Anupam Shahu vs The State

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 13.07.2026
Pronounced on: 21.07.2026
Uploaded on: 21.07.2026
+ CRL.M.C. 3629/2023 & CRL.M.A. 12652/2026
ANUPAM SHAHU .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Ashima Mandla, Ms.
Mandakini Singh, Advs. with
petitioner-in-person.
versus
THE STATE .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Nawal Kishore Jha, APP.
SI Parag, PS Kishangarh.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
JUDGMENT
MADHU JAIN, J.
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode
2. By way of present petition filed under Section 482 of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ CrPC ’), the
petitioner herein seeks quashing of the FIR No. 105/2020 dated 28.03.2020
registered at PS Kishangarh, District South – West, for offences punishable
under Sections 188, 269, 270 and 336 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘ IPC ’), and all the consequential proceedings
emanating therefrom.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. According to the FIR, on 28.03.2020, ASI Sarjeet Singh and Ct.
Sudhir were on picket duty from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. at Aruna Asaf Ali
Marg for the enforcement of the lockdown imposed to contain COVID-19,
when they saw a man walking on the road from the Kishangarh side towards
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JNU. He was stopped and asked who he was and why he was outside during
the lockdown. The petitioner disclosed his identity as Anupam Sahu, a
resident of Kishangarh, Delhi, and informed them that he was unable to pass
his time sitting at home, so he had come out for a walk.
4. Based on this statement alone, the complainant ( who was also the
Investigating Officer in the case ) recorded that the petitioner had violated
MHA Notification No. U-11036/3/1978(1) UTL dated 01.07.1978 and
Order No. 2040-2140/R/ACP/Sub-Division Safdarjung Enclave dated
24.03.2020, and had consequently committed an offence under Section 188
IPC. On the same evening, an FIR was registered under Section 188 IPC,
and the petitioner was arrested immediately and later released on police bail.
5. Subsequently, offences under Sections 269, 270, and 336 IPC were
also invoked against the petitioner in the chargesheet. The chargesheet rests
solely on the statements of three police witnesses, namely, ASI Sarjeet
Singh (the IO/complainant), Ct. Sudhir, and HC Brahm, the Duty Officer.
There was no public witness, and no medical test or examination of the
petitioner was ever conducted. Along with the chargesheet, the ACP, Sub-
Division Safdarjung Enclave, filed a complaint dated 02.06.2020 under
Section 195 CrPC before the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate
(hereinafter referred to as the “ MM ”), seeking cognizance of the offence
under Section 188 IPC.
6. On 24.05.2022, the learned MM took cognizance of the offences and,
consequently, summoned the petitioner. On 24.04.2023, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner entered appearance before the learned
MM. Since the case is triable as a summons case, and there is no stage of
framing of charge, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present
petition on 16.05.2023.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not
out on an idle stroll but was proceeding for a medical follow-up, as he had
been suffering from severe back pain. In support of this contention, learned
counsel places reliance on a medical certificate dated 21.03.2020 issued by
Dr. Prakash Kumar Mishra. Furthermore, even under the MHA guidelines
( in force at the relevant time ), the movement of persons for essential
purposes, including medical needs, was never prohibited.
8. On the aspect of the applicability of Section 188 IPC, learned counsel
submits that the foundational ingredients of the said offence are ex facie
absent, as the order dated 24.03.2020 was not even annexed to the
chargesheet, and even the FIR contains no averment regarding its
promulgation or the petitioner’s knowledge thereof. Learned counsel places
heavy reliance on Mohd. Anwar & Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC
OnLine Del 4951 , to demonstrate that a Coordinate Bench of this Court
quashed a batch of FIRs, registered within days of the present FIR, based
on identically worded orders issued by various ACPs.
9. On the aspect of the applicability of Sections 269 and 270 IPC,
learned counsel asserts that both these sections presuppose an infected
person acting with “ knowledge ”. However, the petitioner was never tested
for COVID-19, and it is not even the case of prosecution that he was
COVID-19 positive.
