SRI BASANAGOUDA R PATIL (YATNAL) vs STATE OF KARNATAKA

- 1 -


Reserved on : 02.09.2026
Pronounced on : 16.10.2026




IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 16 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026


BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7632 OF 2025



BETWEEN:

SRI BASANAGOUDA R. PATIL (YATNAL)
S/O RAMANAGOUDA PATIL
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, OCC.:MLA,
VIJAYPURA CONSTITUENCY
OLD IB, STATION ROAD,
VIJAYPURA – 586 101, KARNATAKA.

ALSO AT:
SINDAGI ROAD MAHAL AINAPUR
AINAPURA, BIJAPUR, KARNATAKA – 586 104.
…PETITIONER









Digitally
signed by
CHETAN B C
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka
(BY SRI GIRISH BHARADWAJ, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY HUBALLI TOWN POLICE STATION
HUBALLI-DHARWAD – 580 001.
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

- 2 -


HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. MOHAMMAD HANNAN
S/O MUNIR AHMAD SHAIKH
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
OCC.:BUSINESSMAN
ADD.:NEAR BASARI BAVI,
MANAGULI, AGASI
VIJAYAPURA – 583 107.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI ANOOP KUMAR, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI R.KOTHWAL, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)


THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 OF BNSS., PRAYING TO QUASH
FIR IN CR.NO.51/2025 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1
HUBBALLI TOWN P.S. PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED
ST
J.M.F.C 1 COURT, HUBLI, HUBLI-DHARWAD FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/S 196(1), 299 AND 353(1) OF BNS 2023 PRODUCED AT
DOCUMENT NO.1.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 02.09.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

- 3 -



CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioner is before the Court calling in question
registration of a crime in Crime No.51 of 2025 registered for
offences punishable under Sections 196(1), 299 and 353(1) of the
BNS, 2023.

2. Heard Sri Girish Bharadwaj, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner, Sri Anoop Kumar, learned Additional State Public
Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri R. Kothwal,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

The petitioner, a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly
addresses a speech on 07-04-2025. On the said speech the crime in
Crime No.80 of 2025 comes to be registered before the Gandhi
Chowk Police Station at Vijayapura. That is challenged before this
Court in Criminal Petition No.5628 of 2025. The moment an interim
order is granted, a second complaint on the same incident of

- 4 -


speech comes to be registered on 17-04-2025. The said crime is
registered in Hubballi Town Police Station coming under Hubballi
South Division. Both the crimes are on account of a speech
delivered by the petitioner on 07-04-2025. The registration of crime
in Crime No.51 of 2025 is what has driven the petitioner to this
Court in the subject petition.

4. The learned counsel Sri Girish Bharadwaj appearing for the
petitioner would vehemently contend that the crime is deliberately
registered on two places so that the petitioner would not be in a
position to take advantage of the interim order so granted by this
Court in Crl.P.No.5628 of 2025. He would submit that there is no
disharmony that has generated by the statement of the petitioner
and the matter is completely covered by the judgments of the Apex
Court on the issue.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri R.Kothwal appearing for
nd
the 2 respondent would vehemently refute the submissions in
contending that the statements of the petitioner, on the face of it,
did generate communal disharmony and therefore, the matter has
to be permitted to be tried. It cannot be closed at the threshold

- 5 -


even if another crime on the same incident has been quashed. The
present crime must be permitted to be investigated into. The
learned counsel would take this Court through the application
seeking vacation of the interim order and rely on plethora of
judgments rendered on the issue.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.

7. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The entire
issue gets triggered from registration of a complaint. The complaint
reads as follows:

“ ೆ
,
ೕೕ ಾ
ಾಾ ೆ
,
ೋ ಗುಂಬಜ ೕ ಾ
ೆ
.
ಜಯಪರ
: , : 07/04/2025
ಷಯ ಹುಬ ಯ ಾ ಓ ಯ " #$ಾಂಕ ರಂದು ನ(ೆದ

)ಾಮನವ, ಾಯ-ಕ.ಮದ" ಇ0ಾ"ಂ ಧಮ- ಮತು3 ಪ.4ಾ#
( . )
ಮಹಮ56 ಸ ಅ ರವರ ಬ ೆ9 ಪ.:ೋಧನ ಾ ಮತು3 ಅವ;ೇಳನ ಾ
.
=ಾಷಣ ?ಾ@ದ ಬಸನ ೌಡ CಾDೕ  ಯEಾFG ಅವರ ರುದH ದೂರು
,
?ಾನI)ೇ
, , 38 ,
$ಾನು Jೕಹಮ56 ಹ$ಾFK ತಂLೆ ಮುMೕN ಅಹ56 OೇP ವಯಸುQ ವಷ-
- , : , : , , ,
ಉLೊIೕಗ 4ಾICಾರ SಾT ಮುU"ಂ 0ಾ ಬಸ ಾ ಹT3ರ ಮನಗೂ  ಅಗU ಜಯಪರ

