Jitendra @ Jitu Niansingh Gehlot vs Union Of India & Anr
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 01.09.2026
Pronounced on: 17.11.2026
Uploaded on: 17.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC014761502017
+ W.P.(CRL) 3053/2017 & CRL.M.A. 17911/2017
JITENDRA @ JITU NAINSINGH GEHLOT .....Petitioner
Through: Mr.Rajshekar Rao, Sr Adv. with
Ms.Shreya Rastogi, Mr.Mihir
Samson, Ms.Moulika Diwakar,
Ms.Tavleen Kaur Saluja,
Ms.Vishaka Gupta, Ms.Anandita
Rana, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR .....Respondents
Through: Mr.Vikram Jetly, CGSC with
Ms.Shreya Jetly, Adv. for UOI.
Mr.Sunil Kumar Singh, Under
Secretary, MHA.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
J U D G M E N T
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as, Cr.P.C.), seeking, inter
alia , the following reliefs:
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“a. Issue an appropriate writ declaring the
condition imposed by the order of the
President of India barring further remission by
any authority to be unconstitutional and bad in
law;
b. Commute the sentence imposed upon the
Petitioner to life imprisonment subject to
remission powers available to the appropriate
government under the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 and relevant provisions of the
applicable prison rules and the Constitution of
India;
c. Quash letter dated 15.10.2016 issued by the
Superintendent, Nagpur Central Jail in so far
as it imposes a condition barring the
possibility of remission upon the Petitioner
d. Quash aside letter bearing no. 14/7/2004
(Judicial Cell) dated 5.10.2016 issued by the
Ministry of Home Affairs in so far as it bars
the possibility of remission to the Petitioner”
BACKGROUND OF FACTS
2. The challenge of the petitioner is to the decision dated
18.09.2016 of the Hon‟ble President of India, commuting the death
sentence of the petitioner to one of life imprisonment, with a caveat
that “ prisoner, Jeetendra alias Jitu Nainsingh Gehlot shall remain in
prison for the whole of the remainder of his natural life and there shall
be no further remission of the term of his imprisonment for life by any
authority”. The said decision was communicated to him vide letter
dated 15.10.2016, issued by the Superintendent, Nagpur Central Jail.
3. The petitioner, along with the co-accused, namely, Narayan
Chetanram Chaudhary, faced trial for the ghastly murders of five
innocent women, one of whom was pregnant, and two children, aged
one and a half years and two and a half years, respectively. The case of
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the prosecution was summarized by the Supreme Court in its
judgment in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457, as under:
“4. The prosecution case, as revealed from
the investigation and official report filed in the
Court, is that complainant Sanjay Rathi (PW1)
along with his father Keshrimal Rathi, his
mother, deceased Meerabai Rathi, his younger
sister, deceased Km Preeti, his wife, deceased
Babita and his son, deceased Chirag were
residing in Flat No.6 on the second floor of
Himanshu Apartment, Shilavihar
Colony, Puad Phata, Kothrud, Pune. One of
the daughters of Keshrimal Rathi, deceased
Hemlata was married to Shri Shrikant
Navandhar, PW15 in the year 1992 and had
come to her parents‟ house along with her son
on the fateful day. Raju Rajpurohit who was
Accused 3 and later after becoming approver
appeared as PW2, a resident of Muklava
District, Ganganagar, Rajasthan after passing
th
11 standard examination in the year 1993-94
came to his elder brother Kalyan Singh at
Pune for the purposes of getting further
education while working or serving there. He
was employed in Bombay Vihar situated at
Laxmi Road, Pune since June 1994. Accused 1
and Accused 2 were also working at the said
Bombay Vihar during the aforesaid period as
Cook and Counter Salesman respectively. After
being acquainted with each other, all the three
became friends. Raju, PW2 was removed from
Bombay Vihar on 8-6-1994 whereafter he got
the service at Sagar Sweet Mart owned by
Keshrimal Rathi and his son Sanjay Rathi
(complainant). In the course of his
employment he used to go to the house of
Rathis to bring chappatis for servants of the
shop daily and thus acquainted himself with
the family members of the complainant as also
their maidservant. Raju worked with the
Rathis for about two to two and a half months.
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When his request for enhancement of salary
was declined by the Rathis, he left their
service. At this time Accused 2 went to him and
informed that he too has left the job at Bombay
Vihar and, therefore, Raju should talk to his
employer to keep Jitu in their service. Raju
requested Sanjay Rathi to employ Accused 2
but as he demanded a salary of Rs 1200,
Sanjay Rathi expressed his inability to provide
him the job. Meanwhile Raju learnt that
Accused 1 has also left the job at Bombay
Vihar. Thereafter all the three went to a room
in Nagpur Chawl in which Accused 1 was
residing and started living there.
5. After being rendered jobless and the
limited amount they had with them being
spent, they started thinking about their future.
They hatched a conspiracy and made up a
plan of robbing the house of some “seth” i.e. a
businessman. On the night of 23-08-1994 they
decided to commit theft/robbery at the house of
Rathis. Accused 1 told the other accused that
before committing the theft/robbery they have
to make some further preparations. He
suggested to purchase a knife because all the
inmates of the house were to be killed so that
no one could depose anything against them.
They also decided to sprinkle chilly powder in
the mouth and eyes of their victims to
immobilise them for easy killings by the
accused. On 24-08-1994 all the accused
persons discussed the details of the plan to
commit the theft and killings at the house of
Rathis. Accused 2 agreed to sell his silver
anklet and out of its sale proceeds to purchase
a new knife. They went to the shop of
Shrinagar Jewellers on 24-08-1994 in the
evening. Accused 2 requested the proprietor of
the shop to purchase his said silver anklet. As
Accused 2 was not having the purchase receipt
of his anklet, the shopkeeper refused to
purchase it. However, as the accused persons
were then residing at Nagpur Chawl which
was adjacent to the Shrinagar Jewellers‟ shop,
the anklet was kept as pledge and they were
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given a sum of Rs. 90 as loan. They went to the
shop of Jaswant (PW5) and purchased one
utility knife of Fiscer-make (art. 147) for Rs
55.
6. On 25-08-1994 at about 11 a.m. to 12
noon, the accused persons went towards the
house of Rathis to observe the situation. They
stayed and surveyed the said area and found
that the area remained isolated during 2.00
p.m. to 4.00 p.m. They decided to commit the
act of theft after killing all the persons,
whosoever were found at the house of Rathis
during the aforesaid period only.
7. On 26-08-1994 at about 8.45 a.m. the
complainant Sanjay Rathi is stated to have left
his house for his shop. Thereafter Hemlata,
deceased with her husband and son arrived at
the house of Rathis in connection with tying
rakhi to her brother PW1 as she had not come
for the said purpose on the day of Rakhi,
Poornima Festival on 21-08-1994. Sanjay
Rathi, PW1 came to his house at about 1 p.m.
to 1.30 p.m. on his motorcycle. Sanjay and his
brother-in-law Shri Shrikant Navandhar,
PW15 took their meals and went to the
complainant‟s shop. Accused persons left their
room at about 12 noon for going to the house
of Rathis. Accused 1 was armed with the new
knife and Accused 2 with the old one. They had
taken with them chilli powder regarding which
decision had already been taken, as according
to them its throwing in the eyes of victims
would have facilitated the commission of the
crime. They reached near the house of Rathis
at about 2 p.m. They saw one motorcycle kept
near the said building which was identified by
Raju, PW2 as belonging to Sanjay Rathi,
PW1. Realising that Sanjay Rathi, PW 1 was
at his house, they returned to the main road
and watched. After about one hour they again
returned near the building of Rathis. After
noticing that the motorcycle of Sanjay Rathi
was not there, they decided to execute their
plan. Accused 1 told Accused 3 (PW2) to go
ahead into the house of Rathis and start
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talking with the family members in respect of
his service and by that time they would reach
there after chaining the doors of other flats in
the said building from outside. After the doors
of all other flats were chained from outside,
Raju (PW2) went to the flat of Rathis. He
found that the door of the flat was half-open
and when he peeped into the said flat he saw
the maidservant, deceased Satyabhamabai
Sutar cleaning the floor with the water. He
entered the flat and the appellants followed
him. Appellant Jitu closed the door from
inside.