10. Learned counsel further contends that the cognizance taken by the
learned MM is bad in law, as it is barred by Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC. It is
asserted that the ACP’s complaint dated 02.06.2020 is a belated attempt to
fill the lacuna.
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11. Learned counsel for the petitioner also challenges the fairness of the
investigation. It is contended that the IO and the complainant are the same
person, thereby investigating a case of his own making. Moreover, the
chargesheet filed on 02.06.2020 rests solely on the testimony of police
officials, and the statement of Ct. Sudhir recorded under Section 161 CrPC
is merely a reiteration of the tehrir and adds nothing independent.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
12. Learned APP for the State submits that the petitioner was
apprehended on a public road during the period when the COVID-19
restrictions imposed by the State were in force. The explanation offered by
the petitioner upon being questioned by the police officials was found to be
unsatisfactory and in violation of the MHA notification and the order dated
24.03.2020. Accordingly, the FIR came to be registered against him under
Section 188 IPC.
13. Learned APP submits that, pursuant to the directions of this Court,
the petitioner’s medical documents were verified. The medical certificate
dated 21.03.2020 issued by Dr. Prakash Kumar Mishra of Neuron
Physiotherapy & Rehabilitation Centre was found to be genuine. However,
the prescriptions purportedly issued by Care and Cure Clinic could not be
verified, as the clinic was not functioning at the given address.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
14. This court has heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned
APP for the State and perused the record.
15. At the outset, it is clarified that the fact that cognizance has been
taken by the learned MM is no bar to the maintainability of the present
petition. In Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC
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706 , the Supreme Court held that the power under Section 482 CrPC
survives the filing of the chargesheet. Indeed, any abuse of the process of
law stands aggravated once unfounded allegations harden into a
prosecution. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“16. There is nothing in the words of this Section
which restricts the exercise of the power of the
Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or
miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR.
It is settled principle of law that the High court
can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of
CrPC even when the discharge application is
pending with the trial court. Indeed, it would be a
travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against
a person can be interfered with at the stage of
FIR but not if it has advanced, and the
allegations have materialized into a charge
sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the
abuse of process caused by FIR stands
aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a
charge sheet after investigation. The power is
undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of
process of power of any court. ”
16. The principal question that, therefore, falls for consideration is
whether the allegations in the FIR and the material collected during the
investigation, even if accepted in their entirety, disclose the commission of
the offences alleged. The answer to that question necessarily requires an
examination of the ingredients of each of the offences invoked by the
prosecution.
SECTION 188 OF THE IPC:
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17. The prosecution under Section 188 IPC forms the fulcrum of the
present case. It is, therefore, necessary to first examine the essential
ingredients of the said provision. Section 188 IPC is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by
public servant.—Whoever, knowing that, by an
order promulgated by a public servant lawfully
empowered to promulgate such order, he is
directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take
certain order with certain property in his
possession or under his management, disobeys
such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes
or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or
injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury,
to any person lawfully employed, be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend
to one month or with fine which may extend to two
hundred rupees, or with both; and if such
disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to
human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to
cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine
which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with
both.
Explanation. — It is not necessary that the
offender should intend to produce harm, or
contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce
harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order
which he disobeys, and that his disobedience
produces, or is likely to produce, harm.”
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18. From a bare reading of Section 188 IPC, the following five
ingredients emerge: (i) an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully
empowered to promulgate it; (ii) knowledge of that order on the part of the
accused; (iii) disobedience of it; and (iv) such disobedience causing or
tending to cause; (v) obstruction, annoyance or injury to persons lawfully
employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a riot or affray. The
Explanation to the provision dispenses with the requirement of an intention
to cause harm; however, it does not dispense with the requirement of
knowledge of the order. “ Knowledge ” is the hinge on which the offence
turns.
19. In Bhoop Singh Tyagi v. State, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 277 , this
Court held that, although knowledge may, in certain circumstances, be
presumed, the FIR must at least furnish an inkling that the accused had
knowledge of the order and had knowingly disobeyed it. In the absence of
such knowledge , no offence under Section 188 IPC is made out, and the FIR
would be liable to be quashed. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“8. We are not at this stage concerned with police
commissioner's competence to pass an order
requiring house owners to give particulars of
their tenants under Section 144 under challenge
before us. But it would have to be examined
whether his order was to the knowledge of the
petitioner and he had knowingly disobeyed it.
