DILIP KUMAR vs BHARAT COKING COAL LIMITED THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR

2026:JHHC:13644
N THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI


W.P.(S) No. 1706 of 2018
….…..

Dilip Kumar aged about 40 years S/o Late Sitaram
Rajwar, Resident of Village-Pradhan Khanta, P.O.
Pradhan Khanta, P.S. Topchanchi, District-Dhanbad, at
present residing at Prem Nagar, P.O. Saraidih, P.S.
Madhuban, District-Dhanbad. ..… Petitioner (s)
Versus
1. Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL), through its
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Koyla Bhavan,
P.O. B.C.C.L, P.S. Saraidhela, District-Dhanbad.
2. General Manager, Bharat Coking Coal Limited,
Govindpour Area, P.O. Saraidih, P.S. Madhuban,
District-Dhanbad.
3. Project Officer, Block IV Colliery, B.C.C.L,
Govindpur, P.O. Saraidih, P.S. Madhuban, District-
Dhanbad. ..... Respondent(s)
….…..

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
….…

For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. P.P.N.Roy, Sr. Adv
Ms. Pragati Prasad, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. A.K.Das, Adv
Mrs. Swati Shalini, Adv
….…..
C.A.V. ON: 20/04/2026 PRONOUNCED ON:06/05/2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition
seeking for quashment of Order No.1346 dated
04/06.11.2017, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed
from his services on account of his conviction under Section
498-A IPC.
Brief Facts
3. The writ petitioner was employed in Bharat Coking Coal
Limited and was posted at Block-IV Colliery as an EP
Mazdoor. While in service, he was convicted in C.P. Case
No.2027 of 2009, corresponding to T.R. No.158 of 2017, by a
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judgment dated 21st of July 2017 for an offence under
Section 498-A of IPC. His conviction was affirmed in appeal
and presently a revision application is pending.

4. Under Clause 26.1.19 of the Certified Standing Orders, a
conviction for offence involving moral turpitude is a serious
misconduct warranting dismissal from service. When such
judgment of conviction was brought to the notice of the
Management, show-cause notice was issued to the writ
petitioner on 13.10.2017 directing the writ petitioner to show
cause as to why his services be not terminated on account of
his conviction for an offence under Section 498-A of IPC in
terms of Clause 26.1.19 of the Certified Standing Orders. The
writ petitioner submitted his reply (Annexure 3) which was
duly considered and he was ultimately discharged from
service by an order dated 04/06.11.2017. The dismissal order
has been challenged by the writ petitioner in the instant writ
petition.

5. The respondents have filed a detailed counter affidavit
explaining therein that Section 498-A of IPC is an offence
involving moral turpitude and in view of his conviction, the
writ petitioner cannot continue in service more particularly in
view of Clause 26.1.19 of the Certified Standing Orders and
accordingly, he has been rightly terminated.
6. The writ petitioner has mainly argued that the offence
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under section 498A of IPC do not involve moral turpitude and
relied upon a judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High
Court in the matter of Sarju Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar
and Others, 1987 PLJR 285 (FB), wherein the Patna High
Court in paragraphs 12 and 13 has held as under:-
“11. Indeed, herein we are concerned with the charge of murder in its
true legal sense. When Rule 100 talks of a criminal charge, it is not an
abstract, but in the concrete form of a pending proceeding or allegation
levelling such a criminal charge. Inevitably, one has to turn to the
relevant provisions of Sections 299 and 300 and of Section 302,
providing the punishment for murder Contained in Chapter XVI of
the Indian Penal Code, pertaining to the offences affecting human
body. The line of distinction that divides culpable homicide from the
ultimate offence of murder is somewhat thin and a matter of deep
intricacy, into which it is unnecessary to delve and be bogged down in
the present case. It suffices to mention that the true concept of murder,
as spelt out by the Code is a matter of some complexity. Section
299 first defines what is culpable, homicide, with three illustrations
and three explanations thereto. The succeeding Section 300 then spells
out the aggravated forms of culpable homicide, which would amount to
murder. These are precisely laid out in Clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4)
of Section 300. Out of these, five exceptions are then carved out, which
would again take the offence out of the ambit of murder, and reduce
them to only culpable homicide. These are then detailed in exceptions
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to Section 300. It is against this context that a change
of murder has to be viewed and construed. When in legal terms one
talks of a murder charge, then what is precisely indicated is that the
offence comes squarely within the four clauses of Section 300, and,
further that it is not excluded therefrom by coming within any of the
five exceptions thereto. It is only in this sense alone that a criminal
charge of murder is to be understood as the ultimate crime against the
human body by extinguishing the very life therefrom.
12. Having exhaustively discussed the matter on principle, one might
as well advert briefly to precedent. In Durga Singh v. The State of
Punjab (AIR 1957 Punj. 97,) Bishan Narain, J., observed as follows:—
“After all, the term ‘moral turpitude’ is a rather vague one and
it may have different meanings in different contexts. The term
has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what
a man owes to a fellow man or to society in general. It has
never been held that gravity of punishment is to be considered
in determining whether the misconduct involves moral turpitude
or not……..”

