Harinder Pal Singh vs Directorate Of Enforcement
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CRM-M-29227-2026 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
203-2 CRM-M-29227-2026
Harinder Pal Singh ....Petitioner
V/s
Directorate of Enforcement thr.
Assistant Director Chandigarh ....Respondent
Date of decision: 13.11.2026
Date of Uploading : 16.11.2026
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Bipan Ghai, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Nikhil Ghai, Advocate and Mr. Akhil, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. H.S. Oberoi, Advocate for the respondent-ED.
*
SUMEET GOEL , J.
1. The present petition (hereinafter referred to as ‘ petition in
hand’ ) has been filed by the petitioner –– Harinder Pal Singh for grant of
regular bail in PMLA prosecution complaint No.COMA/25/2025 arising out
of ECIR No.CDJO-I/02/2024 dated 09.02.2024 registered by Enforcement
Directorate (hereinafter referred to as ‘ ED ’) under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PMLA’ ).
2. For the sake of convenience, the relevant factual milieu has
been drawn from the order dated 03.04.2026 passed by passed by the
learned Special Judge, PMLA, Panchkula (whereby regular bail plea of the
petitioner was rejected) which reads thus:
“2. As per the case set up by Directorate of Enforcement, on
19.10.2023, an FIR No.266 was registered by Himachal Police, Mandi
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with the allegations that complainant namely Rajesh Saini was de-frauded
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to the tune of 12,60,390/- by Ramesh Chauhan etc. in the guise of QFX
Group of Companies. Said persons had introduced the complainant to
QFX Trade Limited and informed that said company was in the business
of investing in Forex and that there was return on the investment @ 5%
per month. For that reason, the complainant was allured and he invested
the money stated above from his bank account. As security, he was given
post-dated cheques but the account on which the said cheques were
drawn, was found to be blocked.
3. According to ED, apart from the FIR mentioned above, there were
as many as seven other such FIRs registered against Ramesh Chauhan
etc., QFX Trade Limited, Navab @ Lavish Choudhary, Ashadul Islam,
Rekhchandra Morya and others wherein as well, same modus operandi of
said persons came to be identified. One of those FIRs bearing
No.102/2024 dated 18.07.2024 was registered at P.S.Sector-20,
Panchkula, Haryana on the complaint of Shri Ashwani Kumar, Resident
of House No.55-P, Sector-19, Panchkula. Since FIR No.266/2023 was
registered for commission of scheduled offences, ED proceeded to record
an ECIR bearing No.ECIR/CDZO-I/02/2024 dated 09.02.2024 and
commenced investigation.
4. It may be mentioned here that the predicate agency after
investigation, filed a charge-sheet in respect of afore-mentioned FIR and
the findings returned therein by the IO were duly considered whereupon it
came to be known that about Rs.210 crores were invested by the investors
in the company through unregulated deposit scheme run by the accused,
out of which, pay out was of 116 crores approximately and, thus, it was
found that QFX and other entities were running full fledged syndicate of
crime de-frauding innocent investors by running Multi Level Marketing
(MLM) Scheme on the pretext of Forex trading yet promising fixed
returns thereby alluring innocent investors.
5. During investigation undertaken by ED, statements of main agents
of M/s QFX Trade Limited namely Kewal Krishan, Jitender Julee etc.
were recorded and it was revealed that Navab @ Lavish Choudhary was
the mastermind behind the fraud and he was operating from Dubai and
after registration of FIR at Mandi (HP), main accused Rajender Kumar
Sood etc. fled to Dubai. Thus, during course of investigation, according to
ED, it came to be revealed that funds were being collected in cash from
benami accounts; return of investments were being paid in cash or in
form of Crypto Coin; investment model was such where-under investors
were required to bring more investors and the majority of them, ended up
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losing their money; investors were being lured with various additional
income over and above the returns on the investments and they were also
being lured with foreign trips and SUV vehicles on achieving certain
targets.
