. It is also pertinent that once the legislature has
restricted certain provisions of the Act to apply in another Act
legislated subsequently, it eliminates the other provisions of the said
Act and, therefore, the recourse thereunder is not permissible.
13. Taking a clue from the aforesaid provision, which assumes
significance in addressing the point on the maintainability of appeal at
the behest of the Tahasildar against the order of the Additional
Tahasildar, whether can be raised for the first time as a pure question
of law.
14. In Gurucharan Sing v. Kamla Sing and others, reported in
(1976) 2 SCC 152 , an identical question arose when a plea being a
pure question of law was raised for the first time before the Court and
objection was raised that such point cannot be agitated for the first
time. The Apex Court noticed the judgment rendered by Lord Watson
in Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Kavanath reported in
1892 AC 473, wherein it was held that when a question of law is
raised for the first time even in a Court of last resort, it would be
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 9 of 32
prudent and expedient in the interest of justice to entertain such plea.
Placing reliance upon such observation, it is held that the Court shall
permit the parties to raise a pure question of law, which strikes at the
root of the jurisdiction based upon undisputed and/or proven facts,
provided it does not surprise the other party in the following:
Before we examine this quintessential aspect
“11.
presented before us with complex scholarship by Shri
S.C. Misra we had better make short shrift of certain
other questions raised by him. He has desired us, by
way of preliminary objection, not to give quarter to the
plea, founded on Section 6 of the Act, to non-suit his
client, since it was a point raised de novo at the Letters
Patent stage. The High Court gave thought to this
objection but overruled it, if we may say so, rightly.
The Court narrated the twists and turns of factual and
legal circumstances which served to extenuate the
omission to urge the point earlier but hit the nail on the
head when it held that it was well-settled that a pure
question of law going to the root of the case and based
on undisputed or proven facts could be raised even
before the Court of last report, provided the opposite
side was not taken by surprise or otherwise unfairly
prejudiced. Lord Watson, in Connecticut Fire Insurance
Company v. Kavanagh [1892 AC 473, 480] , stated the
law thus:
“When a question of law is raided for
the first time in a Court of last resort upon the
construction of a document or upon facts
either admitted or proved beyond controversy,
it is not only competent but expedient in the
interest of justice to entertain the plea. The
expediency of adopting that course may be
doubted when the plea cannot be disposed of
without deciding nice questions of fact in
considering which the Court of ultimate
review is placed in a much less advantageous
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 10 of 32
position than the courts below. But Their
Lordships have no hesitation in holding that
the course ought not in any case to be
followed unless the court is satisfied that the
evidence upon which they are asked to decide
establishes beyond doubt that the facts if fully
investigated would have supported the new
plea.
We agree with the High Court that the
new plea springs from the common case of
the parties and nothing which may work
injustice by allowance of this contention at
the late stage of the Letters Patent appeal has
been made out to our satisfaction. Therefore,
we proceed to consider the impact and
applicability of Section 6 of the Act to the
circumstances of the present case.”
15. In Greater Mohali Area Development Authority and other v.
Manju Jain and others , reported in (2010) 9 SCC 157 , the apex Court
made a distinction between new plea of fact or mixed question of fact
and/or law to be raised for the first time and a plea of pure question of
law. It is categorically held that the plea which is founded upon a new
fact or essentially a mixed question of fact and law cannot be
permitted to be raised for the first time before the higher forum, but if
the plea is pure question of law founded upon the existing facts can
be raised for the first time in the following:
“26. Respondent 1 raised the plea of non-receipt of the
letter of allotment first time before the High Court.
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 11 of 32
Even if it is assumed that it is correct, the question does
arise as to whether such a new plea on facts could be
agitated before the writ court. It is settled legal
proposition that pure question of law can be raised at
any time of the proceedings but a question of fact which
requires investigation and inquiry, and for which no
factual foundation has been laid by a party before the
court or tribunal below, cannot be allowed to be
agitated in the writ petition. If the writ court for some
compelling circumstances desires to entertain a new
factual plea the court must give due opportunity to the
opposite party to controvert the same and adduce the
evidence to substantiate its pleadings. Thus, it is not
permissible for the High Court to consider a new case
on facts or mixed question of fact and law which was
not the case of the parties before the court or tribunal
below. [Vide State of U.P. v. Dr. Anupam Gupta [1993
Supp (1) SCC 594 : AIR 1992 SC 932] , Ram Kumar
Agarwal v. Thawar Das [(1999) 7 SCC 303] , Vasantha
Viswanathan v. V.K. Elayalwar [(2001) 8 SCC 133] ,
Anup Kumar Kundu v. SudipCharan Chakraborty
[(2006) 6 SCC 666 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1521] , Tirupati
Jute Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [(2009) 14 SCC
406 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 338] and Sanghvi
Reconditioners (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(2010) 2
SCC 733] .]
