Jangeer Singh Trading As Jangeer Singh Kabulshah Agriculture Works vs Yogesh Jangid Trading As Jangid Agro Engineering & Anr.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
# CNR No. DLHC010427772026
+ CS(COMM) 987/2026 and I.A. 24805/2026 and I.A. 24806/2026,
I.A. 24807/2026

Between:

ABD MAESTRO PRIVATE LIMITED
394-C, LAMINGTON CHAMBERS,
LAMINGTON ROAD,
MUMBAI - 400 004

ALSO, AT
ASHFORD CENTRE, 7TH FLOOR,
SHANKARRAO NARAM MARG,
LOWER PAREL (WEST),
MUMBAI - 400013
.....PLAINTIFF

(Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayyar, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr.
Advocate along with Mr. Shrawan Chopra and Mr. Achyut Tewari,
MS. Krishna, Ms. Kairavi, Ms. Sugandh, Mr. Pratham, Mr. Mridul
and Ms. Shreya, Advocates..)

Versus

GREAT GALLEON VENTURES LTD.
160, KANCHAN BAGH,
INDORE, MADHYA PRADESH

ALSO, AT
308-309, PRINCE'S BUSINESS SKYPARK,
SCHEME NO. 54, A.B. ROAD,
INDORE, MADHYA PRADESH – 452010

Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

1

PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS:
A-33, GROUND FLOOR,
NARAINA INDUSTRIAL AREA,
PHASE L, NEW DELHI,
SOUTH WEST DELHI, DELHI, 110028.
.....DEFENDANT

(Through: Mr. Chander M. Lall, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Kapil
Wadhwa, Ms. Priyanshi Bhageria and Ms.Ananya Mehan,
Advocates.)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 24.09.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# CNR No. DLHC010431792026
+ CS(COMM) 996/2026, CAV. 444/2026, I.A. 24980/2026 & I.A.
24981/2026

AMBER NUTRITION PRIVATE LIMITED
THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
MR. RAJESH DHINGRA
332/2, BEHIND AGRAWAL TOL KANTA,
UDHYOG NAGAR, GRAM PALDA,
INDORE-452002, MADHYA PRADESH, INDIA

.....PLAINTIFF

(Through: Mr. Samrat S. Kang and Mr. Swapnil Agrawal,
Advocates.)

Versus

1. MR. MANISH CHANDAK
TRADING AS M/S PANKAJ CONFECTIONARY
G-115, C/O RONAK CONFECTIONARY,
AGRO FOOD PARK, BORANDA,
JODHPUR – 342001, RAJASTHAN

Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

2

.....DEFENDANT NO.1

2. MR. JAI KISHAN BOOB
TRADING AS M/S POONA SWEET PRODUCTS,
1, BEHIND GEETA BHAWAN, MAHESH SCHOOL ROAD,
JODHPUR, 342003, RAJASTHAN

.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

(Through: Mr. Shravan Kumar Bansal and Mr. Pankaj Kumar,
Advocate for D-1.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 24.09.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# CNR No. DLHC010326252022
+ CS(COMM) 598/2022 and I.A. 121/2023

JANGEER SINGH TRADING AS
JANGEER SINGH KABULSHAH
AGRICULTURE WORKS
NEAR NEW DHAN MANDI, ANOOPGARPH
ROAD, RAISINGH NAGAR, DISTT. SRI
GANGA NAGAR, RAJASTHAN, THROUGH
ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
MR. PARVINDER SINGH
.....PLAINTIFF

(Through: Mr. Vikas Khera (VC), Ms. SnehaSethia, Ms. Kumari
Pragati and Ms. Payal Aggarwal, Advs..)

Versus

YOGESH JANGID
TRADING AS JANGID AGRO ENGINEERING
KANASIA NAKA, AB ROAD,
UJJAIN - 456770, MADHYA PRADESH

Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

3

.....DEFENDANT

(Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Senior Advocate with Mr. Avinash
Sharma, Mr. Raghav Nagar and Mr. Rishab Nagar, Advocates for D-
1.)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 28.09.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# CNR No. DLHC010437382026
+ CS(COMM) 1010/2026 and I.A. 25298/2026, I.A. 25299/2026, I.A.
25300/2026 & I.A. 25301/2026

NAMASTU ENTERPRISE
PRIVATE LIMITED
THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE,
MR. SUMIT MARDA
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES
ACT, 2013 (CIN: U46491WR2026PTC293004), AND A
REGISTERED MICRO ENTERPRISE UNDER THE MSME
ACT (UDYAM REG. NO. UDYAM-WB-08-0133978),
REGISTERED OFFICE AT 19, PANCHANANTALA ROAD,
BALLY, HOWRAH, WEST BENGAL – 711201
.....PLAINTIFF

(Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Saral Sharma, Mr.
Karikey Sharma and Ms. Purnima Vashishtha, Advs..)

Versus

1. KAJALBEN MAHESHBHAI KAKLOTAR
PROPRIETOR OF M/S KHODAL ENTERPRISE
(TRADING AS ―M. KAASA‖)
HAVING ITS PRINCIPAL ADDRESS AT THIRD
FLOOR, FLAT NO-309, BUILDING- F, EWS-37(P2), TP
NO. 45, FP NO. 117, SUMAN VANDAN-2, NR SAI
PUJAN APP, JAHANGIRPURA, ICHCHHAPOR, SURAT,
GUJARAT, 395005
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

4

ALSO AT:
221, SANTOSHI KRUPA SOC NR BAPA SITARAM
CHOWK, SURAT,
GUJARAT – 395004, INDIA
.....DEFENDANT NO.1

2. AMAZON SELLER SERVICES
PRIVATE LIMITED
CIN: U51900KA2010PTC053234
HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT SATTVA
HORIZON, SURVEY NO 6/1 AND 7/1, VINAYAK
NAGAR, KATTIGENAHALLI VENKATALA VILLAGE,
YELAHANKA HOBLI BANGALORE,
KARNATAKA – 560064
.....DEFENDANT NO.2

(Through: None.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 28.09.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010451972026
+ CS(COMM) 1041/2026 & I.As. 26095-99/2026
ZYDUS WELLNESS PRODUCTS LTD
ZYDUS CORPORATE PARK
SCHEME NO. 63, SURVEY NO. 536
KHORAJ (GANDHINAGAR), NR. VAISHNODEVI CIRCLE
SARKHEJ – GANDHINAGAR HIGHWAY
AHMEDABAD – 382481, GUJARAT
… PLAINTIFF
( Through: Mr. Adarsh Ramanujan with Ms. Archana Sahadeva, Mr.
Rahul Bhujbal and Mr. Yash Raj, Advocates. )

versus
TUSHAR CHIMANLAL CHITALIA
[TRADING AS: TUSHAR HEALTH CARE (INDIA)]
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

5

2ND FLOOR, 219/220, DIAMOND INDUSTRIAL ESTATE
KETKI PADA ROAD, DAHISAR EAST
MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA, 400068

AND ALSO D/B/A AND AT:
M/S HELLO (INDIA)
KH NO 999, SALEMPUR
RAJPUTANA INDUSTRIAL AREA
ROORKEE, HARIDWAR
UTTARAKHAND, 247667
.....DEFENDANT NO. 1

KUNAL SHAH
D/B/A: NAVKAR DISTRIBUTORS
FLOOR NO. 5, ROOM NO. 110, 22/24 ANANTWADI
BHULESHWAR, MUMBAI - 400002,
MAHARASHTRA
.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

ENDURANCE INTERNATIONAL
GROUP (INDIA) PVT. LTD.
D/B/A PUBLICDOMAINREGISTRY.COM
UNIT 401, 4TH FLOOR, IT BUILDING 3, NESCO IT PARK
NESCO COMPLEX, WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY,
GOREGAON (EAST)
MUMBAI 400063
.....DEFENDANT NO. 3

INDIAMART INTERMESH LTD.
D/B/A WWW.INDIAMART.COM
1ST FLOOR, 29 DARYAGANJ
NETAJI SUBASH MARG,
DELHI – 110002
.....DEFENDANT NO. 4

INFOCOM NETWORK PVT. LTD.
A-86, PHASE-II OKHLA INDUSTRIAL
AREA DELHI – 110020
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

6

.....DEFENDANT NO. 5
JOHN DOE
ADDRESS UNKNOWN
.....DEFENDANT NO. 6

( Through: None. )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 30.09.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010307162026
+ CS(COMM) 746/2026 and I.A. 18505-18510/2026
1. SANJAY KUMAR JAIN
KARTA OF SANJAY JAIN (HUF)
TRADING AS M/S RADHA PHARMACY,
B/H.ARYA SAMAJ, SHEOGANJ,
DIST- SIROHI, (RAJASTHAN)
… PLAINTIFF NO.1
2. KAACHAL EXPORTERS
PRIVATE LIMITED
BEHIND ARYA SAMAJ, SHEOGANJ,
SIROHI, RAJASTHAN,307027
… PLAINTIFF NO.2
( Through: Mr.Harish Kumar and Mr.Pranav, Advocates .)
versus
NANDI AYURVED
NEAR WATER TANK,
VILLAGE SANDIYA
THE. SOJAT DISTT. PALI,
RAJASTHAN, 306306
.....DEFENDANT NO. 1

NIRMAYA AYURVED
THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

7

VILLAGE SANDIYA, THE, SOJAT,
DISTT. PALI, RAJASTHAN-306306
.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

VAID DHANVANTARI AYURVEDA
NEAR BANSAL B.K.O
UBHAWAL ROAD, SANGRUR,
PUNJAB-148001
.....DEFENDANT NO. 3

RAMESH BELT HOUSE &
MAYUR PUJA BHANDAR
MATRIKUNDIYA, TEHSIL RASHMI,
CHITTORGARH, RAJASTHAN,
312203,
.....DEFENDANT NO. 4

INDIAMART INTERMESH LIMITED
1ST FLOOR, 29 DARYAGANJ,
NETAJI SUBASH MARG,
NEW DELHI , DELHI – 110002
.....DEFENDANT NO. 5

( Through: None. )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 01.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010246432026
+ CS(COMM) 611/2026, I.A. 15270/2026, I.A. 15271/2026, I.A.
15272/2026, I.A. 15273/2026, I.A. 15274/2026, I.A. 15275/2026 &
I.A. 27570/2026

AMRITSAR HAVELI CUISINES
PRIVATE LIMITED
J-2/3, MAIN NAJAFGARH ROAD,
RAJOURI GARDEN, NEAR CENTURION BANK OF INDIA,
NEW DELHI-110027
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

8

… PLAINTIFF NO.1

RUBJEET SINGH GROVER
312, EAST MOHAN NAGAR,
AMRITSAR, PUNJAB, 143001

… PLAINTIFF NO.2

( Through: Mr. Anshuman Upadhayay, Mr. Naseem Sheikh and Mr.
Rahul Singh, Advs. )

versus

AMARBIR SINGH
PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW
TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI,
INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI,
AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006

.....DEFENDANT NO. 1

KULWINDER SINGH
PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW
TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, INSIDE
SARAGARHI SARAI,
AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006

.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

GAGANDEEP SINGH
PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW
TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI,
INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI,
AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006

.....DEFENDANT NO. 3

JASPAL SINGH SIDHU
PARTNER OF CAFE GREEN BREW
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

9

TOWN HALL, INSIDE SARAGARHI SARAI, INSIDE
SARAGARHI SARAI,
AMRITSAR, PUNJAB- 143006

.....DEFENDANT NO. 4

( Through: None. )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 05.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# CNR No. DLHC010371962026
+ CS(COMM) 874/2026 and I.A. 21757-21761/2026
PHARMED LIMITED
SATTVA MINDCOMP TECH PARK
GROUND FLOOR, OFFICE 1, 149-A, EPIP II PHASE,
WHITEFIELD INDUSTRIAL AREA,
BENGALURU - 560 066, KARNATAKA

Also at:
nd
1/23-B, 2 Floor, Asaf Ali Road,
New Delhi-110002, India
.....PLAINTIFF

( Through: Ms.Lakshmidevi Somanath and Ms/Kanishka Vaish,
Advocates. )

versus

BEST BIOTECH
76-13-18B/6 A&B, OPP. AVSR SKY COURT,
BESIDE LANE OF SAMSKRUTI FUNCTION HALL
URMILA NAGAR ROAD, BEST BIOTECH STREET,
BHAVANIPURAM, VIJAYAWADA
ANDHRA PRADESH 520012.

Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

10

.....DEFENDANT NO. 1

SAVYA PHARMACEUTICALS
PLOT. NO-5A-4, SECTOR 09,
IIE PANTNAGAR, U.S.N. - 263153
UTTRAKHAND

.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

JUST DIAL LIMITED
PALM COURT, M.M. MALVIYA ROAD,
UPPER GOVIND NAGAR, MALAD (WEST),
MUMBAI-400097

Also at:
rd
No. 184, 187, 3 Floor, Temple Steps,
B Block, Anna Salai, Little Mount Saidapet,
Chennai - 600015

.....DEFENDANT NO. 3

( Through: Mr.Avinash Kumar Sharma and Mr.B. Sidhi Pramodh
Rayudu, Advocates for D-1.
Mr. Bharat Garg with Ms. Surabhi Pandey and Mr.
Davansh Garg, Advocates for D3. )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 07.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# CNR No. DLHC010048972026
+ CS(COMM) 128/2026 & I.A. 3790/2026, I.A. 9921/2026

SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT SHRM
A U.S. BASED COMPANY HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT:
1800 DUKE STREET, ALEXANDRIA,
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

11

VIRGINIA 22314,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.....PLAINTIFF
( Through: Mr. Neeraj Bhardwaj with Mr. N.K. Bhardwaj, Mr.
Bikash Ghorai & Mr. Salil Oberoi, Advocates .)

versus

STRATEGIC HRM
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
HILITE BUSINESS PARK,
CALICUT, (KOZHIKODE) KERALA,
PIN- 673014

.....DEFENDANT NO. 1

GODADDY.COM LLC,
14455, NORTH HAYDEN ROAD,
SUITE-219, SCOTTSDALE,
ARIZONA 85260

.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

HOSTGATOR.COM LLC
5005 MITCHELLADALE
ST, SUITE 100, HOUSTON,
TEXAS, UNITED STATES- 77092

.....DEFENDANT NO. 3

( Through: Ms. Julien George with Ms. Deepika Pokharia & Mr.
Vedam Anand, Advocates for D1. )

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 07.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

12

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010179982026
+ CS(COMM) 444/2026, I.A. 11717/2026, I.A. 16164/2026, I.A.
15483/2026 & I.A. 28513/2026

KBB NUTS PVT. LIMITED
B-57 LAWRENCE ROAD, INDUSTRIAL AREA,
DELHI - 110035.
.....PLAINTIFF
( Through: Mr. Manish Biala and Mr. Devesh Ratan, Advocates. )

versus

MR. SURESH CHAND

PROPRIETOR, MIS ARUNA FLOOR DAL & OIL MILL
F-179, RIICO INDUSTRIAL AREA, GANGAPUR CITY,
SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN- 322201.

.....DEFENDANT NO. 1

MS. ARUNA DEVI
PROPRIETOR, MIS ARUNA ENTERPRISES
1 KRISHNA MILL, SHEETLA MATA ROAD,
GANGAPUR CITY,
SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN – 322201

.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

DNA NUTS & DRY FRUITS
THROUGH ITS PARTNERS
1 GANGAPUR CITY ,PURAANI ANAAJ MANDI,
NEAR MANDIR, GANGAPUR CITY,
SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN - 322201.

.....DEFENDANT NO. 3

MR. DEEPAK KUMAR GOYAL
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

13

PARTNER, DNA NUTS & DRY FRUITS
1 GANGAPUR CITY, PURAANI ANAAJ MANDI,
NEAR MANDIR, GANGAPUR CITY,
SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN - 322201.

.....DEFENDANT NO. 4

MR. ANSHUL KUMAR GUPTA
PARTNER, DNA NUTS & DRY FRUITS
1 GANGAPUR CITY ,PURAANI ANAAJ MANDI,
NEAR MANDIR, GANGAPUR CITY,
SAWAI MADHOPUR, RAJASTHAN - 322201.

.....DEFENDANT NO. 5

( Through: Ms. Niyati Vishwakarma, Advocate for D-1 and 2 (thr.
VC )
Mr. Naveen Gupta and Ms. Sandhya Gupta, Advocates for D-3 to 5. )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 09.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010391112026
+ CS(COMM) 917/2026 and I.A. 22773/2026, I.A. 22775/2026
JSW MG MOTOR INDIA
PRIVATE LIMITED
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY,
10 TH FLOOR, MILESTONE EXPERION CENTRE
SECTOR 15, GURUGRAM, HARYANA- 122001

.....PLAINTIFF NO.1

SAIC MOTOR CORPORATION
LIMITED
ROOM 509, BUILDING 1, NO. 563,
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

14

SONG TAO ROAD, PILOT FREE TRADE ZONE,
SHANGHAI, CHINA- 201203

.....PLAINTIFF NO.2

( Through: Mr. Saif Khan, Mr. Prajjwal Kushwaha and Ms. Diya
Vishwanath, Advocates. )

versus

TRISTAR AUTO AGENCIES
(VIZAG) PRIVATE LIMITED,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
B. RAJESH CHITTIBABU,
DOOR NO.38-13-54,
NH-5, LAKSHMI NAGAR, MARRIPALEM,
VISAKHAPATNAM-530018

.....DEFENDANT
( Through: None. )
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 09.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

# CNR No. DLHC010375502026
+ CS(COMM) 883/2026 & I.A. 21989/2026

SHIROMANI GURDWARA
PARBANDHAK COMMITTEE
THROUGH BALWINDER SINGH
SECRETARY & AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE
TEJA SINGH SAMUNDRI HALL,
SRI DARBAR SAHIB COMPLEX, AMRITSAR,
PUNJAB (INDIA) PIN – 143006

.....PLAINTIFF NO.1
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

15

G-NEXT MEDIA PVT. LTD.
THROUGH KRISHAN KUMAR
FINANCE MANAGER & AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE
F-138, PHASE VIII B,
INDUSTRIAL FOCAL POINT, SAS NAGAR,
MOHALI, PUNJAB, 160055, INDIA,

.....PLAINTIFF NO.2

( Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Kapil Midha, Mr.
Karmanya Singh Sareen, Mr. Krishnagopal Abhay, Mr. Sahib Singh
Dhillon, Ms. Pari Bhardwaj, Mr. Soumya Benerjee, Ms. Shree Sruthi,
Ms. Tushita Poddar, Ms. Yadavi Malhotra, Mr. Pratham Vir, Mr.
Shreyas Maheshwari and Mr. Naman Maheshwari, Advs. for P-1.

Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Mahima Kirori, Mr. Anshul
Saharan and Ms. Purnima Vashishtha, Advs. for P-2 .)

versus

GALACTIC TELEVISION
& COMMUNICATIONS
PVT. LTD.
CORPORATE OFFICE:
78, OKHLA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, PHASE-3,
NEW DELHI – 110020
REGISTERED OFFICE:
SCO NO. 45 (FIRST FLOOR) SECTOR-82
SAS NAGAR (MOHALI), PUNJAB – 140306

.....DEFENDANT NO.1

GTC NETWORK UK LIMITED
THROUGH DIRECTOR
RABINDRA NARAYAN
HAVING REGISTERED ADDRESS:
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

16

167-169 GREAT PORTLAND STREET,
LONDON, ENGLAND, W1W 5PF

.....DEFENDANT NO.2

RABINDRA NARAYAN
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF DEFENDANT NO. 1
78, OKHLA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, PHASE-3,
NEW DELHI – 110020

.....DEFENDANT NO.3

MANPREET SINGH
DIRECTOR OF DEFENDANT NO. 1
78, OKHLA INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, PHASE-3,
NEW DELHI - 110020

.....DEFENDANT NO.4

( Through: Mr. P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv. and Mr. Pawan Singh
Bindra, Sr. Adv. with Mrs. Pavitra Kaur, Mr. Harkirat Singh, Mr.
Sushant Singh, Mr. Sushant Singh, Mr. Aditya Notani, Ms.
Dhanushiya S., Ms. Deveshi Chand and Mr. Priyansh Kumar,
Advocates. )

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 12.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010494792026
+ CS(COMM) 1115/2026 and I.A. 28420-28426/2026

MARICO LIMITED
7TH FLOOR, GRANDE PALLADIUM, 175, CST
ROAD KALINA SANTACRUZ (EAST) MUMBAI-
400098 MAHARASHTRA
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

17

....PLAINTIFF

( Through: Mr.Neeraj Grover, Sr. Advocate with Mr.Ankur Sangal,
Mr.Ankit, Mr.Shaurya, Mr.Varoon and Ms.Sanandika, Advocates. )

versus

SHREE UDAY OIL AND FOOD
INDUSTRIES LLP
PLOT NO. 3240, GIDC CHHATRAL, PHASE-3
MANGALAM ALLOYS, GANDHI NAGAR, KALOL
GUJARAT- 382729
ALSO AT:
A-309, SUMEL- 11, ABOVE VIJAY SALES
OPPOSITE NAMASTE CIRCLE
AHMEDABAD - 380004, GUJARAT
.....DEFENDANT
(Through: None.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% Reserved on: 13.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010424552026
+ CS(COMM) 980/2026 and I.A. 24644/2026, I.A. 24645/2026, I.A.
24646/2026, I.A. 24647/2026, I.A. 24648/2026, I.A. 24649/2026 and
I.A. 24650/2026

HAVELI RESTAURANT
AND RESORTS LTD
2ND FLOOR, G - 135,
JAIN COLONY, SECTOR - 22,
ROHINI, DELHI-110086.
ALSO AT
VILLAGE KHAJURLA, PHAGWARA,
KAPURTHALA, PUNJAB - 144402.
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

18

.....PLAINTIFF

( Through: Mr. Peeyoosh Kalra, Mr. Srish Kumar Mishra, Mr.
Vinayak Goel, Mr.Alexander Mathai Paikaday, Mr.Ankit Jain,
Advocates and Mr.Ajay Sandhal, AR. )

versus

SHUBHAM FOOD ENTERPRISES
SUKHI JOHRI, DHARAMPUR,
DHARAMPUR, SOLAN,
HIMACHAL PRADESH, 173209.

.....DEFENDANT

(Through: None.)
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% Reserved on: 14.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
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# CNR No. DLHC010497832026
+ CS(COMM) 1120/2026 and I.A. 28592/2026, I.A. 28593/2026, I.A.
28594/2026, I.A. 28595/2026, I.A. 28596/2026, I.A. 28597/2026

LABORATE PHARMACEUTICALS
INDIA LIMITED
CORPORATE OFFICE:
PLOT K-17, SECOND FLOOR, UDYOG NAGAR,
INDUSTRIAL AREA, ROHTAK ROAD,
NANGLOI, NEW DELHI-110041
.....PLAINTIFF
( Through: Mr. Siddharth Bambh, Ms. S. Garg and Ms. Aroshi Pal,
Advocates. )

versus
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

19

M/S JMBS HEALTHCARE
THROUGH ITS PARTNERS
ADDRESS:
KALA AMB ROAD, NEAR PREET PALACE,
NARAINGARH AMBALA, HARYANA- 134203
ALSO, AT:
PLOT NO. 92, HPSIDC INDUSTRIAL AREA,
NEAR SHREE SAI ENTERPRISES,
BADDI, HIMACHAL PRADESH - 173205

.....DEFENDANT

( Through: None. )

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% Reserved on: 14.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010475012026
+ CS(COMM) 1081/2026 and I.A. 27355-27362/2026

BEIERSDORF AG
BEIERSDORFSTRAßE 1-9
22529 HAMBURG, GERMANY

.....PLAINTIFF NO.1

NIVEA INDIA PVT. LTD.
KURLA (WEST), PHOENIX MARKET CITY,
A WING, 4TH FLOOR, ART GUILD HOUSE,
400070 MUMBAI, INDIA

.....PLAINTIFF NO. 2

( Through: Mr. Pravin Anand, Mr. Dhruv Anand, Ms. Ms. Bhavya
Verma and Mr.Dhananjay Khanna, Advocates. )
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

20

versus

DUVAC COSMEDICS
B/403, SAMANVAY SILICON,
OPP KALYAN HOTEL,
SAYAJIGUNJ, VADODARA – 390020
ALSO AT:
PLOT NO-504 VADODARA MARKET,
BHD JETALPUR GAM, AKOTA,
VADODARA-390020, GUJARAT

.....DEFENDANT NO. 1

GLEXON HEALTHCARE
PRIVATE LIMITED
SHYAM INDUSTRIAL HUB, A-18,
BAKROL-GATRAD RD,
BAKROL, GUJARAT – 382430

.....DEFENDANT NO. 2

M/S JAHNAVI MEDICAL STORE
SF 216, SIDDHARTH CREST,
OPPOSITE NIZAMPURA BUS STAND,
VADODARA – 390024, GUJARAT

.....DEFENDANT NO. 3

(Through: None.)

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% Reserved on: 15.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CNR No. DLHC010041822026
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

21

+ CS(COMM) 111/2026 and I.A. 3271/2026, I.A. 5167/2026
KAJARIA CERAMICS LIMITED
CORPORATE OFFICE AT:
J-1/ B-1(EXTENSION)
MOHAN COOPERATIVE INDUSTRIAL ESTATE,
MATHURA ROAD, NEW DELHI- 110044
THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
MR. SACHIN SAXENA

ALSO AT:
SF-11, SECOND FLOOR, JMD REGENT PLAZA,
MEHRAULI GURGAON ROAD,
VILLAGE SIKANDERPUR GHOSI,
GURGAON, HARYANA- 122001

.....PLAINTIFF

( Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rishabh Gupta,
Ms. Akshita Makin, Mr. Vikrant Rana, Ms. Lucy Rana, Mr. R.
Abhishek Avadhani, Advocates. )

versus

MR. YOMESH VIJAYA
TRADING AS M/S. WESTERN DRYMIX
ADDRESS: PLOT NO. 205,
DELHI MIA ROAD
MATSYA INDUSRTRIAL AREA,
ALWAR RAJASTHAN – 301030

ALSO AT:
02/19, RC MANSION
PREET VIHAR, TRANSPORT NAGAR,
ALWAR, RAJASTHAN-301001

.....DEFENDANT

Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

22

( Through: Mr. Ashutosh Kumar, Mr. Utkarsh Gupta, Mr.Sajan
Shankdhar, Mr. Sanidhya Sharma, Mr. Deepank Singhal, Ms. Shruti
Gupta and Mr. Ayush Sharma, Advocates. )
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% Reserved on: 16.10.2026
Pronounced on: 03.11.2026
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J U D G M E N T
INDEX
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES RAISED AND THE ANSWERS
FOUND ........................................................................................................ 25
II. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 37

A. THE PRAYERS TO BE TESTED ........................................................ 37

B. ―CARRIES ON BUSINESS‖ ............................................................... 39

C. ―CAUSE OF ACTION, WHOLLY OR IN PART‖ .............................. 79
(i) Quia Timet Action ............................................................................. 79
(ii) An Action for Passing Off ................................................................ 92
(iii) An Action for Infringement in the Offline World ............................ 97
(iv) An Action for Infringement in the Online World .......................... 105
D. ―DYNAMIC EFFECT‖ AND IT CONFERRING JURISDICTION . 122
E. THE USE OF AN ― INVESTIGATOR ‖ ................................................ 124
F. THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS ...................... 130
G. DOCTRINE OF DEMURRER ........................................................... 170
III. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................ 176
Signature Not Verified
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

23

IV. ADJUDICATING THE ISSUE OF TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION ....................................................................................... 182
V. APPLICATION TO FACTS .............................................................. 191
ABD M AESTRO P RIVATE L IMITED V . G REAT G ALLEON V ENTURES L TD . ....... 191
A MBER N UTRITION P RIVATE L IMITED V . M R . M ANISH C HANDAK & A NR . ..... 194
A MRITSAR H AVELI C UISINES P RIVATE L TD . AND A NR . V . A MARBIR S INGH AND
O RS . ......................................................................................................... 209
H AVELI R ESTAURANT AND R ESORTS L TD . V . S HUBHAM F OOD E NTERPRISES 210
B EIERSDORF AG & A NR . V . D UVAC C OSMEDICS & O RS . ............................ 194
N AMASTU E NTERPRISE P VT . L TD . V . K AJALBEN M AHESHBHAI K AKLOTAR AND
A NR . ......................................................................................................... 216
JSW MG M OTOR I NDIA P VT . L TD . V . SAIC M OTOR C ORPORATION L TD . .... 218
UTS VT TD V R URESH HAND AND RS
KBB N P . L . . M . S C O . ............................. 222
ARICO TD V HREE DAY IL AND OOD NDUSTRIES
M L . . S U O F I LLP .................. 224
YDUS ELLNESS RODUCTS TD V USHAR HIMANLAL HITALIA AND RS
Z W P L . . T C C O .
................................................................................................................. 226
ABORATE HARMACEUTICALS NDIA IMITED V S EALTHCARE
L P I L . M/ JMBS H . 229
ANGEER INGH RADING V OGESH ANGID
J S T . Y J ............................................. 232
AJARIA ERAMICS TD V OMESH IJAYA
K C L . . Y V ............................................... 234
P HARMED L TD . V . B EST B IOTECH AND O RS . ............................................... 236
S OCIETY FOR H UMAN R ESOURCES M ANAGEMENT V . S TRATEGIC HRM ........ 236
S HIROMANI G URUDWARA P RABANDHAK C OMMITTEE VS G ALACTIC TV &
C OMMUNICATION ...................................................................................... 240
S ANJAY K UMAR J AIN AND A NR . V . N ANDI A YURVED AND O RS . ..................... 243
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

24

VI. ORDER ............................................................................................... 245

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES RAISED AND THE ANSWERS
FOUND

The present judgment deals with seventeen commercial suits filed
before this Court. In more than half of these suits, neither parties, through
any means, are at Delhi. In each of these suits, the court within whose
territorial jurisdiction the parties are situated is competent to adjudicate upon
the lis sought to be agitated before this Court. They however, while
disturbing the horizontal allocation of territorial jurisdiction, knock this
Court, on novel and ingenious grounds.

2. It is vehemently argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that this Court has
been entertaining and deciding cases of parties located across the length and
breadth of India. It has done so on the basis that part of cause of action has
arisen within Delhi or that either of the parties carries on business at Delhi.
It is argued by counsel that in the world of IP litigation, a suit for
infringement along with passing off can be filed at a place where a website
having the infringing products is accessible and commercial transactions can
get concluded on the website. This, it is submitted, constitutes a part of the
cause of action and makes a suit maintainable under Section 20(c) of the
1
Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
3. It is also submitted that a defendant or a plaintiff ― carries on
business ‖ at a place from where the website advertising, promoting, or

1
―CPC‖.
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Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

25

offering for sale, the goods or services in question, is accessible. It is
clarified by learned counsel that for jurisdiction to be conferred, the website,
also, need not be hosted by the defendant, nor is it necessary that the listing
(if any) be made by the defendant. Importantly, it has been argued, that
because the plaintiff or a person set up by him, has placed an order on an e-
marketplace like Flipkart or Amazon for the defendant‘s goods, and given
the address of Delhi, jurisdiction is manifestly made out. Such a transaction,
the Court may observe, the plaintiff or his agent could have done from
Ladakh, Tamil Nadu, Arunachal Pradesh, or Gujarat. The argument of
counsel, however, remains that this Court must entertain such a suit because
its agent gave the delivery address of Delhi.
4. A statute or a provision cannot be interpreted in a manner that confers
an unbridled, unguided and uncanalised right on the plaintiff to create
jurisdiction within the territory of a given Court and obligates it to decide
that lis . Such an exercise of an uncircumscribed right is bound to create a
mockery of the concept of territoriality and the ― local limits ‖ of the court.
5. In today‘s digital world, every website is accessible pan-India, if not
worldwide; services can be availed of through the internet in every remote
corner of the country, and goods can be delivered to most, if not all, places.
If the position of law is what has been stated above, jurisdictional rules
would have no meaning. The horizontal division of jurisdiction in the world
of IP disputes would cease to have any application. The jurisdictional
provisions under the CPC, which allocate jurisdiction amongst courts, may
as well be given a burial.
Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

26

6. In some of the decisions passed by this Court undoubtedly jurisdiction
has been exercised in the manner canvassed by counsel. After enjoying,
effectively, a pan-India jurisdiction, it becomes difficult for a court today to
draw a Lakshman Rekha and restrain itself from stepping outside its bounds.
This issue, however, demands closer consideration. The question is not one
of losing territory but of institutional discipline. If jurisdiction is naturally
made out, the Court must entertain the suit without hesitation. But if a
dispute ought to be agitated before another court and is brought to Delhi,
almost forcibly, and such a suit is entertained, the other rightful and natural
forum which should have exercised jurisdiction over the matter gets
deprived of the opportunity to adjudicate upon that cause of action.
Institutional discipline and respect require this Court to refrain from
entertaining such a suit. The statutory and constitutional scheme evinces a
carefully structured division of courts‘ jurisdiction. Constitutional morality
demands that this Court respect that scheme and abides by it.
7. It may be possible that some of the features that this Court has,
arguably, no other High Court does. Its role in the advancement of IP law in
this country, and its implication abroad, simply cannot be overstated.
8. The establishment of the IPD, following the abolition of the
Intellectual Property Appellate Board, was accompanied by the IPD Rules
and specialised Patent Suit Rules. These reflect an understanding that patent
and other technology disputes may call for a different approach to pleadings,
technical evidence, confidentiality and case management.
9. In fact, the World Intellectual Property Organization‘s International
Guide to Patent Case Management for Judges too identifies several
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

27

procedural features of the Delhi model: concurrent expert evidence or ―hot-
2 3
tubbing‖, remote evidence, preservation of evidence and litigation-hold
4 5 6
notices, guidance on damages, consolidation of proceedings,
7 8
confidentiality clubs, summary adjudication, technically qualified
9 10
assistance, and mediation or early neutral evaluation.
10. The filing procedure before this Court is also uniquely suited for
commercial disputes. Actions in fresh, pending and disposed of cases are
ordinarily filed electronically by the advocate or litigant in person. Court
fees are capable of being deposited electronically, and hearings are
conducted in physical, hybrid or video conferencing mode.
11. The Registry communicates objections to the filing advocate or
11
litigant by email, SMS or web hosting, and once the objections are cleared
the case is processed for listing. Any urgent matter filed before 12 noon is
12
put before the Court for hearing on the following working day, and the
daily cause lists of this Court notify that fresh petitions and applications
filed before 12 noon are listed before the roster Bench accordingly. The
practical consequence is that a plaintiff whose filing is free of defects may
ordinarily expect the matter to be taken up on the next working day. This is

2
Rule 16, IPD Rules.
3
Rule 15, IPD Rules.
4
Rule 18, IPD Rules.
5
Rule 20, IPD Rules.
6
Rule 26, IPD Rules.
7
Rule 19, IPD Rules.
8
Rule 27, IPD Rules.
9
Rules 31 and 32, IPD Rules.
10
Rule 37, IPD Rules.
11
Rule 18.3 of the e-Filing Rules.
12
Rule 12 of Chapter I of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

28

a unique feature which perhaps may not be available in any other court. It
guarantees quick listing, hearing, and adjudication of disputes.
12. Two related features of this Court also give litigants a measure of
certainty after a matter is instituted. First , an order is ordinarily recorded and
uploaded on the website of this Court on every date on which a matter is
listed, whether before the Bench or before the Joint Registrar, including
where the proceeding is confined to an adjournment or to directions on
pleadings. The record of proceedings is, therefore, available to the parties,
and to anyone examining the file, without reliance on oral accounts of what
transpired. Second , every matter ordinarily leaves the courtroom with a fixed
next date, and that date is reflected on the case status page. Where a matter
does not reach, it is ordinarily assigned a fresh date of listing. Matters are,
thus, not left to languish without a date, and parties and counsel are able to
plan the progress of the litigation, including compliance with timelines
under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, with reasonable predictability.
13. Last among these features, and one the most important is the Bar
practising before this Court. It includes a large body of advocates and law
firms who devote their practice to commercial and intellectual property
litigation. This Court also has the advantage of being assisted by lawyers
who are specialists and authorities in their fields. The doyens of India‘s IP
Bar practice before this Court.
14. The uniqueness of this Court, thus, lies not simply in assigning IP
matters to designated judges, but in building an institutional and procedural
framework suited to the peculiar legal, scientific and commercial questions
presented by IP disputes.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

29

15. India‘s IP landscape to a large extent has grown under the Banyan
Tree, which is the Delhi High Court. While the Banyan provides shelter and
comfort, it also stunts the growth of other trees below it.
16. There is no reason to believe that other High Courts will not rise to
the occasion, create a specialised machinery like this Court, and make IP
litigation conducive either before them, or the district courts.
17. This Court, without any doubt, must not command a reputation that
no matter how minuscule a connection the lis has with Delhi, the plaintiff or
the defendant, the High Court of Delhi, would entertain a suit.
18. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P)
13
Ltd. , the Supreme Court in the context of another premier High Court
observed ― we are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta
should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no
14
jurisdiction. ‖ In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu ,
which arose after the decision in Aligarh Muslim University , the Supreme
Court, noted that the institutional integrity of a court is predicated upon the
manner in which its members conduct themselves. If a lis having no material
connection with a given court is entertained, suspicions arise and eyebrows
get raised. Para. 12 of the decision is extracted as under:
― 12. …It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a court
depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an
impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the court would be willing to
exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and
unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of

13
(1994) 4 SCC 710.
14
(1994) 4 SCC 711.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

30

the said court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the
cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would
lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule…‖
19. Bearing in mind considerations of predictability, fairness, and the
larger public interest, this Court has attempted to re-examine the caselaw on
jurisdiction in IP suits. The position of law, as the discussion below shall
reveal, is not as laissez-faire as learned counsel have contended it to be. A
brief snapshot of the manner in which caselaw has been dealt with in the
present judgment is as under:
20. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Patel Roadways Limited v.
15 16
Prasad Trading Company , Dhodha House v. SK Maingi , and Indian
17
Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia and Anr. , and of this Court in
Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey &
18
Ors. authoritatively declare the meaning of the expression ― carries on
business ‖, as it appears in Sections 20(a) and (b) of the CPC and Sections
19
62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and the Trade Marks Act,
20
1999, respectively. The judgment of this Court in World Wrestling
21
Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection & Ors. , despite noticing the
decision of Dhodha House , appears to have fallen foul of its material
conclusions. The underlying reasoning of WWE , more importantly, becomes
completely unworkable after the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay
Dalia and of this Court in Ultra Home .

15
(1991) 4 SCC 270. Followed in New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. ,
(2004) 4 SCC 677.
16
(2006) 9 SCC 41.
17
(2015) 10 SCC 161.
18
2016 SCC OnLine Del 376.
19
―Copyright Act‖.
20
―Trade Marks Act‖.
21
2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031.
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KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

31

21. In the subsequent chain of decisions of our Court, which begin from
22
Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. and
23
end at ITC v. Adyar Gate Hotels Ltd. , it was not pointed out to the learned
Division Bench that WWE is no longer a binding precedent on the issue
raised in these cases. The observations and findings given by the learned
Division Bench in these judgments, thus, may not be binding as they were
rendered on the basis of WWE .
22. Similarly, for claims concerning passing off, the decisions of our
24
Court in Glen Raven Mills Inc. v. Vaspar Concepts Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. ,
25
and Indovax Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck Animal Health and Ors. , were not
canvassed before the Court in Burger King Corporation v. Techchand
26
Shewakramani and Ors . The decision in Burger King having been
rendered without adverting to earlier applicable judgments on the issue of
passing off, may not be binding insofar as it relates to a claim for passing
off.
23. The judgment of the Division Bench of our Court in Banyan Tree
27
Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy and Anr. , continues to
govern jurisdictional issues when a plaintiff pleads a cause of action for
infringement or passing off on the basis of a website. Banyan Tree , inter
alia , requires the plaintiff to, prima facie , show using material/documents,
that some commercial transactions using the website were entered into by

22
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727.
23
2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852.
24
1995 SCC OnLine Del 724.
25
2017 SCC OnLine Del 9393.
26
2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881.
27
2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

32

the defendant with a user of its website within the forum State. The decision
of another Division Bench in Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata
28
Founders and Ors. , dispenses with this requirement in Banyan Tree on
the basis of a decision of this Court in Millennium & Copthorne
29
International Limited v. Aryans Plaza Services Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. , and of
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Lifestyle Equities CV v.
30
Amazon UK Services Ltd.
24. It was, however, not pointed out to the learned Division Bench in
Tata Sons that the decision in Millennium & Copthorne International
Limited was rendered by a learned Single Judge of our Court, which could
not have disturbed the mandatory requirements of Banyan Tree . It was also
not brought to the notice of the Division Bench that the law in England was
fundamentally different from that declared in Banyan Tree . The finding
rendered by the Division Bench that a ― looming presence ‖ and an ability to
access the website may be sufficient to constitute ― targeting ‖ appears to be
in conflict with both Banyan Tree and the law prevailing in England, as
31
propounded in the judgment rendered by the UK Supreme Court, in appeal
against the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Lifestyle Equities .
25. The use of an ― investigator ‖ to enter into trap transactions so as to
concoct jurisdiction in a forum which otherwise has no jurisdiction is also
impermissible, as declared in Banyan Tree . The decisions of our Court in
Machinenfabrik Rieter AG and Anr. v. Tex Tech Industries India Pvt. Ltd.

28
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2968.
29
2018 SCC OnLine Del 8260.
30
[2022] EWCA Civ 552.
31
2024 UKSC 8.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:PRIYA
Signing Date:03.11.2026
20:27:11

33

32
and Anr. , and Reiter AG and Anr. v. Kavassery Narayanaswamy
33
Venkatasubramanian , hold that Banyan Tree’s dictum concerning trap
transactions does not apply to offline transactions. It was, however, not
pointed out to the learned Benches in these cases that the conclusion of
Banyan Tree on the issue of trap transactions was itself based on cases
which concerned offline transactions. The decisions in Machinenfabrik
Rieter AG and Reiter AG may not, therefore, be binding precedents on this
issue.
26. Accordingly, the decisions which govern this Court are: first , Patel
Roadways , Sanjay Dalia , and Ultra Home to interpret the expression
― carries on business ‖ under Section 20(a) of the CPC and Section 134(2) of
the Trade Marks Act and 62(2) of the Copyright Act; second , Glen and
Indovax for determining where the cause of action for a passing off action in
the offline world has accrued; third , Burger King , to adjudicate on
territoriality for suits concerning trademark infringement in the offline
world; and fourth , Banyan Tree , for determining jurisdictional issues when
a plaintiff pleads cause of action for infringement or passing off on the basis
of a website.
27. The Court is conscious that finding some difficulty in the application
of the aforenoted decisions, a reference order has been passed by a co-
34
ordinate Bench, to decide the issue of jurisdiction in infringement and
passing off suits. The filing of fresh suits, however, has not come to a halt.
Many matters require urgent interim relief to be granted and the issue of this

32
2021 SCC OnLine Del 1825.
33
2025 SCC OnLine Del 4379.
34
2026:DHC:7198.
Signature Not Verified
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
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Signing Date:03.11.2026
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Court‘s territorial jurisdiction necessarily requires an adjudication. There
cannot, it may be stressed, be a vacuum in law.
28. The Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Sadarangani v. Union of
35
India and Ors. , was requested to abstain from pronouncing judgment on
36
an issue which was the subject matter of a reference to the larger bench.
The Supreme Court, while rejecting the plea, observed as under:
― 29. …the pendency of a reference to a larger Bench, does not mean that all
other proceedings involving the same issue would remain stayed till a
decision was rendered in the reference…Till such time as the decisions cited
at the Bar are not modified or altered in any way, they continue to hold the
field.‖
Thus, through the present judgment, this Court intends to decipher, pending
37
the reference made to a larger Bench, the position of law governing
territorial jurisdiction for infringement and passing off claims, arising under
the law governing the intellectual property rights of the parties.
29. Learned counsel appearing for the parties in the captioned matters
have been heard, and their written submissions and compilation of
judgments, concerning the issues dealt with in the present judgement have
also been perused. A thoughtful consideration has been given to the
submissions made in the instant batch of matters.