6. Thus, respondent-ED has come up with a case that though actual
masterminds and most of the agents have fled the country but criminal
syndicate has been running in India through top agents, who are in direct
touch with the masterminds and they are involved in generation of huge
proceeds of crime (POC) and one such agent is accused Harinder Pal
Singh of "Singh Brothers" whose brother namely Harjit Singh's role has
also surfaced during investigation but as per the information received, he
too has fled to Dubai on 13.09.2025. Respondent-ED maintains that
statement of one Mohmmad Asif recorded on 03.02.2025 under Section 50
of PMLA has disclosed about criminal activities of accused Harinder Pal
Singh and he is the one who while acting as top agent of Chandigarh, has
been managing more than 80,000/- investors and is head of Singh
Brothers team. Respondent-ED also refers to a statement of one another
agent namely Nawab Hassan, recorded under Section 17 of PMLA, who
too mentioned the names of the said brothers and, therefore, respondent -
ED has alleged that applicant-accused Harinder Pal Singh has been
working as a main agent for the masterminds of the entire fraudulent
scheme, who works directly under the directions and instructions of
Navab @ Lavish Choudhary and in this manner, he has been not only
duping the innocent investors by providing them false hopes and dreams
but has also been duping new investors thereby tempting them top invest
their hard earned money in their fraudulent schemes with false promises
of high returns on their investments”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner; led by Mr. Bipan Ghai,
Senior Advocate; has argued that the petitioner has been falsely implicated
into the instant case and his continued incarceration is not warranted in the
factual milieu of the case in hand. Learned senior counsel has further
iterated that the petitioner was neither named in the original FIR No.266
dated 19.10.2023, registered at Police Station Bhal, District Mandi,
Himachal Pradesh nor has any specific role been attributed to him in the
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said FIR. According to learned senior counsel, the petitioner was also not
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named in the original ECIR and his implication in the present proceedings is
primarily based upon the statements allegedly recorded under Section 50 of
the PMLA. It has been further contended that the petitioner is a permanent
resident of Punjab and was working as a Government School Teacher.
Learned senior counsel has emphasized that the petitioner has unblemished
antecedents and there is no material to suggest that he has ever misused the
process of law or attempted to influence any witness.
3.1. Learned senior counsel has further contended that the
allegations regarding the role of the petitioner as a top agent and the alleged
number of investors brought by him are matters which would require
appreciation of evidence during the course of trial and cannot, by
themselves, justify his continued incarceration for an indefinite period. It
has been further contended that the petitioner was arrested on 16.09.2025,
whereas his formal arrest has been shown on 17.09.2025. Learned senior
counsel has questioned the legality of the arrest of the petitioner and has
contended that the mandatory safeguards contemplated under Section 19 of
the PMLA and the Constitutional protection available under Articles 21 and
22 of the Constitution of India have not been duly complied with. It has
been further contended that the grounds of arrest were vague and were not
effectively communicated to the petitioner in the manner required by law.
Furthermore, the investigation qua the petitioner stands completed and the
prosecution complaint whereof was filed on 14.11.2025. Learned senior
counsel has further contended that the respondent- ED has already collected
the relevant document(s); examined the petitioner and seized the electronic
devices & other material relied upon in support of its allegations and hence
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no useful purpose would be served by keeping him behind the bars
particularly when no further custodial interrogation is required.
3.2. Learned senior counsel has further contended that the petitioner
has been in custody for a considerable period of time i.e. since
16/17.09.2025 and the prosecution complaint cites 49 prosecution witnesses
as also 147 relied upon documents running into more than 12,400 pages, the
trial is at pre-cognizance stage and, thus, the prospect of conclusion of trial
in near future is bleak.
On the strength of these grounds, the grant of petition in hand
is entreated for.