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 12 of 32
16. The similar view was expressed in V.L.S. Finance Limited v.
Union of India and others , reported in (2013) 6 SCC 278 in the
following:
“7. Mr Shankaranarayanan has taken an extreme stand
before this Court and contends that the Company Law
Board has no jurisdiction to compound an offence
punishable under Section 211(7) of the Act as the
punishment provided is imprisonment also. Mr
Bhushan, however, submits that imprisonment is not a
mandatory punishment under Section 211(7) of the Act
and, hence, the Company Law Board has the authority
to compound the same. He also points out that this
submission was not at all advanced before the
Company Law Board and, therefore, the appellant
cannot be permitted to raise this question for the first
time before this Court. We are not in agreement with
Mr Bhushan in regard to his plea that this question
cannot be gone into by this Court at the first instance.
In our opinion, in a case in which the facts pleaded
give rise to a pure question of law going to the root of
the matter, this Court possesses discretion to go into
that. The position would have been different had the
appellant for the first time prayed before this Court for
adjudication on an issue of fact and then to apply the
law and hold that the Company Law Board had no
jurisdiction to compound the offence.
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 13 of 32
8. Here, it is an admitted position that the allegation
made exposed the Company and its Managing Director
for punishment under Section 211(7) of the Act which
provides for imprisonment or fine or with both. In the
face of the same, no fact needs to be adjudicated and
the point being a pure question of law going to the root
of the matter, the same can be permitted to be raised
before this Court for the first time. But that does not
help the appellant as we are inclined to accept the
submission of Mr Bhushan on merit.”
17. In a subsequent judgment rendered in Ariane Orgachem
Private Limited v. Wyeth Employees Union and others , reported in
(2015) 7 SCC 561 a plea was taken by the appellant therein on the
competency of the Deputy Labour Commissioner in passing the order
of reference for the first time before the apex Court, which was
admittedly not raised before the High Court. The objection was raised
that such point having not been raised at the earliest opportunity
cannot be raised for the first time before the Apex Court. The Apex
Court repelled the aforesaid contention and held that if the question
partakes a character of pure question of law and strikes at the root of
the competence and/or jurisdiction based on the available facts, there
is no fetter on the part of the Court of last resort to take up such point
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 14 of 32
after affording an opportunity of hearing to the other side in the
following:
“36. The appellant Company has also contended that
the respondent Union has also raised the legal question
regarding the competency of the Deputy Labour
Commissioner in passing the order of reference for the
first time before this Court and the same was not raised
before the High Court, therefore, the same shall not be
permitted to be raised in these proceedings and this
Court need not go into this aspect of the matter, which
is wholly untenable in law. This contention raised by
the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is rejected
as the said contention is contrary to the
issues/principles laid down by the Privy Council and
this Court in the following judgments:
36.1. In Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kavanagh
[1892 AC 473 (PC)] , Lord Watson has observed as
under : (AC p. 480)
“… When a question of law is raised for the
first time in a court of last resort, upon the
construction of a document, or upon facts either
admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is
not only competent but expedient, in the
interests of justice, to entertain the plea .”
(emphasis supplied)
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 15 of 32
The aforementioned view of the Court of Appeal has
been relied upon by this Court in Gurucharan Singh v.
Kamla Singh [(1976) 2 SCC 152] . Therefore, with
regard to the abovementioned aspect regarding the plea
of the competency of the Deputy Labour
Commissioner to pass an order of refusal to make a
reference, although is being raised before this Court
for the first time, is based on admitted facts. Hence, in
accordance with the view taken by the Court of Appeal
in Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. case [1892 AC 473
(PC)] and this Court in Gurucharan Singh case [(1976)
2 SCC 152] , the argument advanced by the first
respondent Union deserves to be considered by this
Court.