30. A lis concerning infringement and passing off is governed by Section
20 of the CPC. A suit for infringement, additionally , is covered by Sections

35
(2012) 11 SCC 321.
36
(2012) 11 SCC 321, para. 23.
37
Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Kwick Living (I) Pvt. Ltd. , CS (Comm) 904/2026, judgment dated
25.08.2026.
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38
62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright and Trade Marks Act, respectively. For
ease of reference these provisions are reproduced, in seriatim , as under:
Section 20 of the CPC:
― 20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of
action arises.
Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one,
at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the
commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either
the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or
carry on business, or personally works for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in
such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
Explanation.—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole
or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any
place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.‖
Section 62 of the Copyright Act:
― 62. Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under this Chapter.
(1) Every suit or other civil proceeding arising under this Chapter in respect
of the infringement of copyright in any work or the infringement of any
other right conferred by this Act shall be instituted in the district court
having jurisdiction.
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a ―district court having jurisdiction‖
shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, include a
district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the
institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or
other proceeding or, where there are more than one such persons, any of
them actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain.‖

38
Cumulatively termed as ―special provisions‖.
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Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act:
― 134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted before District Court.
(1) No suit—
(a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or
(b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or
(c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark
which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff‘s trade mark,
whether registered or unregistered, shall be instituted in any court inferior
to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.
(2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), a ―District
Court having jurisdiction‖ shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law for the time
being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the
person instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one
such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain.
Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (2), ―person‖ includes the
registered proprietor and the registered user.‖

31. The case law pertaining to specific aspects may be analysed. It is
important, however, to caveat the discussion that follows by noting that
since certain judgments deal with multiple issues, a straitjacket
categorisation has not been possible. A judgment under a given heading may
not exclusively deal with the topic identified in the heading.
II. ANALYSIS
A. THE PRAYERS TO BE TESTED
32. If a single suit has been filed alleging infringement and passing off,
jurisdiction for both claims needs to be individually established before the
suit can be termed as being maintainable.
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33. In Dhodha House , the Supreme Court examined the decision of the
Allahabad High Court holding that a suit under the Trade and Merchandise
Marks Act, 1958, and the Copyright Act, 1957, was primarily under the
former, for which resort cannot be made to Section 62 of the latter Act.
Dismissing the appeal, SB Sinha J. observed:
― 54. For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a court only because two
causes of action joined in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the same would not mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be
conferred upon a court which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect of
one cause of action and not the other. Recourse to the additional forum,
however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes of action arise
within the jurisdiction of the court which otherwise had the necessary
jurisdiction to decide all the issues.‖
39
34. Similarly, Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries arose from a suit
filed before a learned Single Judge of this Court alleging copyright
infringement and passing off qua a product‘s carton which the plaintiff
claimed was protected as ― artistic work ‖ within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. It was held that, insofar as the relief of passing off is
concerned, jurisdiction in Delhi is not made out as the defendant resided in
Andhra Pradesh, and there was no documentary evidence to show that the
respondent was selling goods in Delhi. The said view was affirmed by the
Division Bench and the case travelled to the Supreme Court. SB Sinha J.
dismissed the appeal and upheld the view taken by the Division Bench and
the Single Judge. The Supreme Court held that where jurisdiction for a suit
for passing off is not made out before a given court, merely by clubbing
prayers for infringement and passing off, and relying on Section 62(2) of the
Copyright Act, jurisdiction cannot be established.

39
(2008) 10 SCC 595.
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35. In Dabur India , the Court held that a composite suit meant a suit
founded on an infringement action where incidental powers of the court are
required to be invoked. In such a case, the plaintiff seeks a remedy which
can, even otherwise, be granted by the Court. A composite suit is not one
where two different causes of action have been clubbed together. An action
for passing off is distinct from an infringement claim, and Section 62 cannot
be relied upon in such a case by clubbing both these causes in a single suit.
36. From the discussion above concerning the manner in which prayers in
a suit are to be tested, it may be concluded that a suit for infringement is
different from that of passing off. In a given case jurisdiction may be
established for infringement but not for passing off. If a composite suit is
filed seeking reliefs for both infringement and passing off, it must be
established that jurisdiction is made out for each relief. If it is found that a
court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with any of the reliefs, the suit
cannot proceed.
37. Having noted the aforesaid, the specific provisions that can be
invoked to plead jurisdiction may be examined.
B. “CARRIES ON BUSINESS”
38. The expression ― carries on business ‖ finds mention under Sections
20(a) and (b) of the CPC, and Sections 62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright
Act, 1957 and Trade Marks Act, 1999, respectively. While the CPC
provision allows a suit to be instituted where the defendant ― carries on
business ‖, the special provisions allow for a suit to be filed where the
plaintiff ― carries on its business ‖.
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40
39. In Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Company , the Supreme
Court interpreted the phrase ― carries on business ‖ in the context of Section
20(a) of the CPC and the effect which the explanation to the said provision
has on its construction. While two appeals were disposed of via a common
order, the underlying facts of the appeals were identical. For the present
purposes, reference may be made to one of them. M/s. Patel Roadways (P)
Ltd., the defendant, carried on the business of a carrier and transported
goods on hire. It had its principal office at Bombay and branch offices at
various places, including at Tamil Nadu. A contract was entered into
between the defendant and M/s. Prasad Trading Company, the plaintiff, who
was a dealer in cardamom. Under the contract, the plaintiff entrusted goods
to the defendant at its sub-ordinate office at Tamil Nadu. After the goods
were transported by the defendant and kept in a godown at Delhi, they got
destroyed and damaged in a fire. Contending that the fire was a result of
negligence on the part of the defendant‘s staff, the plaintiff instituted a suit
at Tamil Nadu.
40. Before the trial court, an objection of territorial jurisdiction was
raised. It was the defendant‘s case that since it carried on business at
Bombay, the courts at Bombay had jurisdiction to entertain the lis under
Section 20(a) of the CPC. The jurisdiction of the courts at Madras was, in
turn, ousted owing to the operation of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the
contract between the parties. This objection came to be rejected by the Trial
Court, and also by the High Court in revision.

40
(1991) 4 SCC 270.
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41. The Supreme Court found that the explanation to Section 20 is in two
parts: the first part states ― a corporation shall be deemed to carry on
business at its sole or principal office in India ‖, and the second part states
― in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a
subordinate office, at such place ‖. The two parts of the explanation were
found, by the Supreme Court, to deal with distinct scenarios; the first dealt
with a case where a defendant-corporation has a sole office or a principal
office at a particular place. In this case, the corporation shall be deemed to

carry on business at that place where it has its sole office or principal office.

42. The second case dealt with by the explanation is where the principal
office of a corporation is at one place, and the sub-ordinate office is at
another place. In this case, if the cause of action has accrued at the place
where the sub-ordinate office is situated, the corporation shall be considered
to be carrying on business at that place. The Courts within whose
jurisdiction a corporation has its principal office would then not have
jurisdiction to entertain the lis . Paras. 9 and 12 of the decision in Patel
Roadways read as under:
― 9. …The Explanation is in two parts, one before the word ―or‖ occurring
between the words ―office in India‖ and the word ―in respect of‖ and the
other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a
corporation, which term, as seen above, would include even a company such
as the appellant in the instant case. The first part of the Explanation applies
only to such a corporation which has its sole or principal office at a
particular place. In that event the courts within whose jurisdiction the sole or
principal office of the defendant is situate will also have jurisdiction
inasmuch as even if the defendant may not be actually carrying on business
at that place, it will ―be deemed to carry on business‖ at that place because
of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation
takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has
a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another
place. The words “at such place” occurring at the end of the
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Explanation and the word “or” referred to above which is disjunctive
clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the
Explanation it is not the court within whose jurisdiction the principal
office of the defendant is situate but the court within whose jurisdiction
it has a subordinate office which alone shall have jurisdiction “in
respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a
subordinate office ‖.

12. We would also like to add that the interpretation sought to be placed by
the appellant on the provision in question renders the Explanation totally
redundant. If the intention of the legislature was, as is said on their behalf,
that a suit against a corporation could be instituted either at the place of its
sole or principal office (whether or not the corporation carries on business at
that place) or at any other place where the cause of action arises, the
provisions of clauses ( a ), ( b ) and ( c ) together with the first part of the
Explanation would have completely achieved the purpose. Indeed the effect
would have been wider. The suit could have been instituted at the place of
the principal office because of the situation of such office (whether or not
any actual business was carried on there). Alternatively, a suit could have
been instituted at the place where the cause of action arose under clause ( c )
(irrespective of whether the corporation had a subordinate office in such
place or not). This was, therefore, not the purpose of the Explanation. The
Explanation is really an Explanation to clause ( a ). It is in the nature of a
clarification on the scope of clause ( a ) viz. as to where the corporation can
be said to carry on business. This, it is clarified, will be the place where the
principal office is situated (whether or not any business actually is carried
on there) or the place where a business is carried on giving rise to a cause of
action (even though the principal office of the corporation is not located
there) so long as there is a subordinate office of the corporation situated at
such place . The linking together of the place where the cause of action
arises with the place where a subordinate office is located clearly shows that
the intention of the legislature was that, in the case of a corporation, for the
purposes of clause ( a ), the location of the subordinate office, within the
local limits of which a cause of action arises, is to be the relevant place for
the filing of a suit and not the principal place of business. If the intention
was that the location of the sole or principal office as well as the location of
the subordinate office (within the limits of which a cause of action arises)
are to be deemed to be places where the corporation is deemed to be
carrying on business, the disjunctive ―or‖ will not be there. Instead, the
second part of the Explanation would have read ― and , in respect of any
cause of action arising at any place where it has a subordinate office, also at
such place‖.
(Emphasis supplied)
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42

43. It may also be clarified that in Patel Roadways jurisdiction was
sought to be established exclusively through Section 20(a) of the CPC. The
case of the defendant in the said case was that despite cause of action
(wholly or in part) not accruing at its principal office, which was at Bombay,
jurisdiction of that forum Court was made out by an application of Section
20(a) of the CPC. It is this contention that the Supreme Court rejected.
44. The following conclusions can be drawn from the decision of the
Court in Patel Roadways : first , if a corporation has a sole office, it can be
sued at that place under Section 20(a) of the CPC as it shall be deemed to
carry on business at that place; second , if a corporation has more than one
offices, meaning there is a principal office and other sub-ordinate office(s),
and they are located at different places, then:
a. If no cause of action (wholly or in part) has arisen where the
defendant-corporation has its subordinate office, then the
corporation can be sued at the place where it has its principal
office.
b. If cause of action (wholly or in part) has arisen where the
defendant-corporation has its subordinate office, and no cause
of action has arisen at the company‘s principal office, then a
defendant-corporation can only be sued at the place of its sub-
ordinate office and not at the place where it has its principal
office.
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41
45. In Dhodha House v. SK Maingi , the Supreme Court decided two
civil appeals by a common order. The first, being 6248/1997, arose from a
decision of the Allahabad High Court, and is dealt with at para. 33 of this
judgment. The discussion under this head need not be gone into for the
present purposes. The second civil appeal 16/1999 arose, originally, from a
suit filed before this Court for trademark and copyright infringement, along
with an action for passing off. The defendant and the plaintiff were found to
be carrying on business in diesel engines at Rajkot, Gujarat. Jurisdiction was
sought to be invoked, inter alia , by relying on Section 62 of the Copyright
42
Act, and claiming that the plaintiff ― carries on business ‖ at Delhi. An
interim injunction application of the plaintiff was rejected on the ground that
jurisdiction was not made out. Upon an intra-court appeal being preferred
before the Division Bench, the same was allowed.
43
46. The order of the Division Bench, at para. 3 notes that the jurisdiction
of Delhi was invoked on three counts. Firstly , in view of Section 62(2) of
the Copyright Act. Secondly , on grounds that the defendants had sought
registration of the trade mark for sale at Delhi as well. Thirdly , by invoking
Section 20(c) of the CPC claiming that goods bearing the impugned mark
were being sold at Delhi. The Division Bench did not delve into the third
ground and found jurisdiction to be made out based on the first two. In order
to conclude that the plaintiff was ― carrying on business ‖ at Delhi, the
Division Bench relied upon the pleading made in the plaint that the

41
(2006) 9 SCC 41.
42
(2006) 9 SCC 41, para. 13.
43
1998 SCC OnLine Del 181.
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plaintiff‘s goods are sold in Delhi. Mere sale of goods was equated with a
corporation carrying on business at that place.
47. The decision of the Division Bench was assailed before the Supreme
Court, which held that merely because a corporation‘s goods are available in
the market at Delhi or are actually being sold at Delhi, would not mean that
44
the corporation is carrying on business at that place. This view expressed
by the Supreme Court at paras. 47 and 51 of the decision is in
contradistinction to what was held by the Division Bench of this Court. It
must be stressed that this observation of the Supreme Court in Dhodha

House forms an essential part of the ratio decidendi of the said decision.
48. At para. 46, while relying on the authoritative commentary of Mulla
on CPC, SB Sinha J., expounded on the meaning of the phrase ― carries on
business ‖ and observed as under:
― 46. The expression ―carries on business‖ and the expression ―personally
works for gain‖ connote two different meanings. For the purpose of carrying
on business only presence of a man at a place is not necessary. Such
business may be carried on at a place through an agent or a manager or
through a servant. The owner may not even visit that place. The phrase
―carries on business‖ at a certain place would, therefore, mean having an
interest in a business at that place, a voice in what is done, a share in the
gain or loss and some control thereover. The expression is much wider than
what the expression in normal parlance connotes, because of the ambit of a
civil action within the meaning of Section 9 of the Code. But it is necessary
that the following three conditions should be satisfied, namely,
―(1) The agent must be a special agent who attends exclusively to
the business of the principal and carries it on in the name of the
principal and not a general agent who does business for anyone
that pays him. Thus, a trader in the mofussil who habitually sends
grain to Madras for sale by a firm of commission agents who have
an independent business of selling goods for others on commission,

44
(2006) 9 SCC 41, paras. 47 and 51.
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cannot be said to ‗carry on business‘ in Madras. So a firm in
England, carrying on business in the name of A.B. & Co., which
employs upon the usual terms a Bombay firm carrying on business
in the name of C.D. & Co., to act as the English firm's commission
agents in Bombay, does not ‗carry on business‘ in Bombay so as to
render itself liable to be sued in Bombay.
(2) The person acting as agent must be an agent in the strict sense
of the term. The manager of a joint Hindu family is not an ‗agent‘
within the meaning of this condition.
(3) To constitute ‗carrying on business‘ at a certain place, the
essential part of the business must take place in that place.
Therefore, a retail dealer who sells goods in the mofussil cannot be
said to ‗carry on business‘ in Bombay merely because he has an
agent in Bombay to import and purchase his stock for him. He
cannot be said to carry on business in Bombay unless his agent
made sales there on his behalf. A Calcutta firm that employs an
agent at Amritsar who has no power to receive money or to enter
into contracts, but only collects orders which are forwarded to and
dealt with in Calcutta, cannot be said to do business in Amritsar.
But a Bombay firm that has a branch office at Amritsar, where
orders are received subject to confirmation by the head office at
Bombay, and where money is paid and disbursed, is carrying on
business at Amritsar and is liable to be sued at Amritsar. Similarly
a life assurance company which carries on business in Bombay and
employs an agent at Madras who acts merely as a post office
forwarding proposals and sending moneys cannot be said to do
business in Madras. Where a contract of insurance was made at
place ‗A‘ and the insurance amount was also payable there, a suit
filed at place ‗B‘ where the insurance company had a branch office
was held not maintainable. Where the plaintiff instituted a suit at
Kozhikode alleging that its account with the defendant Bank at its
Calcutta branch had been wrongly debited and it was claimed that
that court had jurisdiction as the defendant had a branch there, it
was held that the existence of a branch was not part of the cause of
action and that the Kozhikode Court therefore had no jurisdiction.
But when a company though incorporated outside India gets itself
registered in India and does business in a place in India through its
agent authorised to accept insurance proposals, and to pay claims,
and to do other business incidental to the work of the agency, the
company carries on business at the place of business in India.‖
[See Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edn., Vol. I, pp.
246-47.]‖

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49. From the aforenoted, it is clear, therefore, that as per Dhodha House ,
― carrying on business ‖ at a place means:
a. Having an interest in a business at that place, a voice in what is
done, a share in the gain or loss and control thereover.
b. If it is contended that a corporation is carrying on business
through an agent, at the bare minimum, that agent must be a
special agent who attends exclusively to the business of the
principal and carries on the business in the name of the
principal.

c. The activities must also be an essential part of the business.
d. Most importantly, mere availability or sale of goods at a given
place does not amount to ― carrying on of business ‖. This ruling
is the most essential part of the ratio decidendi in Dhodha
House .
50. The principles expounded in Dhodha House were aptly applied by
this Court in Sholay Media Entertainment and Anr. v. Yogesh Patel and
45
Ors . In this case, a suit was filed for trademark infringement along with
passing off. It was alleged that the defendant owned www.sholay.com,
which violated the plaintiff‘s mark. To establish jurisdiction, it was averred
that the defendant advertised SHOLAY, in a magazine called ― IT-
Information Technology ‖, which was circulated and sold in Delhi. The
magazine issue was also stated to be accompanied by a free CD, that directly
connected the user to the defendant‘s website. Relying on Dhodha House ,
S. Ravindra Bhat J. (as his Lordship then was), found that goods being

45
2010 SCC OnLine Del 4738, per S. Ravindra Bhat J.
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available, or even sold, in Delhi would not be sufficient to conclude that a
corporation ― carries on business ‖ at a given place; the ― essential part of the
business ‖ ought to take place there. The decision in Sholay Media
Entertainment , thus, represents a perfect and apt application of the Dhodha
House principles.
51. A departure from the position of law enunciated in Dhodha House
appears to have been made in World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v.
46
Reshma Collection & Ors . The suit was filed for trademark and copyright
infringement, along with an action of passing off. The plaintiff-company
was incorporated in the State of Delaware, United States and all the
defendants resided in Mumbai. It was an admitted position that the
defendants did not carry on business within the territory of Delhi.
Jurisdiction was sought to be established by the plaintiff by relying upon
Sections 134(2) and 62(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act. Upon
there arising a doubt as to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, arguments
took place on this issue. In exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 10 of
47
the CPC, vide a detailed order dated 04.10.2013, the learned Single Judge
returned the plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction.
52. Para. 8 of the order of the learned Single Judge in WWE notes the
grounds on the basis of which jurisdiction of this Court was sought to be
invoked. It reads as under:
― 8. In Paragraph 32 of the plaint, the plaintiff claims jurisdiction of this
court under Section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2)

46
2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031 (DB).
47
2013:DHC:5122.
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of the Copyright Act, 1957 by claiming that the plaintiff carries on business
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in the following manner –
i. The plaintiff‘s programmes consisting of its various characters are
broadcast at Delhi
ii. The plaintiff‘s products such as its merchandising goods and books are
available in Delhi
iii. The plaintiff‘s goods and services are sold to consumers in Delhi
through its websites which can be accessed in Delhi‖
53. From paras. 21 to 23, the Court painstakingly analysed the issue at
hand and concluded that the plaintiff, under the specialised provisions, is not
― carrying on business ‖ within the territory of Delhi. It was observed that if
mere accessibility of a website was sufficient to constitute carrying on of
business, the plaintiff, could file a suit wherever its website was accessible.
Upon testing the purported presence of the plaintiff in India on the
touchstone of the principles laid down in Dhodha House , Vipin Sanghi J.
(as his Lordship then was) found that the plaintiff was not ― carrying on
business ‖ at Delhi. Jurisdiction under Sections 134(2) of the Trade Marks
Act and 62(2) of the Copyright Act was, thus, not made out. Paras. 21 to 23
of the decision deserve to be reproduced and read as under:
― 21. I may deal with the plaintiff‘s submission regarding territorial
jurisdiction on account of its website being accessible in Delhi first, as bulk
of the submissions have been advanced on this issue. Section 134(2) of the
Act uses the expression ―carries on business‖. The objective of inserting
Section 134(2) was to provide the plaintiff a convenient forum to file a suit
for infringement, as long as the plaintiff voluntarily resides, carries on
business or personally works for gain at such place. The said provision goes
beyond the normal rules laid down in the C.P.C. for vesting jurisdiction in
Courts. The test to be satisfied as regards the aspect of carrying on business
has been laid down in Dhodha House (supra). The sum and substance of the
criteria laid down in Dhodha House (supra) is that an essential part of the
plaintiff‘s business, coupled with an element of control exercised by the
plaintiff, must exist in such place where the plaintiff claims to be carrying
on business either on its own or through an exclusive agent.
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22. The aforementioned criteria will be equally applicable to a party that
concludes transactions with its customers over the medium of internet as
opposed to a physical retail space. Internet is another medium which
provides audio-visual interactive facility for doing business. Merely because
it is a more advanced or superior medium, it does not impinge on the
determination of the issue whether the merchandiser is carrying on business
at a particular place. Prior to the advent of e-commerce over the internet,
and even now, business was and continues to be done over telephone and
fax. Merely because a person has embarked upon an ecommerce business
model, the tests which apply for determination of issues, such as – when and
where the contract is made, or whether the vendor carries on business at the
place where the merchandise may be sold, or service may be offered, would
not change and would be the same as apply to communications over
telephone and fax (see Bhagwan Goverdhandas Kedia Vs. Girdharilal
Parshottamdas & Co. AIR 1966 SC 543). In such cases, the plaintiff would
have to show that it actually has business interest at the relevant place; a
voice in what is done; a share in the gain or loss and some control thereover.
For example, the plaintiff could show that it has an exclusive C&F operator
in the forum State, or an exclusive dealer that stocks the goods or services of
the plaintiff in the forum State – to be delivered or shipped as per a
consumer‘s convenience. The plaintiff could show that it has a
registered/branch office to address a consumer‘s dissatisfaction over the
plaintiff‘s merchandise or services. The plaintiff can show that it has an
exclusive tie up with an agent to manufacture the plaintiff‘s goods for a
particular geography. In the present case, no essential part of the plaintiffs
business is carried on at Delhi. In fact, the plaintiff has not pleaded to
having any branch office or exclusive agent anywhere in India, let alone
Delhi. Merely because the website of the plaintiff is accessible in Delhi is
not sufficient to clothe this court with jurisdiction.
23. If the plaintiff‘s submission were to be accepted, it would mean that the
plaintiff could file a suit at any place which provides internet access to the
plaintiffs website, irrespective of the defendant‘s location, only on account
of the plaintiff‘s website being accessible in that State. The insertion of
Section 134(2) was with a view to enable the plaintiff to institute a suit
where it has actual and substantial business interest so that an additional
forum convenient to the plaintiff is available. If the intent of the legislature
had been to vest jurisdiction solely on account of accessibility of plaintiff‘s
website at the place of suing, then the same would have been expressly
provided for, especially keeping in mind plaintiff‘s submissions that the
legislature has recognized new media on account of various amendments.‖
54. The learned Single Judge in WWE had also dealt with the plaintiff‘s
grounds invoking jurisdiction under Section 20(c), which did not, ultimately,
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become an issue before the Division Bench. However, the reasoning of the
learned Single Judge on this issue is exceptionally lucid and deserves to be
reproduced:
― 28. …The broadcast of the plaintiff‘s programs in Delhi is also not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Just as mere advertisement in a journal or
paper is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction (See ONGC Vs. Utpal Kumar
Basu, 1994 (4) SCC 711). Similarly, broadcast of the plaintiff‘s programmes
is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in this Court.
29. The plaintiffs submission founded upon ―New Media‖ has no merit.
Wherever the legislature thought it necessary, it amended the laws to make
provision for the ―New Media‖. The Parliament has not amended the Act,
the Copyright Act, or the C.P.C even while amending other legislations, and
enacting the I.T. Act, in the manner as contended by Mr. Anand. The ―new
media‖, as aforesaid, does not change the basic concepts or legal principles
which apply to trade and commerce. They continue to remain the same as
applicable to the ―old media‖ i.e. telephone and FAX. Even otherwise, I am
of the view that the proposition advanced by Mr. Anand has no merit as, its
acceptance would lead to undue hardship to those resorting to e-commerce
and open them to multifarious litigations in every nook and corner of the
world where their goods or services may be sold over the internet, even
though they do not meet the requirements laid down in Banyan Tree (supra).
The same would stifle the growth of e-commerce.‖
55. This order of the learned Single Judge was assailed before the
Division Bench which allowed the appeal.
56. The Division Bench in WWE found that jurisdiction under the special
provisions can be invoked as the plaintiff was ― to a certain extent, carrying
on business ‖ at Delhi. The facts that constituted carrying on of business
were firstly , customers in Delhi making offers to purchase merchandise and
goods. Secondly , these goods being confirmed/accepted by the plaintiff
through its website. Thirdly , money being paid from Delhi. The Court
opined that the availability of transactions through the website at a particular
place is virtually the same as a seller having shops in that place in the
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physical world. As per the Division Bench, if there was a shop of the
plaintiff in Delhi from where it sold its various goods and services, ― it could
not be denied that the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi. ‖ Para. 24 of the
said decision captures the reasoning and is extracted as under:
― 24. But, we are not concerned with the question of cause of action between
the appellant/plaintiff and its customers in Delhi because the defendants are
not such customers and they are, in any event, all residents of Mumbai.
What we are examining is whether the third condition specified in Dhodha
House (supra) is satisfied or not. In other words, if the contracts and/or
transactions entered into between the appellant/plaintiff on the one hand and
its customers are being concluded in Delhi, can it not be said that the
essential part of the business of the appellant/plaintiff, insofar as its
transactions with customers in Delhi are concerned, takes place in Delhi?
The offers are made by customers at Delhi. The offers are subject to
confirmation/acceptance of the appellant/plaintiff through its website. The
money would emanate or be paid from Delhi. Can it not then be considered
that the appellant/plaintiff is, to a certain extent, carrying on business at
Delhi? In our view, it would be so. Because of the advancements in
technology and the rapid growth of new models of conducting business over
the internet, it is possible for an entity to have a virtual presence in a place
which is located at a distance from the place where it has a physical
presence. The availability of transactions through the website at a particular
place is virtually the same thing as a seller having shops in that place in the
physical world. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the
appellant/plaintiff had a shop in Delhi from where it sold its various goods
and services. In that case, it could not be denied that the plaintiff carried on
business in Delhi. This is apart from the fact that the appellant/plaintiff may
also have been regarded as having voluntarily resided in Delhi. When the
shop in the ―physical sense‖ is replaced by the ―virtual‖ shop because of the
advancement of technology, in our view, it cannot be said that the
appellant/plaintiff would not carry on business in Delhi.‖
57. Quite a few issues arise concerning the reasoning adopted by the
Division Bench in WWE . They shall be cumulatively considered after taking
note of the decisions in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home .
58. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia , originally arose
by the filing of CS (OS) 527/2007 before this Court. The plaintiff in the said
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case was a non-profit-making company having its registered office at
Mumbai. The plaintiff claimed that it was established for the purposes of
monitoring, protecting, and enforcing the rights, interests, and privileges of
its members (comprising authors, composers, and publishers of literary
and/or musical works), as well as on behalf of the members of other sister
concerns who are owners of copyrights in their literary and musical works.
Defendant no. 1 was the Chief General Manager of defendant no. 2-Cineline
Cinemas. Defendant no. 2 was claimed to have 33 screens up and running in
various locations and 97 screens in the making.

59. It was alleged in the plaint that the defendants had been indulging in
continuous violation of the rights of the plaintiff by communicating to the
public literary and musical works from the plaintiff‘s repertoire without
having obtained a license from the plaintiff. An objection of territorial
jurisdiction was raised on the ground that the entire cause of action had
arisen in Mumbai. Both the plaintiff and the defendant no. 2 were also stated
to have their principal offices in Mumbai. The assignment deeds, which
formed the fulcrum of the plaintiff‘s case, were also executed in Mumbai by
artists residing in Mumbai. The plaintiff, however, relying on Section 62(2),
claimed that it was ― carrying on business ‖ in Delhi through its branch
office, and thus was entitled to maintain its suit at Delhi.
48
60. A novel argument was put forth by the learned senior counsel
appearing for the defendants therein. He submitted that the explanation to
Section 20(a) of the CPC ought to be read into Section 62(2) of the
Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Per contra , the

48
Mr. Rajiv Nayyar.
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learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted, while relying
upon the Joint Committee deliberations with respect to the Copyright Bill,
49
1955, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Exphar SA ,
that the explanation to Section 20(a) of the CPC cannot be incorporated into
Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act.
61. Badar Durrez Ahmed J., sitting as a Single Judge of our Court in
50
Sanjay Dalia vide order dated 31.08.2007 accepted the contentions of the
defendants and read into Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, the explanation
appended to Section 20(a) of the CPC. In categorical terms, the Court found
that ― merely having a branch office at Delhi would not mean that the
plaintiff carries on business in Delhi. The plaintiff would be deemed to carry
on business at a branch office only if cause of action had arisen in Delhi ‖.
62. The plaintiff preferred an intra-court appeal which was dismissed vide
51
order dated 19.11.2008. Notable observations were made by the Division
Bench concerning the jurisdictional avenues available to a plaintiff and
when, generally, they can be invoked and curtailed. These observations are
discussed in the later part of this judgment. Specifically, on the appeal which
was before the Division Bench, at the outset, Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, learned
senior counsel with his usual fairness to the Court, had accepted that no part
of the cause of action had arisen at Delhi. His contention, however, was that
Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act does not require the accrual of cause of
action at the branch office, in order to constitute ― carrying on business ‖. The
Division Bench noted that while the explanation is absent in the text of

49
(2004) 3 SCC 688.
50
2007:DHC:1031.
51
2008:DHC:3060-DB.
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Section 62(2), the CPC was the ― grundnorm, the ethos and essence of which
percolates through all other statutes. ‖ While affirming the view of the
learned Single Judge, the appeal came to be dismissed by the Division
Bench. This order came to be assailed before the Supreme Court in Sanjay
52
Dalia .
63. The Supreme Court interpreted the additional option available to a
plaintiff under Sections 62 and 134(2) of the Copyright Act and Trade
Marks Act respectively. The Court held that the option is subject to the
caveat that if the plaintiff resides, carries on business or personally works for
gain at a place where the cause of action has also arisen, the suit should be
filed at that place and not at some other places where the plaintiff may have
a branch office, etc. The Supreme Court, thus, incorporated the explanation
appended to Section 20 of the CPC into Section 62 of the Copyright Act and
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. The decision of the Division Bench
and the learned Single Judge were, resultantly, affirmed.
64. In Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar
53
Chaubey & Ors. , a Division Bench of this Court headed by Badar Durrez
Ahmed J. after relying upon Sanjay Dalia and Patel Roadways iterated two
significant propositions:
First , that for the purposes of Section 20 of the CPC, when the principal
office and subordinate office of a company are situated at different places,
the company would be deemed to carry on business either at the principal
office, or at its subordinate office if cause of action has accrued at that place,

52
(2015) 10 SCC 161.
53
2016 SCC OnLine Del 376.
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54
but not at both places. Second , the application of Sanjay Dalia leads to
four distinct factual scenarios, and the additional option under Sections
134(2) and 62(2) of the Trade Marks Act and the Copyright Act,
respectively, can be exercised only in the following manner:

S.
No.
Place of Plaintiff‘s
Principal Office
(Sole office in s.
no. 1)
Place of
Plaintiff‘s
Subordinate/
Branch
Office
Place
where
the cause
of action
arose
Place where the
Plaintiff can
additionally sue
under Section
134(2) and Section
62(2)
1. A -- C A
2. A B A A
3. A B B B
4. A B C A

65. Before delving, further, a brief analysis may be made, concerning the
judgment of WWE , the issues with its reasoning, and the authoritative force
it carries post the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia and in
Ultra Home .
66. Firstly , at the outset it may be noted that the Division Bench‘s
conclusion in WWE that ― it could not be denied that the plaintiff carried on
business in Delhi ‖ if it had a shop from where it sold its goods and services,
goes against the express words of Dhodha House . At para. 51 the Supreme
Court in Dhodha House had observed ― …it is possible that the goods
manufactured by the plaintiff are available in the market of Delhi or they
are sold in Delhi but that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries
on any business in Delhi ‖. It is clear that the sale of goods, in and of itself,
either through a physical store or a ― virtual store ‖, would not be sufficient to

54
2016 SCC OnLine Del 376, para. 12.
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hold that a corporation ― carries on business ‖ at that place. Depending upon
the nature of the business engaged in and the kind of activity being
undertaken at a given place, it needs to be determined, whether, among other
things, ― the essential part of the business ‖ is conducted at that place.
67. Secondly , while placing reliance on para. 46(3) of Dhodha House , the
Division Bench had found that the case of the plaintiff was akin to the
example given by SB Sinha J. of a Bombay firm having a branch office at
Amritsar, where orders were received, subject to confirmation by the head
office at Bombay and where money was paid and disbursed. Since in
Dhodha House , the branch office at Amritsar, in the example, was
considered as a place where business was carried on, the Division Bench, by
the use of analogy, found that the plaintiff-corporation in WWE was
― carrying on business ‖ in Delhi. The example taken note of, however, does
not appear to be applicable to the plaintiff‘s facts; particularly, when
examined in light of the other examples given in Dhodha House . These
examples noted by SB Sinha J. at para. 46(3) of the said decision are:
a. A retail dealer who sells goods in the mofussil cannot be said to
― carry on business ‖ in Bombay merely because he has an agent
in Bombay to import and purchase his stock for him. He cannot
be said to carry on business in Bombay unless his agent made
sales there on his behalf;
b. A Calcutta firm that employs an agent at Amritsar who has no
power to receive money or to enter into contracts, but only
collects orders which are forwarded to and dealt with in
Calcutta, cannot be said to do business in Amritsar;
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c. Similarly, a Life Assurance Company which carries on business
in Bombay and employs an agent at Madras who acts merely as
a Post Office forwarding proposals and sending moneys cannot
be said to do business in Madras;
d. But a Bombay firm that has a branch office at Amritsar, where
orders are received subject to confirmation by the head office at
Bombay, and where money is paid and disbursed, is carrying
on business at Amritsar and is liable to be sued at Amritsar; and

e. When a company though incorporated outside India gets itself
registered in India and does business in a place in India through
its agent authorized to accept insurance proposals, and to pay
claims, and to do other business incidental to the work of
agency, the company carries on business at the place of
business in India.
68. A mapping of the above examples to the facts of WWE would reveal
that a website that has its server outside India, and allows customers in Delhi
to buy products is closer to examples (b) and (c) than example (d), which the
Division Bench took into consideration. It is again important to clarify that
mere conclusion of commercial transactions, in and of itself, is not sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of ― carrying on business ‖. This formed part of the
ratio decidendi of Dhodha House , and was expressly mentioned at paras. 47
and 51 of the decision.
69. The view that mere conclusion of transactions in WWE ‘s facts could
not constitute ― carrying on business ‖ is also strengthened by the nature of
business engaged in by the plaintiff therein. Incorporated in the State of
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Delaware, USA, the plaintiff-company was engaged in the development,
production and marketing of television programming, live events and the
licensing and sale of branded consumer products featuring its brand. The
plaintiff was stated to have offered a variety of memorabilia including, but
not limited to, apparel, posters, calendars, fact books, sunglasses, water
bottles, key-rings, DVDs, etc. It was stated to have more than 200 licenses
distributing its products in 86 countries, including India. It had been averred
by the plaintiff that it licensed out its well-known trademarks and the
images/characters to different parties for use on merchandise in a wide range
of products.
70. This being the expanse, nature and breadth of the plaintiff‘s business,
a simple purchase of a product/service via the internet could not have
constituted ― carrying on business ‖ at Delhi. A perusal of the judgment
would also reveal that while the activity of entering into transactions has
been described in detail by the Division Bench the issue of whether this
activity is an ― essential part ‖ of the plaintiff‘s business has not been
analysed. Indeed, owing to this, the conclusion of the Division Bench was
that the plaintiff ― to a certain extent ‖ carries on business in Delhi. Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act,
however, do not allow a plaintiff to sue at a place where it carries on
business ― to a certain extent ‖.

71. Thirdly , the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench would allow
a corporation not having any presence in India to sue a defendant at all
places where it engages in online website sales with customers at a given
place. A foreign corporation can, relying on the additional avenues under
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Sections 62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright and Trade Marks Act,
respectively, sue a defendant belonging to Ladakh at the courts in
Kanyakumari, if the plaintiff has made such sales at Kanyakumari. Such an
interpretation would allow the additional option, granted to a plaintiff under
the specialised statutes, to be used as a means to harass a defendant and
indulge in forum shopping.
72. While analysing the decisions rendered on this issue and the
applicable statutory regime, this Court is conscious of the settled principle
that what binds the Court is not every line and observation made in the
judgment but the ratio decidendi of the decision. It is the legal principle on
the basis of which a conclusion is arrived at and an order is given, that is to
be followed by Courts.
73. The defendants were residents of Mumbai and the plaintiff was a
multinational company having ample resources and wealth. The additional
options under the Trade Mark and Copyright Act were intended to, as noted
55
in the Joint Committee report , provide relief to authors, who were deterred
from instituting infringement proceedings because the Court was at a
considerable distance from their place of ordinary residence.
74. The consequence of there not being a place where the plaintiff is
― carrying on business ‖ for the purposes of the special legislations would
simply mean that the plaintiff has to file a suit under Section 20. A plaintiff-
corporation like the one in WWE would face no difficulty, at all, by

55
Published in the Gazette of India dated 23.11.1956.
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instituting the suit at the place where the defendant resides, carries on
business, or personally works for gain.
75. Considering the discussion above, the decision in WWE would not
govern the field on this issue, and would have to be restricted to its own
peculiar and unique facts. Such facts may possibly exist in a case dealt with
at paras. 77-78 below.
76. What remains of Badar Durrez Ahmed J.‘s opinion in WWE after his
own subsequent opinion in Ultra Home and the decision of the Supreme
56
Court in Sanjay Dalia , which in turn affirmed his Lordship‘s decision
rendered by him as a Single Judge, may now be examined. Two situations
may be considered:
77. Firstly , where the plaintiff is entering into commercial transactions,
through the means of internet, with customers only within the jurisdiction of
one court. And secondly , where the plaintiff is entering into commercial
transactions, through the means of internet, with customers within the
jurisdiction of multiple courts.
78. In the first case, if the principles in WWE are applied, a deemed
physical office would be created at the sole place where commercial
transactions are getting concluded. Since that would be the sole office,
applying the dictum in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home , the plaintiff-company
shall be deemed to carry on business at that given place, and jurisdiction
under the special provisions may be made out. This, however, shall be rare
as it would be rather abnormal for an international corporation not having

56
Badar Durrez Ahmed J.
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any presence in India to have transactions only within the jurisdiction of one
court.
79. In order to bring oneself within this first category, a plaintiff may
deliberately omit to plead that transactions are also getting concluded within
the jurisdiction of other courts. In such a case, a given court may put suitable
questions to the plaintiff, inter alia , under Section 168 of the Bharatiya
57
Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 . If it is found that the plaintiff had cleverly
attempted to conceal from the court, facts which had a bearing on
jurisdiction, he need not, it is trite law, be heard on merits at all. He who
comes to the court seeking an equitable relief must come with clean hands
disclosing all that is material.
80. However, if, after being honest and fair to the Court, a company is
found to be concluding contracts only within the jurisdiction of one Court,
jurisdiction may be made out under the specialised statutes, under the WWE
reasoning. This may also, arguably, amount to specifically targeting a given
58
forum state as per the standard in Banyan Tree , and resort to the
additional forum may, perhaps, not even be required.
81. In the second category, which would be most cases, transactions
would get concluded within the jurisdiction of multiple forum courts. As per
the ruling in WWE itself, there would be multiple deemed physical stores,
all at the same footing, spread across multiple jurisdictions. Amongst these
stores, there would be no ― principal office ‖. Resultantly, these sub-offices

57
―BSA‖.
58
2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780.
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would be deemed to be ― carrying on business ‖ only when cause of action
(as per the standard in Banyan Tree ) accrues at that place.
82. Post the decisions in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home , the mere
presence of a store at a given place without the accrual of cause of action,
cannot be considered to be ― carrying on business ‖. As was noted by Badar
59
Durrez Ahmed J. himself as a Single Judge in Sanjay Dalia , ― merely
having a branch office at Delhi would not mean that the plaintiff carries on
business in Delhi. The plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at a
branch office only if cause of action had arisen in Delhi ‖.
83. If it can be established that cause of action as per the Banyan Tree
standard had accrued at the place where the deemed physical stores exist, a
basis to sue, under Section 20(c) of the CPC, would already exist. A resort to
the specialised provisions again may not be required. Thus, for an
overwhelming number of cases, the decision in WWE , post Sanjay Dalia
and Ultra Home , can no longer be made applicable.
84. It may be argued that under certain circumstances the additional
option to sue under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section
62(2) of the Copyright Act would not, meaningfully, exist for a foreign
company. When could, arguably, such a case arise? Where an international
conglomerate, that has no physical presence in India, wishes to protect its IP
rights, which are purportedly infringed by website sales in India, within the
jurisdiction of multiple courts in India. Inconvenience to such a plaintiff by

59
Which ultimately came to be affirmed both by the Division Bench and the Supreme Court.
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an insistence to sue under the conventional Section 20 grounds, does not
seem to be a real possibility.
85. Therefore, no real prejudice would be caused if the option, which was
intended to provide small artists in India the opportunity to sue for their
intellectual property, is not made available to an international giant. An
interpretation to the contrary would allow a company to harass a defendant
by filing suits, at any one of the multiple places where its online sales are
taking place. The additional option intended to redress the difficulties of
artists cannot be interpreted in a way that allows the plaintiff to erode the
foundations of conventional jurisdictional rules. In this connection, the
60
following dictum of CK Thakker J. in Laxman Prasad may be taken note
of:
―Section 20 has been designed to secure that justice might be brought as
near as possible to every man‘s hearthstone and that the defendant should
not be put to the trouble and expense of travelling long distances in order to
61
defend himself.‖
86. An unmodified and wholesale application of the rule in WWE would
place the defendant be at the mercy of the plaintiff. This would, as was
pithily observed by the Coordinate Bench ― through the very concept of
62
territorial jurisdiction of courts to the winds. ‖
87. Thus, owing to WWE being in the teeth of the ratio of Dhodha
House , and after the decisions in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home , no longer
being workable, the decision of the Division Bench no longer governs the
issue.