8. Accused 2 Jitu threw chilli powder on
the inmates of the flat who had collected into
the hall on hearing the call made by the
maidservant. All the inmates were wade to
keep quite and surrender to the orders of the
accused persons lest they may be deprived of
their lives with the knives which the appellants
had in their hands. The family members of
Rathis were taken to different rooms in the flat.
9. Realising that the middle-aged woman
Meerabai, who had raised her voice, was the
lady of the house, Accused 1 promptly asked
her about the valuables. Seeing a knife in his
hand and realising the danger to her life as
also the lives of the rest of the members of the
family she immediately pointed out a finger
towards an almirah inside the room. Accused 1
and 2 took her to the said room. Accused 2
handed over the packet containing the
remaining chilli powder to Raju, PW2 and
directed him to sprinkle it on the victims if they
started shouting or made any other effort.
10. Smt. Meerabai was done to death with
the knife-blows inflicted by Accused 1 and was
left to lie on bed where she died. Thereafter
Babita @ Nita was taken to another room,
apparently for getting the valuables and was
killed by Accused 1 by inflicting knife injuries
on her person. Her son Chirag was also
likewise killed by the aforesaid accused. Raju,
PW2, took Preeti into the bathroom at the
instance of Accused 1 who cut a length of wire
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of the washing machine and used it to choke
her to death, who, however, survived. When
they came out of the bathroom, they heard
some noise from the bathroom which prompted
Accused 1 to go again inside. In the bathroom
he found Preeti alive and told his other
colleagues that “she was still alive and had
not died”. To accomplish the conspiracy
hatched he gave knife-blows to her which
resulted in her death. Raju, PW2 took
Satyabhamabai Sutar in the kitchen where the
Accused 1 had already reached and was
washing the bloodstained knife. Raju held
Satyabhamabai Sutar and Accused 1 gave
knife-blows resulting in her death. Thereafter
Raju and Accused 1 went towards a room
where the married daughter of Rathis was held
up by Accused 2. Pratik, her son was tried to
be taken from her, which she resisted. Accused
2 assured her that he will not kill the child but
will give him to his grandmother and
threatened that if the child was not given to
him, he will kill the child. Hemlata was also
killed by inflicting knife injuries. Accused 2
and Raju, PW2 took the child into the room
where Meerabai was lying dead in the pool of
blood. The child was suffocated by gagging
and when his movements stopped, the Accused
2 put down the child on the floor saying he had
died. Accused 2 and Raju, PW2 then came out
and joined Accused 1 who was standing before
Hemlata. Upon enquiry about the child she
was told by Accused 2 that the child had been
given to her grandmother. Accused 1 then
caught hold of Hemlata who put up some
resistance and in the process fell down.
Accused 2 gave her blows by putting his knees
on her stomach and when she was immobilised
this way, Accused 1 gave her knife-blows on
her neck with the result she also died.
11. Almirahs found in the flat were emptied
to the extent the accused could put articles and
other cash and valuables in the air bag
obtained from the said flat. Before leaving the
scene of occurrence Accused 1 changed his
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pant which was bloodstained and also put on
him khaki jerkin clothes which were available
in the house. Accused 2 helped himself to a
black shirt. Bloodstained clothes of Accused 2
were put in the air bag along with the stolen
articles. At the time when they were about to
leave the flat, the phone installed therein
started ringing. Accused 1 cut the telephone
wires with his knife. At this stage they heard
the cries of child from the room where
Meerabai was lying dead. All of them went
inside and found that the child Pratik had not
died. Despite the death spree caused, they did
not think, even to leave that child alive.
Accused 2 took the knife from Accused 1 and
gave blows to the child and killed him.
12. After completing the crime of
theft/robbery and murders, the accused
persons came out of the house with the air bag
in which they had kept the bloodstained
clothes, knives and stolen property. Vishwajit
Joshi, PW 9 saw accused persons coming out
of the compound wall of the Himanshu
Apartments concerned where the flat of the
Rathis was located. On the road they boarded
a rickshaw and came back to their room in
Nagpur Chawl.
13. As noticed earlier, Sanjay Rathi, PW1,
his brother-in-law Shrikant Navandhar
(PW15) had left the flat before the accused
attacked the victims. Both of them went back to
the house of Rathis by 6.45 p.m. Sanjay Rathi,
PW1 rang the doorbell and as nobody opened
the door, he made inquiries from Smt Khara
and Smt Dhade as to whether the key of the
door of his flat was kept at their houses. On
getting reply in the negative, Sanjay Rathi
made inquiries from his relatives and family
members by making phone calls from the
house of Mrs Khara as to whether his family
members had gone there and on receiving the
information in the negative he telephoned his
father at the shop. His father told him that
nobody from the family members had come to
the shop nor did he receive any message from
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them. Sanjay Rathi went to the shop and
brought the duplicate key. Meanwhile Damu
Sutar, the husband of the maidservant had also
come there. Sanjay Rathi, PW1 opened the
door with the duplicate key in the presence of
Shrikant Navandhar PW15, Damu Sutar and
Smt Sharmila Dhade. Upon entering in the flat
they saw the maidservant Satyabhamabai
Sutar lying dead in a pool of blood. They
rushed out crying and saying that the police be
called. On hearing the cries of the
complainant Sanjay Rathi, the neighbours and
passers-by got collected in front of the
building. Two of the neighbours went to
Kothrud Police Station and informed the
police that several persons had gathered in
front of the Apartment in which the flat of
Rathis was situated. Entry about the
information was recorded in the station diary
whereafter PI Vikram Pawar along with his
staff rushed to the Apartment building. The
said Shri Vikram Pawar along with Sanjay
Rathi, PW1 and Shrikant Navandhar, PW15
entered the flat and saw the maidservant
Satyabhamabai Sutar, Preeti, Meerabai,
Pratik, Babita, Hemlata and Chirag lying
dead in pools of blood in the kitchen,
bathroom, bedroom and the store of the flat of
Rathis. The almirahs were found open. Sanjay
Rathi was asked to verify the purportedly
stolen articles. Sanjay Rathi was not in a
condition to check the articles on account of
the shock received after having seen the dead
bodies all around in his flat. However, after
the passage of sometime and consolation by
Vikram Pawar, Sanjay Rathi told the police
that cash of Rs 85,000 besides gold and silver
ornaments was missing.
