AJAZ AHMAD SEH vs UNION TERRITORY OF J AND K AND ANR. (HOME)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
HCP 279/2025
Reserved on: 22.10.2026
Pronounced on: 30.10.2026
Uploaded on: 31.10. 2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full

1. Ajaz Ahmad Seh (aged 26 years)
S/o Gulam Nabi Seh
R/o Sehpora, Tehsil Rajpora and District
Pulwama
Through his father, Gulam Nabi Seh S/o
Late Mohd Shaban She, R/o Shepora,
Tehsil Rajpora, District Pulwama, aged
R/o Sehpora, Tehsil Rajpora, District
Pulwama

…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s).


Through: Mr. Mohammad Ayoub Bhat, Advocate with
Ms. Mahajabeen Bhat, Advocate
Vs.
1. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir
...Respondent(s).
Through Chief Secretary to the
Government, Home Department, J &K,
Civil Secretariat, Srinagar/Jammu

2. District Magistrate, Pulwama

Through: Mr. Jahangir Ahmad Dar, GA
CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
30.10.2026
B rief facts of the case
1. The petitioner, Ajaz Ahmad Seh, aged 27 years, a resident of Shehpora,
Tehsil Rajpora, District Pulwama, by profession a driver, has been taken
into preventive custody vide Order No. 34/DMP/PSA/2025 dated
28.07.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”), passed by
respondent No. 2 in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 8 of
the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Act”), on the basis of a dossier submitted by the Senior
Superintendent of Police (SSP), Pulwama.
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2. The petitioner has approached this Court through his father and is
presently lodged in District Jail, Udhampur. Pertinent to mention that,
according to the petitioner, he was initially taken into custody by the
police in the first week of July 2025, whereafter the impugned order dated
28.07.2025 came to be issued against him.
3. As per the grounds of detention, the petitioner is alleged to have remained
in contact with one Aashiq Ahmad Nengroo, stated to be a terrorist handler
affiliated with Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), through telephone number
+#####370023 and the encrypted application Zangi, accessed through a
secured VPN, for the purpose of communicating with handlers based in
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir/Pakistan.
4. It is further alleged that the petitioner acted as an Over Ground Worker
(OGW) by providing food, shelter, clothing, transportation and
information to active terrorists, including one Haris Nazir, a resident of
Kachipora, Rajpora, Pulwama.
5. The grounds of detention also make a reference to the execution of bonds
under Sections 126 and 170 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023, on 21.04.2025, 04.06.2025 and 04.07.2025, respectively. It is further
alleged that, notwithstanding the same, the petitioner continued to indulge
in activities involving obstruction of the daily activities of the local
residents and intimidation.
6. The police dossier records that the petitioner was in contact with terrorist
handlers, was being encouraged to join the ranks of terrorists and to
motivate other local youth to do so, and was providing information
regarding the movement of the security forces in the area.
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7. The dossier further records that the petitioner was assessed to be at risk of
engaging in activities associated with terrorist organisations. It also refers
to the possibility of his involvement in the targeted killings of non-local
labourers, political workers, Kashmiri Pandit employees and police
personnel.
8. On the basis of the material contained in the police dossier and the grounds
of detention, the competent authority passed the impugned order under
Section 8 of the Act, whereby the petitioner has been placed under
preventive detention. Feeling aggrieved of the same, the petitioner has
approached this Court.
Submissions on behalf of the petitioner
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No. 2 has
passed the impugned order on the basis of an undated report furnished by
the Senior Superintendent of Police, Pulwama, without due application of
mind. It is contended that the allegations set out in the grounds of
detention are largely speculative and rest on presumptions and conjectures,
rather than on substantiated material.
10. It is further submitted that no specific allegations, supported by adequate
material, have been attributed to the petitioner. According to the petitioner,
the absence of details concerning the alleged activities renders the grounds
of detention vague.
11. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was furnished only with
the detention order, the grounds of detention and the police dossier,
whereas the other documents relied upon by the detaining authority were
not supplied to him. It is also contended that, during the period of his
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detention, the petitioner was denied access to legal assistance, his relatives
and the concerned authorities, thereby impairing his right to make an
effective representation to the Government or the detaining authority.
12. It is urged that the grounds of detention substantially replicate the contents
of the dossier prepared by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Pulwama.
It is submitted that respondent No. 2 has merely reproduced the police
version, without independently evaluating the material on record, and has
thereby failed to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction for ordering
preventive detention.
13. It is contended that the impugned order is unsupported by any strong
reasons or cogent material necessitating the preventive detention of the
petitioner. It is asserted that he has no criminal antecedents and that the
alleged communications with terrorist handlers through virtual means have
not been substantiated by any evidence supplied to him. Without prejudice
to the said contention, it is argued that such allegations, even if accepted
for the sake of argument, could well be addressed under the ordinary
criminal law.
14. It is further submitted that the statutory safeguards relating to the approval
of the detention order and the reference of the matter to the Advisory
Board have not been complied with within the prescribed period. It is also
contended that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of being
heard by the Advisory Board, either in person or through legal assistance,
thereby violating the procedural safeguards governing preventive
detention.
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15. Learned counsel further submits that the detention order and the grounds
communicated to the petitioner are couched in technical English, which he
is unable to comprehend adequately, having studied only up to Class XII
and being employed as a driver. It is contended that the failure to
communicate the grounds and the supporting material in a language
understood by him has deprived him of the opportunity to make an
effective representation.