60
(2008) 1 SCC 618.
61
(2008) 1 SCC 618, para. 35.
62
CS (Comm) 904/2026, judgment dated 25.08.2026, para. 52.
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88. The decision of the Division Bench in Blueberry Books & Ors. v.
63
Google India Pvt. Ltd. , does not disturb the conclusion reached above. In
the said case, the Division Bench sat in appeal over an order of the learned
Single Judge, accepting the interim applications made by some of the
defendants, whereby they were directed to be deleted from the array of
parties in the plaintiff‘s copyright infringement suit.
89. The suit filed by the plaintiff in Blueberry Books claimed that the
defendants were infringing the copyrighted work of the plaintiff through
internet applications across several platforms and website applications. At
the outset, it was noted that the plaintiff was a Delhi based firm. On this
short ground, it was found that jurisdiction under Section 62(2) of the
64
Copyright Act was made out. In relation to an argument made that
jurisdiction of this Court was ousted as infringing activity took place outside
borders of India and in USA alone, it was observed that once jurisdiction
under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act was made out, it was not to be
additionally proven, that the infringing activity also took place within Delhi.
The observations made by the Division Bench at para. 19 were made in
passing, and as noted in the paragraph itself, were in arguendo . They do not
constitute binding precedent.
90. In Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. Agribiotech Industries
65
Ltd. , a suit was instituted for trademark and copyright infringement along
with a claim for passing off, for its mark and artwork ―OFFICERS
CHOICE‖ and ―OFFICERS CHOICE BLUE‖, registered in favour of the

63
2016:DHC:4326-DB.
64
2016:DHC:4326-DB, para. 14.
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2020 SCC OnLine Del 2861.
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plaintiff. Jurisdiction of Delhi, under Section 20(a) of the CPC was invoked.
It was submitted that the defendant ― carries on business ‖ at Delhi through
66
its office bearing the address of Beetal House, New Delhi. This address, it
was argued by counsel therein, was also indicated to be an address of the
defendant on its own website. While hearing the plaintiff‘s application under
Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2, for ad-interim reliefs, a jurisdictional objection
was raised by the defendant.
91. The Court found that at the ad-interim stage, the website of the
defendant, containing the Beetal House Address under the ― Contact Us ‖
page, was sufficient to prima facie conclude that the defendant carried on
business at Delhi. The analysis provided for in Dhodha House for
determining whether a corporation ― carries on business ‖ was found to
require completion of pleadings and evidence, and thus, was not delved into.
For ease of analysis, the ― Contact Us ‖ page of the defendant therein is
extracted as under:
― REGISTERED OFFICE :
ADDRESS:
SP-825, Road No. 14,
Vishwakarma Industrial Area,
Jaipur 302013 (Rajasthan)
Tel. No. 01412331771-2,
Fax. 0141 2330810
E-mail : [email protected]

REGISTRARS :
ADDRESS:
Beetal House, 3rd Floor,
99 Madangir, Behind Local Shopping Centre,
Near Dada Harsukhdas Mandir,
New Delhi-110062

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―Beetal House Address‖.
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Phone-91-11-2996 1281-83
Fax-91-11-2996 1284
E-mail : [email protected]

COMPLIANCE OFFICER :
ADDRESS: Ms Anisha Jain,
SP-825, Road No. 14,
Vishwakarma Industrial Area,
Jaipur-302013, (Rajasthan) Tel. No. : 0141-2331771/2
Fax. No. : 0141-2330810
E-mail : [email protected]‖
(Emphasis supplied)
92. While it is true that what was before the court was simply the plaint
and along with it a document showing the ― Contact Us ‖ page of the
defendant, on the basis of that material as well, the Dhodha House test, if
applied, would have led to a different conclusion. The ― Contact Us ‖ page
showed two addresses of the defendant. The first was the address to the
defendant‘s registered office and the second was the address to an office
which bore the heading ―REGISTRARS‖. It would, ex facie , indicate that
the Beetal House Address was that of the registrars and not the corporation.
Even otherwise, even if the address of the registrars was to be considered as
that of the corporation, what was ultimately before the court were two
offices.
93. In such a situation, naturally, under the explanation to Section 20 of
the CPC, the defendant-company shall not be considered as being one with a
sole office. It became essential, therefore, to determine where its principal
place of business was and where was its sub-ordinate office. It was not
brought to the notice of the Coordinate Bench that in Sanjay Dalia , itself,
the Supreme Court noted that ordinarily, the residence of a company would
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67
be where its registered office is. The controlling power, also, as a fact,
generally , was found to be exercised at the registered office, and that office,
68
is, therefore, the principal place of business.
94. The defendant in Allied Blenders as per the plaint, was not selling its
goods in Delhi. The compliance officer, as the webpage of the defendant
narrated, was also situated at the registered office i.e., at Jaipur, Rajasthan.
In such a situation, even by a prima facie consideration of the material, it
would appear that the principal place of business was at the registered Jaipur
office. The Beetal House Address at Delhi would then be a sub-ordinate
office. For the purposes of Section 20(a), such a place would carry on
business, only when cause of action also accrued at that place. It would be
difficult, therefore, to hold, even while considering the plaint alone, that the
defendant was ― carrying on business ‖ at the Beetal House Address.
95. Lastly, it may also be highlighted that the decision of Allied Blenders
& Distillers Pvt. Ltd. , was rendered while adjudicating an ad-interim
interlocutory prayer of the plaintiff. The Court did not render any final
decision on the rights and obligations of the parties. It was merely an ad-
interim order subject to the outcome, not merely of the suit, but also of the
interim injunction application. The precedential value of such a judgment is,
therefore, doubtful. In any case, the decision of Allied Blenders & Distillers
Pvt. Ltd. , is not a binding precedent and turns on its own unique facts.
96. In Cable News Networks INC v. CTVN Calcutta Television Network
69
Pvt. Ltd. , a company incorporated in Delaware, US, with its headquarters

67
Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das , (1994) 4 SCC 225.
68
(2015) 10 SCC 161, para. 16.
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in Atlanta, Georgia, filed a suit before this Court, primarily, for trademark
infringement along with a claim for passing off. There was no subordinate
office that the plaintiff had within the jurisdiction of Delhi. The defendant
had its registered office at Kolkata. The plaintiff‘s case was that the
defendant conducted its business under the name Uttar Bangla and
commenced using the name Calcutta News, with the acronym CN only in
2014. The design of the defendant‘s logo with C and N, joined at the bottom,
was contended to approach the plaintiff‘s logo so close as to create
confusion.

97. The Court observed that the defendant carried on business within the
territorial limits of Delhi. Para. 114 of the said decision contains the
reasoning and reads as under:
― 114. Viewed thus, it is clear that the averments in the present plaint, as
enumerated in para 42.2.15 supra, sufficiently assert that the defendant
carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. The defendant is
engaged in the business of dissemination of news, over its news channel.
There is a specific assertion, in para 49(a) of the plaint, that the defendant
carries on business within the territory of this Court through its website,
social media pages and YouTube channels. How it does so, cannot be
examined under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC. Further, para 49 goes on to
assert, in so many words, that the defendants are offering news services
under the impugned logos within the territory of this Court. The business of
the defendant being offering of news services, this assertion is a complete
answer to the submission, of the defendant, that the suit is bad for want of
territorial jurisdiction and has, therefore, to be returned under Order VII
Rule 10.‖

98. The registered office of the defendant in the said case was at Kolkata.
As per Sanjay Dalia , specifically para. 16, the defendant-company would be
deemed to have its principal office at Kolkata. Given that mere sale of goods

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2023 SCC OnLine Del 2436.
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cannot constitute carrying on of business, similarly, mere display of news
could also not have attracted Section 20(a) of the CPC. The essentiality
analysis required under Dhodha House was not sufficiently pressed before
the learned Single Judge. Similar observations are to be made concerning
the conclusion at para. 118 of the said judgment that the plaintiff carried on
business at Delhi because its pan-India news channel was viewed in Delhi.
99. In Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt.
70
Ltd. , the plaintiff had filed a suit for infringement of its registered
trademark along with a claim for passing off. The case against the defendant
was that while a Marketing Agreement was entered into between the parties,
under which the defendant was permitted to use the plaintiff‘s mark, the use
undertaken by the defendant was in violation and outside the scope of the
said agreement. The jurisdiction paragraph in the plaint is reproduced at
para. 3.2 of the judgment which reads as under:
― 3.2. …
JURISDICTION
50. The present suit is a consolidated suit for infringement and/or passing
off three Plaintiff's Subject Marks, by the same Defendant, arising out of the
same course of transaction. This Hon'ble High Court has jurisdiction to
3
entertain the present suit under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act,
1999 since the Plaintiff's registered address is within the jurisdiction of this
Hon'ble Court, i.e., New Delhi, and the Plaintiff ordinarily carries on
business in New Delhi. The two registered marks asserted in the present suit
has been registered with the Delhi Trademarks Registry. Further, the seed
packets of the impugned goods of the Defendant are available on various e-
commerce platforms like India Mart etc., which are available for access
within New Delhi, and in any event, are dynamic websites that permits
communication and placement of orders. In addition, the relationship
between parties to the suit arises out of the Marketing Agreement executed
in New Delhi. As such, this Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has territorial

70
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727.
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jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. The suit is valued beyond the
minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and is also a
commercial suit within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.‖

100. The Court found that Delhi courts had territorial jurisdiction to
maintain and entertain the plaint on quite a few grounds, one of which
deserves consideration under the present heading.
101. The Division Bench concluded that the mere fact of the defendant‘s
product being available for sale on an e-commerce website is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of Section 20(a) i.e., of the defendant carrying on
business within the territory of Delhi. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court
relied upon WWE and what it considered to be its ratio , namely, that a
website allowing the purchase of a product is akin to a physical store of
brick-and-mortar.
102. The reasoning in WWE , has been questioned in this judgement at
paras. 66-71 and 76-87. It has also been detailed as to why it no longer
governs the field. Distinct from the merits of WWE , the applicability of
WWE to Kohinoor Seed Fields is also possibly doubtful. In WWE , the
plaint had averred that commercial transactions were being concluded at
Delhi. Per contra , no such averment was present in Kohinoor Seed Fields .
Even otherwise, unlike a case where a sole office of a corporation is present,
which in turn is deemed as the place where it is carrying on business, where
multiple offices are present, it is essential for the Court to inquire where the
principal place of business is.
103. Additionally, in WWE , the website on which the transactions were
getting concluded belonged to the plaintiff itself, while in Kohinoor Seed
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Fields , it were third-party marketplaces. Thus, even assuming WWE to be
the law governing the issue raised in Kohinoor Seed Fields , its reasoning of
transactions getting concluded being akin to sales taking place at a physical
store cannot apply to Kohinoor Seed Fields as the website itself was not of
the individual whose store was sought to be created. Thus, owing to it not
being pointed out to the Division Bench that WWE on facts may not be
applicable, and that WWE was and is no longer the authority holding the
field, the decision in Kohinoor Seed Fields , in turn, is not treated to be
binding precedent on this issue.

104. Relying on Kohinoor Seed Fields , three decisions were rendered
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which are Raju Kumar v. Vinod Sah , Sauss Home Products Pvt. Ltd. v.
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Reckitt Benckiser India Pvt. Ltd. , and ITC Ltd. v. Adyar Gate Hotels
73
Ltd. Each of these three cases involves the application of the rule laid
down in Kohinoor Seed Fields .
105. The material portion of Raju Kumar reads as under:
― 20. Section 20 CPC specifically empowers a plaintiff to sue a defendant
before any court within which the defendant principally carries on its
business or where the whole or part of the cause of action has arisen. As we
have held in our decisions in Diamond Modular and Kohinoor-II,
prominently following the earlier Division Bench in World Wrestling
Entertainment, in the e-commerce age, every virtual platform over which the
defendant's goods or services would be available operates as a brick and
mortar store present in every location where that website is accessible.
Though, in Banyan Tree Holding, the Court had held that it is necessary to
show conclusion of a commercial transaction over the said website, that
position now does not survive after the decision in World Wrestling
Entertainment, which postulates that even the possibility of concluding a
commercial transaction would be sufficient. Tata Sons further dilutes the

71
2026 SCC OnLine Del 893.
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2026 SCC OnLine Del 937, paras. 61-65.
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2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852.
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principle by holding that even the possibility of interacting over a website,
without any commercial element involved, would also be sufficient to
invoke territorial jurisdiction of a particular court within whose jurisdiction
the website is accessible.‖

106. The material portion of Sauss Home Products reads as under:
― 61. On the aspect of territorial jurisdiction, the Division Bench of this
Court has already held in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed
Sciences Pvt. Ltd. that the availability of the products of the appellant on the
India Mart website would by itself confer jurisdiction on any Court within
which the website was accessible. ...

62. The law has, thus, travelled from Banyan Tree Holding to World
Wrestling Entertainment v. Reshma Collection and thereafter to Tata Sons.
In view of the fact that the appellant's product was admittedly available on
the India Mart platform, it could not be said that the appellant was not
carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this Court. The fact that the
Indiamart platform may have been a B2B21 platform rather than a B2C22
platform, cannot make any substantial difference to this legal position in
view of the law as it has developed on the aspect of territorial jurisdiction.‖

107. In Adyar Gate , the plaintiff-company having its registered office at
Kolkata, West Bengal filed a suit before this Court contending that the
defendant was infringing its trademark ―DAKSHIN‖ by using it at its
restaurant in Chennai. The plaintiff also contended that the defendant was
passing off its services as those of the plaintiff. An ad-interim injunction
was granted by the learned Single Judge of our Court but the main
injunction application was dismissed on grounds of territorial jurisdiction as
also on merits. Assailing this order of dismissal, the Division Bench was
moved.
108. The Division Bench in Adyar Gate clarified that the defendant had no
branch or outlet in Delhi and that it is not physically possible to avail the
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74
services provided in the Chennai Dakshin restaurant from Delhi. The
Court, however, concluded that jurisdiction at Delhi was made out under
Section 20(a) of the CPC. Two independent reasons were given to arrive at
this conclusion. Firstly , the defendant was carrying on business in relation to
its restaurant in Chennai at Delhi and at every place where the Zomato page
could be accessed and a reservation could be booked using the ― Order
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Online ‖ link. Secondly , and additionally, it was found that jurisdiction was
also made out at Delhi because the defendant was responding to critical
reviews by its customers of its Chennai restaurant on the Zomato page,
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which was accessible at Delhi. The development in the law taken note of at
para. 98 of the judgment reads as under:
― 98. As per the law which has developed over the decisions in Banyan Tree
Holding , World Wrestling Entertainment , Ultra Home Construction , Tata
Sons , Kohinoor Seed Fields and Sauss Home Products , among others,
interactive accessibility is the key to determining territorial jurisdiction. The
accessibility must be interactive. In other words, a mere webpage which
provides information, and with which it is not possible to interact but only
to learn about the goods or services of a defendant, may not confer
jurisdiction over a Court from within whose jurisdiction the website can be
accessed. However, if the website is interactive and, more particularly, if it
is possible to conclude a commercial transaction over the website, territorial
jurisdiction would prima facie exist.‖

109. It can, thus, be seen that Kohinoor Seed Fields and its application in
Raju Kumar , Sauss Home Products , and Adyar Gate are premised on the
application of WWE to Section 20(a) of the CPC and of the purported
dilution of the principles in Banyan Tree in the subsequent decision of Tata
Sons . Paras. 179-186 of this judgment raise certain issues concerning the

74
2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852, para. 88.
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2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852, para. 98.
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2026 SCC OnLine Del 4852, para. 102.
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decision of Tata Sons . It suffices to observe at this stage that there is no real
curtailment of the Banyan Tree principles in Tata Sons . The requirement of
concluding commercial transactions still remains a fundamental requirement
for conferring jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC. Insofar as the
decision of WWE is concerned, the analysis above has revealed that its
reasoning was at odds with Dhodha House and post the decisions in Sanjay
Dalia and Ultra Home , the judgment in WWE may not govern the field.
110. Cumulatively, it was not pointed out to the Division Bench that the
incorporation of WWE into Section 20(a) of the CPC, and the claim of
Banyan Tree having been diluted, may not be correct. Resultantly,
Kohinoor Seed Fields , and the decisions that follow it, do not constitute
binding precedent on this issue. It is further settled that a judgment is
precedent for what it decides, it can never be binding qua issues which were
not raised before it.
111. At last, the effect of the decision in Kohinoor as seen through Adyar
Gate , may be appreciated through the means of an example. Let there be a
defendant having its registered office at Kanyakumari and a sub-ordinate
office, through the means of an actual flourishing restaurant, at Delhi.
Assume that cause of action may have accrued at any place apart from
Delhi. If the plaintiff, in such a case, files a suit in Delhi, invokes Section
20(a) of the CPC, and contends that the defendant is carrying on its business
at Delhi, the plaint would be returned. The dictum of Patel Roadways would
allow the plaintiff to file at the place of its sub-ordinate office (in this the
restaurant at Delhi) only when cause of action has also accrued at that place.
Meaning, thereby, that a restaurant having a number of employees and a
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considerable infrastructure, is not in and of itself sufficient to contend that
the defendant is carrying on business at Delhi.
112. But if instead of investing capital, time and human resource at Delhi,
a defendant were to have a website that allows people to make bookings at
its restaurant in Kanyakumari, as per the dictum of Kohinoor and Adyar
Gate , the defendant would be carrying on business at Delhi and become
susceptible to the jurisdiction of Delhi courts under Section 20(a) of the
CPC. It is this conundrum that gets first created by WWE , and the learned
Division Bench is made to apply in Kohinoor and Adyar Gate . As noted
above, owing to the errors in WWE not being pointed out to the Division
Benches, the said decisions are not binding on the issue raised.
113. It may also be noted that a Special Leave Petition, challenging the
decision in Kohinoor Seed Fields , is presently pending before the Supreme
Court, on which notice was issued vide order dated 20.02.2026.
114. A brief reference may also be made to the decision of the Division
77
Bench in Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Kwick Living (I) Pvt. Ltd. ,
where, it was observed, inter alia , that a defendant‘s own declaration as to
its ― principal place of business ‖ to the Goods and Services Tax authorities,
would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ― carrying on business ‖
under Section 20(a) of the CPC. Though the ultimate conclusion of the
Division Bench was arrived at on the basis of additional grounds, this
specific finding, may be analysed in some depth.

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2026 SCC OnLine Del 6703.
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115. It was not pointed out to the Division Bench that the ― principal place
of business ‖, under the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, is a defined
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term. Section 2(89) of the Act reads as under:
― 2. Definitions.
In this Act , unless the context otherwise requires:
(89) ―principal place of business‖ means the place of business specified as
the principal place of business in the certificate of registration‖

(Emphasis supplied)
79
116. Under Section 25 of the GST Act, 2017, a corporation is required to
register itself in each State/Union Territory where it becomes liable for
registration. In every such State it has to provide a ― principal place of
business ‖ which is within that State/Union Territory. The meaning of the
expression ― principal office ‖ as it appears in the explanation to Section 20,
is, ordinarily, as per Sanjay Dalia , the place of its registered office. The
rationale being that this is generally the place where the controlling power of
the corporation is exercised. The principal office is also at a single place
regardless of the States in which a company may operate.
117. The import, requirements, and constituent elements, of what
constitutes a ― principal office ‖ is fundamentally in contradistinction to what
is considered as the ― principal place of business ‖ under the GST Act. The
declaration made by the defendant for the purposes of GST, in order to
comply with the requirement of the GST Act, cannot be incorporated to
determine where the corporation has its ― principal office ‖ for the purposes

78
―GST Act‖.
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―Section 25. Procedure for registration.
(1) Every person who is liable to be registered under section 22 or section 24 shall apply for registration in
every such State or Union territory in which he is so liable within thirty days from the date on which he
becomes liable to registration, in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed…‖
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of Section 20(a) of the CPC. In Hindustan Unilever , the binding and
applicable statutory provisions, were not pointed out to the Division Bench.
Resultantly, the conclusion on this issue, may not have binding effect.
118. From the discussion above, the following conclusions may be drawn
concerning the interpretation of the expression ― carries on business ‖:
a. The decision of WWE , does not govern the field concerning the
interpretation of the expression ― carries on business ‖ owing to:
first , it being irreconcilable with the judgments in Sanjay Dalia
and Ultra Home ; and second , it ignoring material portions of
Dhodha House .
b. The judgment in Kohinoor Seed Fields , which incorporates the
dictum of WWE , and applies it to the expression ― carries on
business ‖ under Section 20(a) of the CPC, is not a controlling
authority on the interpretation of this expression. The decisions
of Raju Kumar and Sauss Home which apply the dictum in
Kohinoor Seed Fields , similarly, are not authorities on this
issue.
c. The law, therefore, concerning the meaning and import of the
expression ― carries on business ‖ as it appears in Section 20(a)
and (b) of the CPC, Sections 134(2) and 62(2) of the Trade
Marks Act and Copyright Act, respectively, is governed by the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court in, inter alia , Patel
Roadways , Dhodha House and Sanjay Dalia , as also the
dictum of this Court in Ultra Home .
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d. If a corporation has a sole office, it shall be deemed to carry on
business at that place of its sole office. If, however, there is
more than one office, it must be deciphered where the principal
place of business of that corporation is. This principal office
shall ordinarily be the place of its registered office. Once the
principal office is discovered, the other offices shall be the sub-
ordinate offices/branch offices.
e. A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sub-
ordinate office if the cause of action for a given suit accrues at
that place. In such a scenario it shall not be open for the
company to sue a defendant at the place of its principal office,
where no cause of action has accrued.
C. “CAUSE OF ACTION, WHOLLY OR IN PART”
119. There are various dimensions to the expression ― cause of action,
wholly or in part ‖, as it appears in Section 20(c) of the CPC. It is again
difficult to compartmentalise them in defined silos but for the ease of
exposition, they are being considered under the heads that follow.
(i) Quia Timet Action
80
120. The learned authors of the celebrated commentary Snell’s Equity , at
para. 18-029, has observed the following in relation to a quia timet action:
― (2) Claimant’s rights not yet interfered with.
Although the claimant must establish his right, he may be entitled to an
injunction even though an infringement has not taken place but is merely

80 th
John McGhee, QC and Steven Elliott, QC, 34 Ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 2020.
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feared or threatened; for ―preventing justice excelleth punishing justice‖. This
class of action, known as quia timet , has long been established, but the
claimant must establish a strong case ; ―no one can obtain a quia timet order
by merely saying ‗Timeo‖‘. He must prove that there is an imminent
danger of very substantial damage, or further damage , e.g. by showing
that the threatened act ―is attended with extreme probability of irreparable
injury to the property of the plaintiffs, including also danger to their
existence‖. The court applies a two-stage test: ―(a) First, is there a strong
probability that, unless restrained by injunction, the defendant will act in
breach of the claimant‘s rights? (b) Secondly, if the defendant did an act in
contravention of the claimant‘s rights, would the harm resulting be so grave
and irreparable that, notwithstanding the grant of an immediate interlocutory
injunction (at the time of actual infringement of the claimant‘s rights) to
restrain further occurrence of the acts complained of, a remedy of damages
would be inadequate?‖
(Emphasis supplied)
121. In M/s Jawahar Engineering Co. and Ors. v. M/s. Javahar
81
Engineers Pvt. Ltd. , the plaintiffs claiming to be the registered trade mark
holder of the mark ‗ Javahar ‘ filed a suit claiming that the defendants had
applied for the registration of the trade mark ‗ Jawahar ‘ in respect of diesel
oil engines, inter alia , for the Union Territories of Delhi and Chandigarh.
This application was advertised in the Trade Mark Journal.
122. After the completion of pleadings, a preliminary issue on territorial
jurisdiction was framed. The learned Single Judge decided the issue against
the defendant and found that requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
suit was made out. It was held that jurisdiction was established, as an
advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal was published by the Registrar of
Trade Marks, Delhi. Upon an intra-court appeal being preferred, the
Division Bench held that ― the real point which gives the court jurisdiction is

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1983 SCC OnLine Del 41.
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not the place where the advertisement has appeared, but the fact that the
82
trade mark is sought for sale in Delhi amongst other places. ‖
123. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s PM Diesels Ltd.
83
v. M/s. Patel Field Marshal Inds. and Anr. , had relied upon the decision
of Jawahar Engineering , to conclude that jurisdiction of Delhi was made
out by an application for registration of trade mark being filed by the
defendant. This order in PM Diesels was assailed before the Supreme Court,
which was decided by the decision in Dhodha House .

124. SB Sinha J. in Dhodha House while disagreeing with the reasoning in
Javahar Engineers observed that an application for trade mark registration
could either be rejected or allowed. The mere filing of an application before
the concerned registrar, therefore, does not affect jurisdiction nor does it
constitute a cause of action, wholly or in part, to maintain a suit.
84
125. In Pfizer Products, Inc. v. Rajesh Chopra and Ors. , Badar Durrez
Ahmed J. observed that the decision in Javahar Engineers was merely
distinguished in Dhodha House and not disapproved. It was opined by the
Court that Javahar Engineers continued to be good law, even after the
decision in Dhodha House .
126. The decision of the Supreme Court in K. Narayanan and Anr. v. S.
85
Murali , decisively settles the issue. The case arose from an action of
passing off filed by the plaintiff against the defendant on the ground that an

82
1983 SCC OnLine Del 41, para. 10.
83
1998 SCC OnLine Del 181.
84
2006 SCC OnLine Del 177. This decision has also been referenced by Dr. Sikri J. in LG Corporation &
Anr. v. Intermarket Electroplasters (P) Ltd. and Anr. , 2006 SCC OnLine Del 1661 and was also approved
by the Division Bench in Pfizer Products Inc v. Rajesh Chopra , 2006 (32) PTC 301, para. 13.
85
(2008) 10 SCC 479.
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application seeking pan-India registration of the trade mark was filed by the
defendant before the Trade Mark Registry at Chennai. The High Court of
Madras revoked the leave to sue, which was affirmed by the Division
Bench, and the matter reached the Supreme Court. Relying on Jawahar
Engineers , it was submitted before the Supreme Court that when an
injunction is sought, it is not necessary that the threat should have become a
reality before the injunction is granted or refused; it can even be sought for a
threat which is yet to materialise.
127. The Supreme Court held that a proposed registration of a mark which
may or may not be granted, will not confer a cause of action to the plaintiff,
whether the application for registration is filed by the plaintiff or the
defendant. The material portion of the judgment reads as under:
― 11. Let us now consider the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties. The learned counsel for the appellants argued before us that the
Division Bench of the High Court in its impugned judgment had taken a
contrary view from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
of Delhi in Jawahar Engg. Co. v. Jawahar Engineers (P) Ltd. [1983 PTC
207 (Del)] which has held that the real point which confers jurisdiction on
the court is not the place where the advertisement is published but the
place for which the trade mark is sought for sale. It has also held that when
an injunction is sought, it is not necessary that the threat should have
become a reality before the injunction is granted or refused and it can even
be sought for a threat that is still to materialise.

13. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that when the
respondent filed a trade mark application at the Trade Mark Registry at
Chennai, a threat was communicated regarding the use of the trade mark in
Chennai, and it was immaterial whether there was actual use or not and the
appellants would be entitled to an injunction (being a prohibitive remedy)
against the said mark. The learned counsel for the appellants finally argued
that the respondent had based its application for registration of the trade
mark on use of the mark throughout India without any geographical
limitation from 1-4-1995, which included the city of Chennai, which thus
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entitled the appellants to file the suit at the High Court of Madras based on
the claims made in the trade mark application.

― 20. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after carefully
examining the aforementioned judgment of the High Court and also of the
learned Single Judge, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment of
Division Bench of the High Court holding that before registration is
granted for the trade mark, there is no right in the person to assert that the
mark has been infringed and that a proposed registration which may or
may not be granted, will not confer a cause of action to the plaintiff,
whether the application for registration is filed by the plaintiff or the
defendant.‖

86

128. In Deepak Kumar Kheka v. Yogesh Kumar Jaiswal & Ors. , a
registered holder of trademarks had filed a suit before the Commercial Court
at Saket seeking permanent injunction and certain other consequential
reliefs. It was an admitted position that no goods bearing the trade mark
were prevalent in the market. However, on the ground that ― a strong and
credible apprehension that the impugned goods bearing the impugned trade
marks (were) going to be infused into the markets ‖ within the jurisdiction of
the Commercial Court at Saket, the suit was instituted as a quia timet action.
Relying on K Narayanan , the Commercial Court allowed the defendant‘s
application under Order VII Rule 11 and rejected the plaint on the ground
that it did not disclose a cause of action. This order was impugned before the
Division Bench of this Court.
129. It was canvassed before the Division Bench that the Supreme Court‘s
observations in K. Narayanan were confined only to cases of passing off.
Rejecting this contention, the Division Bench held:

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― 18. What Mr. Bansal essentially seeks is that we should read the
reference to ―infringement‖, in para 20 of the judgment of the Supreme
Court as referring to passing off.

19. It goes without saying that this Court can hardly seek to rewrite a
judgment of the Supreme Court. Moreover, even in the opening sentence
of para 13 of the same decision, we find that the Court has recorded the
submission of the Counsel for the appellant before it held that the filing of
a trademark application by the respondent at the Trade Mark Registry at
Chennai amounted to a communication of a threat regarding the use of the
trademark at Chennai and it was immaterial whether there was actual use
or not. Clearly, these two observations, read together, indicate that the
Supreme Court is of the view that no application for injunction on the
ground of infringement of the trademark would lie where the defendant
has only applied for a registration of the mark.

20. When we read paras 13 and 20 in juxtaposition, it is clear that the
Supreme Court has held that no cause of action, to maintain a suit for
infringement, would lie merely on the defendant filing an application for
registration of a trade mark.‖

130. It is, thus, clear that the filing of an application for registration of
trade mark does not give rise to a cause of action for filing a quia timet suit
for infringement or passing off.
87
131. In Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. R.K. Distillery Pvt. Ltd. ,
a Division Bench of this Court dealt with an order of the learned Single
Judge returning the plaint for want of jurisdiction. The suit was filed by the
plaintiff for trademark and copyright infringement along with a claim for
passing off. The plaintiff‘s trademark in respect of whiskey was ― Officers
Choice ‖, whereas the respondent‘s mark was ― Regular Choice ‖. The
plaintiff did not have its registered office in Delhi and the defendant did not
reside in Delhi. The infringing goods were sold at Andhra Pradesh and not at
Delhi. The Court, while setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge,

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held that the suit of the plaintiff was in the nature of a quia timet action
based on the apprehension that the defendant would start selling its whiskey
under the impugned mark and label ― Regular Choice ‖ in Delhi.
132. For determining the question of territorial jurisdiction while
considering an application under Order VII Rule 10, it was re-iterated by the
Court in R.K. Distillery that the averments made in the plaint are to be taken
as true and correct. Considering the pleadings made by the plaintiff,
specifically at para. 28 in the plaint, it was found that the plaint could not be
returned. Para. 28 of the plaint reads as under:
― JURISDICTION :
28. This Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the
instant suit by virtue of Section 62 (2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1999 as the Plaintiff being the owner
of the copyright and the registered proprietor of the trademark in issue has
its office located at A-61/5, Ground floor, G.T. Kamal Road Industrial Area,
Azadpur, Delhi. Moreover, the Plaintiff is also carrying on its business
within the territorial limits of this Hon‘ble Court in a variety of ways such
as (but not limited to) sale of its products under the relevant marks in New
Delhi. The scale of business and activity of the Defendant is not known at
present and it is apprehended as being highly likely that the product sold
under the impugned mark ―Regular Choice‖ will be made available in New
Delhi. As the scope and extent of the Defendant‘s business is not known at
present, it is believed that they have a reasonably large scale business
around India and it is therefore strongly apprehended that they will launch
the impugned product in New Delhi and would be available within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. It is submitted that the threat that the
Defendants will sell and / or offer for sale the impugned product within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court is credible and imminent. There is a
reasonable apprehension that the Defendant is likely to sell its products
bearing the impugned mark and label within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court. Thus, giving rise to a substantial and integral part of the cause of
action within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. This Hon‘ble Court
therefore has the necessary jurisdiction by virtue of Section 20 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908.‖
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133. Importantly, the Division Bench in R.K. Distillery further observed
that while the plaint‘s averments for adjudicating an application under Order
VII Rule 10 need to be considered as true and correct, while adjudicating an
application for interim injunction, relatively stricter scrutiny is warranted.
The defendant‘s written statement/reply to the interim injunction application
as also the documents placed by it on record, can be considered at this stage.
For the grant of interim injunction, a plaintiff is required to establish a prima
facie case that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Para. 22 of the said decision
reads as under:
― 22. We must make it clear that the considerations with regard to territorial
jurisdiction in the context of Order VII Rule 10, CPC are entirely different
from those in the context of an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 &
2, CPC or in the context of an issue framed in the suit with regard to
territorial jurisdiction. While in the backdrop of Order VII Rule 10, it is only
the averments contained in the plaint that have to be seen in the case of an
application for the grant of interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2,
the contentions of the defendant in the reply to this application as also those
contained in the written statement are required to be examined to arrive at a
prima facie view. So, while in the case of an Order VII Rule 10 CPC
application, the issue of jurisdiction is decided on the basis of what is stated
in the plaint and, that too, after assuming the statements to be correct, an
application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC requires the examination
of the contentions of the defendants that may be contained in the written
statement and / or the reply to the application as also the other material
which may be placed by the defendant before the court. Here, there is no
question of considering the pleas of the plaintiff by way of a demurrer.
Furthermore, the standards would be higher when an issue with regard to
territorial jurisdiction is to be finally decided in the course of trial of the
suit. Thus, while for the purposes of an examination under Order VII Rule
10, CPC, the court may come to the conclusion that it has territorial
jurisdiction, this would not come in the way of the defendant in raising a
question as to territorial jurisdiction, both when the issue of temporary
injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC is being considered and
when an issue as to territorial jurisdiction is being decided in the course of
trial of the suit. To put it differently, while a plaintiff may succeed in
demonstrating, for the purposes of Order VII Rule 10 CPC that this court
has territorial jurisdiction and that the plaint ought not to be returned, he
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may fail in obtaining an order of interim injunction on the ground that the
plaintiff‘s entitlement is itself shaky because the issue of territorial
jurisdiction is highly debatable and prima facie not tenable. Therefore, the
decision of the court in putting down an objection of the defendant and in
rejecting the defendant‘s prayer for return of the plaint under Order VII Rule
10, CPC, would not come in the way of the defendant raising the question of
territorial jurisdiction, both as an objection to the grant of an interim
injunction as also at the time of decision of the issue of territorial
jurisdiction, if framed, at the time of trial of the suit.‖
134. Similarly, M/s Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. Prag
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Distillery Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. , was a decision which arose from facts that
were largely similar to those in R.K. Distillery Pvt. Ltd. . The Division Bench
held ― the mere fact that the plaint contained an averment that there was
credible and imminent apprehension that the infringing product would be
launched by the defendants within the territorial jurisdiction of this court,
would by itself constitute a cause of action ‖.

135. In Shree Nath Heritage Liquor Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Octaga Green
89
Power and Sugar Co. Ltd. and Ors. , the Court decided on the preliminary
issue framed by it on the question of territorial jurisdiction. The suit was
filed for design infringement and passing off action by defendant‘s
―GRENADE XXX RESERVE BOTTLE‖ rum product. Neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant resided within the jurisdiction of this Court. The
impugned product also was not sold in Delhi. Jurisdiction was pleaded
contending the suit to be a quia timet action on grounds that the defendant‘s
product is about to be launched in Delhi. Reliance was placed on the
decision of the Supreme Court in Kuldip Singh v. Subhash Chander Jain

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2017 SCC OnLine Del 9137.
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90
and Ors. , where R.C. Lahoti J., while finding the suit in question therein to
be pre-mature, importantly observed:
― 6. A quia timet action is a bill in equity. It is an action preventive in nature
and a specie of precautionary justice intended to prevent apprehended wrong
or anticipated mischief and not to undo a wrong or mischief when it has
already been done. In such an action the court, if convinced, may interfere by
appointment of receiver or by directing security to be furnished or by issuing
an injunction or any other remedial process. In Fletcher v. Bealey [(1885) 28
Ch D 688 : 54 LJ Ch 424 : 52 LT 541] , Mr Justice Pearson explained the law
as to actions quia timet as follows:
―There are at least two necessary ingredients for a quia timet action.
There must, if no actual damage is proved, be proof of imminent
danger , and there must also be proof that the apprehended damage
will, if it comes, be very substantial. I should almost say it must be
proved that it will be irreparable, because, if the danger is not proved
to be so imminent that no one can doubt that, if the remedy is
delayed the damage will be suffered, I think it must be shown that, if
the damage does occur at any time, it will come in such a way and
under such circumstances that it will be impossible for the plaintiff
to protect himself against it if relief is denied to him in a quia timet
action‖.
7. Kerr on Injunctions (6th Edn., 1999) states the law on ―threatened injury‖
as under:
―The court will not in general interfere until an actual nuisance has
been committed; but it may, by virtue of its jurisdiction to restrain
acts which, when completed, will result in a ground of action,
interfere before any actual nuisance has been committed, where it is
satisfied that the act complained of will inevitably result in a
nuisance. The plaintiff, however, must show a strong case of
probability that the apprehended mischief will in fact arise in
order to induce the court to interfere. If there is no reason for
supposing that there is any danger of mischief of a serious
character being done before the interference of the court can be
invoked, an injunction will not be granted ‖.
(Emphasis supplied)

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(2000) 4 SCC 50.
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136. Relying on Kuldip Singh , in Shree Nath Heritage Liquor , this Court
held that even for a quia timet action, a plaintiff has to show that there is a
strong possibility of the defendants selling their product in Delhi, which is
likely to cause injury to its business and trade mark. Significantly, it was
noted that the defendant therein did not have an excise license for Delhi
which would enable it to sell the impugned product. The plaintiff, also, did
not plead that the defendant possesses an excise license which would allow
the defendant to sell the impugned product at Delhi. While stressing on the
fact that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were in Delhi, the plaint was
found to be an attempt at forum shopping and an outcome of clever drafting.
Resultantly, the plaint was returned.
137. The standard of scrutiny applied by the Division Benches in Prag
Distillery Pvt. Ltd. and R.K. Distillery Pvt. Ltd. for a quia timet action was
far lesser. While the decision in Shree Nath Heritage Liquour could be
justified on the ground that it was passed on the preliminary issue which was
framed after the completion of pleadings, it seems more appropriate to view
it in the context of the additional issues which came to be raised before the
learned Single Judge. The decision of RC Lahoti J. in Kuldip Singh was not
noticed by the Division Benches, nor was the issue of the goods concerned
being regulated by the Excise Act, and requiring a license to sell, adverted
to. Both these aspects have a bearing on whether a cause of action for a quia
timet action was made out. A judgment, it is trite law, is a precedent for
what it decides and not what can be inferred from it. The issues not
presented before a Court can never be said to be decided by it.
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138. A brief reference may also be made to the decision of Allied Blenders
91
& Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. Agribiotech Industries Ltd. , where jurisdiction
was sought to be invoked on the ground that the suit was in the nature of a
quia timet action and cause of action under Section 20(c) of the CPC has
been made out. It was found that ― the mere apprehension of the likelihood of
the defendant launching the allegedly infringing product within the
92
territorial jurisdiction of this Court, would confer jurisdiction ‖. The
decision of Shree Nath Heritage , was not adequately canvassed before the
learned Single Judge. In Shree Nath Heritage , the court had observed that a
strong possibility of the defendants selling the impugned goods must be
established. For alcohol, which is an excisable commodity, a license to sell
must exist with a defendant for a quia timet action to be made out.
93
139. In Novartis AG and Anr. v. Zydus Healthcare Limited and Anr. , a
Division Bench of this Court crystallised the manner in which an application
seeking outright rejection of a quia timet plaint is to be adjudicated. Paras.
50 and 51 of the said decision read as under:
― 50. What has to be seen, therefore, in assessing whether a quia timet plaint
can be rejected outright under Order VII Rule 11, is
(i) whether the plaint alleges
(a) a deliberate expressed intention to engage in activity the
result of which would raise a strong possibility of
infringement ,
(b) that the activity to be engaged in is imminent , and

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2020 SCC OnLine Del 2861.
92
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2861, para. 42.
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2022 SCC OnLine Del 4373.
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(c) that, if the defendant were to engage in the activity, the
plaintiff would suffer substantial , if not irreparable,
prejudice ,
(ii) that the claim of the plaintiff is not merely speculative , in the
hope that sufficient facts, to support the allegations, would be
gleaned on discovery during the course of trial, and
(iii) that the plaint contains cogent, precise and material recitals of
facts .
51. Nothing more is to be seen, when examining an Order VII Rule 11
challenge.‖
(Emphasis supplied)

140. From the discussion above, concerning quia timet actions, it can be
concluded that:
a. The cause of action for quia timet action accrues when the
defendant expresses a deliberate intention to engage in an
activity the result of which would raise a strong possibility of
infringement.
b. The activity to be engaged in must be imminent, and of such a
character that if the defendant were to engage in the activity,
the plaintiff would suffer substantial, if not irreparable,
prejudice.
c. For goods and services that are subject to regulatory control, in
determining whether a quia timet action is maintainable, it is
essential to consider whether the defendant holds the required
licences or permissions, statutory or otherwise, required for
their sale, use or any other commercial exploitation. For
instance, for the commercial sale of liquor, an excise license
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under the State‘s specific Excise Act is required, for
manufacturing a pharmaceutical product, license under the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 may be required, and for the
sale of insecticides a license under the Insecticides Act, 1968
may be required.
(ii) An Action for Passing Off
141. In Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Produce Marketing and
94
Processing Corp. Ltd. v. M/s. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. , the plaintiff
had filed a suit for infringement and passing off seeking, inter alia , a
permanent injunction and rendition of accounts. In order to establish
territorial jurisdiction of the Courts at Ludhiana, the plaintiff had averred
that apple juice manufactured by the defendant was sold with the plaintiff‘s
mark in Ludhiana.
142. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana placing reliance on the
opinion of Cornelius J. in Firm Bhagwan Dass v. Watkins Mayor and
95
Co. , observed that cause of action wholly or in part, for a claim of passing
off, can be said to have arisen only when: first , the defendant has directly
made sales of the goods carrying the impugned trademark within the
jurisdiction of a given Court. Second , the sales are made by the defendant
not to an individual consumer but to a distributor or a wholesaler or a
retailer. Third , such sales are at a commercial scale.
143. The Court in Mohan Meakin opined that if this much was not insisted
upon, corporations can make a mockery of jurisdictional rules and big firms

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1980 SCC OnLine P&H 297.
95
AIR 1947 Lah 289.
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could file civil actions as per their own whims and fancies. Para. 9 of the
said decision is worth reproducing and reads as under:
― 9. …If this much is not insisted upon, then the defendant can be dragged
into litigation in any part of the country by only adducing flimsy kind of
evidence that has been adduced in the present case by a company which has
its head office at Solan in Himachal Pradesh where the defendant too have
their head office and where it was convenient to the plaintiff to prosecute
the suit and to the defendant to defend the suit. A big firm like Mohan
Meakin Breweries Limited has its ramifications all over the country and it
is easy for it to have dragged this public Corporation into litigation
even at a far off place like Kanya Kumari if the only evidence necessary
to give jurisdiction to that Court was of purchasing of a few bottles by
any agent of Mohan Meakin Limited from someone locally there. ‖
(Emphasis supplied)
th
It must be stressed that the said decision was delivered on the 29 of
September, 1980, approximately 15 years before the official release of
public internet services in India.
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144. In Glen Raven Mills Inc. v. Vaspar Concepts Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. , a
suit for trademark infringement along with passing off was filed before this
Court seeking, inter alia , a permanent injunction. The plaint narrated that
the plaintiff instructed its attorneys to investigate the use of the impugned
mark by the defendant. As part of the investigation, one Mr. Debjit Gupta, a
resident of Delhi, placed an order for goods under the impugned mark via
exchange of letters. Thereafter, pursuant to the order, goods were dispatched
by the defendants and were delivered to Mr. Gupta at Delhi.
145. S.K. Mahajan J. concluded that goods could not be stated to be
delivered in Delhi. The Court noticed that freight had been paid by the
plaintiff, and the carrier, thus, was found to be the plaintiff‘s agent. Relying

96
1995 SCC OnLine Del 724.
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on Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, it was held that the delivery
of goods to the carrier/agent was made at Bangalore, which shall be deemed
to be the delivery to the plaintiff. The entire contract for supply of goods
was, thus, completed at Bangalore with no cause of action, wholly or in part,
accruing in Delhi.
146. Further in Glen , this Court analysed, that assuming the delivery did in
fact happen in Delhi, whether jurisdiction was made out under Section 20(c)
of the CPC. Placing reliance on the decisions of Mohan Meakin Breweries
Limited and Bhagwan Dass , the Court observed that in a case of passing
off, it is necessary to prove that the supply made by the defendant at a
particular place was on a commercial scale. There should also be a direct
transaction of sale and purchase between the defendant and a distributor,
whole-seller or a retailer, and such transactions should be of a commercial
98
proportion. Para. 12 of the said decision reads as under:
― 12. With a view, therefore, to give jurisdiction to the Court in a case of
passing off, it is necessary to prove that the supply made by the defendant at a
particular place was on a commercial scale. There should have been direct
transaction of sale and purchase between the defendant and a distributor or a
wholeseller or a retailer and such transactions should be of commercial
proportion.‖
99
147. In Indovax Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck Animal Health and Ors. , originally a
suit for trademark infringement along with passing off was filed, which
subsequently, was confined by the plaintiff to passing off alone. Neither the
plaintiffs nor the defendants resided within the jurisdiction of the court. The
question which arose was whether cause of action can be said to have arisen

97
―Sale of Goods Act‖.
98
1995 SCC OnLine Del 724, para. 12.
99
2017 SCC OnLine Del 9393.
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within the jurisdiction of the forum court. To support its case, the plaintiff
along with the plaint had filed an invoice issued in Jind, Haryana to prove
the accrual of cause of action. Subsequently, however, the plaintiff filed on
record three invoices of one ‗Baxi Medical Stores‘ in Delhi, along with the
amended plaint. These invoices were purported to be issued not to the
plaintiff but to third parties.
148. Deepa Sharma J. in Indovax appointed a Local Commissioner in
order to discover the source from where Baxi Medical Stores procured the
stock of the impugned products, sold under the invoices attached by the
plaintiff. The Local Commissioner in its report dated 26.11.2013 stated that
Baxi Medical Stores sourced the stock from Karnal, Haryana and that the
proprietor of Baxi Medical Stores also admitted that he is not a distributor of
defendants and had merely procured the three vials of product INNOVAX
from outside Delhi. The proceedings were found to be an abuse of process
and an attempt by the plaintiff to forum-shop.
149. The Court reiterated the test, inter alia , laid down in Glen , namely,
that for cause of action to accrue in a suit for passing off, the defendant must
have directly made sales of the goods carrying the impugned trademark, not
to an individual consumer, but to a distributor, wholesaler or retailer, at a
commercial scale. Mere availability of goods, it was opined, does not confer
jurisdiction. The invoices put on record by the plaintiff were found to be a
result of the plaintiff‘s own acts. The Court found that the impugned goods
were otherwise not available in Delhi, but were procured from the
authorised dealer of the defendant at Haryana. No cause of action was found
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to have arisen within the jurisdiction of Delhi and the plaint was resultantly
returned.
150. From the discussion above, it may be concluded that in a suit for
passing off:
a. Cause of action (wholly or in part) can be said to have arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of a court only if the defendant
has made sales of the goods carrying the impugned trademark
within the jurisdiction of a given Court. Direct sales are made
by the defendant not to an individual consumer but to a
distributor, wholesaler or a retailer. Such sales are at a
commercial scale. Mere availability of goods within the
jurisdiction of a forum court does not confer jurisdiction.
b. Sale of goods within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum
court by a firm which does not act as a distributor, wholesaler,
retailer, or agent of the defendant, does not confer jurisdiction.
c. Where goods are procured by a firm from another firm that is
outside the jurisdiction of the forum court and in turn sold
within the territory of the forum court, jurisdiction shall not, be
conferred.
d. Additionally, delivery of goods to the agent/carrier of the
plaintiff or its investigator, for onward transmission, is deemed
delivery upon the plaintiff or its investigator. This conclusion is
not restricted to suits for passing off, but is a general conclusion
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arrived at by the application of Section 39 of the Sale of Goods
Act.
(iii) An Action for Infringement in the Offline World
151. In the year 1915, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kheshtra
100
Pal Sharma v. Pancham Singh Varma , decided a civil revision filed
against the judgment of the District Judge, affirming the Subordinate
Judge‘s order returning the plaint in a suit for trademark infringement and
passing off on the ground that territorial jurisdiction was not made out. The
plaint averred that the plaintiff had been making and selling in Muttra a
medicine named ― Sudha Sindhu ‖. The mark ― Suddha Sindhu ‖ was claimed
to be registered in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant, a resident of Gaya,
had advertised for sale at Gaya, a medicine made by him and named ― Asli
Sudha Sindhu ‖. Advertisements of the defendant‘s medicine had appeared in
papers published in Muttra, and in circulars and hand-bills distributed in
Muttra.
152. Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru along with Pandit Motilal Nehru appeared for
the revisionists and argued that if a person advertises as his own, a trade
mark belonging to another, he thereby infringes the mark. The distribution
of hand-bills and the publication of advertisement in Muttra was contended
to be the infringement complained of which gave the plaintiff his cause of
action. Per contra , Dr. Sunder Lal appeared for the respondent and argued
that for jurisdiction of a given court to be invoked there must be actual sale
of the impugned goods within the local limits of a given court.