36.2. A similar view has also been taken by this Court
in V.L.S. Finance Ltd. v. Union of India [(2013) 6 SCC
278] and Greater Mohali Area Development Authority
v. Manju Jain [(2010) 9 SCC 157 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ)
639] , wherein it has been held that pure question of
law can be raised at any stage of litigation.
36.3. In National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Nareshkumar
Badrikumar Jagad [(2011) 12 SCC 695 : (2012) 2
SCC (Civ) 791] , it has been held by this Court that a
new ground raising pure legal issue for which no
inquiry or proof is required, can be raised at any stage.
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 16 of 32
36.4. Further, in Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu
International [(1979) 4 SCC 176] , this Court has held
thus : (SCC p. 177, para 2)
“ 2. … The plea of limitation based on this
section is one which the court always looks upon
with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public
authority like the Port Trust should, in all
morality and justice, take up such a plea to
defeat a just claim of the citizen. It is high time
that Governments and public authorities adopt
the practice of not relying upon technical pleas
for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of
citizens and do what is fair and just to the
citizens. Of course, if a Government or a public
authority takes up a technical plea, the court has
to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has
to be upheld by the court, but what we feel is
that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up
by a Government or a public authority, unless of
course the claim is not well founded and by
reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the
purpose of resisting such a claim has become
unavailable.”
18. Recently, the apex Court in Shri Saurav Jain and Anr. v. M/s.
A.B.P. Design & Anr , reported in (2022) 18 SCC 633 considering the
point when a plea of power or jurisdiction was raised for the first time
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 17 of 32
which was repelled on the score that once the plea partakes a character
of pure question of law and strikes at the competency and jurisdiction
of the Court, it may be raised. The observations made in paragraphs-
37 to 39 are quoted as under:
“37. In P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma
[ P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma , 1995
Supp (4) SCC 286] as well, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court entertained an objection as to
maintainability of the suit under Section 9 CPC,
despite the plea not having been raised before the
courts below. The Court observed that the plea of a bar
or lack of jurisdiction can be entertained at any stage,
since an order or decree passed without jurisdiction is
nonest in law.
38. The position of law has been consistently applied
even in criminal proceedings under Article 136 of the
Constitution. In Masalti v. State of U.P. [ Masalti v.
State of U.P. , 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30 : AIR 1965 SC
202] , the confirmation of the death sentence of a
number of accused persons by the High Court was
under challenge before this Court. Gajendragadkar,
C.J., speaking for a four-Judge Bench of this Court,
observed that : (SCC OnLine SC para 11)
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 18 of 32
“ 11 . We are not prepared to accept Mr
Sawhney's argument that even if this point was
not raised by the appellants before the High
Court, they are entitled to ask us to consider that
point having regard to the fact that 10 persons
have been ordered to be hanged. It may be
conceded that if a point of fact which plainly
arises on the record, or a point of law which is
relevant and material and can be argued without
any further evidence being taken, was urged
before the trial court and after it was rejected by
it was not repeated before the High Court, it
may, in a proper case, be permissible to the
appellants to ask this Court to consider that
point in an appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution; after all in criminal proceedings of
this character where sentences of death are
imposed on the appellants, it may not be
appropriate to refuse to consider relevant and
material pleas of fact and law only on the
ground that they were not urged before the High
Court . If it is shown that the pleas were actually
urged before the High Court and had not been
considered by it, then, of course, the party is
entitled as a matter of right to obtain a decision
on those pleas from this Court. But even
otherwise no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 19 of 32
prohibiting such pleas being raised in appeals
under Article 136.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. Based on the position of law, we find it just to
allow the appellant to raise the ground of jurisdiction
before us. Allowing the ground to be raised would not
require the submission of additional evidence since it
is a pure question of law and strikes at the heart of the
matter. We shall now turn to the merits of this
argument.”
19. On the proposition of law enunciated in the above report, it
leaves no ambiguity in our mind that any point which assumes a
character of a pure question of law and can be conveniently decided
on the basis of the undisputed and/or available facts from the record,
can be permitted to be raised even at the Court of last resort. Every
question of law, if based upon facts, which cannot be deciphered from
the record, is not amenable to be raised for the first time when the
party did not take such plea before the forum of first instance. The
question of law, which raises a doubt on the locus standi of a person
to maintain a proceeding or the competence and jurisdiction of the
Court to entertain a proceeding, if it strikes at the exercise of such
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 20 of 32
jurisdiction, it partakes a character of pure question of law and
amenable to be raised for its determination.