- 6 -


: 8660047194, .
J ೈ ಸಂWೆI ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ತಮ5 ಾ
ೆಯ" ದೂರನುF Lಾಖ ಸುT3Lೆ[ೕ$ೆ $ಾನು
,
?ಾಧIಮಗಳ ವರ#ಗಳ\ ಮತು3 ಇತರ ಮೂಲಗಳ ಮೂಲಕ T ದುೊಂ@ರುವ ಷಯ4ೇ$ೆಂದ)ೆ

. . ( )
ಜಯಪರ ನಗರ Oಾಸಕ ಬಸನ ೌಡ ಆN CಾDೕ  ಯEಾFG ನು ಹುಬ  ನಗರದ ಾ
: 07-04-2025
ಓ ಯ " #$ಾಂಕ ರಂದು ನ(ೆದ )ಾಮನವ, ಾಯ-ಕ.ಮ^ಂದರ" ಇ0ಾ"ಂ ಧಮ-
( )
ಮತು3 ಇ0ಾ"ಂ ಧಮ-ದ ಪ ತ. ಪ.4ಾ# ಮಹಮ56 ಸಲ"_ಾ"ಹು ಅ_ೈ` ವಸಲ"ಂ ರವರ ಬ ೆ9 ಅತIಂತ
, .
ಪ :ೋದನಾ ಅವ;ೇಳನ ಾ ಮತು3 ದುರುLೆ[ೕಶಪb ತ =ಾಷಣ Mೕ@Lಾ[)ೆ M#-ಷc4ಾd
, "
;ೇಳ\ವ Lಾದ)ೆ ಅವರು ತಮ5 =ಾಷಣದ " ಾಳ 0ಾe ಾೆ. ಮ$ೆಯ " ಮಹಮ56 CೈಗಂಬN
" .
ಹುDcLಾ[$ೆ ಎಂಬ ಆgಾರರ`ತ ಮತು3 gಾ,-ಕ ಅವ?ಾನ ಾರಕ ;ೇ ೆಯನುF Mೕ@Lಾ[$ೆ


ಅವನ ಈ ;ೇ ೆಗಳ\ ಮುU"ಂ ಸಮುLಾಯದ gಾ,-ಕ =ಾವ$ೆಗ ೆ Tೕವ.4ಾದ
, .
ಆhತವನುFಂಟು?ಾ@ದು[ ಸ?ಾಜದ " OಾಂT ಮತು3 0ೌ;ಾದ-Eೆ ೆ ಧ ೆjkಾಗುವ ೕTಯ"4ೆ
.
ಇಂತಹ =ಾಷಣಗಳ\ ಮುU"ಂ ಸಮುLಾಯದ " ಅಸ?ಾgಾನ ಮತು3 ಆ ೊ.ೕಶವನುF ಹುಟುc;ಾl4ೆ

196 (1), 299, 353(1) BNS-2023
ಅವನ ಈ ಕೃತIವ  ಕಲಂ ಅ@ಯ " noಣ
: -9
ಅಪ)ಾಧಗ ೆ ಒಳಪಡುವಂEಾdLೆ ಈ =ಾಷಣವನುF D  ಕನFಡ 4ಾ`Mಯ ಅ ಕೃತ ಯೂಟೂIe

:ಾ$ೆ ನ" ಕೂಡ ಪ.0ಾರ ?ಾಡ_ಾdLೆ.
https://youtu.be/ZghONHMMJ3M?si=SOHKsNxEcuxe5bGd
`ೕ ಾd ಈ ಷಯವನುF
,
ತoಣ ಪ ಗ U ಬಸನ ೌಡ CಾDೕ  ಯEಾFG ಅವರ ರುದH ಾನೂನುಬದH4ಾದ ಕ.ಮವನುF

ೈೊಂಡು OಾಂT, 0ೌ;ಾದ-Eೆ ಮತು3 ಾನೂನು ಪ.ಭುತuವನುF ಾಯು[ೊಳಲು ಕ.ಮವ`ಸೇಾd ಈ
.
ಮೂಲಕ $ಾನು ನಂTಸುEೆ3ೕ$ೆ
,
ಧನI4ಾದಗvೆwಂ# ೆ

ಸ`/-“
: .
ಸzಳ ಜಯಪರ
: 08/04/2025."
#$ಾಂಕ

The complaint relates to a speech delivered by the petitioner on
07-04-2025 on the occasion of Ramanavami. Two crime had sprung
on the same speech, one within the jurisdiction of Vijayapura Police
Station which was stayed at the hands of this Court on 17-04-2025

- 7 -


and the other is the impugned crime. Therefore, there are two
crimes registered on the same fulcrum. Insofar as the crime in
Crime No.80 of 2025 which was subject matter of Criminal Petition
No.5628 of 2025, this Court has disposed of the same in terms of
its order dated 20-08-2026. The order reads as follows:
“ The petitioner is before this Court calling in question the
registration of a crime in Crime No.80/2025 pending before the
st
1 Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and JMFC, Bijapur for the offences
punishable under Sections 196(1), 299 and 353(1) of the BNS.

2. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:
The petitioner allegedly made a statement on the
occasion of Ramanavami, against which respondent No.2 -
complainant files a complaint, alleging that the statement of the
petitioner hurt the religious sentiments of a certain religious
community. On that score, a crime comes to be registered in
Crime No. 80/2025 against the petitioner for the afore-quoted
offences.
3. Heard Sri. Venkatesh Dalwai, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri. Anoop Kumar, learned
Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent
No.1.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
would submit that on the same offence there are two FIRs
registered and would submit that the issue in the lis stands
covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of
SRI BASANAGOUDA R. PATIL (YATNAL) v. THE STATE OF
KARNATAKA, Crl.P.No.13650/2024, disposed on
30.01.2024.
5. Sri. Naveed Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.2 would refute the submission contending that
some conditions should be imposed.

- 8 -


6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
respective submissions made by the respective learned counsel
for the parties and have perused the material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of
events are a matter of record and would not require any
reiteration. The issue in the lis lies in a narrow compass. The
issue now would be, whether the ingredients of the offences
under Sections 196(1), 299 and 353(1) of the BNS, which were
Sections 153A, 295A and 505 of the earlier regime - the IPC,
respectively, are met in the case at hand.
8. What should be the ingredients of the afore-quoted
offences need not detain this Court for long as the Apex Court in
the case of IMRAN PRATAPGADHI v. STATE OF GUJARAT,
reported in (2026) 1 SCC 721 following its earlier judgment in
the case of JAVED AHMAD HAJAM v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA reported in (2024) 4 SCC 156, interprets
Sections 196 and 299 of the BNS , and holds as follows:
"…. …. ….
14. Now, let us examine whether any offence
as alleged is attracted. Section 196 BNS reads thus:
“196. Promoting enmity between
different groups on grounds of religion, race,
place of birth, residence, language, etc. and
doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of
harmony . —(1) Whoever—
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by
signs or by visible representations or through
electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or
attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race,
place of birth, residence, language, caste or
community or any other ground whatsoever,
disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will
between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities; or
(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to
the maintenance of harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities, and which disturbs or is
likely to disturb the public tranquillity; or

- 9 -


(c) organises any exercise, movement, drill
or other similar activity intending that the
participants in such activity shall use or be trained
to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be
likely that the participants in such activity will use or
be trained to use criminal force or violence, or
participates in such activity intending to use or be
trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing
it to be likely that the participants in such activity
will use or be trained to use criminal force or
violence, against any religious, racial, language or
regional group or caste or community and such
activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely
to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity
amongst members of such religious, racial,
language or regional group or caste or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in
sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious
worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to five years
and shall also be liable to fine.”
15. The offence under Section 196 is
attracted when the words, either spoken or written, or by
signs or visible representations, promote enmity
between different groups, on the grounds of religion,
race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or,
community or any other ground. The offence will be
attracted when the words either spoken or written, or
signs or visible representation, promote or attempt to
promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-
will between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities. On a plain
reading of the poem, we find that the same has nothing to do
with any religion, caste, community or any particular group.
The poem's words do not bring about or promote disharmony or
feelings of hatred or ill-will. It only seeks to challenge the
injustice made by the ruler . It is impossible to say that the
words used by the appellant disturb or are likely to
disturb public tranquillity. Therefore, neither clause (a)
nor clause (b) of Section 196(1) are attracted. There is
no allegation against the appellant of organising any
exercise, movement, drill or similar activity. There is no
allegation against the appellant that he uttered the
words in any place of worship or in any assembly
engaged in the performance of religious worship or

- 10 -


religious ceremonies. Hence, clause (c) will have no
application. The appellant has put a video of a mass marriage
function, and in the background, the words are uttered.
Therefore, Section 196 can have no application.
16. Section 197 reads thus:
“ 197. Imputations, assertions
prejudicial to national integration. —( 1)
Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by
signs or by visible representations or through
electronic communication or otherwise—
(a) makes or publishes any imputation that
any class of persons cannot, by reason of their
being members of any religious, racial, language or
regional group or caste or community, bear true
faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as
by law established or uphold the sovereignty and
integrity of India; or
(b) asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or
publishes that any class of persons shall, by reason
of their being members of any religious, racial,
language or regional group or caste or community,
be denied, or deprived of their rights as citizens of
India; or
(c) makes or publishes any assertion,
counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of
any class of persons, by reason of their being
members of any religious, racial, language or
regional group or caste or community, and such
assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is
likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or
hatred or ill-will between such members and other
persons; or
(d) makes or publishes false or misleading
information, jeopardising the sovereignty, unity
and integrity or security of India,
shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.
(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in
sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious
worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to five years
and shall also be liable to fine.”