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1915 SCC OnLine All 115.
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153. The Division Bench found actual sale to be dispensable to determine
infringement of a registered trademark. Mere advertisement was found to be
sufficient to invoke jurisdiction of a given Court. The material portion of the
judgment reads as under:
―The question is whether the publication of the advertisement, by the
respondent, of his medicine, Asli Sudha Sindhu, in papers, hand-bills and
circulars published in Muttra is an infringement of the applicant's trademark.
For the purpose of this application we must of course assume that the
applicant is entitled to the trade mark which he claims, and that the
respondent's advertisement is calculated to induce people to believe that they
will get from him the applicant's medicine. No authority has been produced in
support of the argument that such an advertisement cannot be an infringement
of the trade mark. On the other hand several English cases have been cited
which show that it has been held for some years past that a trade mark may be
infringed by means of an advertisement. We think it is sufficient to refer to
the decisions in Jay v. Ladler (1), Bourne v. Swan and Edgar, Limited (2), and
to the injunction which was issued by the House of Lords in the case of Frank
Reddaway v. George Banham (3). On the authorities we must hold that if the
facts are as alleged by the applicant his trade mark has been infringed within
the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Muttra. We therefore allow this
application, set aside the orders of the courts below and direct that the record
be returned to the court of first instance and the suit restored to the pending
file to be disposed of according to law. Costs here and hereto will be costs in
the cause.‖
154. In Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani and
101
Ors. , the plaintiff had filed a suit for trademark infringement along with a
claim for passing off for its mark ―BURGER KING‖ and ―HUNGRY
JACK‘S‖. All the defendants were based out of Mumbai and the plaintiff
was a US based company. The question before the court was whether
territorial jurisdiction was made out in Delhi. On the website of the
defendant, it was mentioned that street carts containing the impugned mark
of the plaintiff were ― coming soon ‖ at Delhi. The threat of the defendants

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2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881.
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launching Burger King carts in Delhi was found by the Court to be imminent
and credible, particularly because of, among other things, an article
appearing in the Business Digest magazine on 30.07.2014. Considering the
unique facts and circumstances of the said case, the court found that
jurisdiction for a quia timet was made out in Delhi.
102
155. In M/s. Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Allergen Inc. , a Division
Bench of this Court noted that the dictum in Dhodha House of jurisdiction
not being conferred by goods manufactured by the plaintiff being available
or sold in the market of Delhi, applied while interpreting the phrase ― carries
on business ‖ and not while construing Section 20(c). In the said case, the
plaint had averred that the impugned goods were sold and distributed within
the jurisdiction of the forum court. The defendant had not denied this
pleading in its written statement. Finding sale and distribution of goods in
Delhi to be an admitted position, the Court held that jurisdiction of Delhi
Courts is made out.
103
156. Similarly, in Pfizer Enterprises Sarl v. Cipla Ltd. , a Division
Bench of this Court dealt with a suit for trademark infringement along with a
claim for passing off. Jurisdiction of Delhi courts was sought to be invoked,
inter alia , on the ground that the defendant‘s products under the impugned
mark are available for sale in Delhi and jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of
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the CPC was, therefore, made out. Qua the Pfizer appeal which arose
from an order of a learned Single Judge dated 16.07.2008, the Division

102
2006 SCC OnLine Del 802.
103
2009 (107) DRJ 735 (DB).
104
Two separate appeals were decided vide a common order in Pfizer Enterprises Sarl . One of the appeals
was the Pfizer Appeal (FAO (OS) 356/2008).
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Bench noted that the defendant had not specifically traversed the pleadings
pertaining to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Resultantly, the
plaintiff would not be required to lead any evidence on this aspect of the
case. Thus, the factum of sale of the impugned goods having been admitted,
jurisdiction was found to be made out.
157. While the conclusion in Burger King of jurisdiction for a quia timet
action being made out was sufficient to adjudicate upon the controversy
which arose in the said case, additional observations were made concerning
the elements of ― cause of action ‖ in a passing off and infringement suit. It
was held by the Court that cause of action for a trademark infringement suit
arises when a person ― uses in the course of trade ‖ any mark without the
owner‘s consent. After referring to the definition of using a mark under
Section 2(2) of the Trade Marks Act, and other provisions relating to the
rights conferred upon a registered mark holder, the court found that any
unauthorised use of the mark within the jurisdiction of this Court would
constitute a cause of action to sue. Paras. 19 and 21-22 of the decision read
as under:
― 19. What constitutes cause of action in the context of a suit alleging
violation of rights in a trade mark, would therefore be the question. In a case
involving trade mark infringement, infringement happens when a person
―uses in the course of trade‖ any mark without the owner's consent. Thus,
use of a mark is the cause of action in an infringement as also in a passing
off action. If use takes place in a territory where the suit is filed, that court
has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. When there is use of a mark, there is
a cause of action to sue, where the use takes place. it is relevant to point out
that ―use‖ of a trade mark as per Section 2(2)(c) of the TM Act is as under:

―(2) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, any reference—
∗∗∗
(c) to the use of a mark—
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(i) in relation to goods, shall be construed as a reference to
the use of the mark upon, or in any physical or in any other
relation whatsoever, to such goods;
(ii) in relation to services, shall be construed as a reference
to the use of the mark as or as part of any statement about
the availability, provision or performance of such services;‖

21. Thus, jurisdiction of a court in a trade mark action, could be invoked
where there is use upon or in relation to goods. The phrase ―in relation to‖
has been interpreted to include advertising, promotion, publicity, etc. Thus,
in addition to actual sale of goods and providing services, if a person
advertises his or her business under the mark in a territory, promotes his or
her business under the mark in a territory or for example invites franchisee
queries from a particular territory, sources goods from a particular territory,
manufactures goods in a particular territory, assembles goods in a particular
territory, undertakes printing of packaging in a particular territory, exports
goods from a particular territory, it would constitute ―use of a mark‖.

22. This scheme of the TM Act is amply clear from a reading of Sections 28
and 29 as also Section 56. Under Section 28, the rights conferred are the
exclusive right to use of a mark. Under Section 29, use of a mark could be
any form of use, including—
• as part of a trade name or a corporate name or name of a business
concern [Section 29(5)];
• use by affixing it to products/services [Section 29(6)(b)];
• use by affixing it to packaging [Section 29(6)(b)];
• use by offering goods/services for sale;
• use for the purpose of import or export[Section 29(6)(c)];
• use on business papers [Section 29(6)(d)];
• use in comparative advertising which is detrimental to distinctive
character or repute of the mark [Section 29(4)];
• use in advertising [Section 29(7)];
• Applying a mark in a territory for purposes of export of goods/services
[Section 56(1)]; and
• Use by which a trade connection is created between the user and the
proprietor [Section 56(2)].‖

158. At para. 23 of the decision in Burger King , the learned Senior Judge
observed that ― principles which apply to infringement, actions to determine
“use” would equally apply to passing off actions. ‖ The decisions of this
Court in Glen and Indovax , which were earlier in time, were not pointed out
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to the learned Single Judge. The finding at para. 23 is in the teeth of the
ratio in Glen and Indovax insofar as an action of passing off is concerned.
Since these judgements were not taken note of by the learned Single Judge,
no justification can be found in Burger King to deviate from the views taken
in the earlier decisions. Thus, the observations made by the learned Single
Judge in Burger King are to be confined exclusively to infringement cases
while Glen and Indovax continue to hold the field for passing off cases.
159. An example of what may not constitute cause of action may now be
considered. In Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences
105
Pvt. Ltd. , the plaintiff had filed a suit for infringement of its registered
trademark along with a claim for passing off. Upon an objection of territorial
jurisdiction being raised, this Court found that jurisdiction of Delhi was
made out on a number of grounds. One of these grounds was that the
trademark was registered at Delhi. The Court opined that the factum of
registration at Delhi was part of the cause of action as it was an essential fact
needed to be proved to support the right to judgment.
160. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Alchemist Ltd. and Anr. v.
106
State Bank of Sikkim and Ors. , and Union of India v. Adani Exports
107
Ltd. , were, however, not pointed to the Division Bench.
108
161. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. , the writ petitioner had
challenged the denial of benefits under an import-export passport scheme
before Gujarat High Court, which had entertained the writ petition, and the

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(2007) 11 SCC 335.
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(2002) 1 SCC 567.
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(2002) 1 SCC 567.
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same was assailed before the Supreme Court. Different factual indicia ,
prima facie , appearing to favour the jurisdiction of different High Courts
were present. Facts supporting the jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court
were:
The petitioner carried out business of export and import from Ahmedabad;
non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the passbook was to
affect the business at Ahmedabad; the orders of export and import of the
petitioner are placed from and are executed at Ahmedabad; documents and
payments for export and import are sent/made at Ahmedabad; and credit of
duty claimed in respect of exports were handled from Ahmedabad since
export orders as well as payments were received at Ahmedabad.
162. Facts supporting the jurisdiction of Madras High Court:
Passbook in question was issued by an authority at Chennai; designated
authority, which is the competent person in respect of matters concerning
the Passbook Scheme is at Chennai; the entries in the passbook under the
scheme are to be made by authorities at Chennai; and the export of prawns
made by the petitioner and the import of the inputs, benefit of which the
petitioner was seeking, will also have to be made through the Chennai port.

163. The Supreme Court in Adani Exports held that the Gujarat High
Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the lis , and it was the Madras
High Court, before which the writ petition should have been filed. It was re-
iterated by the Supreme Court that each and every fact pleaded in the
petition does not constitute a cause of action unless the facts have a nexus
and relevance with the dispute. Facts which have no bearing on the lis or the
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dispute involved in the case do not constitute cause of action (wholly or in
part).
164. In Alchemist Ltd. , a company having its registered and corporate
office at Chandigarh, in furtherance of an invitation to offer made by the
State of Sikkim, concerning disinvestment in the Bank of Sikkim, deposited
4.50 crores with the State Bank of India, Chandigarh. Upon the proposal of
the company being rejected, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was
moved claiming that a part of the cause of action had accrued within its
jurisdiction. The High Court found that no part of cause of action had arisen
within its territory. This finding was affirmed by the Supreme Court noting:
― 37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down
in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of
deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would
not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such
fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It
is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises
within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a ―part of
cause of action‖, nothing less than that.‖
165. If the logic of Kohinoor Seed Fields was to be applied to the facts of
Alchemist Ltd. , the factum of proving part-performance at Chandigarh, by
depositing 4.50 crores at the branch office of the State Bank of India, was
material to the judgment. Arguably, it would also be important for such a
corporation to prove that it was actually incorporated. But would the situs of
incorporation have any bearing on the cause of action? Certainly not. In the
facts of Kohinoor Seed Fields , the factum of the trademark being registered
at Delhi has nothing to do with the bundle of facts constituting the cause of
action. Thus, owing to the decisions of Alchemist Ltd. and Adani Exports
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not being pointed out to the learned Division Bench, the decision of
Kohinoor Seed Fields , may not be binding on this issue.
166. From the discussion above, it may be concluded that in a suit for
infringement of trademark:
a. Cause of action (wholly or in part) can be said to have arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of a court when the defendant,
in the course of trade, uses a mark which is identical with or
deceptively similar to the trade mark, in relation to goods or
services in respect of which the trade mark is registered, within
the jurisdiction of the forum court.
b. Registration of a mark within the jurisdiction of a given court
does not constitute a part of the cause of action.
(iv) An Action for Infringement in the Online World
167. There are multitude of forums available to a plaintiff in order to sue
for infringement or passing off. For instance, they may sue where the
defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain.
Additionally, under the specialised statutes, if applicable, where the plaintiff
resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. Another set of
forums are to be made available under Section 20(c) of the CPC in the
context of online activity.
168. CS(COMM)-980/2026 is one of the commercial suits dealt with in the
present batch of matters. In the said case, jurisdiction of Delhi courts is
pleaded on the grounds that the ― infringing activities of the Defendant are
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not geographically limited but are borderless and accessible from
anywhere, including New Delhi, in view of the online activities being
conducted through various online platforms. ‖ This case, and specifically the
pleading made, is a prime example of why high jurisdictional thresholds
ought to be set under Section 20(c) of the CPC, where infringement is
claimed through the use of internet. The requirement of proving cause of
action (wholly or in part), in the context of internet activity, cannot
encompass each and every one of the wrongs mentioned in Burger King .
169. Although an internet activity may constitute a statutory wrong under
the Trade Marks Act or the Copyright Act, it may not confer jurisdiction on
a given court, owing to other counter-vailing considerations, that are
required to be balanced with the right of the plaintiff. These considerations
include, inter alia , predictability i.e., a given defendant must have a
reasonable idea of where it may be sued. It ought not to be the case that for a
particular act purportedly done by a defendant it could be equally sued at
Ladakh and at Jhumri Telaiya. Next, the jurisdictional avenues made
available must be fair and reasonable. The places where the plaintiff can sue
cannot be, as is claimed in CS(COMM)-980/2026, at all places where the
so-called borderless infringing activity is taking place. Some degree of
balancing is essential.
170. There is, it may be clarified, no cavil with the age old proposition that
where there is a right there is a remedy. None can question whether a
plaintiff has a right to sue upon infringement taking place. The issue,
however, concerns where it can sue.
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171. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree
109
Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy and Anr. , which was
rendered approximately 17 years ago, recognised the concern noted above.
The Division Bench being conscious of the scheme of the Trade Marks Act,
including the multifarious acts that constitute infringement, provided a high
threshold for when Section 20(c) of the CPC can be invoked. It may again
be stressed that if jurisdictional rules are to have any meaning at all, in the
context of internet activity, high thresholds are necessarily required to be set.
The decision in Banyan may now be examined.
110

172. The judgment arose from a reference order made by a learned
Single Judge of this Court. After considering the submissions made by Mr.
Pravin Anand, the Division Bench framed the following questions:
― 7. …
(i) For the purposes of a passing off action, or an infringement action where
the Plaintiff is not carrying on business within the jurisdiction of a court, in
what circumstances can it be said that the hosting of a universally accessible
website by the defendants lends jurisdiction to such Court where such suit is
filed (―the forum court‖)?
(ii) In a passing off or infringement action, where the defendant is sought to
be sued on the basis that its website is accessible in the forum state, what is
the extent of the burden on the Plaintiff to prima facie establish that the
forum court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit?
(iii) Is it permissible for the Plaintiff to establish such prima facie case
through ―trap orders‖ or ―trap transactions‖?‖
173. The material portion of the discussion made by the Court concerning
the first question, reads as under:

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― 40. …It appears to this court that for the purposes of a passing off action or
an action for infringement where the Plaintiff is not carrying on business
within the jurisdiction of the forum court, and where there is no long arm
statute, the Plaintiff would have to show that the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the jurisdiction of the forum court. It is not enough merely to
show that the website hosted by the defendant is an interactive one. It would
have to be shown that the nature of the activity indulged in by the defendant
by the use of the website was with an intention to conclude a commercial
transaction with the website user.

42. This Court holds that jurisdiction of the forum court does not get attracted
merely on the basis of interactivity of the website which is accessible in the
forum state. The degree of the interactivity apart, the nature of the activity
permissible and whether it results in a commercial transaction has to be
examined. For the ―effects‖ test to apply, the Plaintiff must necessarily plead
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and show prima facie that the specific targeting of the forum state by the
defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum state.
For the purposes of a passing off or an infringement action (where the
plaintiff is not located within the jurisdiction of the court), the injurious effect
on the Plaintiff's business, goodwill or reputation within the forum state as a
result of the defendant's website being accessed in the forum state would have
to be shown. Naturally therefore, this would require the presence of the
Plaintiff in the forum state and not merely the possibility of such presence in
the future. Secondly, to show that an injurious effect has been felt by the
Plaintiff it would have to be shown that viewers in the forum state were
specifically targeted. Therefore the ―effects‖ test would have to be applied in
conjunction with the ―sliding scale‖ test to determine if the forum court has
jurisdiction to try a suit concerning internet based disputes.‖
The material portion of the discussion made by the Court concerning the
second question reads as under:
― 45. This court holds that in order to prima facie establish that the defendant
purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this court, the Plaintiff would have
to show that the defendant engaged in some commercial activity in the forum

111
Para. 22 of the decision in Banyan Tree , after relying on the comments of Prof. Thomas Schultz and
Prof. Michael Geist, explained targeting as follows:
―Schultz defines targeting to mean ―in essence that the activity must be intended to have effects within the
territory of the state asserting jurisdiction.‖ According to another scholar, Professor Michael Geist (―Is
There a There There? Towards Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction‖ 16 Berkeley Tech LJ (2001)
1345 at 1357) the principle of targeting is to ―identify the intentions of the parties and to assess the steps
taken to either enter or avoid a particular jurisdiction.‖ Targeting is described as ―something more than
effects, but less than physical presence….‖
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State by targeting its website specifically at customers within that State. … In
any action for passing off or infringement, it would have to be shown that the
defendant by using its mark intended to pass off its goods as that of the
Plaintiff's. A mere hosting of a website which can be accessible from anyone
from within the jurisdiction of the court is not sufficient for this purpose. Also
a mere posting of an advertisement by the defendant depicting its mark on a
passive website which does not enable the defendant to enter into any
commercial transaction with the viewer in the forum state cannot satisfy the
requirement of giving rise to a cause of action in the forum state. Even an
interactive website, which is not shown to be specifically targeted at viewers
in the forum state for commercial transactions, will not result in the court of
the forum state having jurisdiction. In sum, for the purposes of Section 20(c)
CPC, in order to show that some part of the cause of action has arisen in the
forum state by the use of the internet by the defendant, the Plaintiff will have
to show prima facie that the said website, whether euphemistically termed as
―passive plus‖ or ―interactive‖ was specifically targeted at viewers in the
forum state for commercial transactions. The Plaintiff would have to plead
this and produce material to prima facie show that some commercial
transaction using the website was entered into by the defendant with a
user of its website within the forum state and that the specific targeting of
the forum state by the defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the
Plaintiff within the forum state. Question no. (ii) is answered accordingly.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
174. Importantly, in Banyan Tree , the Court consciously rejected the
contention that purposeful availment ought to be replaced by purposeful
avoidance. The acceptance of purposeful avoidance as a test would allow
jurisdiction to be conferred merely because blinkers and blockers have not
been put qua the forum state‘s access to the website, and commercial
transactions have in turn taken place. Thus, the mere fact that a website has
not restricted its accessibility to a forum court cannot be sufficient to
conclude that targeting and purposeful availment has taken place.
175. In Sholay Media Entertaiment , the Banyan Tree standard was found
to not have been met and the plaint was returned to the plaintiff.
Importantly, this Court relied upon an important decision of the Karnataka
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High Court in Presteege Property Developers Ltd. v. Prestige Estates
112
Projects Ltd. , which held that even booking or placing an order through
the internet is insufficient to conclude that a transaction took place within
the jurisdiction of a given court.
176. Next, in Impressario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. S&D
113
Hospitality , a suit was filed by the plaintiff for the infringement of its
registered trademark along with a claim for passing off. It was contended
that the plaintiff was the owner of the registered trademark ―SOCIAL‖ and
―STONE WATER‖ which it utilised with respect to cafes. While the
registered office of the plaintiff was in Mumbai, it was stated that it ran four
cafes in Delhi. It was claimed that the defendant ran two restaurants at
Hyderabad using the trade mark ―SOCIAL MONEY‖, which infringed the
plaintiff‘s trademark and constituted the tort of passing off. Jurisdiction of
Delhi was sought to be claimed on grounds that the defendant had its
114
presence on websites like Zomato and Dine-Out, from which it could
invite customers of the plaintiff to visit its outlet in Hyderabad.
177. While ordering for the return the plaint, this Court in Impressario
held that the listing of the cafe on the given website was neither sufficient to
constitute cause of action (wholly or in part) nor to claim that the defendant
carried on business within Delhi. Even if it was assumed that customers in
Delhi actually made bookings on the websites, this was found to be
insufficient as the actual transaction was to take place at Hyderabad. The

112
MFA No. 494 and 13696, 2006.
113
2018 SCC OnLine Del 6392.
114
Back then, Zomato did not deliver food.
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analysis made at para. 19 of the decision deserves reproduction and reads as
under:
― 19. Thus even if the defendant has been able to attract customers from
other jurisdiction including by way of Zomato and Dine-Out, the services of
the defendant cannot be availed unless the customers go to Hyderabad.
Through Zomato and Dine Out the customers will only be able to invite a
customer and resume a table at the restaurant of the defendant at Hyderabad.
The commercial transaction would take place only on the customer availing
the services of the defendant at Hyderabad. Claim of the plaintiff is that at
least one customer through the website booked the table at defendant's
restaurant from Delhi believing that it was a restaurant of the plaintiff. On
the basis of a solitary transaction, through internet plaintiff cannot claim that
cause of action having arisen at Delhi this Court will have territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Facts pleaded in the plaint do not pass the
tests laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree Holding
(P) Ltd. (supra).‖
It may be highlighted that the decision in Impressario involved the
application of the Banyan Tree standard to a case of trademark
infringement.
178. In Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders and
115
Others , the plaintiff was the holding company of the TATA Group of
Companies that had filed a suit, primarily, for trademark infringement along
with a claim for passing off. The plaintiff owned the registered trademark
―TATA‖ and the defendants were claimed to be using its mark for doing
online trading in cryptocurrency through their websites
―www.tatabonus.com‖ and ―www.hakunamatata.finance‖. It was further
averred that the owner of the websites had its office based in the UK. Behind
the website, there were also a team of individuals who were UK nationals of

115
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2968.
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Pakistani origin. The question was whether territorial jurisdiction was made
out.
179. The Division Bench began its analysis by citing a decision in
Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v. Aryans Plaza Services
116
Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. , where a learned Single Judge diluted the Banyan Tree
standard and dispensed with the requirement of showing injury or harm to
the plaintiff within the forum state. The second question answered in
Banyan Tree was what is the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prima facie
establish that the forum court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit. This was
answered by the Division Bench by holding that the plaintiff would have to
plead and produce material to prima facie show that some commercial
transaction using the website was entered into by the defendant with a user
of its website within the forum state resulting in an injury or harm to the
plaintiff within the forum state. This answer given by the Division Bench
was ignored by the learned Single Judge in Millennium & Copthorne
International Limited . A perusal of the decision in Millennium &
Copthorne International Limited would reveal that no reasons were given
to detract from the view in Banyan Tree . The learned Single Judge, thus,
could not have diluted the ruling in Banyan Tree .
180. In Tata Sons , the Court, thereafter, referred to a decision of the Court
of Appeal of England and Wales in Lifestyle Equities CV v. Amazon UK
117
Services Ltd. , and laid down that ― targeting ‖ is to be interpreted as per the

116
2018 SCC OnLine Del 8260.
117
[2022] EWCA Civ 552.
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118
dictum in Lifestyle Equities CV . While the decision in Banyan Tree was
premised on the tests adopted in the USA, Tata Sons switched the baton to
the law declared by English courts which was premised on ― targeting ‖ as
opposed to specific targeting which was required under the Banyan Tree
standard.
181. Para. 22 of Tata Sons deserves to be extracted, it reads as under:
― 22. We are in complete agreement with the above view of the English
court. Even if a website is not directed at customers in a particular country,
the fact that they are not restricted by the website to have access to it, is
enough to characterise it as targeting. Targeting need not be a very
aggressive act of marketing aiming at a particular set of customers. Mere
looming presence of a website in a geography and ability of the customers
therein to access the website is sufficient, in a given case. It may not be
forgotten that in the matters of infringement of trade mark, it is the
possibility of confusion and deception in the mind of public due to
infringing trade mark that is good enough for the court to grant injunction.‖
182. The opinion of the Division Bench that a given website not being
restricted to a forum constitutes targeting does not sit well with the
observations made in para. 41 of Banyan Tree . In the said paragraph, the
argument of ― purposeful availment ‖ being replaced with the test of
― purposeful avoidance ‖ was rejected. Thus, the mere fact that filters don‘t
exist to block the access at a forum state cannot be sufficient to constitute
specific targeting. The plaintiff must not merely show the lack of blockers
but something in addition to that.
183. The finding that a ― mere looming presence of a website in a
geography and ability of the customers therein to access the website is

118
It may be noted that the decision of the Court of Appeal, though affirmed in its outcome by the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom in Lifestyle Equities CV and Anr. v. Amazon UK Services Ltd. and Ors. , 2024
UKSC 8, was modified to some extent in terms of its reasoning.
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sufficient ‖ appears to be against the ratio of both Banyan Tree and Lifestyle
Equities CV where the UK Supreme Court, in appeal from the decision of
the Court of Appeal, observed as under:
― 18. Accessibility of the website was not enough, however, as the court
went on to explain, at para 94: ―On the other hand, the mere accessibility of
the trader‘s or the intermediary‘s website in the member state in which the
consumer is domiciled is insufficient. The same is true of mention of an e-
mail address and of other contact details, or of use of a language or a
currency which are the language and/or currency generally used in the
member state in which the trader is established.

21. On the other hand, the court continued, at para 64, mere accessibility of
the accused website from the territory covered by the trade mark was not
enough to establish targeting of consumers in that territory. That would have
the consequence that such websites and advertisements which, although
obviously targeted solely at consumers in third states, would wrongly be
subject to EU law.

25. The Court of Appeal revisited the issue of targeting in Argos Ltd v
Argos Systems Inc [2018] EWCA Civ 2211; [2019] Bus LR 1728. There,
Floyd LJ (with whom Lord Kitchin JSC and Sir Colin Rimer agreed)
emphasised, at para 48, that the mere fact that a website is accessible from
anywhere in the world, and therefore may attract occasional interest from
consumers there when this is not intended, should not give rise to any
liability. He continued…‖

184. The reasoning adopted in Tata Sons to dilute the decision in Banyan
Tree , thus would have no precedential value.
185. Independently, however, a fact centric limitation could be added to
the rule in Banyan Tree . In Banyan Tree , the defendants were residents of
Hyderabad. The question which the Division Bench, therefore, answered
was: what would warrant jurisdiction being conferred upon a given forum
court under Section 20(c) of the CPC, given that the avenues under Section
20(a) always remain open. In order to prevent Section 20(c) from becoming
an unruly horse, the burden of proof requirement under Banyan Tree was
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conceived of. However, in the facts of Tata Sons , the defendant had no
presence in India at all. If a given plaintiff cannot invoke the provisions of
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright
Act, then the only avenue which remains available is Section 20(c).
186. If, in such a case, compliance with the burden of proof under the
Banyan Tree standard is demanded, a plaintiff may not be able to sue at all.
Thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case, particularly, where
the defendants had no presence in India the Banyan Tree standard may be
relaxed. This relaxation is not available where defendants reside in Delhi
and no exceptional situations are presented.
187. Before parting with the decision in Tata Sons , a brief observation
may be made on the decision of Lifestyle Equities CV , which was relied
upon in Tata Sons . While the said decision of the English court was
premised on the language used in the EU regulations, and thus is not per se
applicable, some guidance may be taken in the manner in which targeting is
adjudged.
188. The specific targeting and purposeful availment required by Banyan
Tree is not intended to be a subjective intention of a person to step into a
forum court‘s territory. The Court while seeking compliance with the
Banyan Tree standards is not engaging in an exercise to determine the state
of mind of the person controlling the corporation. The intention is to be
objectively determined by analysing the indicia available on a given
website. The words used by the UK Supreme Court, at para. 30 provide
some guidance: ― the task of the court is to decide whether the foreign
trader’s activities, viewed objectively, from the perspective of the average
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consumer, are targeted at such consumers in the UK. It is therefore not
necessary to establish that the foreign trader had the subjective intention of
targeting customers in the UK ‖.
189. In Cable News Networks INC v. CTVN Calcutta Television Network
119
Pvt. Ltd. , a learned Single Judge, after relying upon WWE and Tata Sons ,
dispensed with the requirement propounded in Banyan Tree of prima facie
proving that an actual commercial transaction took place. This, as has been
noted above, may not be permissible.

190. In Johnson & Johnson Pte. Ltd. v. Abbireddi Satish Kumar and
120
Ors. , a suit for trademark infringement was filed by the plaintiff claiming
that its ―ORSL‖ marks and trade dress were being infringed by the
defendant. The Court gave the following reasoning at para. 19 to conclude
that jurisdiction at Delhi was made out:
― 19. Considering the averments made in the plaint, it is manifest that this
Court has jurisdiction in the present matter. The plaintiff has made
categorical averments in the plaint as regards placing an order for the
products of the defendants in Delhi. Thus, when the website marketing the
goods of the defendants is accessible from Delhi, though the said website
may have stopped its operation subsequently, and products may not have
been ultimately delivered in Delhi, the very fact that the said website could
be accessed with the products of the defendants shown online, at the time of
filing of the suit, this Court would have territorial jurisdiction. The same
would constitute use in relation to goods, as the goods of the defendants
were promoted and advertised through the third-party website, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, at the time of filing of the suit.‖
191. A reading of the said decision would reveal that the learned Single
Judge did not, at all, avert to the decision in Banyan Tree . Reference was
made to Burger King Corporation , and its exhortation on the ― use ‖ of a

119
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2436.
120
2025 SCC OnLine Del 688.
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mark was used to claim that the mere listing of goods on a website is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. It may be noted that the Banyan Tree tests
apply to infringement cases as well. Burger King Corporation merely
describes the kinds of infringement that may take place by various uses of
the mark. However, if the infringement is online, the Banyan Tree tests
must necessarily govern the field. The only way in which Burger King
could be considered as superseding the dictum in Banyan Tree would be if
it can be said that the Division Bench in Banyan Tree was not aware of the
ways in which a trademark gets infringed under the Trade Marks Act. There
is no indication that the Bench was not aware of the provisions relating to
this aspect.
192. In Sun Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. Artura Pharmaceuticals P.
121
Ltd. , a co-ordinate bench of this Court relying on Tata Sons Ltd. , held
that the requirement to consummate a commercial transaction has been
dispensed with in toto . Resultantly, by merely relying on the ― Contact Page ‖
of the defendant‘s website, it was concluded that the Banyan Tree standard
of purposeful availment through specific targeting, was satisfied. As noticed
above, the same may not be permissible, least of all, because of the
foundational factual difference between Tata Sons Ltd. and Sun
Pharmaceuticals . Similar observations may be made regarding the decision
122
in Ravinder Singh v. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. , which was
rendered relying on Sun Pharmaceuticals .

121
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8642.
122
2026 SCC OnLine Del 3716.
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193. The decision of Kohinoor Seed Fields has already been considered
under the heading of ― carrying on business ‖. It has been observed at paras.
102-103 and 111-112 of this judgement, that the incorporation of WWE into
Section 20(a) of the CPC may not be correct. The reliance on Tata Sons to
hold that the principle in Banyan Tree has been diluted has also been
examined, and it has been found that material issues were not pointed out to
the Division Bench. Additionally, it appears that Kohinoor Seed Fields , has
also made an observation on Section 20(c) of the CPC. While there may not
be a detailed analysis of how access to websites constitutes cause of action,
in para. 20.3 of the judgment, the Division Bench has concluded that the
impugned goods being available for sale across e-commerce websites,
including at Delhi, constitutes a substantial part of the cause of action. The
said paragraph reads as under:
― 20.3 We need not delve too deep into this aspect, as, in our view, a
substantial part of the cause of action in the present case does arise
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, because (i) the asserted
trade marks of the appellant stand registered within the jurisdiction of this
Court, (ii) the Marketing Agreement was executed at Delhi and (iii) the
allegedly infringing goods of the respondent are available for sale and
purchase, across e-commerce websites, at Delhi . As such, no occasion
arises to invoke the Ultra Home Construction doctrine.
(Emphasis supplied)
194. This conclusion was reached by the Division Bench despite observing
at para. 19.5.5 that the decision in WWE is not an authority on Section 20(c)
of the CPC. It would be fit to merely observe that the observations made in
the context of Section 20(c) constituted obiter dicta and not binding
precedent.
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195. The subsequent decision in Rukhmani Keshwani v. Raju Agarbatti
123
Works & Anr. , however, applies the passing reference in Kohinoor Seed
Fields to the substantive interpretation of Section 20(c). Previously, Courts
attempted to move around the decision in Banyan Tree , recognising its
application in the domain of Section 20(c). In Rukhmani Keshwani , the
Court found that the law has developed past Banyan Tree . Paras. 54 to 56
and 58 of the decision in Rukhmani Keshwani are reproduced as under:
― 54. The jurisprudence governing internet-based territorial jurisdiction has
evolved progressively, beginning with the principles enunciated in Banyan
Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, where the Court
differentiated between a passive website and an interactive commercial
platform designed to target consumers within a particular jurisdiction.
55. This principle, however, did not remain confined to the narrow passive
versus interactive website dichotomy. The doctrine was subsequently
expanded and contextualized in WWE (supra), wherein the Court
recognized that the true test is whether the defendant has purposefully
availed itself of the forum by commercially targeting customers therein
through electronic means.
56. The aforesaid principles were further elaborated by one of us (C. Hari
Shankar J.) in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences
Pvt. Ltd., where this Court, while noting the transformation of commercial
activity in the digital era, observed that modern ecommerce platforms are
designed to transcend territorial barriers and facilitate commercial
engagement across jurisdictions. This Court emphasized that once a
defendant consciously projects its goods or services through interactive
online interfaces enabling commercial solicitation, inquiry, negotiation, or
purchase by consumers situated within a forum State, such activity
constitutes a material part of the cause of action.

58. The ratio emerging from Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd (supra) is
that the Court must examine the substance of the commercial targeting and
the purposeful availment of the forum, rather than mechanically confining
itself to the existence or absence of completed transactions. Thus, where
online listings are intended to solicit business, display commercial contact

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2026 SCC OnLine Del 4904.
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details, facilitate customer interaction, and expand market reach into
multiple jurisdictions, the territorial nexus is sufficiently established.
196. It is difficult to discern a basis in either WWE or Kohinoor Seed
Fields for the conclusions noted in paras. 54 to 56 and 58 above.
197. WWE as has been noted above was a decision rendered in the context
of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade
Marks Act. Badar Durrez Ahmed J., explicitly, at para. 8 of the decision
notes that the decision of Banyan Tree shall not have any application. If that
be the case, the finding in Rukhmani Keshwani at para. 55 that the doctrine
of Banyan Tree was ― expanded and contextualised ‖ in WWE , may not be
correct.
198. Next, the finding rendered in para. 56 of Rukhmani Keshwani that
Kohinoor Seed Fields has held that an activity constituting the conscious
projection of goods or services ― through interactive online interfaces
enabling commercial solicitation, inquiry, negotiation, or purchase by
consumers ‖ also does not seem to find support in the text of Kohinoor Seed
Fields . Similar observations may be made with respect to the ruling in para.
58 of Rukhmani Keshwani that Kohinoor Seed Fields allows for sufficient
― territorial nexus ‖ to be made out if online listings are intended to ― solicit
business, display commercial contact details, facilitate customer interaction,
and expand market reach into multiple jurisdictions. ‖ In the context of
Section 20(c) of the CPC, this appears to be against the dictum of Banyan
Tree . Further, in para. 59 of Rukhmani Keshwani the following has been
observed:
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― 59. This Bench in Raju Kumar v. Vinod Sah (authored by C. Hari Shankar
J.) relied upon and applied the principles enunciated in Kohinoor Seed
Fields India Pvt. Ltd (supra) while determining territorial jurisdiction in
online trademark disputes. The judgment in Raju Kumar (supra) has since
been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Vinod Sah v. Raju Kumar.‖

124
199. It appears that an SLP was dismissed against the decision of Raju
Kumar v. Vinod Sah . It is trite law, as was also declared in Kunhayammed
125
and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. , that the dismissal of an SLP in
limine does not amount to a merger of the impugned decision with the order
of the Supreme Court. Thus, the order remains as that of our Court.
200. Before parting, a brief reference may especially be made to the
Copyright Act. The decisions of this Court in Nilesh Girkar v. Zee
126
Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. and Ors. , and Zee Entertainment
127
Enterprises Ltd. v. Mohalla Tech Pvt. Ltd. , concern factual matrices
where the conclusion of commercial transactions may not be possible. In
such a situation it would not be appropriate to insist upon a commercial
transaction where none can take place. Making available a copyrighted film
on rogue websites would give rise to a cause of action by it becoming
accessible in Delhi. That is not, however, the end of the inquiry. As the
discussion below shall reveal, considerations of forum conveniens shall have
a role to play. The place where the uprooting of the protected content takes
place, where the plaintiff resides and carries on business, are material
considerations to determine as to whether the cause of action at Delhi is

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SLP (C) No. 12585/2026, order dt. 30.04.2026.
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AIR 2000 SC 2587.
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2025 SCC OnLine Del 6040.
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slender/minuscule and the lis is better left to be adjudicated by another court
that is forum conveniens .
201. From the discussion above the following conclusions can be drawn
concerning cause of action for infringement and passing off in the online
world:
a. To establish that cause of action (wholly or in part) has arisen
through the means of website activity, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant has purposefully availed itself
of the jurisdiction of the forum court by specifically targeting
persons within its territory and it resulting in an injury or harm
to the plaintiff within the forum state.
b. Additionally, the plaintiff must also demonstrate the conclusion
of commercially concluded transactions between the defendant
and persons within the forum court‘s jurisdiction through the
website in question.
c. The requirement of prima facie demonstrating commercially
concluded transactions taking place can be relaxed in a case
where the plaintiff cannot invoke the provisions of Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the
Copyright Act, and the defendant has no presence in India at
all.
D. “DYNAMIC EFFECT” AND IT CONFERRING JURISDICTION
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202. In a number of cases concerning the present batch of matters, for
instance CS(COMM) 611/2026, CS(COMM) 917/2026, CS(COMM)
444/2026, and CS(COMM) 874/2026, the plaintiff has claimed jurisdiction
of Delhi on the basis of the elusive expression of the ― Dynamic Effect ‖ of
the infringement taking place in Delhi. There is no reference made at the bar
to dictionaries, lexicons, or commentaries to indicate what dynamic effect is.
The arguments of counsel would indicate that it constitutes the effect that an
infringement has at the place where the plaintiff has its presence.
203. A brief reference may also be made to the decision in Adyar Gate ,
where jurisdiction was also found to be made out under Section 20(c) of the
CPC. The case concerned an action for trade mark infringement and passing
off filed by ITC Ltd. which had its registered office at Kolkata and a
restaurant at Delhi. Invoking an expression, which may ordinarily lie in the
doctrine of forum conveniens , the Court held that the ― determinative part ‖ of
the cause of action had accrued at Delhi. By observing that the use of the
mark by the defendant in its restaurant at Chennai, had an effect on ITC
Ltd.‘s restaurant at Delhi, jurisdiction of this Court was established. By
doing so, the Court, effectively applied the dynamic effect principle using
the text of Section 20(c).
204. The dynamic effect principle and such an interpretation of part cause
of action, in the opinion of this Court, may not confer jurisdiction. The
rationale behind the legislature enacting Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act
and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act was allowing a given plaintiff to
sue where it resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. If
indeed, the effect, dynamic or otherwise, of an infringement could confer
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jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC, why would the legislature have
enacted the specialised provisions? No tenable answer can be found. The
concept of dynamic effect, therefore, appears to be unknown to
jurisdictional principles governing the specialised statutes and the CPC. A
pleading that invokes jurisdiction basis the ― dynamic effect ‖ like it does in
the above-noted suits, ought to be ignored.
205. From the discussion above the following conclusions concerning the
principle of dynamic effect can be drawn:

a. If the principle of dynamic effect is applied to cases of
infringement, the amendment to the Trade Marks Act and the
Copyright Act shall be rendered otiose. Jurisdiction, therefore,
cannot be established basis this principle.
b. An attempt to find jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC
on the basis that the effect of the infringement is felt at the
place where the plaintiff has its presence, also, goes against the
spirit of the specialised provisions. It also renders the
amendments nugatory. Such an interpretation, thus, ordinarily
ought to be avoided.
E. THE USE OF AN “ INVESTIGATOR ”

206. In Machinenfabrik Rieter AG and Anr. v. Tex Tech Industries India
128
Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. , a suit was filed for trademark and patent infringement.
The plaintiffs had their registered office in Mumbai, defendant no. 1 was
placed in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, and defendant no. 2 was a resident of

128
2021 SCC OnLine Del 1825.
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Chandigarh. None of the parties had their head office, branch office, or
residence within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Delhi‘s jurisdiction
was sought to be invoked by making the following pleadings:
―That the plaintiffs instructed their investigator to ascertain the scope and
extent of the defendant no. 1‘s activities. Pursuant to initial investigation,
the plaintiffs‘ investigator placed an order with defendant 1 via an email
dated 26-12-2019; a performa invoice was issued on 27-12-2019; thereafter,
an email was received from a representative of defendant 2 who informed
the investigator that defendant 2 is a supplier of spare parts manufactured by
defendant 1. The plaintiffs, then, made the payment and samples were
despatched by defendant 1 on 29-1-2020 and the same were received by the
plaintiff's investigator on 31-1-2020 in Delhi. Two such separate orders
were also received by the plaintiffs‘ investigator. It was claimed by the
plaintiff that the products so received from defendant 1 at Delhi infringe the
plaintiffs‘ patent. The plaintiffs had also filed documents including invoices
showing delivery of goods in Delhi.‖

207. It was found by the Court that the dictum of the Division Bench in
Banyan Tree , concerning the impermissibility of trap transactions, does not
apply to offline transactions. Para. 13, in which the finding was reached,
reads as under:
― 13. In my opinion the above judgment of the Division Bench does not have
application to the facts of this case. That was a case in which territorial
jurisdiction was claimed by the plaintiff based on the defendants alleged
presence in Delhi through their website which was accessible in Delhi. It
was contended that the website is not a passive website since inputs from
customers through interactive web page were being taken. The court was
dealing with the issue of territorial jurisdiction of this Court on account of
the defendants hosting a website which was accessible in Delhi. It was in
those facts that the Division Bench had come to the aforenoted conclusions.
The present case is a case of offline transaction.‖

208. Two issues arise concerning the above-noted conclusion: first , a
learned Single Judge in Indovax (P) Ltd. had already applied the law laid
down in Banyan Tree to offline transactions; no reasons were given for
departing from the said view; and second , a reading of Banyan Tree ,
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particularly paras. 46-56, would reveal that the discussion of Banyan Tree
was not made solely in the context of online transactions. The case law,
taken note of by the Division Bench to arrive at the answer to the third
question formulated in the reference, was not exclusively concerning online
transactions.
209. As a matter of principle as well, allowing jurisdiction to be conferred
through transactions entered into between an investigator of the plaintiff and
a given defendant seems unjust and unfair. Allowing this to happen would
allow litigants to engage in forum shopping and litigation tourism. If this
were to be condoned, all that is required is for a given plaintiff to have a
clever enough agent who orchestrates a well-designed plan to concoct
jurisdiction before a given court. It has been settled by a catena of decisions
that jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court where none in actuality
exists. By allowing this, effectively, jurisdiction is being artificially created
at a given place which the plaintiff believes is favourable to him. The
― investigator ‖ may very well be at Port Blair, or arguably may be asked to
be at that place, when a defendant is at Ladakh. The mere fact that goods
were delivered in Port Blair should not become a reason to force the person
at Ladakh to go to Port Blair.
210. Jurisdiction rules can never be interpreted in a manner that allows a
plaintiff to engage in such a mischief. Courts are not meant to be silent
spectator in this theatre called ― jurisdiction ‖ scripted by the plaintiff. The
scene in such scripted plays usually goes in the following manner:
An investigator in Delhi is engaged by a company in Mumbai to get goods
delivered from a company, which operates in Chennai. This Court is moved
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and a vociferous plea is raised that under Section 20(c) of the CPC cause of
action has partly arisen in Delhi. In order to protect the plaintiff‘s goodwill,
the counsel for the plaintiff eloquently argues that urgent ex parte ad-interim
reliefs are required to be granted.
211. Such ‗ gaming of the system ‘ cannot be allowed to go by. Transactions
with such an ― investigator ‖, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. Two exceptions, however, are possible:
first , where the plaintiff can prima facie demonstrate, on the basis of his
plaint and the documents attached with it, that but for such an ― investigator ‖
being hired to plead jurisdiction, cause of action under Section 20(c) of the
CPC could not be maintained before another court. And second , where ex
facie it can be demonstrated that sales of the impugned goods are taking
place within a forum court, and an investigator merely provides evidence.
For instance, if the defendant has readily supplied its goods within Delhi to
various retailers, distributors and stockists, and the plaintiff‘s investigator
buys these goods from these classes of persons, that report may not be
discarded.
212. However, if in the natural course of events, jurisdiction can in fact be
founded under Section 20(c) of the CPC at a place other than Delhi, the use
of an ― investigator ‖ to forge jurisdiction before this court, shall, ordinarily,
be an abuse of the process of law and impermissible. The fact of the plaintiff
being aware of the defendant using his registered trademark, or passing off
its goods, in the ordinary and natural course of the trade, at a jurisdiction
different from Delhi, is most material to the lis . If the plaintiff is aware of
such facts the option of engaging an ― investigator ‖ may get foreclosed. Non-
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disclosure with respect to this, shall amount to the plaintiff coming to the
court with unclean hands. An equitable relief of injunction can never be
granted to such a claimant. It is trite law as was also noted by RC Lahoti J.
129
in Dorstener Maschinenfabrik AG v. Sand Plast India Ltd. and Ors. ,
that despite a given claimant satisfying the trinity requirements, an
injunction can be refused on grounds, inter alia , of conduct as it is an
equitable relief.
213. Additionally, it may be noted that despite the plaintiff not disclosing
to the court facts pertaining to the defendant‘s usual, natural, and ordinary
sale/use of the impugned mark, the Court may in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 168 of the BSA put relevant questions to the parties.
The said provision reads as under:
― 168. Judge's power to put questions or order production.
The Judge may, in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts, ask
any question he considers necessary, in any form, at any time, of any
witness, or of the parties about any fact; and may order the production of
any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their representatives shall
be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without
the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given
in reply to any such question:
Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this
Adhiniyam to be relevant, and duly proved:
Provided further that this section shall not authorise any Judge to compel
any witness to answer any question, or to produce any document which such
witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 127
to 136, both inclusive, if the question were asked or the document were
called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it
would be improper for any other person to ask under section 151 or 152; nor
shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the
cases hereinbefore excepted.‖
[

129
1994 SCC OnLine Del 777.
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130
214. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in his speech, while elaborating on the
purpose of Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (the precursor to
the BSA), opined:
―…It is absolutely necessary that the Judge should not only hear what is put
before him by others, but that he should ascertain by his own inquiries how
the facts actually stand. In order to do this, it will frequently be necessary
for him to go into matters which are not themselves relevant to the matter in
issue, but may lead to something that is, and it is in order to arm Judges with
express authority to do this that section 165, which has been so much
objected to, has been framed.‖

A brief reference may also be made to the following portion of Sir John
131
Woodroffe & Syed Amir Ali’s Law of Evidence :
“ Section 165 is intended to arm the judge with the most extensive power
possible for the purpose of getting at the truth. The effect of this section is
that in order to get to the bottom of the matter before it, the court will be
able to look at and enquire into every fact whatever and thus possibly
acquire valuable indicative evidence which may lead to other evidence
132
strictly relevant and admissible. ”

And:

―It is obvious that the judge contemplated by the section is not a mere
umpire at a witcombat between the lawyers for the parties whose only duty
is to enforce the rules of the game and declare at the end of the combat who
133
has won and who has lost.‖

215. The subsequent decision in Reiter AG and Anr. v. Kavassery
134
Narayanaswamy Venkatasubramanian , was rendered on the basis of the
decision in Machinenfabrik Rieter AG ; the conclusion reached may be
doubted on the grounds detailed above.

