Sri Gopi Kishan Khandelwal vs Smt Archana Tripathi
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 15460 of 2026
Sri Gopi Kishan Khandelwal
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Smt Archana Tripathi
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Prakhar Tandon
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Manish Tandon
AFR
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri Prakhar Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Sri Manish Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
2. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
is directed against the order dated 20.11.2025 passed by the learned
Judge, Small Causes Court, Kanpur Nagar in SCC Suit No. 12 of 2020
(Smt. Archana Tripathi v. Gopi Kishan Khandelwal), whereby the
application Paper No. 113-Ga, filed by the petitioner-defendant under
Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Code'), seeking amendment of the written statement,
has been rejected. The petitioner has also assailed the consequential
order dated 07.10.2026 passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
Court No. 19, Kanpur Nagar in SCC Revision No. 45 of 2026, whereby
the revision preferred against the aforesaid order has been dismissed.
3. The controversy arising in the present petition centers around the
refusal of the courts below to permit the petitioner to introduce an
additional defence founded upon an alleged partition of the property in
dispute between the respondent and Smt. Krishna Tripathi, and the
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consequential division of the tenanted accommodation. The question is
whether such a plea could have been permitted to be incorporated in the
written statement at the stage when the suit had already reached the stage
of final arguments.
4. The respondent instituted SCC Suit No. 12 of 2020 on 10.01.2020
against the petitioner, seeking his eviction from the tenanted
accommodation, recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and
occupation. She claimed ownership and the status of landlady in respect
of the disputed accommodation on the basis of a Will dated 10.11.2010
executed by Smt. Satyawati Tripathi.
5. The petitioner contested the suit by filing a written statement on
18.02.2021, disputing the respondent's claim of ownership and
landlordship. He pleaded that Smt. Satyawati Tripathi had subsequently
executed another registered Will dated 21.01.2012, thereby revoking the
earlier Will dated 10.11.2010. It was further pleaded that the rent in
respect of the tenanted accommodation was being collected by Sri
Devendra Tripathi and not by the respondent.
6. During the pendency of the suit, the respondent brought on record,
by filing Paper Nos. 34-Ga and 35-Ga on 09.11.2021, certain documents
relating to a compromise entered into between her and Sri Devendra
Kumar Tripathi in Suit No. 1599 of 2019, including the compromise
application and the judgment dated 19.10.2021. The terms of the
compromise, inter alia, recognised the respondent's entitlement to collect
rent and institute proceedings against the petitioner in respect of the
tenanted accommodation. After the aforesaid documents had been
brought on record, the petitioner himself moved an application seeking
amendment of his written statement under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code.
The said application was allowed by the trial court on 18.05.2024, and
the consequential amendment was incorporated in the written statement.
7. When the suit had already reached the stage of final arguments,
the petitioner moved an application dated 15.09.2025, registered as
Paper No. 113-Ga, under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, seeking
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amendment of the written statement by incorporating proposed
paragraphs 21-H, 21-I, 21-J and 21-K.
8. The basis of the proposed amendment was that the petitioner had
acquired knowledge, in the last week of August 2025, that the property
in dispute had already been partitioned between the respondent and Smt.
Krishna Tripathi, even before institution of the suit. According to the
petitioner, the partition had been effected pursuant to Resolution No. 121
dated 07.09.2019 passed by the Kanpur Nagar Nigam. It was further
asserted that, consequent upon such partition, a separate house number,
namely 92-A, had been allotted to the portion falling to the share of Smt.
Krishna Tripathi, whereas the portion falling to the respondent's share
continued to bear house number 92.
9. On the strength of the aforesaid assertions, the petitioner sought
to introduce the further plea that the tenanted accommodation had also
been divided between the respective co-owners, resulting in a splitting of
the tenancy. It was, accordingly, contended that, in view of the alleged
division of the tenanted accommodation, the suit instituted by the
respondent, in the absence of Smt. Krishna Tripathi, was not
maintainable in its existing form.