20. Having perceived such proposition of law, the solitary
question raised in the instant writ appeal is whether the Tahasildar can
be regarded as a “person aggrieved” against the order of Additional
Tahasildar, when such authority exercises the power of the Tahasildar
by virtue of an inclusive definition assigned in the statute. By Rule
2(e) of the Odisha Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965, the word
‘Tahasildar’ has been defined to include an Additional Tahasildar. As
succinctly adumbrated hereinabove, the appeal under Section 58 of
the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960 is filed by the Tahasildar
assailing the order of the Additional Tahasildar passed under Section
8-A of the said Act. Hence, the question is, can he be regarded as a
person aggrieved? The expression “any person aggrieved” is not
defined in any statutes, nor in the Act under consideration and,
therefore, it is an ardent duty of the Court to ascertain the meaning of
such expression judicially determined.
21. Before we proceed to ascertain the meaning of the words “any
person aggrieved”, the emphasis is pressed upon a coordinate Bench
decision of this Court in Pabani Barik v. Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 21 of 32
and others, reported in 86 (1998) CLT 853 . In the said case, the
Tahasildar preferred an appeal under Rule 42 of the Odisha Survey
and Settlement Rules, 1962 assailing the order of the Additional
Tahasildar exercising the powers of the Tahasildar in mutating the
name in the Record of Rights and a plea was taken whether the
Tahasildar can be regarded as “person aggrieved” to maintain an
appeal before the appellate authority. Rule 2(d) of the said Rules
ascribes the meaning of the word ‘Tahasildar’, which includes
Additional Tahasildar. Such plea of demur was taken before the
coordinate Bench which upon taking note of the letter issued by the
Revenue and Excise Department, Government of Odisha dated
21.11.1992 held that the appeal at the instance of the Tahasildar is
maintainable against the order of Additional Tahasildar. The said
letter vividly reflects that the Tahasildar can file an appeal against the
order of the Additional Tahasildar and vice versa not in his such
capacity, but on behalf of the Government subject, however, to an
approval from the concerned Collector.
22. We find a significant distinct feature in the language
employed in the statutory provision relating to right to appeal in the
said Rules and the Act and Rule applicable in the present case. Rule
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 22 of 32
42 of the Odisha Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962 does not contain
the expression “person aggrieved”, but exposits the right of an appeal
from any final order made under Rule 41 thereof, if the original order
is passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer exercising power of
Tahasildar or any other Officer exercising such power of Tahasildar.
The said Rule 42 is reproduced hereunder:
“ 42. Appeal - (1)An appeal from any final order made
under Rule 41 shall lie –
(i) if the original order was made by an Assistant
Settlement Officer exercising the powers of the
Tahasildar under those rules and working under the
administrative control of the Settlement Officer, to the
Settlement Officer; and
(ii) if the original order was made by any other officer
exercising the powers of the Tahasildar under these
rules, to Sub-divisional Officer.
(2) Every such appeal shall be presented within 180
(one hundred eighty days) from the date of order
appealed against.
Provided that the appeal period shall not be a bar for
correction of records in respect of mutation case,
where all co-sharers or recorded tenants sell the plot
part or in full.”
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 23 of 32
23. It is, thus, evident from the language and the expression used
in the said Rule that even if the Additional Tahasildar is included in
the definition of a Tahasildar, yet he exercises the power that of a
Tahasildar and it is clearly stipulated that such order is amenable to be
challenged by way of an appeal before the authorities mentioned
therein. Though the coordinate Bench held that the appeal at the
instance of a Tahasildar is competent against the order of the
Additional Tahasildar, but in view of the said letter dated 21.11.1992,
it was in effect an appeal by the Government and not by the
Tahasildar per se .
24. It is no longer res integra that the ratio of the judgment is to
be culled out in the context it is so used. A little difference or an
additional fact may invite a different conclusion and, therefore, the
Court must read the judgment in its entirety in order to find out the
ratio decidendi . The Court should not use a sentence or word from the
judgment to decipher the ratio, nor the judgment should be read in a
piecemeal manner. It is no gainsaying that the judgment rendered by
the Court cannot be read as a statute and every word or expression
used therein is to be interpreted under the rigour of the interpretative
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 24 of 32
tools. See paragraph 12 of Union of India v. Arulmozhi Iniarasu,
(2011) 9 SCR 1 .
