NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. vs SADHNA WD.O MUKESHKUMAR SHAILESHKUMAR PANDEY

C/FA/2109/2013 (GJHC240396052013) JUDGMENT DATED: 03/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2109 of 2013
With
R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2110 of 2013

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
Yes
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NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
Versus
SADHNA WD.O MUKESHKUMAR SHAILESHKUMAR PANDEY & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR PALAK H THAKKAR(3455) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR AMIT C NANAVATI(1384) for the Defendant(s) No. 1,2,3,4
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

Date : 03/09/2026

JUDGMENT
1. Captioned appeals under section 173 of the Motor Vehicle
Act, arise from the common judgment and order dated
26.02.2013 passed in MACT, Ahmedabad City in MACP No.465
of 2010 and MACP No.466 2010 by which the learned Tribunal
allowed both the claim petition in tune of Rs.9,61,000/- MACP
No.465 of 2010 and Rs.2,60,000/- in MACP No.466 of 2010
along with 9% yearly interest from the date of claim petition till
realization.
2. The appellant Insurance Company has preferred this
appeals on the ground that vehicle has been involved in the
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C/FA/2109/2013 (GJHC240396052013) JUDGMENT DATED: 03/09/2026
matter subsequently.
3. Facts of the case are as under :-
3.1. On 18.01.2010, the deceased, Mukeshkumar, was riding
his motorcycle with a friend within the city of Ahmedabad from
Ropad Cross Road to Ring Road. At that time, Opponent No. 1
drove tanker No. GJ-1-X-7900 at an excessive speed,
endangering human life, and dashed with the motorcycle from
behind. As a result, the deceased and the pillion rider were
thrown from the motorcycle and sustained multiple injuries.
Both of them were shifted to L.G. Hospital, Ahmedabad, for
treatment, but during the course of treatment, Mukeshkumar
succumbed to his injuries.
4. In aforesaid factual background, the claimants have filed
claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act
claiming the compensation of Rs. 13,00,000/- in MACP No.465
of 2010 and Rs.7,50,000/-in MACP No.466 of 2010 along with
interest and cost.
5. Learned Tribunal after permitting both the parties to lead
evidence, ultimately passed award in aforesaid terms.
6. Heard learned advocate Mr. Palak Thakkar for the
appellant – Insurance Company and learned advocate Mr.
Nanavaty for the respondents – claimants.
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C/FA/2109/2013 (GJHC240396052013) JUDGMENT DATED: 03/09/2026
7. Learned advocate Mr. Palak Thakkar raised main
contention that the FIR was lodged against an unknown person,
and the registration number of the offending vehicle was not
even mentioned in the FIR. It is submitted that the tanker was
subsequently planted or falsely implicated by introducing the
vehicle into the FIR at a later stage, which renders the entire
case highly doubtful. It is further submitted that the tanker was
not involved in the accident, and defense was raised in the
written statement which is supported by the deposition of the
driver-cum-owner of the vehicle. Despite this, the learned
Tribunal committed an error in fastening liability upon the
opponents to pay compensation. It is also submitted that there is
inconsistency between the Panchnama and the FIR: the former
states that the motorcycle driven by the deceased sustained
damage on the front side, whereas the FIR states that the
motorcycle was hit from behind. It is submitted that this factual
discrepancy establishes that the tanker was falsely implicated in
the accident after the 20 to 25 days of lodging FIR. In light of
these submissions, it is prayed that the appeals be allowed and
the insurance company be exonerated from any liability to pay
compensation.
8. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Nanavati for respondents-
claimants supported impugned judgment and award and
submitted to dismiss the appeals.
9. Regard being had to the rival submissions and upon
perusal of the impugned judgment and award as well as the
Record and Proceedings of the case, it appears that Opponent
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C/FA/2109/2013 (GJHC240396052013) JUDGMENT DATED: 03/09/2026
No. 1, who is the driver-cum-owner of the tanker, did not file any
written statement raising the defense that the vehicle was not
involved in the road accident. Examining this factual aspect
alongside the other evidence, the record indicates that although
the initial FIR did not contain the name of the accused or the
tanker number, the police subsequently added the name of
Opponent No. 1 as well as the tanker details into the FIR and
filed a charge sheet against Opponent No. 1. These criminal
proceedings were never challenged or questioned by Opponent
No. 1 before any competent forum. Furthermore, the insurance
company failed to lead the evidence of its officer in defense by
filing an affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
10. Cross exemption of the witness is material, which reads as
under (it is in Gujarati language, for better understanding, it is
translated in English) :-
“1. It is true that the summons for this matter was served
on me. It is true that I have not appeared through an
advocate. It is true that I have not filed any reply in this
case. It is true that no summons was served on me by the
Court to give testimony today. I have come to give testimony
today as instructed by the Insurance Company. It is true
that I was arrested in connection with this accident, a
charge-sheet has also been filed in that regard, and that
case is currently ongoing. 3 persons were working on the
tanker by which the accident occurred. I have not seen the
accident happening. I have no knowledge as to which truck
caused the said accident. The police from Vatva Police
Station had arrived at the place of the incident, and I had
not informed them either about how the accident occurred.
At that time, the police had not recorded my statement or the
statements of other employees on the tanker. I was not
present when the police drew up the panchnama. I did not
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C/FA/2109/2013 (GJHC240396052013) JUDGMENT DATED: 03/09/2026
attempt to obtain the number of the truck that caused the
accident, nor did I chase it.
2. It is not true that I am falsely stating that the accident
occurred with another truck. It is not true that the accident
occurred with my truck.
3. When the incident occurred, I was residing in
Ahmedabad. At that time, I had shown my permanent
address as Ahmedabad. It is true that the registration and
policy of the vehicle bear the address of Surendranagar. It is
true that since no one was residing at the Surendranagar
address, my arrest was made later on. It is not true that I
am lying when I say that the relatives of the deceased came
to my place a week after the incident. It is not true that I fled
with the tanker after causing the accident. It is not true that
I am giving false testimony to help the Insurance Company.”