- 11 -


17. As stated earlier, the poem does not make or
publish any imputation and is not concerned with any religious,
racial, language, regional group, caste, or community. It does
not suggest that any class of persons have been denied rights
as citizens because they are members of a religious, racial,
language, regional group, caste, or community. It does not
make or publish any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal likely to
cause disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill will. The
poem does not publish or make any false or misleading
information.
18. Offence under Section 299 BNS is also alleged
against the appellant, which reads thus:
“ 299. Deliberate and malicious acts,
intended to outrage religious feelings of any
class by insulting its religion or religious
beliefs. —Whoever, with deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of any
class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken
or written, or by signs or by visible representations
or through electronic means or otherwise, insults
or attempts to insult the religion or the religious
beliefs of that class, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.”
19. To say the least, it is ridiculous to say that
the act of the appellant is intended to outrage the religious
feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious
beliefs. The poem only tells the rulers what the reaction will
be if the fight for rights is met with injustice.
…. …. ….
31. Coming back to the offence punishable
under Section 196 BNS to decide whether the words,
either spoken or written or by sign or by visible
representations or through electronic communication
or otherwise, lead to the consequences provided in the
section. The police officer to whom information is
furnished will have to read or hear the words written
or spoken, and by taking the same as correct, decide
whether an offence under Section 196 is made out.
Reading of written words, or hearing spoken words
will be necessary to determine whether the contents
make out a case of the commission of a cognizable
offence. The same is the case with offences punishable

- 12 -


under Sections 197, 299 and 302 BNS. Therefore, to
ascertain whether the information received by an
officer in charge of the police station makes out a
cognizable offence, the officer must consider the
meaning of the spoken or written words. This act on
the part of the police officer will not amount to making
a preliminary inquiry which is not permissible under
sub-section (1) of Section 173.
32. We will give an example. A person utters the
following words. “If the rulers attack me, I will not retaliate
and, on the contrary, face the attack with love. If I do that,
it will lead to the defeat of the rulers.” If the person who
furnishes information, alleges that these words are spoken
or written to promote enmity between different groups as
provided in Section 196, while deciding whether the
information is of commission of a cognizable offence, the
officer concerned will have to read and understand the
meaning of the alleged spoken words. This exercise does not
amount to making a preliminary inquiry which is prohibited
under sub-section (1) of Section 173 BNSS.
…. …. ….
Standard to be applied
40. At this stage, we cannot resist the
temptation of quoting what Bose and Puranik, JJ., authored
as the Judges of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court. In
Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., C.P. & Berar
[Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., C.P. & Berar,
1946 SCC OnLine MP 5], in para 67, it is held thus: (SCC
OnLine MP)
“67. Viewing the impugned article in that
light we are of opinion, as a matter of fact, that it
is not seditious because its professed aim is to
obtain a change of Government through the ballot
box and not to incite people to a disobedience of
the laws of Government. Some extravagance of
language there is, and there is the usual crude
emotional appeal which is the stock-in-trade of the
demagogue, as well as a blundering and ineffective
attempt to ape the poets . But that is all. However,
it is not enough to find that the writer is not guilty
of sedition because we are concerned with Section
4 of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act which
travels wider than Section 124-A. We have
therefore further to see whether these words tend

- 13 -


directly or indirectly to incite to sedition, or, in the
words of the Ordinance, whether they are intended
or are likely to produce that effect. We say
deliberately whether the words are likely to incite
to sedition because, as the Federal Court points
out, the formula of words used in Section 4, as also
in the Ordinance, is precisely the formula used in
Section 124-A, therefore to the extent of the
formula the two things are the same. The only
difference is that under the Press Act we have to
consider not only whether there is sedition in fact
but also whether the words tend, directly or
indirectly, to excite to sedition and whether they
are intended or are likely to produce that effect.
We pause to observe that here, as in the case of
reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and as in the
case of putting in fear of hurt in a matter of
assault, we must use the standards of reasonable,
strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not
those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those
who scent danger in every hostile point of view .
Using those standards we hold as a fact that the
effects apprehended by the Crown and required by
the section are not likely to be caused by this
article, nor do the words used, viewed in their
proper setting, tend to cause that effect. The paper
is in English. It has a limited circulation. It is read
by those who know and understand English. It is a
party paper and is read mainly by persons who are
politically minded. They are aware of contemporary
political thought and occurrences. They realise as
well as any one else that neither His Excellency the
Governor nor his advisers went round shooting and
killing persons. They know that these acts were
done by the troops and by the police. They know
that there was a demand for an impartial
investigation and a judicial enquiry. They know
that the demand was refused and they know that
the whole complaint, so far as Government is
concerned, lies there. They are therefore no more
likely to attribute to Government any greater
responsibility than Mr Jamnadas Mehta and other
members of the Central Assembly did. They are as
much aware as the writer that the appeal is for a
constitutional change of Government by
constitutional means. They were not, in our
opinion, likely to interpret it otherwise. Therefore,
in our judgment, the article does not tend, directly
or indirectly to sedition, nor is it likely to produce
that result. In our view, the applications should be
allowed and the orders of forfeiture set aside. The

