XYZ VICTIM vs STATE OF GUJARAT

R/CR.A/2273/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 21/10/2026
(GJHC240527372026)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 2273 of 2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
==========================================================
XYZ VICTIM
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR RISHABH R JAIN(12326) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR LB DABHI, APP for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 21/10/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)
1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of
acquittal dated 31.01.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Court No.7, City Civil and Sessions Court, Ahmedabad, in
Sessions Case No.457 of 2021, whereby the respondent-accused came to
be acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n)
and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant-State has preferred the
present appeal, under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS” for short).
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are as
under:
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2.1. The complainant, who is also the victim, was pursuing her studies
in the second year at a college at Usmanpura, Ahmedabad. She and the
respondent-accused were in a relationship for about a year prior to the
incident. The respondent-accused was employed at a showroom.
According to the complainant, on the morning of 13.08.2019 she went to
the house of the respondent-accused, and both of them thereafter
presented themselves at a police station. The parents and the uncle of the
respondent-accused took her from the police station. It is alleged that the
respondent-accused was of a tender age, a mutual agreement came to be
executed between the two on 14.08.2019. The respondent-accused
allegedly induced her with a promise to marry him upon attaining the
marriageable age and kept her with him. For about two months, they
resided at his house, during which period he allegedly established
physical relations with her forcibly, on the false promise of marriage, and
assaulted her whenever she refused. Owing to differences between her
and the parents of the respondent-accused, the couple later shifted to a
rented house at Gujarat Ratna Society, Ranip, where the respondent-
accused allegedly continued to commit the same acts. He also allegedly
demanded money from her and assaulted her when she declined.
2.2. The complainant further alleged that on the morning of 29.01.2020,
the respondent-accused told her that they would marry on her birthday,
which fell on 31.01.2020, and asked her to get the agreement cancelled.
When she refused, he threatened to take his own life. Frightened by the
threat, the agreement was cancelled by mutual consent. The respondent-
accused thereafter took her on a motorcycle to the Motera Stadium and
left her on the road. She returned to her father’s house by auto-rickshaw
and, accompanied by her father, lodged the complaint.
2.3. The complaint, lodged on 30.01.2020, came to be registered at
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Vadaj Police Station as First C.R. No.11191023200089 of 2020 for the
offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 323 of the Indian
Penal Code. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Agency
recorded the statements of the concerned witnesses and drew a
panchnama of the place of offence in the presence of panchas. The
clothes of the victim and of the respondent-accused were seized under
panchnamas, both of them were medically examined, and the medical
samples were seized and forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory
for analysis. The respondent-accused was arrested on 08.02.2020 and was
subsequently released on bail. Upon conclusion of the investigation, a
charge-sheet was filed on 24.09.2020 before the Court of the learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.9, Ahmedabad, in
Criminal Case No.51051 of 2020. As the offences were exclusively
triable by the Court of Session, the learned Magistrate, after due
compliance with Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(“the Code” for short), committed the case to the learned Sessions Court
under Section 209 of the Code, and it came to be registered as Sessions
Case No.457 of 2021.
2.4. The charge for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)
(n) and 323 of the Indian Penal Code was framed by the learned Sessions
Court on 23.08.2022 at Exh.-4. The plea of the respondent-accused was
recorded at Exh.-5, wherein he denied the charge and claimed to be tried.
The prosecution thereupon adduced oral and documentary evidence and
closed its case by filing a closing purshis at Exh.-67. The further
statement of the respondent-accused under Section 313 of the Code was
thereafter recorded, wherein he stated that his mother had lodged a
complaint against the victim at Vadaj Police Station, being C.R.
No.11191023200090 of 2020, for the offences punishable under Sections
323 and 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code, and that, to escape the
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consequences of that complaint, the victim had filed a false complaint
against him. He denied having established physical relations forcibly,
having demanded money, or having assaulted the victim, and stated that,
since he had not attained the age of marriage, it could not be believed that
he had induced her with a promise of marriage. He did not examine
himself on oath or lead any defence evidence. Upon appreciation of the
evidence, the learned Sessions Court, by the judgment and order dated
31.01.2026, acquitted the respondent-accused, namely Pavan
Shaileshbhai Parmar, of the offences punishable under Sections 376,
376(2)(n) and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, by giving him the benefit of
doubt under Section 235(1) of the Code. Being aggrieved, the appellant-
State has preferred the present appeal.
