Joginder Singh vs Charan Dass

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M)

Joginder Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Charan Dass ...Respondent
Sr. No. Particulars Details
1 The date when the judgment is reserved 12.11.2026
2 The date when the judgment is pronounced 17.11.2026
3 The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 17.11.2026
Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or full
4 Full
judgment is pronounced
The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full judgment, and Not
5
reasons thereof applicable

CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA
Present:- Mr. Inderjeet Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Vipin Mahajan, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Gaganbir Kaur Kahlon, Advocate
for the respondent.

MANISHA BATRA, J.
1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') for quashing of the order dated
27.04.2012 (Annexure P-8) and the charge dated 28.04.2012 (Annexure P-11)
framed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, in the complaint
case titled 'Charan Dass v. Romi and others' , along with all the subsequent
proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioner.
2. Brief facts as emanating from the record are that Asha Nand alias
Assu, the son of the respondent-complainant Charan Dass, aged about 16 years,
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 2
went missing near river Ravi on 24.08.2003. His dead body was never
recovered. At the relevant time, the petitioner was posted as an Assistant Sub
Inspector and was incharge of Police Post Behrampur, District Gurdaspur. On
26.08.2003, the respondent appeared at the police post along with some
respectables of the village and his report was entered in the daily diary as DDR
No.6 (Annexure P-1). As per this report, Asha Nand had gone towards the river
on the morning of 24.08.2003 and it was being talked about in the village that
he had drowned while taking bath. The report further records that the
respondent and the respectables had been searching for his body but could not
find it. The report bears the signatures of the respondent and of six other
persons, including the Sarpanch, an Ex-Sarpanch and members of the
Panchayat. Since the death appeared to be accidental, no FIR was registered
and a copy of the report was handed over to the respondent.
3. The respondent, thereafter, approached the Punjab State Human
Rights Commission through his complaint dated 10.02.2004. On the directions
of the Commission, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur got an
inquiry conducted through a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Through his
report dated 31.03.2004 (Annexure P-2), the Senior Superintendent of Police
informed the Commission that Asha Nand had been sitting on the stones at the
bank of the river when his foot slipped and he fell into the water. The youths
of the village tried to save him but he drowned in the river. The report also
recorded that no truth was found in the complaints made by the respondent
against Romi, Suresh and Banti. The proceedings before the Commission were
closed on 22.03.2005 for want of appearance of the respondent. They were,
however, reopened at his request. Before the Commission, the respondent
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 3
stated that ASI Joginder Singh had colluded with the accused persons. Vide
order dated 09.08.2005 (Annexure P-3), the Commission agreed with the
report of the Senior Superintendent of Police and closed the proceedings, while
observing that the respondent was free to file a private complaint, if so advised.
4. On 18.01.2006, the respondent filed a complaint (Annexure P-4)
under Sections 302, 201, 120-B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short
'IPC') against Romi, Banti, Purshotam Lal, Suresh Kumar and the petitioner.
He alleged that Romi, Banti and Suresh Kumar had taken his son from his
house on 24.08.2003 for lifting sand from the river on a tractor-trolley. At
about 1:00 PM, his married daughter Rekha Rani went to the place of work to
give lunch to her brother but did not find him there. When she asked these
accused about her brother, they gave no satisfactory reply and abused her. On
the next day, the respondent read in the newspaper that his son had drowned in
the river. As per the complaint, the respondent then went to Police Post
Behrampur to make a statement against these three accused. The petitioner
recorded his statement and also took his signatures on some blank papers on
the pretext of investigation. After one or two days, the respondent came to
know that the petitioner, at the behest of accused Purshotam Lal, had destroyed
his original statement and had fabricated a false statement. It was further
alleged that on 25.12.2005, Purshotam Lal and the other accused came to the
house of the respondent and boasted that they had killed his son and thrown
him into the river.
5. In the preliminary evidence, the respondent appeared as CW-1
and examined his daughter Rekha Rani as CW-2 and Davinder Singh, Senior
Assistant of the Punjab State Human Rights Commission, as CW-3. Vide order
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 4
dated 14.07.2009 (Annexure P-5), the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Gurdaspur summoned all the accused, including the petitioner, to face trial for
the offences punishable under Sections 302, 201, 120-B and 34 IPC. The case
was then committed to the Court of Sessions.