25. Section 58 of the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960 confers a
right of an appeal to a person aggrieved by an order passed under any
of the sections mentioned therein and, therefore, any person who does
not satisfy the ingredients of the “person aggrieved” has no right to
appeal. The aforesaid expression has been used since time
immemorial in various British statutes and there is also a long list of
the statutes enacted in our country.
26. Lord Parker attempted to give definition of the expression
“person aggrieved” in Ealing Corporation v. Jones, reported in 1959-
1 QB 384 having perceived to be an expression which often create
conflict as made in a different context and involved the special
standing of the party claiming the right of appeal. Drawing an
inspiration from the fons et origo of the discussion of the said phrase
propounded by James L. J. in In Re Sidebotham Ex p. Sidebotham,
(1880) 14 Ch D 458 in relation to the Bankruptcy Act of 1869,
observed that a person would not satisfy the definition of a person
aggrieved simply on a disappointment of the benefit, but must be a
person who has suffered a legal grievance and be a man against whom
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 25 of 32
a decision has been pronounced wrongfully depriving him of
something or wrongfully refusing him of something or wrongfully
affecting the title to something.
27. In In Re Kitson; Ex. p. Sugden (Thomas) and Sons Ltd.,
(1911) 2 KB 109 , an attempt was made to explain the said expression
“person aggrieved” to mean that mere fact that an order is wrongly
made does not by itself give a grievance to a petitioner not otherwise
aggrieved. The five Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in
Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of
Maharashtra, Bombay reported in AIR 1971 SC 385 fortifies the
aforesaid principles in the following:
“12. From these cases it is apparent that any person who
feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a
“person aggrieved”. He must be disappointed of a
benefit which he would have received if the order had
gone the other way. The order must cause him a legal
grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. It is
no doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about
material matters but his legal grievance must be a
tendency to injure him. That the order is wrong or that it
acquits some one who he thinks ought to be convicted
does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance. These
principles are gathered from the cases cited and do not,
as I shall show later, do violence to the context in which
the phrase occurs in the Advocates' Act. Although I am
aware that in Seven Oaks Urban District Council v.
Twynam (1929) 2 KB 440 at 443, Lord Hewart, C.J.,
uttered words of caution, again emphasised by Lord
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Parker, C.J. in 1959-1 QB 384 (supra), in applying too
readily the definitions given in relation to other statutes
but I do not think I am going beyond what Lord Hewart,
C.J., said and what Lord Parker, C.J., did in the case.
Lord Parker observed:
“… As Lord Hewart, C.J., pointed out in 1929-2 KB 440:
‘But as has been said again and again there is often little
utility in seeking to interpret particular expressions in
one statute by reference to decisions given upon similar
expressions in different statutes which have been enacted
alio intuitu. The problem with which we are concerned is
not, what is the meaning of the expression ‘aggrieved’ in
any one of a dozen other statutes, but what is its meaning
in this part of this statute? Accordingly, I only look at the
cases to which we have been referred to see if there are
general principles which can be extracted which will
guide the court in approaching the question as to what
the words ‘person aggrieved’ mean in any particular
statute.”
If I may say respectfully I fully endorse this approach. I
am now in a position to examine the Advocates' Act but
before I do so I must refer to a case near in point to this
case, than any case considered before.”
28. The case before the five Judge Bench relates to a locus standi
of the Advocate General of the State challenging the decision of the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council as he felt that the order is
erroneous. In the backdrop of the above, it is held as under:
“64. A decision by the Disciplinary Committee cannot
necessarily be said to raise a point of public interest
merely because the Advocate-General feels that it is
erroneous or that he himself would have arrived at a
different conclusion. That at best is his personal opinion
as regards the conduct of an advocate who has to deal
with the public and the non-acceptance thereof does not
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 27 of 32
make him a person aggrieved. An Advocate-General in
India is not the guardian angel of the Bar, nor is he the
champion of public interest in any matter save as
specified in a statute.”
29. It is, thus, evident from the exposition of law laid down in the
five Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court that a person cannot
satisfy the definition of “person aggrieved” merely he felt that the
order annoys him or disappoints him unless he has a substantial
interest, not only affecting his right, but prejudicial to his interest.