7. At this stage itself, it is relevant to indicate that the said
judgment relates to a conviction under Section 302 IPC and
the termination of the employee in the said judgment has
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been upheld by holding in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 as
under:-
“13. In Baleshwar Singh v. The District Magistrate and Collector of
Banaras (AIR 1959 All. 71), taking a similar view, it was held that
even an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code would well
come within the ambit of a conviction involving moral turpitude.
In Mangali v. Chhakhakhi Lal (AIR 1963 All. 527), on which reliance
was placed by learned Counsel for the petitioner, the broad proposition
of law with regard to moral turpitude was adhered to. However, it was
rightly pointed out that any and every act punishable in law is not an
offence involving moral turpitude. On that premise, it was rightly held
that the mere possession of one tola bhang by a person for medicinal
use, in the district of Kanpur, where it was totally banned, and the
consequent conviction under section 60(a) of the Excise Act, punished
with a paltry fine of Rs. 10/- therefor, was not one which involved
moral turpitude. I am unable to find anything in the said case which
can possibly and or advance the stand taken on behalf of the
petitioner.
14. It remains to advert now to the Division Bench judgment of this
Court in Adya Singh v. The State of Bihar (supra). Undoubtedly, the
observations therein go materially in aid of the petitioner's stand, and,
indeed, it was the correctness of that view, which has necessitated
this reference. A close persual of the short judgment and the brief
observations made therein would indicate that the issue was not
adequately canvassed before the Bench by the learned Counsel for
patties. The binding precedent in ‘Mr. P’ an Advocate (supra) was not
brought to the notice of the Bench and the precise question of a liberal
construction thus seems to have been missed. Equally, the earlier case
in Durga Singh v. The State of Punjab (supra) and in Baleshwar
Singh v. The District Magistrate and Collector of Banaras (supra) did
not come up for pointed consideration. However, what appears to me
as the basic error that seems to have in seriously crept in that
judgment is that it again missed the legal distinction between any and
every killing and specific charge of substantive murder under section
302. This aspect has already been dealt with in some detail in the
earlier part of this judgment. With the deepest respect of the learned
judges of the Division Bench, it has to be held that the law has not
been correctly laid down by them and the same is hereby overruled.
15. To conclude on the legal aspect, the answer to the question posed
at the outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the
criminal charge of substantive murder Under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code involves moral turpitude.”

8. The said judgment is of no help to the writ petitioner. The
only argument of the writ petitioner is that conviction under
Section 498-A IPC does not involve moral turpitude which
apparently is wholly misplaced and misconceived.
9. In this regard one may refer to the terms ‘moral turpitude’
as defined by Wikipedia, as per which, ‘moral turpitude’ is
defined as acts that gravely violate community standard of
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2026:JHHC:13644
justice, honesty or good morals often described as base, vile
or depraved conduct.
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushil
Kumar Singhal v. Regional Manager, Punjab National
Bank, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 573 , has observed that
Management is under an obligation to discontinue the
services of an employee who is or has been convicted by a
criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude. While
explaining the meaning of ‘moral turpitude’ , the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case referred to Black’s Law Dictionary and
observed as under:-
th
“23. Moral turpitude means per Black’s Law Dictionary (8 Edn. 2004)
Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area of
legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude such as fraud or breach
of trust. Also termed moral depravity.
Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness- so extreme a
departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or
ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has
also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between people."
Emphasis Supplied