- 14 -


costs should, we think, in each case be paid by the
Crown.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. What is held by Bose and Puranik, JJ. in
Bhagwati Charan Shukla [Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial
Govt., C.P. & Berar, 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5], has been quoted
with approval in at least two cases. The first such case is in the
decision of Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra
[Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1
: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417]. The second case is the decision in
Ramesh v. Union of India [Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1
SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266]. Finally, the view taken by Bose
and Puranil, JJ., as the Judges of Nagpur High Court, is again
quoted with approval by this Court in Javed Ahmad Hajam v.
State of Maharashtra [Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of
Maharashtra, (2024) 4 SCC 156 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383].
42. This Court in Javed Ahmad Hajam [Javed
Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 4 SCC 156
: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] , was dealing with an offence
punishable under Section 153-AIPC. Section 153-AIPC is
in pari materia with Section 196 BNS. The only difference
is that the words “or through electric communication”
have been added in clause (a) of Section 196 BNS, which
were not in clause (a) of Section 153-AIPC. When an
offence punishable under Section 196 BNS is alleged, the
effect of the spoken or written words will have to be
considered based on standards of reasonable, strong-
minded, firm and courageous individuals and not based
on the standards of people with weak and oscillating
minds. The effect of the spoken or written words cannot
be judged on the basis of the standards of people who
always have a sense of insecurity or of those who always
perceive criticism as a threat to their power or position.
Ingredient of mens rea
43. In Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed
Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 417] and Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya
[Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, (2021) 15 SCC
35] , the ingredient of mens rea has been read into
Section 153-AIPC by this Court. Paras 8 to 14 of the
decision in Javed Ahmad Hajam [Javed Ahmad Hajam v.
State of Maharashtra, (2024) 4 SCC 156 : (2024) 2 SCC
(Cri) 383], which analyses both the above decisions,

- 15 -


read thus: ( Javed Ahmad Hajam case [Javed Ahmad
Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 4 SCC 156 :
(2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383], SCC pp. 161-64)
“8. This Court in Manzar Sayeed Khan
[Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1: (2007) 2 SCC
(Cri) 417] referred to the view taken by
Vivian Bose, J., as a Judge of the erstwhile
Nagpur High Court in Bhagwati Charan Shukla
v. Provincial Govt., C.P. & Berar [Bhagwati
Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., C.P. &
Berar, 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5] . A Division
Bench of the High Court dealt with the offence
of sedition under Section 124-AIPC and
Section 4(1) of the Press (Emergency
Powers) Act, 1931. The issue was whether a
particular article in the press tends, directly
or indirectly, to bring hatred or contempt to
the Government established in law. This Court
has approved this view in its decision in
Ramesh v. Union of India [Ramesh v. Union of
India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266]
. In the said case, this Court dealt with the
issue of applicability of Section 153-AIPC. In
para 13, it was held thus: (Ramesh case
[Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668
: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] , SCC p. 676)
‘ 13. … the effect of the words
must be judged from the standards of
reasonable, strong-minded, firm and
courageous men, and not those of weak
and vacillating minds, nor of those who
scent danger in every hostile point of
view. … It is the standard of ordinary
reasonable man or as they say in
English law “the man on the top of a
Clapham omnibus”.’
Therefore, the yardstick laid down
by Vivian Bose, J., will have to be applied
while judging the effect of the words,
spoken or written, in the context of
Section 153-AIPC.
9. We may also make a useful
reference to a decision of this Court in
Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya
[Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya,
(2021) 15 SCC 35] . Paras 8 to 10 of the
said decision read thus: (SCC pp. 41-43)