16. It is also argued that the impugned detention infringes the constitutional
protections available to the petitioner, as no sufficient justification has
been furnished for resorting to detention under the Act. It is further
submitted that the petitioner earns his livelihood by driving a commercial
vehicle and supports his family, which has suffered financial and personal
hardship owing to his continued detention.
17. It is contended that preventive detention cannot be founded solely on an
apprehension of possible future misconduct, without adequate material
supporting such apprehension. According to the petitioner, the impugned
order has been passed hastily and mechanically, without due consideration
of the circumstances or of sufficient material warranting recourse to
preventive detention.
18. The petitioner further assails the manner in which the detention order was
executed, contending that the authority entrusted with its execution could
not have further delegated that function to another officer. It is submitted
that such further delegation is impermissible in law and constitutes an
additional ground for setting aside the impugned order.
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19. On the aforesaid grounds, the petitioner seeks quashing of the impugned
order on the grounds of non-application of mind, procedural irregularities
and violation of the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing
preventive detention.
Submissions on behalf of the respondents
20. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that preventive
detention is intended to prevent a person from engaging in activities
prejudicial to the security of the State, and not to punish him for his past
conduct.
21. It is submitted that the impugned order bearing No. 34/DMP/PSA/25
dated 28.07.2025 was passed by the District Magistrate, Pulwama, after
considering the police dossier and the accompanying material and upon
arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction. The respondents maintain
that the detention was ordered to prevent the petitioner from engaging in
activities prejudicial to the security of the State.
22. That the constitutional and statutory safeguards under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India and Section 13 of the Act were duly complied with.
It is submitted that the detention order, the grounds of detention and the
supporting material were furnished to the petitioner within the prescribed
period and that he was informed of his right to make a representation to
the detaining authority or the Government.
23. It is further submitted that the detention warrant was executed on
29.07.2025 by ASI Bashir Ahmad of District Police Lines, Pulwama, and
the petitioner was lodged in District Jail, Udhampur. According to the
respondents, the contents of the detention order and the grounds of
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detention were read over and explained to the petitioner in a language
understood by him, and his signatures were obtained on the execution
report.
24. That the petitioner, though informed of his right to make a representation,
did not avail himself of the said remedy. It is further submitted that no
material has been placed on record to establish that any representation
was submitted to the Home Department or that any such representation
remained unconsidered.
25. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the grounds of
detention contain specific, relevant and proximate particulars of the
activities attributed to the petitioner and are neither vague nor stale. It is
contended that the material considered by the detaining authority
sufficiently demonstrated the necessity of preventive detention under the
Act.
26. That the detaining authority exercised its powers independently and
applied its mind to the material furnished by the police before passing the
impugned order. The respondents deny that the impugned order was
passed mechanically or without adequate consideration of the relevant
facts and circumstances.
27. The respondents lastly contend that Section 10 of the Act provides for
independent treatment of each ground of detention where an order is
based on multiple grounds.