4. In oppugnation, learned counsel appearing for the ED, has
opposed the petition in hand by arguing that the allegations against the
petitioner are serious in nature and relate to a large-scale organized
investment fraud involving thousands of innocent investors. Referring to
reply filed by way of application i.e. CRM-37976-2026, learned counsel has
contended that the investigation has revealed that the petitioner, along with
his associate Harjit Singh, operated under the name of ID ‘Singh Brothers’
and was instrumental in bringing a large number of investors and sub-agents
into the scheme. The relevant part of the said reply reads thus:
“21. Role of the Petitioner/Accused:-
Active participant and top agent in the fraudulent scheme:
Harinder Pal Singh was found to be a top agent operating under
the ID "SINGH BROTHERS" on the FIXALPHA and BOTBRO
platforms. Digital records show 87,278 investors/agents/sub-
agents associated with this ID, with aggregate investments of
approximately USD 10.09 crore and commission/IB income of
approximately USD 25.13 lakh, demonstrating the scale of his
involvement.
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Knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the scheme:
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In his statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA,
Harinder Pal Singh admitted that no genuine forex/Al-based
trading was actually being undertaken through
QFX/YFX/BOTBRO and associated portals such as
ONESTEPFIX, FIXALPHA and CROSSMARKET.AI. He further
admitted that the purported trading activity was represented to
investors to induce investments and that payouts to earlier
investors were made from funds received from subsequent
investors.
Receipt and layering of Proceeds of Crime: Analysis of the bank
accounts of Harinder Pal Singh and his wife revealed receipt of
Rs. 90,49,880/-, comprising credits identified as
commissions/withdrawals from QFX/YFX/BOTBRO and its
associated portals, as well as transactions routed through third-
party accounts. His own statements and the banking trail
corroborate the receipt and layering of such funds.
Conversion and utilisation of PoC for acquisition of assets: A
substantial portion of the identified PoC was utilised for
acquisition of two immovable properties at High Tech City, Chhat,
Zirakpur, for an aggregate consideration of Rs. 80 lakh, with
payments traced to his PNB account in which PoC had been
received. Further, investigation and digital evidence revealed
acquisition of five immovable properties in Dubai, having a total
consideration paid of AED 61,52,744, with the properties standing
in his name and the funds for their acquisition linked to the
proceeds generated through the network.
Conscious concealment/destruction of evidence:
Immediately after being intercepted at Chandigarh Airport on
16.09.2025, Harinder Pal Singh performed a factory reset of his
mobile phone, allegedly pursuant to directions received from his
leader in the QFX/YFX network. This conduct, viewed alongside
his admissions, digital evidence, banking trail and acquisition of
assets, indicates his conscious involvement, knowledge and active
participation in the acquisition, possession, concealment, transfer
and utilisation of Proceeds of Crime generated through the
fraudulent investment scheme”
4.1. Raising submissions in tandem with the aforesaid reply,
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the alleged recovery and analysis of electronic data, bank transactions and
property documents. It has been further contended that the petitioner
received proceeds of crime through several bank accounts and utilized the
same for acquiring immovable properties in India as well as abroad. It has
been further contended that the conduct of the petitioner in allegedly wiping
the data from his mobile phone at Chandigarh Airport clearly reflects his
intention to destroy material evidence. Furthermore, the petitioner was
allegedly going to Dubai when he was intercepted by the officers of the ED
at the airport and the possibility of his fleeing from the country, thus, cannot
be ruled out. Learned counsel has emphasized that the offence under
Section 3 of the PMLA is a distinct offence as also the fact that the name of
the petitioner did not figure in the predicate FIR would not, by itself,
absolve him of the allegations of money laundering.
4.2. Learned counsel has further urged that the factum of the
petitioner being incarcerated for a period of more than 01 year in the ECIR
in question vis-à-vis the nature of allegations against him do not, ipso facto,
warrant his release on regular bail.
Thus, dismissal of the petition in hand is canvassed for.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and have
gone through the available record of the case.
