Greenopolis Welfare Confederation vs Rakesh Kumar Gupta

Court
Supreme Court

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ INHERENT JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 1070

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6797- 6801 OF 2023

ORRIS INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATE LIMITED ...APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

RAKESH KUMAR GUPTA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6792 - 6796 OF 2023

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6802 - 6806 OF 2023

WITH
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NOS. 249-253 OF 2025
IN C.A. NOS. 6792 - 6796 OF 2023

J U D G M E N T


Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 2

II. Facts ................................................................................................. 3

(i) Findings of Adjudicating Authority (AA) on the allegation of fraud and
collusion by the original operational creditor who filed Section 9

Petition………………………………………………………………………11

(ii) Findings of AA on Ownership and control of M/s Orris over the
Project………………………………………………………………………16

III. Re Issue I – Whether the AA has the power and jurisdiction to recall
CIRP by dismissing the Section 9 petition that was admitted at the
instance of a collusive operational creditor? .................................... 16

IV. Re Issue II – If there is such a power, whether the CIRP proceedings
could be continued. ......................................................................... 26

V. Directions ........................................................................................ 36

Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
KAPIL TANDON
Date: 2026.09.30
18:02:13 IST
Reason:
1

I. Introduction
1. A unique situation arose in 2023 when the Adjudicating Authority
(“AA”) was called upon to examine whether the corporate insolvency
resolution process (“CIRP”) that was initiated with admission of the
Section 9 petition under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(“IBC”) by M/s Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd., claiming to be an
operational creditor, is fraudulent and in collusion with the corporate
debtor. Upon examination, it became crystal clear that the initiation of
CIRP was fraudulent and, in fact, collusive. The consequent question that
arose for consideration before the AA as well as the National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”), and continued to prevail for our
consideration, is:
I. Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the power and jurisdiction
to recall CIRP by dismissing the Section 9 petition that was
admitted at the instance of a collusive operational creditor?
2. While the AA held that there is no power of recall after an application

is admitted and CIRP commences, the NCLAT held that such power
certainly exists. Having held that the power exists, the NCLAT considered
it to be a logical consequence to simply reject the application and recall the
entire CIRP process. The approach adopted by the AA, the NCLAT,
followed by the submissions of the learned counsel at the bar, necessitates
formulating yet another question, and it is:
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II. Assuming such a power exists, does dismissal of the petition under
Section 9 on the grounds of fraud and collusion, inevitably entail
recall of the CIRP process, or can the process be preserved by
substituting the original applicant with another?
3. Having considered the matter in detail, we have answered each of
the questions that have arisen for consideration and disposed of these
appeals with specific directions. Before we set out the reasons followed
by our conclusions, the facts, to the extent that they are relevant for our
consideration, are as follows.
II. Facts
4. Of the three Civil Appeals, we have taken the appeal in C.A No.
6797-6801 of 2023 by Orris Infrastructure Private Limited (“Orris”) as the
lead matter. Orris Infrastructure Private Limited is the landowner of a
parcel of 47.218 acres of land situated at Sector 89, Gurgaon. Orris
entered into a development agreement dated 02.11.2011 with M/s Three
C Shelters Private Limited, the Corporate Debtor (“CD”), for construction
of a real estate project called Greenopolis with 1862 flats (“Project”). The
agreement stipulated that the CD is to develop the Project at its own cost
and that the constructed flats would be shared in the ratio of 65:35
between the CD and the appellant, respectively.
4.1 Pursuant to the agreement, between 2012-13, the appellant and the
CD entered into tripartite apartment buyer agreements with various home
3

buyers. Apart from others, clause 5 of the agreement requires the CD to
complete construction of the Project within 36 months from allotment of
each unit with a grace period of 6 months. The relevant clause is
reproduced here;
“Subject to Clause 5.2 and subject to all the buyers of the
apartments in the Project making timely payment the 3C
shall endeavor to complete the construction of the
Apartment within 36 months with a grace period of 06
months from the date of the allotment of the Apartment.”

4.2 Despite explicit contractual obligation, the CD was not proceeding
to complete the Project in time. Home buyers, who had invested heavy
amounts, were anxious about the completion of the project, and in order
to seek representative and legal remedies, they came together and
formed an association called the Greenopolis Welfare Association
(“GWA”).
4.3 GWA filed a Complaint before the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory
Authority (“HRERA”) seeking appropriate directions to the CD for
completing the Project and handing over possession to allottees. By its
order dated 23.01.2019, the HRERA directed the CD to complete
construction as per schedule and also directed that monies deposited in
the escrow account must be used only for the Project. Aggrieved against
the finding of the HRERA that the CD is a joint promoter of the Project and
against attachment of 10 acres of its land, Orris appealed to the Haryana
Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (“HREAT”), but the HREAT dismissed the
4

appeal, holding that Orris and the CD, as promoters, must complete the
project and hand over possession expeditiously.
4.4 Insofar as consumer complaints by allottees of the CD and Orris are
concerned, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
(“NCDRC”), vide its common judgment dated 20.07.2020, held that the
CD and Orris shall be responsible towards their respective
allottees/consumers.
4.5 As the project was getting further delayed, the HRERA initiated suo
motu proceedings. Having examined the matter, by its order dated
07.10.2020, the HRERA directed that the CD has no development rights
and that Orris, being the landowner, licensee and collaborator of the
project, has the primary responsibility for development, construction and
completion of the project. The relevant portion of the direction is as
follows;
“(i) M/s Orris being one of the landowners, the license holder
and collaborator of the project as per the provisions of the
Act has the primary responsibility for development,
construction and completion of the project.
(iii) M/s Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd. is directed that since the
funds available in the account No.[omitted] of the KMBL
Mahindra Bank, Noida are the assets of the homebuyers,
therefore, they shall be transferred to the new dedicated
RERA account to be opened in the name of “Greenopolis
Project” as per the provisions of Section 4(1)(1)(D) of the
Act ibid. so that the project can be completed without any
future delay. All future receivables from the sold and unsold
inventory will be deposited in this account.”
(emphasis supplied)

5

5. It is in the above-referred background that the proceedings under
the IBC were initiated by M/s Straight Edge Pvt Ltd., a company claiming
to be an operational creditor of the CD. M/s Straight Edge Pvt Ltd filed the
Section 9 petition for initiation of CIRP of the CD on 17.10.2019, and the
company petition came up for hearing on 24.10.2019, when the
Adjudicating Authority (AA) issued notice to the CD. It is interesting to note
that, by the time the company petition under Section 9 came up for further
hearing, an affidavit filed on 27.01.2020 by the director of the CD,
admitting the operational debt, was already on record. The AA therefore
allowed the application on 20.07.2020 in terms of the following order;
“Heard the submissions made by the Operational Creditor
as well as Corporate Debtor. Annexure A-10 which is
affidavit of admission shows that on January 27, 2020, the
Director of Three C Shelters Private Limited. Mr. Girish
Chander Joshi has confirmed that the Corporate Debtor has
to pay to the Operational Creditor as per his claim.
Therefore, the petition is allowed.”