6. Before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, the
petitioner, who had retired from service on 30.09.2008, moved an application
dated 09.04.2011 under Section 227 Cr.P.C. (Annexure P-6) seeking his
discharge. He pleaded that no sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. had been
obtained for his prosecution. He also pleaded that the ingredients of the
offences were not made out against him. The respondent opposed the
application through his reply (Annexure P-7). Vide the impugned order dated
27.04.2012 (Annexure P-8), the application was dismissed. Relying upon P.
Prakash IPS v. State of Kerala, 2011(3) RCR (Criminal) 578 , the learned trial
Court held that no sanction was required, as obtaining signatures on blank
papers was not a part of the official duty of a police officer. On 28.04.2012,
the impugned charge (Annexure P-11) was framed. The petitioner was
chargesheeted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for having
sharesheeted the common intention of his co-accused in the murder of Asha
Nand. He was also charged along with the other accused under Section 201
IPC for having destroyed the original statement of the respondent and
fabricated a false statement in order to save the culprits.
7. As discernible from the record, the petitioner had earlier
approached this Court twice. His previous petitions were dismissed as
withdrawn on 08.10.2012 and 24.09.2013. The latter was withdrawn after it
was pointed out that the charge had since been framed against him. The present
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 5
petition was then filed in March, 2014. On 27.07.2017, the learned trial Court
was directed to adjourn the case beyond the date fixed by this Court and the
interim order has continued since then. On 27.08.2026, learned counsel for the
petitioner sought time to place on record the statements of the witnesses
examined in the preliminary evidence. These statements, along with copies of
the applications made by the respondent to the Commission on 10.02.2004 and
31.05.2005, have been placed on record through CRM-41865-2026 as
Annexures P-12 to P-16.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner
has been falsely implicated in this case. The impugned orders are not
sustainable in the eyes of law. He had merely recorded the report of the
respondent in the daily diary in the discharge of his official duty. The
respondent had come to the police post along with the Sarpanch and other
respectables of the village, who had all signed the report. Neither in that report
nor in his first complaint to the Commission the respondent had raised any
suspicion of foul play against the petitioner. It is argued that the respondent
concealed the DDR in his complaint and later came out with a different story,
which was found to be false in the inquiry conducted by the Senior
Superintendent of Police. There is not even an allegation that the petitioner was
present at the time of the alleged occurrence on 24.08.2003 or had any
connection with the co-accused before that date. Thus, the charge under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC could not have been framed against him.
Learned counsel has further argued that no ingredient of Section 201 IPC is
made out, as there was no material showing that the petitioner knew or had
reason to believe that any offence had been committed. Moreso, there is
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 6
nothing on record to show that the petitioner caused disappearance of any
evidence of the offence of murder. It is also argued that the cognizance against
the petitioner was bad in the absence of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
Learned counsel has, therefore, prayed for setting aside the impugned order
and charge and for discharging the petitioner. To buttress his arguments
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the authorities cited as D.T.
Virupakshappa v. C. Subash, (2015) 12 SCC 231 , P.K. Choudhury v.
Commander, 48 BRTF (GREF), (2008) 13 SCC 229 , S.K. Zutshi and another
v. Bimal Debnath and another, (2004) 8 SCC 31 , P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala
and another, (2010) 2 SCC 398 and Anjani Kumar v. State of Bihar and
another, (2008) 5 SCC 248 .
9. Per contra , learned senior counsel for the respondent has argued
that the petitioner, having withdrawn his two earlier petitions, cannot file a
third petition on the same grounds. He has argued that the Commission had
expressly left it open to the respondent to file a private complaint and its order
does not bind the trial Court. The respondent and his daughter have
consistently stated in the preliminary evidence that the petitioner tore away the
original statement of the respondent and prepared a false one. Learned senior
counsel has further argued that destroying a statement and fabricating a record
to shield murderers can never be a part of the official duty of a police officer.
