Jittu Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 657
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2911 OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.4727 of 2026)
JITTU YADAV …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant before us assails the order dated 16.10.2025
passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR No.
548 of 2025 (for short, “Impugned Judgment”).
3. Briefly put, the facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows:
That the appellant was issued a show-cause notice dated
Signature Not Verified
24.04.2025 by the District Magistrate, Balodabazar-Bhatapara
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2026.06.24
16:52:01 IST
Reason:
under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha
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Adhiniyam, 1990 (for short, “Adhiniyam”), calling upon him to
explain why an Externment Order should not be passed against
him. The appellant submitted his reply; however, the District
Magistrate passed the Externment Order dated 18.06.2025,
directing the appellant to be externed from District Balodabazar-
Bhatapara for a period of one year. Aggrieved, he preferred an
appeal under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam before the State
Government. However, by order dated 03.10.2025, the appeal was
dismissed on the ground of limitation under Section 9 of the
Adhiniyam, per which an appeal against the order of the Collector
dated 18.06.2025 ought to have been preferred by the appellant
within a period of thirty (30) days, but the same was filed only on
12.09.2025, i.e., after approximately 50 days, by the appellant.
Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the appellant preferred a writ
before the High Court. However, the same also came to be
dismissed vide the impugned order dated 16.10.2025. Hence, this
appeal.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ashish
Kumar Pandey and learned A.A.G. Sri Rajat Nair for the State of
Chhattisgarh. We have perused the material on record.
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5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted as follows:
(i) The appellate authority being respondent No.1/State
found that the appeal had been filed beyond the
prescribed period of limitation being thirty (30) days as
stipulated under Section 9(1) of Adhiniyam.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed vide Order dated
03.10.2025 as barred by limitation. However, while
Section 9 of the Adhiniyam prescribes a period of
limitation for filing the appeal, it does not provide any
express mechanism for condonation of delay nor does
it expressly exclude applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “Limitation Act”). The
Adhiniyam also does not prescribe any outer period of
delay which could be condoned by the appellate forum.
(ii) That in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and
the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. This is
because the said provision is not specifically excluded
in the present case. Hence, the delay in filing the appeal
ought to have been condoned.
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5.1 In the above context, learned counsel for the appellant drew
our attention to the relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam and
Limitation Act, which we shall refer to later.
5.2 Lastly, it was argued that the Externment Order, by directing
the removal of the appellant from his district of residence entailed
serious civil consequences for him and adversely affected his
fundamental rights of movement and livelihood secured under
Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
6. Per contra , learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.1-
State submitted as follows:
(i) Several criminal cases including five cases under the
Excise Act and two preventive proceedings were
registered against the appellant and that the said cases
revealed repeated involvement of the appellant in
criminal activities. Therefore, on 13.04.2025, the
Superintendent of Police, District Balodabazar-
Bhatapara, after assessing the criminal antecedents
and activities of the appellant, submitted a report to the
District Magistrate recommending initiation of
externment proceedings against the appellant whose
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presence was considered prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order in the locality.
(ii) That the appellant was afforded an opportunity of
hearing in compliance with the principles of natural
justice and accordingly, a show-cause notice was
issued to him on 24.04.2025. On 05.05.2025, the
appellant submitted his reply to the show cause notice
and only thereupon, after due consideration of the
material available on record, the District Magistrate
passed the Externment Order dated 18.06.2025
directing the appellant to remove himself from District
Balodabazar-Bhatapara for a period of one year.
(iii) The appeal against the said order was filed on
12.09.2025 which was beyond the prescribed limitation
period of 30 days as stipulated under Section 9(1) of the
Adhiniyam. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed vide
Order dated 03.10.2025 as being barred by limitation.
That Section 9 of the Adhiniyam prescribes a period of
limitation for filing appeal. The appeal, having been
5
filed only on 12.09.2025, i.e., after approximately 50
days, was rightly held barred by limitation.
(iv) In any case, the appellant had not preferred an
application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act in the appeal before the State
Government against the Externment Order passed by
the District Magistrate. Be that as it may, the State
Government, while dismissing the appeal, proceeded on
the premise that the delay was incapable of
condonation under the statutory scheme of the
Adhiniyam. The High Court also proceeded on the same
assumption while declining to interfere under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. Resultantly, the
Impugned Judgment has attained finality and warrants
no intervention by this Court.