6. However, as IRP had not been appointed by the earlier order, by a
subsequent direction dated 16.10.2020, the AA while appointing an IRP
for the CD, proceeded to impose moratorium. The relevant portion of the
order is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference;
“9. That apart in compliance of sub-section (3) (b) and (C)
of Section 9 of the Code, the petitioner has affirmed that
respondent corporate debtor has not raised any dispute in
respect of the unpaid operational debt.
10. It is reiterated that in the present case the default
committed by the corporate debtor is not denied. The
material on record clearly goes to show that the respondent
committed default in payment of the claimed operational
debt even after demand made by the applicant operational
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creditor. In fact, there is a clear admission of debt and
default and therefore there is no need to comply with any
additional requirement as provided in Clauses (d) and (e) of
sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Code.
11. Therefore, on fulfilment of requirements of Section 9 (5)
(i) (a) to (d) of the Code, the present application is admitted.
12. In terms of sub-section (6) of Section 9 of the Code the
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in respect of
respondent corporate debtor shall commence from the date
of this admission order.”

7. The homebuyers who had formed an association and were pursuing
remedies before HRERA and NCDRC were naturally aggrieved with the
admission of the CD into CIRP and therefore appealed to the NCLAT, also
alleging fraud and collusion between M/s Straight Edge, portraying itself
to be the operational creditor and the CD. The NCLAT vide order dated
06.01.2021 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the admission of Section
9 petition on the ground that a number of other creditors, whose petitions
were pending, had already invoked the provisions of the Code and the
moratorium had commenced from 16.10.2020. The relevant portion of the
order is as follows;
“13. The grievance of the Appellant appears to be that it was
the biggest Financial Creditor and instead of acting on its
Application, the Application of Respondent No.2 was
admitted. Prayer - d of the Appeal also indicates that the
Appellant also wants CIRP proceedings against the
Respondent No.1 – Corporate Debtor. The IRP of
Respondent No.1 has with Diary No.24141 filed list of
Company Petitions which were moved by stakeholders
including home buyers against the present Respondent No.
1 - Corporate Debtor. It is a list of 22 petitions in which it
appears that the Appellant also had filed CP No. 1335 of
2019. Sumita Gogoi who filed I.A. 2970/2020 in this matter
was another Petitioner with CP No. 503/2019. Intervener –
Dhruv Verma in I.A. 2605/2020 also wants the CIRP to
7

continue. Even if we set aside Impugned Order, there are
others waiting against Respondent No. 1 Corporate Debtor.
When Respondent No.2 as Operational Creditor filed
Petition/Application under Section 9 of IBC, the only
consideration for Adjudicating Authority was to examine if
there is operational debt due and default. It found the debt
due of Rs.29,95,91,034/- was not disputed and passed
Impugned Order 1 dated 20.07.2020 allowing the Petition.
In such matter, after Petition was allowed, the Adjudicating
Authority had no power left to review the Order dated
20.07.2020, especially so, on vague surmises of collusion.
We do not see any purpose in setting aside on technical
grounds the CIRP initiated. The Order dated 16th October,
2020 vide which Order the Adjudicating Authority has
recorded reasons thus shows that there was material to
show debt due claimed by the Respondent No.2 -
Operational Creditor and default to seek CIRP against
Respondent No.1. If the Application was complete, the
same was required to be admitted.
14. The grievance raised by the Appellant is that the detailed
Orders dated 16th October, 2020 were passed in spite of
stay dated 15th October, 2020. For this, I.A. 2547/2020 is
filed which relies on Annexure A-2 to say that the staff of the
Adjudicating Authority was informed. Para- 2 of I.A.
2547/2020, in this regard, does not disclose the name or
particulars of any staff member. There is no reason why the
said order was not put on record by a proper application, if
the Appellant was so interested. We would thus not find fault
with the passing of detailed Order dated 16th October, 2020
which was indicated by the Adjudicating Authority in its
Order dated 14th October, 2020 (Annexure R-5). The
Adjudicating Authority cured defect and we do not wish to
interfere on technical grounds, as it will serve no purpose.
Record shows that both Respondents are now under CIRP
and we would trust the IRPs/RPs to follow the law. As such,
alleged collusion would be irrelevant, even otherwise.

8. By a subsequent order dated 15.04.2021, passed on an application
filed by the RP of the CD, the AA directed the parties to maintain status
quo as regards to the amounts lying in the escrow account. Various
parties, including Orris, challenged this order and the contest continued
till this Court, when, by its order dated 01.07.2021, this Court permitted
8

Orris to approach the AA by filing an appropriate application for the
necessary clarification. On the basis of the liberty granted by this Court,
Orris filed an application for relevant directions before the AA. Apart from
this, an application by Orris for impleadment and an application by RP of
M/s Three C Universal Developers, being a shareholder of the CD, were
also pending.
9. It is important to note the prayers of Orris and M/s Three C Universal
Developers. The prayers of Orris, in IA 2902/ND/2021 (the other IA
2482/ND/2021 is only for impleadment), are as follows -
“i. Confirm and declare that the order dated 07.10.2020
passed by the Ld. HRERA prior to the commencement of
the moratorium as per order dated 16.10.2020;
ii. Declare that the Resolution Professional filed IA No. 1573
of 2021 before this Hon’ble Tribunal by concealing the fact
that the Corporate Debtor in CIRP has filed an appeal
against order dated 07.10.2020 and the same is pending
adjudication before HRERA Appellate Authority and the
Escrow Bank Account in this IA is the subject matter of that
appeal;
iii. Reject the application being IA No. 1573 of 2021 filed by
the Resolution Professional of the Corporate Debtor as his
prayers are contrary to the orders passed by the Ld. HRERA
dated 07.10.2020 and/or Hon’ble High Court of Delhi as
these funds cannot be used for the purpose of CIRP of the
Corporate Debtor.
iv. Confirm and declare that the funds lying in the Escrow
Account cannot be used by the RP in CIR Process as the
same are required to be transferred to Escrow Bank
Account opened by applicant in terms of provisions of
section 4(2)(l)(D) of RERA Act as per order dated
07.10.2020;
v. Direct the RP of the Corporate Debtor not to disturb the
possession of the project GREENOPOLIS and allow the
Applicant to discharge its obligation under the order dated
07.10.2020 passed by the Ld. HRERA qua completion of
the project;
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vi. Pass any other order that this Hon’ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