130
Speech of the Hon‘ble Sir James Fitzjames Stephen on the 12 March 1872, in submitting the Report of
the Committee to the Council.
131 st
21 Ed., 2020, Lexis Nexis.
132 st
21 Ed., 2020, Lexis Nexis, Vol. IV, Pg. 4873.
133 st
21 Ed., 2020, Lexis Nexis, Vol. IV, Pg. 4881.
134
2025 SCC OnLine Del 4379.
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216. From the discussion above, the following conclusions can be drawn
concerning the use of an investigator/agent to establish jurisdiction:
a. As a rule, the use of an investigator or any other person set up
by the plaintiff to find jurisdiction before a forum court
amounts to concocting jurisdiction. The findings of such an
investigator, thus, ordinarily, cannot be relied upon.
b. The two exceptions to this rule are: first , where the plaintiff can
prima facie demonstrate, on the basis of his plaint and the
documents attached with it, that but for such an ― investigator ‖
being hired to plead jurisdiction, cause of action under Section
20(c) of the CPC could not be maintained before another court.
And second , where ex facie it can be demonstrated that sales of
the impugned goods are taking place within a forum court, and
an investigator merely provides evidence. For instance, if the
defendant has readily supplied its goods within Delhi to various
retailers, distributors and stockists, and the plaintiff‘s
investigator buys these goods from these classes of persons,
that report may not be discarded.
F. THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS
217. The conclusions rendered by this Court under this section curtail the
options available to a plaintiff to institute a suit. The objection raised by
counsel, against the reasoning adopted by this Court, is an alleged unbridled
right that the plaintiff has to institute a suit, in the absence of an express bar
contained in the statute. In doing so the counsel have conflated the
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availability of a forum before which a suit may lie, with an indefeasible
vested right to bring the suit in that forum.
218. This right, perhaps may have existed, at a given point in time; the law,
however, has travelled far ahead. Today, suits ought to be tested on the
ground on forum non conveniens. The development in law was captured in
eloquent words by Lord Denning MR in Smith Kline & French
135
Laboratories Ltd. v. Block , the material portion of which reads as under:
“The law
It often happens that a plaintiff is entitled to bring proceedings in two or
more jurisdictions. Sometimes it is said that the choice is his. He can choose
whichever of them suits him best. If he can get more damages in one than he
can in the other, then good luck to him. Let him go there. If he will be met by
a time bar in one and not in the other, let him go to the one where he is not
barred. If it is more convenient for the plaintiff in one than it is for the
defendant, then the plaintiff can choose. You need not spin a coin between
the two contestants. It always comes down in favour of the plaintiff, so it is
said, unless the defendant can prove that it would work an injustice to him.
That was the way the English Court of Appeal approached the problem in
St. Pierre v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd., (1936) 1 KB 382,
[1935] All ER Rep 408 and the Supreme Court of Illinois approached it in
James v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., (1958) 152 NE 2d 858. …
The basis of all this reasoning has now been removed. In England by the
House of Lords in MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER
625, [1978] AC 795. In the United States by the Supreme Court in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, (1981) 454 US 235. The plaintiff has no longer an
inborn right to choose his own forum. He no longer wins the toss on every
throw. The decision rests with the Courts. No matter which jurisdiction is
invoked, the Court must hold the balance between the plaintiff and the
defendant. It must take into account the relative advantages and
disadvantages to each of them: not only the juridical advantages and
disadvantages, but also the personal conveniences and inconveniences: not
only the private interests of the parties but also the public interests involved.
The Court decides according to which way the balance comes down. …”

135
(19831) 1 WLR 730.
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219. The jurisdictional tension in suits filed before the Intellectual Property
136
Division, at its core, stems from archaic procedural laws being applied to
modern, technology-driven, manifestation of substantive rights. Section 20
of the CPC, as a residuary jurisdictional rule, has been in existence ever
since the Bengal Regulation III of 1793, under the Cornwallis Code. The
essence of the provision has remained the same, throughout the procedural
codes of 1882, 1877 and 1859. The options given to a plaintiff under these
provisions did not take into account actions being founded on the use of
internet. The concept of a ‗pan-India‘ harm, injury, or effect, could not have
been fathomed by the drafters of these provisions. A simple textual
application of Section 20 to a lis concerning intellectual property rights, may
result in unintended consequences as the jurisdictional rule, in most cases, is
a misfit for the action it seeks to govern.
220. Section 20 of the CPC provides a dual umbrella of options to institute
a suit. The first umbrella is defendant centric: a plaint can be presented
within the local limits of a court where the defendant resides (actually or
voluntarily), carries on business, or personally works for gain. This rule
resonates with the Justinian dictum ‗ actor sequitur forum rei ‘ i.e., plaintiff
follows the defendant‘s forum. It forces a plaintiff to leave his home-ground
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and go into the territory of the defendant. On occasions this may be
inconvenient. Thus, an option is given to the plaintiff to file where the cause
of action, wholly or in part, has arisen. The first illustration to Section 20
exemplifies this scenario. It is reproduced as under:

136
―IPD‖.
137
The dictum in M/s RSPL Limited v. Mukesh Sharma and Anr. , FAO (OS) No. 145/2016 and Chandra
Kishore Chaurasia v. R A Perfumery Works Pvt. Ltd. , 2022:DHC:4454, similarly, also may not remain
good law today.
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― (a) A is a tradesman in Calcutta, B carries on business in Delhi. B, by his
agent in Calcutta, buys goods of A and requests A to deliver them to the
East Indian Railway Company. A delivers the goods accordingly in
Calcutta. A may sue B for the price of the goods either in Calcutta, where
the cause of action has arisen, or in Delhi, where B carries on business.‖
221. The person ‗A‘ in the illustration has an option to sue the defendant at
Calcutta, which is the place where the cause of action accrued. He need not
go to the far off place viz . Delhi. The object and purpose of allowing a plaint
to be presented before a Court where the cause of action partly accrues is to
enable the plaintiff to sue nearer to himself, not to take the lis away from the
place having a dominant and substantial connection with the case.
138
222. In Krishna Veni Nigam v. Harish Nigam , the Supreme Court was
moved for the transfer of a case pending before the Family Court, Jabalpur,
to the Family Court of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. The Court held that the
doctrine of forum conveniens is applicable in civil proceedings despite the
plaintiff being the dominus litis . The Supreme Court, therefore, did not find
the powers of transfer vested with it to be in conflict with the doctrine of
forum non conveniens . Para. 13 of the said decision reads as under:
13. We have considered the above suggestions. In this respect, we may
also refer to the doctrine of forum non conveniens which can be applied in
matrimonial proceedings for advancing interest of justice. Under the said
doctrine, the court exercises its inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings at a
forum which is considered not to be convenient and there is any other forum
which is considered to be more convenient for the interest of all the parties at
the ends of justice. In Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte.
Ltd. [ Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd. , (2003) 4 SCC
341] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 356-57, para 19)

Though these observations have been made in the context of granting anti-suit
injunction, the principle can be followed in regulating the exercise of
jurisdiction of the court where proceedings are instituted. In a civil

138
(2017) 4 SCC 150.
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proceeding, the plaintiff is the dominus litis but if more than one court
has jurisdiction, court can determine which is the convenient forum and
lay down conditions in the interest of justice subject to which its
jurisdiction may be availed [ Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India ,
(2004) 6 SCC 254, para 30] .
(Emphasis supplied)
139
223. In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. ,
a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Vikramjit Sen
J. laid down the judicial approach which is to be adopted on jurisdiction, and
specifically for Section 20 of the CPC. The Court found that the doctrine of
forum conveniens has application in civil suits. Para. 12 of the said decision
reads as under:
― JUDICIAL APPROACH ON JURISDICTION
12. We shall take a short digression in terms of brief discussion of the
approach preferred by this Court in the context of Section 20 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as, ‗CPC‘), which inter
alia, enjoins that a suit must be instituted in a court within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or
carries on business, or personally works for gain, or where the cause of
action wholly or in part arises. The Explanation to that Section is
important; it prescribes that a corporation shall be deemed to carry on
business at its sole or principal office, or, in respect of any cause of action
arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.
Since this provision primarily keeps the Defendant in perspective, the
corporation spoken of in the Explanation, obviously refers to the
Defendant. A plain reading of Section 20 of the CPC arguably allows the
Plaintiff a multitude of choices in regard to where it may institute its lis,
suit or action. Corporations and partnership firms, and even sole
proprietorship concerns, could well be transacting business simultaneously
in several cities. If sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 20 are to be
interpreted disjunctively from sub-section (c), as the use of the word ‗or‘
appears to permit the Plaintiff to file the suit at any of the places where the
cause of action may have arisen regardless of whether the Defendant has
even a subordinate office at that place. However, if the Defendants’
location is to form the fulcrum of jurisdiction, and it has an office also
at the place where the cause of action has occurred, it has been held

139
(2014) 9 SCC 129.
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that the Plaintiff is precluded from instituting the suit anywhere else.
Obviously, this is also because every other place would constitute a
forum non conveniens. This Court has harmonised the various hues of
the conundrum of the place of suing in several cases and has gone to
the extent of laying down that it should be courts endeavour to locate
the place where the cause of action has substantially arisen and reject
others where it may have incidentally arisen . Patel Roadways Limited,
Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company, AIR 1992 SC 1514 : (1991) 4 SCC
270 prescribes that if the Defendant-corporation has a subordinate office in
the place where the cause of action arises, litigation must be instituted at
that place alone, regardless of the amplitude of options postulated in
Section 20 of the CPC. We need not dilate on this point beyond making a
reference to ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 and South
East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 3
SCC 443.‖
224. In a similar vein this Court in Ansal Buildwell Ltd. v. North Eastern
140
Indira Gandhi Institute of Health & Medical Science and Ors. , noted
that the doctrine of forum conveniens applies in the context of civil
proceedings and had held as under:
― 25. In the context of forum conveniens it may be noted that in an
appropriate case, a court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
by invoking the said doctrine. While invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens a court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
notwithstanding that some part of cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.‖

225. The chartered High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, having
original ordinary jurisdiction, routinely apply the doctrine of forum
141
conveniens to civil suits. For instance in Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal , the
Calcutta High Court held that leave to sue may be revoked by applying the
doctrine of forum conveniens . The material portion of the decision reads as
under:

140
2005 SCC OnLine Del 268.
141
1945 SCC OnLine Cal 145.
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―(g) that in giving or refusing leave or maintaining or revoking leave the
Court will ordinarily take into consideration the balance of convenience and
may, if the balance is definitely in favour of the defendant, apply the
doctrine of forum conveniences;‖
Relying on Madanlal Jalan , in Union of India v. M. Kuppuswamy
142
Naicker , the Calcutta High Court similarly observed:
―6. It is well settled that in giving or refusing leave or maintaining or
revoking leave the Court would ordinarily take into consideration the
balance of convenience and may, if the balance is definitely in favour of the
defendant, apply the doctrine of forum convenience, vide Madanlal Jalan v.
Madanlal reported in AIR 1949 Cal 495.‖
143
226. In TN Seshan v. All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam ,
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh decided a challenge to an order declining
to revoke the leave for instituting four suits by plaintiff and granting leave
for a fifth suit. At para. 12 the Court took note of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens , it reads as under:
― 12. Before, however, we part with this judgment we propose to clarify that
refusal to revoke the leave is not treated as an order to deny to the
defendants the right to challenge the facts or traverse the facts which appear
to give rise to the cause of action and in case the facts alleged in the plaint
stand rebutted or disproved or not proved by the plaintiff in accordance with
law, the Court may take the view that the Court's ordinary civil jurisdiction
is not attracted and the suit should be filed somewhere else. One of the
settled principles is, while examining whether, on the ground of a part of
cause of action of the suit has arisen within the territorial limits of the
ordinary civil jurisdiction of the court, leave should be granted or not, to test
the locus conveniente i.e., whether it shall be convenient for the plaintiff and
inconvenient for the defendant or whether it shall be convenient for the
defendant and not for the plaintiff, or whether it shall be convenient for
both, if the trial is held in the court and not anywhere else. The principle of
balance of convenience of the parties in this regard is stated in a Bench
decision of the Madras High Court by one of us in Turicorin Alkali
Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd. v. Cochin Silicate & Galss Industries (4) 1992
(1) LW 308. In the instant case, however such a plea is not required to be

142
1977 SCC OnLine Cal 235.
143
1995 SCC OnLine AP 546.
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examined at all for it was a plea of inconvenience of the defendant which
prevailed before the Supreme Court and the cases have been transferred
from the Madras High Court to this Court.‖
227. In Arun Digambar Varangaonkar v. M/s Karpe Gruh Udyog and
144
Ors. , a suit was filed before the Bombay High Court for trademark and
copyright infringement along with a claim for passing off. It was contended
that the defendants were using the plaintiff‘s protected artistic work and
mark in relation to masala products and spice preparations so as to infringe
upon protected works, and also pass off his goods as that of the plaintiffs. It
was contended by the plaintiff therein that he resides at Amravati and also at
Bombay. The products of the plaintiff were sold in Maharashtra, Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. The plaintiff also caused an
enquiry and purportedly found that the impugned preparations of the
defendants were available in Bombay and caused purchases of them to be
made. Two cash memos in respect of the test purchases made by the plaintiff
from Messrs Amruta Traders had also been placed on record to demonstrate
the preparations being the impugned trademark.
228. RM Lodha J. (as his Lordship then was), found that the plaintiff
mainly resides at Amravati and carries on business also at Amravati. The
goods were also manufactured at Amravati. The defendants reside and also
manufacture the impugned goods at Amravati. It was found that two cash
memos produced by the plaintiff, prima facie , showing sale of goods at
Bombay was not sufficient to entertain a suit at Bombay. Invoking the
doctrine of forum conveniens , the Court observed as under:

144
1997 SCC OnLine Bom 132.
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― 10. From the perusal of the plaint itself, it transpires that plaintiff mainly
resides at Amravati and he carries on business also at Amravati. The goods
are also manufactured by Plaintiff at Amravati. The Defendants reside nt
Amravati and they also manufacture the goods concerning the disputed trade
mark and the device at Amravati. Except two cash memos produced by the
Plaintiff along with the plaint there is no other material prima facie showing
the sale of the disputed goods manufactured by the Defendants in Bombay or
within the jurisdiction of this Court. Subsection (2) of section 62 of the Copy
Right provides that the suit in respect of the infringement of the copy right or
any right conferred under the Copy Right Act shall be instituted in the district
court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the person instituting the suit
actually and voluntarily resides or carries business or presently works for
gain. Obviously sub-section (2) of section 62 enables the suitor to file the suit
or initiate civil proceedings arising under Chapter XII of Copy Right Act in
the District Court within whose jurisdiction he actually and voluntarily resides
or carries on business or personally works for gain. This wholesome
exceptional provision is intended to save suitor if he so desires for redressal of
his grievance in respect of the infringement of copy right or any right
conferred the Copy Right Act from suing at the place where defendant resides
or carries on business. Section 62 of Copy Right Act, of course, cannot take
away the jurisdiction of this Court which it has under Letters Patent but at the
same time this Court shall not entertain and try a suit under Copy Right Act
where whole of cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction or
material part of cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction or where
though some part of cause of action has arisen within its jurisdiction but
balance of convenience strongly and definitely is in favour of suit being
proceeded within some other Court. In applying the doctrine of forum
convenience the court may consider place of residence or business of the
parties, the place where transactions took place, the volume of evidence and
convenience or inconvenience of producing it at a particular forum, expenses
of trial and such other relevant considerations. As already observed earlier,
plaintiff in his plaint has himself come out with the case that he resides at
Amravati and also at Bombay. The principal residence of the plaintiff,
therefore, appears to be at Amravati. The goods are also manufactured at
Amravati. The Defendants, according to Plaintiff himself reside at Amravati
and carry on business at Amravati. The volume of evidence that may be led
by the parties can be conveniently produced at Amravati. The trial at
Amravati shall save the parties from unnecessary expenses and, therefore,
balance of convenience definitely would be if the suit is tried at Amravati.‖
229. The argument that the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras
could invoke the doctrine of forum conveniens only because of the wording
of their respective Letters Patent is erroneous. The decisions of the Supreme
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Court in Dashrath and Harish Nigam were not in the context of Letters
Patent. While Dashrath was concerned with the application of the CPC,
Harish Nigam ‘s dictum applies to all civil proceedings.
230. The doctrine of forum conveniens does not require an express
statutory basis for its invocation in civil proceedings. A civil court has
inherent power to decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that it is not
the forum conveniens .
145
231. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert , the Supreme Court of the USA
decided on the issue ― whether the United States District Court has inherent
power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens
and, if so, whether that power was abused in this case ‖. Authoring for the
majority, Justice Jackson opined that the doctrine of forum conveniens has
application even for intra-state disputes.
― It is conceded that the venue statutes of the United States permitted the
plaintiff to commence his action in the Southern District of New York, and
empower that court to entertain it. [Footnote 3] But that does not settle the
question whether it must do so. Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue.

In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into
play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is
amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between
them. The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute . These statutes are
drawn with a necessary generality, and usually give a plaintiff a choice of
courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his
remedy. But the open door may admit those who seek not simply justice,
but perhaps justice blended with some harassment . A plaintiff sometimes

145
330 US 501 (1947).
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is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most
inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
146
232. Unequivocally, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Torres v. Walsh ,
held that the invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not
require a statutory backing. It originates and lies in the common law. The
lucid words of Justice Clark read as under:
―While in Illinois we are without any statutory authorization, we find that
such authority to transfer a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
exists at common law, and, therefore, statutory authorization is unnecessary
as it only recognizes and codifies a right that previously existed at common
law. The doctrine of forum non conveniens originated in the common law of
England which Illinois adopted as it existed ―prior to the fourth year of James
the First" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 1, par. 801).‖‖
233. There is, thus, no requirement for there to be a provision in the CPC,
providing in explicit terms, that the doctrine of forum conveniens applies to
civil suits. A careful analysis of the provisions of the CPC would also reveal
that there is indeed scope to read this doctrine into the Code. A bar on the
application of this doctrine simply cannot be found in the Code. To analyse
this, a few provisions of the CPC, may be extracted as under:
Section 15 of the CPC reads as under:
― 15. Court in which suits to be instituted.
Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to
try it.‖
Section 20 of the CPC reads as under:
― 20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of
action arises.

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456 N.E.2d 601, 98 Ill. 2d 338.
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Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one,
at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily
resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the
commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either
the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or
carry on business, or personally works for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in
such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
Explanation.—A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole
or principal office in India or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any
place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.‖
234. Sections 15 and 20 of the CPC contain the necessary conditions that
ought to be satisfied by the plaintiff while instituting a suit. A plaint cannot
be instituted before a forum which is not of the lowest grade competent to
try it. A suit not governed by Sections 16 to 19, will have to be instituted in
accordance with Section 20 and comply with the requirements of sub-
sections (a) to (c). Satisfaction of Sections 15-20 of the Code determines
whether a forum is capable of adjudicating a lis . The doctrine of forum non-
conveniens is, however, concerned with whether a forum ought to adjudicate
a given case. The doctrine of forum conveniens , it is trite law, is applicable
only when a forum is found to possess jurisdiction. It is after that stage, the
inquiry begins: whether it is appropriate to adjudicate that suit. No conflict,
at all, can be found between the doctrine of forum non-conveniens and the
provisions of the CPC.
235. A Code cannot be expected to contemplate every possible issue that
may arise in civil proceedings. Section 151 of the CPC, which saves the
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inherent powers of the Court, is intended to redress those very situations,
which are not effectively redressed by the remaining portion of the Code.
Reliance may be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar
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Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal , where Raghubar
Dayal J. speaking for a Four Judge Bench, observed as under:
― 18. …the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in
circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 CPC.
There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue
of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any
rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code
are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of
contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future
litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect
of the expression ―if it is so prescribed‖ is only this that when the rules
prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued,
ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary
orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the
circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions
of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary
injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No
party has a right to insist on the Court‘s exercising that jurisdiction and the
Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely
necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise
of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of
Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of
the Court to exercise its inherent power.

20. Further, the provisions of Section 151 of the Code make it clear that
the inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code. Section
151 reads:
―Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the
inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the
ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.‖
21. A similar question about the powers of the Court to issue a
commission in the exercise of its powers under Section 151 of the Code in
circumstances not covered by Section 75 and Order 26, arose in Padam Sen v.
State of Uttar Pradesh [(1961) 1 SCR 884] and this Court held that the Court
can issue a commission in such circumstances. It observed at p. 887 thus:

147
1961 SCC OnLine SC 17.
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―The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers
specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to
those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise
them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the
exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been
expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature.‖

These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way
controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in
Section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their
exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the
Code or against the intentions of the legislature. This restriction, for practical
purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are
controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be persumed
that the procedure specifically provided by the legislature for orders in certain
circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice.‖

236. Justification for invoking the doctrine of forum non-conveniens can be
adequately found in Section 151 of the Code. Additionally, the language of
Order VII Rule 10 may also be examined. The words used are under:
― 10. Return of plaint.
(1) Subject to the provisions of rule 10A, the plaint shall at any stage of the
suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have
been instituted .

Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that a Court
of appeal or revision may direct after setting aside the decree passed in a
suit, the return of the plaint under this sub-rule.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
237. The word ― should ‖ is defined in the following manner in various
dictionaries:
― Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation ;
although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a
moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from ―ought.‖ It is not normally
synonymous with ―may,‖ and although often interchangeable with the word
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―would,‖ it does not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes
148
does .‖

―Should. 1. used to say or suggest that something is the proper, reasonable, or
best thing to do; used with have to say that something was the proper,
reasonable, or best thing to do but was not done. 2. used to say that something
149
is expected or correct.‖

―Should vb the past tense of shall: used as an auxiliary verb to indicate that an
action is considered by the speaker to be obligatory (you should go) or to
150
form the subjunctive mood with I or we.‖

151
―Should:— used to show what is right, appropriate , etc. ….‖

(Emphasis supplied)

238. A plaint shall be returned if it is not filed in a forum where it ― should
have been instituted ‖. This includes a case where it is presented before a
Court having no jurisdiction at all, but may also, additionally, include a
court which is forum non-conveniens . Suits should be instituted at a place
which is forum conveniens . Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, can, thus,
additionally, be considered as containing sufficient leg-room to house the
doctrine of forum non-conveniens .
239. The argument that the doctrine of forum conveniens is in the teeth of
the transfer provisions contained in the Code is devoid of merit. The
doctrine of forum non conveniens can only be invoked by a court before
which a suit is maintainable . The availability of jurisdiction to decide the lis
agitated before a court is, thus, essential for the doctrine to apply. When the
Supreme Court acts under Section 25 of the CPC to transfer proceedings

148 th
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5 Ed., 1979.
149 th
Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary, 1160, 11 Ed., 2003.
150
Collins English Dictionary 30th Anniversary Edition (10th Edn. in 2009).
151
Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, New 8th Edn.
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from a High Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other
Civil Court in any other State, it does not apply forum conveniens as that lis
which is being transferred could not be decided by the transferring-court. A
civil suit which gets transferred from one High Court to another under
Section 25 of the CPC could not have been decided by the Supreme Court.
The doctrine, thus, is not in conflict with the powers of transfer exercisable
under Section 25 of the CPC. Even otherwise in Harish Nigam , the
Supreme Court while exercising transfer jurisdiction noted the application of
this doctrine to civil proceedings.

240. There may not be explicit statutory provisions, as there are today, in
England and certain States of the USA, empowering a civil court to invoke
principles of forum non-conveniens but that does not mean in appropriate
cases the doctrine cannot be invoked. Our Code remains of 1908, as has
been noted above, a portion of jurisdictional provisions in the CPC have not
changed since the 1700s. It is on the basis of this legislative text that courts
have to interpret modern internet based IP infringement cases. Merely
because the bare letter of the Code is not keeping with the changing times,
does not mean, that courts ought to be stuck at the bark of words. The
doctrine of forum non-conveniens existed and flourished in both US and
England prior to it gaining statutory recognition. There is no reason why it
must not, in India.

241. What necessitates a suit being required to be filed at the appropriate
and convenient forum? A requirement for certainty, predictability and
fairness. A defendant that utilises internet for its business, does not sign up
to get sued around the country. He also does not sign up to live in a constant
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state of uncertainty as to which part of the country he/she may get summons
from. Yes indeed the right of the plaintiff may get infringed by internet
activity of the defendant. That right needs to be redressed. Ordinarily the
place that redresses that infraction is the place where that wrong occurred.
This in itself was an indicator to the defendant as to where it may be sued.
This is the rationale and idea, behind making forums competent to
adjudicate on issues that take place within their territories. The underlying
premise of this doctrine, however, changes when the cause of action is
contended to be pan-India or susceptible to being created in any part of India
depending upon the plaintiff‘s acts.
242. While in conventional suits it is the defendant‘s conduct, which, in an
overwhelming number of cases, determines where the cause of action
accrues; however, in cases filed before the IPD, it is the plaintiff who seems
to have control over where cause of action can be generated. Jurisdictional
rules have always been defendant-centric. The plaintiff must not have too
many options to choose from, not merely because there is a possibility of
him choosing a place that is the most inconvenient to the defendant, but also
because his choice determines the legal infrastructure required to handle and
manage the consequences of that choice.
243. Legal rules are intended to govern human affairs. They are to be
framed and postulated in a manner that they are understandable to the
everyday citizen of our country. Jurisdictional rules, similarly, intend to
govern procedural law that determines, among other things, where a suit can
be filed. Why should a person know where they could be possibly sued? At
the outset because litigation is expensive, but also because that is the very
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purpose for which rules are framed. To give clarity to the citizens as to the
manner in which they may conduct themselves and their business.
244. The plaintiff being dominus litis is a consideration. Similar to another
consideration of the rule of law, certainty and construing provisions in a
manner that they don‘t become susceptible to misuse. The issue boils down
to which value is to be given a higher preference. In this Court‘s opinion the
latter set of factors are to be given more importance. This is not, it may be
noted, something completely novel which is being proposed. When the
Supreme Court in Patel Roadways interpreted the explanation to Section
20(a), it restricted certain forums to which the plaintiff otherwise could have
gone. When the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia incorporated Section 20(a)
to Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and 62(2) of the Copyright Act, it
naturally foreclosed certain forums which otherwise would have been
available to a given plaintiff.
245. Courts have, depending upon the situation that gets presented,
restricted the right of the plaintiff and the options that are available to it for
filing a given suit. Nobody has an inherent vested right to file a suit before a
specific court. The plaintiff can validly insist that a violation of his right
must be remedied. He cannot, however, insist that it must be remedied by a
particular court.
246. The parliament while choosing to continue with the language of the
residuary jurisdictional provision, originally enacted by the British in the
form of the Code of 1908, did not intend to allow a plaintiff to file a suit
before a forum where neither he, nor the defendant resides, carries on
business, or personally works for gain, on the ground that cause of action
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had partially accrued within the jurisdiction of that forum, in a case where
cause of action had also partially accrued at the place where the plaintiff or
the defendant resides, carries on business or personally works for gain.
There also does not appear to be, subject to pleadings being made to the
contrary, any reason for a plaintiff to move away from his own territory and
away from the territory of the defendant, when he very well could have
instituted suits at those place.
247. The application of forum conveniens and an insistence on filing a suit
before the appropriate forum shall also mean that the plaintiff no longer
needs to go through the trouble to come to Delhi from far off places and
institute an action before this Court on grounds that a slender part of cause
of action has accrued within the ― local limits ‖ of this Court. He would file
before the court that is forum conveniens . As noted above, this shall give the
defendant the required predictability of knowing from which court he may
be summoned. The menace of trade mark and copyright infringement indeed
ought to, and must be, remedied by the court most closely connected with
the lis and the parties. This is necessary in order to bring about convenience
in litigation to the plaintiff as also the defendant.
248. Ease of litigation ought be the most foundational pillar of the
litigation policy in a country. Interpretation of rules that burden the plaintiff
or the defendant must be eschewed. In the context of IP disputes, each court
within whose jurisdiction the parties reside, carry on business, or personally
work for gain, or the material, integral and essential part of the cause of
action has arisen, has jurisdiction to adjudicate such a suit. A court must in
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these cases unhesitatingly entertain a plaint without giving any impression
of being incapacitated.
249. The common denominator in the present batch of matters dealt with in
this judgment is an attempt by the plaintiff to disturb the natural flow of
litigation. Through its own voluntary acts, jurisdiction is sought to be
created at a place distant from its own place of residence or where it carries
on business. An impression is given as though the convenient and more
proximate forum is unable to adjudicate the lis or grant the reliefs prayed
for. Such a notion deserves to be dispelled.
250. Further, text alone may not be conclusive of the construction which is
to be given to a provision. For instance, the bare words of Sections 62(2)
and 134(2) of the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act, respectively, did not
contain an explanation, proviso , caveat, or bar. Despite it, the Supreme
Court in Sanjay Dalia narrowed the options available to the plaintiff, where
a suit can be instituted. Arun Mishra J.‘s observations in Sanjay Dalia
details the motivation behind putting fetters to the discretion that the
plaintiff had under the special legislations. The material portion of the
judgement reads as under:
― 24. If the interpretation suggested by the appellant is accepted, several
mischiefs may result, intention is that the plaintiff should not go to far-flung
places than that of residence or where he carries on business or works for gain
in order to deprive the defendant a remedy and harass him by dragging
to distant place . It is settled proposition of law that the interpretation of the
provisions has to be such which prevents mischief. …
25. …The provisions [Sections 62 and 134(2) of the Copyright Act and Trade
Marks Act respectively] enabled the plaintiff or any of them to file a suit at
the aforesaid places. But if they were residing or carrying on business or
personally worked for gain already at such place, where cause of action has
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arisen, wholly or in part, the said provisions have not provided additional
remedy to them to file a suit at a different place. The said provisions never
intended to operate in that field. The operation of the provisions was limited
and their objective was clearly to enable the plaintiff to file a suit at the place
where he is ordinarily residing or carrying on business, etc. as enumerated
above, not to go away from such places. The legislature has never intended
that the plaintiff should not institute the suit where he ordinarily resides
or at its head office or registered office or where he otherwise carries on
business or personally works for gain where the cause of action too has
arisen and should drag the defendant to a subordinate office or other
place of business which is at a far distant place under the guise of the fact
that the plaintiff corporation is carrying on business through branch or
otherwise at such other place also. If such an interpretation is permitted,
as rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents, the abuse of the
provision will take place. Corporations and big conglomerates, etc. might
be having several subordinate offices throughout the country.
Interpretation otherwise would permit them to institute infringement
proceedings at a far-flung place and at an unconnected place as
compared to a place where the plaintiff is carrying on their business, and
at such place, cause of action too has arisen ….
26. The avoidance of counter-mischief to the defendant is also necessary
while giving the remedy to the plaintiff under the provisions in question. It
was never visualised by the lawmakers that both the parties would be made to
travel to a distant place in spite of the fact that the plaintiff has a remedy of
suing at the place where the cause of action has arisen where he is having
head office/carrying on business, etc. The provisions of the Copyright Act and
the Trade Marks Act provide for the authors/trade mark holders to sue at their
ordinary residence or where they carry on their business. The said provisions
of law never intended to be oppressive to the defendant. The Parliamentary
debate quoted above has to be understood in the manner that suit can be filed
where the plaintiff ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain. Discussion was to provide remedy to the plaintiff at
convenient place; he is not to travel away . Debate was not to enable the
plaintiff to take the defendant to farther place, leaving behind his place of
residence/business, etc. The right to remedy given is not unbridled and is
subject to the prevention of abuse of the aforesaid provisions, as
discussed above. Parliament never intended that the subject provisions be
abused by the plaintiff by instituting suit in wholly unconnected
jurisdiction. In the instant cases, as the principal place of business is at
Mumbai the cause of action is also at Mumbai but still the place for suing has
been chosen at Delhi. There may be a case where the plaintiff is carrying on
the business at Mumbai and cause of action has arisen in Mumbai. The
plaintiff is having branch offices at Kanyakumari and also at Port Blair,
if interpretation suggested by the appellants is acceptable, mischief may
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be caused by such plaintiff to drag a defendant to Port Blair or
Kanyakumari . The provisions cannot be interpreted in the said manner
devoid of the object of the Act.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
251. There has been some debate as to the exact import of Sanjay Dalia .
There is a divergence of opinion at the Bar on what is meant by the lines
highlighted and quoted above. The question raised pertains to what may be
called the ― Merger Doctrine ‖. It provides that if cause of action (wholly or
in part) has arisen where the plaintiff resides, carries on business, or
personally works for gain, he can sue at that place and at no other place.
Whether the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia by making these observations
intended to foreclose the avenues under Section 20 of the CPC or do they
remain intact is the issue that has been agitated ad nauseam . This Court, is
refraining from rendering any conclusive finding on this issue. It may only
be noted that the most appropriate and relevant guidance that this Court
could find on this issue was the decision of the Division Bench in Sanjay
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Dalia , which was subsequently approved by the Supreme Court.
Vikrmajit Sen J. (as his Lordship then was), opining for the Bench, in
unequivocal terms observed:
― 13. In this analysis, we find the Appeal to be devoid of merits. So far as the
facts of the present case are concerned, the cause of action, as laid out in the
Plaint, has arisen in Maharashtra only, where the Plaintiff‘s principal office
is located. Had it allegedly arisen at a place where the Plaintiff does not
have its principal or subordinate office, the suit could have been filed in any
Court holding territorial jurisdiction over any of its offices. Thus, it is
evident that we are, in no wise, whittling down the provisions of either the
Copyright Act or the Trade Marks Act. We hold that if the cause of action
has arisen at a place where the Plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides
or carries on business or personally works for gain, that place is not

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2008:DHC:3060-DB.
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only the appropriate but also the only place where a suit can be
instituted ventilating a grievance of violation of copyright, (and since
the provisions are similar) to an infringement of the trademark. In
holding so we are not ignoring the provisions of either the Copyright
Act or the Trade Marks Act; we are only imparting a pragmatic
interpretation to them. ‖
(Emphasis supplied)
252. The intent behind the words of the Supreme Court can be gathered
from the decision which was affirmed by it. The words used by the Division
Bench are categorical and unequivocal.
253. The argument of there being a bar in the application of the Merger
Doctrine owing to each sub-clause of Section 20 being independent without
any correlation with each other must be stated only to be rejected. There is
no mention of the expression ― cause of action ‖ in the text of Section 20(a).
This sub-clause which is defendant centric, gets narrowed down, as noted in
Patel Roadways , by the application of the explanation. This explanation,
links the place where the defendant has its sub-ordinate office with ― cause of
action ‖, which is an avenue mentioned in sub-clause (c) of Section 20. In
other words, the explanation merges the presence of the defendant with the
place where cause of action has arisen, and this results into an option
available with the plaintiff being curtailed. The rationale for this being that
the place where cause of action accrues is convenient to the plaintiff; where
the defendant has a sub-ordinate office is similarly convenient to the
defendant, and resultantly, in the context of the explanation, the appropriate
forum becomes the only forum where a plaintiff could file in terms of the
explanation.
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254. The very same underlying reasoning is being applied under Section 20
for the Merger Doctrine . The place where the plaintiff resides, carries on
business, and personally works for gain is convenient to the plaintiff; since
cause of action has also accrued there, it may not be inconvenient for the
defendant to be sued at that place. The most appropriate forum both in terms
of convenience, and predictability, becomes this place of merger. The
underlying rationale of Patel Roadways thus assists in arriving at the
conclusion under the Merger Doctrine .
255. Separate from the issue concerning the Merger Doctrine , the decision
in Sanjay Dalia , is being used in the present case, only to highlight that the
absence of textual language may not be conclusive of the construction which
is to be adopted.
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256. Maxwell details when the language of a statute may be modified:
―Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical
construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the
enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies
the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.‖

257. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation also mentions that a
construction must not be preferred where owing to a remedy being construed
too widely a counter-mischief would prevail. The court also has to be
mindful of the consequences on public welfare. A counter-mischief unseen

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Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes (P. St. J. Langan ed., 12th Edn, 1969), Ch. 11, Section 1,
―Modification of the Language to Meet the Intention‖, ― Maxwell ‖.
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by the legislature ought to be mitigated by the Court. The material portion
of the commentary is:
―Section 12.1: Presumption that ‗absurd‘ result not intended
12.1
(1) The court seeks to avoid a construction that produces an absurd result,
since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament...
Section 10.3: The mischief for which Parliament legislated
10.3
(1) An Act may be concerned with several different mischiefs. Where the
legal meaning of a particular enactment is in question, it is important to
identify the precise mischief that the enactment was intended to remedy...
Section 12.7: Avoiding a disproportionate counter-mischief
...Clearly it would be absurd to suppose that Parliament intended to abolish
one mischief only at the cost of establishing another which is just as bad, or
even worse. As a matter of common sense, rules whose disadvantages
outweigh their benefits ought to be discarded.
EXAMPLE
Lord Bingham of Cornhill said:
‗My Lords, s 4 of the Statute of Frauds was enacted in 1677 to address a
mischief facilitated, it seems, by the procedural deficiencies of the day…It
quickly became evident that if the seventeenth century solution addressed
one mischief it was capable of giving rise to another…( Actionstrength Ltd
(t/a Vital Resources) v International Glass Engineering IN.GL.EN. SpA
[2003] UKHL 17).
Strict construction
Where another mischief would arise if the remedy provided by the Act were
construed widely, the court may avoid or at least reduce it by limiting the
remedy.
It may appear to the court that one of the opposing constructions of the
enactment, if adopted, would create a mischief of its own. The prospect of
this would constitute a negative factor in weighing the applicability of the

154
Diggory Bailey & Luke Norbury, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis, 7th Edn, 2017), Ch.
12, Section 12.7, ―Avoiding a disproportionate counter-mischief‖, ― Bennion ‖.
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construction in question. The court also has in mind the consequences for
the public welfare.

