Kapil Kumar Patel vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:86508
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH
th
ON THE 28 OF OCTOBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 42277 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC010751172026
KAPIL KUMAR PATEL
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Pradeep Patel and Shri Utkarsh Patel - Advocates for petitioner.
Shri V.S. Choudhary - Government Advocate for State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been
filed by the petitioner seeking following reliefs:
"A. To issue a writ in the nature of
mandamus, or any other suitable writ, order
or direction, directing the Respondents to
reconsider the petitioner's case for
appointment as Samvida Shala Shikshak
Grade-III against the vacancy arising out of
Appointment Order No. 2292/2293 dated 05-
07-2013, in light of his higher merit of 89
marks, in the interest of justice.
B. To direct the Respondents to decide the
petitioner's pending representation (Annexure
P-5), asking for appointment on the ground
of higher merit, within such time as this
Hon'ble Court thinks fit, by a reasoned order,
in accordance with law.
C. Any other relief or order which this
Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper under the
facts and circumstances, in the interest of
justice."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner secured
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TAJAMMUL
HUSSAIN KHAN
Signing time: 29-10-2026
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89 marks in the Eligibility Test under the OBC category and fulfills all the

requisite eligibility criteria, yet the respondents have denied him appointment
while appointing candidates of the same category who secured between 75
and 84 marks. It is contended that such action is arbitrary and contrary to
Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Samvida Shala Shikshak (Niyojan
Avam Samvida ki Sharten) Niyam, 2005, read with the Recruitment Scheme
dated 29.07.2011, which provides for preparation of a category-wise merit
list on the basis of marks obtained in the Eligibility Test. Learned counsel
further submits that the petitioner’s representation seeking redressal of his
grievance has not been decided by the respondents, thereby violating the
principles of natural justice and fairness in public employment.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner and raises a preliminary objection
regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition on the ground of
gross delay, laches and acquiescence. Accordingly, learned counsel submits
that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. In view of the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel
for the State regarding delay, laches and acquiescence and considering the
facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the claim of the petitioner does not warrant interference in exercise of
the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the aspect of delay in
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TAJAMMUL
HUSSAIN KHAN
Signing time: 29-10-2026
10:21:33

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approaching the Court in the case Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing

Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. reported in (2013) 12
SCC 649 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that
can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, nonpedantic approach while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay, for the courts
are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged
to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms
are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on
the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note
of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no
real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to
the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas
to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the
first one warrants strict approach whereas the second
calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the
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Signed by: TAJAMMUL
HUSSAIN KHAN
Signing time: 29-10-2026
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fundamental principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be given a total
go-by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the
courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by
taking recourse to the technicalities of law of
limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is
founded on objective reasoning and not on individual
perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some
more guidelines taking note of the present day
scenario. They are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay
should be drafted with careful concern and not in a
haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock
of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay
should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
base of individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down
regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion,
yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and
collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be
made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as
a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner
requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.

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Signed by: TAJAMMUL
HUSSAIN KHAN
Signing time: 29-10-2026
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7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs.

Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the
contention that a petition should be considered
ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner
approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the
same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay
and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep
slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in
cases where some diligent person had approached the
Court within a reasonable time."
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn.
Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise
their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court
may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there
is such negligence or omission on the part of the
applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the opposite party. Even where
fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports
[(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course,
the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably."
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC
at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills
Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor
Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir
Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
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Signed by: TAJAMMUL
HUSSAIN KHAN
Signing time: 29-10-2026
10:21:33

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by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as it
relates to the remedy.”

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs District
Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311 has further held as under:
“10. … It is time and again, stated that a party who
has slept over his right since is not entitled to the
discretionary relief of the High Court.”
10. Thus, on the ground of delay itself, this Court is not inclined to
entertain this writ petition.
11. Accordingly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches.
(VIVEK KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE
THK

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: TAJAMMUL
HUSSAIN KHAN
Signing time: 29-10-2026
10:21:33