10. It is even more important to note the prayers of RP of Three C
Universal Developers, as it alleges fraud and collusion between the
alleged operational creditor M/s Straight Edge and the CD. The contents
of the application, as articulated by the AA, are as follows -
a. The application filed by the Operational Creditor Straight
Edge Contracts Private Limited was fraudulently filed in
collusion with the directors of the corporate debtor to
defraud the creditors of the corporate debtor.
b. The applicant submitted that Three C Universal
Developers Private Limited is also undergoing CIRP and the
applicant was appointed by this Tribunal as Resolution
Professional for the company vide order dated 17.12.2019
passed by Bench-II of this Tribunal. Three C Universal
Developers Private Limited is holding 38.25% equity shares
of the Corporate Debtor and owes Rs. 127,56,03,605/-,
excluding interest.
c. It is also submitted that Mr. Rajiv Baisoya filed an affidavit
expressing the company’s inability to pay the debt of
Operational Creditor and on the basis of same affidavit the
CIRP was initiated against the corporate debtor. However,
it is submitted that the Board Resolution filed by Mr. Rajiv
Baisoya was dated 24.06.2019, 107 days prior to the
issuance of Demand Notice.
d. It is also stated that when the applicant/RP inquired from
Mr. Rajiv Baisoya about affairs of the Three C Universal
Developers Private Limited, since he was also director of
Three C Universal Developers Private Limited, Mr. Rajiv
Baisoya informed applicant vide e-mail dated 07.07.2020
that he is only office boy/filing boy/store keeper of the
company, and he also gave in a writing letter dated
06.02.2021 confirming the said facts.
e. Further, Mr. Girish Chander Joshi, another director of
both the companies also informed the applicant that he was
only a pantry boy and had no knowledge about the business
and operations of the company. Mr. Joshi also gave same
facts vide written letter dated 06.02.2021. It has been
pointed out that Mr. Girish Chander Joshi, vide email dated
27.01.2020 admitted the liability towards Operational
Creditor.
10

f. The applicant further pointed out that at the time of
issuance of Demand Notice, the Escrow Account was
opened with Kotak Mahindra Bank as per the directions of
the RERA and all payment of money from the said account
could only be withdrawn for the purpose of construction and
the corporate debtor did not request the HRERA for release
of funds from the said account despite having adequate
funds in the said account.
g. Thus, it is prayed that the entire CIRP proceedings are
fraudulent & collusive in nature, accordingly, prayed for
setting aside the same.

11. The above-referred IAs led to a full-fledged hearing, giving rise to
some fundamental questions about the very maintainability of the petition
under Section 9 and continuation of CIRP itself. The AA formulated 10
questions, of which only 4 are relevant for our consideration –
“ii. Whether there was active collusion between M/s Straight
Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd.
in the initiation of CIRP proceedings and this tribunal has
got jurisdiction u/s 65 of IBC to set aside the entire CIR
proceedings?

iii. Whether this Tribunal is having jurisdiction to recall or
review its own order after the admission of the petition under
Section 9 on the ground of allegation of fraudulent and
malicious intention of initiation of CIRP proceedings?
…
v. Whether the Resolution Profession by virtue of order dt.
20th July 2020 and 16th October 2020 is entitled to take
control and custody of Greenopolis Project?

vi. Whether M/s Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd. is vested with
any right, title & interest in Greenopolis project by virtue of
collaborating agreement dated 02/11/2011?”


(i) Findings of Adjudicating Authority (AA) on the allegation of
fraud and collusion by the original operational creditor who filed
Section 9 Petition.
11

12. As regards the issue relating to fraud and collusion between Straight
Edge and CD, the AA came to a clear and categorical finding of fraud and
collusion. The findings are as follows –
“46. …therefore, it is proved on the record that no work was
going on at the site since 2016 onwards. Further, in the
order dated 23rd January, 2021, it is clearly reflected that
the developer was main contractor on costs basis. Further,
the assignment work order was executed on 28th
November, 2017 and invoices were raised for the period of
Nov. 2017 to August 2018... However, in the same report, it
is also reflected that the arrangement of Rs. 21 crores was
made for the payment of Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd.
Apart that, a sum of Rs. 53 crores were also lying in the
escrow account. Once the arrangement of payment was
there and then the factum of not making the payment of Rs.
33 crores as alleged on behalf of the Straight Edge
Contracts Pvt. Ltd. creates a serious doubt in the story of
the petitioner. This fact also indicates that there was a
collusion between them.

47. No doubt, the agreement dated 28th November, 2017
was executed between Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd. as
well as Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd. and by virtue of that, it
was agreed to provide the services for the remaining
construction of the project Greenopolis. But it is also matter
of fact that in the said agreement dated 28th November,
2017, two other parties were also there i.e. M/s Econovation
Homes LLP & M/s Three C Builders Pvt. Ltd. These
companies were never found in the subsequent
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 07.01.2019.

48. By virtue of clause 18 of the agreement dated
28.11.2019, all the labour records have to be kept by second
party, however, may be checked weekly by the first party.
All records/register compliances documents were to be duly
submitted by the second party to the first party on monthly
basis. Apart that, as per Clause 19, the Second party was
required to follow the rules & regulations qua labour
including payment, salary, wages, ESI, Payment of Bonus
Act, Payment of Gratuity Act as well and the zero date for
accounting balance sharing date i.e. 13th November, 2017.
Simultaneously, as per the said agreement, M/s
Econovation Homes LLP was required to infuse a sum of
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Rs. 65 Crores and the Second party i.e. Straight Edge
Contracts Pvt. Ltd. was required only to invest Rs. 5 Crores
out of its own funds, therefore, the investment was upto Rs.
65 Crores only, whereas, the tentative costs to complete the
work of Phase-I, Phase-II, Phase- III without margin was Rs.
256 crores, which can increase or reduced by 10%. The
above said agreement dated 28th November, 2017 is totally
absent qua the manner of making payment by the Three C
Shelters Pvt. Ltd. In order to cover the said ambiguity,
another Memo of Understanding (MoU) dated 07.01.2019
was executed on a simple paper, which was not got
registered at all, wherein it is simply admitted that M/s
Straight Edge Contract Pvt. Ltd. had spent a sum of Rs.
330,846,411 and the respondent/Corporate Debtor could
clear only Rs. 312,55,376, therefore, the total amount of Rs.
299,592,035 stated to be due.