11. A careful perusal of the aforesaid cross-examination of the
witness makes it manifestly clear that Opponent No. 1 never
challenged the criminal proceedings initiated against him,
though criminal case was duly registered against him. He also
accepted that road accident took place on that place but clarified
that it was at the instance of truck and not tanker. Later on, he
has accepted that he was arrested.
12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Geeta Dubey v/s.
United Insurance Company Limited [2024 SCC online 3779]
observed that Motor accident Claim Petitions under Section 166
of the MV Act must be adjudicated on the touchstone of
“preponderance of probability” rather than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It is further held that under Section 173 of the
MV Act , the Appellate Court is required to carefully marshal all
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C/FA/2109/2013 (GJHC240396052013) JUDGMENT DATED: 03/09/2026
oral and documentary evidence before reversing a reasoned
MACT award.
13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ICICI Lombard
General Insurance Co. v/s. Rajani Sahoo [(2025) 2 SCC 599]
held that Police investigation records, including the FIR and
Charge-Sheet, constitute valid, admissible, and reliable prima
facie evidence to establish rash and negligent driving in MACT
proceedings. It is further held that subsequent acquittal in a
criminal case does not affect the assessment of tortious liability
under the MV Act. Relevant para 8 to 11 reads as under :-
“8. As regards the reliability of charge sheet and other
documents collected by the police during the investigation in
motor accident cases, this Court in the case of Mangla Ram
v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.1 , held in paragraph
No.27, thus : -
“27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to
interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 & 3, was
absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum of
negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this
view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis done
by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701 was
driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when it
collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to the
accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of
witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the
police, naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent decision
in Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier
Cruz , (2013) 10 SCC 646, noted that the key of negligence
on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by
the claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on
the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly
not by standard of proof beyond reasonable (2018) 5 SCC
656; 2018 INSC 311 doubt. Suffice it to observe that the
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exposition in the judgments already adverted to by us, filing
of charge-sheet against Respondent 2 prima facie points
towards his complicity in driving the vehicle negligently and
rashly. Further, even when the accused were to be acquitted
in the criminal case, this Court opined that the same may be
of no effect on the assessment of the liability required in
respect of motor accident cases by the Tribunal”.
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. It is true that the Tribunal had looked into the oral and
documentary evidence including the FIR, final report and
such other documents prepared by the police in connection
with the accident in question. The Tribunal had also taken
note of the fact that based on the final report, the driver of
the offending truck was tried and found guilty for rash and
negligent driving. The High Court took note of such aspects
and found no illegality in the procedure adopted by the
Tribunal and consequently dismissed the appeal.
10. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a
decision of this Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohammed
Shafi & Anr.2 , this Court held thus:-
“12….A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into
consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an accident
caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner need
not be established by the claimants. The claimants have to
establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities. The standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition
seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a
road traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation
made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes vs. Joaquim Xavier
Cruz , (2013) 10 SCC 646 which has referred to the aforesaid
judgment in Bimla Devi.”
11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the
position that the question regarding negligence which is
essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle accident
claim should be considered based on the evidence available
before the Tribunal. If the police records are available before
the Tribunal, taking note of the purpose of the Act it cannot
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C/FA/2109/2013 (GJHC240396052013) JUDGMENT DATED: 03/09/2026
be said that looking into (2023) 13 SCC 510; 2023 INSC 621
such documents for the aforesaid purpose is impermissible
or inadmissible.”
14. In recent judgment in case of Reena Versus Managing
Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation [2026
(0) INSC 889 ], summarized the principle and in para 21 held as
under :-
“21. The following principles can be laid out from the above
judgments:
A. Charge Sheet creates a prima facie case of negligence.
B. Criminal acquittals do not displace this prima facie civil
liability.
C. Scene sketches showing post-impact vehicle positions
cannot be used to infer contributory negligence against
smaller vehicles.
D. High Courts cannot summarily overturn MACT Awards
without meeting the standard of preponderance of
probability in civil cases.”
15. In view above, the contention raised by the learned
advocate Mr. Thakkar is arid of merit. There are sufficient
evidence on record to prove involvement of the tanker in the road
accident. Learned Tribunal has has rightly examined the
evidence and passed aforesaid judgment. I see no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment and award. Consequently,
the appeals being devoid of merits, are dismissed.
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16. The learned Tribunal concerned shall disburse the entire
awarded amount lying in the FDR and/or with the Tribunal, with
accrued interest thereon, if any, to the claimant/s, by account
payee cheque / NEFT / RTGS, after proper verification and if
required by passing necessary order for disbursement.
17. While making the payment, the Tribunal shall deduct the
courts fees, if not paid, in accordance with rules/law.
18. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned
Tribunal, forthwith.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
SATISH
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