3. Submissions on behalf of the Learned Advocate for the appellant:
3.1. Learned advocate for the appellant-victim has assailed the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions
Court in favour of Respondent No. 2 for the offences punishable under
Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. He has
submitted that the learned Sessions Court has erred in law and on facts,
that the impugned judgment is patently illegal and contrary to the
material on record, and that it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
3.2. It is submitted that the appellant, being the victim, is entitled to
challenge the order of acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 of the
CrPC. He has contended that this Court, as the first appellate court, has
the power to re-appreciate the entire evidence, and that interference is
called for where the view taken is not a possible view, where material
evidence has been ignored, or where the law has been misread.
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3.3. Learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that the acquittal
rests mainly on the finding that the fresh agreement dated 29.01.2020
cancelled the earlier agreement dated 14.08.2019. He has fairly stated that
the appellant does not deny the execution of the fresh agreement.
However, he has submitted that the learned Sessions Court ought to have
considered the circumstances in which it was executed. According to him,
on 29.01.2020 Respondent No. 2 informed the appellant that the parties
would marry on 31.01.2020, which was the appellant’s birthday, and on
that assurance the earlier understanding was to be done away with. He
has further submitted that Respondent No. 2 physically assaulted the
appellant, and that the fresh agreement was therefore procured on the
pretext of marriage and under threat. An agreement so obtained, he has
argued, cannot be treated as a valid or voluntary document, and the
learned Sessions Court erred in relying upon it to acquit Respondent
No.2.
3.4. It is further submitted that the learned Sessions Court has not
recorded any reasoning or factual finding on the physical assault. He has
pointed out that, as per the testimony of the medical officers and the
documents on record, multiple injury marks were present on the body of
the appellant, which establishes that she was physically assaulted by
Respondent No. 2. He has submitted that this evidence has not been
discussed at all in the impugned judgment, and that this omission by itself
renders the order of acquittal improper.
3.5. Learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that the learned
Sessions Court itself noted that the appellant stood by her statements in
both her examination-in-chief and her cross-examination. Despite this,
her testimony was not relied upon, and no reasons were assigned for
discarding it. He has contended that the testimony of the victim is of
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utmost relevance, and that rejecting it without any legal reasoning shows
non-application of mind and warrants interference.
3.6. It is also submitted that the fresh agreement is dated 29.01.2020
and the FIR was registered on 30.01.2020, that is, on the very next day.
He has argued that this is not a case of afterthought on the part of the
appellant. The theory of afterthought could have been applied only if the
police had been approached after delay, and no such delay occurred.
3.7. He has further submitted that the learned Sessions Court
misinterpreted the provisions of Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 323 of the
IPC and failed to consider the material on record. According to him, the
learned Sessions Court took irrelevant factors into consideration and
misdirected itself in passing the impugned judgment, which is therefore
illegal, unjust and against the provisions of law.
3.8. Without prejudice, he has submitted that even if the fresh
agreement were assumed to be valid, it cannot efface the offences
alleged, nor can it answer the independent offence under Section 323 of
the IPC, which is supported by medical evidence.
3.9. On these grounds, learned advocate for the appellant has urged that
the view taken by the learned Sessions Court is not a possible view. He
has prayed that the appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment and order
of acquittal be quashed and set aside, and Respondent No. 2 be convicted
and sentenced in accordance with law.
4. Submissions on behalf of the Learned APP for the respondent-
State:
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4.1. Learned APP for the respondent-State has supported the
submissions of the learned advocate for the appellant. He has submitted
that the learned Sessions Court has committed a manifest error in
appreciating the evidence and that the acquittal is not sustainable in law.