49. In the present matter, though in the report of the
Investigating Officer, it is manifest that petitioner herein
started working at the site of Greenopolis since June 2017,
but the said fact does not find substantiate from any
documentary evidence. Moreover, Ld. HRERA as well as
HREAT after examining all the facts & evidence on the file
recorded concurrent findings that the work of Greenopolis
had come to stand still since early 2016. Moreover, the
agreement was executed between the petitioner herein &
the Corporate Debtor as well as Three C Universal Pvt. Ltd
and M/s Econovation Homes LLP on 28.11.2017, but the
work was alleged to have been already stand started in the
month of June 2017. Had, the work would have been
commenced in the month of June 2017, certainly, the parties
must have entered into agreement on or before that month
and not after five months of the execution of the work that
too, when the completion of construction work was worth
Rs. 256 crores. Admittedly, the land about 47 acres worth
more than Rupees Five Hundred Crore was put into project
by Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., but strangely enough, when
the project completion work was allegedly assigned by
Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd. to Straight Edge Contracts Pvt.
Ltd., the tentative costs was Rs. 256 crores, then why only
Rs. 5 Crore were agreed to be spent by Straight Edge
Contracts Pvt. Ltd. and Rs. 65 crores by M/s Econovation
Homes LLP. The entire agreement is silent about the rest of
the payment, how it would have to come to the project and
even the mode of making payment to Straight Edge
Contracts Pvt. Ltd. was also not clearly laid down in the said
agreement. Further, no default clause is laid down in the
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said agreement to fix the liability of the Straight Edge
Contracts Pvt. Ltd. These all facts & circumstances create a
serious dent not only in the story of the petitioner, but also
Corporate Debtor as well.

50. Further, it is to be mentioned that the demand notice in
the present matter was issued on 09th October, 2019,
whereas the resolution of the Board of the Corporate Debtor
pertains to 24th June, 2019, whereby Mr. Rajiv Basoya and
Mr. Girish Joshi were directed to file reply. Hence, the
company had already preempted that reply on behalf of
company must have to be filed with respect to the demand
notice, accordingly, both Mr. Rajiv Basoya & Mr. Girish Joshi
filed reply in the petition. All these circumstantial evidence
on the record indicates that there was active collusion
between the Corporate Debtor & the Petitioner herein to get
initiate the insolvency proceedings. Further, without any
Resolution on the part of the Corporate Debtor, some of the
Directors & Petitioner herein got executed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) dated 07.01.2019 even without
involving M/s Econovation Homes LLP & Three C Universal
Pvt. Ltd., which were actually parties to an agreement dated
28.11.2017. Moreover, the said Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) was also not got attested or
registered, therefore, the said documents were nothing, but
after thought documents fabricated / created just to facilitate
the initiation of CIR proceedings. Further, the petitioner
herein without redeeming the securities (as alleged work
has to be stated to be secured by way properties i.e. plot SC
201/09 approximately 8000 square feet and another plot SC
201/05 approximately 20,000 square feet situated at
Noida.), proceeded to file the present petition. One of the
erstwhile Director Mr. Surender Singh Suri i.e. respondent
No. 4 categorically deposed that Mr. Bhardwaj while
deposing before EOW categorically stated that his
signatures on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
were not genuine, which further puts clouds qua the
authenticity of the execution of that document. Further,
there was no authorization or resolution of corporate debtor
in the favour of Mr. Bhardwaj, Mr. Girish Joshi & Mr. Rajiv
Basoya qua execution of the documents of any kind with
Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd. Hence, even, the alleged
agreement dated 28.11.2017 also comes under cloud.
Further, the Corporate Debtor was having in its Escrow
Account Rs. 53 Crores at that time, and the Corporate
Debtor despite admitting the liability did not prefer to pay the
14

same. Hence, the said fact creates a serious doubt about
the execution of the very Ist. agreement.

51. Apart that, Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd. was being
represented by Mr. Rajiv Basoya and Mr. Girish Chander
Joshi, who were mere pantry boys or office boys in the
company… These affidavits clearly proves that these two
persons were not at all aware of any of the activities of the
company and they were also not familiar with any
documents etc. accordingly, they have also made request
to discharge and remove them from the directorship...
Pleading of the main petition has been merely admitted by
these dummy Directors, Mr. Rajiv Basoya and Mr. Girish
Chander Joshi. Except, this admission, there is no
authenticated document to corroborate the fact whether the
work was actually carried out at the site. Ld. HRERA, also
specifically held that no construction was going on
Greenopolis since earlier 2016. Although, the contention
has been raised on behalf of M/s Straight Edge Contract
Pvt. Ltd. that it was not a party to that litigation, the said
findings, if any recorded, are not binding upon it. But in this
context, it is to be mentioned that Three C Shelters Pvt. Ltd.
was in fact party therein and the said complaint as well as
other proceedings were duly contested by it. Further, Ld.
HREAT also recorded the same finding categorically stating
as under: “the construction of the project virtually came to a
stand still in early 2016.” It is Three C Shelters, which
admitted the liability in the present application, and the said
issue was also hotly contested by Three C Shelters before
the Ld. HRERA as well as Ld. HERAT. Therefore, the said
findings are very much binding upon the petitioner herein
also, as the interest stands accrued to it through the
respondent corporate debtor itself.

13. It is evident from the above findings that activities of M/s Straight
Edge were anything but straight, in fact outright crooked. There is a clear
collusion between M/s Straight Edge and the CD. We may mention at this
very stage, that these findings are affirmed by the NCLAT. Even before
us there was no contest on the findings of fraud and collusion as found by
the AA and affirmed by the NCLAT. We affirm these findings.
15

(ii) Findings of AA on Ownership and control of M/s Orris over the
Project.

14. As regards the contention of Orris with respect to ownership of the
project is concerned, while considering issues (v) & (vi), the AA observed
that Orris, being landowner and statutory licensee, will be responsible for
development of the project. It clarified that the Corporate Debtor has “ no
right, title and interest in the said project and also have no right to dispose
1
of the property or sell any of the units as well”. This observation may be
in line with the findings of the HRERA in order dt. 07.10.2020. It also
observed that any property in possession of the CD, “ under the
contractual arrangement are specifically kept out of the term “Assets”
2
under the explanation under Section 18 ” and that the Resolution
Professional is not entitled to take control of the said property.
15. We are not called upon to adjudicate on this issue and as such we
express no opinion whatsoever on this matter.
III. Re Issue I – Whether the AA has the power and jurisdiction to
recall CIRP by dismissing the Section 9 petition that was admitted at
the instance of a collusive operational creditor?
16. As regards issue relating to power and jurisdiction to recall its own
order of admission of the Section 9 petition on the ground of fraud and
collusion, the AA came to the conclusion that no such power exists. In this

1
NCLT Order dated 29.03.2022, Para 74.
2
NCLT Order dated 29.03.2022, Para 77.
16

view of the matter, it held that there is no option but to continue the CIRP
proceedings. The logic of AA is as follows;
“59. No doubt there is collusion between the petitioner &
respondent qua initiation of the CIR proceedings, but under
the garb of section 65 of code the entire proceedings
already stand initiated before filing of this application,
cannot be set aside. Though, NCLT-In the matter of Middle
Zone Solitor Hotel India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Middle Tone Hotel Pvt.
Ltd, held that once there are fraudulent initiation of the
proceedings, the said proceedings can be set aside.
However, Hon'ble NCLAT, in the matter of Adesh Jain
(supra) categorically held that this Tribunal has no power to
review its own order. Thus, in the light of the principle laid
down in order passed in the matter of Adesh Jain (supra), it
is held that this Tribunal is not empowered to review or recall
its order, except where there is error apparent on the record.
Accordingly, this Tribunal stand barred to recall or review its
order dated 20.7.2020/16.10.2020.