10. The respondent opposed the amendment application by filing
objections Paper No. 115-Ga. It was contended, inter alia, that the facts
sought to be introduced were neither newly discovered nor beyond the
petitioner's knowledge and that the documents relating to the
compromise in Suit No. 1599 of 2019 had already been brought on
record during the pendency of the suit. It was further pointed out that the
evidence of both parties had concluded, written arguments had been filed
and the suit had reached the stage of final hearing. The petitioner, in
turn, filed his counter-objection Paper No. 117-Ga, reiterating the
grounds set out in the amendment application.
11. The learned Judge, Small Causes Court, upon consideration of the
rival submissions and the material available on record, rejected the
amendment application by order dated 20.11.2025. The principal
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considerations which weighed with the learned trial court were that the
circumstances forming the basis of the proposed amendment existed
even prior to institution of the suit, that the petitioner was aware of the
relevant facts and that the proposed amendment was neither necessary
for adjudication of the controversy nor justified at the advanced stage at
which it had been sought.
12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred SCC
Revision No. 45 of 2026. The learned Revisional Court, upon
consideration of the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and
examination of the record, dismissed the revision by order dated
07.10.2026, thereby affirming the order passed by the learned trial court.
The petitioner has consequently approached this Court.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the courts below
have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of the proposed
amendment. It is contended that the plea relating to partition of the
property and the consequential division of the tenanted accommodation
has a direct bearing upon the relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties and the maintainability of the eviction proceedings instituted
by the respondent.
14. It is further submitted that the petitioner acquired knowledge of
the alleged partition only in the last week of August 2025 and, therefore,
the courts below have erred in proceeding on the premise that the facts
sought to be incorporated were already within his knowledge. Learned
counsel submits that the proposed amendment merely seeks to introduce
an additional defence, without displacing or withdrawing any admission
made in the written statement or setting up a defence inconsistent with
the existing pleadings. It is also contended that permitting the
amendment would not cause any prejudice to the respondent.
15. Learned counsel has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court
1
in A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation and contends
that the courts below have misinterpreted the principle laid down therein.
1 AIR 1967 SC 96
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It is submitted that the said decision concerned an amendment of the
plaint whereby the plaintiff sought to introduce an additional relief,
whereas the present case concerns an amendment of the written
statement by which the defendant seeks to introduce an additional
defence. According to learned counsel, the distinction between the two
situations has not been properly appreciated by the courts below,
resulting in an erroneous approach to the petitioner's application for
amendment.
16. It is lastly submitted that the direction issued for expeditious or
time-bound disposal of the suit could not, by itself, curtail the
jurisdiction of the trial court to consider an application for amendment
on its merits in accordance with law. The impugned orders are, therefore,
assailed as suffering from material illegality warranting interference by
this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
17. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposes the
petition and submits that the petitioner has not disclosed the complete
facts and circumstances in which the subsequent amendment application
came to be moved. It is contended that the petitioner never disputed the
existence of the tenancy in respect of the accommodation in question in
his written statement dated 18.02.2021. The respondent had instituted the
SCC suit on the basis of her claim of ownership under the Will dated
10.11.2010 executed by Smt. Satyawati Tripathi, which claim was
contested by the petitioner by disputing her ownership and landlordship.
18. Learned counsel further submits that, on 09.11.2021, the
respondent brought on record Paper Nos. 34-Ga and 35-Ga, comprising
the compromise entered into between the respondent and Sri Devendra
Kumar Tripathi in Suit No. 1599 of 2019 and the judgment dated
19.10.2021 passed therein. It is pointed out that Clause 4 of the
compromise specifically recognised the respondent's entitlement to
collect rent and institute proceedings against the petitioner in respect of
the tenanted accommodation. Learned counsel submits that, after the
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aforesaid documents had been brought on record, the petitioner himself
sought amendment of the written statement under Order VI Rule 17 of
the Code, which was allowed by the trial court on 18.05.2024, and the
consequential amendment was incorporated in the written statement.