4.2. He has submitted that the learned Sessions Court found that the
victim stood by her version in her examination-in-chief and cross-
examination, yet discarded her testimony without assigning any reason.
According to him, the testimony of a victim, if found consistent and
trustworthy, can by itself form the basis of a conviction, and it cannot be
rejected on the strength of a subsequent agreement.
4.3. Learned APP has further submitted that the medical evidence,
which records multiple injury marks on the body of the victim, lends
direct support to the allegation of physical assault under Section 323 of
the IPC, and that the learned Sessions Court has altogether failed to
consider it. He has also submitted that the learned Sessions Court did not
examine the circumstances in which the fresh agreement dated
29.01.2020 was executed, namely the assurance of marriage on
31.01.2020 and the alleged assault, and that an agreement made in such
circumstances cannot be treated as a free consent or as a defence to the
offences charged.
4.4. It is further submitted on behalf of the State that the FIR was
registered on 30.01.2020, one day after the fresh agreement, so there was
no delay and no scope for the theory of afterthought. He has contended
that the learned Sessions Court misread Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 323
of the IPC and arrived at a view that is not a possible view on the
evidence on record, ignoring material evidence and resulting in a
miscarriage of justice.
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4.5. Learned APP therefore on the same flow and force has prayed that
the appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
be set aside.
5. We have heard the learned APP for the State, at the stage of
admission and carefully examined the oral and documentary evidence
adduced before the learned Sessions Court.
6. The learned Sessions Court first relied on the history which the
victim herself gave to the doctor who treated her. In that history she
clearly stated that she recognised the accused for one year, that the two
were in love, and that for the last eight months they had been living
together under a friendship agreement (maitri karar). On this basis the
learned Sessions Court held that nothing on record shows that the accused
took the victim to his house against her will under that agreement, or that
he established physical relations with her against her will. We find no
infirmity in this view. The history was recorded when the victim was
being medically treated, long before she gave her deposition in Court. It
is a contemporaneous account in her own words, and it describes a
consensual and continuing relationship. It does not describe force,
coercion or deceit. The prosecution has not explained how this account
can be reconciled with the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse.
7. The deposition of the victim’s father, in cross-examination, was
that the victim went to stay with the accused after asking him, and that
when she went she had entered into the agreement with her consent. He
admitted that the friendship agreement between the victim and the
accused had since been cancelled. He also admitted that, while his
daughter was away from his house and living with the accused, and after
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she returned, he gave no written application against the accused at any
police station. The learned Sessions Court held that this deposition does
not support any allegation against the accused. We find that a father who
permits his daughter to go, who does not complain at any stage while she
is away, and who does not dispute that she acted with consent cannot be
said to support a case of forcible intercourse. His silence and inaction at
the relevant time, together with his admissions, weaken the prosecution
case.
8. The deposition of the victim’s uncle (PW-13) is to the same effect.
In cross-examination he admitted that the victim went with the accused of
her own will. The learned Sessions Court did not find in this deposition
any incriminating circumstance against the accused. We find that the
admission is simple and unqualified, and it is inconsistent with the
allegation that the victim was taken away or kept against her wishes.
9. The deposition of Hiraben Parmar (PW-14), the owner of the house
in which the accused and the victim lived, shows that the victim and the
accused stayed in her house as husband and wife. In cross-examination
she admitted that the victim never told her that her husband was harassing
her. The learned Sessions Court held that her deposition does not support
the allegation of coercion or ill-treatment. We find no error in this
finding. She is an independent witness who saw the couple’s daily life.
Had the victim been forced into the relationship, or beaten and threatened
as alleged, some complaint or sign of distress would ordinarily have come
to the notice of the person with whom she lived. Her deposition indicates
the contrary, and it also supports the prosecution’s own case that the
parties lived together as a couple during the relevant period.