61. Pursuant to specific provision 61 of the Code, it could be
said that if Orris was aggrieved of the order dated 20th July
2020 or 16th October 2020, it has got remedy to approach
the Hon'ble NCLAT by way of filing an appeal. As word “Any
aggrieved person” includes not only party to the litigation,
but it may be any third party, who is affected with any such
order can file an appeal. Thus, there was an effective
remedy with orris, but it failed to avail. Had, there been any
intention on the part of legislature to give the power of
review to this tribunal, the said provision would have been
specifically incorporated. In the absence of any such
specific provision for review, this Tribunal has got no
jurisdiction to recall or review its own order, that too, when
an efficacious remedy to file an appeal lies with Orris.
Hence, it is held that though there was collusion between
the petitioner and respondent, but this Tribunal has got no
jurisdiction to re-call or review its own order qua initiation of
CIR proceedings under the garb of Section 65 of the code.
Accordingly, the Point No.II is partly answered in
Affirmative, whereas, the Point No. III answered in
Negative.”

17. In view of the above-referred reasoning adopted by AA, the following
conclusions were drawn;
17

“a. Orris is necessary party to the lis, being aggrieved party,
hence, it is allowed to intervene as there was active
collusion between Petitioner & Respondent corporate
debtor and there was material suppression of the facts on
behalf of Ld. RP of the Corporate Debtor from this Tribunal.
b. This Tribunal vests with no power to review or recall its
own order 20.07.2020 & 16.10.2020, qua initiation of CIR
proceedings under the garb of section 65 of code.
c. "Moratorium" commenced on passing of order dated
16.10.2020 and not on 20.07.2020, hence, it doesn't not
over-ride the order dated 7.10.2020 passed by Ld. HRERA.
Accordingly, both the orders co-exist, being not in conflict
with one another.
d. On the strength of collaboration agreement dated
02.11.2011, the status of the corporate debtor is mere of
'contractor' and not 'statutory license holder', of project
gsreenopolis, accordingly, it does not vest with any right,
title and interest in that project.
e. Project "Greenopolis" belongs Orris being owner of land
as well as statutory license holder from Director town &
Country planning, Haryana, accordingly, Ld. RP of
Corporate Debtor is not entitled to take its control & custody.
f. Rs. 53 Crores lying in the Escrow account pertains to
project Greenopolis and has to be utilized for its construction
only, accordingly, Ld. RP of Corporate Debtor doesn't have
any right & interest in the same also accordingly, it could not
be controlled by him.”

18. Against this order, the RP of Three C Universal Developers, Straight
Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd., RP of the CD, GWA and Girish Chander Joshi
(suspended director of CD) filed appeals at the NCLAT.
19. The NCLAT vide the impugned order dated 28.08.2023 examined
only the narrow issue of, “ whether the NCLT committed a patent error in
not recalling the admission order ”. Relying on Beacon Trusteeship v.
3 4
Earthcon Infracon Pvt. Ltd. , S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath

3
2020 SCC OnLine SC 1233.
4
(1994) 1 SCC 1.
18

5
and A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors. , the NCLAT came to the
conclusion that CIRP initiated under the garb of fraud cannot be sustained
and that the AA has the power to recall its own orders. With this finding,
the NCLAT set aside the CIRP owing to fraud at the time of initiation of
insolvency proceedings. The relevant portion of the findings is as follows;
“22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the
case, we are totally satisfied that there is complete
misappreciation of law on the part of the Adjudicating
Authority in rejecting the application filed both by the present
Appellant as well as M/s. Oriss Infrastructure Pvt Ltd.
wherein they have also submitted that the Adjudicating
Authority has the jurisdiction to recall its own order if it is
obtained by playing fraud upon it.

23. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the present appeal
has the merit, therefore, the same is allowed and the
impugned order is set aside.”

20. The present Civil Appeals, challenging the judgment and order of
the NCLAT, are filed by; i) Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., ii) Greenopolis
Welfare Confederation (“GWC”), a subsequently constituted body of
allottees distinct from GWA, and iii) Safalta Goel and Pushpa Goel,
individual homebuyers. All these appellants are aggrieved by the
impugned judgment of the NCLAT as it sets aside the entire CIRP
process. Suspended Directors of the CD also filed an appeal in the name
of the CD, challenging the finding of fraud; however, their appeal has been
6
withdrawn. This act confirms the findings on fraud and collusion. It may

5
(2007) 4 SCC 221.
6
Civil Appeal No. 7704 of 2023.
19

be mentioned at this stage that this Court, vide order dated 13.10.2023,
directed that status quo be maintained by all parties. Vide order dated
19.11.2024, this Court also granted a stay on the impugned order and
permitted the CIRP to continue. This stay, read with the clarification that
proceedings before AA would continue in accordance with law, also had
the effect of reviving the NCLT’s order dated 29.03.2022. This Court's
order dated 19.11.2024 is in the following terms;
“1. These appeals are admitted.
2. Until further orders, there shall be stay of the impugned
order dated 28.08.2023 passed by the National Company
Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench.
3. It is clarified that the stay would not mean the stay of
proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT) and the same would proceed in accordance with
law…”

21. Mr. Ramji Srinivasan’s submission is simple, without being
simplistic. He submitted that the CIRP has reached an advanced stage
and the present appeals can be disposed of by making the above-referred
interim order dated 19.11.2024 of this Court absolute. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi
argued that the proceedings under the IBC can steer clear of fraudulent
and collusive initiation of M/s Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd. by
adopting the principles contemplated under the erstwhile Rule 101 to 103
of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. He would submit that the CIRP
proceedings, once initiated, would be in rem. On the other hand, Mr.
Krishnan Venugopal has submitted that fraud and collusion vitiate the
entire proceedings and he strongly supported the conclusion of the
20

NCLAT. It is in this context that the first question of law has arisen for our
consideration.
22. A fundamental principle of statutory law is that when statutory
authorities are empowered to exercise a certain jurisdiction, the power to
exercise such jurisdiction rests on the existence of certain facts and
events. In administrative law, such facts are referred to as jurisdictional
facts . Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, for example, the
existence of a “debt” is the jurisdictional fact. In Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy
7
Swaminathan & Sons , it is explained that -
“…the fact or facts upon which the jurisdiction of a court, a
tribunal or an authority depends can be said to be a
‘jurisdictional fact’. If the jurisdictional fact exists, a court,
tribunal or authority has jurisdiction to decide other issues.
If such fact does not exist, a court, tribunal or authority
cannot act. It is also well settled that a court or a tribunal
cannot wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and
proceed to decide a matter. The underlying principle is that
by erroneously assuming existence of a jurisdictional fact, a
subordinate Court or an inferior tribunal cannot confer upon
itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess.
In Halsbury’s Laws of England, it has been stated;
“Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on
the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state
of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or
collateral to the merits of, the issue. If, at the inception
of an inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge is made
to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind
whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the
preliminary or collateral issue; but that ruling is not

conclusive”.
The existence of jurisdictional fact is thus sine qua non or
condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a
court or tribunal.”