Often it is reasonable to assume that a particular consequence was quite
unforeseen by Parliament. Enacted law suffers by comparison with
unwritten law in that it involves laying down in advance an untried
remedy…‖
258. Further, Bennion on avoiding a disproportionate counter-mischief,
has observed in Section 12.7:
― 12.7 The presumption against absurdity means that the courts will
generally avoid adopting a construction that cures the mischief the
enactment was designed to remedy only at the cost of establishing another
mischief.‖
259. The learned author Justice G.P. Singh has further observed that
regard must be had to the subject and object of the Act. The court‘s effort is
to harmonise the words of the statute with the subject of enactment and the
object the legislature has in view. When two interpretations are feasible, the
court will prefer the one which advances the remedy and suppresses the
155
mischief as envisioned. The relevant portion is extracted below:
―As stated earlier (Chapter 1, title 2 ―Intention of the Legislature‖, text and
Notes 59 to 71, pp 15 to 17) and as approved by the Supreme Court: ―The
words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be
understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the
enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is
found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of
language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on
which they are used, and the object to be attained‖. ( Workmen of Dimakuchi
Tea Estate v Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate , AIR 1958 SC 353, p
356). The courts have declined ―to be bound by the letter, when it frustrates
the patent purposes of the statute‖. ( Cabell v Markham , 148 F 2d 737 (2d
Cir 1945) (Learned Hand J)). In the words of Shah J, ―It is a recognised rule
of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should

155
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation , ― Regard to Subject and Object - General ‖ (A.K.
Patnaik rev., LexisNexis, 14th Edn, 2016), ― Justice G.P. Singh ‖.
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ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the
object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature‖. ( New
India Sugar Mills Ltd v Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar , AIR 1963 SC
1207, p 1213). Therefore when two interpretations are feasible the court will
prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the
legislature envisioned. ( Carew & Co Ltd v UOI , AIR 1975 SC 2260, p
2270). The Court should adopt an object-oriented approach keeping in mind
the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as
interpretative possibility permits. ( Busching Schmitz Private Ltd v PT
Menghani , AIR 1977 SC 1569, pp 1575, 1576). The object-oriented
approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the
plain language used by rewriting the section or substituting words in place
of the actual words used by the legislature. ( CIT v Budhraja and Co. , AIR
1993 SC 2529, p 2535).
Having regard to the object of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 to
implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at distribution of land to
landless labourers who were versed in agriculture and who had no other
means of subsistence, it was held that the expression ‗landless persons‘ in
Section 14, which made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was
limited to landless labourers as described above and did not include a
landless businessman residing in a city. ( UP Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v Braj
Kishore , AIR 1993 SC 2529, p 2535).‖
260. Justice G.P. Singh has also observed that it is the court‘s duty to
avoid hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and anomaly while
selecting out of different interpretations. The doctrine must be applied with
great care and in case absurd inconvenience is to be caused that
interpretation has to be avoided. The relevant discussion is extracted
hereunder:
―(a) Hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and anomaly to be
avoided
In selecting out of different interpretations ―the court will adopt that which
is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those
things‘ ( Holmes v Bradfield Rural District Council , (1949) 1 All ER 381, p
384 (KBD) (Finnemore J)), as it may be presumed ―that the Legislature
should have used the word in that interpretation which least offends our
sense of justice‖. ( Simms v Registrar of Probates , (1900) AC 323, p 335
(PC) (Lord Hobhouse)). If the grammatical construction leads to some
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absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the
instrument, it may be departed from so as to avoid that absurdity and
inconsistency. ( Grey v Pearson , (1857) 6 HLC 61, p 106). Similarly, a
construction giving rise to anomalies should be avoided. ( Veluswami Thevar
v G Raja Nainar , AIR 1959 SC 422, pp 427, 428). As approved by
Venkatarama Aiyar, J.: Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary
meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of
the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or
absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction
may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the
structure of the sentence.‖ ( Tirath Singh v Bachittar Singh , AIR 1955 SC
830, p 833).‖

―Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as avoiding a particular
construction is a rule which must be applied with great care. ―The argument
ab inconvenient ‖, said Lord Moulton, ―is one which requires to be used with
great caution‖. ( Vacher & Sons v London Society of Compositors , (1913)
AC 107 : (1911-13) All ER Rep 241, p 252 (HL)). Explaining why great
caution is necessary Lord Moulton further observed, ―There is a danger that
it may degenerate into mere judicial criticism of the propriety of the Acts of
legislature. We have to interpret statutes according to the language used
therein, and, though occasionally the respective consequences of two rival
interpretations may guide us in our choice between them, it can only be
where, taking the Act as a whole, and viewing it in connection with the
existing state of the law at the time of the passing of the Act, we can satisfy
ourselves that the words can have been used in the sense to which the
argument points‖. ( Vacher & Sons v London Society of Compositors , (1913)
AC 107 : (1911-13) All ER Rep 241, pp 252, 253 (HL)). According to Brett,
LJ, the inconvenience necessitating a departure from the ordinary sense of
the words should not only be great but should also be what he calls an
―absurd inconvenience‖. Moreover, individual cases of hardship or injustice
have no bearing for rejecting the natural construction ( Young & Co v Royal
Leamington Spa Corp , (1883) 8 AC 517, p 527 (HL)), and it is only when
the natural construction leads to some general hardship or injustice and
some other construction is reasonably open that the natural construction
may be departed from. It is often found that laws enacted for the general
advantage do result in individual hardship; for example laws of Limitation,
Registration, Attestation although enacted for the public benefit, may work
injustice in particular cases but that is hardly any reason to depart from the
normal rule to relieve the supposed hardship or injustice in such cases.
( Lucy v Henleys Telegraph Works , (1969) 3 All ER 456, p 465 (CA)). ―It is
the duty of all courts of justice‖, said Lord Campbell, ―to take care for the
general good of the community, that hard cases do not make bad law‖. ( East
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India Co v Odichurn Paul , 7 Moo (PC) 85: (1849) 5 Moo Ind App 43, p 69
(PC)). ―Absurdity‖ according to Willes J, should be understood ―in the same
sense as repugnance that is to say something which would be so absurd with
reference to the other words of the statute as to amount to a repugnance‖.
( Christopherson v Lotinga , (1864) 33 LJ CP 121, p 123). ―Absurdity‖, said
Lord Greene MR, ―like public policy, is a very unruly horse‖. ( Grundt v
Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd , (1948) 1 All ER 21, p 29 (CA)). He
proceeded to add:
There is one rule, I think which is clear … that, although the absurdity or the
non-absurdity of one conclusion as compared with another may be, and very
often is, of assistance to the court in choosing between two possible
meanings of ambiguous words, it is a doctrine which has to be applied with
great care, remembering that Judges may be fallible in this question of an
absurdity and in any event it must not be applied so as to result in twisting
language into a meaning which it cannot bear. It is a doctrine which must
not be used to rewrite the language in a way different from that in which it
was originally framed. ( Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd , (1948)
1 All ER 21, pp 29, 30 (CA)).
The alternative construction contended for must be such which does not put
an undue strain on the words used; ( Kanailal Sur v Paramnidhi Sadhukhan ,
AIR 1957 SC 907, p 911) and does not require recasting of the Act or any
part of it. It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for out of the
words actually used. ( Shamrao V Parulekar v District Magistrate, Thane ,
AIR 1952 SC 324, p 327).
No doubt in cases of ambiguity that construction which better serves the
ends of fairness and justice will be accepted, but otherwise it is for the
legislature in forming its policy to consider these elements. ( IRC v Mutual
Investment Co , (1966) 3 All ER 265, p 268 (PC)).
The courts should as far as possible avoid a construction which results in
anomalies. ( NT Veluswami Thevar v G Raja Nainar , AIR 1959 SC 422, pp
427, 428).‖
261. In R v. Roberts , the accused‘s front garden was treated at trial as a
― public place ‖ under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1988, because
harm could be inflicted from it upon persons in the adjacent street. This
extension was rejected as it would also make the status of a garden depend
upon its wall and could turn part of a room abutting the street into a public
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place. Para. 5 concludes that ― in our view such a construction could not
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possibly be correct. ‖
262. In Public Prosecutor v. Oie Hee Koi , Section 57(1) of the Malayan
Internal Security Act, 1960, prohibited ― any person ‖ from carrying arms
without lawful authority. The Privy Council, while interpreting the
provision, held that although ― any person ‖ appeared wide enough to include
everybody, it excludes the soldiers. Words, it was highlighted, had to be
157
understood in the context and purpose of the Act.

263. A reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in
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Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. In this case, insured
premises, the fire policy, and the claim were connected with Ambala, but the
complaint was brought at Chandigarh on the basis of the insurer‘s branch
office being there. The Supreme Court found that allowing a claim to be
filed at a forum where no cause of action accrues but only a branch of the
insurer is present, would amount to plain absurdity. It may also lead to the
parties indulging in bench hunting. The Supreme Court categorically
accepted that it is departing from the plain and literal words, but noted that
such a departure sometimes is necessary. Para. 10 of the decision reads as
under:
― 10. … In our opinion, an interpretation has to be given to the amended
Section 17(2)(b) of the Act, which does not lead to an absurd
consequence. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant
is accepted, it will mean that even if a cause of action has arisen in
Ambala, then too the complainant can file a claim petition even in
Tamil Nadu or Gauhati or anywhere in India where a branch office of

156
R v. Roberts(Leroy Lloyd) , [2003] EWCA Crim 2753, [2004] 1 WLR 181.
157
Public Prosecutor v. Oie Hee Koi , [1968] AC 829 (Privy Council).
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(2010) 1 SCC 135.
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the Insurance Company is situated . We cannot agree with this
contention. It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to bench-
hunting. In our opinion, the expression ―branch office‖ in the amended
Section 17(2) would mean the branch office where the cause of action has
arisen. No doubt this would be departing from the plain and literal words of
Section 17(2)(b) of the Act but such departure is sometimes necessary (as it
is in this case) to avoid absurdity.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
264. The absurdity taken note of by the Supreme Court in Sonic Surgical
gets presented before this Court through the route of Section 20 of the CPC
and on occasions the special provisions. The same concerns of Bench and
court hunting, luxury tourism, and forum shopping arise in connection with
an unrestricted application of Section 20 of the CPC. On the basis of a
remote and minuscule fraction of a cause of action, it is contended that a suit
is to be maintained in Delhi. The interpretation expounded in this judgment
is intended to tame this very unruly horse. But for this, in cases, where
jurisdiction is sought to be established by the plaintiff on the basis that
deliveries took place at a given forum, or that copyrighted material is
accessed at a given place, the plaintiff, can virtually choose any place in
India to sue the defendant at. Plainly, this is absurd and goes against the very
purpose of having jurisdictional provisions.
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265. In Horlicks Ltd. and Anr. v. Heinz India (Pvt.) Ltd. , a Division
Bench of this Court held that the principles of forum conveniens do not
apply to civil suits which are governed by the CPC. The decisions of the
Supreme Court in Dashrath and Harish Nigam , were rendered after the
decision in Horlicks . Both these judgments hold that the doctrine of forum
conveniens applies to civil proceedings and civil suits.

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266. The view expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Federal Express
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Corporation v. Fedex Securities Ltd. & Ors. , that the observations in
para. 12 of Dashrath were not an application of forum conveniens to Section
20, was a passing obiter which does not form part of the ratio decidendi . At
para. 29 of the said decision, the Court concluded that no part of cause of
action had accrued within the jurisdiction of Delhi. The doctrine of forum
non conveniens can only be applied once the court concludes that it does
have jurisdiction but ought to relegate a party to a different forum. In
Federal Express , therefore, there was no occasion for the Court to render
binding findings on the view of the Supreme Court in Dashrath .
267. Importantly, in the celebrated commentary of Mulla on the Civil
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Procedure Code, the decision of Dashrath is not treated as an exceptional
case but rather is considered under the heading on the approach to be taken
while interpreting Section 20 of the CPC.
268. Though the decisions in Dashrath and Harish Nigam in and of
themselves are sufficient to depart away from the view taken in Horlicks , to
some extent the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court may be
analysed.
269. At the outset, it may be noted that the decision in Horlicks does not
refer to a previously decided Division Bench decision of our Court in
Sanjay Dalia , where our Court, in paras. 5 and 6, applies the doctrine of
forum non-conveniens to civil suits. The judgment in Horlicks , thus, may be
termed as being rendered without adverting to a binding precedent of this

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Court. On this short ground, again, the decision in Horlicks may not be
termed as a precedent. The material portion of the judgment in Sanjay Dalia
reads as under:
― 5. A plain reading of Section 20 of the CPC apparently allows the Plaintiff
a multitude of choices where it may institute its suit. Corporations and
partnership firms, and even sole proprietorship concerns, could well be
transacting business simultaneously in several cities. If sub-sections (a) and
(b) of Section 20 are to be interpreted disjunctively from sub-section (c), as
the use of the word ―or‖ appears to allow, the Plaintiff could file a suit
where the cause of action may have arisen, regardless of whether the
Defendant has even a subordinate office at that place. However, if the
Defendant‘s location is to form the fulcrum of jurisdiction, and it has an
office also at the place where the cause of action has occurred, the Plaintiff
is precluded from instituting the suit anywhere else. Obviously, this is
because at every other place would constitute a forum non conveniens .
6. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has dwelt on the various
hues of this problem of the place of suing in several cases and has gone
to the extent of laying down that it should be court’s endeavour to find
out the place where the cause of action has substantially arisen and
reject others where it may have incidentally arisen . We need not delve
further on this point beyond making a reference to Oil & Natural Gas
Commission –vs- Utpal Kumar Basu, JT 1994 (5) SC1 and South East Asia
Shipping Co. Ltd. –vs- Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC
443….‖
(Emphasis supplied)
270. Additionally, the reasoning in Horlicks may be considered. The
Division Bench held that the principle of forum non conveniens does not
apply to civil suits on the grounds that: firstly , invocation of Section 151 of
the CPC to apply the doctrine of forum conveniens is impermissible as it is
contrary to the substantive provisions of the CPC. Secondly , the doctrine of
forum non-conveniens is purportedly the flip-side of the principle governing
anti-suit injunctions. Since anti-suit injunctions cannot be issued by a
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domestic forum against a domestic forum, therefore, the doctrine of forum
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non-conveniens also cannot be invoked in the domestic sphere.
271. Concerning the first reason noted above, the discussion made in paras.
234-237 of this judgment reveals that the provisions of the CPC are not in
conflict with the doctrine of forum conveniens . Rather, the wording of the
provisions allow for this principle to be housed in the Code. The second
reason warrants a few observations being made.
272. In Horlicks the Division Bench also took note of the judgments
passed by the Calcutta High Court applying the doctrine of forum
conveniens . The Court, however, was of the opinion that post the decision of
the Supreme Court in Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial
163
Bank Limited , the doctrine of forum non-conveniens cannot be applied in
the domestic context. In Cotton Corporation of India , the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether in view of Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, a court will have jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining
any person from instituting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that
from which the injunction is sought. The Supreme Court found that it is
impermissible. The issue, however, being analysed in this judgment is
slightly different. Anti-suit injunctions and forum conveniens may be two
arms of the same body, but merely because one is cut, does not, ipso facto ,
mean that the other needs to be severed.
273. The fundamental rationale for preventing a domestic court to issue an
injunction against another domestic court not subordinate to that from which

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2009 SCC OnLine Del 3342, para. 65.
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(1983) 4 SCC 625.
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the injunction is sought, is hierarchy. The legislature did not find it
appropriate that a court which does not have superintendence and
jurisdiction over another court should be issuing injunction orders
concerning it. This discomfiture of the parliament does not arise when the
doctrine of forum conveniens is invoked. Under this doctrine, the court
which has jurisdiction, and before which a suit is maintainable refuses to
entertain the suit on grounds of appropriateness.
274. Additionally, conclusion (ii) noted in para. 92 of Horlicks , declares
that the doctrine of forum conveniens can be invoked by a writ court. A High
Court exercising writ jurisdiction, however, cannot injunct a party from
approaching another High Court. If the reasoning of Horlicks was taken to
its logical conclusion, the doctrine of forum non-conveniens could also not
be applied to writ proceedings. In any case, if this principle was restricted to
being a flip side of anti-suit injunctions, proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, not being suits , could not have been susceptible to
this doctrine. However, writ courts do use, and the Supreme Court has on
numerous occasions, directed the courts to be mindful of the principle of
forum conveniens .
275. The decision of this Court in ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Rathi Syntex Ltd.
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and Anr. , noting that the doctrine of forum conveniens does not apply to
civil proceedings was rendered without adverting to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Dashrath . Even otherwise, the decision of Harish Nigam ,
is a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court noting that forum conveniens
applies to ordinary civil proceedings. Further, the issues highlighted in the

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present judgment were not raised in ICICI Bank . It is trite law that a
judgment is a precedent only on what it decides and not what can be inferred
from it.
276. Before delving further, an argument raised by counsel in a few
matters may be considered. It is submitted by them that the use of the
expression ― in part ‖ under Section 20(c) of the CPC, implies that the
doctrine of forum non-conveniens cannot apply to civil suits. For two
reasons this objection holds no force: the first , Article 226 of the
Constitution of India also uses the expression ― in part ‖, and it is nobody‘s
case that the invocation of forum non-conveniens in the context of writ
proceedings is impermissible. The second concerns the purpose of this
expression. As opposed to the earlier civil procedure codes, which used the
language ― where cause of action arises ‖ for their residuary jurisdiction
provision, the Code of 1908, used the words ― wholly or in part ‖ as well.
This expression is merely to clarify that it is not necessary that the entire
cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of a given court, in order to
clothe it with jurisdiction. It is not intended to require courts to entertain
suits where a fraction of a cause of action has accrued before a given Court.
277. From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the doctrine of
forum non-conveniens has application in civil suits. The Court can,
therefore, in appropriate cases, where a small or slender part of cause of
action has arisen within the jurisdiction of a given court and a substantial,
material and integral part of the cause of action has arisen within the
jurisdiction of another court, relegate a plaintiff to the latter court.
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278. The principle of forum conveniens was explained in Kusum Ingots &
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Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. , in the following words:
― Forum Conveniens
We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of
action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by
itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the
High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court
may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine
of forum conveniens. (See Bhagar Singh Bagga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhany,
AIR 1941 Cal; Mandal Jalan v. Madanlal, (1945) 49 CWN 357; Bharat
Coking Coal Limited v. M/s Jharia Talkies & Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (1997)
CWN 122; S.S.Jain & Co. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1994) CHN
445; M/s. New Horizon Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 Delhi 126) ‖
279. This Court in The Indure Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of
166
Delhi , noting the caution of this Court not becoming a pan-India superior
court, opined as under:
― 36. A petitioner who approaches this Court to assail a decision of an
authority situated in Delhi, when the underlying cause for the said decision
lies elsewhere, effectively attempts to make this High Court a mini-pan
India Superior Court exercising jurisdiction over all events which take place
throughout this Country. There is no gainsaying with the proposition that
every High Court is competent to adjudicate upon a lis which arises from
events or actions taking place within its territory. Merely because the
ultimate order, which is based on events taking place outside Delhi and
takes cognizance of actions outside of Delhi, is passed within the
jurisdiction of this Court, a writ petition ought not be entertained by this
Court.‖
280. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the substance of a matter must be
adjudged, and not the unchanging constant which is present in action to
arrive at a conclusion on whether to entertain an action in the context of
territorial jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. At para. 42 this Court
observed:

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― 42. It is the substance of the matter which the Court must consider in
determining the connection with Delhi. An order being passed by an
authority in Delhi is an unchanging constant. This static/uniform facet,
which is unmoved by the nature of the lis , ought not to determine where
territorial jurisdiction would lie.‖
281. Reference may also be made to the doctrine of the ‗ centre of
interests ‘, applied in the European Union to determine jurisdiction over
claims concerning, inter alia , the infringement of personality or publicity
rights where harm occurs across multiple Member States. Although rooted
in EU Regulations, the doctrine offers useful guidance on the approach to be
taken qua jurisdiction in such disputes. In appropriate cases, the inquiry
while applying the doctrine of forum conveniens may indeed be where the
centre of interests of a given dispute lies.
282. The centre of interests doctrine holds that in cases particularly those
involving publication over the internet and infringement of
personality/publicity rights, the proper forum for instituting legal
proceedings is the jurisdiction where the plaintiff‘s reputation is most
significantly established and where the alleged publication is likely to cause
the most substantial harm. The doctrine shifts focus from the place of mere
publication to the place where the impact on reputation is the greatest.
283. The plaintiff‘s habitual residence, principal place of business, or the
location of their strongest social and professional connections typically
constitutes this ― centre of interests ‖. The doctrine aims to prevent artificial
or opportunistic forum selection and ensures that claims are adjudicated at
the appropriate forum.
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284. Reference can be made to the decision of eDate Advertising GmbH v.
167
X , which interpreted Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters. In the context of personality
rights being infringed across multiple jurisdictions of the Europe, the Court
168
of Justice of European Union held as under:
―48 The connecting criteria referred to in paragraph 42 of the present
judgment must therefore be adapted in such a way that a person who has
suffered an infringement of a personality right by means of the internet may
bring an action in one forum in respect of all of the damage caused,
depending on the place in which the damage caused in the European Union
by that infringement occurred. Given that the impact which material placed
online is liable to have on an individual‘s personality rights might best be
assessed by the court of the place where the alleged victim has his centre of
interests, the attribution of jurisdiction to that court corresponds to the
objective of the sound administration of justice, referred to in paragraph 40
above.
49 The place where a person has the centre of his interests corresponds in
general to his habitual residence. However, a person may also have the
centre of his interests in a Member State in which he does not habitually
reside, in so far as other factors, such as the pursuit of a professional
activity, may establish the existence of a particularly close link with that
State.
50 The jurisdiction of the court of the place where the alleged victim has the
centre of his interests is in accordance with the aim of predictability of the
rules governing jurisdiction (see Case C‑144/10 BVG [2011] ECR I‑0000,
paragraph 33) also with regard to the defendant, given that the publisher of
harmful content is, at the time at which that content is placed online, in a
position to know the centres of interests of the persons who are the subject
of that content. The view must therefore be taken that the centre-of-interests
criterion allows both the applicant easily to identify the court in which he
may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may
be sued (see Case C‑533/07 Falco Privatstiftung and Rabitsch [2009] ECR
I‑3327, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).‖

167
Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10 (CJEU, 2011) wherein the Grand Chamber.
168
―CJEU‖.
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285. Further, in the case of Bolagsupplysningen OÜ v. Svensk Handel
169
AB , as regards the identification of the centre of interests of a juristic or
legal person, the CJEU held as under:
―40 As to the identification of the centre of interests, the Court has stated
that, with regard to a natural person, this generally corresponds to the
Member State of his habitual residence. However, such a person may also
have his centre of interests in a Member State in which he does not
habitually reside, in so far as other factors, such as the pursuit of a
professional activity, may establish the existence of a particularly close link
with that State (judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and
Others, C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:685, paragraph 49).
41 As regards a legal person pursuing an economic activity, such as the
applicant in the main proceedings, the centre of interests of such a person
must reflect the place where its commercial reputation is most firmly
established and must, therefore, be determined by reference to the place
where it carries out the main part of its economic activities. While the centre
of interests of a legal person may coincide with the place of its registered
office when it carries out all or the main part of its activities in the Member
State in which that office is situated and the reputation that it enjoys there is
consequently greater than in any other Member State, the location of that
office is, not, however, in itself, a conclusive criterion for the purposes of
such an analysis.
42 Thus, when the relevant legal person carries out the main part of its
activities in a Member State other than the one in which its registered office
is located, as is the case in the main proceedings, it is necessary to assume
that the commercial reputation of that legal person, which is liable to be
affected by the publication at issue, is greater in that Member State than in
any other and that, consequently, any injury to that reputation would be felt
most keenly there. To that extent, the courts of that Member State are best
placed to assess the existence and the potential scope of that alleged injury,
particularly given that, in the present instance, the cause of the injury is the
publication of information and comments that are allegedly incorrect or
defamatory on a professional site managed in the Member State in which
the relevant legal person carries out the main part of its activities and that
are, bearing in mind the language in which they are written, intended, for the
most part, to be understood by people living in that Member State.‖

169
Case C-194/16 (CJEU, 2017).
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286. From the discussion above concerning forum non-conveniens the
following conclusions may be drawn:
a. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens shall apply to civil suits.
Once a plaint is found to be maintainable under the CPC or the
special provisions, an inquiry may be undertaken as to whether
the plaint is to be entertained.
b. The application of this doctrine shall take into account the
entirety of avenues that are competent to adjudicate a lis and
have jurisdiction to entertain a suit as per the applicable law.
Specifically, in the context of Section 20(c) of the CPC, this
doctrine shall determine whether ― part ‖ cause of action
includes merely an incidental, minuscule, or slender part of the
cause of action. The doctrine shall apply to determine whether
the court before which a plaint is presented is the place where
the material, integral and essential part of the cause of action
has arisen.
c. In order to determine where the material, integral and essential
part of the cause of action has arisen, the Court shall, unless an
exceptional situation warrants otherwise, be confined to the
pleaded facts themselves. It is on the basis of the facts pleaded
by the plaintiff himself, the lis and infringement described by
him, that such a conclusion needs to be arrived at.
G. DOCTRINE OF DEMURRER
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287. In the present batch of matters, the doctrine of demurrer has
frequently been invoked to insulate a plaint from a deeper judicial scrutiny.
An impression is sought to be created that at the initial pre-trial stage, a
Court is but a silent audience in the theatre acted by the parties.
170
288. In Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. , the Supreme Court,
inter alia , held that an averment made in the plaint that the plaintiff is
carrying on business within the jurisdiction of a given court is sufficient to
maintain a suit in that court. It was observed at para. 35 of Dhodha House
that the questions raised in Dhodha House were not raised in Exphar SA ,
and the decision in Exphar SA turned on its own facts. A holistic reading of
Dhodha House and Exphar SA would reveal that the Supreme Court in
Dhodha House sought to restrict the application of Exphar SA to its own
171
facts. Similarly, in Pfizer Enterprises Sarl v. Cipla Ltd. , while
172
adjudicating the PM Diesels appeal the Division Bench found an
averment contained in the plaint that the defendant was selling its goods in
Delhi to be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court, on the basis of the
demurrer doctrine.
289. The law has travelled far beyond accepting a bald pleading of a
plaintiff that jurisdiction is made out. In today‘s day and age a mere
statement that a court has jurisdiction, or that ― cause of action has arisen
within the jurisdiction of this Court ‖, or any variation where a provision is
attempted to be reproduced in the plaint, will not confer jurisdiction. The

170
(2004) 3 SCC 688.
171
2009 (107) DRJ 735 (DB).
172
Two separate appeals were decided vide a common order in Pfizer Enterprises Sarl . One of the appeals
was the PM Diesel appeal (FAO (OS) 428/2008)), the facts of which were narrated by the Division Bench
in para. 2 of the judgment.
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demurrer doctrine cannot be so interpreted so as to preclude a Court from
discovering and acting upon, what appears to be, clever drafting by a
plaintiff to forum shop and engage in luxury litigation.
173
290. In T. Arivandhandam v. TV Satyapal and Anr. , VR Krishna Iyer J.
had observed:
―The pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the
Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous
and vexatious cases.
2 …The long arm of the law must throttle such litigative caricatures if the
confidence and creditibility of the community in the judicature is to
survive…
5 . …The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not
formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in
the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power
under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned
therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party
searchingly under Order 10, CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to
irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on
examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot
down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to
meet such men, (Cr. XI) and must be triggered against them. In this case,
the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked
on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi:
―It is dangerous to be too good.‖‖
174
291. Similarly, in K. Akbar Ali v. K. Umar Khan & Ors. , the Supreme
Court observed:
5. It is well settled that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC, the question before the Court is whether the plaint discloses any
cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law, on the face of the
averments contained in the plaint itself. While considering an application

173
(1977) 4 SCC 467.
174
(2021) 14 SCC 51.
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under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court is not to look into the strength or
weakness of the case of the plaintiff or the defence raised by the defendant.

7. In any case, application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the
plaint requires a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole. As held by this
Court in ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal2, clever drafting
creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right
to sue should be shown in the plaint. Similarly the Court must see that the
bar in law of the suit is not camouflaged by devious and clever drafting
of the plaint. Moreover, the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 are not
exhaustive and the Court has the inherent power to see that frivolous or
vexatious litigations are not allowed to consume the time of the Court.

8. In this case, a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole makes it
abundantly clear that the relief claimed in the suit is barred in view of the
restricted scope of the power of attorney given by the first defendant to Mr
Zahir Ali.

13. The Division Bench of the High Court has done substantial justice by
nipping in the bud, a suit which is ex facie not maintainable for want of
cause of action against the defendants or any of them, thereby saving
precious judicial time as also inconvenience and expenditure to the parties
to the suit.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
292. Reliance may be placed on the recent decision of the Supreme Court
175
in Manjula and Ors. v. DA Srinivas , which held as under:
― 9.3. Once the plaint is presented for institution, and before it is admitted, it
is the duty of the trial Court to verify the contents of the plaint and ensure
that all legal requirements are satisfied before admitting the plaint. A trial
Court cannot mechanically admit the plaint and register the suit. Admission
of the plaint cannot be a mechanical process by which the note of the
Registry is merely endorsed by the Court. If, at the stage of admission of the
plaint, the trial Court, upon a meaningful reading of the plaint, comes to the
conclusion that the plaint is liable to be rejected, it shall reject the plaint. It

175
2026 INSC 465.
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is not necessary for the trial Court to wait for the defendant to enter
appearance and seek rejection of the plaint. Once the Court finds that the
suit is frivolous, without jurisdiction, instituted without compliance with
prerequisites, fails to disclose a real cause of action, suppresses material
facts, or is barred by law but couched in clever drafting to create an illusion
of a cause of action, it must reject the plaint with costs. [See
T.Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (supra)]. In this context, it would be
useful to refer to the following judgments of this Court and the observations
made therein:

9.4. Every plaint must be presented along with the documents relied upon in
the plaint as per Rule 14 of Order VII. A document is ordinarily relied upon
in the plaint, and the narration in the bundle of facts contribute to the cause
of action. Therefore, it is imperative upon the plaintiff to produce such
document. It is trite law that the plaint can be rejected for failure to produce
documents relied upon or referred to in the plaint. There can be no quarrel
with the well settled position that while considering an application for
rejection of plaint, only the averments in the plaint and the documents filed
along with the plaint can be looked into. Though we agree with the learned
Senior Counsel for the Respondent / Plaintiff on this proposition, the plaint
cannot be read in an incomprehensive manner. What is implied in Order VII
is a meaningful reading of the plaint, because the bar under law may be
either express or by necessary implication. [See T.Arivandandam v. T.V.
Satyapal (supra), Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity
Commissioner and others25 and Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v.
Syed Jalal26].
9.5. Similarly, all material facts have to be stated in the plaint. Material facts
are those facts which create a complete cause of action; those facts which
directly bear upon the maintainability or sustainability of the suit; and those
facts upon adjudication of which may bring an end to the lis . Any
suppression of a material fact, which has the effect of creating an illusory
cause of action and eclipsing the legal bar, ought to be dealt with firmly, and
the plaint would be liable to be summarily rejected. It is also settled law that
a person who has suppressed a material fact is not entitled to any relief.
Suppression of a material fact within the knowledge of the party amounts to
fraud upon the Court. The relevancy or otherwise of a fact is to be decided
by the Court, and parties cannot contend that they omitted a material fact on
the assumption that it was not relevant. It is not only the duty of the Court to
summarily reject the claim of a party suppressing a material fact, but also to
ensure that any benefit obtained by such party is undone and status quo ante
restored in its fairness and equity. The consistent view of this Court,
irrespective of whether it is a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution,
a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, or in any proceedings
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before a civil, criminal, judicial or quasi-judicial forum is that the parties
must disclose all material facts in their pleadings, and that a party, who
suppresses any material fact is not entitled to any relief.

28.2. At the same time, the power to reject a plaint at the threshold under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC is a serious jurisdiction to be exercised with due
circumspection. While genuine causes must not be shut out prematurely,
courts are equally bound to prevent misuse of judicial process where the
pleadings, on their own showing, disclose no enforceable right or reveal a
claim barred by law. The provision thus serves as an important filter,
balancing access to justice with the need to prevent frivolous, vexatious, or
legally untenable claims from being carried to trial.

29. The conspectus of our discussion and findings may be summarised thus:

(vii) Courts below must curtail frivolous suits which are barred by
law, and cases where the cause of action disclosed is illusory, by
piercing the veil of clever drafting and giving a meaningful and
wholesome reading to the plaint and accompanying documents,
preferably at the earliest stage of the suit.‖
293. The doctrine of demurrer also has to be balanced with the obligation
of the Court to nip in the bud frivolous litigation. The Court is bound to
meaningfully read the plaint and if found appropriate pierce through
averments to identify the missing material facts, internal contradictions, or a
legal bar, which have been cleverly omitted only to create an illusion of
jurisdiction before this Court.
294. From the discussion above concerning the doctrine of demurrer the
following conclusions may be drawn:

a. The doctrine of demurrer which required every averment in the
plaint, whatever it may be, to be taken as truth at the pre-trial
stage of a litigation, has been diluted.
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b. Today, the Court is fully empowered to pierce through clever
drafting where pleadings have been made solely to take
advantage of the demurrer doctrine and to create an illusion of
jurisdiction before this Court.
c. Bald, unfounded, and empty narrations unsupported by any
documents ought to be ignored while determining whether the
Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a suit.
III. CONCLUSIONS

295. The analysis made above would lead to the following conclusions:
A. THE PRAYERS TO BE TESTED
(i) A suit for infringement is different from that of passing off. In a given
case jurisdiction may be established for infringement but not for passing off.
If a composite suit is filed seeking reliefs for both infringement and passing
off, it must be established that jurisdiction is made out for each relief. If it is
found that a court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with any of the
reliefs, the suit cannot proceed.
B. MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION “CARRIES ON BUSINESS”
(i) The meaning and import of the expression ― carries on business ‖ as it
appears in Sections 20(a) and (b) of the CPC, Sections 134(2) and 62(2) of
the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act, respectively, is governed by the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court in, inter alia , Patel Roadways ,
Dhodha House and Sanjay Dalia , as also the dictum of this Court in Ultra
Home .
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(ii) If a corporation has a sole office, it shall be deemed to carry on
business at that place of its sole office. If, however, there is more than one
office, it must be deciphered where the principal place of business of that
corporation is. This principal office shall ordinarily be the place of its
registered office. Once the principal office is discovered, the other offices
shall be the sub-ordinate offices/branch offices.
(iii) A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sub-ordinate
office if the cause of action for a given suit accrues at that place. In such a
scenario it shall not be open for the company to sue a defendant at the place
of its principal office, where no cause of action has accrued.
C. CAUSE OF ACTION (WHOLLY OR IN PART) FOR A QUIA
TIMET ACTION
(i) The cause of action for a quia timet action accrues when the defendant
expresses a deliberate intention to engage in activity the result of which
would raise a strong possibility of infringement.
(ii) The activity to be engaged in must be imminent, and of such a
character that if the defendant were to engage in the activity, the plaintiff
would suffer substantial, if not irreparable, prejudice.
(iii) For goods and services that are subject to regulatory control, in
determining whether a quia timet action is maintainable, it is essential to
consider whether the defendant holds the required licences or permissions,
statutory or otherwise, required for their sale, use or any other commercial
exploitation. For instance, for the commercial sale of liquor, an excise
license under the State‘s specific Excise Act is required; for manufacturing a
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pharmaceutical product, a license under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
may be required; and for the sale of insecticides a license under the
Insecticides Act, 1968 may be required.
D. CAUSE OF ACTION (WHOLLY OR IN PART) FOR A PASSING
OFF ACTION
(i) Cause of action (wholly or in part) can be said to have arisen within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court only if the defendant has made sales of
the goods carrying the impugned trademark within the jurisdiction of a given
Court. Direct sales are made by the defendant not to an individual consumer
but to a distributor, wholesaler or a retailer. Such sales are at a commercial
scale. Mere availability of goods within the jurisdiction of a forum Court
does not confer jurisdiction.
(ii) Sale of goods within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum court by a
firm which does not act as a distributor, wholesaler, retailer, or agent of the
defendant, does not confer jurisdiction. Where goods are procured by a firm
from another firm that is outside the jurisdiction of the forum court and in
turn sold within the territory of the forum court, jurisdiction shall not be
conferred.
(iii) Additionally, delivery of goods to the agent/carrier of the plaintiff or
its investigator, for onward transmission, is deemed delivery upon the
plaintiff or its investigator. This conclusion is not restricted to suits for
passing off, but is a general conclusion arrived at by the application of
Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act.
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E. CAUSE OF ACTION (WHOLLY OR IN PART) FOR AN ACTION
FOR INFRINGEMENT IN THE OFFLINE WORLD
(i) Cause of action (wholly or in part) can be said to have arisen within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court when the defendant, in the course of
trade, uses a mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the trade
mark, in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is
registered, within the jurisdiction of the forum court.
(ii) Registration of a mark within the jurisdiction of a given court does not
constitute part of the cause of action.
F. CAUSE OF ACTION (WHOLLY OR IN PART) FOR AN ACTION
FOR INFRINGEMENT IN THE ONLINE WORLD
(i) To establish that cause of action (wholly or in part) has arisen through
the means of website activity, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction of the forum
court by specifically targeting persons within its territory and it resulting in
an injury or harm to the plaintiff within the forum state.
(ii) Additionally, the plaintiff must also demonstrate the conclusion of
commercially concluded transactions between the defendant and persons
within the forum court‘s jurisdiction through the website in question.
(iii) The requirement of prima facie demonstrating commercially
concluded transactions taking place can be relaxed in a case where the
plaintiff cannot invoke the provisions of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks
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Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, and the defendant has no
presence in India at all.
G. “DYNAMIC EFFECT” AND WHETHER IT CAN CONFER
JURISDICTION
(i) If the principle of dynamic effect is applied to cases of infringement,
the amendment to the Trade Marks Act and the Copyright Act shall be
rendered otiose. Jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be established on the basis of
this principle.
(ii) An attempt to find jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC on the
basis that the effect of the infringement is felt at the place where the plaintiff
has its presence, also, goes against the spirit of the specialised provisions. It
also renders the amendments nugatory. Such an interpretation, thus,
ordinarily ought to be avoided.
H. WHETHER THE USE OF AN “INVESTIGATOR” IS
PERMISSIBLE
(i) As a rule, the use of an investigator or any other person set up by the
plaintiff to find jurisdiction before a forum court amounts to concocting
jurisdiction. The findings of such an investigator, thus, ordinarily, cannot be
relied upon.
(ii) The two exceptions to this rule are: first , where the plaintiff can prima
facie demonstrate, on the basis of his plaint and the documents attached with
it, that but for such an ― investigator ‖ being hired to plead jurisdiction, cause
of action under Section 20(c) of the CPC could not be maintained before
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another court. And second , where ex facie it can be demonstrated that sales
of the impugned goods are taking place within a forum court, and an
investigator merely provides evidence. For instance, if the defendant has
readily supplied its goods within Delhi to various retailers, distributors and
stockists, and the plaintiff‘s investigator buys these goods from these classes
of persons, that report may not be discarded.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS
(i) The doctrine of forum non-conveniens shall apply to civil suits. Once
a plaint is found to be maintainable under the CPC or the special provisions,
an inquiry may be undertaken as to whether the plaint is to be entertained.
(ii) The application of this doctrine shall take into account the entirety of
avenues that are competent to adjudicate a lis and have jurisdiction to
entertain a suit as per the applicable law. Specifically, in the context of
Section 20(c) of the CPC, this doctrine shall determine whether ― part ‖ cause
of action includes merely an incidental, minuscule, or slender part of the
cause of action. The doctrine shall apply to determine whether the court
before which a plaint is presented is the place where the material, integral
and essential part of the cause of action has arisen.
(iii) In order to determine where the material, integral and essential part of
the cause of action has arisen, the Court shall, unless an exceptional
situation otherwise warrants, be confined to the pleaded facts themselves. It
is on the basis of the facts pleaded by the plaintiff himself, the lis and
infringement described by him, that such a conclusion needs to be arrived at.
J. DOCTRINE OF DEMURRER
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(i) The doctrine of demurrer which required every averment in the plaint,
whatever it may be, to be taken as truth at the pre-trial stage of a litigation,
has been diluted. Today, the Court is fully empowered to pierce through
clever drafting where pleadings have been made solely to take advantage of
the demurrer doctrine and to create an illusion of jurisdiction before this
Court. Bald, unfounded, and empty narrations unsupported by any
documents ought to be ignored while determining whether the Court has the
requisite jurisdiction to entertain a suit.
IV. ADJUDICATING THE ISSUE OF TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
296. Considering the prolonged discussion above, and the number of
conclusions reached, it is found appropriate to briefly discuss in a
methodological manner, the inquiry which a Court is to undertake while
deciding on the issue of territoriality. Though an exhaustive and straight-
jacketed elucidation of cases which may arise before this Court is not
possible, an endeavour is being made, to at least lay down some basic tests
to be applied in the cases of copyright or trademark infringement and
passing off:
TABLE 1
S.
Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff’s
Defendant’s
Defendant’s
Cause of
Whether suit
No.
Principal
Sub-
Principal
Sub-
Action
is
Office
Ordinate
Office
Ordinate
has
Maintainable
Office
Office
arisen at
at Delhi
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SUIT FOR INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE MARK OR COPYRIGHT
1. Delhi At any
At any place At any place At any
Yes. Under
place
place
Section 62(2)
including
and 134(2) of
at Delhi.
the Copyright
and Trade
Marks Act
respectively.
2. Outside
Delhi At any place At any place At any
Yes. Under
Delhi
place
Section 62(2)
including
and 134(2) of
at Delhi.
the Copyright
and Trade
Marks Act
respectively.
SUIT FOR INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE MARK OR COPYRIGHT ALONE
OR ALONG WITH PASSING OFF
3. Outside
Outside
Delhi At any place At any
Yes. Under
Delhi
Delhi
place
Section 20(a)
including
of the CPC.
at Delhi.
4. Mumbai Outside Delhi Mumbai At any No. In such a
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Delhi place
circumstance
including
a suit can
Mumbai.
only be filed
at the place
where the
sub-ordinate
office is and
the cause of
action has
also accrued
i.e., at
Mumbai.
5. Outside
Outside
At any place Delhi At any
Yes. Under
Delhi
Delhi
place
Section 20(a)
including
of the CPC.
at Delhi.
6. Outside
Outside
Outside
Outside
At any
Yes. Under
Delhi
Delhi
Delhi
Delhi
place
Section 20(c)
including
of the CPC.
at Delhi.

297. In terms of actual fact based examples, the following table may
indicatively provide guidance as to the manner in which the above-noted
provisions, and the caselaw discussed in this judgment may be applied:
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TABLE 2
S.
Facts pleaded Approach to be adopted
No.
1. A defendant-restaurant situated
No cause of action can be said to have
outside Delhi accepts enquiries or
accrued within the jurisdiction of this
bookings from Delhi through its
Court. The conclusion of transactions in
website or a third-party platform.
this factual matrix requires actual dining
The restaurant is claimed to be
by visiting the restaurant which is situated
carrying on business at Delhi and
outside Delhi.
part cause of action to also have
Allowing inquiries or bookings from Delhi
arisen at Delhi. Section 20(a) and
also does not mean that the restaurant in
20(c) of the CPC are invoked.
question is carrying on business at Delhi.
2. Social-media analytics show
No cause of action can be said to have
substantial traffic, followers or
accrued within the jurisdiction of this
engagement from Delhi. This is
Court. Social media analytics showing
contended to be part of the cause
Delhi traffic may be a result of a wide
entitling a plaintiff to sue at Delhi
variety of factors including population.
under Section 20(c) of the CPC.
This in itself would not be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on this Court.
3. A suit is filed against multiple
It is the contesting defendant and not pro-
defendants. One of them is a
forma/formal parties that determine
Delhi-based marketplace,
whether jurisdiction of a Court is made
intermediary, domain registrar or
out. If presence is sought to be established
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web host. This defendant is
only by relying upon the addresses of the
contended to be carrying on
pro-forma parties, jurisdiction of Delhi is
business at Delhi and Section
not made out.
20(a) of the CPC is invoked to
establish jurisdiction.
4. A GST registration describes
Under the GST Act, ― principal place of
Delhi as the defendant‘s
business ‖ is a defined term, distinct from
― principal place of business ‖
the expression used under Section 20(a) of
while its registered office and
the CPC. In every State/UT in which a
relevant operations are elsewhere.
company operates and has a GST
Jurisdiction is claimed under
registration, a ― principal place of
Section 20(a) of the CPC on the
business ‖ in that State/Union Territory is
ground that the defendant is
formed. A suit against a defendant under
carrying on business at Delhi.
Section 20(a) of the CPC can only be filed
at the sole office, principal office or at the
sub-ordinate office, when cause of action
also accrues at that place.
On the basis of a bare averment made in
the plaint that the defendant has its
― principal place of business ‖ at Delhi
owing to its registration under the GST
Act, jurisdiction of Delhi shall not be
established.
5. An impugned controlled product The requirements of a quia timet action to
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expressly restricted to sale in
file a suit at Delhi do not, ordinarily, get
another State. A suit is filed as a
fulfilled if the defendant does not have the
quia timet action claiming that the
requisite license/permission for the
defendant is about to expand to
concerned controlled goods/service in
Delhi.
question.
6. The plaintiff makes an averment
Such an empty averment without
that the impugned products are
supporting documents may amount to a
freely being sold in Delhi at
hollow statement pleaded merely to
various places and to a number of
concoct jurisdiction. It shall amount to
persons including dealers,
clever drafting and creating an illusion of a
distributors or stockists. No
cause of action at Delhi when there exists
documents are attached in support
none. Simply on the basis of the pleading,
of this averment. Jurisdiction is
jurisdiction of Delhi cannot be made out.
sought to be invoked under
Section 62(2) of the Copyright
Act and 134(2) of the Trade
Marks Act.