10. Having regard to the sum and substance of the conclusions arrived
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at by the learned Sessions Judge, it transpires that the appellant herein,
the prosecutrix, entered into a deed of understanding with the contesting
respondent. At the time of executing the said deed, the respondent was 20
years of age. They decided to live together on their own volition, without
any coercion or pressure on the part of any third person. The relevant
portions of the said deed, in vernacular language dated 14.08.2019, are
reproduced hereinbelow in translation form:
“We, the Party of the Second Part, are dependent on the Party of the First
Part, and will remain so, only as long as we wish and as long as we have
trust in them. The Party of the First Part has not offered us any greed,
temptation, or threat to make us stay with them. We have done this of our
own free will, willingly, and voluntarily. No pressure or coercion has been
applied to us by anyone, and no inducement or allurement has been offered
to us. We have made this decision while in a sound state of mind and with
free consent.”
11. The prosecutrix, described therein as the party of the other part,
declared that she would reside in the company and under the shelter of
the party of the first part so long as it was her wish and she had trust in
him. She further declared that no allurement or inducement had been held
out to her to live with the party of the first part, and that she had executed
the deed of her own free will, willingly and voluntarily. It was further
stipulated that they would take decisions regarding their life by their own
free will, and that on the party of the first part attaining the age of
majority, namely 21 years, they would marry each other of their own will
and consent, and the parties gave an undertaking to that effect.
12. Subsequently, on 29.01.2020, a further deed of understanding was
executed between the parties. It recited that the parties were then pursuing
their studies and that, of their own free will and without any harassment
or threat, they had decided to live separately. By this deed, the earlier
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deed, along with its terms, conditions and recitals, came to be cancelled
by the consensus arrived at between the parties.
13. The subsequent deed of understanding dated 29.01.2020, by which
the parties themselves cancelled the earlier friendship agreement of
14.08.2019, records that they had lived together by mutual consent, that
differences in temperament had arisen, and that they had decided to part
of their own free will, without any greed, allurement, pressure or threat,
so that the prosecutrix could continue her studies. This contemporaneous
document, executed at the very end of the period alleged in the charge,
contains no recital of any beating, any threat to die, or any forcible
intercourse, and is wholly consistent with the admissions of the
prosecutrix’s father and uncle that she had gone and stayed with the
accused of her own will and that the agreement stood cancelled.
14. When two adults, after living together for several months under a
written arrangement that itself declared free consent, mutually put an end
to that arrangement by a further written instrument that again affirms the
absence of coercion, the prosecution case that the relationship was
throughout the product of a false promise of marriage and of repeated
force becomes difficult to sustain. The cancellation deed though not
required to be executed compulsorily in law, therefore lends direct
support to the finding that the physical relationship, such as it was, rested
on the continuing consent of the prosecutrix and that the separation was
voluntary.
15. What transpires from the aforesaid is, admittedly, that at the time
of executing the first deed of understanding the respondent had not yet
attained the marriageable age. The deed dated 14.08.2019 was executed
in that backdrop, and it remained in operation until the said agreement
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came to be rescinded and cancelled by the subsequent deed. It is thus
admitted that during the intervening period the parties, and the appellant
herein in particular, resided with the respondent of her own consent and
volition, and without any force or coercion applied by any person,
including the respondent herein.
16. Further, even otherwise, an agreement of this nature is opposed to
public policy. Even if it is considered that at the time of executing the
deed of understanding the respondent was 20 years of age, and 21 years
in continuity thereof, he cannot be said to have entered into an agreement
enforceable in law. The very purpose of the agreement was that, on
attaining the marriageable age, the respondent would marry the appellant
herein. The probative value of such a document, with regard to
contracting a marriage by a person who was not competent to contract it
by reason of the debarment of age, is nil. Such a document cannot be said
to be a legal one, and it is otherwise one against public policy and against
the law. This is irrespective of the fact that any breach or violation cannot
be executed by initiating compelling issues like putting prosecution in
motion, as the allegations and statements of it, would have to be
established by leading substantial evidence. However, the document
cannot be used in the manner alleged by the prosecutrix herein. The
present case is not one of a promise to marry made with a dishonest
intention from the very inception, so as to obtain sexual favours under the
guise of such a promise. Here, the parties entered into a written
agreement by mutual consent to live together, and thereafter, by another
deed, mutually cancelled it. The prosecutrix, being a major, resided with
the respondent of her own consent, and the case therefore cannot be
brought within the ambit of rape on the premise of a false promise of
marriage.