7
(2007) 8 SCC 559, paras 27 and 28.
21

8
23. In Shrisht Dhawan (SMT) v. M/s Shaw Brothers , this Court
observed-
“…What, then, is an error in respect of jurisdictional fact? A
jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of
which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction
by a court, tribunal or an authority. In Black’s Legal
Dictionary it is explained as a fact which must exist before a
court can properly assume jurisdiction of a particular case.
Mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction is an error of
jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority or tribunal can
assume jurisdiction in respect of subject matter which the
statute does not confer on it and if by deciding erroneously
the fact on which jurisdiction depends the court or tribunal
exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Error of
jurisdictional fact renders the order ultra vires and
bad. In Raza Textiles Raza Textile v. Income Tax Officer,
Rampur, it was held that a court or tribunal cannot confer
jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly.
… Error in assumption of jurisdiction should not be confused
with mistake, legal or factual in exercise of jurisdiction. In
the former the order is void whereas in the latter it is final
unless set aside by higher or competent court or authority.
An order which is void can be challenged at any time in any
proceeding. A permission granted under Section 21 once
permitted to attain finality becomes unassailable on error in
exercise of jurisdiction. It could be challenged later or in
execution only if it could be brought in the category of a void
or ultra vires permission. Such invalidity can arise if
jurisdiction is exercised by misrepresentation of facts either
about existence of vacancy or nature of premises. In other
words what attains finality in accordance with law cannot be
permitted to be reagitated or reopened except in the larger
social interest of preventing a person from practising deceit.
Therefore an error of jurisdictional fact which could entitle a
Controller to re-examine the matter in the context of Section
21 is the same, namely, fraud or collusion.”

24. Thus, it becomes essential for an AA to be satisfied of the existence
of a jurisdictional fact, which alone grants to it the power and jurisdiction

8
(1992) 1 SCC 534, para 19.
22

to proceed under the Act. It is essential, and important, to ensure that
assumption of jurisdiction is not “mindless”. This Court in Shrisht Dhawan
(supra) observed that “ an action is mindless when it is thoughtless or
without any care or caution. In law it is passing of an order without any
regard to the provision of law. If the section requires the authority to pass
an order on inquiry or on being satisfied of existence or non-existence of
a fact, then the duty cast is higher and an order which is passed without
9
due regard to duty to investigate then the order may be mindless ” .
25. Further, there may be instances where a court or a tribunal would
have been induced to exercise jurisdiction by exercise of fraud or
collusion. Fraud and collusion have a different juridical significance when
considered in the sphere of private contractual relations and when
considered in the context of public-law proceedings. In a private
transaction, fraud ordinarily concerns deception practised upon a
contracting or affected party, while collusion denotes a concert or common
design between persons to secure an improper private advantage or to
prejudice the rights of another.
26. In public law, however, the vice travels beyond the private interests
of the parties. Fraud may corrupt the decision-making process by
misleading the court, tribunal or statutory authority, and collusion
undermines the very genuineness of the proceeding by using the process

9
Ibid, para 18.
23

of adjudication or statutory decision-making to procure a privately
engineered result. The distinction is therefore necessary because public
power is exercised not simply for the benefit of the parties before the
authority, but in accordance with law and for the public purpose for which
that power is conferred. The object of maintaining the distinction is to
protect the integrity of the public decision-making process, to prevent the
machinery of law from being employed as an instrument of private
arrangement or deception, and to ensure that the principle of finality does
not confer legitimacy upon a decision whose foundation or process has
itself been vitiated by fraud or collusion.
27. Deception committed by deploying incorrect facts to invoke
jurisdiction of a tribunal is fraud in public law as it results in exercise of
jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. In Shrisht
Dhawan , this Court held -
“20… But fraud in public law is not the same as fraud in
private law. Nor can the ingredients which establish fraud in
commercial transaction be of assistance in determining
fraud in Administrative Law… it is dangerous to introduce
maxims of common law as to effect of fraud while
determining fraud in relation to statutory law… it was
observed that fraud in relation to statute must be a
colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute.
“If a statute has been passed for some one particular
purpose, a court of law will not countenance any attempt
which may be made to extend the operation of the Act to
something else which is quite foreign to its object and
beyond its scope”. Present day concept of fraud on statute
has veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise of
power... The colour of fraud in public law or administrative
law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It
arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect
24

facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power
and procure an order from an authority of tribunal. It must
result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not
have been exercised. That is misrepresentation must be in
relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence
or non-existence of which power can be exercised…”

28. Those who invoke IBC proceedings are under a public law obligation
and duty not to deceive or mislead. If jurisdiction is exercised on the basis
of fraud or collusion, the Court or the Tribunal can undoubtedly withdraw
the proceedings at any point of time. Jurisdictional facts affected by fraud
or collusion cannot be the foundation for assuming jurisdiction, as such
facts cannot continue to sustain jurisdiction.
29. The Courts exercise somewhat greater control over the
determination of jurisdictional facts than over findings on non-jurisdictional
facts, i.e, facts which do not have a consequence on the jurisdiction.
30. In the facts of the present case, it is conclusively proved that the
existence of debt is a mirage; none existed at all. In fact, it was fraudulently
portrayed as if there was a debt so that the AA could initiate CIRP
proceedings and impose moratorium, thereby blocking other legal
remedies of the homebuyers and other claimants. Under these
circumstances, there is every power and jurisdiction for the AA to recall
CIRP by dismissing the Section 9 petition that was admitted at the
instance of a collusive operating creditor. The issue is answered
accordingly.
25