14. Meanwhile, after reaching Nagpur
Chawl, where the accused persons were
residing, Accused 2 asked PW 2 Raju to bring
liquor and some edibles for which he was
given Rs 200. The air bag was opened in
which they had kept their bloodstained clothes,
mouth organ, knives, camera, one bundle of
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Rs500 denomination currency notes, one
bundle of Rs 100 denomination currency notes,
one bundle of Rs 50 denomination currency
notes and bundles of Rs 10 denomination,
besides gold and silver ornaments. Raju kept
for himself a mouth organ, camera and a
ladies‟ wristwatch of Rico-make as also some
coins of Nepal origin. Mangalsutra and one
HMT watch was taken away by Accused 1.
Golden chain, three golden bangles and one
golden ring, having S.R. written on it, were
taken away by Accused 2.
15. Raju, PW2 was asked by Accused 1 to
wash the bloodstained clothes. While washing
the pant of Accused 1 Raju found one gold ring
in the pocket which he took out and kept with
him. As he could not wash the bloodstained
clothes of Accused 1 he put back the ring in
the pocket of the pant which was later on
concealed in the tin roof. The accused
thereafter went to the jewellery shop where the
silver anklet was pledged. After making the
payment they got the silver anklet released. On
reaching back in the room in the Nagpur
Chawl, they consumed the liquor brought by
PW2 and moved around the area for about an
hour or so. Again coming back to the said
room, Accused 1 declared that he will go and
hide the knives. He went away and on his
return, upon inquiry, he told that the knives
were hidden near the latrine.
16. On the next day at the instance of
Accused 1 Raju brought newspapers Prabhat
and Aaj ka Anand wherein the incident of
murders and dacoity was reported without
indicating the identity of the accused persons.
In the afternoon they purchased the evening
newspaper Sandayanad which carried further
details of the incident and mentioned the name
of Accused 2 being probably responsible for
the crime. After reading such news-item they
agreed to part company and to meet at
Ahmedabad on 29-8-1994. They met at
Ahmedabad and again dispersed. Accused 1
was arrested on 5-9-1994, Accused 2 on 21-
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11-1994 and Raju, PW2 on 15-10-1994 from
different places in Rajasthan. They made
disclosure statements consequent to which
various articles were recovered vide
panchanamas prepared in accordance with
law. In the identification parades they were
identified by various witnesses.”
4. In the above narration of the case of the prosecution, the
petitioner herein is the Accused No. 2.
5. The petitioner was charged with the offences punishable under
Sections 120-B; Section 302 read with Section 120-B and, in the
alternative, under Section 302 read with Section 34; under Sections
302 and 342 read with Section 120-B and, in the alternative, under
Section 342 read with 34; under Section 397 read with Section 120-B
and, in the alternative, under Section 397 read with Sections 392 and
34; under Section 449 read with Section 120-B and, in the alternative,
under Section 449 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
(hereinafter referred to as, „IPC‟).
6. The petitioner was thereafter convicted by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Pune (hereinafter referred to as, „Trial
Court‟), vide the judgment of conviction dated 19.02.1998 passed in
Sessions Case no. 462/1994, for the offences under Sections 302,
302/120-B, 120-B, 397/120-B, 449/120-B and 342/34 of the IPC.
7. The order on sentence dated 23.02.1998 was then passed by the
learned Trial Court. Finding no mitigating circumstances in favour of
the petitioner, noting the absence of any remorse on the part of the
petitioner for committing the offences, and taking into consideration
the aggravating circumstances, the learned Trial Court observed that
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the petitioner was not entitled to any concession on account of his age,
and imposed the following sentences on the petitioner, with a direction
that the sentences were to run concurrently:
Sr.
No.
Offence Substantive
Sentence
Fine Sentence in
default of
payment of fine
1. Section 302, Section
Death Rs. 10,000/- Rigorous
Imprisonment for
3 years
302 read with 120-B
and Section 120-B of
the IPC
2. Section 397 read
Rigorous
Imprisonment
for 7 years
Rs. 5,000/- Rigorous
Imprisonment for
2 years
with Section 120-B of
the IPC
3. Section 449 read
Rigorous
Imprisonment
for 7 years
Rs. 5,000/- Rigorous
Imprisonment for
2 years
with Section 120-B of
the IPC
4. Section 342 read
Rigorous
Imprisonment
for 1 year
Rs. 500/- Rigorous
Imprisonment for
1 month
with Section 34 of the
IPC
8. The petitioner, along with the co-accused, thereafter preferred
appeals before the Bombay High Court, being Criminal Appeal Nos.
415 and 462 of 1998, challenging the said judgment of conviction and
the order on sentence passed by the learned Trial Court. However, vide
the judgment dated 22.07.1999, that is, The State of Maharashtra v.
Narayanram Chetanram Chaudhary & Ors., 1999 SCC OnLine Bom
859, the Bombay High Court dismissed the said appeals. The High
Court also answered in the affirmative the reference by the learned
Trial Court for confirmation of the petitioner‟s death sentence,
observing as under:
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“231. In the background of the last two cases,
if the case before us is considered, in our
opinion, none of the circumstances noted in
those cases are to be found here. The evidence
has been thoroughly discussed by the Trial
Court. While considering the aspect of the
corroboration, we too have done so to the
extent necessary. The circumstances that have
been narrated above clearly suggest that the
crime was definitely for gain.
232. The Accused did gain out of It. Whatever
little that the Police have recovered is before
the Court by way of articles. For the rest, there
is nothing on record. Killing of adult as
possible witnesses can be explained away by
the Accused but the manner in which each of
them were dealt with several blows coupled
with cruelty done to the children which was
totally wanton and senseless, and blows given
in the stomach of a pregnant woman, who has
been inflicted a fatal wound, if all taken
together along with the position culled out
from the various judicial pronouncements
referred to above, in our opinion, there is no
escape from coming to the conclusion that they
fall in the category of the rarest of rare case.
233. We, therefore, answer the reference for
confirmation in the affirmative and direct that
the sentence be carried out in accordance with
law. Both the appeals filed by the respective
Accused are dismissed.”
9. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner, along with the co-accused,
filed appeals before the Supreme Court, being, Criminal Appeal nos.
25-26/2000, however, the said appeals were dismissed by the Supreme
Court vide order dated 05.09.2000, thereby upholding the conviction
and sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court and confirmed by the
High Court of Bombay. The Supreme Court in Narayan Chetanram
Chaudhary (supra), held as under:
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“45. After going through whole of the
evidence, perusing the record, thoughtfully
considering the submissions made before us
and before the Trial Court as well as the High
Court, we have come to an unmistakable
conclusion that the present case is one of the
rarest of rare cases warranting the extreme
penalty imposable by law. The case of the
appellant 2 Jitu is not distinguishable. But for
his active participation in the conspiracy and
its execution, Accused 1 could not have
succeeded in committing the murder of six
persons including a pregnant woman and a
teenaged child. The manner in which Jitu,
Appellant 2 committed the murder of Pratik is
not only ghastly but reflects his beast-like
mental attitude. The appellants do not deserve
any sympathy from the law and the society.”
10. The petitioner, along with the co-accused, then filed a Review
Petition, being, Review Petition (Criminal) Nos. 1139-1140/2000,
before the Supreme Court. The same was also dismissed by the
Supreme Court vide the order dated 24.11.2000, observing therein that
no ground existed to review the imposed sentence.