11. Even the Orissa High Court, in the case of
Prashant Kumar Bishoi v. Sahadeo Bishoi and Another
[WP(C) 5283/2008], had observed that moral turpitude is an
expression which is used in legal as well as societal parlance
to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved
and having any connection showing depravity.
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2026:JHHC:13644
12. Long before, in the case of Baleshwar Singh v. District
Magistrate and Collector, Banaras 2, (AIR 1959 All. 71) , it
was observed as under:-
"The expression moral turpitude is not defined anywhere. But it means
anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It
implies depravity and wickness of character or disposition of the
person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement
made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it
discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social
duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general.
If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty,
either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a
specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does
so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and
depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty
between man and man."
Emphasis Supplied


13. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench
of the Bombay High Court in the case of Narendra Ramdas
Borse v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom
2504 , and it has been observed as under:-
“15. As noted earlier, there is no dispute that the petitioner stands
convicted for offences punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC. This
conviction is in the context of the demise of his wife. The circumstances
in which such offence was committed are referred to in the judgments
and orders made by the Sessions Court, this Court and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. For the purposes of the present petition, there is no
necessity to restate such circumstances, particularly as the conviction
under Section 498-A has attained finality.
16. From the perusal of the material on record, it cannot be said that
the penalty imposed upon the petitioner suffers from any non
application of mind. In fact, even though it may not be strictly
necessary, the respondent, did issue a show cause notice to the
petitioner requiring him to show cause as to why he should not be
dismissed from service on the ground of his conduct which has led to
his conviction of a criminal charge. The response of the petitioner was
duly considered by the disciplinary authority and it is only thereafter
that the penalty of dismissal came to be imposed upon the petitioner.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case therefore, we are
unable to uphold Mr. Chandratre's contention that the disciplinary
authority ignored the relevant consideration referred to by him or took
into account any irrelevant considerations.
17. The conviction under Section 498-A of the IPC, certainly amounts to
conviction for offence involving moral turpitude. In such circumstances,
it is not possible to hold that action under clause (a) of the proviso to
Article 311(2) of the Constitution was not competent. There are GRs to
supplement the constitutional powers, which suggest that action of this
nature is permissible. The ruling in Saroj Kumari (supra) turns on its
own facts. In that case, the incident which led to the conviction of the
petitioner, essentially arose on account of a quarrel with the neighbour
in the village where both the warring families reside. The learned
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2026:JHHC:13644
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, merely remanded
the matter for reconsideration to the disciplinary authority.”
Emphasis Supplied

14. Similar view has been taken by the Kerala High
Court in the case of Vincent Varghese v. State Bank of
India & Ors, 1998 SCC OnLine Ker 148 , wherein the Kerala
High Court after taking note of several Supreme Court
Judgments in paragraphs 5 to 9 has observed as under:-
“5. Therefore, if the offence for which the petitioner had been
convicted, is one which involves moral turpitude, there arise no
consideration of imposing penalty lesser than sending out the
petitioner from service. So, the only issue is whether an offence under
Sec. 498-A involves moral turpitude. Section 498-A I.P.C. reads as
follows:
“ 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting
her to cruelty :— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years and shall also be liable to fine.”
6. It is clear from the reading of the said section itself, so far as a
civilized society is concerned the offence under the said section
involves moral turpitude. The expression ‘moral turpitude’ has been
elaborately explained in Baleshwar Singh v. Dist. Magistrate and
Collector (AIR 1959 All. 71) as follows:
“The expression ‘moral turpitude’ is not defined anywhere. But it
means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition
of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false
statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would
be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private
and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society
in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct
owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to
act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it
and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness
and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty
between man and man”.
7. It has also been held in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana ((1996) 4
SCC 17) as follows:
“Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also social
parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved
or having any connection showing depravity”.
8. In Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola ((1997) 4 SCC 1)
referring these two decisions, the Supreme Court held that:
“What is an offence involving ‘moral turpitude’ must depend upon the
facts of each case”.
Emphasis Supplied

15. Having regard to the discussions made herein
above, there is no room of doubt that conviction under
Section 498 IPC involves moral turpitude and once it is found
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that the petitioner has been convicted for an offence 498-A
IPC, which, as has been discussed hereinabove, is obviously
an offence involving moral turpitude. The petitioner has no
right to continue in his service and, therefore, the order dated
04/06.11.2017; whereby the petitioner was dismissed from
service, has been passed strictly in accordance with law and
does not call for any interference, more so, when such order
was passed after issuing a show-cause notice and giving full
opportunity to the petitioner to respond.
16. As a result, the instant writ application stands
dismissed. Pending IAs, if any, are closed. No cost.

(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Dated:06 /05/2026
Amardeep/
A.F.R

Uploaded on
08.05.2026




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