- 16 -


‘8. “It is of utmost importance to
keep all speech free in order for the truth
to emerge and have a civil society.” —
Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution is a very valuable
fundamental right. However, the right is
not absolute. Reasonable restrictions can
be placed on the right of free speech and
expression in the interest of sovereignty
and integrity of India, security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States,
public order, decency or morality or in
relation to contempt of Court, defamation
or incitement to an offence. Speech crime
is punishable under Section 153-AIPC.
Promotion of enmity between different
groups on grounds of religion, race, place
of birth, residence, language, etc. and
doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of
harmony is punishable with imprisonment
which may extend to three years or with
fine or with both under Section 153-A. As
we are called upon to decide whether a
prima facie case is made out against the
appellant for committing offences under
Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant
to reproduce the provisions which are as
follows:
*
9. Only where the written or spoken words
have the tendency of creating public disorder or
disturbance of law and order or affecting public
tranquillity, the law needs to step in to prevent
such an activity. The intention to cause disorder
or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of
the offence under Section 153-AIPC and the
prosecution has to prove the existence of mens
rea in order to succeed. [Balwant Singh v. State
of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri)
432]
10 . The gist of the offence under Section
153-AIPC is the intention to promote feelings of
enmity or hatred between different classes of
people. The intention has to be judged primarily
by the language of the piece of writing and the
circumstances in which it was written and
published. The matter complained of within the
ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole.
One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated
passages for proving the charge nor indeed can
one take a sentence here and a sentence there
and connect them by a meticulous process of
inferential reasoning [Manzar Sayeed Khan v.
State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 417].”
10. Now, coming back to Section 153-A,
clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-

- 17 -


AIPC is attracted when by words, either
spoken or written or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, an attempt is
made to promote disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill will between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups
or castes or communities. The promotion of
disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill will must be
on the grounds of religion, race, place of
birth, residence, language, caste, community
or any other analogous grounds. Clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC will apply
only when an act is committed which is
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
between different religious, racial, language
or regional groups or castes or communities
and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the
public tranquillity.
11. Now, coming to the words used by
the appellant on his WhatsApp status, we
may note here that the first statement is that
August 5 is a Black Day for Jammu and
Kashmir. 5-8-2019 is the day on which Article
370 of the Constitution of India was
abrogated, and two separate Union Territories
of Jammu and Kashmir were formed. Further,
the appellant has posted that “Article 370
was abrogated, we are not happy”. On a plain
reading, the appellant intended to criticise the
action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the
Constitution of India. He has expressed
unhappiness over the said act of abrogation.
The aforesaid words do not refer to any
religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community. It is a simple
protest by the appellant against the decision
to abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution of
India and the further steps taken based on
that decision. The Constitution of India, under
Article 19(1)(a), guarantees freedom of
speech and expression. Under the said
guarantee, every citizen has the right to offer
criticism of the action of abrogation of Article
370 or, for that matter, every decision of the
State. He has the right to say he is unhappy
with any decision of the State.
12. In Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar
Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007)
5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] , this Court
has read “intention” as an essential

- 18 -


ingredient of the said offence . The alleged
objectionable words or expressions used by
the appellant, on its plain reading, cannot
promote disharmony or feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill will between different religious,
racial, language or regional groups or castes
or communities. The WhatsApp status of the
appellant has a photograph of two barbed
wires, below which it is mentioned that
“AUGUST 5 — BLACK DAY — JAMMU &
KASHMIR”. This is an expression of his
individual view and his reaction to the
abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution
of India. It does not reflect any intention to
do something which is prohibited under
Section 153-A. At best, it is a protest, which is
a part of his freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).
13. Every citizen of India has a right to
be critical of the action of abrogation of
Article 370 and the change of status of
Jammu and Kashmir. Describing the day the
abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an
expression of protest and anguish. If every
criticism or protest of the actions of the State
is to be held as an offence under Section 153-
A, democracy, which is an essential feature of
the Constitution of India, will not survive.
14. The right to dissent in a legitimate
and lawful manner is an integral part of the
rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).
Every individual must respect the right of
others to dissent. An opportunity to
peacefully protest against the decisions of the
Government is an essential part of
democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful
manner must be treated as a part of the right
to lead a dignified and meaningful life
guaranteed by Article 21. But the protest or
dissent must be within four corners of the
modes permissible in a democratic set up. It
is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed
in accordance with clause (2) of Article 19. In
the present case, the appellant has not at all
crossed the line.”
(emphasis in original and supplied)
44. Hence, mens rea will have to be read
into Section 196 BNS. In this case, looking to the

- 19 -


text of the words spoken and the context in which
those were spoken, it is impossible to attribute any
mens rea to the appellant.
…. …. ….
53. Following is the summary of our
conclusions:
53.1. Sub-section (3) of Section 173 BNSS
makes a significant departure from Section 154CrPC. It
provides that when information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence which is made
punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is
received by an officer in charge of a police station, with
the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned
therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a
preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a
prima facie case for proceeding in the matter. However,
under Section 154CrPC, as held in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524], only a limited preliminary inquiry is
permissible to ascertain whether the information
received discloses a cognizable offence. Moreover, a
preliminary inquiry can be made under CrPC only if the
information does not disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry. Sub-section (3) of Section 173 BNSS is an
exception to sub-section (1) of Section 173. In the
category of cases covered by sub-section (3), a police
officer is empowered to make a preliminary inquiry to
ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out for
proceeding in the matter even if the information received
discloses commission of any cognizable offence.
53.2. Under sub-section (3) of Section 173
BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer
comes to a conclusion that a prima facie case exists to
proceed, he should immediately register an FIR and
proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a
prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he should
immediately inform the first informant-complainant so
that he can avail a remedy under sub-section (4) of
Section 173.
53.3. In case of the offence punishable
under Section 196 BNS to decide whether the
words, either spoken or written or by sign or by