11. A Mercy Petition dated 27.06.2001 was then submitted by the
petitioner before the Hon‟ble President of India through the Yerawada
Central Prison, Pune, Maharashtra. However, no response was
received by the petitioner on his Mercy Petition, accordingly, he sent a
letter dated 02.11.2004 through one advocate, Mr. Vikramaditya Rai,
to the Hon‟ble President, again seeking mercy and commutation of his
death sentence to life imprisonment.
12. The said letter was received by the Ministry of Home Affairs
(hereinafter referred to as, „MHA‟) through the President Secretariat
vide Note No. 15(9)/2004-CA II dated 10.11.2004, and was forwarded
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to the Home Department, Government of Maharashtra, vide letter
No.F.Dy No. 1245/2004-JUDL. CELL, dated 23.12.2004, asking
whether the Mercy Petition of the petitioner had been considered by
the Hon‟ble Governor of the State under Article 161 of the
Constitution of India and, if so, requesting that the decision thereon,
along with the details, be communicated to the MHA.
13. On 18.03.2006, the Home Department, Government of
Maharashtra informed the MHA that the petitioner has not submitted
any Mercy Petition under Article 161 of the Constitution of India to
the Hon‟ble Governor or to the State Government.
14. In response thereto, by a letter No. 14/7/2004-Jud.Cell, dated
23.03.2006, the MHA informed the State Government that a Mercy
Petition is required to be first considered by the Hon‟ble Governor
under Article 161 of the Constitution of India and, in the event of
rejection of the Mercy Petition by the Hon‟ble Governor, the same is
to be forwarded to the MHA along with the necessary records of the
case, for consideration and decision of the Hon‟ble President. Taking a
note of the fact that the Mercy Petition of the petitioner herein had
been directly addressed to the Hon‟ble President, the MHA forwarded
it to the Government of Maharashtra for consideration by the Hon‟ble
Governor. It was also requested that the decision of the Hon‟ble
Governor be conveyed to the MHA urgently, so as to avoid any undue
delay.
15. Subsequently, reminders dated 10.07.2006, 06.05.2008,
24.09.2009 and 20.03.2013 were also sent by the MHA to the State
Government in this regard.
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16. Thereafter, on 26.02.2013, a letter was issued by the
Government of Maharashtra to the MHA, informing it that, due to a
fire in the Ministry on 21.06.2012, the documents and files relating to
certain prisoners, including the petitioner herein, were destroyed, and
requesting for copies of the records of such prisoners.
17. On 01.04.2013, a letter was issued by the Government of
Maharashtra to the Additional Director General of Police, and
Inspector General Prisons, seeking copies of all the relevant
documents pertaining to the petitioner‟s Mercy Petition.
18. Subsequently, on 14.02.2014, another letter was issued by the
MHA to the Government of Maharashtra regarding the petitioner‟s
Mercy Petition, highlighting therein that a delay of about 10 years had
already been caused by the State Government without any
justification. It was also requested that the decision of the Governor of
Maharashtra, along with the judgments, nominal report, health reports
and other records of the petitioner be forwarded to the Ministry, within
21 days of the receipt of the letter, for submission of the case to the
Hon‟ble President.
19. It is at this stage that the Hon‟ble Governor of Maharashtra
rejected the petitioner‟s Mercy Petition on 15.03.2014. The
Government of Maharashtra, on 02.04.2014, informed the MHA that
the Hon‟ble Governor had rejected the Mercy Petition of the
petitioner, and requested the Ministry to communicate the same, along
with the file, to the Hon‟ble President for a decision.
20. It is the case of the petitioner that no intimation of the same was
provided to him at the time of such rejection. He, in fact, became
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aware of the same only by the letter dated 22.11.2016, received in
response to an application filed by him under the Right to Information
Act, 2005 on 03.11.2016, wherein he was informed that the Hon‟ble
Governor had rejected his Mercy Petition as the Deputy IGP and
Minister for Home had recommended that the petitioner‟s Mercy
Petition be rejected and the said recommendation had also been
endorsed by the Hon‟ble Chief Minister.
21. Coming back to passing of the buck taking place between the
MHA and the State Government, on 21.05.2014, the MHA asked the
State Government to convey the decision of the Government on the
Mercy Petition of the co-convict, namely, Narayan Chetanram
Chaudhary, so that the two cases may be considered together.
Reminders were also sent in July, August and September, 2014 in this
regard, however, MHA claims that to avoid further delay, the Mercy
Petition of the petitioner herein was processed further.
22. On 14.07.2015/23.07.2015, the Hon‟ble Home Minister
recommended rejection of petitioner‟s Mercy Petition, observing that
it was devoid of merits and that the petitioner did not deserve any
compassion warranting commutation of his death sentence. A detailed
note in this regard was directed to be sent to the Hon‟ble President for
consideration.
23. The OSD to the Hon‟ble President, however, sought a
clarification on the applicability of the criteria of delay, as laid down
by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Shatrughan Chauhan &
Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 1. Accordingly, on
12.08.2015, the State Government was again asked by the MHA to
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clarify the reasons for the delay in consideration of the petitioner‟s
Mercy Petition. Response dated 29.09.2015 was received thereto by
the MHA, whereafter only the file with comments of the MHA was
sent to the Hon‟ble President for his opinion.
24. Hon‟ble President, vide letter dated 01.01.2016 of the OSD to
the President, desired that in view of the delay in deciding the Mercy
Petition of the petitioner herein, the MHA should obtain the opinion of
the Attorney General of India regarding the applicability of the ratio of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan & Anr.
(supra) and to thereafter re-submit the file. The file was, accordingly,
referred to the Ministry of Law and Justice on 07.01.2016 for the
opinion of the learned Attorney General.
25. The learned Attorney General tendered his opinion on
11.02.2016, stating that there was „ huge unexplained delay in the
instant case, at every stage ‟. In view of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), it was recommended that a
case for commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment was
made out. The Hon‟ble Home Minister, however, disagreed with the
opinion and recommended rejection of the Mercy Petition, vide office
noting dated 07.03.2016.
26. The Mercy Petition, along with the two differing opinions, was
thereafter submitted to the President‟s Secretariat on 18.03.2016.
27. The Hon‟ble President of India, on 18.09.2016, disposed of the
Mercy Petition of the petitioner, commuting the death sentence of the
petitioner to life imprisonment, however, with a condition that the
petitioner “shall remain in prison for the whole of the remainder of his
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natural life and there shall be no further remission of the term of his
imprisonment for life by any authority ”. The decision was
communicated to the petitioner vide the letter dated 15.10.2016, issued
by the Superintendent, Nagpur Central Jail.
28. Aggrieved by the said conditional acceptance of his Mercy
Petition, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
THE PETITIONER
29. As an objection on the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to
adjudicate on the present Writ Petition has been taken by the
respondents, Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, at the outset, submits that as the Mercy Petition of the
petitioner was decided by the Hon‟ble President, a substantial cause of
action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He
submits that this Court would, therefore, have the jurisdiction to hear
the present petition. In support, he relies on the judgment of this Court
in Sonu Sarda v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8928.
30. On merits, he submits that the powers of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India are wide and include the
power to review an order of the Hon‟ble President of India on the
ground of arbitrariness. The learned Senior Counsel distinguishes the
present petition from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh , 2026 INSC 764,
wherein the Court upheld an order of the Hon‟ble President under
Article 72 of the Constitution, commuting death sentence to life
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imprisonment without remission, on the ground of delay, non-
application of mind, and other supervening circumstances not being
considered. He submits that the said judgment does not oust the
jurisdiction of this Court from exercising its power of judicial review
of the decision of the Hon‟ble President.
31. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shatrughan
Chauhan (supra), to submit that the gravity of the offence is an
aggravating circumstance to be considered while considering
imposition of a death sentence, however, it cannot be a factor to
disregard the consideration of supervening circumstances like the
delay in the very consideration of the Mercy Petition and the long
pending sword of death penalty. In support of his submissions, he also
places reliance on Epuru Sudhakar & Anr. v. Govt. of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 161; Triveniben v. State of Gujarat,
(1989) 1 SCC 678; and, Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) &
Anr., (2014) 7 SCC 264.
32. He submits that the petitioner‟s Mercy Petition dated
27.06.2001 was not considered, and the subsequent Mercy Petition
filed on 02.11.2004 was decided and the decision thereon
communicated only on 05.10.2016, that is, after an unexplained delay
of 11 years and 11 months and a cumulative delay of 15 years and 3
months. Such inexplicable delay in consideration of the petitioner‟s
Mercy Petition amounts to torture, is in violation of the Fundamental
Rights of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution, and
entails as a ground for commutation of the petitioner‟s sentence. In
support, he relies on the judgments of the Supreme Court in
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Shatrughan Chauhan (supra) and State of Maharashtra & Ors. v.
Pradeep Yashwant Kokade & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3662.
33. He submits that the petitioner is also entitled to unconditional
commutation of his sentence on the ground of illegal solitary
confinement. He submits that the petitioner has been in custody for
over 31 years, that is, since his arrest on 21.11.1994, and has also
spent over 18 years in solitary single-cell confinement, that is, since
imposition of Death Sentence upon him by the learned Sessions Court
on 23.02.1998. He submits that this circumstance, itself, entitles the
petitioner to unconditional commutation of sentence. In support, he
places reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Shatrughan
Chauhan (supra); Ajay Kumar Pal v. Union of India & Anr. , (2015)
2 SCC 478; and, Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. , (1978)
4 SCC 494.
34. He submits that a claim of privilege attaching to the advice
tendered to the Hon‟ble President or Hon‟ble Governor under Article
74(2) and Article 164(3) of the Constitution, respectively, does not
extend to underlying material and the file notings on which that advice
was based. He further submits that once such material is produced, the
Court examines the record itself rather than accepting the assertion of
due consideration. In support, he places reliance on Epuru Sudhakar
(supra), Swaran Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1998) 4 SCC 75;
Satpal & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2000) 5 SCC 170; and
Sonu Sarda (supra).
35. He submits that the Hon‟ble President‟s decision is not based
upon a consideration of the petitioner‟s Mercy Petition filed on
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27.06.2001, which included a detailed account of his family and
socio-economic background, offence details, and the role of the
petitioner and the approver. Instead, only the Mercy Petition filed by
one advocate, namely, Mr. Vikramaditya Rai, on 02.11.2004, has been
considered. He submits that, in contravention with the principles
expounded in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra) and the Guidelines
regarding Clemency of Death Row Convicts of the Union of India,
information regarding the age of the petitioner, his personality, his
family history, socio-economic background, history of confinement in
different prisons and conditions of incarceration, his jail conduct,
mental and physical health record were not sought by the Hon‟ble
President. He submits that there is strong evidence of the petitioner‟s
reformation and rehabilitation in the form of the multiple educational
and vocational qualifications acquired by him during the period of his
incarceration.
36. He submits that despite the opposing opinions received from the
Hon‟ble Home Minister and the learned Attorney General, the
Hon‟ble President has, without any basis, imposed the impugned
condition on the petitioner. The condition leaves the petitioner to face
slow death with no ray of hope to ever rehabilitate into the society,
and therefore, is contrary to the very objective of clemency powers
under Article 72 of the Constitution. In support, he relies on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias
Murugan & Ors. , (2016) 7 SCC 1.
37. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that imposition of
such a condition by the Hon‟ble President is unconstitutional and
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illegal. He submits that the power of the Hon‟ble President is a
constitutional responsibility and the absence of a non-obstante clause
implies that it cannot oust the authority of the Governor or override
the constitutional or statutory power to suspend, remit, or commute a
death sentence, and must be read harmoniously with them. In support,
he places reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kehar
Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. , (1989) 1 SCC 204; Epuru
Sudhakar (supra); G. Krishta Goud & Anr. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 157; and, Maru Ram v. Union of
India & Ors. , (1981) 1 SCC 107.
38. He submits that even in cases where the Courts have imposed
life imprisonment with prohibition on remission, the Supreme Court,
in V. Sriharan (supra), has held that the right to claim remission,
commutation, etc., will continue to be available as per constitutional
remedies.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE
RESPONDENTS
39. Mr. Vikram Jetley, the learned Central Government Standing
Counsel appearing for the Union of India, on the other hand, submits
that the power of the Hon‟ble President of India to grant remission
under Article 72 of the Constitution is a constitutional power lying
within the exclusive domain of the Hon‟ble President. The power of
clemency must be exercised as per the constitutional mandate and the
law laid down in judicial precedents. He submits that this
constitutional power is uninfluenced by the judicial decision regarding
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the quantum of punishment to a convict. He submits that the clemency
powers of the Hon‟ble President and Governor are absolute and
cannot be fettered or altered by any statutory provisions. In support,
he places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Joginder Singh & Ors. , (1990) 2 SCC 661.
40. The learned counsel submits that though the President‟s power
of clemency is not immune from judicial review, the scope of such
review is limited to only exceptional cases. He places reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Epuru Sudhakar (supra) to
contend that the limited grounds on which judicial review of the
Hon‟ble President‟s order may be entertained are not met in the
present case.
41. He submits that a convict, who has already been benefitted from
an order of commutation reducing his sentence from Death Sentence
to Life Imprisonment, cannot question the condition attached to such
commutation. Such condition has been imposed by the Hon‟ble
President in the exercise of his sui generis powers. The order reducing
the sentence has to be accepted as a whole. It is not open to the
convict to accept it to the extent it favors him and challenge it to the
extent he finds it unfavorable.
42. He submits that the Supreme Court has, vide order dated
13.11.2017 passed in SLP (Crl.) 8357/2017, titled “ Union of India v.
Sonu Sardar & Anr.”, issued notice in a petition challenging the
power of this Court to review the decision of the Hon‟ble President or
the Governor. The said SLP challenges the order of this Court in Sonu
Sardar v. The Union of India & Anr ., 2017:DHC:3193-DB, wherein
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this Court allowed a petition seeking quashing of the orders of the
Hon‟ble President and the Hon‟ble Governor of Chhattisgarh rejecting
the Mercy Petition of the petitioner therein. He submits that in view of
the above and the fact that the said petition is still pending
adjudication before the Supreme Court, the present petition deserves
to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
43. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.
44. As far as the challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court
to adjudicate on the present petition is concerned, the same is only to
be stated to be rejected.
45. The petitioner is challenging the Order dated 15.10.2016 issued
by the Superintendent, Nagpur Central Jail, by which the petitioner
was informed that his Mercy Petition has been partially allowed by the
Hon‟ble President and that his sentence has been commuted to life
imprisonment from death sentence, with a condition that he shall
remain in prison for the whole of his remaining life and there shall be
no further remission of the term of his imprisonment by any Authority.