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LEGAL ANALYSIS
28. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material on
record, including the detention record produced by the respondents.
29. At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that preventive detention is a
precautionary measure and not a substitute for the ordinary criminal
process. The power of preventive detention, being an extraordinary
invasion of personal liberty, must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and
only in strict conformity with the constitutional and statutory safeguards
governing its exercise. The object of such detention is to prevent a person
from engaging in activities prejudicial to the security of the State or other
interests specified under the relevant law, and not to punish him for
alleged acts already committed.
30. The mere existence of allegations of a serious nature cannot, by itself,
justify recourse to preventive detention. The authority must apply its
mind to whether the circumstances genuinely warrant preventive
detention and whether the statutory purpose can appropriately be
achieved through the ordinary criminal law.
31. It is equally well settled that preventive detention cannot be resorted to
as a convenient alternative to criminal prosecution. Where the alleged
conduct constitutes an offence under the ordinary criminal law, the
competent authorities are expected to consider the available legal
remedies and proceed in accordance with law. The availability of
preventive detention does not absolve the authorities of the obligation to
distinguish between the need to investigate and prosecute an alleged
offence and the necessity of preventing future prejudicial conduct.
Although the existence of an alternative criminal remedy does not, in
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every case, preclude preventive detention, the latter cannot be invoked
mechanically without a rational and legally sustainable basis for
concluding that such extraordinary action is warranted.
32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011)
5 SCC 244 , has held as under:
“30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged
one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is: was
the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the
answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the
present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs
after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal
Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this
situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention
order in question was illegal”.
33. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State
of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 , held as under:
“32....It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law
and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that
the liberty of a person is not jeopardized unless his case falls squarely
within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive
detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an Accused
who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the
purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary
criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail,
unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements
of the legal provisions authorizing such detention. When a person is
enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be
exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention
which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the
criminal court.”
34. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr Ram
Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi and others, 1953 SCR 708 ,
observed as under:
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“ Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such
meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the
improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced
by the Court.”
35. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M . Nagaraj &
Ors. V. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 212, observed:
“It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from the State to
its citizens. Individuals possess basic human rights independently of
any Constitution by reason of the basic fact that they are members of
the human race.”
36. The Nine-Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. V. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1,
observed:
“It is necessary to always bear in mind that fundamental rights have
been considered to be the heart and soul of the Constitution…..
Fundamental rights occupy a unique place in the lives of civilized
societies and have been described in judgments as „transcendental‟,
inalienable, and primordial.”
37. The aforesaid legal position makes it abundantly clear that preventive
detention, being an extraordinary measure that directly impinges upon the
personal liberty of an individual, must be resorted to with utmost caution
and strictly within the parameters prescribed by law. It is incumbent upon
the detaining authority to examine whether the ordinary law of the land is
sufficient to deal with the alleged activities, for where the existing
criminal law provides an adequate mechanism to address the situation,
recourse to preventive detention would be legally impermissible. The
power of preventive detention cannot be employed as a substitute for
ordinary criminal proceedings, to circumvent the safeguards available
under criminal law, or merely to keep a person in detention when the
requirements of the governing statute are not satisfied. The settled
position, therefore, is that such power must be exercised on the basis of
relevant material, upon due application of mind, and only when the
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circumstances of the case demonstrably warrant preventive intervention
in accordance with law.
38. This Court is further mindful that the existence of an ordinary criminal
remedy does not automatically render preventive detention
impermissible. There may be circumstances in which preventive
detention is lawfully warranted notwithstanding the possibility of
criminal prosecution. However, the existence of such circumstances must
emerge from the material considered by the detaining authority and from
a legally sustainable assessment of the necessity for preventive action. In
the present case, the absence of adequate particulars of the alleged
activities, coupled with the failure of the grounds to sufficiently
demonstrate why recourse to preventive detention was necessary,
assumes significance in determining the validity of the impugned order.
39. Preventive detention legislation cannot be permitted to become an
instrument for bypassing the safeguards of the ordinary criminal process
or for detaining a person on the strength of allegations that remain
insufficiently particularised. The extraordinary nature of the power
demands that the detaining authority exercise it only upon genuine
application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. Where the
grounds fail to disclose the requisite factual foundation for the
apprehension of future prejudicial conduct, or where the decision-making
process does not demonstrate the independent satisfaction required by
law, the resulting deprivation of liberty cannot be sustained.
40. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the grounds of detention reveal
that the detenue is alleged to have remained in contact with one Aashiq
Ahmad Nengroo, stated to be a Pakistan-based terrorist handler affiliated
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with the proscribed terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammad, through a
specified telephone number and the encrypted application Zangi,
allegedly accessed through a secured Virtual Private Network (VPN). It
is further alleged that the detenue was functioning as an Over Ground
Worker (OGW), providing food, shelter, clothing, transportation and
information to active terrorists, including Haris Nazir, and supplying
information concerning the movement of security forces. The grounds
also refer to his alleged involvement in activities intended to encourage
local youth to join terrorist organisations.
41. The allegations, if supported by cogent material, are undoubtedly serious
and warrant appropriate action in accordance with law. However, what
assumes significance is that the grounds of detention, as placed before
this Court, do not furnish adequate particulars of the alleged
communications or activities. There is no clear indication of the specific
dates on which the alleged communications took place, the nature or