19. It is contended that the subsequent application, Paper No. 113-Ga,
moved on 15.09.2025, seeks to introduce a substantially similar
controversy concerning the respondent's entitlement in respect of the
disputed property, despite the relevant documents and circumstances
having already been brought on record and being within the petitioner's
knowledge. According to learned counsel, the plea that the petitioner
acquired knowledge of the alleged partition only in the last week of
August 2025 is an attempt to overcome the requirement of due diligence
embodied in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. It is, therefore,
submitted that the proposed amendment, having been sought after
commencement of trial and when the suit had already reached the stage
of final arguments, was rightly rejected by the trial court.
20. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner has not placed
the complete procedural history of the proceedings in their proper
perspective. It is pointed out that, when the suit had earlier reached the
stage of final arguments, the petitioner had moved an application seeking
recall and re-examination of D.W.-1, which was rejected by the trial
court by order dated 04.02.2025. The said order was affirmed by the
Revisional Court on 19.09.2025 in SCC Revision No. 81 of 2025 and
was thereafter challenged before this Court in Matters Under Article 227
No. 650 of 2026. The aforesaid petition was allowed on the basis of a
concession made on behalf of the respondent at the admission stage,
permitting the petitioner to examine D.W.-1 on the next date fixed,
subject to the stipulation that, in default of availing the opportunity so
granted, the same would stand closed and the suit would be decided on
the basis of the evidence already available on record.
21. According to learned counsel, the aforesaid sequence of
proceedings demonstrates that the suit had already reached an advanced
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stage of adjudication and that the successive applications moved by the
petitioner had the effect of prolonging its disposal. It is submitted that
the present application for amendment was yet another attempt to reopen
the controversy at the stage of final hearing, notwithstanding that the
material now sought to be relied upon was available at an earlier stage of
the proceedings.
22. It is lastly submitted that the courts below have duly considered
the nature of the proposed amendment, the stage of the proceedings, the
material available on record and the statutory requirement of due
diligence under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. The petitioner has failed
to establish that the impugned orders suffer from any jurisdictional error,
material irregularity or perversity warranting interference by this Court
in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. Learned counsel, accordingly, prays for dismissal
of the petition.
23. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and examining the
material available on record, the issue that falls for consideration is
whether the rejection of the petitioner's application for amendment of the
written statement suffers from any jurisdictional error or material
irregularity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, having regard to the advanced stage of the proceedings at which
the amendment was sought.
24. Before examining the rival submissions in the light of the facts of
the present case, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions of
Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, which govern amendment of pleadings.
The provision confers discretion upon the court to permit either party to
alter or amend its pleadings, in such manner and on such terms as may
be just, provided that the proposed amendment is necessary for
determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.
25. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17, however, imposes a statutory
restriction on the exercise of such power after commencement of trial. It
mandates that no application for amendment shall be allowed after
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commencement of trial unless the court comes to the conclusion that,
despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before
commencement of trial.
26. Thus, while the main provision confers discretion upon the court
to permit amendments in appropriate cases, the exercise of such
discretion, after commencement of trial, is subject to the mandatory
requirement embodied in the proviso. The court is, therefore, required to
examine not merely whether the proposed amendment is relevant or
necessary for determining the real controversy, but also whether the
applicant has satisfactorily established that, despite due diligence, the
matter could not have been raised at the stage contemplated by law.
2
27. In Vidyabai and Others v. Padmalatha and Another , the Supreme
Court explained the mandatory nature of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17
of the Code and held that, after commencement of trial, the court can
exercise its jurisdiction to permit amendment only upon recording its
satisfaction that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised
the matter before commencement of trial.
28. In Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and
3
Sons and Others , the Supreme Court enumerated the relevant
considerations governing applications for amendment of pleadings.
These include whether the proposed amendment is necessary for
determining the real controversy between the parties; whether it
introduces a fundamentally different or inconsistent case; whether it
causes prejudice to the opposite party; and whether the application is
bona fide.
29. It is also well recognised that an amendment of the written
statement ordinarily stands on a somewhat different footing from an
amendment of the plaint. In Baldev Singh and Others v. Manohar Singh
4
and Another , the Supreme Court recognised that a defendant may
ordinarily be permitted to introduce an additional or even an alternative
2 (2009) 2 SCC 409
3 (2009) 10 SCC 84
4 (2006) 6 SCC 498
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defence, subject to the limitations governing the exercise of such
discretion. The relatively liberal approach adopted towards amendments
of written statements, however, does not dispense with the statutory
requirement of due diligence contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule
17 of the Code.