As the Impugned Order arises from the decision dated 18.09.2016
passed by the Hon‟ble President of India under Article 72 of the
Constitution of India, the office of the President of India being
situated at Delhi, and the cause of action having arisen in Delhi, there
can be no merit in the objection to the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court.
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46. Coming to the merits of the challenge of the petitioner, we shall
first consider the limited jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and
adjudicate on such a challenge.
47. In Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), the Supreme Court held that
while entertaining a challenge to an order passed by the Hon‟ble
President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution of India or by
the Governor of a State under Article 161 of the Constitution of India,
where the challenge is laid by the petitioner on the ground of violation
the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a
Writ under Article 32 of the Constitution of India shall be
maintainable. Equally, therefore, a Writ Petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India shall also be maintainable where such a
challenge is made by the petitioner to an order passed by the Hon‟ble
President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution of India or by
the Hon‟ble Governor of a State under Article 161 of the Constitution
of India.
48. Examining the scope of exercise of the power vested in the
Hon‟ble President/Governor under Article 72/161 of the Constitution
of India, the Supreme Court emphasized that it is not a matter of grace
or privilege, but is a matter of constitutional responsibility reposed by
the people in the highest authority.
49. It further emphasized on the limited scope of judicial review of
the Order so passed by the Hon‟ble President of India/Hon‟ble
Governor of a State, by first emphasizing that there is always a
presumption that a constitutional authority acts with application of
mind and there can be no specific guidelines laid down for the
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exercise of such power by the Hon‟ble President of India/Hon‟ble
Governor of a State. At the same time, the Supreme Court took note of
certain criteria in form of circulars that have been laid down by the
Union Government itself for deciding the mercy petitions, as under:
“55. Though guidelines to define the
contours of the power under Article 72/161
cannot be laid down, however, the Union
Government, considering the nature of the
power, set out certain criteria in the form of
circular as under for deciding the mercy
petitions:
55.1. Personality of the accused (such as age,
sex or mental deficiency) or circumstances of
the case (such as provocation or similar
justification);
55.2. Cases in which the appellate Court
expressed doubt as to the reliability of
evidence but has nevertheless decided on
conviction;
55.3. Cases where it is alleged that fresh
evidence is obtainable mainly with a view to
see whether fresh enquiry is justified;
55.4. Where the High Court on appeal
reversed acquittal or on an appeal enhanced
the sentence;
55.5. Is there any difference of opinion in the
Bench of High Court Judges necessitating
reference to a larger Bench;
55.6. Consideration of evidence in fixation of
responsibility in gang murder case;
55.7. Long delays in investigation and trial
etc.”
50. The Supreme Court held that decision taken by the Hon‟ble
President or the Hon‟ble Governor shall, therefore, be subject to
limited judicial review on the principle that while the decision itself
may not be judicially reviewable, the manner of exercise of the power
is certainly subject to judicial review. Such power should, therefore,
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not be exercised mala fide or for political consideration and must be
passed considering all the relevant materials, including the
supervening events before arriving at a conclusion. Delay is one of the
primary grounds for limited judicial review. The Supreme Court also
culled out the events which may fall within the scope of supervening
circumstances other than delay.
51. As far as the delay in taking the decision is concerned, the
Supreme Court emphasized as under:
“ 44 . In view of the above, we hold that undue
long delay in execution of sentence of death
will entitle the condemned prisoner to
approach this Court under Article 32.
However, this Court will only examine the
circumstances surrounding the delay that has
occurred and those that have ensued after the
sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial
process. This Court cannot reopen the
conclusion already reached but may consider
the question of inordinate delay to decide
whether the execution of sentence should be
carried out or should be altered into
imprisonment for life.
45. Keeping a convict in suspense while
consideration of his mercy petition by the
President for many years is certainly an agony
for him/her. It creates adverse physical
conditions and psychological stresses on the
convict under sentence of death. Indisputably,
this Court, while considering the rejection of
the clemency petition by the President, under
Article 32 read with Article 21 of the
Constitution, cannot excuse the agonizing
delay caused to the convict only on the basis of
the gravity of the crime.
46. India has been a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
as well as to the United Nations Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Both these
conventions contain provisions outlawing
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cruel and degrading treatment and/or
punishment. Pursuant to the judgment of this
Court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,
international covenants to which India is a
party are a part of domestic law unless they
are contrary to a specific law in force. It is this
expression (“cruel and degrading treatment
and/or punishment”) which has ignited the
philosophy of Vatheeswaran and the cases
which follow it. It is in this light, the Indian
cases, particularly, the leading case of
Triveniben has been followed in the
Commonwealth countries. It is useful to refer
the following foreign judgments which
followed the proposition: i) Pratt v. Attorney
General for Jamaica, ii) Catholic Commission
for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney
General, iii) Soering v. United Kingdom, iv)
Attorney General v. Susan Kigula, v) Herman
Mejia v. Attorney General.
47. It is clear that after the completion of
the judicial process, if the convict files a mercy
petition to the Governor/President, it is
incumbent on the authorities to dispose of the
same expeditiously. Though no time-limit can
be fixed for the Governor and the President, it
is the duty of the executive to expedite the
matter at every stage, viz. calling for the
records, orders and documents filed in the
court, preparation of the note for approval of
the Minister concerned, and the ultimate
decision of the constitutional authorities. This
Court, in Triveniben, further held that in doing
so, if it is established that there was prolonged
delay in the execution of death sentence, it is
an important and relevant consideration for
determining whether the sentence should be
allowed to be executed or not.
48. Accordingly, if there is undue,
unexplained and inordinate delay in execution
due to pendency of mercy petitions or the
executive as well as the constitutional
authorities have failed to take note of/consider
the relevant aspects, this Court is well within
its powers under Article 32 to hear the
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grievance of the convict and commute the
death sentence into life imprisonment on this
ground alone however, only after satisfying
that the delay was not caused at the instance
of the accused himself. To this extent, the
jurisprudence has developed in the light of the
mandate given in our Constitution as well as
various Universal Declarations and directions
issued by the United Nations.
49. The procedure prescribed by law, which
deprives a person of his life and liberty must
be just, fair and reasonable and such
procedure mandates humane conditions of
detention preventive or punitive. In this line,
although the petitioners were sentenced to
death based on the procedure established by
law, the inexplicable delay on account of
executive is unexcusable. Since it is well
established that Article 21 of the Constitution
does not end with the pronouncement of
sentence but extends to the stage of execution
of that sentence, as already asserted,
prolonged delay in execution of sentence of
death has a dehumanizing effect on the
accused. Delay caused by circumstances
beyond the prisoners‟ control mandates
commutation of death sentence. In fact, in
Vatheeswaran, particularly, in para 10, it was
elaborated where amongst other authorities,
the minority view of Lords Scarman and
Brightman in the 1972 Privy Council case of
Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica, by
quoting: (Vatheeswaran case, SCC p. 72)
“10. „...Sentence of death is one
thing: sentence of death followed by lengthy
imprisonment prior to execution is another‟.”
(riley case, AC p. 735 B)
(emphasis supplied)
The appropriate relief in cases where the
execution of death sentence is delayed, the
Court held, is to vacate the sentence of death.
In para 13, the Court made it clear that
Articles 14, 19 and 21 supplement one another
and the right which was spelled out from the
Constitution was a substantive right of the
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convict and not merely a matter of procedure
established by law. This was the consequence
of the judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India which made the content of Article 21
substantive as distinguished from merely
procedural.”