- 20 -


visible representations or through electronic
communication or otherwise, lead to the
consequences provided in the section, the police
officer to whom information is furnished will have
to read or hear the words written or spoken, and
by taking the same as correct, decide whether an
offence under Section 196 is made out. Reading of
written words, or hearing spoken words will be
necessary to determine whether the contents
make out a case of the commission of a cognizable
offence. The same is the case with offences
punishable under Sections 197, 299 and 302 BNS.
Therefore, to ascertain whether the information
received by an officer in charge of the police
station makes out a cognizable offence, the officer
must consider the meaning of the spoken or
written words. This act on the part of the police
officer will not amount to making a preliminary
inquiry which is not permissible under sub-section
(1) of Section 173.
53.4. The police officers must abide by the
Constitution and respect its ideals. The philosophy of the
Constitution and its ideals can be found in the Preamble
itself. The Preamble lays down that the people of India
have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic and to
secure all its citizens liberty of thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship. Therefore, liberty of thought
and expression is one of the ideals of our Constitution.
Article 19(1)(a) confers a fundamental right on all
citizens to freedom of speech and expression. The police
machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution. Moreover, the police
officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the
Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold
freedom of speech and expression conferred on all
citizens.
53.5. Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution
carves out an exception to the fundamental right
guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article
19. If there is a law covered by clause (2), its operation
remains unaffected by sub-clause (a) of clause (1). We
must remember that laws covered by clause (2) are
protected by way of an exception provided they impose a
reasonable restriction. Therefore, when an allegation is

- 21 -


of the commission of an offence covered by the law
referred to in clause (2) of Article 19, if sub-section (3)
of Section 173 is applicable, it is always appropriate to
conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a
prima facie case is made out to proceed against the
accused. This will ensure that the fundamental rights
guaranteed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article
19 remain protected. Therefore, in such cases, the
higher police officer referred to in sub-section (3) of
Section 173 must normally grant permission to the police
officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry.
53.6. When an offence punishable under
Section 196 BNS is alleged, the effect of the
spoken or written words will have to be considered
based on standards of reasonable, strong-minded,
firm and courageous individuals and not based on
the standards of people with weak and oscillating
minds. The effect of the spoken or written words
cannot be judged on the basis of the standards of
people who always have a sense of insecurity or of
those who always perceive criticism as a threat to
their power or position.
53.7. There is no absolute rule that when
the investigation is at a nascent stage, the High
Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to quash an
offence by exercising its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India or under Section
482CrPC equivalent to Section 528 BNSS. When the
High Court, in the given case, finds that no offence
was made out on the face of it, to prevent abuse of
the process of law, it can always interfere even
though the investigation is at the nascent stage. It
all depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case as well as the nature of the offence. There is
no such blanket rule putting an embargo on the
powers of the High Court to quash FIR only on the
ground that the investigation was at a nascent
stage.
53.8. Free expression of thoughts and views by
individuals or group of individuals is an integral part of a
healthy civilised society. Without freedom of expression
of thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified
life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a
healthy democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts

- 22 -


expressed by an individual or group of individuals must
be countered by expressing another point of view. Even
if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed
by another, the right of the person to express the views
must be respected and protected. Literature including
poetry, dramas, films, stage shows including stand-up
comedy, satire and art, make the lives of human beings
more meaningful. The Courts are duty-bound to uphold
and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may
not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty
to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a).
We Judges are under an obligation to uphold the
Constitution and respect its ideals. If the police or
executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Courts to step in and
protect the fundamental rights. There is no other
institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of
the citizens.
53.9. 75 years into our republic, we cannot be
seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere
recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or
entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be
alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different
communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all
legitimate expressions of view in the public domain
which is so fundamental to a free society."
(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that the
offences under sections 196 and 299 of the BNS require the
officer in charge of the police station to consider the meaning of
the spoken or written words and observe if it makes out a
cognizable offence. The respondent no.1 - police did not make
such consideration in the present case.
9. What would now remain is the offence under
Section 353 of the BNS/Section 505 of the IPC. The Apex Court
in the case of PATRICIA MUKHIM v. STATE OF MEGHALAYA
reported in (2021) 15 SCC 35 interprets Section 505 of the
IPC and holds as follows:
“ …. …. ….