298. Once a plaint is found to be maintainable under the CPC or the
special provisions, in an appropriate case, the Court may decline to entertain
a plaint on grounds of forum non-conveniens . Therefore, notwithstanding the
finding rendered on whether a suit is maintainable under Section 20, or the
special provisions, the Court may, in an appropriate case relegate a party to
another forum by invoking the doctrine of forum non-conveniens .
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299. While analyzing a case on the touchstone of this doctrine, the Court
must take notice of all jurisdictional avenues open to a plaintiff given the
facts pleaded in the plaint. Thus, if jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under Section 20(a) of the CPC, but on the pleaded facts, jurisdiction of
Mumbai can also be invoked under Section 20(c) of the CPC, a scrutiny
must be made of the plaint as to why Delhi is being approached and whether
another forum is forum conveniens .
300. Illustratively, the following non-exhaustive examples are being given,
to elucidate the circumstances in which the Court may exercise the doctrine
of forum conveniens .
TABLE 3
S.
Grounds pleaded to
Application of forum non-conveniens
No.
invoke jurisdiction of
Delhi.
1. Defendant has had a
Such a suit ordinarily ought to be entertained. The
conference in Delhi that
Court must, however, satisfy itself by meaningfully
it is about to release its
reading the plaint and supporting documents that
products in Delhi. A suit
the threat at Delhi is prima facie real and imminent.
is filed in Delhi as a quia
For this, the Court may also, in an appropriate case,
timet action on grounds
invoke powers under Section 168 of the BSA and
that an immediate
question the parties.
injunction restraining the
defendant‘s actions is
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required.
2. A suit for trademark or
Delhi may not be the forum conveniens to entertain
copyright infringement
such a suit. Goods of the defendant are also being
is filed at Delhi on the
sold at the place where the defendant or the
sole grounds that the
plaintiff have its presence. The manufacturing of
goods of the defendant
the impugned product, its subsequent packaging
are being sold pan-India
and labelling by using the plaintiff‘s mark or
including at Delhi.
copyrighted work constitute a significantly more
important part of the cause of action than the
fraction available at Delhi.
3. Both the plaintiff and the
The plaintiff in such a case leaves his territory,
defendant are outside
does not exercise its statutory rights under the
Delhi and a suit for
special provisions to sue at his own place, neither
trademark or copyright
institutes a suit where the defendant has its
infringement is filed
presence, but rather approaches this Court.
before this Court
In addition to the inquiry noted at serial number 2,
claiming that the goods
the court engages in an additional inquiry.
of the defendant are
Despite the availability of the same kind and
being sold pan-India
proportion of the cause of action existing at the
including at Delhi.
plaintiff‘s place, when the plaintiff approaches
another Court, an obvious question arises qua
plaintiff‘s bona fides and as to whether it is
intending to institute a suit before a court that is not
forum conveniens . He remains answerable for
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choosing a court which, subject to pleadings to the
contrary, prima facie is forum non conveniens .
4. The goods of the
Delhi may not be forum conveniens to entertain
defendant were
such a suit. Goods of the defendant can also be
purchased from Flipkart
delivered to the place where either the plaintiff or
or Amazon with a Delhi
the defendant has its presence.
address, or were
The acts of the plaintiff which were consciously
purchased from the
and strategically targeted to cause certain acts to
defendant who delivered
happen within the local limits of this Court,
it at Delhi.
arguably may constitute a part of a cause of action,
but that ought not to make Delhi the forum
conveniens .
This purported cause of action is capable of being
created in any part of the country, if a plaintiff‘s
voluntary acts were to obligate a court to entertain
a lis , the concept of the ― local limits ‖ of a court
shall be thrown to the winds.
5. A film or content is
Access to a film or content, particularly under the
accessible at Delhi.
Copyright Act may amount to publication. But this
sole fact occurring at Delhi may not be sufficient to
entertain a suit. The access to a content is merely
the incidental result of uploading/uprooting which
may occur at another forum. It is the place from
where uprooting is taking place, which is the forum
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conveniens . There may be cases where the place of
uprooting is not discernible despite reasonable
efforts, in such a case, prima facie , subject to
pleadings to the contrary, the court within whose
― local limits ‖ the plaintiff resides, carries on
business, or personally works for gain, is the forum
conveniens .

V. APPLICATION TO FACTS
301. Turning now to the facts of each case.
ABD Maestro Private Limited v. Great Galleon Ventures Ltd.
[CS(COMM)-987/2026]

302. The plaintiff has filed the suit for copyright, trade mark, and trade
dress/label infringement, along with an action for passing off, and other
consequential reliefs thereto. The plaintiff-company is engaged in the
business of, inter alia , manufacturing, marketing, sale and distribution of
alcoholic beverages. The plaintiff claims to be the proprietor and exclusive
user of the ‗YELLO‘ trade dress, mark and label, which encompasses a
vibrant yellow colour, a specific arrangement of the label, and a distinctive
overall presentation. It is contended that the defendant by its product ‗V21‘
vodka is infringing upon the intellectual property rights of the plaintiff. It is
claimed that the defendant‘s product has a deceptively similar yellow-and-
black bottle design, label and overall trade dress, thereby misappropriating
the plaintiff‘s goodwill and causing a likelihood of consumer confusion.
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303. Paras. 50 and 51 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
“ 50. This Hon‘ble Court has the necessary jurisdiction to try and entertain
the present suit as per Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on
account of the following factors:

a. The Defendant is actively engaged in the commercial
distribution and sale of its products, which are found all over the
markets of New Delhi.

b. The Defendant‘s website is accessible from any location within
New Delhi and the National Capital Region (NCR) and provides an
interactive platform through which the Defendant advertises,
markets the impugned products and further, prospective customers
can contact the Defendant by submitting enquiries and
communicating with the Defendant for commercial purposes. The
website is directed at consumers across India, including within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The Defendant‘s
various social media accounts are also accessible within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court and advertise the products of the
Defendant.

c. The Defendant is also registered in Delhi, bearing GSTIN No.
07AABCK1743N1ZE, with its Principal Place of Business situated
at A-33, Ground Floor, Naraina Industrial area, Phase l, New
Delhi, South West Delhi, Delhi, 110028, which falls within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The said GST
registration evidences the Defendant‘s commercial presence and
business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble
Court.

51. This Hon‘ble Court has the necessary jurisdiction to try and entertain the
present matter as per Section 134 (2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 read with
Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, the present suit being one inter
alia for infringement of the Plaintiffs copyright in the original artistic work
comprising the ‗YELLO‘ label, as the Plaintiff, is carrying on business
within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The Plaintiff is carrying out its
business within the territorial limits of this Hon‘ble Court in a variety of
ways such as (but not limited to) sale of its products under the ‗YELLO‘
trade dress. Thus, the Hon‘ble Court has the necessary territorial jurisdiction
to try and entertain the present suit. Furthermore, and independently, the
Plaintiff, being the owner of the copyright subsisting in the original artistic
work comprising the ‗YELLO‘ label and carrying on business for gain
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within the territorial limits of this Hon‘ble Court, is entitled to institute the
present suit before this Hon‘ble Court under Section 62(2) of the Copyright
Act, 1957.‖

304. The plaintiff admits that its principal place of business and registered
office is at Mumbai, Maharashtra and outside the jurisdiction of this Court.
The defendant, also, has its registered office outside the jurisdiction of this
Court, at Indore, Madhya Pradesh. For the plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court under Section 20(a) of the CPC, the defendant must ― carry on
business ‖ within Delhi. The explanation to the said section provides that in
order for Section 20(a) of the CPC to apply, a corporation shall be
considered to ― carry on business ‖ at its sub-ordinate office, only when cause
of action also accrues within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court where
the sub-ordinate office is located.
305. In the instant case the impugned product of the defendant is not sold
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The picture of the defendant‘s
product attached with the plaint also notes in bold letters ―FOR SALE IN
MADHYA PRADESH ONLY‖. No cause of action, therefore, can accrue
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
306. Additionally, applying Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home , since the
explanation is deemed to have been incorporated in Sections 62 and 134 of
the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act, respectively, the option of Delhi is
also not available to the plaintiff under the specialised statutes.
307. The defendant‘s GST registration showing its ― principal place of
business ‖ to be at Delhi also does not change the aforenoted finding. As
noted in paras. 115-117 of this judgement, the ― principal place of business ‖
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under the Goods and Services Tax Act is a defined term, having its distinct
meaning. It does not have any bearing to determine as to whether the
defendant carries on business for the purposes of Section 20(a) of the CPC.
308. Insofar as the argument concerning the invocation of jurisdiction on
the basis of the defendant‘s website is concerned, the Banyan Tree standard
has not been satisfied. There is no commercially concluded transaction
between the defendant and persons within the forum court‘s jurisdiction
through the website in question.

309. Lastly, it may also be noted that the plaintiff has cleverly omitted to
plead as to whether the defendant has an excise license in Delhi concerning
the impugned product. As noticed in Shree Nath Heritage , liquor is an
excisable commodity. The sale of such a product, which arguably gives rise
to a cause of action, can only take place when a given corporation has an
excise license. It was essential, therefore, for the plaintiff to plead about
facts concerning a defendant‘s excise license.
310. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(a) or Section 20(c) of CPC and under
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act or Section 62(2) of the Copyright
Act. Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which
may be presented before the Court having the requisite territorial
jurisdiction, if so advised.
Beiersdorf AG & Anr. v. Duvac Cosmedics & Ors.
[CS(COMM)-1081/2026]
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311. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants are located within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Plaintiff no. 1 is Beiersdorf AG, a
German company, plaintiff no. 2 is Nivea India Pvt. Ltd., having its
registered office at Mumbai. Defendant no. 1 is Duvac Cosmedics,
defendant no. 2 is Glexon Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., and defendant no. 3 is M/s
Jahnavi Medical Store, all of them are located at Gujarat. The suit is
instituted, primarily, for trademark infringement and passing off of the
plaintiff‘s registered ― EUCERIN ‖ trademark, used in relation to skincare and
dermatological products, including face washes. It is alleged that the
defendants are manufacturing, marketing, distributing and selling skincare
products bearing the identical mark ― EUCERIN ‖ without authorisation.
312. Para. 77 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 77. This Hon‘ble Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit
due to the following reasons:

Under Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908:

(a) The infringing products of the Defendants who are inextricably
interrelated are being made available within the jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court. Therefore, the Defendants have purposefully availed of the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court and are specifically targeting customers
based in Delhi.

(b) Furthermore, since the Defendants have supplied the infringing
products in Delhi thereby exists a reasonable and credible apprehension
that the Defendants will expand its commercial operations within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.‖

313. In Banyan Tree , Mr. Anand had argued before the Division Bench
that purposeful availment must be replaced with purposeful avoidance i.e.,
merely because a defendant has not avoided a jurisdiction would show that it
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has availed the jurisdiction of a given Court. This argument was, however,
rejected by the Division Bench. The requirement of Banyan Tree i.e., of
purposefully availing the jurisdiction of a forum Court by specifically
targeting customers at Delhi as also commercially concluding transactions
have not been proven. The ground pleaded in para. 77(a), at least in the
context of online availability, thus deserves to be rejected.
314. The second ground taken by the plaintiff to invoke jurisdiction under
Section 20(c) is the findings of an investigator engaged by the plaintiff. It is
pleaded that the investigator visited the premises of defendant no. 1 at
Vadodara, Gujarat and found that a multi-storey building, located in a
commercial area, was erected. Upon inquiring from individuals at that place
in Vadodara, Gujarat, it was found that business of the impugned product
was being conducted. At the premises of defendant no. 3 at Vadodara,
Gujarat, the investigator is stated to have purchased three units of the
impugned product. It was discovered by the investigator that defendant no. 3
had been selling the impugned product approximately from the past one to
one-and-a-half years. A visit is also stated to have been made at defendant
no. 2‘s premises at Bakrol, Gujarat, where it was found that the impugned
product is manufactured at that place for defendant no. 1, who is at
Vadodara, Gujarat. One Prisha Pharmacy, again located at Vadodara,
Gujarat is also stated to have sold the impugned product to the investigator
of the plaintiff.
315. It is the pleadings made from para. 58 to 60 of the plaint that bring
Delhi into the picture. It is contended that on 30.07.2026, the investigator
contacted defendant no. 3 to purchase the impugned products and get them
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delivered at Delhi. It is stated that defendant no. 3 dispatched the products to
Delhi on a cash-on-delivery basis to the investigator in Delhi. On
03.08.2026, the products are stated to have been received at the Delhi
address of the investigator and payments are claimed to have been made. It
is claimed that no invoice or rough bill was raised.
316. To support these pleadings, the plaintiff has filed the affidavit of the
purported investigator one Mr. Nripendra Kashyap. This investigator, as the
affidavit records, works with an investigative agency called ―E-Cluewise‖
located at Noida. However, despite the ordinary residence, it appears that the
investigator while making the affidavit was at Delhi. The averment made in
the affidavit is ― presently in New Delhi ‖.
317. The affidavit makes mention of certain ― associates ‖ that helped Mr.
Kashyap during the course of the investigation. They are unnamed and not
identified. To support the pleadings made concerning the activities at
Gujarat, the following has been stated in the affidavit:
9. On 13th July 2026, my associate visited the premises of Defendant No. 1
situated at B/403, Samanvay Silicon, Opp. Kalyan Hotel, Sayajigunj,
Vadodara. My associate noticed that the said address was a multi-storey
building, located in a commercial area and no signage of the subject entity
was displayed around the premises. It was occupying approximately 40-50
square yards of floor area and around 3 people were seen working inside the
premises.

10. During the course of the visit, my associate met one Mr. Vivek Vasani,
Territory Manager of Defendant No. 1. Mr. Vasani stated that Defendant
No. 1 is engaged in the business of skincare products, including facewash
and sunscreen products, and stated that the entity markets products under
various brands including EUCERIN. He further stated that the said entity is
a partnership firm which is owned and managed by Mr. Kamlesh Joshi, Ms.
Alkaben Kamlesh Joshi, and Mr. Bhavinkumar Yogeshkumar Joshi.

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11. Mr. Vasani informed my associate that Defendant No. 1 has been selling
facewash products under the EUCERIN mark for approximately one to one-
and-a-half years. Upon being questioned regarding the adoption of the mark,
Mr. Vasani stated that the decision had been taken by the partners of the
firm and that he was not aware of the reason behind such adoption.

12. Mr. Vasani further informed my associate that the present premises is
their office, and they do not have any other office located anywhere else.

13. He further added that they get their products manufactured by a few
third-party skincare manufacturing companies, however he did not disclose
the details of any third-party manufacturer to the investigator.

14. Mr. Vasani further informed my associate that Defendant No. 1 does not
directly sell its products to end consumers and instead supplies its products
through dealers. In this regard, he directed my associate to M/s Jahnavi
Medical Store, Defendant No. 3 herein, for the purchase of products sold
under the impugned mark.

19. Pursuant to the information furnished by the representative of Defendant
No. 1, my associate visited the premises of Defendant No. 3, M/s Jahnavi
Medical Store, at the address SF 216, Siddharth Crest, Opposite Nizampura
Bus Stand, Vadodara – 390024, Gujarat on 13th July 2026.
20. My associate met with a staff member working at the said premises who
informed him that they are engaged in the business of dealing in medical
and cosmetic products.

21. At the said premises, my associate purchased three units of the
impugned EUCERIN product against Invoice No. CA-BS/6069 dated 13th
July 2026 for a total amount of INR 891/- paid in cash. The purchased
products prominently bore the trademark EUCERIN and specifically
identified Defendant No. 1 as the marketer and Defendant No. 2 as the
manufacturer. Furthermore, the details on the packaging reflect further
details on Defendant No.1, including its phone number being 9825096755.

22. Upon enquiries, the staff member at Defendant No. 3‘s premises stated
that they had been selling impugned EUCERIN branded products for
approximately one to one-and-a-half years. My associate further observed
that around 7-8 units of the infringing products were stocked and offered for
sale at the premises. Defendant No. 3 also supplied to the investigator a
brochure of Defendant No. 1 wherein the impugned mark EUCERIN was
prominently used as a brand name for facewash products.

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24. On 17th July 2026, my associate visited the premises of Defendant No.
2 situated at Shyam Industrial Hub, Bakrol, Gujarat. During the visit, my
associate met Mr. Ritesh Chauhan, a representative of Defendant No. 2, who
confirmed that Defendant No. 2 is engaged in the manufacture of cosmetic
and skincare products for third parties.

25. Mr. Chauhan stated that Defendant No. 2 manufactures skincare
products for Defendant No. 1 under the brand names EUCERIN and
DERMCAL.‖

318. Specifically to support the pleadings made in paras. 58 to 60 of the
plaint, which provide the Delhi connection, the affidavit has stated the
following:
― 34. During the course of the conversation, I and/or my associate
expressed interest in purchasing products under the EUCERIN brand and
enquired whether the same could be supplied to a Delhi address. Mr. Joshi
readily agreed to dispatch the products and thereafter the investigator shared
his requirement and delivery address with him on WhatsApp. Thereafter, the
infringing products were dispatched by the Defendants on a cash-on-
delivery basis to me and/or my associate in Delhi.

35. Thereafter, on 3rd August 2026, I and/or my associate received four
units of EUCERIN Foaming Face Wash at his Delhi address and made
payment of INR 1,188/- through a QR code provided by Mr. Bhavinkumar
Joshi over WhatsApp. However, no invoice or rough bill was raised against
the said purchase.‖

(Emphasis supplied)

319. The verification appended to the affidavit reads as under:
― VERITICATION:
Verified at New Delhi on this the __ day of September, 2026 that the
contents of my above affidavit are true to my knowledge and nothing
material or relevant has been concealed therefrom .‖

(Emphasis supplied)

320. Order XIX of the CPC deals with ‗ Affidavits ‘. Rule 3 deals with
matters to which an affidavit shall be confined and reads as under:
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― 3. Matters to which affidavits shall be confined.
(1) Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his
own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which
statements of his belief may be admitted: provided that the grounds thereof
are stated.

(2) The costs of every affidavit which shall unnecessarily set forth matters
of hearsay or argumentative matter, or copies of or extracts from documents,
shall (unless the Court otherwise directs) be paid by the party filing the
same.‖

321. Further, the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 under
Chapter XIX deals with ‗ Affidavits ‘. While sub-rule 4 deals with the form of
the affidavit, sub-rule 5 deal with the contents of the affidavit, they read as
under:
― 4. Form.
Every affidavit shall be drawn up in the first person, and shall be divided
into paragraphs to be numbered consecutively, and shall state the
description, occupation if any, and the true place of abode of the deponent.

5. Contents of affidavit.
Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able, of his own
knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which
statements of his belief may be admitted, provided that the grounds thereof
are stated.‖

176
322. A Constitution Bench in A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India , noted
the importance of a verification in an affidavit. It was opined by the
Supreme Court that a verification tests the genuineness and authenticity of
the allegations and also makes the deponent responsible for the allegations.
A genuine verification, most importantly, enables the Court to find out
whether it will be safe to act on such an affidavit. Para. 8 of the said decision
is extracted as under:

176
(1969) 3 SCC 864.
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― 8. …The reasons for verification of affidavits are to enable the Court to
find out which facts can be said to be proved on the affidavit evidence of
rival parties. Allegations may be true to knowledge or allegations may be
true to information received from persons or allegations may be based on
records. The importance of verification is to test the genuineness and
authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for
allegations. In essence verification is required to enable the Court to find out
as to whether it will be safe to act on such affidavit evidence. In the present
case, the affidavits of all the parties suffer from the mischief of lack of
proper verification with the result that the affidavits should not be
admissible in evidence .‖

(Emphasis supplied)

323. A perusal of the affidavit would reveal that the visit made to Gujarat,
and the investigation undertaken there, was not made by the deponent of the
affidavit. Rather it was an associate of Mr. Kashyap who had travelled to
Gujarat. This associate is unnamed and unknown. The statements made in
the affidavit are stated to be true to the knowledge of the deponent. Unless
the deponent can be at two places at once, or can see events taking place
hundreds of kilometres away, it seems impossible that Mr. Kashyap could
have personal knowledge about the events which took place at Gujarat.
324. What is even more concerning is the use of the expression ― I and/or
my associate ‖ at para. 34 and 35 of the affidavit which are intended to
support the pleadings which state that the delivery of the impugned product
took place at Delhi. ― I and/or my associate ‖ is not a fact. Only facts can be
stated in an affidavit. This expression as found in the affidavit has no
meaning or weight in law. It has to be discarded.
325. The affidavit and verification are, thus, found to be non-compliant
with the CPC, the Original Side Rules of this Court, and the decision of the
Supreme Court in A.K.K. Nambiar . Resultantly, both are discarded in toto .
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326. The plaintiff has, along with the plaint, tendered pictures showing a
parcel purportedly from ― Duvac Cosmedic Vadodara ‖ being sent to ― RK
st
Verma c/o DC Sharma, 29, 1 Floor, Masjid Road, Bhogal, New Delhi -
110014 ‖. Who this ― RK Verma ‖ is, to whom is he related, what is the
association with the plaintiff, appears to be unknown. There is no pleading
regarding ― RK Verma ‖ in the entire plaint. The plaint had narrated that the
investigator had contacted the defendants through WhatsApp and received
the goods. Para. 28 of the plaint notes that the affidavit of the investigator is
tendered with the plaint. This affidavit is of Mr. Kashyap not Mr. Verma.

327. Is Mr. Verma the associate of Mr. Kashyap? The plaint has no
answers. The affidavit of the investigator mentions, at variance with the
plaint, that an associate had engaged with the defendants and gotten the
delivery of the impugned product at Delhi. That affidavit, as has been noted
above, is being discarded. Effectively, therefore, the pictures are without any
supporting pleadings and cannot, at all, be looked at by this Court.
328. Arguably, the defect highlighted above may be a curable defect. Even
if cured, as the discussion below shall reveal, jurisdiction cannot be made
out at Delhi.
329. Notwithstanding this, even if the WhatsApp chats are looked at, they
demonstrate that Mr. Verma had sought the price of the impugned products
inclusive of courier charges. The courier/delivery partner, thus, was an agent
of the plaintiff. As noted in Glen and para. 305 of this judgment, by
application of Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, the delivery upon the
delivery agent at Gujarat shall be deemed to be delivery upon the buyer. The
transaction, thus, concluded at Gujarat only.
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330. Even otherwise, such trap transactions, even in the offline world, as
noted at paras. 208 and 216 of this judgement, have been prohibited by the
decision in Banyan Tree . No reliance can, therefore, be placed upon such
transactions to concoct jurisdiction before Delhi Courts. The requirements of
Section 20(c) of the CPC are, thus, not satisfied.
331. Assuming that an investigator, in law, has some role to play, he
cannot, under the guise of purported investigation, be permitted to
selectively create jurisdiction, and compel a court to entertain a suit which
otherwise lies within the ― local limits ‖ of another court, which is forum
conveniens . If at all such an investigator was to get from a distributor,
retailer or stockist from Delhi, impugned products, which ex facie were sold
in Delhi, the situation perhaps may have been different.
332. In the instant case, the plaintiff no. 1 is at Germany, plaintiff no. 2 is
at Mumbai, all three of the defendants are at Gujarat. The defendants at
Gujarat include the manufacturer, distributor as also the retailer. The
material, essential and integral part of the cause of action, has, therefore,
arisen outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because an investigator
hired by the plaintiff selectively purchased the impugned product at Delhi
the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked. If this exercise is allowed, in law,
the plaintiffs will be capable of filing a suit in any nook and corner of the
country through engaging an investigator who gets the product delivered at
that place. Such a recourse cannot be countenanced in law. Even if it is
assumed that the delivery did constitute a part of the cause of action, this
minuscule part of cause of action, which is capable of being generated by
the plaintiff in any part of the country, ought not to be the reason to
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entertain a suit in Delhi. This, thus, would be a fit case to refuse to exercise
jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens .
333. Cumulatively, no cause of action can be said to have arisen within the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20(c) of CPC. Even if it is assumed
that a part cause of action has accrued within Delhi, on grounds of forum
conveniens , the suit ought not to be entertained. Accordingly, the plaint
deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the
Court having the requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Amber Nutrition Private Limited v. Mr. Manish Chandak & Anr.
[CS(COMM)-996/2026]
334. None of the parties are at Delhi. The plaintiff is at Madhya Pradesh,
defendant no. 1 and 2 are at Rajasthan. The plaintiff‘s suit in this case is for,
inter alia , trademark and copyright infringement along with a claim for
passing off. Reliefs are sought for permanent and mandatory injunctions,
damages, delivery up, rendition of accounts. The plaintiff claims to be the
owner of the registered trademark ― AMBER KREAM TOFFEE ‖. It is averred
that defendant no. 1 has been marketing and selling ― PANKAJ CREAM
TOFFEE ‖ using deceptively similar packaging and artwork. Defendant no.
2, Mr. Jai Kishan Boob trading as M/s Poona Sweet Products, is stated to
have participated in the distribution of the impugned product.
335. Paras. 88 to 92 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 88. That, this Hon‘ble Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain, try and
adjudicate upon the present suit on the following, amongst other, grounds:

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89. That, pursuant to an order placed with Defendant No. 2, the Impugned
Product/infringing product were, in fact, delivered at Delhi, within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, as is evident from the Kacchi
Invoice and delivery receipt filed herewith, which shows that Defendants‘
infringing products are available in Delhi. Accordingly, a substantial and
material part of the cause of action qua the present suit has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. It is further submitted that
Defendants‘ goods are also available at various retail and wholesale shops in
Delhi specifically by various confectionary wholesalers and retailers.

90. The Defendant No. 1, despite being fully conscious of the infringing
nature of the Impugned Product, has deliberately and prominently displayed
the Impugned Product, bearing artwork that is deceptively similar to, and
infringing of, the Plaintiffs Trademarks and Copyrights, on its official
website, namely https://gdigitalindia.in/sites/Pankaj-Confectionary, with the
express object of promoting and soliciting the sale thereof. The said display
continues to remain available and accessible to the public in Delhi on
Defendant No. 1‘s interactive website even as on the date of institution of
the present suit. The aforesaid conduct unequivocally demonstrates the
wilful, deliberate and brazen disregard, despite service and receipt of Cease
and Desist Notice, of Defendant No. 1 for the Plaintiff‘s statutory and
common law rights, and establishes that the infringement is neither innocent
nor inadvertent, but is calculated and contumacious in nature.

91. The Impugned Product is, in addition, presently listed, displayed,
advertised and offered for sale on multiple major e-commerce platforms and
online business directories which are widely accessible and operational
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, including but not
limited to Google.com, Justdial.com, Indiamart.com and Tradeindia.com.
These listings directly target, and are designed to solicit orders from,
merchants, retailers, wholesalers and consumers located in Delhi and the
National Capital Region. Through each such listing, the Impugned Product
bearing the Plaintiff‘s infringing artwork is presented to Delhi-based users
as available for bulk purchase, distribution and retail supply, thereby
multiplying the reach, visibility and commercial exploitation of the
infringing gel-up within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.
The presence of the Impugned Product on these high-traffic platforms
accessible to Delhi consumers constitutes a continuation and amplification
of Defendant No. l‘s calculated infringement, and occasions direct and
measurable injury to the Plaintiff‘s Trademarks, Copyrights, goodwill and
commercial interests within this jurisdiction. The aforesaid conduct
substantially reinforces that Defendant No. 1 has not merely made the
infringing Impugned Product available, but has actively targeted and
solicited the Delhi consumer market, thereby rendering this Hon‘ble Court
the appropriate forum for adjudication of the Plaintiff‘s claims.
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92. That, the Plaintiffs goods are also sold and marketed within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court at Delhi, and that the Plaintiff
has substantial goodwill and reputation amongst the consumers situated
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, which goodwill and
reputation is being damaged by the Defendants‘ infringing activities, and
accordingly, the Plaintiff is suffering injury within the territorial jurisdiction
of this Hon‘ble Court.‖

336. The plaintiff has its registered office at Indore, Madhya Pradesh. Both
the defendants have their offices at Jodhpur, Rajasthan. Jurisdiction of this
Court is sought to be invoked on grounds that the website of the defendant
and third parties, purportedly having the impugned product, is accessible in
Delhi. This falls foul of the Banyan Tree standard. There is no indicia of the
defendant purposefully availing itself of the jurisdiction of this Court by
specifically targeting customers within Delhi. Nor are there commercially
concluded transactions between the defendant and persons within the forum
court‘s jurisdiction through the website in question. Jurisdiction, therefore,
on the basis of websites cannot be claimed.
337. Next, it is pleaded that the plaintiff‘s goods are sold and marketed
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Though not pleaded, perhaps
the plaintiff wishes to invoke the provisions of the specialised statutes under
Sections 62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright and Trade Marks Act,
respectively. At the outset it may be noted that in order to entertain a plaint,
a Court must have jurisdiction qua each of the prayers made in the suit. In
the instant case, since there is also a prayer for passing off, reference cannot
be made to the specialised provisions for this given prayer. Even otherwise,
as held in Dhodha House , paras. 47 and 51, the plaintiff cannot be claimed
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to be ― carrying on business ‖ in Delhi for the purposes of the specialised
statute merely because its goods are sold in Delhi.
338. The plaintiff has also claimed that the ― defendants goods are
available at various retail and wholesale shops in Delhi specifically by
various confectionary wholesalers and retailers ‖. Not a single such
reference has been given in the plaint, and no document at all, has been
annexed with the plaint to make good this pleading. Upon being inquired
about the basis of this pleading, the plaintiff roars ‗ demurrer doctrine ‘.

339. This is a classic case of clever drafting where jurisdiction is sought to
be pleaded by hoodwinking the court and abusing the doctrine of demurrer.
The plaintiff has asked this Court to be a mute spectator and look only at the
averments without asking more. This is a fit case where the pleading can be
considered to be clever drafting, engaged in, only for the purposes of
concocting territorial jurisdiction. As held by the Supreme Court in
Manjula , the Court needs to pierce through such averments. Thus, on this
ground as well, jurisdiction cannot be invoked.
340. Lastly, it has also been claimed that an order was placed with
defendant no. 2, and the impugned product was delivered at Delhi. In para.
50 of the plaint, the plaintiff has made his averments concerning this
transaction with defendant no. 2; the paragraph reads:
― 50. That, upon further investigation, and to narrow down upon the further
infringing channels of Defendant No. 1, Plaintiffs representatives came
across further infringers and got to know that Defendant No. 2 has also been
selling well. Thereafter , the Plaintiff, through its representative , placed an
order for the Impugned Product through WhatsApp of the mobile number of
the Defendant No. 2 obtained by Plaintiff through its dealer network.
Pursuant thereto , the Impugned Product were duly delivered the infringing
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product as to the Plaintiffs representative in Delhi along with the Kacchi
Invoice bearing particulars and details of the Impugned Product….‖

341. The plaintiff has also attached pictures of a carton containing the
impugned products, a parcel having an A4 sheet cello-taped over it, bearing
the following text typed out:
―To,
B-222, 3rd floor, Layak Ram complex Badarpur
South Delhi – 110044
Near deepa medicos.
Contact – 9560930499
Bhanu Gupta
From = SURAJ BHAI JODHPUR
889092758‖

There is another ― Kacchi Invoice ‖ appended with the plaint and also a
delivery invoice showing the consignor to be one Mr. Suraj Bhai and the
consignee to be Bhanu Gupta, Delhi.
342. For quite a few reasons, this narration as well would not confer
jurisdiction on this Court. First , the Court is truly unsure, even on a prima
facie basis, who ‗Suraj Bhai Jodhpur‘ is. The memo of parties shows
defendant no. 2 to be Mr. Jai Kishan Boob trading as M/s Poona Sweet
Products. The documents, however, show that goods were sent by one Suraj
Bhai Jodhpur. There is no pleading that connects Suraj Bhai with Jai Kishan
Boob. In the absence of it, the averments seem to be foundationally hollow.
Second , the plaintiff cannot set up an individual at Delhi, who enters into a
transaction with the defendant, and gets goods purportedly delivered at
Delhi, and then claim jurisdiction of this Court. Trap transactions of this
nature are prohibited by Banyan Tree . As analysed in this judgement, the
dictum of Banyan Tree on trap sales was not restricted to online
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transactions. Gaming of jurisdictional rules through setting up individuals
simply cannot be tolerated. Thus, on this ground as well, jurisdiction cannot
be invoked.
343. Third , the ― Kacchi invoice ‖ demonstrates that the courier charges
were included in the cost of goods. Prima facie , therefore, the delivery
charges appear to have been paid by the plaintiff. This being the case, the
delivery partner/courier shall, as was held in Glen , be deemed to be the
agent of the plaintiff. As per Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the
procurement of the impugned goods at Rajasthan, by the agent, is deemed
delivery upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff is at Madhya Pradesh. No delivery
thus, takes place, at Delhi.
344. Even if the trap transaction in question was considered to be a genuine
sale for reasons stated in the analysis for CS(COMM) 1081/2026, this suit
ought not to be entertained on grounds of forum conveniens .
345. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(a) or Section 20(c) of CPC. The plaintiff‘s
sale of goods in Delhi also does not establish jurisdiction under Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act or Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. Even
if it is assumed that a part cause of action has accrued within Delhi, on
grounds of forum conveniens , the suit ought not to be entertained.
Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which may
be presented before the Court having the requisite territorial jurisdiction, if
so advised.
Amritsar Haveli Cuisines Private Ltd. and Anr. v. Amarbir Singh and Ors.
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[CS(COMM)-611/2026]
Haveli Restaurant and Resorts Ltd. v. Shubham Food Enterprises
[CS(COMM)-980/2026]
346. The suit in CS(COMM)-611/2026 has been instituted seeking,
primarily, reliefs of permanent injunction and damages for the alleged
infringement and passing off of their registered trademarks ― AMRITSAR
HAVELI ‖/― AMRITSARI HAVELI ‖, used in relation to restaurants, food and
hospitality services. Plaintiff no. 1 is a company having its registered office
at Amritsar, Punjab, and branch outlet at Delhi. Plaintiff no. 2 is claimed to
be the founder and managing director of plaintiff no. 1, and as per the memo
of parties, also resides at Amritsar. Defendant nos. 1 to 4 are partners of the
firm ‗Café Green Brew‘ which was constituted on 05.02.2026. The said firm
is stated to be engaged in the restaurant business and is using the trademarks
―The Amritsar Haveli‖ and ―Amritsari Haveli‖ in the course of its trade and
business.
347. Paras. 23 and 24 of the plaint reveal that previously, defendant no. 1
along with plaintiff no. 2 had formed a partnership firm under the name and
style of M/s Café Green on 24.06.2013. During the subsistence of the
partnership, plaintiff no. 2 is stated to have coined the term ‗ Amritsar
Haveli/Amritsari Haveli ‘, and procured trademarks for the said term. It is
clarified in the plaint that the said mark was not made part of the
partnership. Cause of action, primarily, is pleaded to have arisen owing to
the defendant applying for registration of trademarks which are deceptively
similar to the plaintiff‘s mark.
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348. Paras. 60 and 61 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 60. This Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and adjudicate
the instant suit under Section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 and
Section 62 of Copyright Act, 1957 as the Plaintiff has a branch
office/restaurant/outlet in Delhi. It is also submitted that the Plaintiff is a
copyright owner of the label whereof is part of the cause of action of the
present suit. Therefore, this Hon‘ble Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
present suit under section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999, Section 62
of Copyright Act, 1957.

61. That this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and
adjudicate the present suit as the Plaintiffs carry their business within
jurisdiction of this Court and Defendants are soliciting and networking,
through their website and social media handles all of which are accessible
within territorial limits of this Hon‘ble Court, for giving franchises and
opening restaurants under the impugned trademark/trade name in Delhi and
have all intention to sell, offer for sale, their impugned services under the
impugned trademark within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.
Defendants are committing act of infringement of Plaintiffs‘ said trade mark
and passing-off within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.
Defendant infringing activities are likely to have a dynamic effect on the
Plaintiff‘s business, both current and upcoming, within the jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court. It is evident that the dynamic effect of the defendant‘s
activities is being felt in Delhi and there exists an undeniable nexus between
the cause of action in the present suit and the territory of Delhi. The
Plaintiffs‘ above said proprietary rights are being prejudicially affected or
likely to be so affected in Delhi due to the defendant‘s impugned activities.
Plaintiffs thereafter made inquiry in the market and trade which revealed
that the Defendants are soliciting trade and business in Delhi with the
proposal/promise of extending franchise of the impugned trademarks. The
carrying on of business by the Defendant as well as whole or part of cause
of action for filing the suit has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court within the meaning of Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. Further the Plaintiffs are working for gain and also carrying on its
business & services under its said trade mark in Delhi which is being
tarnished or likely to be tarnished within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble
Court by the impugned activities of Defendant. The Defendant website,
social media website and promotions are targeting consumers in Delhi.
Therefore, this Hon‘ble court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the present
suit.‖

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349. The suit in CS(COMM)-980/2026 is instituted by Haveli Restaurant
and Resorts Ltd., against the defendant-Shubham Food Enterprises. It is
contended that the defendant is running a restaurant called ― Dharampur
Haveli ‖ at Himachal Pradesh. In doing so, submits the plaintiff, the
defendant has adopted the impugned mark together with deceptively similar
branding, architecture, trade dress, menu cards, creating a false association
with the plaintiff‘s establishments. It is contended that the defendant‘s
business at Dharampur, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh, infringes the
plaintiff‘s trademark and copyright. Owing to customers at Delhi
purportedly identifying the defendant‘s establishment as that of the plaintiff,
a claim for passing off is also made. Reliefs for, inter alia , permanent
injunction and damages have been sought.
350. Paras. 104 to 108 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 104. That this Hon‘ble Court has the necessary territorial jurisdiction to
entertain and adjudicate the present suit, by virtue of the Plaintiff‘s carrying
on business within the territorial limits of this Hon‘ble Court and by reason
of the Defendant‘s infringing activities having a direct, substantial, and
continuing impact within this jurisdiction. The present suit has been
instituted under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, to be read
with Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Section 134(2) of the Trade
Marks Act to be read with Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, confers
jurisdiction on a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the
time of the institution of the suit, the Plaintiff actually and voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. The Plaintiff
herein carries on business within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble
Court. The Plaintiff is carrying on business through its office located within
the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.

105. It is further submitted that the Plaintiff is also advertising their services
on the interactive third-party website www.tripadvisor.com, which is
accessible within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court and allows any
consumer across India, including within NCT of Delhi, to view content, post
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and read reviews, make enquiries, interact with the business, and form
consumer perceptions based on the representations made by the Plaintiff.
Therefore, by operation of law, the Plaintiff is entitled to institute the
present action for Trade Mark infringement and passing off before this
Hon‘ble Court. The Defendant is engaged in the business of rendering
hospitality and restaurant services under the impugned mark/label/trade
name ― Dharampur Haveli ‖ and is actively marketing, promoting, soliciting,
and advertising their infringing services through various online platforms
and social media, which are interactive in nature and accessible within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The relevant digital platforms being used
by the Defendant include:

Domain Name: https://havelidharampur.com/
Instagram: www.instagram.com/havelidharampur/
Facebook:
www.facebook.com/people/HaveliDharampur/61579838786917/#

106. These platforms are not merely passive but allow consumers across
India, including within NCT Delhi, to view content, post and read reviews,
make enquiries, interact with the business, and form consumer perceptions
based on the representations made by the Defendant. The interactive nature
of such platforms brings the infringing activity directly within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.

107. Furthermore, the Defendant is promoting, advertising, offering for sale,
and soliciting bookings in respect of its impugned services under the
impugned mark on the interactive e-commerce platform, i.e.,
www.tripadvisor.com. The said interactive website is accessible to
consumers within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, and
enables prospective customers, including those within the jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court, to access information regarding the Defendant‘s services,
make enquiries, and avail bookings.

108. Accordingly, the Defendant is carrying on commercial activities and
purposefully targeting consumers within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble
Court. The presence and accessibility of infringing material online,
combined with its commercial intent and interactive features, are sufficient
to confer jurisdiction in the forum where such material is viewed and has a
deleterious impact, which also gives rise to a part of the cause of action in
the present suit. The infringing activities of the Defendant are not
geographically limited but are borderless and accessible from anywhere,
including New Delhi, in view of the online activities being conducted
through various online platforms. The Defendant‘s unauthorized adoption
and use of a deceptively similar trade name, label, trade dress, and brand
identity, identical setup and ambience coupled with their promotional
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activities targeting consumers across India through digital means, has
resulted in actual deception and confusion amongst the public, particularly
in the minds of consumers who are familiar with the Plaintiff‘s well-known
brand ―HAVELI‖, which enjoys considerable goodwill and reputation in
and around the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The Plaintiff has
legitimate apprehension that consumers, traders, and members of the public
located within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court are being misled into
believing an association between the Plaintiff and the Defendant owing to
the latter‘s unauthorized use of the impugned mark/label/trade name.
Accordingly, in view of the Plaintiff‘s place of business being located
within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, the accessibility of infringing
material within this jurisdiction, and the continuing nature of the harm
caused to the Plaintiff‘s brand within the territorial limits of this Court, this
Hon‘ble Court has the necessary jurisdiction to entertain and try the present
suit.‖

351. The plaintiffs in both of the aforenoted suits, have their registered
office at Punjab. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Dalia ,
specifically the observations in para. 16, the registered office shall be treated
to be the principal place of business. Applying the dictum of Ultra Home ,
the plaintiffs can be considered to be ― carrying on business ‖ at Delhi, only if
cause of action also accrues at Delhi. In this connection, firstly , it may be
iterated that similar to the decision in Impressario , mere viewing of content,
posting/reading of reviews, making of enquiries, or even making of
bookings will not confer jurisdiction as the transactions get concluded after
visiting and dining at the restaurant/café, which lies outside the jurisdiction
of this Court.
352. Secondly , the social media handles and websites of the defendant, or
listings on third party websites, do not satisfy the Banyan Tree standard.
Commercially concluded transactions between the defendant and persons
within the forum court‘s jurisdiction through the website in question have
not been shown, nor is there any indicia of the defendants in the said cases,
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purposefully availing the jurisdiction of Delhi by specifically targeting
customers here. Instagram or Facebook data indicating that Delhi users are
the most active is immaterial to the defendant‘s objective intention to target
customers at Delhi. A statistic showing most traffic from Delhi may be a
result of population disparity or a wide variety of other factors. Traffic, in
and of itself, does not indicate targeting of a given forum. Cause of action,
thus, cannot be said to have accrued at Delhi. Resultantly, neither under
Section 20(c) of the CPC nor under the specialised statutes, jurisdiction can
be established.