52. The Court further noted the conflict between commutation of
the death sentence on the ground of undue delay in its execution and
the rights of the victim, and held as under:
“57. Another vital aspect, without mention of
which the present discussion will not be
complete, is that, as aforesaid, Article 21 is the
paramount principle on which rights of the
convict are based, this must be considered
along with the rights of the victims or the
deceased‟s family as also societal
consideration since these elements form part
of the sentencing process as well. It is the
stand of the respondents that the commutation
of sentence of death based on delay alone will
be against the victim‟s interest.
58. It is true that the question of sentence
always poses a complex problem, which
requires a working compromise between the
competing views based on reformative,
deterrent and retributive theories of
punishments. As a consequence, a large
number of factors fall for consideration in
determining the appropriate sentence. The
object of punishment is lucidly elaborated in
Ram Narain v. State of U.P. in the following
words: (SCC p. 91, para 8)
“8. …the broad object of punishment of
an accused found guilty in progressive
civilized societies is to impress on the guilty
party that commission of crimes does not pay
and that it is both against his individual
interest and also against the larger interest of
the society to which he belongs. The sentence
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to be appropriate should, therefore, be neither
too harsh nor too lenient.”
59. The object of punishment has been
succinctly stated in Halsbury's Laws of
England, (4th Edn. Vol. 11, Para 482) thus:
“482. Object of punishment.- The aims
of punishment are now considered to be
retribution, justice, deterrence, reformation
and protection and modern sentencing policy
reflects a combination of several or all of these
aims. The retributive element is intended to
show public revulsion to the offence and to
punish the offender for his wrong conduct. The
concept of justice as an aim of punishment
means both that the punishment should fit the
offence and also that like offences should
receive similar punishments. An increasingly
important aspect of punishment is deterrence
and sentences are aimed at deterring not only
the actual offender from further offences but
also potential offenders from breaking the law.
The importance of reformation of the offender
is shown by the growing emphasis laid upon it
by much modern legislation, but judicial
opinion towards this particular aim is varied
and rehabilitation will not usually be accorded
precedence over deterrence. The main aim of
punishment in judicial thought, however, is
still the protection of society and the other
objects frequently receive only secondary
consideration when sentences are being
decided.”
(emphasis supplied)
60. All these aspects were emphatically
considered by this Court while pronouncing
the final verdict against the petitioners herein
thereby upholding the sentence of death
imposed by the High Court. Nevertheless, the
same accused (the petitioners herein) are
before us now under Article 32 petition
seeking commutation of sentence on the basis
of undue delay caused in execution of their
levied death sentence, which amounts to
torture and henceforth violative of Article 21
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of the Constitution. We must clearly see the
distinction under both circumstances. Under
the former scenario, the petitioners herein
were the persons who were accused of the
offence wherein the sentence of death was
imposed but in latter scenario, the petitioners
herein approached this Court as a victim of
violation of guaranteed fundamental rights
under the Constitution seeking commutation of
sentence. This distinction must be considered
and appreciated.
61. As already asserted, this Court has no
jurisdiction under Article 32 to reopen the
case on merits. Therefore, in the light of the
aforesaid elaborate discussion, we are of the
cogent view that undue, inordinate and
unreasonable delay in execution of death
sentence does certainly attribute to torture
which indeed is in violation of Article 21 and
thereby entails as the ground for commutation
of sentence. However, the nature of delay i.e.
whether it is undue or unreasonable must be
appreciated based on the facts of individual
cases and no exhaustive guidelines can be
framed in this regard.”
53. The Court further held that unexplained delay is one of the
grounds/supervening circumstances for commutation of sentence of
death into life imprisonment and the said supervening circumstance is
applicable to all types of cases, including the offences under the then
existing Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
54. The Court also considered insanity/mental illness/schizophrenia
as one of the supervening circumstances that warrants commutation of
death sentence to life imprisonment.
55. In Pradeep Yashwant Kokade (supra), the Supreme Court after
examining the precedents on the issue, summarized the law applicable
to a challenge to rejection of a Mercy Petition as under:
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“22. ….We have carefully perused several
other decisions of this Court which have been
rendered in the facts of the case before this
Court. The propositions laid down in these
decisions can be summarized as under:
(i) Undue, unexplained and inordinate
delay in execution of the sentence of death will
entitle the convict to approach this Court
under Article 32. But this Court will only
examine the nature of the delay caused and
circumstances that ensued after the judicial
process finally confirmed the sentence and will
have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions
reached by the court while finally maintaining
the sentence of death. This Court, however,
may consider the question of inordinate delay
in the light of all circumstances of the case to
decide whether the execution of sentence
should be carried out or should be altered into
imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay
could be held to make the sentence of death
inexecutable.
(ii) Keeping a convict sentenced to death in
suspense while considering his mercy petitions
by the Governor or the President for an
inordinately long time is certainly agony for
him/her. It creates adverse physical conditions
and psychological stress on the convict under
sentence of death. Therefore, this Court, while
considering the delay in the disposal of
clemency petitions by the highest
constitutional authorities, while exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Article
21 of the Constitution, cannot excuse the
agonising delay caused to the convict only
based on the gravity of the crime; and
(iii) It is well established that Article 21 of
the Constitution does not end with the
pronouncement of the sentence but extends to
the execution stage of that sentence. An
inordinate delay in the execution of the
sentence of death has a dehumanising effect on
the accused. An inordinate delay caused by
circumstances beyond the prisoners' control
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mandates the commutation of a death
sentence.”
56. The Supreme Court in the above judgment, summarized the law
applicable to the consideration of a challenge to the rejection of a
Mercy Petition, as under:
“ OUR CONCLUSIONS
42. We hold that:-
(i) Undue, unexplained and inordinate
delay in execution of the sentence of death will
entitle the convict to approach this Court
under Article 32. However, this Court will only
examine the nature of the delay caused and
circumstances that ensued after the judicial
process finally confirmed the sentence and will
have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions
reached by the Court while finally maintaining
the sentence of death. This Court, however,
may consider the question of inordinate delay
in the light of all circumstances of the case to
decide whether the execution of sentence
should be carried out or should be commuted
to imprisonment for life;
(ii) Keeping a convict in suspense while
considering his mercy petitions by the
Governor or the President for an inordinately
long time will certainly cause agony to
him/her. It creates adverse physical conditions
and psychological stress on the convict.