Hence, no sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was required. He has also argued
that the truth or otherwise of the allegations, as well as the question of sanction,
can be tested only during the trial and this Court cannot weigh the defence
material at the stage of framing of charge. Hence, it is urged that the petition is
liable to be dismissed. To buttress his arguments learned senior counsel has
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 7
relied upon the authorities cited as P. Prakash's case (supra) , Centre for
Public Interest Litigation and another v. Union of India and another, (2005)
8 SCC 202 , Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Gurmej Kaur and another, (1987) 4
SCC 663 and State of Maharashtra v. Devahari Devasingh Pawar and others,
(2008) 2 SCC 540 .
10. This Court has heard the rival submissions at considerable length,
besides going through the material placed on record.
11. At the very outset, it may be stated that the objection regarding
maintainability does not help the respondent. The first petition was filed for
quashing of the complaint and the second petition was a revision against the
order dated 27.04.2012. The revision was withdrawn 'at this stage' when it was
brought to the notice of this Court that the charge had been framed on
28.04.2012. The present petition is directed against that charge, which is a fresh
order giving rise to a fresh cause of action. Neither of the earlier petitions was
decided on merits. Moreover, the present petition has remained pending since
2014 and has been heard at length on merits. This Court does not find any
ground to non-suit the petitioner at this stage.
12. As regards the scope of interference, the principles governing the
stage of framing of charge were summarised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368 , wherein
it was held that the Court may sift the material for the limited purpose of
finding out whether a prima facie case is made out, but it cannot hold a roving
enquiry. Where the material gives rise only to suspicion, as distinguished from
grave suspicion, the accused is entitled to be discharged. The relevant part of
the judgment reads as under:
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 8
“(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
*
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise
to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion,
the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the
accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial
will end in conviction or acquittal.”
13. The same principles were reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in P. Vijayan's case (supra) , relied upon by learned counsel for the
petitioner. It is equally settled that the accused has no right to produce his own
material before the trial Court at the stage of framing of charge. Reliance in
this regard can be placed upon State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005)
1 SCC 568 . However, in the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
preserved the power of the High Court to look into material of unimpeachable
character in the following words:
“Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial
despite being in a position to produce material of
unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the
powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code
and Article 226 of Constitution of India is unlimited
whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can
make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal's
case.”
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 9
14. The test for the exercise of this power was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor,
(2013) 3 SCC 330 . The relevant part of the judgment reads as under:
“Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing
paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to
determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by
an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused
is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of
sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the
charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is
sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions
contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and
condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, has not been refuted by the
prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it
cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would
result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not
serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial
conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash
such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. ...”
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 10
15. Keeping the aforementioned principles in view, this Court first
takes up the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Section 34
IPC does not create a distinct offence. It makes a person liable for a criminal
act done by others only when that act is done in furtherance of a common
intention shared by him. In Jasdeep Singh alias Jassu v. State of Punjab,
(2022) 2 SCC 545 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is the proof of
common intention that is required and there may be an offence without
common intention, in which case Section 34 IPC is not attracted. Following
this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Constable 907 Surendra Singh
and another v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 INSC 114 observed as under:
“18. By now it is a settled principle of law that for
convicting the accused with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC
the prosecution must establish prior meetings of minds. It
must be established that all the accused had preplanned and
shared a common intention to commit the crime with the
accused who has actually committed the crime. It must be
established that the criminal act has been done in
furtherance of the common intention of all the accused. ...”
16. In the present case, the complaint, the statements of CW-1 and
CW-2 and the impugned charge itself do not attribute any role to the petitioner
in the events of 24.08.2003. It is nowhere alleged that he was present at the
bank of the river, that he knew the co-accused or that he had met them before
Asha Nand went missing. The only act attributed to him relates to what
allegedly happened at the police post after the respondent read the news of the
drowning in the newspaper. Even if this allegation is taken to be correct, an act
done after the alleged occurrence to help the offenders cannot, by itself, make
a person a participant in the murder. This Court is of the considered opinion
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 11
that there is no material at all, much less material raising a grave suspicion, to
frame a charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the
petitioner. The learned trial Court did not give any reason for framing this
charge against him and the same cannot be sustained.