substance of the information purportedly exchanged, the particular acts
by which logistical assistance was allegedly rendered, or the specific
incidents from which the apprehension of future prejudicial conduct was
drawn. The mere assertion that the detenue used an encrypted application
or a VPN, or remained in contact with persons alleged to be associated
with terrorist organisations, cannot, without further particulars and
relevant supporting material, furnish an adequate basis for curtailing
personal liberty through preventive detention.
42. Equally, the alleged communication with a person suspected of
involvement in terrorist activities must be assessed in the context of the
material available and the nature of the conduct attributed to the detenue.
The grounds of detention must disclose sufficient particulars to enable
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the detenue to understand the allegations against him and make an
effective representation. General assertions, however grave in tenor,
cannot be permitted to take the place of specific and intelligible grounds
capable of being meaningfully answered.
43. If the investigating agency possessed material indicating that the detenue
had used electronic communications to coordinate terrorist activities,
transmitted information concerning security-force movements or
provided assistance to members of a terrorist organisation, such material
could have been examined and acted upon in accordance with the
applicable criminal law. Depending upon the facts disclosed by the
investigation, the relevant provisions of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, or other applicable penal statutes could have
been invoked, subject to the ingredients of the offences concerned being
satisfied. The authorities were not precluded from investigating the
alleged activities, collecting electronic and other evidence, and initiating
prosecution in accordance with law.
44. The question, therefore, is not whether the allegations could be regarded
as serious, but whether the material disclosed a legally sustainable
necessity for resorting to preventive detention rather than proceeding
under the ordinary criminal process. The impugned grounds do not
adequately explain why the alleged conduct, despite being capable of
investigation under the applicable criminal law, necessitated the
extraordinary measure of preventive detention. There is no subjective
satisfaction by the detaining authority of why the ordinary legal process
would be inadequate in the circumstances of the case or what particular
feature of the alleged conduct justified the invocation of the Public Safety
Act. Preventive detention cannot be sustained merely by invoking the
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security of the State in general terms, without demonstrating a rational
connection between the material relied upon and the necessity for the
preventive measure adopted.
45. Another aspect which merits consideration is the reference in the grounds
of detention to the detenue having been bound down on three occasions,
namely, 21.04.2025, 04.06.2025 and 04.07.2025, under Sections 126 and
170 of the BharatiyaNagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. While such
proceedings may constitute relevant background circumstances, their
mere existence cannot independently establish the necessity of preventive
detention.
46. The manner in which the grounds of detention have been formulated by
District Magistrate also raises a legitimate concern regarding the
independent application of mind by the detaining authority. A
comparison of the police dossier with the grounds of detention indicates
substantial reproduction of the allegations put forward by the sponsoring
agency. Although similarity between the dossier and the grounds is not,
by itself, sufficient to invalidate an order of detention, the detaining
authority is required to independently evaluate the material and arrive at
its own subjective satisfaction. The statutory responsibility cannot be
discharged by mechanically adopting the narrative supplied by the police.
47. In the present case, the grounds largely reiterate the allegations
concerning the detenue's alleged association with terrorist handlers, his
purported use of encrypted communications and his alleged role as an
Over Ground Worker. However, they do not sufficiently demonstrate an
independent evaluation of the specific circumstances that made
preventive detention necessary. In particular, the absence of adequate
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particulars concerning the alleged communications, the acts of assistance
attributed to the detenue and the basis for apprehending their continuation
renders the recorded satisfaction vulnerable to the objection that the
material supplied by the sponsoring agency was accepted without the
requisite independent scrutiny. The requirement of subjective satisfaction
is not fulfilled merely by reproducing the allegations in the form of
grounds of detention; it must reflect due application of mind to the
material and the necessity of invoking the extraordinary power conferred
by the Act.
48. The requirement of independent application of mind assumes particular
importance because the consequences of preventive detention are
immediate and severe. The detaining authority is expected to examine not
only the allegations but also their relevance to the statutory purpose, the
proximity of the alleged conduct to the apprehended future activities, and
the necessity of resorting to preventive detention. Where the grounds
merely recite allegations without adequately disclosing the factual basis
for the apprehension or the need for the extraordinary measure, the Court
cannot presume that the requisite satisfaction has been lawfully arrived
at.
49. This Court is fortified by the observations of this Court in Noor-ud-Din
Shah v. State of J&K & Ors.reported as 1989 SLJ 1, wherein this
Court quashed the detention order, which was only a reproduction of the
Dossier supplied to the detaining authority on the ground that it amounted
to non-application of mind. The Court observed as under:
“I have thoroughly by examined the dossier submitted by the
Superintendent of Police, Anantnag, to District Magistrate, Anantnag
as also the grounds of detention formulated by the latter for the
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detention of the detenue in the present case, and I find the said
grounds of detention are nothing but the verbatim reproduction of the
dossier as forwarded by the Police to the detaining authority. He has
only changed the number of paragraphs, trying in vain to give it a
different shape. This is in fact a case of non-application of mind on the
detaining authority. Without applying his own mind to the facts of the
case, he has acted as an agent of the police. It was his legal duty to
find out if the allegations leveled by the police against the detenue in
the dossier were really going to effect the maintenance of public
order, as a result of the activities, allegedly, committed by him. He
had also to find out whether such activities were going to affect the
public order is future also as a result of which it was necessary to
detain the detenue, so as to prevent him from doing so. After all, the
preventive detention envisaged under the Act is in fact only to prevent
a person from acting in any manner which may be prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, and not to punish him for his past penal
acts. The learned District Magistrate appears to have passed the
impugned order in a routine manner being in different to the import of
preventive detention as or detained in the Act, Passing of an order
without application of mind goes to the root of its validity, and in that
case, the question of going into the genuineness or otherwise of the
grounds does not arise. Having found that the detaining authority has
not applied his mind to the facts of the case while passing the
impugned order, it is not necessary to go to the merits of the grounds
of detention, as mandated by Section 10-A of the Act.”
50. Thus, applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of the
present case and upon careful perusal of the record, this Court finds that
the dossier and the grounds of detention are couched in substantially
identical language, giving rise to a clear inference that the Detaining
Authority has failed to independently assess and evaluate the material
placed before it. Such substantial reproduction, in the absence of any
indication of an independent application of mind, vitiates the subjective
satisfaction required to be arrived at by the Detaining Authority before
passing an order of preventive detention.

