Spo/Constable Irb Satpal Singh vs State Of Punjab

NON-REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 798

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9749 OF 2016

SPO/CONSTABLE IRB SATPAL SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. … RESPONDENTS


J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Reversal of an original decree in a first appeal resulting in dismissal
of a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction, since affirmed by
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in a second
appeal, is under challenge.
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2. The present civil appeal by special leave, granted on 23 September,
2016, is at the instance of the appellant who, as plaintiff, had
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successfully instituted a suit in the trial court . He had prayed for
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declaration that the act of the defendant no.3 in not allowing him to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR
Date: 2026.08.04
18:51:33 IST
Reason:

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Civil Suit No. 189 of 2008
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Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gurdaspur
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Commandant, First IRB, Patiala
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join as Constable in Indian Reserve Battalion and the act of the
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defendant no.2 in not allowing him to join as Special Police Officer
in Batala district are illegal, invalid, unlawful, null and void and that
he is entitled to join as a Constable or Special Police Officer, as the
case may be, with consequential relief of mandatory injunction
directing the defendants to allow him to join treating the intervening
period from the date of termination of service till reinstatement as on
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duty with all service benefits. The trial court decreed the suit on 2
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December, 2011. Defendants 1 and 2 were directed to reinstate the
appellant with continuity of service and all other consequential
benefits within three months; however, the appellant was held not
entitled to wages from the date of his dismissal till reinstatement.
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3. Defendants in the suit carried the decree in appeal before the District
Judge, Gurdaspur. They succeeded before the appellate court which,
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vide judgment and decree dated 21 May, 2014, set aside the decree
under challenge and dismissed the suit of the appellant.
4. Thoroughly dissatisfied, the appellant moved the High Court in an
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appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 . The
High Court dismissed the appeal by its judgment and decree dated
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12 May, 2016, which is impugned in this appeal.

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IRB
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Senior Superintendent of Police, Batala
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State of Punjab
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C.A. No. 20 of 2012
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R.S.A. No. 4771 of 2014 (O&M)
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CPC
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5. The short question arising for decision is whether reversal of the
original decree resulting in denial of relief to the appellant, which was
granted to him by the trial court, suffers from any error warranting
interference.
6. For answering this question, we need to note the facts in brief which
resulted in the appellant’s service being terminated. The order of
termination of service is not on record and whether the appellant was
dismissed or removed is not too clear. However, the materials suggest
that termination was brought about by discharge.
7. The pleaded case of the appellant was that he came to be appointed
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on 17 October, 1991 as Special Police Officer in Police District Batala.
While performing official duty efficiently and without any blemish, he
was selected for appointment as Constable in First IRB, Patiala vide
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a letter dated 27 August, 2002. Despite having reported on 30
August, 2002 in the office of the Commandant, IRB, Patiala, he was
denied joining on the ground of pendency of a criminal case.
Incidentally, at the relevant time, the appellant was an accused in FIR
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No. 159 dated 20 July, 2001 under Sections 324/326/34, Indian
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Penal Code, 1860 registered at Police Station Sadar, Pathankot. He
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was tried by the magistrate . Trial culminated in the appellant’s
conviction under Section 324/326, IPC and sentence of rigorous
imprisonment for 2 (two) and 3 (three) years’, respectively vide

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IPC
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Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pathankot
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judgment and order dated 21 April, 2006. In appeal, the appellate
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court vide judgment dated 27 August, 2007 maintained the
conviction under Section 324, IPC but set aside the conviction under
Section 326, IPC. We consider it appropriate to reproduce below
relevant portions from the order on sentence:
“… . The accused is a first offender and had not repeated any kind of
delinquent act since 2001 which is circumstances to be taken into
consideration to release the accused on probation. It is evident that
the FIR dates back to the 24.08.2001 and more than six years had
elapsed during which the accused Sat Pal had been suffering the
agony of the trial. … Hence, the accused is ordered to be released on
probation of good conduct for the period of two years on furnishing
probation bond of Rs.10,000/- and cost of litigation is assessed to be
Rs.3,000/- and it is directed that the fine of Rs.500/- already paid
will be adjusted in the costs and he will now pay the cost of
Rs.2,500/-. … The accused having been convicted had lost face in the
society and the accused had been released on probation with the
further direction that the conviction shall not affect his service career.
The opinion of this court is fortified in the judgment of our Hon’ble
High Court in the case Jaswant Singh vs. The State of Punjab
1989 (2) RCR 162. This direction will form part of the judgment and
now file be consigned to the record-room.”