IV. Re Issue II – If there is such a power, whether the CIRP
proceedings could be continued.
31. While the AA does have power to recall the CIRP proceedings upon
finding of fraud and collusion, the next question that arises is whether it is
duty-bound to do so in every case. What would be the consequence of
such a finding on CIRP proceedings that have advanced to a mature
stage?
32. The statutory architecture of the IBC can be seen as set in two
10
stages. In GLAS Trust Company LLC v. Byju Raveendran & Ors . , this
Court explained that initially, the petitions under Sections 7, 9 or 10 are in
personam , involving essentially the applicant and the Corporate Debtor.
Once the application is admitted and CIRP commences, moratorium is
declared, and management is transferred to the IRP, the situation is
different, and this is explained as follows-
“41. Once the application is admitted, CIRP commences
and NCLT inter alia declares a moratorium; issues a public
pronouncement of the initiation of CIRP and a call for
submission of claims; and appoints an IRP…
42. From this scheme of Chapter II IBC, it appears that the
admission of an application is a significant event that alters
the nature of the proceedings, and the stakeholders
involved. Initially, when the petition is filed by the financial
creditor, operational creditor or corporate applicant, as the
case may be, the proceedings are in personam and the only
relevant stakeholders are the applicant creditor and the
corporate debtor... Therefore, the proceedings now change
character — they become in rem and are no longer the
preserve of only the applicant creditor and the corporate

10
(2025) 3 SCC 625.
26

debtor and even creditors who were not the original
applicants, become necessary stakeholders.
43. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Indus Biotech (P)
Ltd. v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund adjudicated on
the question of the stage at which the proceedings under
the IBC attain the status of in rem and create third-party
rights for all creditors. This Court held that the trigger point
is not the filing of the application, but the admission of the
application, and observed as follows…
44. In summary, the scheme of the IBC under Chapter II
gives rise to two significant principles:
44.1. Once the petition is admitted, the proceedings are no
longer the preserve of the applicant creditor and the debtor.
They now become in rem and all creditors of the corporate
debtor become stakeholders in the process; and
44.2. Once the petition is admitted, the management of the
affairs of the corporate debtor is vested in the IRP and
eventually, in the RP. Thus, the corporate debtor no longer
exists in the form that it did, before the admission of the
petition. Once CIRP is initiated, the interests of the erstwhile
management of the corporate debtor must be distinguished
from the interests of the corporate debtor.”

33. Section 9 of the Code enables an Operational Creditor to initiate
CIRP upon the occurrence of “default”, subject to the statutory
requirements concerning demand notice, absence of a pre-existing
dispute and completeness of the application. Section 9(5) provides the
statutory test for admission or rejection. The provision is mandatory in
character, and the AA has to examine the statutory conditions prescribed
by the Code. This Court has consistently emphasised that the inquiry at
the stage of admission is a limited one and if there is a plausible pre-
existing dispute which is not “spurious, hypothetical or illusory,” the
Section 9 application cannot be admitted. This is because the jurisdiction
27

at the stage of admission is not intended to become a full-fledged
adjudication of the underlying commercial dispute.
34. Admission of any application for insolvency resolution is a
watershed moment and before admission, the proceedings are essentially
inter se , i.e., between the Operational Creditor and the Corporate Debtor.
After admission, the proceedings acquire a fundamentally different
character.
35. The statutory regime that applies after an application is admitted
involves exercises of powers and jurisdiction under several interlocking
provisions of the Code such as Sections 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 32 and 53.
36. Section 14, relating to Moratorium: On admission of the CIRP
application, Section 14 imposes a moratorium having consequences far
beyond the original applicant’s individual claims. While existing
management of the Corporate Debtor loses control, moratorium protects
the Corporate Debtor against institution or continuation of proceedings,
execution of judgments, enforcement of security interests and other
coercive actions. The process that commences after admission
encompasses the entire body of creditors and other stakeholders, not
merely interests of the applicant. A proceeding having consequences of
this magnitude cannot logically remain a private proceeding between the
original Operational Creditor, the applicant under Section 9 and the
Corporate Debtor.
28

37. Sections 17 and 20 relating to passing on the management to the
IRP: Section 17 provides that, from the date of appointment of the IRP,
management of the affairs of the Corporate Debtor vests in the IRP and
the powers of the Board of Directors stand suspended. Section 20 obliges
the IRP to preserve and protect the value of the property of the Corporate
Debtor and continue its operations as a going concern. The consequence
is material as the applicant creditor loses the character of being the person
in control of the insolvency proceeding. The insolvency process is placed
in the hands of an independent insolvency professional.
38. Section 18 relating to collection and collation of claims: Section 18
requires the IRP to collect information relating to the assets, finances and
operations of the Corporate Debtor and receive, collate and verify claims
submitted by creditors. This is perhaps the clearest indication that the
proceeding has ceased to be an individual dispute. Once claims of
numerous creditors are invited, received and adjudicated, the statutory
process is concerned with the collective insolvency estate.
39. Section 21 relating to formation of Committee of Creditors (“CoC”);
although Operational Creditors do not ordinarily constitute the voting
constituency of the CoC, the existence of the CoC demonstrates the
statutory intendment to provide a comprehensive and sustainable solution
to insolvency of the corporate debtor as a whole. The insolvency process
is not structured to secure payment of the debt of the creditor who
29

happened to file the initiating application, rather, it contemplates a
collective architecture to deal with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor
and therefore the duties of the Resolution Professional under Section 25
of the Act extend to preserving and protecting the assets of the Corporate
Debtor, representing and acting on behalf of the Corporate Debtor,
maintaining claims register, inviting prospective resolution applicants,
presenting resolution plans and taking measures necessary for resolution.
These provisions thus indicate in clear terms the purpose and object of
the Code relating to insolvency resolution for maximization of value of
assets. After admission, the process formulated under the Code, detaches
itself from the original applicant and reorients towards securing a larger
public purpose of promoting entrepreneurship and availability of credit for
the economy.
40. Further, Section 30(2) requires a Resolution Plan to make provision
for payment of debts of Operational Creditors and others in the manner
prescribed by the Code. Consequently, an Operational Creditor who never
initiated the CIRP nevertheless acquires statutory interests within the
process. The Code is designed to move away from resolving the individual
debt of the initiating creditor to the resolution of collective liabilities for
rendering Corporate Debtor solvent. The larger purpose to subserve is to
ensure credit availability for robust entrepreneurship for our economy.
30

41. Section 53 relates to distribution of liquidation estate; the waterfall
mechanism under Section 53 illustrates the collective character of
insolvency proceedings where distribution is not according to the identity
of the person who first invoked the code. This again reinforces the
proposition that the initiating creditor is merely the triggering creditor, and
not the proprietor of the CIRP.
42. Yet another provision of the Code, Section 12A, introduced in 2018,
is significant as it demonstrates that the applicant ceases to have
unilateral control of the proceedings. Section 12A provides for withdrawal
of the application admitted under Sections 7, 9 or 10 “ with the approval of
11
90% voting share of the Committee of Creditors ”. The provision was
introduced precisely because after admission, withdrawal is no longer a
unilateral choice of the applicant.
43. Once the CIRP proceedings have commenced, a large number of
independent creditors would have submitted their claims. These creditors
have not chosen the original applicant but are seeking to participate in the

11
Section 12A, IBC 2016 –
“12-A. Withdrawal of application admitted under Section 7, 9 or 10.—(1) Subject to sub-section (2), the
Adjudicating Authority may allow the withdrawal of an application admitted under Section 7, 9 or 10, on
an application made by the resolution professional, with the approval of ninety per cent voting share of
the committee of creditors in such manner as may be specified.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an application admitted
under Section 7, 9 or 10 shall not be withdrawn—
(a) before the constitution of the committee of creditors under sub-section (1) of Section 21; and
(b) after the first invitation for submission of a resolution plan has been issued by the resolution
professional.
(3) The Adjudicating Authority shall pass an order under sub-section (1) within a period of thirty days
from the date of receipt of the application:
Provided that if the Adjudicating Authority has not passed an order within such period, it shall record
the reasons for such delay in writing.”