7. On hearing learned counsel for the respective parties, the
question of law that falls for our consideration is: whether Section
5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded either expressly or by
necessary implication from proceedings under Section 9 of the
Adhiniyam?
6
8. The Adhiniyam is an enactment to provide security of the
State, maintenance of public order and certain other matters
connected therewith. Section 3 of the Adhiniyam enables a District
Magistrate to make a restriction order for the purpose of
maintenance of public order or to prevent a person from acting in
a prejudicial manner to the security of the State. Section 4 deals
with dispersal of anti-social elements and previous convicts.
Section 5 deals with removal of persons from committing the
offence, while Section 6 deals with removal of persons convicted of
certain offences. Any order made under Sections 4, 5 or 6 against
a person restraining him to enter into a district or part thereof or
such area and any district or districts or any part thereof,
contiguous thereto, shall be for such period as may be specified
therein and shall in no case exceed a period of one year from the
date on which it was made. Section 8 mandates hearing to be given
before an order is made under Sections 3 to 6 of the Adhiniyam.
9. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, with which we are mainly
concerned, states that any person aggrieved by an order of the
District Magistrate or any other officer specially empowered under
the said Act may appeal to the State Government within thirty days
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from the date of such order. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam reads as
under:
“ 9. Appeal —(1) Any person aggrieved by an order under
section 3, 4, 5 or 6 made by the District Magistrate or any
other officer specially empowered under Section 13 may
appeal to the State Government within thirty days from the
date of such order. Such appeal shall be decided as far as
possible within a period of four months of the date of filing
of the appeal.
(2) An appeal under this Section shall be preferred in
the form of a memorandum setting forth concisely the
grounds of objection to the order appealed against, and
shall be accompanied by a certified copy thereof.
(3) On receipt of such appeal, the State Government
may after giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellant
to be heard either personally or by a legal practitioner and
after such further inquiry, if any, as it may deem
necessary, confirm, vary or rescind the order appealed
against:
Provided that the order appealed against shall
remain in operation pending the disposal of the appeal,
unless the State Government otherwise directs.
(4) In calculating the period of thirty days provided for
an appeal under this Section, the time taken for granting
a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be
excluded.”
10. It is a settled position of law that the right to file an appeal
is a statutory right or a creature of the statute and no other right
to file an appeal can be recognized de hors a statute. A right of
appeal is a creature of statute and no appeal can be filed unless
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it is clearly expressed in terms of a statute. Further, the right of
appeal is a substantive right and not merely a matter of
procedure. It is a vested right which can be exercised when an
adverse judgment is pronounced. Though it exists from the date
the lis commences, such right is governed by the law prevailing
on the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by
the law that prevails on the date of its decision or on the date of
the filing of the appeal, vide Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah
Choudhry , AIR 1957 SC 540 .
11. In Anant Mills Company Limited vs. State of Gujarat ,
(1975) 2 SCC 175 , it has been held that though the right of appeal
is a creature of a statute, there is no reason why the legislature
while granting the right cannot impose conditions for the exercise
of such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to
amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost
illusory.
12. There is a fundamental distinction between a right to file a
suit and right to file an appeal which has been explained by Y.V.
Chandrachud J. (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Ganga
Bai vs. Vijay Kumar , (1974) 2 SCC 393 as under:
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"There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and
the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every
person to bring suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is
barred by statute one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of
one's choice. It is no answer to a suit howsoever frivolous
the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit
for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it
is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in
regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal
inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its
maintainability must have the clear authority of law."
13. On the question of a party having a right to file an appeal,
one could usefully recall His Lordship Krishna Iyer J's observation
in Sita Ram vs. State of U.P. , (1979) 2 SCC 656 , wherein he
has observed that "an appeal is the right of entering a superior
court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of
the court below". "In an appeal, strictly the question is whether
the order of the court from which the appeal is brought was right
on the materials which that court had before it" ... "A right of
appeal, where it exists, is a matter of substance, and not of
procedure. Thus, the right of appeal is paramount, the procedure
for hearing canalises so that extravagant prolixity or abuse of
process can be avoided and a fair workability provided.
Amputation is not procedure while pruning may be. That an
appeal is a remedial right and if the remedy is reduced to a husk
10
by procedural excess, the right becomes a casualty. That cannot
be."