30. The aforesaid legal position has also been reiterated by this Court
5
in Mahboob Saifi v. Vimal Kumar Jain . While considering a challenge
to the rejection of an application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17
of the Code, this Court emphasised that the requirement of due diligence
assumes particular significance where the amendment is sought after
commencement of trial. It was observed that a mere assertion of
subsequent knowledge, without disclosing the circumstances in which
such knowledge was acquired or the steps taken thereafter, would not
satisfy the statutory requirement. The Court further observed that an
amendment sought at a highly belated stage, particularly after the matter
has reached the stage of final arguments, warrants careful scrutiny,
especially where the proposed pleas are disputed and their introduction
would necessitate reopening of issues or the adduction of further
evidence.
31. A similar view was taken by this Court in Vinod Chaurasia v. Shri
6
Radha Kishan Ji Maharaj Virajman Mandir . While considering an
application for amendment of a written statement in an SCC suit, this
Court observed that an amendment introducing an altogether new factual
foundation, necessitating further evidence or permitting a party to resile
from clear admissions already made in the written statement, cannot
ordinarily be allowed. The Court reiterated that, after commencement of
trial, the party seeking amendment must satisfy the requirement of due
diligence under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. It was,
however, clarified that rejection of an amendment application does not,
by itself, preclude a party from raising a pure question of law founded
upon the existing pleadings and evidence, provided its determination
5 2026 SCC OnLine All 2064
6 2026 SCC OnLine All 22003
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does not require investigation into fresh facts or cause prejudice to the
opposite party.
32. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions may be
summarised thus: while an amendment of the written statement,
including one introducing an additional or alternative defence, may
ordinarily receive a liberal consideration, such latitude remains subject
to the statutory restriction contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17
of the Code. Once trial has commenced, the relevance or potential
significance of the proposed amendment, the absence of prejudice to the
opposite party or the fact that it introduces an additional defence cannot,
by themselves, justify its allowance. The applicant must independently
satisfy the court that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have
been raised before commencement of trial. Where the amendment is
sought at the stage of final arguments, the court must scrutinise the
explanation for the delay with particular care, especially when the
proposed plea rests upon facts or circumstances which existed before
institution of the suit.
33. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, the proposed
amendment and the explanation furnished by the petitioner require
examination.
34. In the present case, the proposed amendment is founded upon the
alleged partition of the property pursuant to Resolution No. 121 dated
07.09.2019 passed by the Kanpur Nagar Nigam. The petitioner seeks to
introduce the plea that, pursuant to the aforesaid partition, a separate
house number, namely 92-A, was allotted to the portion falling to the
share of Smt. Krishna Tripathi, whereas the portion falling to the
respondent's share continued to bear house number 92. On this basis, the
petitioner seeks to contend that the tenanted accommodation also stood
divided between the alleged co-owners, resulting in splitting of the
tenancy and affecting the maintainability of the suit in its existing form.
35. The resolution relied upon by the petitioner is dated 07.09.2019,
and the alleged partition is stated to have taken place prior to institution
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of the SCC suit on 10.01.2020. The petitioner filed his written statement
on 18.02.2021, yet no specific plea concerning the alleged partition, the
separate municipal identification of the property or the consequential
division of the tenanted accommodation was incorporated therein. The
facts now sought to be introduced, therefore, pertain to an alleged state
of affairs which, according to the petitioner himself, had come into
existence before institution of the suit.
36. The explanation furnished by the petitioner is that he acquired
knowledge of the aforesaid facts only in the last week of August 2025.
However, a perusal of the amendment application does not disclose any
satisfactory particulars explaining the circumstances in which the
petitioner acquired such knowledge at that particular point of time. Nor
does it indicate what steps had been taken by him earlier to ascertain the
relevant facts or why the alleged partition and its consequences could not
have been discovered before commencement of trial. A mere assertion of
subsequent knowledge, without a satisfactory explanation as to why the
matter could not have been raised earlier despite due diligence, would
not, by itself, satisfy the statutory requirement.