6. Before proceeding further, it would be opposite to refer herein
to a judgment passed by this Court titled as Varun Puri vs. Directorate of
Enforcement = 2026: PHHC:112452 whereinafter; relying upon
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar reported as (1980) 1
SCC 81 , Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak reported as (1992) 1 SCC
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225, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another,
2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494, Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of
Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311, V. Senthil Balaji versus The Deputy
Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC Online SC 2626, Manish
Sisodia versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2024(12) SCC 660 , Padam
Chand Jain versus Enforcement Directorate, 2025 SCC Online SC 1291,
Kapil Wadhawan versus Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 SCC
Online SC 3038 and Arvind Dham versus Directorate of Enforcement,
2026 SCC Online SC 30; this Court has held thus:
“1. To divest a human being of physical freedom prior to an
adjudication of guilt is an extraordinary, almost desperate concession
made by the social contract to the demands of public order. In a
constitutional order, the temporary deprivation of an individual’s liberty
pending trial is permitted solely as an ephemeral, strictly necessary
safeguard to ensure that justice may take its course. It is a concession
strictly conditioned upon the absolute brevity and necessity of such
restraint. Yet, when judicial custody ceases to be a brief prelude to trial
and degenerates into years of indefinite confinement, the state silently
commits a gravity of wrong that strikes at the very marrow of human
dignity. The antiquity of this limitation finds its genesis in Roman
nd
jurisprudence, where Ulpian, a 2 Century Roman jurist, recorded the
core precept governing pre-trial/under-trial detention: Carcer ad
continendos homines, non ad puniendos haberi debet , i.e. a prison ought
to be used strictly for keeping men, not for punishing them.
Pertinently, pre-trial/under-trial detention is purely preventive
and temporary; it can never be permitted to degenerate into substantive
punishment. When judicial custody stretches across years without the
realistic prospect of an early trial, the prison wall ceases to serve as a
vessel of lawful restraint and assumes the oppressive character of an un-
adjudicated sentence. Indefinite incarceration without the immediate
prospect of trial is, in truth, the judicial equivalent of the infamous Lettres
de Cachet ; it substitutes the arbitrary certainty of the prison wall for the
majesty of a lawful verdict. The intolerance for delayed justice, is
evidenced by the fact that as early as the 13th Century, long before the
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contemporary lexicon of human rights was articulated, Clause 40 of
Magna Carta (1215) decreed that realisation of right and justice shall not
be delayed; relevant whereof (translated) reads thus:
“To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”
1.1 Exposing the subtle and insidious danger of such untried
confinement, Sir William Blackstone, in his seminal Commentaries on the
Laws of England (1765–1769, Book 1, Chapter 1) , treated confinement
without swift trial as an existential threat to free society, relevant whereof
reads thus:
“To bereave a man of his life, or by violence to confiscate his
estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and
notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of
tyranny throughout the whole kingdom: but confinement of the
person, by secretly sending him to gaol, where his sufferings are
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.”
Ergo, to hold an individual in endless pre-trial captivity is to treat
their life and time as expendable commodities. It forgets that human
personality is endowed with intrinsic worth, and that living with dignity is
an absolute constitutional imperative, not a luxury granted by state grace.
When an untried prisoner is left to wither in a cell, his reputation is
shattered, family structure is annihilated, and humanism is paralyzed.