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8. On 14 January, 2003, the appellant was discharged from service
with reference to pending criminal proceedings against him. This is
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an admitted fact .
9. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended
that the respondent acted illegally in discharging him from service at
a point of time when the criminal case was pending. No conviction
having been recorded against the appellant, mere pendency of a

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Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur
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paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit of the respondents filed in this proceeding
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criminal case did not authorize the defendants to terminate his
service.
10. Next, Mr. Gupta contended that the Additional Sessions Judge had
made it clear, while releasing the appellant on probation, that his
conviction under Section 324, IPC would not affect his service career.
Respondents did not challenge the order of the Additional Sessions
Judge and, therefore, the same attained finality. In such view of the
matter and particularly having regard to Section 12 of the Probation
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of Offenders Act, 1958 , it was legitimately expected that the
respondents would reinstate the appellant in service; not having done
so, the respondents must be held to have acted in an arbitrary
manner.
11. Mr. Gupta then contended that the respondents had acted in clear
breach of the principles of natural justice. Appellant was neither put
to notice nor heard before the order of discharge was made; and this
constitutes a valid ground based on which intervention by this Court
is warranted in favour of the appellant to set things right.
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12. While conceding that the order dated 14 January, 2003 discharging
the appellant from service was not under challenge and also that
reinstatement at this distance of time may not be appropriate, Mr.
Gupta implored the Court to award damages to the appellant for the
wrongful termination of service brought about by the respondents.

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1958 Act
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13. Per contra , Mr. Karan Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents contended that the appeal is absolutely without any
merit. Referring to the decisions of this Court, which were placed for
consideration before the High Court, he urged that the appeal merits
outright dismissal.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials on record together with the decisions cited at the bar.
15. The main thrust of Mr. Gupta’s submission rests on the observation
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of the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur that the conviction
under Section 324, IPC shall not affect the service career of the
appellant. According to him, the decision having attained finality,
nothing including the conviction prevented the respondents from
reinstating the appellant in service.
16. The Sessions Judge seems to have drawn inspiration from the
decision of a Single Judge of the High Court in Jaswant Singh v.
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The State of Punjab . Though not challenged by the respondents,
we have no hesitation to record that such an observation is in the
teeth of a catena of decisions of this Court which perhaps were not
cited before the Sessions Judge.
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17. Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellapan , Trikha Ram v. V.K.
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Seth , Union of India v. Bakshi Ram , Karam Singh v. State

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Sessions Judge
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(1989) 2 RCR (Cri) 162 = 1989 SCC OnLine P&H 290
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(1976) 3 SCC 190
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1987 Suppl. SCC 39
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(1990) 2 SCC 426
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of Punjab and DIG of Police v. P.R.K. Mohan are authorities,
predating the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge, which
consistently laid down the proposition of law that mere release of a
convict on probation under the 1958 Act does not wash away the
conviction and even though benefit is given under the 1958 Act, the
convicted person can be removed from service solely based on his
conviction. All these decisions together with the decisions in Shankar
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Dass v. Union of India , State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ranjit
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Singh and Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram
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Sajivan were noticed in a subsequent decision in Sushil Kumar
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Singhal v. Punjab National Bank where this Court speaking
through Hon’ble B.S. Chauhan, J. held as follows:
18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that the conviction of an employee in an offence permits
the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against
the employee or to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal
only on the basis of his conviction. The word “disqualification”
contained in Section 12 of the 1958 Act refers to a disqualification
provided in other statutes, as explained by this Court in the
abovereferred cases, and the employee cannot claim a right to
continue in service merely on the ground that he had been given the
benefit of probation under the 1958 Act.
(emphasis ours)
18. We defer to the above referred precedents. The decision in Jaswant
Singh (supra) did not notice the decision in T.R. Chellapan (supra)
and Trikha Ram (supra), which were rendered at a prior point of

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(1996) 7 SCC 748
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(1997) 11 SCC 571
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(1985) 2 SCC 358
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(1999) 2 SCC 617
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(2007) 9 SCC 86
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(2010) 8 SCC 573
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time and, hence, it has to be held that Jaswant Singh (supra) does
not lay down correct law. We wish to clarify that though Union of
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India v. Tulsiram Patel partly overruled T.R. Chellapan (supra),
the observations relevant for a decision in this appeal were not
disturbed.
19. Be that as it may, we wish to provide an additional line of reasoning
in support of our conclusion that Section 12 of the 1958 Act cannot
come to the rescue of a convict-employee released on probation
insofar as affectation of his service career is concerned.
20. It would be profitable to note what Section 12 of the 1958 Act
postulates. It reads:
12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction .—
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found
guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3
or Section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a
conviction of an offence under such law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who,
after his release under Section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the
original offence.