9. As already seen, a person booked under
Section 188 IPC must have actual knowledge of
public servant's order requiring him to do or
abstain from doing some act. Acquiring or
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gaining of such knowledge is a pre-requisite.
Any proof of general notification promulgated
by a public servant would not satisfy the
requirement.
10. It is true that the knowledge of accused could
be presumed in certain circumstances but all the
same a complaint/FIR must indicate, even
though not in very express terms, that he had the
knowledge of the order and had knowingly
disobeyed it. Where the terms of complaint/FIR
did not provide even as inkling in this regard, it
cannot be said to make out or constitute an offence
under Section 188 and in such a situation, it would
warrant to be quashed.”
20. In Mohd. Anwar (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, while
dealing with the very orders dated 24.03.2020 issued by various ACPs
across the city, explained the meaning and scope of the expression
“promulgation” in the following terms: -
“69. The meaning of word “promulgation” came
up for consideration before Allahabad High Court
in the case of State v. Tugla, 1955 SCC OnLine All
282, wherein, it was observed that word
‘promulgate’ means “to make known by public
declaration, to publish; to disseminate or to
proclaim”. In essence the word connotes two
ideas: (1) making known of an order and (2) the
means by which the order is made known must
be by something done openly and in public.
Private information will not be “promulgation”.
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But the law does not prescribe any particular
mode in which an order is made known openly
and publicly. It may be by beat of drum; it may
be by publication in Gazette; it may be by reading
out the Order openly in public .
70. Any Order announced in open Court shall be
deemed to have been promulgated, but as the
Court room is a place where the litigants are
expected to go and the public at large is not
expected to be present though they have right to
go there if they so wish, the open declaration of
the Order in Court will be deemed to be a Notice
not to the public at large, but to the parties of the
case in which the Order is passed.”
21. Considering this legal position, the present prosecution collapses at
the threshold. A perusal of the record shows that the order dated 24.03.2020,
which is alleged to have been violated by the petitioner, does not
accompany the chargesheet. Furthermore, neither the FIR, the chargesheet,
nor the statement of Ct. Sudhir contains a single averment that the said order
was promulgated by way of proclamation, publication, affixation, or any
other public mode, or that it was published in any newspaper or other media
circulating in the area where the petitioner resided, or that the petitioner had
knowledge of it. There is, quite literally, nothing on record in this regard.
Knowledge cannot be presumed in a vacuum, least of all on the fourth day
of an unprecedented nationwide lockdown.
22. The prosecution equally fails to establish the consequence
contemplated under Section 188 IPC. The petitioner was merely a solitary
pedestrian. It is not the case of the prosecution that Petitioner’s conduct
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caused, or was even likely to cause, any obstruction, annoyance, or injury
to a person lawfully employed, or any danger to human life, health, or
safety, or a riot or affray. Beyond the petitioner’s presence on a public road,
the FIR alleges no overt act whatsoever. Mere presence on a public road,
unaccompanied by any circumstance capable of attracting the consequences
envisaged under Section 188 IPC, does not constitute an offence under the
provision. The significance of the absence of any overt act is further
underscored by the fact that the lockdown regime did not impose a blanket
prohibition on movement, but expressly permitted movement for essential
purposes, including medical needs.
23. The explanation advanced by the petitioner falls squarely within the
above-mentioned exception. The medical certificate dated 21.03.2020 was
issued exactly one week prior to the petitioner’s apprehension. As per the
Status Report filed by the State on 13.07.2026, the said medical certificate
was found to be genuine. The certificate records that the petitioner was
suffering from severe back pain radiating to both lower limbs and had been
advised rest.
24. It is the case of the Petitioner that he had stepped out for a medical
follow-up, and this version finds contemporaneous support from the record.
The earlier prescriptions of 2019, which could not be verified, are too
remote in time to discredit the petitioner’s case, and the fact that a
neighbourhood clinic was no longer functioning at the given address six
years later proves nothing against him.
25. In any event, even if the version set out in the FIR is accepted in its
entirety, the essential ingredients of promulgation, knowledge, and the
requisite consequence remain unestablished. In the absence of these
foundational ingredients, no offence under Section 188 IPC is made out.
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26. Having held that no offence under Section 188 IPC is made out, it
becomes unnecessary for this Court to examine the objection founded on
Section 195 CrPC. Any finding on whether the complaint filed by the ACP
satisfies the mandate of the said provision would serve no useful purpose in
the present adjudication, the prosecution having failed at the anterior stage
itself, namely, the establishment of the offence. This Court, therefore,
refrains from expressing any opinion on the said issue.
SECTIONS 269, 270 AND 336 OF THE IPC
27. Section 269 IPC punishes one who “ unlawfully or negligently does
any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely
to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life ”. Section 270 IPC
punishes the same act when done “ malignantly ”.
28. Applying these provisions in the context of COVID-19, they
presuppose, at the very least, an allegation that the accused was infected,
knew or had reason to believe that he was so infected, and nonetheless
committed an act likely to spread the infection.
29. In Hla Shwe & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine
Bom 959 , which was followed by the Coordinate Bench of this court in
Mohd Anwar (supra) , the High Court of Bombay had quashed the
proceedings for want of precisely such material. In Sidak Singh Sandhu v.
U.T. Chandigarh and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4394 , the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana held that the failure to conduct a COVID-19
test of the accused was fatal to the prosecution, as there was no basis
whatsoever to conclude that the accused was suffering from any infectious
disease. High Courts across the country have taken the same view of such
prosecutions.
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30. The present case stands on an even weaker footing. The petitioner
was never tested for COVID-19 — neither at the picket, nor at the police
station, nor at any point thereafter. The prosecution does not even allege
that he was infected, suspected of being infected, or symptomatic. The only
act attributed to the petitioner is that he was walking alone on a public road.
In the absence of any material or allegation to establish that the petitioner
was carrying an infectious disease, the very foundation for invoking
Sections 269 and 270 IPC is absent.
31. Section 336 IPC, which penalises “ an act done so rashly or
negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others ”, is
equally inapplicable in the present factual matrix. There is no allegation,
much less any material on record, to suggest that the petitioner’s conduct
endangered any person. Indeed, the chargesheet does not identify a single
individual whose life or personal safety was allegedly put at risk. The
invocation of Section 336 IPC is, therefore, wholly misconceived, as the
foundational requirement of endangerment is conspicuously absent.
32. The other contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner,
namely, that the complainant himself acted as the IO, that no public witness
was associated with the investigation, that the sole witness statement merely
reiterates the tehrir , and that Section 41A CrPC was bypassed, relate to the
fairness of the investigation and would ordinarily fall for consideration at
trial. In light of the conclusions recorded hereinabove, it is unnecessary to
adjudicate upon these contentions. Accordingly, this Court expresses no
opinion thereon.
33. The present case falls squarely within categories (1) and (3) of State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, MANU/SC/0115/1992 . The allegations in the
FIR, even if accepted in their entirety, do not disclose the commission of
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any offence, nor does the material collected during the investigation cure
that deficiency. The continuation of such a prosecution, more than six years
after the incident, would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court,
warranting the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
The relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“ 105. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers
Under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down
any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
xxx
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected
in support of the same do not disclose the
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commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.”
CONCLUSION
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present petition is allowed.
FIR No. 105/2020 dated 28.03.2020, registered at Police Station
Kishangarh, District South-West, for offences punishable under Sections
188, 269, 270 and 336 IPC, along with all consequential proceedings
emanating therefrom, including the proceedings pending before the learned
Trial Court in “ State v. Anupam Sahu ”, is hereby quashed.
35. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. A copy of this
judgment be forwarded to the learned Trial Court for necessary information
and compliance .
MADHU JAIN
(JUDGE)
JULY 21, 2026/m
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