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17. The learned Sessions Court also found that the defence had brought
out material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the victim,
the complainant, on record. It noted that the panch witnesses did not
support the contents of the panchnamas and were declared hostile by the
prosecution. It further noted that the Investigating Officer admitted in
cross-examination that the original agreements referred to in the
complaint were never seized during the investigation. We find these
findings to be well founded.
18. The victim’s deposition is the foundation of the case. When it is
shown to be inconsistent, and the supporting witnesses either turn away
from the prosecution or give evidence favourable to the accused, it cannot
be called wholly reliable and free from doubt. The failure to seize the
original agreements is a serious omission, because the prosecution case is
built around those very agreements and the representations said to have
been made under them. The panchnamas have no value when the panch
witnesses did not support them. The deeds must be read with the evidence
that the original agreements were not seized during the investigation, and
that the panch witnesses did not support the panchnamas. This does not
help the prosecution. The prosecution built its case on these agreements
and the representations said to have been made under them, yet it did not
secure the originals. It has therefore not proved how the agreements were
obtained or that they were procured by deception. The recitals in the
deeds on record remain unrebutted.
19. The learned Sessions Court has righly held that the evidence of the
doctors and the Investigating Officer does not prove beyond doubt that
the accused committed the offence charged, that no case is made out
linking the accused with the crime, and that the documents produced by
the Investigating Officer contain nothing connecting him with it. It
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transpires that the medical evidence and investigative material can show
that an incident took place or that certain steps were taken, but they
cannot take the place of reliable evidence of the accused’s involvement.
Where the main evidence is itself doubtful, such supporting material
cannot fill the gap.
20. The learned Sessions Court also considered the judgments cited by
the parties. It held that the judgment cited for the complainant does not
help the prosecution because its facts and circumstances differ from the
present case, while the judgments cited for the defence partly support the
stance of the accused.
21. In the absence of any contrary material before us, we see no reason
to take a different view. Finally, the learned Sessions Court concluded
that, from 13.08.2019 to 29.01.2020, the prosecution had not proved
beyond reasonable doubt the allegations that the accused gained the
victim’s trust and kept up a love relationship with her, lured her with a
promise of marriage and entered into agreements, repeatedly had forcible
intercourse with her at Vasuki Nagar Vibhag-2, Juna Vadaj, Ahmedabad,
and at Gujarat Ratna Society, Ranip, Ahmedabad, later refused to marry
her, threatened to die, and had the agreement cancelled, and beat her and
repeatedly raped her. The learned Sessions Court therefore has rightly
answered Point No. 1 in the negative and proceeded to pass the final
order on Point No. 2.
SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE IN AN APPEAL AGAINST
ACQUITTAL:
22. We would like to place on record the scope of interference in an
appeal against the acquittal and when the same is justified. In exceptional
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cases, where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under
appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the
judgment of acquittal. The Appellate Court should consider the presence
of innocence of the accused and further that, the trial Court’s acquittal
bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine
manner, where the other view of possible should be avoided, unless there
are reasons for interference, as the same has been laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr.
v. The State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67. At this stage, we may
refer to the decision in case of Ravish Singh Rana v. State Of
Uttarakhand, 2025 (0) AIJEL-SC 75286 , the relevant paragraphs of
which read as under:
“11. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), this Court held that where
the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker, at the time of
making the promise, itself was not to abide by it, but to deceive the woman
to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of
fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. However, a mere breach of a
promise cannot be said to be a false promise. Therefore, to establish a
false promise, it would have to be demonstrated that the maker of the
promise had no intention of upholding his word at the time of making the
promise.
12. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 this Court
observed:
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between
rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to
marry the victim, or had mala de motives, and had made a false
promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within
the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between
the mere breach of a promise and not fullling a promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage, a
false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
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involved was given after fully understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutor agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love
and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused
on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite
having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court
reaches to a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala
de, and that he had clandestine motives.”