14. With regard to filing of a suit or an appeal within the
prescribed period of limitation, in N. Balakrishnan vs. M.
Krishnamurthy , (1998) 7 SCC 123 this Court has held as
,
under:
"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights
of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The
object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes
a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would
never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would
sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal
remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be
fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the
remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus
founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim
interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the
parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea
is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time."
15. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Kumar , (2000) 7
SCC 372 , on the question of a belated appeal being
unaccompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay
11
and the consequences of not filing the said application along with
the memorandum of appeal and the fact that the said defect is
curable, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
"12. It is true that the pristine maxim vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt (law assists those who are
vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights). But
even a vigilant litigant is prone to commit mistakes. As the
aphorism "to err is human" is more a practical notion of
human behaviour than an abstract philosophy, the
unintentional lapse on the part of a litigant should not
normally cause the doors of the judicature permanently
closed before him. The effort of the Court should not be
one of finding means to pull down the shutters of
adjudicatory jurisdiction before a party who seeks justice,
on account of any mistake committed by him, but to see
whether it is possible to entertain his grievance if it is
genuine."
16. We may briefly explain the object and purpose of the
Limitation Act before answering whether Section 5 thereof will
come to the rescue of the appellant notwithstanding that the period
of limitation under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam is specifically
prescribed and the said provision is conspicuous by an absence of
a clause to condone the delay when a belated appeal is filed; nor is
there an express reference to read Section 5 of the Limitation Act
into it.
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17. The Limitation Act consolidates and amends the law of
limitation of suits, appeals and applications and for purposes
connected therewith. The law of limitation is an adjective law
containing procedural rules and does not create any right in
favour of any person, but simply prescribes that the remedy can
be exercised only up to a certain period and not beyond. The
Limitation Act therefore does not confer any substantive right nor
define any right or cause of action. The law of limitation is based
on delay and laches. It is well known that the Limitation Act only
bars the remedy without extinguishing the rights. It is made to
ensure that a plaintiff does not resort to procrastination or
dilatory tactics, but seeks the remedy within a time fixed by the
legislature. But in certain special circumstances like Section 27
of the Limitation Act, once the remedy becomes barred by
limitation, the right itself gets extinguished, that is, when a suit
for possession of any property gets extinguished on the
determination of period of limitation. That unless there is a
complete cause of action, limitation cannot run and there cannot
be complete cause of action unless there is a person who can sue
and a person who can be sued. There is also an important
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principle which has crystallized in the form of the maxim that
"when once the time has begun to run, nothing stops it". The
public policy underlying the law of limitation is “interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium” meaning, that it is in the welfare of
the republic that there be an end to litigation. Thus, the object is
to put an end to the legal remedy and by so doing, have a fixed
period of life for litigation.
18. Section 5 of the Limitation Act states that an appeal or any
application, other than an application under any of the provisions
of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted
after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal or making the application within such period. Section 5
of the Limitation Act reads as under:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. —
Any appeal or any application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after
the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the application within
such period.
Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant
was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High
Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period
14
may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this
section.”
19. We now turn to address situations where a special or local
law, as in the present case, prescribes a different period of
limitation than under the Limitation Act. The answer to this
question is to be found in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. A
plain reading of the said Section reveals that where any special or
local law prescribes, inter alia , any appeal to be filed within a period
of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule
under the Limitation Act, Section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply
and the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, inclusive, shall
apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law. Sections 3 and 29(2) of the
Limitation Act read as under:
“ 3. Bar of limitation.— (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after
the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although
limitation has not been set up as a defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act,—
(a) a suit is instituted,—
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application
for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
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(iii) in the case of a claim against a company
which is being wound up by the court, when
the claimant first sends in his claim to the
official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim,
shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be
deemed to have been instituted—
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as
the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on
which the counter claim is made in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court
is made when the application is presented to the
proper officer of that court.”
x x x
29. Savings.— (2) Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of
limitation different from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if
such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule
and for the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by any special or local law, the provisions contained in
sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law.”
20. On a reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, it becomes
clear that where any special or local law prescribes, inter alia, any
appeal to be filed within a period of limitation different from the
period prescribed by the schedule under the Act, Section 3 of the
Limitation Act shall apply and the provisions contained in Sections
16
4 to 24 inclusive shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
21. What we have to ascertain in the present case is: whether by
virtue of Section 29(2) extracted above, there is an exclusion of
Sections 4 to 24, particularly of Section 5, either expressly or by
necessary implication, under the provisions of the Adhiniyam,
2019.
22. Some of the judicial dicta having a bearing on the question
under consideration may be adverted to this stage:
(i) The effect of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has been
summarised by this Court in Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat
Puthanpurayil Aboobacker , (1995) 5 SCC 5 , as follows:
“8. … A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for
its applicability to the facts of a given case and for
importing the machinery of the provisions containing
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two
requirements have to be satisfied by the authority
invoking the said provision:
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation
under any special or local law in connection with any
suit, appeal or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under
such special or local law should be different from the
period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation
Act.
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9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the
consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would
automatically follow. These consequences are as
under:
(i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would
apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local
law was the period prescribed by the Schedule.
(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed
by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or
application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to
which they are not expressly excluded by such special
or local law.”
There is no difficulty insofar as the applicability of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act to the present case is concerned.
The Adhiniyam, being a special law, prescribes in Section 9 a
period of limitation for appeals against the order of the District
Magistrate, i.e. 30 days. What remains to be seen is, whether,
Section 9 of the Adhiniyam excludes the operation of Sections
4 to 24 (inclusive) and in particular Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.
(ii) In Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain Mishra , (1974)
2 SCC 133 , this Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act against the argument that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings under the
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Representation of the People Act, 1951. It was argued that the
words “expressly excluded” appearing in Section 29(2) would
mean that there must be an express reference made in the
special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation
Act of which the operation is to be excluded. Rejecting the
argument, the three-Judge Bench of this Court held:
“17. … what we have to see is whether the scheme of
the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the
nature of the remedy provided therein are such that
the legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several matters
provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant
provisions it is clear that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the
benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even
in a case where the special law does not exclude the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by
an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to
the court to examine whether and to what extent the
nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-
matter and scheme of the special law exclude their
operation .”
(iii) In Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company,
(2001) 8 SCC 470 (“Popular Construction Company”) , this
Court considered whether the delay in filing an application
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
for setting aside an arbitral award could be condoned by
19
invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 34(3)
prescribes a limitation period of three months, with a further
grace period of thirty days if sufficient cause is shown, is
accompanied by the phrase “but not thereafter.” This Court
interpreted that phrase as a clear legislative mandate
excluding any extension beyond the additional thirty days. It
held that the expression constituted an express exclusion
within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
thereby rendering Section 5 of the said act inapplicable. Upon
further examining the scheme and object of the Arbitration Act,
this Court concluded that the limitation period prescribed
under Section 34(3) was absolute beyond the specified
extended period and incapable of further enlargement.
(iv) In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo
India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791 (“Hongo India”) ,
this Court examined whether delay in filing a reference
application before the High Court under Section 35-H(1) of the
Central Excise Act, 1944 could be condoned by invoking
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The provision required such
reference to be made within 180 days from the date of service
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of the Tribunal’s order. Since the application in that case was
filed beyond the prescribed period, the issue was, whether, the
High Court possessed the authority to extend the limitation
period. Upon analysing the framework of the Central Excise
Act and the nature of the statutory remedy, this Court held
that the said Act constituted a self-contained code governing
limitation for proceedings under it. This Court also observed
that even where a special statute does not expressly exclude
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, exclusion may still arise
by “necessary implication” from the scheme, object, and
structure of the special law. The determination as to whether
Section 5 applies, therefore, depends not merely upon the
language of the Limitation Act, but upon whether the special
enactment manifests an intention to exclude such applicability
expressly or even by necessary implication. It was noted as
under:
“35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must be
an express reference made in the special or local law
to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which
the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have
to see the scheme of the special law which here in this
case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the legislature
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intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone
should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on
an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear
that the provisions of the Limitation Act are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred
therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even
in a case where the special law does not exclude the
provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by
an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to
the court to examine whether and to what extent, the
nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-
matter and scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by
the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to
filing of reference application to the High Court.”
Applying this principle to facts of that case, the Court
concluded that the limitation period prescribed under Section
35-H(1) was intended to be rigid and incapable of extension.
Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act was held
inapplicable, and the delay was not condoned in the said case.
(v) In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23
(“Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board”) , this Court
considered whether delay in filing an appeal under Section 125
of the Electricity Act, 2003 could be condoned beyond the
22
maximum period prescribed therein by resorting to Section 5
of the Limitation Act. Briefly put, Section 125 of the aforesaid
Act provided that an appeal against a decision of the Appellate
Tribunal for Electricity was required to be filed within sixty
days from the date of communication of the order, with the
proviso empowering the Supreme Court to permit filing within
a further period not exceeding sixty days upon sufficient cause
being shown. After examining the scheme and object of the
Electricity Act, this Court held that the enactment was a
complete and self-contained code establishing a specialised
adjudicatory framework for resolution of disputes under the
Act. The limitation provision itself prescribed both the original
period and the maximum extent to which delay could be
condoned. The Court inferred from this scheme that the
Parliament intended to place an absolute outer limit on the
power to condone delay. Accordingly, it was held that once the
aggregate period of 120 days had expired, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act could not be invoked to enlarge the limitation
further, and any appeal filed beyond that period was not
maintainable as being barred.
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(vi) In Bengal Chemists & Druggists Association vs. Kalyan
Chowdhury, (2018) 3 SCC 41 (“Bengal Chemists”) , the
question was, whether, under Sections 421(3) and 433 of the
Companies Act, 2013, an appeal from the orders of the
Tribunal could be preferred after the limitation period of forty-
five (45) days prescribed in Section 421(3) plus additional forty-
five (45) days in its proviso had lapsed. This Court observed
that Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 does not
merely contain the initial period of 45 days for filing an appeal,
but also grants a further period of 45 days, being the grace
period. This grace period of 45 days was held to be a special
in-built variant of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which the
Parliament had expressly incorporated in the special law.
Accordingly, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
was denied by this Court. What is important, for our purpose,
is that emphasis was laid by this Court on the expression “not
exceeding 45 days” in the proviso to Section 421(3) of the
Companies Act, 2013, to state that it would have the same
effect as the expression “but not thereafter”, as occurring in
the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
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23. Thus, what emerges from the above discussion is that
whenever there is a special enactment prescribing a limitation
period distinct from the Limitation Act, it falls for the courts to
determine whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded. In
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act the expression that occurs is
“expressly excluded by special or local law”. But, with the passage
of time, the expression “expressly excluded” has been interpreted
to also include “exclusion by necessary implication”, having regard
to the scope, object and scheme of the special law.
Therefore, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
must be decided from the language, object, and scheme of the
special or local enactment in question. While a special statute may
prescribe a distinct period of limitation, that by itself will not
automatically exclude the operation of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act. Under Section 29(2), those provisions continue to
apply unless their applicability is expressly or by necessary
implication excluded having regard to the scheme of the special or
local enactment.
24. The aforesaid decisions of this Court, which we have referred
to and where Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been held
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inapplicable, demonstrate that exclusion of Section 5 is not
inferred merely because a special statute prescribes a distinct
period of limitation. Rather, exclusion is to be founded on clear
statutory language or a legislative scheme indicating that the
prescribed limitation is absolute and incapable of enlargement.
Thus, in Popular Construction Company , the Court treated the
expression “but not thereafter” in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act as an express exclusion of Section 5.
Similarly, in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board , the
Electricity Act itself prescribed both the original limitation period
and the maximum extent to which delay could be condoned,
leading the Court to conclude that Parliament intended to impose
an absolute outer limit beyond which no extension was
permissible. So also in Bengal Chemists , the expression “not
exceeding 45 days” in the proviso to Section 421(3) of the
Companies Act was held to have the same restrictive effect as the
phrase “but not thereafter,” thereby excluding recourse to Section
5 beyond the prescribed grace period.
24.1 Even in cases where the statute did not expressly exclude
Section 5, the Court examined whether exclusion arose by
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necessary implication from the scheme and structure of the
enactment. Thus, in Hongo India , the Central Excise Act was
treated as a self-contained code and the limitation prescribed
therein was held to be rigid and unextendable.
24.2 However, when we revert to the present case, the statute in
question stands on an entirely different footing. Section 9 of the
Adhiniyam merely prescribes that an appeal may be filed within
thirty days and does not contain any expression akin to “but not
thereafter,” “not exceeding,” or any other restrictive expression
indicating that delay beyond the prescribed period cannot be
condoned. Nor does the Adhiniyam prescribe any maximum outer
limit in terms of period of time for condonation from which,
legislative intent to exclude Section 5 may be inferred. Unlike the
enactments considered in the above decisions, the Adhiniyam does
not create a self-contained code of limitation. It also does not
disclose a scheme suggesting that the appellate authority becomes
functus officio upon expiry of thirty days. It only prescribes a
limitation period but does not provide a specific and limited grace
period for condonation beyond the above limitation period, or use
restrictive expressions such as “but not thereafter” or “not
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exceeding”, etc. If hypothetically it did, the legislative intent could
have been understood to mean that beyond the prescribed outer
limit, the authority ceases to possess jurisdiction to entertain the
matter or becomes functus officio after expiry of that maximum
period. But, Section 9 of the Adhiniyam merely provides that an
appeal may be filed within thirty days from the date of the order.
The provision neither states that the appellate authority shall have
no power to condone the delay, nor employs prohibitive language
indicating finality after expiry of the prescribed period of thirty days
being the limitation period. The absence of words such as “but not
thereafter,” or any equivalent restrictive formulation, is significant
because where the legislature intends to make limitation absolute
and unextendable, it ordinarily does so in clear terms.
24.3 Further, Section 9 of the Adhiniyam does not reveal a self-
contained or exhaustive limitation mechanism to the exclusion of
the general law of limitation. For instance, Section 9(4) which
expressly incorporates a recognised principle of the general law of
limitation by directing exclusion of the time taken for obtaining a
certified copy of the impugned order for the purpose of calculating
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limitation. This indicates that the legislature did not contemplate
total insulation from the general law of limitation.
24.4 The nature of the remedy provided is also relevant. Section
9 of the Adhiniyam confers a right of appeal against orders of
externment which have civil and criminal consequences affecting
the liberty, movement, livelihood, and reputation of the aggrieved
person. The appellate remedy, therefore, constitutes an important
procedural safeguard against possible arbitrary or erroneous
exercise of power under the Adhiniyam. In such a context, the right
of appeal itself is to be treated as an integral component of fair
procedure. Such a right should not ordinarily be defeated on
technical grounds unless, of course, the statute clearly mandates
strict exclusion which, as we have already stated, it does not.
Hence, a purposive interpretation ought to be made of Section 9 of
the Adhiniyam having regard to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
24.5 The law of limitation is intended to regulate the exercise of
remedies and ensure diligence, but it is not meant to extinguish
rights, particularly civil rights, in the absence of express legislative
command. Consequently, where the statute is silent on the
exclusion of condonation powers, as in the present case, the
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interpretation that preserves the appellate remedy and advances
substantial justice ought to be preferred over one that defeats the
remedy on that technicality alone. As noted, this principle will
acquire greater significance where the consequences are grave.
Denial of appellate scrutiny solely on account of delay, despite
sufficient cause being shown, may result in irreversible prejudice,
in fact, loss of an appellate remedy itself if the appeal is to be filed
even on the thirty first day as the limitation period is only thirty
days. Therefore, unless the statute expressly or by necessary
implication excludes the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, the appellate authority should retain the discretion to condone
delay in appropriate cases. Hence, an interpretation that would
lean in favour of an appellant who seeks access to an appellate
remedy under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam must be made.
25. In our view, both from the text of Section 9 and from the
overall statutory scheme of the Adhiniyam, there is no indication
that the legislature intended to exclude the operation of Section 5
of the Limitation Act. There is no contra provision in the Adhiniyam
expressly for not condoning the delay if an application is filed
beyond thirty days under sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the
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Adhiniyam. In the absence of such exclusion, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act operates, and delay in filing the appeal can be
condoned upon sufficient cause being shown in accordance with
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
26. In the result, we conclude as follows:
a. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam does not bar the application of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
b. No application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking
condonation of delay being before the State Government, the
application for directions filed by the appellant being Crl. M.P.
No.150947 of 2026 before this Court is taken on record and is
allowed. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned.
c. Accordingly, the appeal before the State Government under
Section 9 of the Adhiniyam stands restored and shall be
decided on its own merits and in accordance with law as
expeditiously as possible and at any rate on or before
15.06.2026. The appellant shall appear before the State
Government on 01.06.2026.
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d. Resultantly, the Impugned Judgment dated 16.10.2025
passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR
No. 548 of 2025 is set aside.
27. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 27, 2026.
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