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Conclusion
51. In view of the forgoing discussion and upon consideration of the grounds
of detention, the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties
and the material placed on record, this Court is of the considered view
that the impugned order suffers from material legal infirmities. The
allegations, though serious in their nature, have not been set out with
sufficient particulars to disclose the specific conduct attributed to the
detenue and the factual basis for apprehending its continuation. The
grounds also fail to adequately demonstrate why the extraordinary power
of preventive detention was necessary in the circumstances, particularly
when the alleged activities, if supported by evidence, could have been
investigated and dealt with under the applicable criminal law. The
substantial reproduction of the police dossier, when considered alongside
these deficiencies, further reinforces the concern that the requisite
independent application of mind has not been adequately demonstrated.
52. It bears reiteration that the Court does not minimise the seriousness of
allegations involving terrorist organisations or activities prejudicial to the
security of the State. However, a perfect balance has to be maintained
between the protection of the security of the State and the preservation of
personal liberty. The former must be pursued within the limits of the law,
and the latter cannot be curtailed except in strict conformity with the
procedure established by law.
53. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the impugned
detention order cannot be sustained in law and warrants interference in
the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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54. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and Order No. 34/DMP/PSA/2025
dated 28.07.2025, passed by the District Magistrate, Pulwama, under
Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, is hereby
quashed. The respondents are directed to release the detenue, Ajaz
Ahmad Seh, forthwith, provided his custody is not required in connection
with any other case or pursuant to any other lawful order.
55. The detention record shall be returned to learned counsel for the
respondents against proper receipt by the Registry.
56. Disposed of accordingly.


(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
30.10.2026
“Mubashir ”
i. Whether the order is speaking: Yes

ii. Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No

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