31

resolution process. Their claims are pursuant to the invitation issued by
the resolution professional and their rights become part of the collective
insolvency estate. It would be against the very concept of finding a
resolution to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor if these creditors are
to initiate fresh proceedings under Section 9 as the original applicant is
found to be in collusion with the Corporate Debtor. The resolution process
of a Corporate Debtor has to be unitary, and the Code does not
contemplate multiple and simultaneous resolution processes if there are
no other glaring intervening circumstances.
44. The CIRP is intertwined with the jurisdiction, control and supervision
of the Adjudicating Authority. The IRP, or the RP as the case may be, is
independent of the suspended directors of the Corporate Debtor and their
conduct is under direct supervision and direction of the Committee of
Creditors. The resolution process can therefore continue even in the
absence of the original applicant. The carriage of the proceedings at this
stage is not vested in the original applicant but in the joint and
collaborative decisions of the resolution professional and the Committee
of Creditors as approved by the Adjudicating Authority.
45. The text of the Code, coupled with the purpose and object that it
seeks to subserve, enables us to conclude that insolvency resolution
process can be continued even after a finding that the original application
under Section 9 was initiated fraudulently and with active collusion of the
32

suspended Directors of the corporate debtor. The issue is answered
accordingly.
46. For deciding whether to continue the resolution process, the AA will
take into account multiple factors, the most important of which lies in
ensuring that the future proceedings can be conducted with integrity and
confidence that the purpose and object of the Act could be achieved with
certainty, probity and transparency.
47. The AA would, inter alia , be guided by the commercial wisdom of
the Committee of Creditors as also the submissions of the Resolution
Professional before whom multiple stakeholders would have filed their
claims. The decision of the AA is crucial. We do not rule out the
circumstances in which the AA could nevertheless come to the conclusion
that continuation of insolvency proceedings in the circumstances, where
the original applicant has turned out to be a collusive party, cannot be
permitted for reasons that it may indicate for the decision taken.
48. Returning to the facts of the present case, while the adjudicating
authority as well as the NCLAT have concurrently found that the Original
Application of M/s Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd. is collusive and has
been motivated by the interests of the suspended Directors of the
Corporate Debtor, the consequential decision as to whether CIRP
proceedings should be continued or not in the facts and circumstances of
the case has not been taken. While the AA wrongly held that there is no
33

power under the Code to withdraw the proceedings once admitted, the
NCLAT reversed that decision and held that such a power exists but did
not take the crucial step of deciding whether the proceedings should be
continued. We are not in agreement with the approach adopted either by
the AA or by the NCLAT; both failed to take the proper consequential
action upon finding that the original application is collusive.
49. In view of the above discussion, we restate the principles that we
have followed in arriving at our decision:
i. Initiation of proceedings under Sections 7, 9 or 10, as case
may be, of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, is based on
certain fundamental facts which are jurisdictional in nature. If reliance
on such jurisdictional facts, as indicated in the applications, is
subsequently proved to be fraudulent and collusive, the AA is entitled
to recall admission of the application. This is for the reason that in the
invocation of statutory jurisdiction, there is an inherent public law duty
not to deceive or mislead on jurisdictional facts, as such manipulation
will have the effect of subverting the very purpose and object of the
statute.
ii. Commencement and conclusion of proceedings under
Sections 7, 9 or 10, as the case may be, are in two stages. At the
initial stage, the original applicant has the carriage of the proceedings
till the petitions are admitted. Once the petition is admitted, the
34

proceedings are no longer the preserve of the original applicant,
creditor or debtor. They become in rem , and all creditors of the
corporate debtor become stakeholders in the process, and the affairs
of the corporate debtor are vested in the RP, and the proceedings are
under the jurisdiction of the AA.
iii. After the applications are admitted by the AA and CIRP
proceedings commence, it is not permissible for the original applicant
to withdraw the case. This position has also attained statutory
recognition in 2018 with the inclusion of Section 12A in the IBC, 2016.
iv. If the AA arrives at a conclusion that initiation of CIRP under
Sections 7, 9 or 10, as the case may be, is based on fraud and
collusion, it shall disallow the original applicant from participating and
may also initiate proceedings under Section 65 of the Act.
v. If the AA is of the opinion that the CIRP proceedings that have
commenced need to be continued to subserve the larger interests of
resolving the corporate insolvency of the corporate debtor for which
there are other stakeholders, it has the power and jurisdiction to take
such a decision. For this purpose, it shall hear the RP, elicit the view
of the CoC and also the other stakeholders. It is the duty of the AA to
ensure that the proceedings are concluded with integrity and
transparency, and that the purpose and object of the code is
subserved.
35

V. Directions
50. For the reasons stated above,
(i) The present Civil Appeals filed by Orris Infrastructure Private
Limited in Civil Appeal Nos. 6797-6801 of 2023, Greenopolis Welfare
Association in Civil Appeal Nos. 6792-6796 of 2023, and Safalta Goel
and Anr. in Civil Appeal Nos. 6802-6806 of 2023, are allowed in part
and the judgment and order of the NCLAT in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins)
No. 444 of 2022, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 651 of 2022, Comp. App.
(AT) (Ins) No. 370 of 2022, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 602 of 2022,
and Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1379 of 2022 is hereby set aside, and
it is further directed that;
(ii) The CIRP proceedings No. IB-2721/ND/2019 pending before
AA are restored to their original number.
(iii) The AA shall now decide upon the continuation of the
proceedings in view of the conclusive finding of fraud and collusion
of the original applicant M/s Straight Edge Contracts Pvt. Ltd. For this
purpose, it shall take into account all the necessary facts and events,
including the ownership of the Greenopolis project, hear the RP, the
CoC and other stakeholders, including the homebuyers who have
already adopted other statutory and judicial remedies.
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(iv) In the event AA decides to continue the CIRP process, in view
of the long pendency of these cases, there shall be a further direction
to the AA to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.
51. In view of the above, the Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 249-253/2025
are closed. Pending applications, including the applications for
intervention/impleadment are disposed of.

………………………………....J.
[ PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA ]



………………………………....J.
[ ALOK ARADHE ]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 30, 2026.
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