Ergo, the law must maintain that pre-trial detention remains an
extraordinary exception, and prolonged incarceration prior to conviction
an intolerable contradiction of the Rule of Law.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
9. Pertinently, except for a few scattered procedural directives
contained within certain special enactments, the statutory law(s)
contains no express legislative provision guaranteeing “speedy trial” as
a codified, standalone right. Yet, under the expansive and humanistic
interpretation accorded to Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (supra) elevated speedy
trial from a mere procedural aspiration to an indelible, fundamental
constitutional guarantee. It was firmly established that any procedure
which fails to ensure a reasonably expeditious trial cannot be regarded
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This constitutional imperative assumes its most grave and poignant
dimension when the accused is forced to endure pre-trial/under-trial
detention while awaiting the conclusion of his trial. In such
circumstances, prolonged judicial custody directly strikes at the cardinal
pillar of criminal jurisprudence: ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
negat, i.e. the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts, not upon him
who denies. The doctrine of the presumption of innocence is a golden
thread of the criminal law, and where an accused languishes behind bars
without a conclusive verdict of guilt in sight, the passage of un-
adjudicated time hollows out this presumption. As pre-trial incarceration
stretches across months and years, this presumption begins to weigh
heavily against the legitimacy of continued detention and in the absence
of a formal judicial verdict of guilt, the prosecuting agency/State loses
the moral and legal authority to keep the individual captive. In case(s),
where the trial ultimately culminate in an acquittal, the loss inflicted
upon the individual, i.e. the irreparable rupture of liberty, the destruction
of social standing, and the irreversible atrophy of human life, constitutes
an injury for which no state treasury can provide restitutio in integrum.
9.1. Pertinently, recognising the noxious character of under-trial
detention and seeking to align statutory rights with evolving liberty
jurisprudence, the legislature explicitly codified statutory relief against
delayed trial through Section 436-A Cr.P.C., (introduced via the
Criminal law Amendment Act, 2005 and subsequently retained under
section 479 BNSS with a further concession for release on bail on
completing one-third of the maximum punishment prescribed for first
time offenders). This reflects as a formal acknowledgment by the
legislature for un-adjudicated custody, if left unchecked, becoming an
instrument of oppression.
9.2. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman
Antulay (supra), where the accused is behind bars, the burden rests
squarely upon the State to conduct its prosecution with reasonable
dispatch so as to avoid infringing upon the right to a speedy trial of an
accused. When the State fails in its endeavour to guarantee a swift
hearing and lacks the wherewithal to protect the fundamental rights of
the incarcerated, it forfeits its credibility to hold the individual in
custody. Pertinently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulab Nabi
Sheikh (supra) and Arvind Dham (supra) observed that, the sacrosanct
right to a speedy trial applies universally, irrespective of the nature or
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gravity of the crime alleged and the severity of the charge cannot be
weaponised by the prosecution to justify procedural paralysis.
Indubitably, the seriousness and gravity of the allegations
constitute relevant considerations while adjudicating a prayer for bail.
Pertinently, allegations concerning the generation of proceeds of crime
through cheating/defrauding homebuyers are, undoubtedly, of a serious
nature and cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger consequences
alleged to have emanated therefrom. The nature of allegations, the
manner in which the alleged offence was perpetrated, the number of
persons purportedly affected and the attendant economic and societal
ramifications are all legitimate consideration; however, the gravity of
the allegations, cannot ipso facto, constitute a ground for indefinite or
prolonged incarceration, particularly when the prospects of trial
culminating in near future are very distant.
This constitutional imperative of “speedy trial” acquires its
highest urgency in cases governed by special statutes, wherein, the
legislature has provided for stringent statutory fetters on the grant of
bail. Where the operation of law renders bail a distant, almost
insurmountable goal, the state's responsibility to conduct the trial with
utmost swiftness becomes an absolute, non-negotiable duty.
9.3. To counter the menace of money laundering and safeguard the
economic fabric of the nation, the legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted
and provided for stringent bail conditions for offences under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA); Section 45,
whereof, embeds "twin conditions" by imposing heavy statutory fetters
upon the judicial discretion to grant bail. By virtue of these conditions,
the court is constrained to refuse bail unless it is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. However, a
grave constitutional asymmetry arises when an accused languishes
behind bars for an offence under the PMLA while the trial remains
completely dormant or grinds along at a glacial pace. The constitutional
justification for such stringent restrictions on personal liberty
necessarily rests upon the corresponding implied obligation of the
prosecuting agency/State to ensure a fair and expeditious trial. Where
the State fails to discharge that obligation, continued incarceration
ceases to derive its legitimacy from the statute alone. In a system
governed by constitutionalism, such a dual monopoly over the freedom of
an individual cannot be countenanced. The law abhors a condition
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where statutory provision(s) become an instrument of perpetual
incarceration.