37. Another circumstance brought to the notice of this Court by
learned counsel for the respondent is that the documents relating to the
compromise in Suit No. 1599 of 2019 had already been brought on
record by the respondent through Paper Nos. 34-Ga and 35-Ga on
09.11.2021. Clause 4 of the compromise recognised the respondent's
entitlement to collect rent and institute proceedings against the petitioner
in respect of the tenanted accommodation. The record further indicates
that an earlier amendment concerning the aforesaid compromise was
allowed on 18.05.2024 and the consequential amendment was
incorporated in the written statement.
38. The aforesaid circumstance assumes relevance for the limited
purpose of examining the procedural history of the proceedings and the
petitioner's awareness of the respondent's claim in respect of the tenanted
accommodation. It is, however, necessary to distinguish the earlier
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proceedings relating to the compromise from the plea of partition now
sought to be introduced. The fact that the petitioner had earlier sought
and obtained amendment of his written statement after the compromise
documents were brought on record would indicate his awareness of the
respondent's claim in respect of the tenanted accommodation. It would
not, by itself, establish that the petitioner had knowledge of the alleged
municipal partition. Nevertheless, the petitioner was required to furnish a
satisfactory explanation regarding the circumstances in which the
additional facts now sought to be introduced came to his knowledge only
in August 2025, particularly when the alleged partition itself pertained to
a period prior to institution of the suit.
39. The proposed amendment was not sought at an initial stage of the
proceedings. It was moved on 15.09.2025, after the evidence of both
parties had concluded and the matter had reached the stage of final
arguments. The respondent had already filed written arguments and the
suit was awaiting adjudication. The petitioner, therefore, sought to
introduce an additional factual foundation at a stage when the
proceedings had substantially advanced. The nature of the proposed
amendment would also require examination of the alleged partition, the
municipal resolution, the separate identification of the property and the
consequential effect, if any, upon the tenanted accommodation.
40. Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised that the
proposed amendment concerns the very question of the landlord-tenant
relationship and the alleged splitting of the tenancy and is, therefore,
relevant for the effective adjudication of the suit. The submission merits
consideration; however, the relevance of the proposed defence cannot be
examined in isolation from the statutory restriction imposed by the
proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code.
41. Even assuming that the proposed defence may have some bearing
upon the controversy between the parties, the relevance of a proposed
amendment cannot, by itself, dispense with the requirement of due
diligence. The petitioner was required to establish that, despite
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exercising due diligence, the facts sought to be introduced could not
have been raised before commencement of trial. The absence of a
satisfactory explanation in this regard assumes significance, particularly
when the proposed amendment seeks to introduce a factual controversy
concerning an event which allegedly took place before institution of the
suit. In the absence of satisfaction of the statutory requirement, the
amendment could not have been permitted merely on the ground that it
might provide an additional defence to the petitioner.
42. The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner with reference
to A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. also requires consideration. The said decision
arose in the context of an amendment of the plaint whereby the plaintiff
sought to introduce an additional relief. The petitioner seeks to
distinguish that situation from the present case, where the defendant
seeks amendment of the written statement to introduce an additional
defence. The distinction pointed out by learned counsel is relevant for
appreciating the nature of the proposed amendment. However, the
question whether the amendment seeks to introduce an additional
defence, rather than an additional relief in the plaint, does not by itself
conclude the issue arising in the present proceedings. The application
was moved after commencement of trial and, therefore, its permissibility
had necessarily to be examined in the light of the proviso to Order VI
Rule 17 of the Code. Even where the proposed amendment seeks to
introduce an additional defence in the written statement, the applicant is
required to satisfy the statutory requirement that, despite due diligence,
the matter could not have been raised before commencement of trial. The
distinction relied upon by the petitioner does not dispense with that
requirement. The decisive consideration in the present case, therefore, is
not merely the nature of the proposed amendment, but the petitioner's
failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation establishing due diligence.
43. The submission that the proposed amendment would not cause
prejudice to the respondent is also insufficient to warrant interference.