13. In Sonu @ Subash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
another, (2021) 18 SCC 517 this Court quashed the FIR and the
proceedings arising therefrom upon noticing that (1) relationship
between appellant and the second respondent was of consensual
nature; (2) parties were in relationship for a period of one-and- a-
half years; and (3) subsequently, appellant had expressed
disinclination to marry the second respondent which led to
registration of FIR.”
23. While applying the aforesaid proposition to the instant case, we
find that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent, that is
the accused, had been there since prior to 13.08.2019. None of them
disputed having physical relationship with each other, but also of living
together in a rented accommodation as a live-in couple. If two able-
minded adults reside together as a live-in couple for a considerable period
and cohabit with each other, a presumption would arise that they
voluntarily chose that kind of relationship being fully aware and
conversant of its consequences. Therefore, the allegations raised by the
appellant herein that such relationship was entered because there was a
promise of marriage by the contesting respondent is, in the circumstances,
not worthy of acceptance, particularly when there is no allegation at all
that such relationship would not have been established had there been no
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R/CR.A/2273/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 21/10/2026
(GJHC240527372026)
promise to marry, and particularly when, at the time of executing such
deed of live-in, the respondent was not of the marriageable age.
24. Even while considering the facts of the case on hand, so also such
issue which has become rampant in the society, in a case like a long
drawn live-in relationship, occasion may arise where the parties in that
relationship express their desire or wish to formalize the same by seal of
marriage, but that expression of desire or wish by itself would not be
indicative of the relationship being a consequence of that expression of
desire or wish. Nowadays, it is common that women are financially
independent and have the capacity to take conscious decisions of charting
their life on their own terms, including the financial freedom which has
led to proliferation of such live-in relationships. And simply because the
difference and dispute between the parties arise on any count, the same
cannot be given colour of a criminal prosecution.
25. Therefore, we are conscious of the fact that when such type of
matter comes before the Court, it must not adopt a pedantic approach
rather the Court will, based on the length of such relationship and
particularly the conduct of the parties, presume implied consent of the
parties to be in such a relationship regardless of their desire or wish to
convert it into a marital bond.
26. Thus, in view of the detailed discussions in the foregoing
paragraphs, while equating the same with the law and proposition settled
down in the aforesaid decided cases, we are of the considered view that
the long drawn relationship of the appellant with the respondent,
including the circumstances of their living together and cohabiting with
each other, that too in separate rented accommodation with the
knowledge of the parents of the prosecutrix, would give rise to a
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presumption that their relationship was based on valid consent.
27. It is also not disputed by the prosecutrix as to the execution of the
two deeds referred to hereinabove, which points out that the parties had
been in love, and under the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view
that on the ground of refusal to marry, the respondent cannot be subjected
to prosecution for the offence of rape.
28. In continuation of the aforesaid, the statement and allegations with
regard to the prosecutrix having been subjected to sexual assault and also
the compulsion and harassment so as to get extracted the deed of
cancellation by applying force do not inspire much confidence and have
rightly been negated while considering the surrounding circumstances
and the recitals in the settlement agreement which indicate that the parties
lived together and cohabited for a considerable period, which amounts to
the parties being in love with each other. And therefore, any break-up and
subsequent events, which otherwise may not give an inference or finding
in favour of the prosecutrix, is no ground to subject the respondent for the
offence of rape.
29. In an appeal against acquittal, the question is whether the view
taken by the learned Sessions Court is a plausible one on the evidence.
On this record it is and we find no perversity or legal infirmity in the
appreciation of evidence, and the benefit of doubt was rightly extended to
the accused. The finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, call for no interference. In view of the aforesaid
appreciation of the material on record, we are satisfied that the
prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the view taken by the learned Sessions Court is a plausible view,
calling for no interference at this stage.
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R/CR.A/2273/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 21/10/2026
(GJHC240527372026)
30. For the forgoing reasons, the present appeal is dismissed. Record
and proceedings, if any, be remitted to the concerned Court.
(ILESH J. VORA,J)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
MVP
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