9.4. The general procedural rule dictates that where an accused fails
to satisfy the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA, the court should not
enlarge him on bail. Yet, where the accused has suffered prolonged pre-
trial incarceration with no end to the proceedings in sight, an imperative
judicial duty to protect the fundamental right of the individual emerges,
so that Article 21 is not reduced to a dead letter. In such cases of
inordinate delay, the strict fulfillment of the conditions under Section 45
of PMLA must yield and recede into the background. While considering
a plea for bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration, the relief is not
premised upon a relaxed interpretation of the statute, but upon an
independent, non-negotiable right stemming directly from Article 21.
Because this right originates from the Constitution, which is the
Grundnorm, no legislative enactment can erect a wall high enough to
exclude the operation of constitutional remedies. Echoing this principle,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia (supra) and Padam
Chand Jain (supra) reaffirmed that the constitutional mandate under
Article 21 is the "higher law," and the statutory restrictions under
special laws like the PMLA cannot override the fundamental right to a
speedy trial. Addressing this friction between strict statutory thresholds
and delay in trial, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Senthil Balaji
(supra) observed that inordinate delay and a higher threshold for bail
cannot coexist. Where a statute prescribes a higher threshold for bail,
the obligation on the State to conduct a swift trial becomes
correspondingly more onerous and when the State fails to discharge this
heightened duty, the statutory threshold under Section 45 of PMLA must
give way to the constitutional imperative of freedom.
9.5. The consequential question that now arises for pondering is one of
quantification; What duration of under-trial custody constitutes
"prolonged incarceration" so as to breach the sacrosanct threshold of
Article 21?
The jurisprudence, across centuries and legal traditions, has
rejected the notion that personal liberty can be governed by
mathematical formulas or rigid, mechanical arithmetic. The law, in its
wisdom, recognizes that equity operates not through uniformity, but
through sensitive contextual calibration. A critical distinction must be
drawn between the statutory entitlement under Section 436-A
Cr.P.C./479 BNSS and the broader constitutional power of a court to
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grant bail on account of prolonged incarceration under Article 21. There
can neither be a straight-jacket formula, nor a fixed statutory clock that
automatically signals when under-trial detention ceases to be lawful
custody and degenerates into unconstitutional punishment. The threshold
of “one-half/one-third of maximum punishment prescribed” provided for
in Section 436-A Cr.P.C./479 BNSS, constitutes minimum statutory
requirement of mandatory relief therein, it cannot be treated as a pre-
condition for the exercise of Constitutional/inherent jurisdiction where
the continued detention is otherwise rendered unjust or disproportionate.
It is pertinent to observe herein that it was never the legislative intent of
Section 436-A Cr.P.C./479 BNSS to define or restrict the concept of
prolonged incarceration nor to declare that under-trial custody becomes
constitutionally intolerable only after the specified threshold is reached.
Ergo, where the factual matrix of a case reveals that the trial is running
at snail’s pace and the prosecution is exhibiting avoidable inertia and
that prospects of a timely verdict are purely illusory, the court is
constitutionally mandated to declare such incarceration as unduly
prolonged and grant liberty, irrespective of whether the accused has
completed the statutorily prescribed one-half/one-third period.
As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kapil Wadhawan
(supra), that while it would be impossible to lay down any invariable
rule or evolve a straitjacket formula for grant of bail on completion of a
specified period of detention in custody, unduly long deprivation of
liberty pending trial strikes at the heart of Article 21. The determination
of whether under-trial confinement has crossed the threshold of
constitutional endurance rests upon a holistic, multi-factorial matrix
wherein judicial discretion is called upon to balance a constellation of
competing factors; including but not limited to; the minimum and
maximum sentences prescribed by the legislature, the prima facie role
and degree of culpability attributed to the accused, the outer limits
provided by the statute for the conclusion of proceedings and most
crucially, the present stage of the trial measured against the real
prospects of its conclusion within a reasonable time in the future.
No exhaustive set of guideline(s) to govern this aspect of the
satisfaction of a Court can possibly be laid down, however alluring this
aspect may be. It is neither fathomable nor desirable to lay down any
straight jacket formulation in this regard. To do so would be to
crystallize into a rigid definition, a judicial discretion, which has been
left, for best of all reasons, undetermined. Any attempt in this regard
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would be, to say the least, a quixotic endeavour. Circumstantial
flexibility, one additional or different fact, may make a sea of difference
between conclusions in two cases. Such exercise would thus, indubitably,
be dependent upon the factual matrix of the particular case which the
Court is in seisin of, since every case has its own peculiar factual
conspectus. Such judicial discretion, but of-course, ought to be exercised
in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
An age old adage reads, thus:
“The judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not
to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw
his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He
is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the
primordial necessity of order in the social life. Wide enough in all
conscience is the field of discretion that remains”
10. As a sequitur to above-said rumination, the following
postulates emerge:
(I) A regular bail plea on merits, in respect of an offence
under the PMLA Act, is essentially required to meet with the rigour(s) of
Section 45 of the PMLA Act.
(II) The rigour(s) of Section 45 of the PMLA Act pale into
oblivion when regular bail is sought for on account of long incarceration
in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bail-
applicant has suffered long under-trial custody, the trial is
procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bail-
applicant.
(III) There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of
exercise of power by a Court, while determining whether the period of
incarceration, warrants an interference under Article 21 of the
Constitution, shall depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such
Court in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive
guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute
parameters for satisfaction of requirement under Article 21 as every case
has its own unique factual matrix. Making such an attempt is nothing but
a utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom
and discretion of the concerned Court which is in seisin of such matter.”
AJAY KUMAR
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CRM-M-29227-2026 15
7. Indubitably, the prosecution has alleged the existence of an
organized fraudulent investment network in which innocent persons were
allegedly induced to part with their hard earned money on the false promise
of assured returns from foreign exchange trading. The allegations regarding
the diversion of funds through different entities, generation of proceeds of
crime and acquisition of properties in India and abroad, are matters which
would require proper examination/adjudication during the course of trial.
The seriousness of the allegations, though an important consideration,
cannot be the sole ground for keeping an accused in custody for an
indefinite period, particularly when the investigation has been completed.
In the present case, the petitioner was arrested on 17.09.2025 and has
remained in judicial custody for a period of 01 year and 02 months
approximately. The ED , pursuant to the ECIR in question (registered on
09.02.2024) has already completed its investigation qua the petitioner and
filed the prosecution complaint on 14.11.2025. Thereafter, supplementary
prosecution complaint was filed on 02.02.2026. The case of the ED -
respondent is substantially based upon documentary evidence, bank account
transactions, electronic records, statements recorded under Section 50 of the
PMLA and property-related documents. The relevant material, as per the
prosecution itself, has already been collected and placed on record. The
investigation insofar as the petitioner is concerned, stands concluded.
Nothing has been brought on record to indicate that any further custodial
interrogation of the petitioner is either required or contemplated.
8. The stage of proceedings before the trial Court is also a
relevant factor while considering the plea for grant of regular bail. The
AJAY KUMAR
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CRM-M-29227-2026 16
prosecution proposes to examine 49 witnesses and has relied upon 147
documents running into more than 12,400 pages, while the case is
admittedly still at the stage of pre-cognizance. Undoubtedly, the prosecution
complaint is accompanied by extensive documentary material and the
respondent proposes to examine several witnesses in support of its case.