17. The next question is whether the charge under Section 201 IPC
can survive. In Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the ingredients of this offence as under:
“In order to establish the charge under section 201, Indian
Penal Code, it is essential to prove that an offence has been
committed-mere suspicion that it has been committed is not
sufficient, that the accused knew or had reason to believe
that such offence had been committed, and with the
requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the
offender from legal punishment causes the evidence thereof
to disappear or gives false information respecting such
offences knowing or having reason to believe the same to
be false.”
18. The aforesaid view was reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in
Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502 , wherein it was held as
under:
“15. ... It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring
home an offence under Section 201 IPC, a mere suspicion
is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence
to prove that the accused knew or had information sufficient
to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed
and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear
in order to screen the offender, known or unknown.”
19. When the record of the present case is examined in the light of
these principles, the following facts come to light. Firstly, DDR No.6 dated
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 12
26.08.2003 is not a document prepared by the petitioner alone at his own
instance. It records that the respondent came to the police post along with the
respectables of the village. It bears the signatures of the respondent as well as
six other persons, including the Sarpanch, an Ex-Sarpanch and members of the
Panchayat. The respondent's case is that his own signatures were taken on
blank papers. However, neither in the complaint nor in his statement as CW-1
has he said anything about the signatures of these six persons. None of them
has been examined and it is not his case that they too were made to sign blank
papers. Secondly, in his application dated 10.02.2004 to the Commission
(Annexure P-15), which was his earliest written grievance on record, the
respondent stated that he had reported the matter at Police Post Behrampur on
27.08.2003 but no action was taken. There is not a word in this application
about the tearing away of his statement or about any collusion of the petitioner
with the other accused. Thirdly, when the inquiry report mentioned that he had
signed the report, the respondent, in his reply dated 31.05.2005 (Annexure P-
16), did not deny his signatures. He only referred to a letter dated 20.10.2003
addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, which has not been placed on record.
The allegation of collusion against the petitioner surfaced for the first time
before the Commission on 09.08.2005, about two years after the incident.
Fourthly, the statement of CW-2 regarding the events at the police post is
hearsay, as she does not claim to have accompanied her father there. CW-3
only proved the record of the Commission. Lastly, the body of Asha Nand was
never found. On 26.08.2003, the only information before the petitioner was
that a boy was believed to have drowned in the river while taking bath, as
recorded in the presence of the respectables of the village.
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 13
20. These documents are the respondent's own applications and
official records whose authenticity is not in dispute. Their contents have not
been refuted. In the opinion of this Court, they satisfy the test laid down in
Rajiv Thapar's case (supra) . On the basis of this material, it cannot be said
that the petitioner knew or had reason to believe on 26.08.2003 that a murder
had been committed. Nor is there any material, apart from the bald and belated
allegation of the respondent, to show that he destroyed any statement. The
allegation that the petitioner acted at the behest of accused Purshotam Lal is
also not supported by any particulars. This Court is conscious that the
respondent has lost his young son and his anguish is understandable. However,
a criminal trial on a charge of this nature cannot be allowed to continue against
a person on the strength of suspicion alone. In view of the above, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the material on record does not raise a grave
suspicion against the petitioner for the offence under Section 201 IPC either.
21. Coming to the plea of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C., the
judgments on this point require careful consideration. In D. Devaraja v. Owais
Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
protection is attracted when the act is reasonably connected with the official
duty, even if the police officer exceeded his powers. The relevant part of the
judgment reads as under:
“69. Every offence committed by a police officer does not
attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read
with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The
protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka
Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available
only when the alleged act done by the public servant is
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 14
reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty
and official duty is not merely a cloak for the objectionable
act.
*
71. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in
excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection between
the act and the performance of the official duty, the fact that
the act alleged is in excess of duty will not be ground
enough to deprive the policeman of the protection of
government sanction for initiation of criminal action against
him.”