- 23 -


11. In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. [Bilal Ahmed
Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri)
1094] , this Court analysed the ingredients of Sections 153-A
and 505(2)IPC. It was held that Section 153-A covers a case
where a person by “words, either spoken or written, or by
signs or by visible representations”, promotes or attempts to
promote feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will. Under Section
505(2) promotion of such feeling should have been done by
making a publication or circulating any statement or report
containing rumour or alarming news. Mens rea was held to be
a necessary ingredient for the offence under Sections 153-A
and 505(2). The common factor of both the sections being
promotion of feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between
different religious or racial or linguistics or religious groups or
castes or communities, it is necessary that at least two such
groups or communities should be involved. It was further
held in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo [Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of
A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094] that
merely inciting the feelings of one community or group
without any reference to any other community or group
cannot attract any of the two sections. The Court went
on to highlight the distinction between the two
offences, holding that publication of words or
representation is sine qua non under Section 505. It is
also relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in
Ramesh v. Union of India [Ramesh v. Union of India,
(1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] in which it was
held that words used in the alleged criminal speech
should be judged from the standards of reasonable,
strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not
those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who
scent danger in every hostile point of view. The
standard of an ordinary reasonable man or as they say
in English law “the man on the top of a Clapham
omnibus” should be applied.
12. This Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union
of India [Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014)
11 SCC 477 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 400] had referred to the
Canadian Supreme Court decision in Saskatchewan (Human
Rights Commission) v. William Whatcott [Saskatchewan
(Human Rights Commission) v. William Whatcott, 2013 SCC
OnLine Can SC 6 : (2013) 1 SCR 467] . In that judgment, the
Canadian Supreme Court set out what it considered to be a
workable approach in interpreting “hatred” as is used in
legislative provisions prohibiting hate speech. The first test
was for the Courts to apply the hate speech prohibition

- 24 -


objectively and in so doing, ask whether a reasonable person,
aware of the context and circumstances, would view the
expression as exposing the protected group to hatred. The
second test was to restrict interpretation of the legislative
term “hatred” to those extreme manifestations of the emotion
described by the words “detestation” and “vilification”. This
would filter out and protect speech which might be repugnant
and offensive, but does not incite the level of abhorrence,
delegitimisation and rejection that risks causing discrimination
or injury. The third test was for the Courts to focus their
analysis on the effect of the expression at issue, namely,
whether it is likely to expose the targeted person or group to
hatred by others. Mere repugnancy of the ideas expressed is
insufficient to constitute the crime attracting penalty.
13. In the instant case, applying the principles laid
down by this Court as mentioned above, the question that
arises for our consideration is whether the Facebook post
dated 4-7-2020 was intentionally made for promoting
class/community hatred and has the tendency to provoke
enmity between two communities. A close scrutiny of the
Facebook post would indicate that the agony of the appellant
was directed against the apathy shown by the Chief Minister of
Meghalaya, the Director General of Police and the
DorbarShnong of the area in not taking any action against the
culprits who attacked the non-tribals youngsters. The
appellant referred to the attacks on non-tribals in 1979. At the
most, the Facebook post can be understood to highlight the
discrimination against non-tribals in the State of Meghalaya.
However, the appellant made it clear that criminal elements
have no community and immediate action has to be taken
against persons who had indulged in the brutal attack on non-
tribal youngsters playing basketball. The Facebook post read
in its entirety pleads for equality of non-tribals in the State of
Meghalaya. In our understanding, there was no intention on
the part of the appellant to promote class/community hatred.
As there is no attempt made by the appellant to incite
people belonging to a community to indulge in any
violence, the basic ingredients of the offence under
Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c) have not been made out.
Where allegations made in the FIR or the complaint,
even if they are taken on their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR
is liable to be quashed [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]."

- 25 -


(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court holds that the basic ingredient of the
offence under Sections 196 and 353 of the BNS or Sections 153-
A and 505 of the IPC is an attempt to incite people belonging to
a community to indulge in any violence being made out. This
ingredient has also not been met in the present case.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

(i) The criminal petition is allowed .
(ii) The impugned crime in Crime No.80/2025
pending on the file of I Additional Civil Judge
(Jr. Dn.) and JMFC Court, Bijapur District,
stands quashed.
Ordered accordingly.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed as a
consequence.”

The said order has become final. The second crime on the same
incident must tumble down for the very reason of quashment of the
crime in Crime No.80 of 2025.



8. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

O R D E R

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed .

- 26 -


(ii) FIR in Crime No.51 of 2025 registered by Hubballi Town
Police Station on 17-04-2025 and pending before the
JMFC I Court, Hubli stands quashed.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed.




Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE



BKP