353. Separate from jurisdictional grounds concerning the online activity of
the defendants, there is another claim made by the plaintiff that the
defendants are purportedly soliciting trade and business through proposals of
franchise, which if accepted by the public in Delhi, may infringe the
plaintiff‘s rights. This is yet again a desperate and unsuccessful attempt at
cleverly pleading jurisdiction; on the one hand, this is a bald averment
without any supporting document and attracts the ruling in Manjula , on the
other hand, it is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of a quia timet action
as noted at para. 140 of this judgement.
354. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(a) or Section 20(c) of CPC. The plaintiff‘s
sale of goods in Delhi also does not establish jurisdiction under Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act or Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act.
Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which may
be presented before the Court having the requisite territorial jurisdiction, if
so advised.
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Namastu Enterprise Pvt. Ltd. v. Kajalben Maheshbhai Kaklotar and Anr.
[CS(COMM)-1010/2026]
355. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are in Delhi. While the
plaintiff has its registered office at West Bengal, the defendants are at
Gujarat and Karnataka. The suit is for trademark and copyright
infringement, copying of trade dress, and passing off. The plaintiff claims to
be the registered proprietor of the mark ―PHITKU‖ and alleges that
defendant no. 1 is offering personal-care products under the deceptively
similar marks ―PITTCU‖ and ―PHITKARI‖ through the Amazon platform
operated by defendant no. 2.
356. Para. 50 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 50. This Hon‘ble Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the
present suit under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section
62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, as the Plaintiff carries on business within
the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court through its official website accessible
across Delhi, and Defendant No. 1 offers its infringing products for sale to
consumers located in Delhi via Defendant No. 2‘s platform. This is further
evidenced by a test purchase order placed by the Plaintiff on 12.08.2026 for
the Infringing Product ―PHITKARI‖ sold by Defendant No. 1, which was
delivered on 20.08.2026 at D-377, Basement, Defence Colony, New Delhi –
110024, thereby confirming that Defendant No. 1‘s infringing goods are
offered for sale to, and delivered within, the territorial jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court; therefore, the Commercial Division of this Hon‘ble Court
has the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction as a Commercial Division of this
Hon‘ble High Court.‖

357. Merely because the plaintiff‘s official website is accessible in Delhi
would not amount to the plaintiff carrying on business in Delhi. Reliance on
the decision of this Court in WWE is misplaced. As noted in para. 87 of this
judgement, the decision in WWE no longer governs the field on this issue.
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358. Mere accessibility of the defendant‘s website also does not confer
jurisdiction; what is required is the purposeful availment of the jurisdiction
of a given Court by specifically targeting customers within that territory.
Additionally, commercially concluded transactions are required. A sole
transaction cannot form the basis for conferring jurisdiction as has been
noted in Banyan Tree .
359. Even otherwise, the sole transaction mentioned by the plaintiff was by
a person set up by the plaintiff. The same is impermissible as was held in
Banyan Tree . Even assuming that the sale in question is treated to be a
genuine order by the plaintiff and a consequent supply by the defendant at
Delhi, a mere delivery or sale in Delhi, an act capable of occurring at any
place the plaintiff desires, ought not to obligate this Court to entertain this
suit. If this is allowed and a slender part of the cause of action makes a court
entertain a suit on the anvil of Section 20(c), specifically a part cause of
action, the entire jurisdictional jurisprudence shall become a nullity. The
plaintiffs will become capable of creating, concocting and establishing
jurisdiction in any part of the country, howsoever remote it may be.
360. At its highest, therefore, the sale may be part of a fraction/slender part
of the cause of action. The material, integral and essential part of the cause
of action has arisen outside the jurisdiction of this Court. This would,
therefore, be a fit case to invoke the doctrine of forum non-conveniens and
refuse to entertain the plaint.
361. Importantly, the Court may also note that the sole transaction was
entered into by the advocate who has filed the instant suit. The address given
for the delivery in the Amazon invoice is the same as the address of the
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advocate as is found in their Vakalatnama. Rule 13, Section II, Chapter II,
Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules prohibit an advocate from
accepting a brief in which he has reason to believe that he will be a witness.
The rule reads as under:
― 13. An advocate should not accept a brief or appear in a case in which he
has reason to believe that he will be a witness, and if being engaged in a
case, it becomes apparent that he is a witness on a material question of fact,
he should not continue to appear as an Advocate if he can retire without
jeopardising his client‘s interests.‖

362. It is, but obvious, that the advocate would be called as a witness to
prove the transaction entered into. It would be for the good of the Bar if the
advocates do not indulge, at least themselves, in such trap transactions.
363. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(c) of CPC, and Section 134(2) of the Trade
Marks Act or Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. Even if it is assumed that
a part cause of action has accrued within Delhi, on grounds of forum
conveniens , the suit ought not to be entertained. Accordingly, the plaint
deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the
Court having the requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
JSW MG Motor India Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Tristar Auto Agencies (Vizag)
Pvt. Ltd.
[CS(COMM)-917/2026]

364. Yet again, none of the parties are at Delhi. Plaintiff no. 1 is at
Gurugram, Haryana, plaintiff no. 2 is at China, and the sole defendant is at
Visakhapatnam. The suit is filed for infringement of trade mark and passing
off. The plaintiffs claim to be the registered proprietors of the ― MG ‖ trade-
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marks. The defendant is stated to be the dealer of plaintiff no. 1 in
Visakhapatnam until its dealership was terminated on 29.11.2024. It is
alleged that despite the determination of the contract, the defendant
continues to use the MG Marks and dealership branding at its showroom,
online listings and in official communications, thereby falsely representing
itself as an authorised MG dealer.
365. Para. 50 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 50. This Hon‘ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present
suit as stated below:
a. As per Clause 64.2 of the Dealership Agreement, disputes between the
parties are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of New Delhi.
It is settled law that where a jurisdiction clause employs words such as
―alone‖, ―only‖, ―exclusive‖ or the like, an intention to oust the
jurisdiction of all other competent courts stands squarely established.
Clause 64, operates as a distinct covenant conferring exclusive jurisdiction
upon the Courts at New Delhi over all disputes, including the present suit,
arising out of or in relation to the Dealership Agreement.

b. Plaintiff No. 1 carries on business within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court through its network of authorised dealers and
showrooms operating within Delhi. Plaintiff No. 1‘s authorised dealerships
within Delhi include, inter alia, dealerships located at Prashant Vihar,
Karol Bagh, Lajpat Nagar, Dwarka and Safdarjung. Plaintiff No. 1
therefore carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court
within the meaning of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and
this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.

c. The Defendant‘s acts of unauthorised use of the MG Marks, passing off,
and misrepresentation are not confined to Visakhapatnam alone but have a
direct, continuing, and injurious effect on the Plaintiffs‘ goodwill,
reputation, and trade within Delhi, where the Plaintiffs transact substantial
business, where consumers and trade are exposed to and influenced by the
Defendant‘s wrongful conduct, and where the Plaintiffs suffers loss of
reputation, dilution, and tarnishment of its marks. An integral and material
part of the cause of action has therefore arisen within the jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court. The unlawful acts of the Defendant are causing loss
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and injury to the Plaintiffs within Delhi and within the jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court where a large part of the Plaintiffs‘ business and goodwill
is based which is being severely affected due to the acts of the Defendant,
and thus, this Court has territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

d. The Defendant‘s activities have a nexus with the territory of this
Hon‘ble Court. The Defendants are tarnishing the Plaintiffs‘ reputation
and diluting the exclusivity associated with Plaintiffs‘ trademark and this
has a dynamic effect on the Plaintiffs‘ reputation under the MG trademark
within the territory of this Hon‘ble Court. Therefore, it is humbly
submitted that an integral and substantial part of the cause of action has
arisen within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court and this court has
territorial jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. In a suit for infringement and passing off, injury or damage suffered
by the Plaintiffs are an essential part of the cause of action. Where the
Plaintiffs carries on business within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court,
any harm caused to its business, goodwill, or reputation by the
Defendant‘s wrongful acts gives rise to a cause of action within this
jurisdiction, regardless of where the infringing act took place.

e. The Defendants‘ online listings on Just Dial and IndiaMart are intended
to generate commercial enquiries and business from members of the public
across India, including consumers within Delhi, thereby causing injury to
the Plaintiffs‘ statutory and common law rights within the jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court and giving rise to a part of the cause of action herein.‖

366. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a Court that has none. An
exclusive jurisdiction clause merely curtails jurisdiction to a given place and
177
does not create it. It is, essential therefore, for the plaintiff to establish that
jurisdiction of Delhi is in fact made out.
367. Since the plaintiffs have also made prayers for passing off, reliance on
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act is impermissible. Notwithstanding
that, as per Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home , a place separate from the
178
plaintiff‘s principal place of business can be considered as the place

177
Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. , (2013) 9 SCC 32 and ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. v. AP
Agencies Salem , (1989) 2 SCC 163.
178
Which as per para. 16 of Sanjay Dalia , is the place of registered office of a corporation.
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where a corporation ― carries on business ‖ only when cause of action also
accrues at that place. Mere sale of goods, also, does not constitute carrying
179
on of business.
368. The defendant‘s website and online listing on third-party websites do
not confer jurisdiction as they fall foul of the Banyan Tree standard. There
is nothing to demonstrate that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
jurisdiction of a forum Court by specifically targeting customers at Delhi.
Commercially concluded transactions have also not been proven.

369. Reliance has been placed on Section 19 of the CPC to claim that the
wrong has occurred in Delhi, as its effects are being felt in Delhi. The
underlying premise of this argument is that wherever be the wrong
committed, at all such places where the plaintiff has its presence, effects are
being felt which constitute ― wrong ‖ under Section 19 of the CPC. If this is
the case, the dictum of this Court in Sameer Dnyandev Wankhede v. Red
180
Chillies Entertainments Pvt. Ltd. , shall have full force. The Merger Rule
as expounded in the said decision shall apply, and the common place where
the wrong has occurred and the defendant also resides/carries on business,
shall be the only place where a suit could be instituted.
370. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 19 and Section 20(c) of CPC, and Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. The exclusive jurisdiction clause does not
independently confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Accordingly, the plaint

179
Dhodha House , para. 47 and 51.
180
2026:DHC:701.
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deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the
Court having the requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
KBB Nuts Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr. Suresh Chand and Ors.
[CS(COMM)-444/2026]
371. The plaintiff has its registered office at Amritsar, Punjab and a sub-
ordinate office at Delhi. Each of the defendants is at Rajasthan. The plaintiff
has filed this suit for trade mark infringement and passing off. The plaintiff
claims to be the registered owner of the trade mark ― TULSI ‖ for dry fruits
and other food products. The suit alleges that the defendants are selling dry
fruits under the deceptively similar marks ― SHRINATH JI TULSI ‖ and
― RAGHUNATHJI TULSHI ‖ which infringe the plaintiff‘s IP rights.
372. Para. 27 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 27. It is submitted that the Defendants are selling their impugned
products in Delhi. Thus, a part of cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. Furthermore, the Defendants
have filed their impugned trademark applications without any restriction to
any specific territory or other geographical boundaries. Thus, the
impugned trademark applications have been filed by the Defendants with
an all-India effect i.e. the said application has a dynamic effect, operating
throughout the territory of India, including Delhi. Moreover, since the
Plaintiff carries on its business in Delhi, based out of its office in Delhi
itself, the sales by the Defendants of infringing products in Delhi is
causing great harm to the business of the Plaintiff in Delhi. Thus, a part of
the cause of action has arisen in Delhi. Therefore, this Hon‘ble Court has
jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit under Section 20 (a) and
(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Moreover, since the Plaintiff is
carrying on business in Delhi through its office in Delhi, this Hon'ble
Court also has the jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit under
the provisions of Section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999.‖

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373. In the application bearing IA 15483/2026 it has been pleaded by
defendant nos. 3-5 that the registered office of the plaintiff is at Amritsar,
Punjab. Learned counsel for the plaintiff upon being inquired as to the same,
does not deny that the registered office of the plaintiff is at Amritsar, Punjab.
As per the decisions of Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home , under Section 134(2)
of the Trade Marks Act, the suit ought to have been brought before the
courts at Amritsar, Punjab, unless it could be shown that cause of action has
also accrued at the place of the sub-ordinate office. Since the plaintiff had
invoked Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act in its plaint, it was
incumbent upon it to disclose where its registered office is. A suppression
qua this aspect is material to the lis , and warrants the suit being thrown out
in limine , without hearing the plaintiff on merits.
374. Notwithstanding the same, jurisdiction on merits may be tested. As
noted above, in order to claim the benefit of Section 134(2) the plaintiff
must demonstrate that cause of action (wholly or in part) has also accrued
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The plaintiff has pleaded that
the defendant‘s goods are sold in Delhi. There is no document at all to
support this plea. The dictum of Manjula , thus, applies with full force. The
Court is not to be a mute spectator and digest averments made by a claimant
without any basis.
375. The bald statement that the defendants‘ goods are sold in Delhi needs
to be looked through. Additionally, it may also be highlighted that in
Indovax , while rejecting the plaint, the Court had observed that ― the plaintiff
only states that the goods of the defendants are available for sale in Delhi
but this averment is not supported by any documentary evidence ‖. Thus,
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jurisdiction on the basis of the empty statement of the plaintiff that the
defendants‘ goods are sold in Delhi, cannot be established.
376. The filing of a trademark application by the defendant neither gives
rise to a cause of action for a conventional suit, nor for a quia timet action.
Reliance may be placed on Dhodha House and paras. 124, 127 and 129-130
of this judgment. An application may be accepted or rejected. It may be
decided one way or the other. Its mere filing does not give rise to a cause of
action.

377. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(a) or Section 20(c) of CPC, and Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be
returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the Court having the
requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Marico Ltd. v. Shree Uday Oil and Food Industries LLP
[CS(COMM)-1115/2026]
378. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is from Delhi. While the
plaintiff is from Mumbai, the defendant is from Gujarat. The plaintiff‘s suit
is for trade mark and copyright infringement along with passing off. The
plaintiff claims to be the registered proprietor and prior user of the well-
known ― PARACHUTE ‖ trademark and the copyright owner of its original
artistic works, specifically its distinctive blue packaging, ― Flag Device ‖ and
― Broken Coconut Device ‖. The suit alleges that the defendant is infringing
upon the plaintiff‘s statutory and common law rights by manufacturing,
marketing, and selling a competing product named ― UDAY COCORICH
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COCONUT OIL ‖ by means of adopting a deceptively similar trade dress,
deceptively similar bottle and packaging, and substantially copied layout to
ride upon the plaintiff‘s established goodwill.
379. Para. 60 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 60. That this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and
try the present suit under Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 as the infringing goods of the Defendant are available for sale in Delhi
as well as being delivered in Delhi i.e. within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble
Court and therefore part of the cause of action has arisen within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The same is also evident from the fact
that the reviews on the Defendant‘s own website are from customers based
in Delhi. Further, the impugned product is also available for purchase within
the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court through various interactive websites
such as www.indiamart.com and also through the Defendant‘s website
www.udayoilindia.com and for this reason also this Hon‘ble Court has the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit.
That even otherwise the Defendant has agents, stockiest, distributors, etc.
who are responsible for marketing and selling the said impugned product of
the Defendant within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court and for this
reason also, this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain
and try the present suit.

380. Yet again it may be considered that mere accessibility of websites
which list the impugned products either on the defendant‘s website or on
third parties‘ does not give rise to a cause of action under Section 20(c). The
standard of Banyan Tree has not been satisfied. The plaintiff has made a
bald averment without any substantiation that the defendant has ― agents,
stockiest, distributors, etc. ‖ at Delhi who are responsible for selling the
impugned products in Delhi. No document has been annexed in support of
this plea.
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381. The affidavit of the ― investigator ‖ annexed with the plaint cannot be
relied upon for more than one reason: first , there is no pleading concerning
the appointment and use of an investigator; second , the verification
appended to the affidavit is faulty insofar as it conjointly avers that facts are
both true to the deponent‘s personal knowledge as also belief; third , the
investigator being a person set up by the plaintiff cannot, at the threshold, be
181
used to concoct jurisdiction; fourth , the delivery appears to have taken
place through an agent, who prima facie is an agent of the buyer. The
delivery as per Glen and Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act took place at
Gujarat.
382. Even if the defects in the affidavit were to be cured, and the
transaction in question was to be considered as a genuine sale, for similar
reasons noted in the analysis of CS(COMM) 1081/2026 and CS(COMM)
1010/2026 this Court ought not to entertain the suit on grounds of forum
conveniens .
383. In view of the foregoing reasons, no part of the cause of action has
arisen in Delhi so as to confer territorial jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 20(c) of CPC. Even if it is assumed that a part cause of action has
accrued within Delhi, on grounds of forum conveniens , the suit ought not to
be entertained. Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be returned to the
plaintiff, which may be presented before the Court having the requisite
territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. v. Tushar Chimanlal Chitalia and Ors.

181
See paras. 208-212 and 216 of this judgement. The said portions also note that the dictum of Banyan
Tree being confined to online sales is incorrect and it also applies to offline transactions.
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[CS(COMM)-1041/2026]
384. The plaintiff and the principal contesting defendants are situated
outside Delhi. However, defendant nos. 4 and 5, IndiaMART Intermesh Ltd.
and Infocom Network Pvt. Ltd., respectively, have addresses in Delhi and
have been impleaded as intermediaries. The suit is filed for trademark and
copyright infringement along with passing off. The plaintiff claims to be the
registered proprietor of the ― Glucon-D ‖ family of trademarks and its
associated green packaging/trade dress for glucose-based beverage
premixes.
385. The suit alleges that defendant no. 1 is unlawfully manufacturing and
selling an identical product under the deceptively similar mark ― Glucose-D ‖
while copying the plaintiff‘s distinctive packaging, including the ― Instant
Energy ‖ tagline, color scheme, and the ― Happy Family ‖ motif. Defendant
no. 2 is stated to be the distributor, defendant no. 3 is the domain registrar
for the infringing website (www.glucosed.com, https://www.glucosed.com),
and defendant nos. 4 (IndiaMART) and 5 (TradeIndia) are interactive e-
commerce platforms actively promoting and selling the impugned products.
386. Para. 142 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 142. This Hon‘ble Court has the necessary territorial jurisdiction to
entertain and try the present Suit under Section 20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 for the following reasons –
a. The products of Defendant Nos. 1 & 2 bearing the impugned marks and
trade dress are being advertised, promoted, offered for sale and made
available to consumers throughout India, including within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court without any caveat of ―not available in
Delhi‖, via the website operated by Defendant Nos. 4 & 5;

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b. The availability and offer for sale of the infringing products within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court constitute infringement of
ZWPL‘s trademark;

c. Pertinently, the impugned products are being sold and are available for
purchase in New Delhi since Plaintiff has obtained delivery of a sample of
the impugned products at D66 A, 1st floor, Chhabra Complex, Munirka,
New Delhi - 110067, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.
Courier receipt of the said sample is filed with the Plaint.

d. Defendant No. 3 is the domain registrar of https://glucosed.com/ and
carries out its business within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. Its
website is also accessible within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is
the entity responsible for maintaining and transferring the domain name
services of https://glucosed.com/ which enables Defendant No. 1 to engage
in his infringing activities.‖

387. The mere availability or offer of sale of the impugned good via
websites is not sufficient to constitute cause of action for the purposes of
Section 20(c). The requirements of Banyan Tree have not been satisfied.
Similarly, the purchase of the impugned product by the plaintiff itself within
Delhi is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The ― field personnel ‖ of the
plaintiff who purchased the product was a person set up by the plaintiff, for
cause of action to be established under Section 20(c), Banyan Tree requires
commercially concluded transactions through the defendant‘s websites by
persons unconnected with the plaintiff. Defendant nos. 3-5 being the pro-
forma defendants, their residence/situs shall not determine whether a given
182
Court has territorial jurisdiction.
388. Even if the transaction by the ― field personnel ‖ is assumed to be a
genuine transaction for reasons noted in the analysis of CS(COMM)

182
Sector Twenty-one Owners Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval Housing Board , 1996 SCC OnLine
Del 42.
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1081/2026 this Court ought not to entertain this suit on grounds of forum
conveniens .
389. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(c) of CPC. Even if it is assumed that a part
cause of action has accrued within Delhi, on grounds of forum conveniens ,
the suit ought not to be entertained. Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be
returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the Court having the
requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Laborate Pharmaceuticals India Limited v. M/s JMBS Healthcare
[CS(COMM)-1120/2026]
390. The plaintiff, having its office at Delhi, has filed the present suit for
trademark and copyright infringement along with a claim for passing off.
The plaintiff claims to be the registered proprietor and prior user, since
1996, of the trade mark ― LABOCOF ‖ for cough and cold tablets, and the
copyright owner of the yellow-and-white packaging of its export variant.
The suit alleges that the defendant is manufacturing and exporting identical
tablets under the deceptively similar mark ― LAPNACOF ‖ suffixed with
― JM ‖, in near-identical packaging.
391. Paras. 63 to 64 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 63. The present suit is a commercial suit as described in Section 2(c)(xvii)
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, hence this Hon‘ble Court has the
pecuniary and subject matter jurisdiction to try, entertain and adjudicate the
present suit. Additionally, the present suit is liable to be heard and disposed
of by the Commercial Court in view of provisions of Section 6 of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Additionally, this Hon‘ble Court also has the
territorial jurisdiction to try, entertain and adjudicate the present suit under
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Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62 of the Copyright
Act, 1957, as the Plaintiff‘s corporate office is situated at Plot K -17,
Second Floor, Udyog Nagar, Industrial Area, Rohtak Road, Nagloi, New
Delhi-110041 and the Plaintiff is carrying on its business in Delhi.

64. The Defendant also maintains an IndiaMart listing and an interactive
website with a ‗Contact Us‘ tab, through which it is promoting and
soliciting its goods and business and targeting the customers in Delhi. In the
said listings, Defendant has also provided its contact numbers, email IDs
and a detailed form on its website through which potential customers can
reach out to it. Furthermore, Defendant is exporting its counterfeit
pharmaceutical products through the logistic channels operating from Delhi,
including the ports and export facilities in Delhi, within the jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court, which is also corroborated from the publicly available
data on the popular platform- Eximpedia. Furthermore, Plaintiff also gained
knowledge that Defendant is also approaching the market sources in Delhi,
being a major export market, to export its impugned counterfeit products.
Hence, there is an imminent and credible apprehension that Defendant is
likely to expand its export activities and dealings with traders in Delhi in
regard to the counterfeit products. Therefore, owing to Defendant‘s acts, the
Plaintiff‘s goodwill and reputation are being diluted in Delhi and there is a
potential loss of business for the Plaintiff in Delhi. Therefore, the cause of
action has partly arisen in Delhi, and this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial
jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.‖

392. The plaintiff has its registered office outside the jurisdiction of this
Court. Resultantly, as per Sanjay Dalia , specifically para. 16, the principal
place of business shall be considered to be the place of registered office.
Resultantly, the option under Sections 62(2) and 134(2) of the Copyright
and Trade Marks Act, respectively, shall be made available at Delhi only if
cause of action h the place of its registered office as also accrued within the
jurisdiction of this Court. To establish cause of action, the plaintiff has
pleaded that the defendant is exporting its counterfeit pharmaceutical
products through the logistic channels operating from Delhi, including the
export facilities at Delhi. To support this pleading, the plaintiff has annexed
with the plaint a page from ― Eximpedia ‖ which states that the export
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shipments are routed through ― Panchi Gujaran (Sonepat ICD followed
DELHI AIR CARGO and NHAVA SHEVA SEA ‖.
393. While it may indeed be the case that the products of the defendant are
being routed through Delhi, there is nothing to even prima facie demonstrate
that the impugned infringing goods are being routed through the Delhi air
cargo. A general supply of goods does not constitute cause of action; the
movement must be of the infringing goods. Even the plaintiff appears to be
unsure if actual exports are taking place. That is why, in the same paragraph,
it has pleaded that there is an imminent and credible apprehension that the
defendant is likely to expand its export activities to Delhi. Both the pleadings
cannot simultaneously be made. It is either the case that exports are taking
place in Delhi or that there is an imminent threat that they are to take place.
The plaintiff and its plaint are conflicted.
394. Even if the plaint is to be tested on the apprehension to export ground,
the requirements for a quia timet action, as noted in para. 140 of this
judgement, are not made out. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that
the defendant has expressed a deliberate intention to engage in an activity
the result of which would raise a strong possibility of infringement. By no
stretch of imagination can the activity be considered to be imminent, and of
such a character that if the defendant were to engage in the activity, the
plaintiff would suffer substantial, if not irreparable, prejudice.
395. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(c) of CPC, and Section 134(2) of the Trade
Marks Act, or Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. Accordingly, the plaint
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deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the
Court having the requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Jangeer Singh v. Yogesh Jangid
[CS(COMM)-598/2022]
396. The plaintiff in CS(COMM)-598-2022, as per the amended memo of
parties, has filed the suit against the defendant for infringement of trademark
and a claim for passing off. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are outside
the jurisdiction of this Court.
397. Paras. 36 to 37 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 36. That this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and
adjudicate the present suit. The Defendants are offering to sell and are
distributing and supplying their impugned goods bearing the impugned
mark to the dealers, distributors and customers in the markets of inter alia in
New Delhi. The Defendants are carrying out their impugned activities under
the impugned mark by inter alia selling, soliciting the impugned products
through e-commerce websites namely www.indiamart.com, ie. Defendant
no. 2 and www.tradeindia.com within the jurisdiction of the Hon‘ble Court.
Products of the Defendants are available on the aforesaid interactive
websites which are accessible to the consumers within the jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court. The consumers can ask queries about the price and
products and can place order and purchase the impugned products. The
Defendant no. 1‘s product is also advertised and sold through social media
platform www.facebook.com. The Defendant no. 1 has given email id and
mobile no. through which the Defendant no. 1 sells the impugned products.
The goods of the Defendants are also made available to the places situated
within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. By their impugned activities,
the Defendants are passing off their goods as that of the Plaintiff within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The Defendants are carrying
out the impugned activities within the jurisdiction of the Hon‘ble Court
thereby committing the impugned acts of passing off within the jurisdiction
of this Hon‘ble Court by selling and soliciting trade, distribution and
marketing networks in relation to the impugned goods under the impugned
trade mark in Delhi market. Hence, a part of cause of action arose within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court thereby this Hon‘ble Court has
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jurisdiction to entertain and try and adjudicate the present suit under Section
20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Defendants offer, advertise, and sell
their impugned products within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court and
the wrong is done within the local limits of this Hon‘ble Court and
therefore, this Hon‘ble Court also has jurisdiction to entertain and try the
suit under the provision of Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
Hon‘ble Court thus has the jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the suit.
Further, the goods of the Plaintiff are also sold through various ecommerce
websites including www.indiamart.com and www.tradeindia.com. The
Plaintiff also conduct business through their interactive website
www.jangeer.com. The Plaintiff business are being done inter alia in Delhi
which is within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The Plaintiff has
tremendous goodwill and reputation in its said trademark within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court on account of voluminous sales and
distribution. The Plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides and carries on
business and works for gain within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court
and therefore the Hon‘ble Court has a jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the
present suit by virtue of Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999.
Thus, this Hon‘ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit
under Sections 19, 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under Section 134
of Trade Marks Act, 1999 as the Plaintiff is carrying on the business within
the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. This Hon‘ble Court thus has the
jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the suit.

37. Thus, this Hon‘ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present
suit under Sections 19 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the
Defendants are carrying on the business within the jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court. This Hon‘ble Court thus has the jurisdiction to try and
adjudicate the suit.‖

398. There is no document on record to support the averment that the
defendant is distributing and supplying the impugned goods to its dealers,
distributors and customers in the markets of New Delhi. This empty
averment is required to be looked through as per the dictum of the Supreme
Court in Manjula . In Indovax as well, such an averment without supporting
documents has not been given any weight by this Court. The averment is an
attempt at clever drafting and hoodwinking the Court.
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399. Mere availability of the defendant‘s products on IndiaMart or other
websites, including the website of the defendant does not attract Section
20(c) of the CPC as the Banyan Tree standard has not been complied with.
400. The plaintiff‘s website being accessible in Delhi also does not
constitute it carrying on business in Delhi. The decision of WWE is, as has
been analysed in this judgment, does not govern the field on this issue.
Insofar as the pleading on Section 19 is concerned, it may be noted that even
if under Section 19 jurisdiction is made out, since the plaint is not
maintainable qua the suit cannot be instituted before this Court. The plaint
cannot, therefore, be entertained.
401. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(a) or Section 20(c) of CPC, and Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be
returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the Court having the
requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Kajaria Ceramics Ltd. v. Yomesh Vijaya
[CS(COMM)-111/2026]
402. The plaintiff has filed a suit for trademark and copyright infringement
along with a claim for passing off. The plaintiff claims to be the proprietor
of the registered trademark ―KAJARIA‖, used in relation to its
ceramic/vitrified tile business, and the ―KEROVIT‖ family of trademarks,
used in relation to faucets, bathware and sanitaryware products. The plaintiff
alleges that the defendant, trading as M/s Western Drymix, adopted the mark
"KEROVIT" in relation to adhesives and construction-related products and
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filed trademark applications in Classes 1 and 2 in 2024 and 2025. Despite
receiving a cease-and-desist notice dated 27.10.2025, the defendant
allegedly continued using the impugned mark, advertising and offering its
products through online platforms, thereby causing infringement, consumer
confusion and dilution of the plaintiff‘s goodwill.
403. Para. 47 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of which
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 47. The Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademark ―KEROVIT‖
and variations thereof in India, which are duly registered with the
Trademarks Registry, Delhi. The Plaintiff has its Corporate Office at J-1/B-
1 (Extension), Mohan Cooperative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, New
Delhi- 110044, and carries out its business in Delhi. Further, the Plaintiff‘s
official website www.kerovit.com is an interactive website, which is
accessible to consumers all over India, including Delhi. It is also pertinent to
note that the Defendant has filed caveats against the Plaintiff in this Hon‘ble
Court and as such has admitted its jurisdiction for this suit. Therefore, this
Hon‘ble Court has the jurisdiction to try, entertain and adjudicate the
present suit under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act 1999. Furthermore,
the Defendant in its Reply to Examination Report has stated that its
impugned mark is also available online on ecommerce platforms such as
India Mart, and on social media platform Instagram, and against said
submission it has also filed snapshots of its product listings on Social Media
platforms wherein the said Defendant is soliciting business from customers
across the country, which includes Delhi. The Defendant‘s trademark
applications are also filed without any disclaimer as to any region of India.
Hence, this Hon‘ble Court has jurisdiction under Section 20(a) and (c) of
CPC as well.‖

404. The registered office of the plaintiff is outside the jurisdiction of this
Court. As per the decisions of Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home , the plaintiff
under the specialised statutes, and the defendant under Section 20(a) of the
CPC, can be considered as ― carrying on business ‖ at Delhi only if cause of
action also accrues at Delhi. Mere accessibility of the plaintiff‘s website at
Delhi does not constitute carrying on of business. The decision of WWE
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supporting such a view no longer governs the field on this issue. The listing
of the impugned products on websites alone also does not satisfy the
Banyan Tree standard. Resultantly, under Section 20(c) as well, jurisdiction
is not made out.
405. In view of the foregoing reasons, territorial jurisdiction of this Court
is not made out under Section 20(a) or Section 20(c) of CPC, and Section
134(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be
returned to the plaintiff, which may be presented before the Court having the
requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Pharmed Ltd. v. Best Biotech and Ors.
[CS (COMM)-874/2026]
Society for Human Resource Management v. Strategic HRM
[CS(COMM)-128/2026]
406. In CS (COMM)-874/2026, the plaintiff‘s suit is for trademark and
copyright infringement, along with a claim for passing off. The plaintiff
claims to be the prior adopter, user, and registered proprietor of the ― MGD3 ‖
family of trademarks (including ― MGD3 ‖, ― MGD3 10K ‖, and ― MGD3
60K ‖) and holds the copyright in its artistic product labels for its
pharmaceutical and nutraceutical products. The suit alleges that defendant
no. 1 is marketing, and defendant no. 2 is manufacturing, identical
pharmaceutical products under the deceptively similar mark ― CALCIMATE
MGD3 ‖, deliberately incorporating the plaintiff‘s coined trademark in its
entirety and copying its trade dress. Defendant no. 3 is impleaded as a pro
forma defendant, acting as an online listing platform/intermediary through
which the impugned products are actively promoted.
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407. Paras. 103 and 104 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 103. This Hon‘ble Court has the necessary jurisdiction to try and entertain
the present suit under Section 134(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 and
Section 62 of the Copyrights Act, 1957 as the Plaintiff is carrying on their
business in their corporate office at Delhi and the products, under the
Plaintiff‘s trademarks which are the subject matter of the suit, are
extensively marketed and sold in Delhi through various distributors and
dealers, within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.

104. This Hon‘ble Court also has jurisdiction to try and entertain the present
suit under Sections 20 (a) and (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

b. Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2 are conducting their infringing
activities and are soliciting business through their interactive websites,
www.bestbiotechindia.com, https://www.savyapharma.com/about-us/ such
which are accessible in New Delhi. The accessibility of these websites from
within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court results in detrimental harm to
the Plaintiff being felt in Delhi as a part of Plaintiff‘s business is getting
adversely affected. Defendant No.3 is also operating its website
https://www.justdial.com/ which are accessible in New Delhi. These
websites enable users in New Delhi to interact with the Defendants, reach
out to them for business related queries, or avail themselves of their services
online. Thus, these Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court by targeting consumers to conclude
commercial transactions within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.

c. Defendant No.1 conducts and solicits business within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court through their Facebook page and
Instagram account which are accessible and target consumers within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. People can leave comments on videos,
posts and stories, and even interact with the creators of the videos, posts and
stories on any topic or subject of their choosing. As a result, the platform on
which these infringing videos/posts/stories are hosted are interactive in
nature, and a part of the cause of action qua Defendant No.1 has arisen in
New Delhi.

d. As the Defendants does not have any territorial limitation and can be used
to infringe the distinct MGD3 Trademarks of the Plaintiff within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, if the same is not already done.
Further, the dynamic effect of violation of the Plaintiff‘s rights by the
Defendants is felt within the territorial limits of the Hon‘ble Court. On
account of the aforesaid, it is abundantly clear that a substantial and integral
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part of the cause of action has also arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court.

e. In accordance with the findings of the Hon‘ble Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court in the case of Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata
Founders, FAO(OS) (COMM) 62/2022 dated 19th September, 2022 the fact
that third party interactive websites are unlawfully displaying the impugned
mark are accessible to customers in Delhi, and the fact the Defendants have
a looming presence on the virtual world in India, including the territorial
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble court, gives this court the necessary territorial
jurisdiction, since this has the potentiality to cause deception and confusion
amongst consumers in Delhi.‖

408. In CS (COMM)-128/2026, the plaintiff, a US-based professional
association for human resource practitioners, has instituted the suit for trade
mark and copyright infringement along with a claim for passing off, in
respect of its ― SHRM ‖ brand and the domain name ― www.shrm.org ‖. The
plaintiff claims to be the registered proprietor of the marks ― SHRM ‖,
― SHRM INDIA ‖ and ― SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT ‖ (device), together with copyright in the artistic work on its
website. The plaint alleges that defendant no. 1 has adopted the deceptively
similar domain name ― www.shrm.in ‖, offering identical HR consultancy and
training services, thereby misappropriating the plaintiff‘s goodwill and
causing a likelihood of confusion. Defendant nos. 2 and 3, the domain name
registrar and the web host, have been impleaded as intermediaries.
409. Paras. 43 to 44 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 43. That this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and
adjudicate the present suit. The Defendant No. 1 is making false offerings
for the impugned services, displaying, and soliciting, have intention to
offer/solicit their impugned services and business under the impugned
Trademarks/Trade Name/Domain Names in New Delhi area through the
impugned website. In the era of virtualization and in light of the interactive
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nature of the impugned websites being accessible and operational
everywhere, the impugned services under the impugned Trademarks/Trade
Name/Domain Name can be accessible within the jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court. Thus, the Defendant No. 1 is committing the impugned acts
of infringement and passing-off in the New Delhi area through its impugned
website within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court by, soliciting, trading,
offering, and marketing in relation to the impugned services under the
impugned Trademark/Trade Name/Domain Name of the Plaintiff. Further
this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate
the present suit by virtue of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, as the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Court. The impugned website/domain name adopted by Defendant No.
1, being www.shrm.in is accessible within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble
Court and the Defendant is soliciting business, offering services, and
causing confusion to consumers and stakeholders within the jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court. Accordingly, the Plaintiff submits that this Hon‘ble
Court is vested with the requisite jurisdiction to try and decide the present
proceedings. Further, The Plaintiff also works for gain within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court by organising its Annual Conferences in
New Delhi since 2011 and this year also the conference was held in New
Delhi on 13th and 14th November, 2025. The said event, being a significant
commercial and professional activity of the Plaintiff within the jurisdiction
of this Hon‘ble Court, confers jurisdiction upon this Court under Section
134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 as well as Section 62 of the Copyright
Act, 1957. The Plaintiff, therefore, has the right to institute and maintain the
present proceedings before this Hon‘ble Court, in addition to the jurisdiction
arising under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and
Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 as well as Section 62 of the
Copyright Act, 1957.
44. That due to the Defendant No.l‘s impugned activities and adoption of
such impugned domain name/website, the Plaintiff are suffering huge losses
both in business and in reputation and such losses are incapable of being
assessed in monetary terms. Unwary purchasers and consumers are being
deceived as to the origin of the said goods and business of the Plaintiff. The
Defendant No.1‘s gains are Plaintiff losses. The Plaintiff have no access to
the Defendant No. 1‘s accounts and the Defendant No. 1 is therefore liable
to render its accounts to the Plaintiff and to make good to the Plaintiff, the
profits and business earned by them. Without prejudice to the rendition of
accounts and in alternative thereto, the Defendant No. 1 is liable to pay
damages to the Plaintiff, which the Plaintiff conservatively and in a
restricted manner claims to the tune of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two
crores only) even though the Plaintiff is entitled to much more.‖

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410. In both CS (COMM)-874/2026 and CS (COMM)-128/2026
jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked on grounds that the
defendant‘s websites, third party websites having the defendant‘s products
are accessible from Delhi, and the social media pages of the defendant can
also be accessed from Delhi. The test of Banyan Tree has not been satisfied
by the plaintiff.
411. The act of holding conferences and events in Delhi is also not an
essential part of the business; it cannot constitute carrying on of business.
The test laid down in Dhodha House is not satisfied. The plaintiff in
(COMM)-128/2026, thus, is also not carrying on business in Delhi.
412. In view of the foregoing reasons, in CS(COMM) 874/2026, territorial
jurisdiction of this Court is not made out under Section 20(a) or Section
20(c) of CPC, and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act or Section 62(2)
of the Copyright Act. Similarly, in CS(COMM) 128/2026, the territorial
jurisdiction is not made out under Section 20(c) of CPC, and Section 134(2)
of the Trade Marks Act or Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. Accordingly,
the plaints deserve to be returned to the plaintiffs, which may be presented
before the Court having the requisite territorial jurisdiction, if so advised.
Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee & Anr. v. Galactic TV &
Communications Pvt. Ltd.
[CS(COMM)-883/2026]
413. Plaintiff no. 1 claims to be the authority managing and overseeing the
management and affairs of Sri Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple). Plaintiff
no. 2 is stated to have the exclusive broadcasting rights to the Gurbani
Kirtan which takes place at the Golden Temple. The present suit is for
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copyright infringement and unauthorised broadcast of the live and recorded
video stream of Gurbani Kirtan from the Golden Temple. It is alleged that
the defendants, without any licence, have re-transmitted the stream on their
channel ― GTC Punjabi ‖ and on third-party platforms after adding their own
logo.
414. Paras. 65 to 67 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
―65. This Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and adjudicate
the present suit. The Code of the suit is 50000.01.

66. The Corporate Office (headquarters) of the Defendant No. 1 company,
from where the day-to-day business operations, executives, and
management actually work, is situated in Okhla Industrial Estate, Delhi.

67. Additionally, the unauthorised broadcasting and re-transmission of the
video stream (with the Defendants‘ logo) on third-party platforms (non-
exhaustive) such as JioTV, YuppTV, KableOne, etc., which is the infringing
material, is accessible in Delhi - which has a big Sikh and Punjabi
community. Since the infringing content is accessible to the consumers
within the jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, and additionally because the
damage is being caused to the Plaintiffs in Delhi as well, this Hon‘ble Court
would necessarily have the jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the present suit
under Section 62 of the Copyright Act read with Section 20 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.‖

415. The plaintiff has sought to invoke Section 20(a) of the CPC in order
to claim jurisdiction of this Court. It is undisputed that the defendant has a
sub-ordinate office at Delhi. It is also undisputed that a fraction of a cause of
action has accrued in Delhi owing to the impugned broadcasting of the
Gurbani Kirtan being accessible from Delhi. Cause of action has been
claimed to be the access by the public of the unauthorised broadcasting and
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re-transmission of the video stream on third-party platforms such as JioTV,
YuppTV, KableOne etc.
416. As per the memo of parties plaintiff no. 1 is at Amritsar, Punjab.
Plaintiff no. 2 is at Mohali, Punjab. Defendant no. 1 has its registered office
at Mohali, Punjab. Defendant no. 2 has its registered office in London. The
plaintiff‘s own notice concerning the alleged infringement was addressed to
Defendant No. 1 at its Mohali office and the reply thereto was also issued
from the Mohali office. The dispute originates from the defendants
purportedly t aking the live feed of the Gurbani from the plaintiff no. 1‘s
YouTube channel and broadcasting it on their channels.
417. The gravamen of this lis lies in the live feed emanating from the
Golden Temple and the Gurbani Kirtan that takes place at Amritsar, Punjab.
The cause of action available at Delhi, namely access to the broadcast, is
also available at Amritsar Punjab. It is indeed available in most if not all
parts of India. The material, integral, and essential part of the cause of
action, however, has arisen in Amritsar. The mere fact that access to the
infringing material is taking place in Delhi and the defendant has a sub-
183
ordinate office at Delhi does not make Delhi the forum conveniens . The
courts at Amritsar are ex facie the forum conveniens to entertain this lis .
418. Accordingly, the plaint deserves to be returned to the plaintiff, which
may be presented before the Court having the requisite territorial
jurisdiction, if so advised.

183
As per Sanjay Dalia , para. 16, the principal office is to be registered office.
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Sanjay Kumar Jain and Anr. v. Nandi Ayurved and Ors.
[CS(COMM)-746/2026]
419. Both the plaintiffs are in Rajasthan. Defendant nos. 1, 2 and 4 are in
Rajasthan. Defendant no. 3 is in Punjab. Defendant no. 5, IndiaMart, is in
Delhi. Thus, all of the contesting defendants except one are in Rajasthan.
420. The suit has been filed for trademark and copyright infringement
along with a claim for passing off. It is contended that the plaintiffs are the
registered owners of several trademarks including ―ACHAL CHANCHAL‖,
―ACHAL‖, ―TEJ PRAKASH‖, ―RADHA PRAKASH‖, ―KACHAL‖ and
other ACHAL formative marks. The plaint narrates that the defendants
allegedly have dishonestly adopted and commenced use of the marks
―CHANCHAL‖ and ―TEJ PRAKASH‖ in relation to Ayurvedic medicinal
preparations.
421. Paras. 71 to 77 of the plaint contains the grounds on the basis of
which jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked, it reads as under:
― 71. That the Defendants are actively offering for sale, advertising and
promoting their infringing products bearing the impugned marks through
various online platforms and social media, including their Instagram page,
which are accessible across India, including within the territorial jurisdiction
of this Hon‘ble Court. The said infringing products are available for
purchase by consumers through such online platforms and can be delivered
to customers within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The
Defendants are therefore purposefully targeting consumers within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court, and the impugned goods are being
marketed and offered for sale to consumers in Delhi. Consequently, a part of
the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court, and this Hon‘ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and
try the present suit.

72. The Defendants are engaged in systematic and purposeful commercial
activities directed towards consumers located within Delhi. The Defendants
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have advertised, offered for sale and sold the impugned products through e-
commerce platforms including Defendant No. 5, IndiaMART Intermesh
Ltd. which facilitates transactions, listings, communications of the
infringing products to purchasers located within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Hon‘ble Court.

73. Defendant No. 4, Ramesh Belt House & Mayur Puja Bhandar, in active
collusion with Defendant Nos. 1 to 3, has been fulfilling orders of the
impugned goods has caused delivery of the infringing products to Delhi
courier. The evidence of delivery of the infringing goods to addresses
located within Delhi gives rise to a direct commercial effect within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.

74. The Defendants‘ online listings and advertisements are interactive in
nature, inviting orders from and enabling direct transactions with consumers
in Delhi. Accordingly, a part of the cause of action has clearly arisen within
this Hon‘ble Court‘s jurisdiction.

75. That this Hon‘ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and
try the present suit under the provisions of Section 134 of the Trade Marks
Act, 1999 and Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957, as well as under the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

76. That the Plaintiffs carry on business and have commercial presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court through their
distribution network, sale of products through dealers, stockists, chemists,
pharmacies and online platforms. The Plaintiff‘s products bearing the
Plaintiff‘s Marks are widely sold and available to consumers within the
jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court.

77. That the Defendants are actively offering for sale, advertising and
promoting their infringing products bearing the impugned marks
―CHANCHAL‖ and ―TEJ PRAKASH‖ through online platforms and social
media, including their Instagram page, which are accessible across India
including within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon‘ble Court. The said
products can be purchased by consumers within the jurisdiction of this
Hon‘ble Court and are capable of being delivered within Delhi.‖

422. Through the mere listing, which is contended to be an offer for sale,
advertisement and promotion of the impugned product on websites,
jurisdiction cannot be established as it falls foul of the requirements of
Banyan Tree . It is pleaded that certain goods were delivered in Delhi. No
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document in support of the averment has been attached in the plaint. In the
absence of supporting documents, the averment remains an empty and
hollow statement made to confer jurisdiction where there is none. In any
case, in arguendo , if it is assumed that there is a fraction of cause of action
which has accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court, that, in itself ought
not to be the reason to entertain the present suit. A purported delivery at
Delhi could well have happened at Rajasthan or for instance at Jhumri
Telaiya. This fact which is dependent upon the wilful conduct of the
plaintiff, ought not to make this Court the forum conveniens to adjudicate
this suit. Thus for reasons further elaborated in the analysis of CS(COMM)
1081/2026, this court is not forum conveniens to entertain this lis .
VI. ORDER
423. Each of the plaints discussed above, deserve to be returned on
grounds of territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the plaints in CS (COMM)-
987/2026, CS (COMM)-996/2026, CS (COMM)-611/2026, CS (COMM)-
980/2026, CS (COMM)-1081/2026, CS (COMM)-1010/2026, CS (COMM)-
917/2026, CS (COMM)-444/2026, CS (COMM)-1115/2026, CS (COMM)-
1041/2026, CS (COMM)-1120/2026, CS (COMM)-598/2022, CS (COMM)-
111/2026, CS (COMM)-874/2026, CS (COMM)-128/2026, CS (COMM)-
883/2026 and CS (COMM)-746/2026, are returned to the plaintiff under
Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the CPC, to be presented before
an appropriate court, if so advised. Pending applications if any stand
disposed of.
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424. Liberty is, however, granted to each of the plaintiffs in the above-
mentioned suits to make an application, and avail appropriate directions,
under Order VII Rule 10A of the CPC.

(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)
JUDGE

NOVEMBER 03, 2026
Rao
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