The allegations involve examination of multiple bank accounts, financial
transactions, electronic records, property statement and statement(s) of
various persons allegedly associated with the investment scheme. Given the
magnitude of prosecution evidence, it is evident that the trial is not likely to
conclude within the foreseeable future. The petitioner cannot be expected to
remain incarcerated for an indefinite period merely because the allegations
relate to an economic offence. Thus, the prolonged incarceration, coupled
with the absence of a reasonable possibility of the trial concluding within a
foreseeable period, cannot be ignored while considering a prayer for bail.
Furthermore, this Court finds no tangible material to suggest that the
petitioner is likely to abscond or evade the process of law if enlarged on
bail. Equally, the apprehension of the petitioner influencing the prosecution
witnesses remains unsupported by any substantive material. At this stage, it
would not be appropriate for this Court to undertake a detailed examination
of the statement(s) recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA or to return any
finding regarding the correctness of the financial trail projected by the ED-
respondent. The evidentiary value of the statement(s), the electronic
material and the bank transaction(s) relied upon by the prosecution would
have to be tested at the stage of trial, in accordance with law. The ED has
not furnished any list of vulnerable witness(s) muchless any tangible basis
AJAY KUMAR
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CRM-M-29227-2026 17
for the apprehension that the petitioner may interfere with the prosecution
evidence. Thus, having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances
of the petition in hand , in the considered opinion of this Court, the fetters
imposed by Section 45 of PMLA stand diluted in light of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
It is also not in dispute before this Court that the accused
PERSONS, other than the petitioner (herein), are yet to be
arrested/interrogated by the ED- respondent whereupon a supplementary
prosecution complaint is likely to be filed against such accused(s), which
will indubitably result in further delay in effective culmination of THE trial.
It is, thus, apparent that the trial is not likely to commence or conclude in
the near future and in such circumstances, the petitioner cannot be expected
to remain in custody for an indefinite period.
9. Keeping in view the entirety of the factual milieu of the instant
case; most pertinently the factum of petitioner (herein) has remained in
custody for 01 year and 02 months approximately vis-à-vis the
procrastinated nature/stage of trial which is reflectable from the extensive
prosecution evidence likely to be led (in the form of 49 witnesses and 147
relied upon documents running into more than 12,400 pages), the petitioner
(herein) has never been declared as a proclaimed offender in the ECIR in
question, no list of vulnerable witnesses muchless basis thereof being
brought forward, nothing tangible being shown that the petitioner is likely to
influence any prosecution witness(s) & nothing perceptible being brought
forward that the petitioner poses a potent flight risk; this Court is inclined to
afford regular bail to the petitioner (herein).
AJAY KUMAR
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CRM-M-29227-2026 18
10. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
I. The petition in hand is granted & it is directed that the
petitioner be released on regular bail in PMLA prosecution complaint
No.COMA/25/2025 arising out of ECIR No.CDJO-I/02/2024 dated
09.02.2024 registered under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
on such terms and condition(s) as deemed appropriate by the concerned
Special Judge/Duty Magistrate, including but not limited to, the following
conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral
or documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial
without the prior permission of competent Court.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport with the concerned
Special Judge/Duty Magistrate.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating
Officer and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every
month, an affidavit, before the concerned Special Court, to the
effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence
after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be
involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the
present case, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the ED is
mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which
plea, but of course, shall be pondered upon merits thereof.
(ix) The petitioner shall also be obligated to furnish either a demand-
₹
draft or FDR or bank guarantee to the tune of 10.00 lacs in
favour of the Court releasing him on bail. Needless to say that this
amount may be liable to be forfeited forthwith in case of any
default at his end.
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CRM-M-29227-2026 19
II. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid stipulation(s) and
those which may be imposed by concerned Special Court/Duty Magistrate
as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the ED
shall be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail hereby granted to the
petitioner.
III. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression
of opinion on the merits of the case.
IV. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
November 13, 2026
Ajay
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
AJAY KUMAR
2026.11.16 13:58
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