Absence of prejudice to the opposite party is certainly a relevant
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consideration while examining an amendment application; however, it is
not a substitute for compliance with the mandatory requirement of the
proviso. The statutory condition governing amendment after
commencement of trial has to be independently satisfied.
44. The petitioner has also contended that the direction for time-
bound disposal of the suit could not have deprived the trial court of its
jurisdiction under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. There can be no
disagreement with the proposition that a direction for expeditious
disposal does not, by itself, extinguish the jurisdiction of the trial court
to consider an application for amendment in accordance with law.
Nevertheless, such a direction cannot be construed as conferring an
unconditional right upon a party to introduce additional pleadings at an
advanced stage of the proceedings. The application was required to be
examined in accordance with the statutory requirements, which, in the
present case, have not been fulfilled.
45. Learned counsel for the respondent has also brought to the notice
of this Court the proceedings concerning the recall and re-examination
of D.W.-1. It is stated that the petitioner's application seeking recall and
re-examination of the said witness was rejected by the trial court by
order dated 04.02.2025. The said order was affirmed by the Revisional
Court on 19.09.2025 in SCC Revision No. 81 of 2025. The petitioner
thereafter challenged the orders before this Court in Matters Under
Article 227 No. 650 of 2026, wherein the petition was allowed upon a
concession made on behalf of the respondent at the admission stage,
permitting the petitioner to examine D.W.-1 on the next date fixed,
subject to the stipulation that, in default of availing the opportunity so
granted, the same would stand closed and the suit would be decided on
the basis of the evidence already available on record.
46. The aforesaid procedural history indicates that the suit had
already reached an advanced stage and that the question of granting a
further opportunity to lead evidence had also arisen in the course of the
proceedings. This circumstance is relevant only for appreciating the
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stage of the suit and the procedural background in which the present
amendment application came to be moved. It does not, by itself,
determine the petitioner's entitlement to amendment, which has to be
tested independently under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. The rejection
of the amendment application is, therefore, required to be sustained on
the ground that the petitioner has failed to satisfy the statutory
requirement of due diligence.
47. The learned trial court, while rejecting the amendment
application, took into consideration the stage of the proceedings, the
nature of the proposed amendment, the circumstances in which the facts
were sought to be introduced and the absence of any satisfactory
justification for not incorporating them earlier. The learned Revisional
Court also examined these aspects and affirmed the conclusion of the
trial court. The reasons recorded by the courts below, when examined in
the light of the statutory requirement under Order VI Rule 17 of the
Code, do not disclose any illegality warranting interference.
48. This Court is conscious of the fact that the jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature and is
not intended to be exercised as an appellate jurisdiction for
reappreciating the material or substituting one possible view for another
merely because a different conclusion may also be conceivable.
Interference is warranted where the subordinate court has acted without
jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in it or committed a patent error resulting in manifest injustice.
49. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that
the courts below have exercised their jurisdiction in a manner warranting
interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The
conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court and affirmed by the
learned Revisional Court is founded upon relevant considerations,
particularly the advanced stage of the proceedings and the absence of a
satisfactory explanation establishing due diligence. The petitioner has,
therefore, failed to establish that, despite due diligence, he could not
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have raised the facts concerning the alleged partition before
commencement of trial. The impugned orders do not suffer from any
patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference
by this Court.
50. For the reasons discussed above, the present petition is
dismissed.
51. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the
question of permissibility of the proposed amendment and shall not be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the respective
claims of the parties concerning ownership, partition or the landlord-
tenant relationship. The learned trial court shall adjudicate the SCC suit
independently, on the basis of the pleadings and evidence available on
record, and in accordance with law.
52. Having regard to the fact that the suit was instituted in the year
2020 and has already reached an advanced stage, the learned trial court
is directed to proceed with the matter expeditiously and endeavour to
conclude the proceedings, preferably within a period of three months
from the date of production of a certified copy of this order, without
granting unnecessary adjournments to either party.
53. There shall be no order as to costs
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)
November 06, 2026
Arun K. Singh
Digitally signed by :-
ARUN KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad