NILAMANI DIBYA vs STATE OF ODISHA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
WP(C)/15621/2025
ODHC010390962025
2026:OHC:269-DB
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.15621 of 2025
CNR No.ODHC01-039096-2025
In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, 1950
*
1. Nilamani Dibya
Aged about 80 years
Wife of Late Baidyanath Satapathy
Of Village: Gopinathpur
P.O.: Singhnathpitha, P.S.: Badamba
District: Kataka, PIN: 754031.
2. Biswaranjan Satapathy
Aged about 42 years
Son of Late Baidyanath Satapathy
Of Village: Gopinathpur
P.O.: Singhanathpitha, P.S.: Badamba
District: Kataka, PIN: 754031.
3. Sarojini Satapathy
Aged about 63 years
Wife of Prafulla Kumar Satapathy
Daughter of Late Bidyanath Satapathy
Of Village: Gopinathpur
P.O.: Singhnathpitha, P.S.: Badamba
District: Kataka, PIN: 754031.
4. Binodini Devi @ Tripathy
Aged about 50 years
Daughter of Late Baidyanath Satapathy
At present:
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 1 of 51
Wife of Late Sarat Kumar Dash @ Tripathy
At/P.O.: Joranda, P.S.: Athagada
District: Kataka.
5. Kadambini Satapathy
Aged about 46 years
Daughter Late Baidyanath Satapathy
At present:
Wife of Umesh Chandra Satapathy
Of Village: Gopinathpur
P.O.: Singhanathpitha, P.S.: Badamba
District: Kataka, PIN: 754031. … Petitioners
(Opposite party
Nos.2(a) to 2(e) in
the Court below).
-V ERSUS -
1. State of Odisha
Represented through
The Secretary
Revenue and Disaster Management Department
At: Lok Seva Bhawan
Bhubaneswar, District: Khordha.
2. Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha
At: Rajaswa Bhawan
P.O.: Chandinichowk,
Town/District: Kataka.
3. Sub-Collector, Athagada
At/P.O.: Athagada
District: Kataka.
4.
Tahasildar, Badamba
At/P.O./P.S.: Badamba
District: Kataka.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 2 of 51
5. Santosh Kumar Satapathy
Aged about 57 years
Son of Late Janardan Satapathy
Resident of Village: Gopinathpur
P.O.: Singhanathpitha, P.S.: Badamba
District: Kataka. ... Opposite parties
(Opposite party No.4
and Opposite party No.5
were Opposite party No.1
and Petitioner
in the Court below
respectively).
Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Petitioner : M/s. Bhaskar Chandra Panda,
S. Mishra, J.N. Panda,
A. Tripathy, A. Mishra and
A.K. Mishra, Advocates
For the Opposite party : Mr. Manmaya Kumar Dash,
Nos.1 to 4 Additional Standing Counsel.
For the Opposite party : Mr. Santosh Kumar Satapathy,
No.5 In person.
P R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
AND
HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
Date of Hearing : 27.10.2026 :: Date of Judgment : 04.11.2026
J UDGMENT
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 3 of 51
M URAHARI S RI R AMAN
, J.—
The petitioners crave indulgence of this Court to exercise
power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India and interfere with the Order dated 06.05.2025 of
Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha, Kataka passed in
OEA Revision Case No.01 of 2022, filed under Section
38-B of the Odisha Estate Abolition Act, 1951, whereby
1
Order dated 31.03.2003 of the Tahasildar, Badamba in
Bebandobasta Case No.912 of 2001 as confirmed by the
Sub-Collector, Athagada by Order dated 09.08.2004, has
been directed to be modified.
Case of the petitioner:
2. The opposite party No.5-Santosh Kumar Satapathy filed
an application under Section 38-B of the Odisha Estate
1
Relevant portion of the Order dated 31.03.2003 passed by the Tahasildar in
Bebandobasta Case No.912 of 2001 so far as it relates to present parties is
quoted hereunder:
“The case is put up today. Perused the case record and report of Amin. It is
revealed that Khata 1370 of Village: Gopinathpur total area Ac.066 stands
recorded in Bebandobasta status in the name of Bauri Satapathy, son of
Somanath Satapathy of Gopinathpur.
On field enquiry conducted by Amin it is ascertained that the Bebandobasta
holder is not in possession of the land. The Bebandobasta land is being
possessed by different persons on the strength of registered sale deed. The land
has not been settled or alienated otherwise. Spot enquiry memorandum confirms
the possession of claimant. The Bebandobasta holder was the recorded tenant in
the Sabik Record-of-Right. Proclamation duly served. Objection period is over. No
objection received from any quarters.
*
Further the land mentioned below is settled in favour of Baidyanath Satapathy,
son of Mahadev of Gopinathpur on payment of Rs.112.50 salami and payment of
Rs.51.75 as he has been possessing the land by way of purchase vide registered
sale deed 1962 dated 03.08.1973.
Land Schedule
Khata No. Plot Area Kisam
1370 5962 Ac.005 Gharabari
*
Send the case record to the Sub-Collector, Athagada for favour of confirmation.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 4 of 51
Abolition Act, 1951 (“OEA Act”, for short), being
registered as OEA Revision Case No.01 of 2022, before
the Board of Revenue, Odisha, Kataka, challenging the
Order dated 31.03.2003 passed by the Tahasildar,
Badamba in Bebandobasta Case No.912 of 2001, which
was confirmed by Sub-Collector, Athagada on
09.08.2004. Originally the said case was filed against
Tahasildar, Badamba and Baidyanath Satapathy.
During pendency of the said revision case Baidyanath
Satapathy who was opposite party No.2 passed away on
29.08.2022. Consequent upon such eventuality, his
legal heirs were substituted as the opposite party
Nos.2(a) to 2(e), who are the present writ petitioners.
2.1. The case of the present opposite party No.5, who was
petitioner before the Board of Revenue, is that:
(a) Homestead lands bearing Plot No.5961 in Khata
No.378 measuring Ac.0.10 decimals stands in the
name of Santosh Kumar Satapathy as per records
maintained in the settlement operation conducted
in the year 1990 and Plot No.5962 measuring
Ac.0.04dec. has been in the possession of
Baidyanath Satapathy, having purchased by virtue
of executing registered sale deed bearing No.1962
dated 03.08.1973 from Bimal Dibya wife of Late
Somanath Satapathy, agnatic brother of the
grandfather of Santosh Kumar Satapathy.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 5 of 51
(b) Subsequently one Title Suit No.10 of 1974 was filed
by Janardan Satapathy father of Santosh Kumar
Satapathy against Baidyanath Satapathy and
others in the Court of the Additional Munsif,
Badamba, which stood decreed on compromise on
08.02.1877; whereupon Baidyanath Satapathy
relinquished an area measuring Ac.0.006decimals
and ½kadi from Sabik Plot No.4023 and No.4024 in
favour of Janardan Satapathy.
(c) During Settlement of 1990 an area of Ac.0.05dec.
was recorded in Khata No. 1370 under
Bebandobasta status in the name of Baidyanath
Satapathy. But it was wrongly recorded because an
excess area has been carved out from the plot of
the revision petitioner, which is adjacent to the said
land. Though he is an affected party, having not
given opportunity of hearing, an Order dated
31.03.2003 was passed by the Tahasildar in
Bebandobasta Case No.912 of 2001, which got
confirmed by the Sub-Collector, Athagada vide
Order dated 09.08.2004.
2.2. Per contra the case of the writ petitioners before the
revisional authority was:
(a) Sabik Khata No.84, Plot No.4023, Ac.0.02dec., Plot
No.4024, Ac.0.02 dec., Kissam: Gharbari
(corresponds to Hal Khata No.1370, Plot No.5962,
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 6 of 51
Ac.0.05dec.) was originally recorded in the name of
Bauri Satapathy, son of Somanath Satapathy. Said
plots correspond to Mutation Khata No. 1301/305,
Plot No.5962, measuring Ac.0.05dec. stands
recorded in the name of Baidyanath Satapathy, son
of Mahadev Satapathy.
(b) Baidyanath Satapathy purchased the aforesaid
Plots bearing Nos.4023 and 4024 with an area
Ac.0.04dec. from Bimala Dibya, wife of Somanath
Satapathy vide RSD No.l962 dated 03.08.1973.
(c) Janardan Satapathy the father of Sri Santosh
Satapathy filed one Title Suit No.10 of 1974 in the
Court of Additional Munsif, Badamba for
declaration that he is the lawful owner of suit
property, i.e ., Plot Nos.4023 and 4024, under Khata
No.84 and for issue of an order of permanent
injunction. The said suit was filed against
Baidyanath Satapathy, the father of the present
petitioners, along with others. The claim of
Janardan Satapathy in the said suit was that
Bimala Dibya and one Bhagaban Satapathy father
of Swapneswar Satapathy in the said suit were the
original owners of aforesaid Plots in Khata No.84.
They divided the said suit property equally and
possessed separately. Bhagaban Satapathy the
father of Swapneswar Satapathy in the said suit
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 7 of 51
alienated his right, title and interest over his land
in favour of Janardan Satapathy and Kasinath
Praharaj on 10.12.1955. Similarly Bimala Dibya
alienated her right over the suit land on 25.12.1959
in favour of Baidyanath Satapathy, the father of the
present petitioners, except a cottage measuring
10ft. X 8ft., where she was residing.
(d) After pleadings being completed in the said suit,
the same, however, ended in compromise vide
Order dated 08.02.1977. As per the terms of
compromise the father of the present petitioners
left an area of Ac.0.006½kadi out of Ac.0.04dec.
from Plot Nos.4023 and 4024 in favour of the
plaintiff-Janardan Satapathy, over which he would
construct one brick wall and the defendant-
Baidyanath Satapathy had right to use the said
wall for putting his thatched house. Although the
same was decreed, till date Janardan Satapathy or
after him his son Santosh Kumar Satapathy has
not constructed any brick wall over the same.
2.3. The suit plots (Plot Nos.4023 and 4024 under Sabik
Khata No.84 corresponding to Hal Plot No.5962, Hal
Khata No. 1370, both measuring Ac.0.04dec.) stood
recorded in the Hal Settlement as Ac.0.05dec. depicting
Bebandobasta status. However, on the topography as
well as in the map the present petitioners have been in
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 8 of 51
possession of area measuring Ac.0.03dec.3½kadi. As
required under Government Notification No.EA-II-16/
2000/57677/4, dated 06.12.2000, the Tahasildar,
Badamba initiated a suo motu Bebandobasta Case
bearing No.912 of 2001 with respect to the aforesaid
land, i.e ., Hal Khata No. 1370.
2.4. After initiation of aforesaid Bebandobasta Case the
Tahasildar, Badamba made enquiry through Revenue
Inspector and after examining all the documents and
hearing the parties, i.e ., Baidyanath Satapathy, the
father of the petitioners, and Santosh Kumar Satapathy,
the present opposite party No.5, along with others
settled/directed to record the suit land in the name of
Baidyanath Satapathy as well as other lands in favour of
respective parties, which was confirmed by the Sub-
Collector, Athagada vide Order dated 09.08.2004.
Accordingly Mutation Khata No.1301/305 Plot No.5962
Ac.0.05dec. was maintained by recording the name of
Baidyanath Satapathy and Mutation Khata No.378 was
maintained in the name of Santosh Kumar Satapathy
and other legal heirs of Janardan Satapathy.
2.5. While the matter stood thus, Santosh Kumar Satapathy
filed one Civil Suit No. 19 of 2014 before Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Badamba, for declaration of his right,
title, interest and possession with respect to the present
suit schedule property but ultimately the said suit was
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 9 of 51
withdrawn on 17.05.2022. During pendency of the
aforesaid Civil Suit bearing No.19 of 2014, Santosh
Kumar Satapathy filed one Mutation Case bearing
No.4134 of 2019 on 05.09.2019 before the Tahasildar,
Badamba, where an objection being raised by the father
of the present petitioners the said case was kept in
abeyance till disposal of CMA No.5 of 2017 arising out of
the aforesaid Civil Suit No.19 of 2014.
2.6. It is alleged by the petitioners though in the Civil Suit
No.19 of 2014 the withdrawal of the suit was permitted
by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) on 17.05.2022 for
instituting fresh suit on self-same subject-matter,
suppressing such vital and pertinent fact, Santosh
Kumar Satapathy filed Bebandobasta Revision Case No.
1 of 2022 before the Board of Revenue, challenging the
Order dated 31.03.2003 passed by Tahasildar, Badamba
in Bebandobasta Case No.912 of 2001 which was
confirmed by the Sub-Collector, Athagarh on
09.08.2004. The said revision case was filed after 18
years enclosing therewith petition under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of delay.
2.7. The Member, Board of Revenue, without taking up the
petition dated 25.03.2022 for condonation of delay in
filing the revision petition, and/or assigning valid
grounds/reasons, allowed the revision case by Order
dated 06.05.2025.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 10 of 51
Counter affidavit of Santosh Kumar Satapathy:
3. Notices were issued in the instant writ petition by Order
dated 03.06.2025, pursuant to which having appeared
“in-person”, Santosh Kumar Satapathy (opposite party
No.5), filed counter affidavit supporting the order
impugned by stating inter alia that:
(a) Though there was delay in filing revision petition,
the Member, Board of Revenue exercised power
under Section 38-B of the OEA Act rightfully being
convinced with the sufficiency of material placed
before him and entertained the revision petition “to
prevent miscarriage of justice”.
(b) It is asserted that the father of the writ petitioner,
Baidyanath Satapathy, who being stranger having
purchased the land in question, Civil Suit bearing
No.10 of 1974 was instituted at the behest of father
of Santosh Kumar Satapathy for declaration of
lawful owner of the land. Since the father of
Santosh Kumar Satapathy got right, title and
interest and was in possession of the subject-
property in the Title Suit No.10 of 1974, the Civil
Suit No.19 of 2004 was withdrawn in order to
pursue the matter before the appropriate forum,
viz. , Board of Revenue, Kataka by way of filing an
application under Section 38-B of the OEA Act.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 11 of 51
(c) Alleging that the writ petitioners suppressed the
material fact before the Tahasildar, Badamba in
Bebandobasta Case No.912 of 2001 that there was
unassailed decree of the Civil Court in Title Suit
No.10 of 1974 and said Tahasildar having
conducted enquiry through the Revenue Inspector
without issuing summons or notice to the opposite
party No.5 (Santosh Kumar Satapathy) could not
have relied upon the report submitted by the
Revenue Inspector. The Tahasildar having not
taken cognizance of the compromise decree of the
Civil Court and without appreciating foundational
factual aspect that the land measuring Ac.0.04dec.
being sold by Bimala Dibya by virtue of RSD
No.1962/1973, the land measuring Ac.0.05dec.
ought not to have been settled in favour of the
father of the writ petitioners. The Member, Board of
2
Revenue, being satisfied that fraud had/has been
perpetrated by the petitioners/his predecessor,
deemed it apposite to decide the matter strictly on
its merits.
Hearing:
4. A short point is raised by the writ petitioners is this, that
in absence of specific order condoning the delay in filing
the revision petition under Section 38-B of the OEA Act,
2
Paragraph 36 in Bachana Kumari Dei Vs. State of Odisha, W.P.(C) No.15076 of
2008, decided by the High Court of Orissa on 25.03.2022 = 2022 (I) ILR-CUT 689 .
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 12 of 51
the Member, Board of Revenue, Kataka, transgressed his
jurisdiction by deciding the merit of the matter before
the matter is admitted for hearing and there being
unreasonable delay without sufficient explanation there
was no plausible reason for entertainment of the revision
petition and rendering decision on merits.
4.1. On consent of counsel appearing for the respective
parties and the opposite party No.5, this matter is finally
heard on 27.10.2026.
4.2. Heard Sri Bhaskar Chandra Panda, learned Advocate for
the petitioners; Sri Santosh Kumar Satapathy-opposite
party No.5 (appeared in-person) and Sri Manmaya
Kumar Dash, learned Additional Standing Counsel for
the opposite party Nos.1 to 4.
4.3. Hearing being concluded, the matter stood reserved for
preparation and pronouncement of Judgment/Order.
Arguments and submissions:
5. Sri Bhaskar Chandra Panda, learned Advocate
submitted that Santosh Kumar Satapathy suppressed
material fact that Civil Suit bearing No.19 of 2019 filed
at the behest of the opposite party No.5-Santosh Kumar
Satapathy stood disposed of as withdrawn by an order
dated 17.05.2022 passed by the learned Additional Civil
Judge (Junior Division), Badamba on the ground cited
by the plaintiff that he “does not want to proceed in this
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 13 of 51
case further more as the plaint wrongly filed”; yet filed
the petition before the Board of Revenue, registered as
OEA Revision Case No.1 of 2022.
5.1. However, inordinate delay in pursuing remedy under
Section 38-B of the OEA Act being not sufficiently
explained, the Member, Board of Revenue failed to
exercise his power thereunder inappropriately. The
learned counsel would urge that instead of taking up the
matter for hearing on the petition for condonation of
delay, the Member, Board of Revenue by Order dated
06.05.2025 disposed of the revision petition itself on
merit.
5.2. In this respect the argument advanced by the learned
counsel was taken note of by this Court which is
reflected in Order dated 09.03.2026. It is pertinent to
have reference to said order:
From the order sheet enclosed to the Additional
“3.
Affidavit, it appears that the case was taken up on
25th February, 2025 and it was posted to 17th
June, 2025 for hearing on admission. But,
surprisingly, the case was taken up on 15th April,
2025. An office note has been made by the Court
Officer of the Court of learned Member, Board of
Revenue in which, it is stated that the case was
rescheduled on a memo dated 18th March, 2025
filed by the Petitioners showing urgency.
Accordingly, cause list was published on 11th April,
2025. Learned Advocate for Opposite Party Nos.2(a),
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 14 of 51
2(b), 2(c) and 2(e) was informed over phone by the
Assistant Peshkar regarding the change in date.
Although the memo for rescheduling the case is
stated to have been filed on 18th March, 2025, but,
office note was given by the Court Officer on 11th
April, 2025. Further, no order of learned Member,
Board of Revenue appears to have been passed
preponing the date of hearing on admission. It
further appears from the order sheet that the hearing
of the revision was closed on 15th April, 2025 and
the matter was reserved for orders.
4. Hence, Mr. Mishra, learned Additional Standing
Counsel prays for an adjournment to explain the
same by filing an affidavit of the competent officer.
5. Let learned Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha,
Cuttack file an affidavit explaining the above. The
affidavit shall be filed within a period of two weeks
hence serving copy thereof on learned counsel for
the Petitioners and rest of the Opposite Parties.”
5.3. Sri Bhaskar Chandra Panda, learned Advocate with
vehemence submitted that unexplained irregularity in
the proceeding requires to be dealt with sternly and he
strenuously argued that the quasi judicial order fixing
date could not have been so lightly modified on
administrative side.
6. Sri Manmaya Kumar Dash, learned Additional Standing
3
Counsel referring to filed on behalf of the
“affidavit
3
Sworn to by Sri Lakshmikanta Sethi, OAS (SS), aged about 56 years, son of Late
Bhagaban Sethi, working as the Secretary, Board of Revenue, Odisha, Cuttack
instead of the Member, Board of Revenue as directed by this Court vide Order
dated 09.03.2026 passed in the present writ petition. This Court records strong
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 15 of 51
opposite party No.2 (Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha,
Cuttack, pursuant to Order dated 09.03.2026 of the
Hon‟ble High Court” dated 23.04.2026, explained that in
consideration of Memo dated 10.03.2025, Memo dated
18.03.2025 and grievance petition dated 04.04.2025
being filed by Santosh Kumar Satapathy for advancing
the scheduled date of hearing, i.e., 17.06.2026, the
revision case was posted for hearing and such fact was
reflected in the cause list dated 15.04.2025.
6.1. It is further submitted by the learned Additional
Standing Counsel that on the date so re-scheduled, the
Revision Case No.01 of 2022 was taken up for final
hearing on l5.04.2025. On the said date of hearing,
Santosh Kumar Satapathy (in person), the Standing
Counsel and the Advocate for the writ petitioners herein
(opposite party No. 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and 2(e) in the revision
petition) were present.
6.2. The Revision Case No.01 of 2022 was listed on
06.05.2025 for pronouncement of final order and the
cause list was published vide Memo No.1223/Peskar
(Gen.), dated 05.05.2025. Accordingly, the final order
was pronounced on 06.05.2025 and the case was closed.
6.3. The learned Additional Standing Counsel would submit
that no violation of principles of natural justice could be
exception to such affidavit being sworn to by the Secretary, Board of Revenue,
Odisha instead of Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha as directed in Order dated
09.03.2026.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 16 of 51
imputed in the course of proceeding and relied heavily
on paragraph 9 of the said affidavit:
“That in view of the above facts and circumstances, it is
clear that:
i. The whole proceeding of the revision case OEA (BB)
RC No. 01 of 2022 (Santosh Kumar Satapathy Vs.
Tahasildar, Badamba & 5 others) including the
preponement of the date of listing of the case was
performed as per the kind orders of Hon‟ble Member
BoR (O). The „due process‟ of notifying the other side
was satisfied through the phone call and most
importantly, the actual appearance of the opposing
counsel on that date.
ii. Because the opposite parties‟ advocate was
informed via phone and crucially, both parties
appeared on the preponed date, the lack of formal
written notice was cured by the appearance of the
parties, demonstrating no prejudice was caused. If
both parties appear and argue, it is treated as
consent to the preponement.
iii. Allowing 7 days to file written notes after a final
hearing is a standard procedure to allow advocates
to summarize their oral arguments. The opposite
parties were given chance on six (6) different dates
to file their written notes of submission. It was
ensured that despite the date being advanced, both
sides were given a fair opportunity to present their
case, adhering to the principles of natural justice.
Above facts along with the enclosed documents are being
placed for kind orders to the Under Secretary (Judl.),
Board of Revenue, Odisha, for taking steps to file affidavit
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 17 of 51
in compliance with the kind orders of Hon‟ble High Court
in W.P.(C) No.15621 of 2025.”
7. Per contra Sri Santosh Kumar Satapathy, the opposite
party No.5, as a counter-blast to what has been alleged
by the learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted
that the father of the petitioners had suppressed the
material fact of the compromise decree passed in Title
Suit 10 of 1974 in the proceeding of Bebandobasta Case
No.912 of 2001 before the Tahasildar, Badamba. The
petitioners, thus, having played fraud, in view of S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu Vrs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 the
petitioners are not entitled to maintain the writ petition.
This apart, the Tahasildar while finalising the said
Bebandabasta Case did not even make attempt to verify
that the notice is served on the opposite party No.5.
7.1. Having regard to Bachana Kumari Dei Vs. State of
Odisha, 2022 (I) ILR-CUT 689 it was submitted that
restrictive interpretation to the provisions contained
under Section 38-B of the OEA Act cannot be given and
the power of revision conferred upon the Member, Board
of Revenue, Odisha can be exercised by him after
conducting an enquiry from time to time and subject to
his satisfaction can initiate a suo motu proceeding to
rectify the illegalities/irregularities committed by his
subordinate authorities. Since fraud unravels every
solemn action, no infirmity can be imputed against the
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 18 of 51
action of the Member, Board of Revenue in exercise of
his jurisdiction under Section 38-B of the OET Act.
7.2. Winding up his arguments, Sri Santosh Kumar
Satapathy urged that the issue of limitation would not
prevent the exercise of power under Section 38-B of the
OEA Act, especially when it is invoked to obviate a
miscarriage of justice, rectify a statutory violation by
subordinate authorities, or prevent fraud from being
practised on the Court.
Consideration of arguments and submissions:
8. The impugned Order dated 06.05.2025, being passed by
the Member, Board of Revenue in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 38-B of the OEA Act, it is of
benefit to have cognizance of provisions contained in
said section as it stands:
4
“ [38B.Revision.—
5
(1) The [Board of Revenue] may, on its own motion or
on a report from the Collector, call for and examine
the record of any proceeding in which any authority
4
subordinate to the [Board of Revenue] has made
any decision or passed an order under this Act (not
being a decision against which an appeal has been
4
Provisions of Section 38-B has been inserted in the OEA Act, 1951, by virtue of
the Odisha Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1973, in exercise of powers
conferred by Section 3 of the Odisha State Legislature (Delegation of Power) Act,
1973, vide President’s Act No.21 of 1973.
5
The words “Board of Revenue” are substituted for the word “Board” by virtue of
the Odisha Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Odisha Act 16 of 1976),
being published in the Extraordinary issue of the Odisha Gazette dated
27.04.1976.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 19 of 51
preferred to the High Court or the District Judge
under Section 22) for the purpose of satisfying itself
as to the regularity of such proceeding or the
correctness, legality or propriety of such decision or
4
order and if in any case it appears to the [Board of
Revenue] that any such decision or order ought to be
modified, annulled, reversed or remitted, it may
pass orders accordingly.
6
[(2) The Board of Revenue shall not,—
7
[(i) [] *
(ii) revise any decision or order under this section
without giving the parties concerned an
opportunity of being heard in the matter.]”
9. By way of filing written note of submission, Sri Santosh
Kumar Satapathy, the opposite party No.5, laid stress
only on one point that once civil court passes a decree/
compromise decree in Title Suit No.10 of 1974, which
attained finality for all practical purposes, by altering
map to claim Ac.0.05dec., the Tahasildar, Badamba in
6
Sub-section (2) of Section 38-B has been substituted by virtue of the Odisha
Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1976, and the said sub-section (2) as
inserted by virtue of the Odisha Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1973, stood
thus:
“(2) The Board of Revenue shall not revise any decision or order under this
section,—
(i) after the expiry of one year from the date of such decision or order;
and
(ii) without giving the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard
in the matter.”
7
Clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 38-B of the OET Act, 1951, as inserted by
virtue of the Odisha Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1973, and later
substituted by the Odisha Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1976, has been
deleted by virtue of the Odisha Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1979
(Odisha Act 22 of 1979), with effect from 15.10.1979. Prior to such deletion,
said clause stood thus:
“Initiate any proceeding under this section after the expiry of one year from the
date of such decision or order; and”
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 20 of 51
Bebandobasta Case No.912 of 2001 transgressed his
jurisdiction and acted contrary to decree of the civil
court. Such an act would tantamount to “commission of
fraud”. It is the contention of the opposite party No.5
that suppression of material fact before the authority
concerned would not save the petitioner to claim what it
is not entitled to, inasmuch as “fraud” avoids all judicial
acts and, thus, consideration of petition for condonation
of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
would be redundant in such eventuality, particularly
when in order to exercise of power under Section 38-B of
the OET Act under which no period of limitation is
envisaged.
9.1. Examining the scope for consideration of element of
“fraud” on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, it emanates from the Order dated 06.05.2025 of
the Member, Board of Revenue that non-reflection of
“unchallenged civil court decree in Title Suit No.10 of
vide paragraph
1974 in the land records since decades” [
7 of said impugned order] gave rise to suspicion in the
mind of aforesaid revisional authority to hold that:
“Further, an angle of fraud/misrepresentation of facts/
deceit cannot be ruled out altogether specifically when
either there is suppression of facts by the private opposite
parties or the obvious facts in the primarily relied upon
documents like RSD and Civil suit decree have been
overlooked by the revenue officials. Citing the legal
precedent in Ram Chandra Singh Vrs. Sabitri Devi &
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 21 of 51
others, Supreme Court held that
Hon‟ble
misrepresentation constitutes fraud and fraudulent
misrepresentation leads to deceit. It will not be out of
place to cite the judgement in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu
Vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 where it has been held by
the Hon‟ble Apex Court as follows:
„Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal"
observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about
three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that
a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the
court is a nullity and non-est in the eyes of law. Such a
judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest court
has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether
superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even
in collateral proceedings.‟ ” *
9.2. By taking note of said judgment, the Member, Board of
Revenue jumped to the conclusion without making any
endeavour to find out the positive act of the petitioners
or their predecessor-in-interest in the commission of
such fraud. On proper scrutiny of the impugned Order,
it emerges that the Member, Board of Revenue
conspicuously ignored to address on the point, the effect
and impact of Order dated 17.05.2022 passed by the
Civil Judge (Junior Division), Badamba passed in Civil
Suit No.19 of 2014, whereby Santosh Kumar Satapathy
was specifically
“permitted to withdraw the suit with
liberty to file the fresh suit in the self-same subject
matter”. This apart, the contention of Sri Santosh Kumar
Satapathy that no notice was served on him in the
Bebandobasta Case by the Tahasildar should have been
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 22 of 51
considered. In this respect having glance at Order dated
31.03.2003 of the Tahasildar, Badamba it is
unequivocally stated that “Proclamation duly served”
and field enquiry was conducted. Such order was passed
by the Tahasildar on the status of the land after taking
into account not only the lands of the petitioners, but
also others in the Village: Gopinathpur.
9.3. It is pertinent to take note of that the order does not
transpire whether the entries made in the land records
was a outcome of fraud/misrepresentation or mistake.
This is being said for the reason that fraud has to be
specifically pleaded and proved. “Fraud” cannot be
presumed. The very use of expression in the impugned
an angle of fraud/misrepresentation of facts/
order that “
deceit cannot be ruled out ” goes to speak for itself that no
verification or examination was undertaken by the
Member, Board of Revenue to demonstrate, much less
prima facie, that the petitioners have active role in
misleading the Tahasildar, Badamba and the Sub-
Collector, Athagada. Rather the pleading in the revision
petition does not spells out fraud being played by the
petitioners. No specific instance to influence the
authority has been cited by the opposite party No.5
(Santosh Kumar Satapathy). No finding based on
evidence has been returned by the Member, Board of
Revenue to indicate that the petitioners practised fraud
or misrepresentation in maintaining the land records.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 23 of 51
9.4. The legal perspective in this regard has been ignored by
the Member, Board of Revenue. There has to be very
strong and convincing evidence to establish the
allegations of mala fides or misrepresentation. It has to
be specifically alleged in the petition as the same cannot
merely be presumed. The presumption is in favour of the
bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable
material. [ Vide, State of U.P. Vs. Dr. V.N. Prasad, 1995
Suppl (2) SCC 151; Arvind Dattatraya Dhande Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (1997) 6 SCC 169; Utkal University Vs. Dr.
Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, (1999) 2 SCC 193; Kiran
Gupta Vs. State of U.P., (2000) 7 SCC 719; Netai Bag Vs.
State of W.B., (2000) 8 SCC 262 ].
9.5. In the instant case the Member, Board of Revenue has
failed to discuss the circumstances under which the
authorities and/or the officials were “influenced” by the
writ petitioners/respondent, arrayed as party to the
revision proceeding. Of course, suppression of material
particular or concealment of necessary details does
tantamount to fraud. A perusal of the pleading titled
“Consolidated Plaint” filed by Sri Santosh Kumar
Satapathy, the opposite party No.5, before the Board of
Revenue in Bebandobasta Revision Case No.1 of 2022
reveals not an iota of averment, much less proof, to
indicate that the petitioners or their predecessors-in-
interest played an active role in causing the alleged
erroneous recording in the land records made by the
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 24 of 51
Tahasildar, which was subsequently affirmed by the
Sub-Collector. On a careful reading of contents of said
plaint/revision petition on the whole, especially
paragraph 6 thereof, as filed by Santosh Kumar
Satapathy, opposite party No.5, it is found that the
following allegation is made against the writ petitioners
(respondent in the revision):
“That, the respondent being failed to record the land in
his favour in spite of the repeated attempt, finally in the
year 2001 by influencing the Tahasil Officials a Suo Moto
Bebandobasta case was initiated vide B.B. Case No. 912
of 2001 by the Tahasildar, Badamba to settle the land in
favour of the Bebandobasta holders and after verification
of the land sold by the recorded tenants had been settled
in favour of different persons. But the respondent though
in possession of ac.0.04decimals of land influenced the
Government Amin who had submitted the report that
Baidyanath Satapathy is in possession of Ac0.05decimals
of land on the strength of R.S.D. No. 1962 dated
03.08.1973. Hence basing on the report of the R.I. AcO.05
decimals of land has been settled illegally in his favour,
which is without the knowledge of the appellant and the
Hal R.O.R. has been published vide Hal Khata No.
1301/305, Hal Plot No.5962 Area: Ac.0.05decimals
having Kissam: Gharabari which is purely illegal.
Baidyanath actually purchased an, area of Ac.0.04
decimals of land from Bimala Dibya on the strength of
Regd. Sale Deed No.l962 dated 03.08.1973.”
9.6. The aforesaid paragraph and/or none of the pleadings/
grounds in the revision petition demonstrates factually
nor circumstantially that Baidyanath Satapathy has
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 25 of 51
influenced the Officials of the Tahasil to make erroneous
entries in the land records. The impugned order of the
Member, Board of Revenue does not reflect as to whether
and why the concerned officials are not made parties in
person, when scurrilous attack is made against the
functionaries of the Tahasil including the Sub-Collector
who affirmed such alleged erroneous factual entry, if
any.
9.7. There is no cavil for the proposition that when a party
alleges mala fide against a statutory authority, burden
falls heavy on him who alleges it. It is a settled law
where a mala fide is alleged, the authority, who has
passed the order, which is said to be the result of the
mala fide exercise of power, has to be impleaded eo
nominee . In the absence of such impleadment, the Court
neither can look into the plea of mala fide nor can
consider the issue raising mala fide . In the case at hand,
none of the persons/authorities, against whom
unsubstantiated, uncalled for and unwarranted
allegations have been made, has been impleaded. [See,
Tara Chand Khatri Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR
1977 SC 567; J.N. Banavalikar Vs. Municipal Corporation
of Delhi, AIR 1996 SC 326 = 1995 Supp.4 SCR 1; First
Land Acquisition Collector Vs. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli,
(2002) 4 SCC 160; Jasvinder Singh Vs. State of J&K,
(2003) 2 SCC 132; Union of India Vs. Ashok Kumar,
(2005) 8 SCC 760 ].
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 26 of 51
9.8. It has been settled legal proposition that in case
allegations of are made against any person he
mala fide
is to be impleaded by name, otherwise the allegations
cannot be considered. [ Vide, State of Bihar Vs. P.P.
Sharma, IAS of Delhi and another, AIR 1996 SC 326; All
India State Bank Officers Federation and others Vs. Union
of India and others, (1997) 9 SCC 151; and I.K. Mishra
Vs. Union of India and others, (1997) 6 SCC 228 ].
9.9. In the case of A.C. Ananthaswamy Vs. Boraiah, (2004)
Supp.3 SCR 649 it has been held that:
“We do not find any merit in this appeal. Firstly, in the
present case, Patel Chikkahanumaiah had moved an
application under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC for setting aside
the ex-parte decree on the ground of non service of
summons in which fraud was not alleged. As stated
above, Patel Chikkahanumaiah had moved R.A. No.54 of
1977 in which there was no such allegation. Secondly,
the present suit has been instituted to set aside the ex
parte decree on the ground that the decree was obtained
by fraud and misrepresentation. Fraud is to be pleaded
and proved. To prove fraud, it must be proved that
representation made was false to the knowledge of the
party making such representation or that the party could
have no reasonable belief that it was true. The level of
proof required in such cases is extremely higher. An
ambiguous statement cannot per se make the representor
guilty of fraud. To prove a case of fraud, it must be proved
that the representation made was false to the knowledge
of the party making such representation. [See: Pollock &
Mulla on Indian Contract & Specific Relief Acts (2001)
12th Edition page 489].
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 27 of 51
In the present case, there is no evidence of fraud. The
present case is a matter of non-service of summons. In the
present case, there is a bare allegation of fraud. In the
case of Choksi Bhidarbhai Mathurbhai Vs. Purshottamdas
Bhogilal Shah reported in AIR 1962 Gujarat 10, it has
been held that where the only fraud alleged is a bare non
service of summons then such a suit to set aside the
decree on alleged ground of fraud was not maintainable.
Lastly, no substantial question of law arises in this
appeal.
For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this
civil appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, with
no order as to costs.”
9.10. This Court is not unmindful of the settled proposition of
law that “fraud” unravels all solemn acts. Any action or
the benefit derived from an act of fraud, the same is
always frowned upon by the Court and the benefits or
the actions are brought to its original position. Mere
alleging commission of fraud is not enough as
particulars of the fraud should be explicitly, clearly and
elaborately pleaded in the petition. The challenge can be
made on a ground of fraud in a collateral proceeding as
well, but the foundation thereof must have been laid
8
therein.
9.11. Misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. A fraudulent
misrepresentation is called deceit. It is a fraud in law, if
a party makes representation, which he knows to be
8
See, observations made by this Court in Bijay Kumar Prusty Vrs. State of
Odisha, D-WA No.3377 of 2026, vide Order dated 28.01.2026.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 28 of 51
false. However, fraud is proved only when it is shown
that a false representation has been made:
(i) knowingly, or
(ii) without belief in its truth, or
9
(iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.
9.12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anand Nishikawa
Co. Ltd. Vrs. CCE, (2005) 7 SCC 749 observed that,
This Court in the case of Pushpam
“26. *
Pharmaceuticals Co. Vrs. CCE, 1995 Supp (3) SCC
462 while dealing with the meaning of the
expression “suppression of facts” in the proviso to
Section 11-A of the Act (Central Excise Act, 1944)
held that the term must be construed strictly, it does
not mean any omission and the act must be
deliberate and wilful to evade payment of duty. The
Court further held:
„In taxation, it [„suppression of facts‟] can have only
one meaning that the correct information was not
disclosed deliberately to escape payment of duty.
Where facts are known to both the parties the
omission by one to do what he might have done and
not that he must have done, does not render it
suppression.”
9.13. In the case of Bibhas Ranjan Prusty Vrs. The Senior
Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India,
2015 (II) ILR-CUT 574 this Court referring to Life
9
See, Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319; State of Odisha Vrs.
Harapriya Bisoi, (2009) 7 SCR 34.
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 29 of 51
Insurance Corporation of India and others Vrs. Asha Goel,
, held as follows:
(2001) 2 SCC 160
“ the contracts of insurance including the contract of life *
assurance are contracts uberrima fides and every fact of
material (sic. material fact) must be disclosed, otherwise,
there is good ground for rescission of the contract. The
duty to disclose material facts continues right up to the
conclusion of the contract and also implies any material
alteration in the character of the risk which may take
place between the proposal and its acceptance. If there
are any misstatements or suppression of material facts,
the policy can be called into question. For determination of
the question whether there has been suppression of any
material facts it may be necessary to also examine
whether the suppression relates to a fact which is in the
exclusive knowledge of the person intending to take the
policy and it could not be ascertained by reasonable
enquiry by a prudent person.”
9.14. In the case of Indian Bank Vrs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt.
Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550
, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India held as follows:
“By filing Letter No.2775 of 26.08.1991 along with the
Review Petition and contending that the other letter,
namely, Letter No.2776 of the even date, was never
written or issued by the respondent, the appellant, in fact,
raised the plea before the Commission that its judgment
dated 16.11.1993, which was based on Letter No. 2776,
was obtained by the respondent by practising fraud not
only on the appellant but on the Commission too as Letter
No.2776 dated 26.08.1991 was forged by the respondent
for the purpose of this case. This plea could not have been
legally ignored by the Commission which needs to be
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 30 of 51
reminded that the Authorities, be they Constitutional,
Statutory or Administrative, (and particularly those who
have to decide a lis) possess the power to recall their
judgments or orders if they are obtained by fraud as
„fraud‟ and „Justice‟ never dwell together (fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that
fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man (fraus et dolus
nemini patrocinari debent).”
9.15. It may not be out of place in the present context to refer
to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Badami Vrs. Bhali, (2012) 11 SCC 574 to consider
the effect of withholding vital information. The said
Hon’ble Court held as follows:
“29. Presently, we shall refer as to how this Court has
dealt with concept of fraud. In S.B. Noronah Vrs.
Prem Kumari Khanna, (1980) 1 SCC 52 = AIR 1980
SC 193 while dealing with the concept of estoppel
and fraud a two-Judge Bench has stated that:
„20. It is an old maxim that estoppels are odious,
although considerable inroad into this maxim
has been made by modern law. Even so, „a
judgment obtained by fraud or collusion, even,
it seems, a judgment of the House of Lords,
may be treated as a nullity‟. (See Halsbury‟s
Laws of England, Vol. 16, 4th Edn., para
1553.) The point is that the sanction granted
under Section 21, if it has been procured by
fraud or collusion, cannot withstand invalidity
because, otherwise, high public policy will be
given as hostage to successful collusion.‟
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 31 of 51
30. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vrs. Jagannath, (1994)
1 SCC 1 this Court commenced the verdict with the
following words:
„1. „Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal‟ observed Chief Justice Edward Coke
of England about three centuries ago. It is the
settled proposition of law that a judgment
or decree obtained by playing fraud on the
court is a nullity and non est in the eye of
the law.
Such a judgment/decree— by the
first court or by the highest court— has to be
treated as a nullity by every court, whether
superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any
court even in collateral proceedings.‟
In the said case it was clearly stated that the courts
of law are meant for imparting justice between the
parties and one who comes to the court, must come
with clean hands.
31. A person whose case is based on falsehood has no
right to approach the court. A litigant who
approaches the court, is bound to produce all the
documents executed by him which are relevant to
the litigation. If a vital document is withheld in order
to gain advantage on the other side he would be
guilty of playing fraud on court as well as on the
opposite party.
32. In Shrisht Dhawan Vrs. Shaw Bros., (1992) 1 SCC
534 = AIR 1992 SC 1555 it has been opined that the
fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence.
It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit.
The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in
Roshan Deen Vrs. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 = AIR
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 32 of 51
2002 SC 33, Ram Preeti Yadav Vrs. U.P. Board of
High School and Intermediate Education, (2003) 8
SCC 311 and Ram Chandra Singh Vrs. Savitri Devi,
(2003) 8 SCC 319.
33. In State of A.P. Vrs. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6
SCC 149 after referring to the earlier decision this
Court observed as follows:
„16. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. Vrs. Beasley, (1956) 1
QB 702 = (1956) 2 WLR 502 = (1956) 1 All ER
341 Lord Denning observed at QB p. 712:
„… No judgment of a court, no order of a
minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been
obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.‟
In the same judgment Lord Parker, L.J. observed
that fraud
‘vitiates all transactions known to
the law of however high a degree of solemnity’
(Lazarus case, (1956) 1 QB 702 = (1956) 2 WLR 502
= (1956) 1 All ER 341, QB p. 722).‟
34. Yet in another decision Hamza Haji Vrs. State of
Kerala, (2006) 7 SCC 416 = AIR 2006 SC 3028 it
has been held that no court will allow itself to be
used as an instrument of fraud and no court, by
way of rule of evidence and procedure, can allow its
eyes to be closed to the fact it is being used as an
instrument of fraud. The basic principle is that a
party who secures the judgment by taking
recourse to fraud should not be enabled to
enjoy the fruits thereof.
*
38. All these reasonings are absolutely non-plausible
and common sense does not even remotely give
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 33 of 51
consent to them. It is fraudulent all the way. The
whole thing was buttressed on the edifice of fraud
and it needs no special emphasis to state that what
is pyramided on fraud is bound to decay. In this
regard we may profitably quote a statement by a
great thinker:
„Fraud generally lights a candle for justice to get a
look at it; and rogue‟s pen indicts the warrant for his
own arrest.‟ ”*
9.16. This Court does not find appropriate and specific
pleading in the revision petition to establish that there
was involvement of fraud element. No specific instance
or allegation/circumstance with material particular
being pleaded indicating the officials of the Tahasil were
influenced by the petitioners or their predecessor-in-
interest for making entries in the land records which in
the view of the Member, Board of Revenue was
erroneous and irregular. Rather from the Order dated
31.03.2003 of the Tahasildar in the Bebandobasta Case
it is discernible that on the basis of field enquiry report
being submitted to him and after Proclamation being
completed, the order in Bebandobasta case was passed.
This Court appreciates ground No.8 taken in the revision
petition based on which the opposite party No.5 sought
to modify the entries in the land records, which is as
follows:
“For that the order passed by the learned Tahasildar, is
contrary to law as Judgement passed in T.S.No.10 of
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 34 of 51
1974 in respect to the landed property settled illegally in
favour of Baidyanath Satapathy has not been dealt with,
hence the settlement is infructuous as it goes against the
decision of the Civil Court.”
9.17. Nevertheless, nothing is spelt out by Santosh Kumar
Satapathy before the revisional authority with respect to
permission granted in the Civil Suit No.19 of 2014. The
Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Badamba while
permitting withdrawal of suit granted leave to file suit on
self-same subject-matter (but not any other remedy).
Therefore, the revisional authorityw was required to
examine whether sufficient reason was placed on record
explaining (contradistinguished with the term "excuse")
the unusual time consumed in approaching the Board of
Revenue. It is also to be verified, therefore, by the
Member, Board of Revenue whether the matter agitated
in the revision comes within the scope of the Odisha
Estates Abolition Act, 1951, or the Odisha Survey and
Settlement Act, 1958, which would determine the
jurisdiction of the authority competent to carry out any
mistake or error crept in the recording of entries in the
land records. It is also necessary for the Member, Board
of Revenue to examine whether at this stage it is
apposite to unsettle the physical position and nature of
use of the land in question over these years.
10. Another facet which is arduously argued by Sri Bhaskar
Chandra Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioners
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 35 of 51
gains significance for delving into merit of the matter is
the plea of limitation.
10.1. Referring to copy of petition dated 25.03.2022 titled “An
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963”,
(Annexure-10) filed by Sri Santosh Kumar Satapathy
before the Member, Board of Revenue in connection with
Bebandobasta Revision Case No.1 of 2022, Sri Bhaskar
Chandra Panda, learned Advocate laid much emphasis
on the aspect that without condoning the delay in filing
the revision petition, the revisional authority erred in
deciding the matter on merit.
10.2. Furthermore on scrutiny of papers enclosed with the
writ petition, it is observed that in Mutation Case
No.4134 of 2019 filed by Santosh Kumar Satapathy-the
opposite party No.5, the Tahasildar, Badamba has
observed in record of proceeding dated 22.10.2020 that:
“This Case involves in the decree in Title Suit No.10/74
and Civil Suit No.19/2014 and CMA No.03/2017 in the
Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Badamba.
The petitioner submits that this CMA No.05/17 is only
intended to set aside an order of injunction in the C.S
No.19/14 and not the right, title, interest and possession
declared in C.S. No.10/1974. He further submitted that
the present proceeding relates to correction of record
where entitlement of such prayer is available in the
decree passed in C.S. No.10/1974 which is not ever
challenged or a question of title and possession is under
any dispute pending before any court and prayed for
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 36 of 51
correction of R.O.R as per the decree passed in T.S
No.10/74.
The learned advocate for the O.P. submits that the matter
in issue being sub judice in court of Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Badamba in CMA No.03/2017 as well as
Execution Case No.02/2016, the Case should not be
entertained. The decree passed in Title Suit No.10/74 is
barred by limitation since this case has been filed after 45
years. He has also relied on the recording of the Hal
settlement authority. He has further submitted that they
are in exclusive possession over the land and the order in
B.B Case No.912/2001 has also not been set side and
this court has no jurisdiction to set aside his own order
and prayed to dismiss the case.
Under the above premises, I am of the opinion that the
case land involves civil litigations and sub judice in the
Civil Court vide CMA No.05/2017 in Court of Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Badamba. It is a fact that a compromise
petition filed in Civil Suit No.10/1974 which corroborates
that Ac.0.006.½ out of Plot No.5962 has been left to be
used as passage from danda to his own' plot but this
court has limited jurisdiction to decide to fact in issue
while the matter is sub judice in the court of law. So the
fate of the case depends upon outcome of the decree the
come out CMA No.03/2017 in the Court of Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Badamba.
So, I am inclined to close the Case till disposal of the
CMA.”
10.3. Such factual scenario as described by the Tahasildar,
Badamba manifestly not to have been taken into
account by the Member, Board of Revenue. While
recording that the petitioners herein have suppressed
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 37 of 51
fact, the Member, Board of Revenue conveniently ignored
to notice that Sri Santosh Kumar Satapathy in the
revision petition has concealed the factum of withdrawal
of C.S. No.19 of 2014 before the Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Badamba. Order dated 17.05.2022 passed in
C.S. No.19 of 2014, runs as follows:
“The plaintiff files a petition under Order 23, Rule 1(3) of
the Code of Civil Procedure supported by an affidavit with
a prayer to withdraw the suit on the ground stated
therein. Copy served. Heard the learned counsel for the
plaintiff. The plaintiff does not want to proceed in this
case further more as the plaint wrongly filed this Court.
Perused the petition as well as case record. Taking into
consideration of submission of the learned counsel for the
plaintiff, I am to view the plaintiff is permitted to
withdraw the suit with liberty to file the fresh suit
in the self-same subject matter
.”
10.4. As it appears Sri Santosh Kumar Satapathy was granted
liberty to file fresh suit on the self-same subject matter,
but not to pursue matter before the Member, Board of
Revenue by way of invoking Section 38-B of the OEA Act.
By not mentioning about the reason for which
withdrawal of civil suit was permitted the Member,
Board of Revenue was misguided to look into the merit
of the revision against the Order dated 31.03.2003 of the
Tahasildar which was confirmed by the Sub-Collector
way back in the year 2004 by Order dated 09.08.2004.
Careful reading of Order dated 17.05.2022 passed in
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 38 of 51
Civil Suit No.19 of 2014 would show that permission
was granted for limited purpose, but not to widen the
horizon. The permission for withdrawal of suit granted
by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) was restricted to
filing of fresh suit on self-same subject-matter.
10.5. Be that be.
10.6. No limitation is prescribed under the OEA Act
restraining the Member, Board of Revenue to entertain
revision petition. However, dispute raised after a long
period is required to be considered by said authority
whether to entertain or not.
10.7. In this regard the view expressed by a coordinate Bench
of this Court in the case of Anadi Charan Sahoo Vs. State
of Odisha, 2020 (I) ILR-CUT 444 is considered significant.
It has been observed as follows:
There is no dispute that the impugned order under
“4.
Annexure-7 has been passed in exercise of the
power conferred under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act
which was about fifteen years after the passing of
the order by Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar in the
vesting case. The section clearly states that for the
purpose of satisfying itself regarding the regularity
of any proceeding in which any subordinate
authority has made any decision or passed an order
under the O.E.A. Act and also for verifying the
correctness, legality or propriety of the decision
taken by such subordinate authority, the Board of
Revenue can call for and examine the record of such
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 39 of 51
proceeding on its own motion or on a report
submitted by the Collector. If the revisional authority
feels that any decision or order passed by the
subordinate authority needs to be modified,
annulled or remitted, it may pass the order
accordingly which can be done only after giving
opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties.
In the case of: Sri Laxman Kanda Vs. State of
Odisha, 1991 (II) OLR 50 which was relied upon by
the learned counsel for the petitioners, taking into
account the fact that the petitioner in that case was
a tribal and he was in possession of the land since
1945 and since 1965 his sons were in possession of
the land, it was held that ordinarily a person who
has continued in possession for such length of time
is not to be disturbed even if he is not a tribal and
that more weightage is to be attached when the
person concerned is one such. The initiation of the
proceeding by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner
under section 12(3) of the Odisha Prevention of Land
Encroachment Act, 1972 against the petitioners in
the year 1983 was held to be erroneous in law and
accordingly quashed.
In the case of Mst. Surya Rana Vs. State of Odisha,
1996 (I) OLR 180 it is held that the legality of the
order passed by the Revenue Divisional
Commissioner in exercise of the power conferred
under Rule 38-A(2)(bb) read with Rule 38-A(10)(bb)
of the Odisha Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965
framed under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960
has to be tested on touchstone of reasonableness of
time. Even though no period of limitation is
prescribed, power has to be exercised in a
reasonable manner which inheres the concept that it
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 40 of 51
must be done within a reasonable time. Absence of a
provision prescribing a period of limitation is an
assurance to exercise the power with caution or
circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act,
or to prevent miscarriage of justice or misuse or
abuse of the power by lower authorities. It is true
that when benefit has been obtained by fraud, it
does not lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to
plead limitation to get away with the order. Lapse of
time is no excuse to refrain the authority exercising
statutory powers to unravel fraud and set the matter
right.
In the case of Labanyabati Devi Vs. Member, Board
of Revenue, 76 (1993) CLT 937, it is held that since
the learned Member, Board of Revenue exercised his
suo motu jurisdiction under Section 59(2) of the
Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960 after a lapse of
twelve years, it was held to be a case of
unreasonable delay and accordingly, the order
passed by learned Member was quashed.
A Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Nityananda Satpathy Vs. Member, Board of
Revenue, 1996 (II) OLR 262 held that the power of
the Board of Revenue under Section 38-B of the
O.E.A. Act to revise a decision or order of any
authority subordinate to it, has to be exercised in a
reasonable manner within a reasonable time and no
hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what
should be the reasonable time as each case has to
be decided on facts and circumstances peculiar to it.
In that case since the power under Section 38-B was
exercised more than a quarter of century, it was held
that during such long years, the lands might have
suffered transfer from one hand to another creating
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 41 of 51
new rights and liabilities amongst themselves and
unsettling a settled position in abject disregard of
consequences cannot be countenanced and
accordingly, the entire proceeding before the
Member, Board of Revenue was quashed on the
ground that the revisional authority failed to exercise
the power in a reasonable manner within a
reasonable time. The decision rendered by this Court
in Nityananda Satpathy‟s case was set aside on
some other grounds by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
Civil Appeal No.7670 of 1997 decided on
31.07.2003 which is reported in (2003) 7 Supreme
Court Cases 146 [State of Odisha Vrs. Nityananda
Satpathy].
In the case of State of Odisha Vs. Brundaban
Sharma, 1995 Supp.(3) SCC 249, a question arose
before the Hon‟ble Apex Court as to whether Board
of Revenue was justified in exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act after a lapse of
twenty seven years. The Hon‟ble Court held that
when the revisional power was conferred to
effectuate a purpose, it is to be exercised in a
reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its
exercise within a reasonable time. Absence of
limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with
caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose
of the Act or to prevent miscarriage of justice or
violation of the provisions of the Act or misuse or
abuse of the power by the lower authorities or fraud
or suppression. Length of time depends on the
factual scenario in a given case. It was further held
that it cannot be said that the Board of Revenue
exercised the power under Section 38-B after an
unreasonable lapse of time, though from the date of
grant of patta by the Tehsildar was of twenty seven
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 42 of 51
years. In the case of Ibrahimpatnam Taluk
Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham Vs. K. Suresh Reddy
and others reported in (2003) 7 Supreme Court
Cases 667, the Hon‟ble Apex Court had the occasion
to consider Section 50-B(IV) of the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Act, 1950, which provides that the Collector might
suo motu at any point of time, call for and examine
the record relating to any certificate issued or
proceedings taken by the Tahasildar under the
section for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the
legality or propriety of such certificate or as to the
regularity of such proceedings and pass such order
in relation as he may think fit. Exercise of suo motu
power at any time only means that no specific period
such as days, months or years are not prescribed
reckoning from a particular date but that does not
mean that at any time should be unguided and
arbitrary. In this view, at any time must be
understood as within a reasonable time depending
on the facts and circumstances of each case in the
absence of prescribed period of limitation.
In the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and
others Vs. Balasaheb Tukarm Shevale and others
reported in (2009) 9 Supreme Court Cases 352, the
Hon‟ble Apex Court held that it seems to be fairly
settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-
limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not
mean that such power can be exercised at any time;
rather it should be exercised within a reasonable
time. It is so because the law does not expect settled
things to be unsettled after a long lapse of time.
Where the legislature does not provide for any length
of time within which the power of revision is to be
exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 43 of 51
is plain that an exercise of such power within
reasonable time is inherent therein.
Thus the legal principle which is set out from the
above citations is that even though no period has
been prescribed for exercising the power under
Section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act, the revisional
authority has to exercise the same within a
reasonable time and that to in a reasonable manner.
It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case as to what would be the reasonable time. There
cannot be any hard and fast rule for that. However,
when fraud has been committed in obtaining an
order or the decision of the subordinate authority is
based on forged documents or there is suppression
of material facts or there is violation of the provision
of the Act, the revisional authority would be fully
justified in exercising its power under Section 38-B
at any point of time in order to prevent miscarriage
of justice or misuse or abuse of the power committed
by the subordinate authority in granting relief to any
party.”
10.8. In Madan Mohan Jena Vs. State of Odisha, 2016 SCC
OnLine Ori 359 it has been observed as follows:
Section 38-B of the Act provides that the Board of
“7.
Revenue may, on its own motion or on a report from
the Collector call for and examine the record of any
proceeding in which any authority subordinate to it
has made any decision or passed an order under
this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
regularity of such proceeding or the correctness,
legality or propriety of such decision or order.
Admittedly, fixation of fair rent under Section 8(1) of
the Act is an administrative order and the same is
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 44 of 51
not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Member,
Board of Revenue under Section 38-B of the Act. The
said view has been taken in the cases of Chandra
Sekhar Rath Vs. Collector, Dhenkanal, reported in
1988 (II) OLR 572 and State of Orissa Vs.
Baidyanath Jena, reported in 2013 (II) OLR 780.
But, when the OEA Collector usurps jurisdiction
conferred on him under Section 8(1) of the Act and
passes an order, the same shall be treated to be a
proceeding under the Act and Section 38-B of the Act
would be attracted. The Board of Revenue in
exercise of power conferred by Section 38-B of the
Act can test the veracity of the same. Thus, exercise
of power under Section 38-B depends upon the facts
and circumstances of each case and the nature of
the order passed under Section 8(1) of the Act.
Accordingly, initiation of the proceeding under
Section 38-B of the Act cannot be said to be wholly
without jurisdiction at the threshold. The conclusion
with regard to jurisdiction can be arrived at after
assessment of the facts involved and the nature of
the order passed in each case. Further, there is no
dispute to the settled law that when the land is
settled under the lease principles as per the
Government instruction extending the time to make
an application for settlement of the land already
vested in Government, the same cannot be treated to
be a settlement under the Act. (See 1988 (I) OLR
520). Thus, Section 38-B of the Act cannot have any
application since the settlement in question was not
under the provisions of the said Act. (See 63 (1987)
CLT 526). The petitioners claim that the balance
Ac.1.31 decimal of land out of the case land was
settled in their favour by way of lease in O.E.A.
Case No. 2045 of 1970 by order dated 16.04.1973
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 45 of 51
(Annexure-7). Perusal of Annexure-7 reveals that the
said proceeding was initiated pursuant to an
application under Sections 6, 7 and 8(3) of the Act by
the petitioners. Though Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior
Advocate submitted that the said application was
filed by the petitioners in terms of provisions made
in G.O. No. 14399/R dated 02.03.1964, no material
is available on record in support of the same. On the
other hand, order sheet under Annexure-7 reveals a
different state of affairs. Nomenclature of an
application, of course, is not material for
consideration. It is the subject matter of the petition
and prayer made therein are the guiding factor for
consideration of an application. In the facts and
circumstances and more particularly in absence of
sufficient material on record to reach at a conclusion,
the Member Board of Revenue, before whom the
revision is pending should examine the matter in
detail.
8. Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the
petitioners vehemently argued that initiation of the
proceeding under Section 38-B of the Act suffers
from delay and latches. He submitted that no period
of limitation has been provided for initiation of a
proceeding under Section 38-B of the Act. However,
it should be within a reasonable time and period of
40 years and 37 years cannot, at all, by no stretch
of imagination, be said to be a reasonable period
under Section 38-B of the Act. He verily relied upon
the decision of this Court in the case of Nityananda
Satpathy Vs. Member, Board of Revenue, reported in
1996 (II) OLR 262, wherein it has been held that no
time limit is fixed to initiate a proceeding under
Section 38-B of the Act, but the power should be
exercised in a reasonable manner within a
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 46 of 51
reasonable time which depends on facts and
circumstances of each case. It should not be done
arbitrarily. Similar view has also been taken in the
decision in the cases of Labanybati Devi Vs.
Member, Board of Revenue, reported in 1993 (II) OLR
365 and Smt. Parbati Mohapatra Vs. State of
Odisha, reported in 2014 (I) OLR 825. He also relied
upon the decision in the case of Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs.
T.T. Murali Babu, AIR 2014 SC 1141, wherein the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court at paragraph-16 held as
follows:
„16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should
not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is
required to weigh the explanation offered and
the acceptability of the same. The court should
bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a
constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to
keep itself alive to the primary principle that
when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure
or pleasure, the Court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may
not be fatal but in most circumstances
inordinate delay would only invite disaster for
the litigant who knocks at the doors of the
Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on
the part of a litigant— a litigant who has
forgotten the basic norms, namely,
“procrastination is the greatest thief of time”
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 47 of 51
and second, law does not permit one to sleep
and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in
hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case
at hand, though there has been four years'
delay in approaching the court, yet the writ
court chose not to address the same. It is the
duty of the court to scrutinize whether such
enormous delay is to be ignored without any
justification. That apart, in the present case,
such belated approach gains more significance
as the respondent-employee being absolutely
careless to his duty and nurturing a
lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had
remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext
of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost
of repetition that remaining innocuously
oblivious to such delay does not foster the
cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in
injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such
delay may have impact on others' ripened
rights and may unnecessarily drag others into
litigation which in acceptable realm of
probability, may have been treated to have
attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons - who
compete with „Kumbhakarna‟ or for that matter
„Rip Van Winkle‟. In our considered opinion,
such delay does not deserve any indulgence
and on the said ground alone the writ court
should have thrown the petition overboard at
the very threshold.‟
9. He also relied upon the decision in the case of Jt.
Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist. Vs. D. Narsing Rao,
2015 SC 1021, wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
at paragraph-24 held as follows:
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 48 of 51
„24. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional
jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions
or transactions were to remain forever open to
challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless
uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the
policy of law. Because, even when there is no
period of limitation prescribed for exercise of
such powers, the intervening delay, may have
led to creation of third party rights, that cannot
be trampled by a belated exercise of a
discretionary power especially when no cogent
explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of
law it is said must run closely with the rule of
life. Even in cases where the orders sought to
be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power
must be within a reasonable period of the
discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or
transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the
time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise
the exercise of revisional power would itself be
tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that
vests such power in an authority.‟
10. The aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court set out a guideline for consideration
of issue of limitation. Further, in the case of State of
Orissa Vs. Brundaban Sharma, 1995 Supp(3) SCC
249, it has been held that revisional power conferred
on the Board of Revenue under Section 38-B of the
Act should be exercised in a reasonable manner
which inheres the concept of exercising power within
a reasonable time. Absence of limitation is an
assurance to exercise the power with caution or
circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act.
Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a
given case. Thus, the question of limitation, which is
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 49 of 51
necessarily an issue involving mixed questions of
fact and law, has be scrutinized taking into
consideration the aforesaid guidelines set out by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court.”
10.9. This Court finds no sufficient material in the pleading
available in the revision petition filed before the Member,
Board of Revenue to establish element of “fraud” or
alleged influence being exerted by the petitioners on the
officials of the Tahasil compelling them to act contrary to
report and material available on record. While disposing
of revision petition, the Member, Board of Revenue in his
order failed to apply conscientious mind to scrutiny the
involvement of the writ petitioners or their predecessor-
in-interest in influencing any of the officials of the
Tahasil. The impugned Order dated 06.05.2025 in
Bebandobasta Revision Case No.01 of 2022 is silent with
respect to analysis of material facts based on evidence to
prove fraud by the parties. Consequent upon above
discussion with legal perspicuity, the order of the
Member, Board of Revenue deserves to be interfered
with.
Conclusion:
11. Given the factual scenario and on the afore-discussed
legal perspective coupled with reasons ascribed hitherto,
this Court finds the Order dated 06.05.2025 in
Bebandobasta Revision Case No.1 of 2022 passed by the
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 50 of 51
Member, Board of Revenue untenable and cannot be
countenanced in law.
12. Ergo , Order dated 06.05.2025 in Bebandobasta Revision
Case No.1 of 2022 passed by the Member, Board of
Revenue (Annexure-1) is hereby set aside and the matter
is, thus, remitted to the Member, Board of Revenue to
take a decision on the revision petition along with the
petition dated 25.03.2022 (Annexure-11) afresh after
affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the
affected parties taking into account the legal position as
discussed above. It is also desirable that the Member,
Board of Revenue shall also consider the maintainability
of the revision proceeding under Section 38-B of the
Signature Not
Verified
OEA Act. Accordingly, the writ petition, being W.P.(C)
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR
SETHY
Designation: Personal
Assistant (Secretary-in-charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH
COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 04-Nov-2026 18:55:50
No.15621 of 2025, stands allowed to the extent indicated
above and pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, is
also disposed of, but in the circumstances, there shall be
no order as to costs.
(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
JUDGE
D R . S ANJEEB K P ANIGRAHI , I agree.
J.—
(Dr. SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI)
JUDGE
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
th
The 04 November, 2026//Aswini/ Bichi/Laxmikant
WP(C) No.15621 of 2025 Page 51 of 51