21. The precedents referred to in Sushil Kumar Singhal (supra)
examined Section 12 of the 1958 Act, a non-obstante clause, in some
detail. Our understanding of Section 12 is this. A plain reading thereof
makes the position clear that it has two components, the second
explaining the first: (i) a convict released on probation under Section
3 or 4 shall not suffer any disqualification even though a law may
provide for his disqualification; but (ii) the disqualification has to be

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(1985) 3 SCC 398
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one attaching to such conviction for the offence concerned under that
law. The words “shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a
conviction of an offence under such law” are important. The same
cannot be stretched to mean that release on probation would operate
as a bar to terminate the service of a convict if he is in public
employment and to whom the provisions of Article 311 of the
Constitution apply. Release on probation does not obliterate the
conviction. Primary object of releasing a convict on probation is his
reformation and rehabilitation as a useful and self-reliant member of
society without subjecting him to the deleterious effects of prison life.
However, on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on
a criminal charge notwithstanding release on probation, the holder of
a civil post under the State can be proceeded against in view of the
second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 and be dismissed or
removed from service or reduced in rank without any enquiry. If
dismissed or removed, such termination of service because of a
conviction could be seen as one attaching to a conviction in view of
the second proviso referred to above. However, the word “law” used
in Section 12 refers to a general or special law that the Constitution
empowers the Parliament/Legislatures to enact and it (Section 12)
cannot and does not take within its sweep the Constitution itself to
which it owes its origin. Though the words “any disqualification” by
themselves could perhaps be seen as wide enough to cover a case
even of termination of service, nonetheless, the scope of these words
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requires interpretation in the context of the non-obstante clause
which does not exclude operation of a constitutional provision.
22. Since, however, we are not too certain of the appellant’s nature of
appointment, we refrain from rejecting the argument of Mr. Gupta on
this ground but for all the precedents noted above, we hold that
Section 12 of the 1958 Act is incapable of the construction sought to
be put upon it by Mr. Gupta to persuade us hold in the appellant’s
favour.
23. Having so held, we proceed to deal with the other points raised by
Mr. Gupta.
24. This appeal has originated from a suit and not a writ petition. Powers
of the civil court are not as wide as the powers of a writ court; hence,
the appellant must be held to be bound by the rules of procedure
meaning thereby the CPC. This appeal being a continuation of the lis
has to be decided based on the pleadings, the evidence led and the
relief claimed. The plaint and the written statement as well as the
evidence are not on record. Our narration of facts is sourced from the
judgments of the courts below. There is no reference to the order of
appointment of the appellant anywhere in any of the three
judgments. This has disabled us to ascertain the precise nature of his
appointment. It is further significant to note that the order of
discharge was never challenged by the appellant while inter alia
claiming reinstatement in service. Without any prayer for amendment
of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17, CPC and or an application for
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producing additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 thereof, we
have no other option but to limit our scrutiny to the materials on
record. Despite all these shortcomings, we can hold without any
doubt that the appellant was extended a raw deal by reason of he
being discharged from service merely on the ground of pendency of
a criminal case. The fact of discharge on the stated ground is
admitted by the respondents. That the appellant at a later stage stood
convicted under Section 324, IPC cannot cure the illegality vitiating
the order of discharge when it was made. It is possible, because of
ill-advice, the frame of the suit was not proper. Appellant did not
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challenge the order of discharge dated 14 January, 2003. Even the
prayers were defective. Relief of reinstatement in service could not
have been granted by the civil court in view of Section 14 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. It is only damages that the appellant could
have claimed and been awarded. Mr. Gupta did not dispute such
position.
25. But, can or should the resultant deficiencies noticed above completely
absolve the respondents of consequences arising from such an illegal
and arbitrary act? The answer has to be in the negative.
26. Appellant was discharged from service not because of his conviction
on a criminal charge but merely on the ground of pendency of the
criminal case. He was not given an opportunity of raising his defence.
We have not been shown any law which authorises a public employer
to either dismiss or remove an employee serving the police for more
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than a decade solely on the ground of pendency of a criminal case.
The act of termination of service, in the circumstances, cannot be
justified.
27. To do complete justice between the parties, we invoke our power
under Article 142 of the Constitution and direct the respondents to
pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakh) only to the
appellant within 3 (three) months from date. A higher amount could
have been awarded but for lack of information on vital aspects,
noticed above, for which the appellant too cannot escape blame.
28. The civil appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the above terms.
29. Connected applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.



………..…………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



…………..………………J.
(SHEEL NAGU)


NEW DELHI;
August 04, 2026.

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