22. The aforementioned view was followed in G.C. Manjunath and
others v. Seetaram, 2025 INSC 439 , wherein it was held that where there is a
reasonable link between the act complained of and the official duty, 'the
protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police
Act is attracted'. On the other hand, in Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar
Upadhyay and others, 2024 INSC 979 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
fabrication of a false case is no part of the official duty of a police officer. The
relevant part of the judgment reads as under:
“66. ... This Court has held in a legion of decisions that any
misuse or abuse of powers by a public servant to do
something that is impermissible in law like threatening to
provide a tutored statement or trying to obtain signatures on
a blank sheet of paper; causing the illegal detention of an
accused; engaging in a criminal conspiracy to create false
or fabricated documents; conducting a search with the sole
object of harassing and threatening individuals, amongst
others, cannot fall under the protective umbrella of Section
197 CrPC.
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 15
67. In light of the same, it follows that when a police official
is said to have lodged a false case, he cannot claim that
sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC was
required since it can be no part of the official duty of a
public official to lodge a bogus case and fabricate evidence
or documents in connection with the same. ..."
*
"74. The legal position that emerges from the discussion of
the aforesaid case laws is that:
(i) There might arise situations where the complaint or the
police report may not disclose that the act constituting the
offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge
of official duty. However, the facts subsequently coming to
light may establish the necessity for sanction. Therefore, the
question whether sanction is required or not is one that may
arise at any stage of the proceeding and it may reveal itself
in the course of the progress of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
(iv) Courts must avoid the premature staying or quashing of
criminal trials at the preliminary stage since such a measure
may cause great damage to the evidence that may have to
be adduced before the appropriate trial court.”
23. These judgments are not in conflict. All of them apply the same
test of reasonable connection between the act complained of and the official
duty. In Devaraja's case (supra) and G.C. Manjunath's case (supra) , the acts
complained of were committed by the police officers in the course of
investigation and were held to be connected with their duty. In Om Prakash
Yadav's case (supra) , the allegation was that the police officers had registered
an entirely bogus case to create an alibi for a murder accused, which had no
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 16
connection with any duty. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for
the petitioner apply the same test. In D.T. Virupakshappa's case (supra) , the
alleged excesses were committed by a police officer during the investigation
of a case, while in S.K. Zutshi's case (supra) , Anjani Kumar's case (supra)
and P.K. Choudhury's case (supra) , the acts complained of were found to be
connected with the official duties of the public servants concerned. On the
other hand, in Devahari Devasingh Pawar's case (supra) , relied upon by
learned senior counsel for the respondent, tampering with entries in official
registers and tearing pages from them were held to have no nexus with official
duty. The same distinction was drawn in Centre for Public Interest
Litigation's case (supra) . The allegation against the petitioner is that he
obtained the signatures of the respondent on blank papers, destroyed his
statement and fabricated a false one. If such an allegation were established, it
would fall squarely within the acts which, as held in Om Prakash Yadav's case
(supra) and Devahari Devasingh Pawar's case (supra) , cannot claim the
protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court took the same view
while relying upon P. Prakash's case (supra) . Besides, Section 197(1) Cr.P.C.
protects only those public servants who are not removable from office save by
or with the sanction of the Government. An Assistant Sub Inspector is not such
an officer. His protection would, therefore, depend upon a notification issued
by the State Government under Section 197(3) Cr.P.C. No such notification of
the State of Punjab has been brought to the notice of this Court. Hence, the plea
of the petitioner regarding want of sanction cannot be accepted and the order
dated 27.04.2012 does not call for interference. However, the question of
sanction is distinct from the question whether there is any material at all against
MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document

CRM-M-10909-2014 (O&M) 17
the petitioner to frame a charge. Since this Court has found that there is no such
material, the petitioner is entitled to be discharged on merits.
24. In view of the above discussion, the present petition is partly
allowed in the following terms:-
(i) the prayer for setting aside the order dated 27.04.2012
(Annexure P-8) is declined;
(ii) the charge dated 28.04.2012 (Annexure P-11), in so far as
it relates to the petitioner, is set aside and the petitioner is
discharged in the complaint case titled as ‘Charan Dass v.
Romi and others’ ;
(iii) the interim order stands vacated and the learned trial Court
shall proceed with the trial against the remaining accused
and make every endeavour to conclude it within a period of
one year from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order;
(iv) nothing observed herein shall be construed as an expression
of opinion on the merits of the case against the remaining
accused.
23. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s)
disposed of.
17.11.2026 (MANISHA BATRA)
Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari
JUDGE


Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No

MOHAMMAD WASEEM ANSARI
2026.11.17 15:39
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document