Any other connotation to the said expression would create an
anomalous situation where an authority in succession would continue
to challenge the order of the predecessor as he is dissatisfied with the
decision or the manner in which such decision has been arrived. What
is important in this regard is whether he is personally affected or
prejudiced by an order or any other person who can be regarded as a
person aggrieved. It is no misnomer to suggest that the Government
might felt aggrieved by any decision of the quasi-judicial authority
and might invest the power upon any of the officer to act on behalf of
the Government and challenge the said order as if the Government is
an aggrieved person. The appeal is not maintainable in its personal
capacity or a capacity de hors the concurrence of the Government. In
the case of Pabani Barik (supra), the Government authorized the
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 28 of 32
Tahasildar to challenge the said order and, therefore, it was always
regarded as an appeal at the instance of a Government and not the
Tahasildar in its persona designata. The said case is distinguished on
such scope and, therefore, lend in support thereof is not permissible.
30. In the instant case, the Tahasildar, in individual capacity, filed
the appeal against the order of the Additional Tahasildar, who is
admittedly discharging the functions of the Tahasildar without any
such power having conferred by the Government, nor any approval in
this regard is obtained.
31. The matter can be viewed from another angle as well. The
language employed in Rule 42 of the Odisha Survey and Settlement
Rules, 1962 is distinct and different from the language employed in
Section 58 of the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960. It would not be
wrong to suggest that the right of appeal emanates from the statute
and, therefore, is regarded as a statutory right. Unless the right to
appeal is inferred from the statutory provision either expressly or by
necessary implication, no person can exhaust such right of appeal as
he felt that the manner in which the order is passed disappoints him.
Rule 42 of the Odisha Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962 does not
expressly contain the words “person aggrieved” which is evidently
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 29 of 32
incorporated in Section 58 of the Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960.
Rule 42 of the Odisha Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962 contains the
right of an appeal against any final order made by an authority
mentioned therein exercising the powers of the Tahasildar and,
therefore, a clear stipulation was made that even if an authority
exercises the power of the Tahasildar, the right of appeal is reserved
to a forum and if the Government intends to file the appeal, it may
vest power into any authority including the Tahasildar to prefer the
appeal. However, in Section 58 of the Odisha Land Reforms Act,
1960, the expression “any person aggrieved” is explicitly and clearly
incorporated therein and, therefore, the first and foremost endeavour
should be made to ascertain whether the person appealing against the
order is an aggrieved person. Even if, the Additional Tahasildar is
included within the definition of ‘Tahasildar’ given under Rule 2(e) of
the Odisha Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965, it would be regarded
as an order passed by a Tahasildar. The person who passed the order
cannot be regarded as a person aggrieved against his own order unless
a different intention appears from the statutory provision as we found
in the case of Rule 42 of the Odisha Survey and Settlement Rules,
1962.
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 30 of 32
32. In absence of any express stipulation in the statute, the order
passed by the Additional Tahasildar by virtue of an inclusive
definition of the word ‘Tahasildar’ shall be regarded as an order
passed a Tahasildar and, therefore, the Tahasildar cannot be regarded
as a person aggrieved solely on the ground that the order disappoints
him or the manner in which such order is passed, does not conform to
his understanding of law.
33. In view of the law so enunciated in the above reports, we do
not find that the appeal at the instance of the Tahasildar in absence of
any conferment of powers by the Government is competent and,
therefore, he lacks locus standi as a person aggrieved. Though the
impugned order is silent on the above aspect and was restricted to the
powers of the appellate authority in deciding the matter on merit
without condonation of delay, but such being a pure question of law
strikes at the root of the competency of the appeal at the behest of the
Tahasildar, we feel it prudent to decide the same and having held that
the Tahasildar is not a person aggrieved, the appeal is not
maintainable.
34. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the single Bench
is hereby set aside. As a consequence whereof, the appeal filed by the
W.A. No. 1448 of 2026 Page 31 of 32
Tahasildar before the appellate authority is not maintainable and,
therefore, is dismissed.
35. The writ appeal is, thus, disposed of. There shall be no order
as to costs.
(Harish Tandon)
Chief Justice
(M.S. Raman)
Judge
Arun Mishra
S.K. Guin
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SUBASH KUMAR GUIN
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 12-Nov-2026 16:51:21
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