Therefore, this Court, while exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Article
21 of the Constitution, must consider the effect
of inordinate delay in disposal of the clemency
petition by the highest Constitutional
authorities and cannot excuse the agonising
delay caused only on the basis of the gravity of
the crime;
(iii) It is well established that Article 21 of
the Constitution does not end with the
pronouncement of the sentence but extends to
the stage of execution of that sentence. An
inordinate delay in the execution of the
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sentence of death has a dehumanising effect on
the accused. An inordinate and unexplained
delay caused by circumstances beyond the
prisoners' control mandates the commutation
of a death sentence;
(iv) The above principles will also apply to a
case where there is a long and unexplained
delay on the part of the Sessions Court in
issuing the warrant of execution in accordance
with Section 413 or Section 414 of CrPC. After
the order of rejection of mercy petitions is
communicated to a convict, the sword of
Damocles cannot be kept hanging on him for
an inordinately long time. This can be very
agonising, both mentally and physically. Such
inordinate delay will violate his rights under
Article 21 of the Constitution. In such a case,
this Court will be justified in commuting the
death penalty into life imprisonment;
(v) No hard and fast rule can be laid down
as regards the length of delay, which can be
said to be inordinate. It all depends on the
facts of the case. The terms “undue” or
“inordinate” cannot be interpreted by
applying the rules of mathematics. The Courts,
in such cases, deal with human issues and the
effect of the delay on individual convicts. What
delay is inordinate must depend on the facts of
the case;
(vi) A convict can invoke even the
jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution in the event there is an
inordinate and unexplained delay in the
execution of the death sentence, post-
confirmation of the sentence. The same
principles will be applied by the High Court,
which are summarised above; and,
(vii) It is the duty of the Executive to
promptly process the mercy petitions invoking
Articles 72 or 161 of the Constitution and
forward the petitions along with requisite
documents to the concerned constitutional
functionary without undue delay.
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57. The Supreme Court also issued the following directions for
consideration of the Mercy Petitions:
“OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
43. Hence, we pass the following order:
i. The impugned judgment and order, by
which the death sentence of the convicts has
been commuted to a fixed sentence of thirty-
five years of imprisonment, is upheld, and
Criminal Appeals are dismissed;
ii. As regards the mercy petitions, we issue
the following directions to all the State
Governments and Union Territories:
A. A dedicated cell shall be
constituted by the Home Department or the
Prison Department of the State
Governments/Union Territories for dealing
with mercy petitions. The dedicated cell shall
be responsible for the prompt processing of the
mercy petitions within the time frame laid
down by the respective governments. An
officer-in- charge of the dedicated cell shall be
nominated by designation who shall receive
and issue communications on behalf of the
dedicated cell;
B. An official of the Law and
Judiciary or Justice Department of the State
Governments/Union Territories should be
attached to the dedicated cell so constituted;
C. All the prisons shall be informed
about the designation of the officer-in-charge
of the dedicated cell and his address and email
ID;
D. As soon as the Superintendent of
Prison/officer-in-charge receives the mercy
petitions, he shall immediately forward the
copies thereof to the dedicated cell and call for
the following details/information from the
officer-in-charge of the concerned Police
Station and/or the concerned investigation
agency;
a. The criminal antecedents of the
convict;
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b. Information about family members of
the convict;
c. Economic condition of the convict
and his/her family;
d. The date of arrest of the convict and
the period of incarceration as an undertrial;
and,
e. The date of filing charge sheet and a
copy of the committal order, if any.
On receipt of the request made by the jail
authorities, the officer-in-charge of the
concerned police station shall be under an
obligation to furnish the said information to
the jail authorities immediately;
E. On receipt of the said
information, without any delay, the jail
authorities shall forward the following
documents to the officer-in-charge of the
dedicated cell and the Secretary of the Home
Department of the State Government:
a. Information furnished as aforesaid by
the concerned Police Station with its English
translation;
b. Copy of the First Information Report
with its English translation;
c. Details, such as date of arrest of the
convict, date of filing of chargesheet and
actual period of incarceration undergone by
the convict;
d. A copy of the committal order, if any,
passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate;
e. A copy of charge-sheet with its
English translation;
f. Report about the conduct of the
convict in prison;
g. Copies of the notes of evidence, all
exhibited documents in the trial and copies of
statements of convicts under Section 313 of the
CrPC with its English translation;
h. Copies of the judgments of the
Sessions Court (with its English translation, if
it is in vernacular language), High Court and
this Court;
F. As soon as mercy petitions are
received by the dedicated cell, copies of the
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mercy petitions shall be forwarded to the
Secretariats of the Hon‟ble Governor of the
State or the Hon‟ble President of India, as the
case may be so that the Secretariat can initiate
action at their end;
G. All correspondence, as far as
possible, be made by email, unless
confidentiality is involved; and,
H. The State Government shall issue
office orders/executive orders containing
guidelines for dealing with the mercy petitions
in terms of this judgment.
iii. The Registry of this Court shall forward
copies of this judgment to the Secretaries of
the Home Department of the respective State
Governments/Union Territories for its
implementation. The Secretaries shall report
compliance within three months from today to
the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court;
iv. The Sessions Court shall endeavour to
follow the following guidelines:
a. As soon as the order of the High
Court confirming or imposing the death
sentence is received by the Sessions Court, a
note thereof must be taken, and the disposed of
case shall be listed on the cause list. The
proceedings can be numbered as Misc.
Application depending upon the applicable
Rules of the procedure. The Sessions Court
shall immediately issue notice to the State
Public Prosecutor or the investigating agency
calling upon them to state whether any appeal
or special leave petition has been preferred
before this Court and what is the outcome of
the said petition/appeal;
b. If the State Public Prosecutor or the
investigating agency reports that the appeal is
pending, as soon as the order of this Court
confirming or restoring the death sentence is
received by the Sessions Court, again, the
disposed of case or miscellaneous applications
should be listed on the cause list and notice be
issued to the State Public Prosecutor or the
investigating agency to ascertain whether any
review/curative petitions or mercy petitions
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are pending. If information is received
regarding the pendency of review/curative
petitions or mercy petitions, the Sessions Court
shall keep on listing the disposed of case after
intervals of one month so that it gets the
information about the status of the pending
petitions. This will enable the Sessions Court
to issue a warrant for the execution of the
death sentence as soon as all the proceedings
culminate;
c. However, before issuing the warrant,
notice should be issued to the convict, and the
directions issued by the Allahabad High Court
in the case of People‟s Union for Democratic
Rights (PUDR), and as elaborated above,
shall be implemented by the Sessions Court;
d. The Sessions Courts shall consider
what is held in Paragraph 25 above;
e. Copies of the order issuing the
warrant and the warrant shall be immediately
provided to the convicts, and the Prison
authorities must explain the implications
thereof to the convicts. If the convict so
desires, legal aid be immediately provided to
the convicts by the Prison authorities for
challenging the warrant. There shall be a gap
of fifteen clear days between the date of the
receipt of the order as well as warrant by the
convict and the actual date of the execution;
and,
f. It shall also be the responsibility of the
concerned State Government or the Union
Territory administration to apply to the
Sessions Court for the issuance of a warrant
immediately after the death penalty attains
finality and becomes enforceable.
v. A copy of this judgment shall be
forwarded to both the convicts through the Jail
Superintendent of the concerned jail.
vi. A copy of this judgment shall be
forwarded to the Registrar Generals of all the
High Courts, who in turn shall forward the
copies thereof to all the Sessions Courts.
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vii. These disposed of appeals shall be listed
on 17th March 2025 for considering
compliance.”
58. Recently in Ramasrey @ Fakkad (supra), the Supreme Court
again summarized the principles to be kept in consideration by the
Hon‟ble President of India/Hon‟ble Governor of a State while
considering a Mercy Petition, and the limited scope of judicial review
of a decision so taken, as under:
“6. On a perusal of various judgments, where
the scope of the President‟s or the Governor‟s
power has arisen, the following principles,
inter alia, can be noticed:
6.1 The powers under these two
articles are construed in the widest possible
terms since there are no words limiting the
scope thereof used in the Articles; ( Epuru
Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. ).
6.2 Both the President and the
Governor, in exercise of these powers must act
with the aid and advice of Council of
Ministers; ( Maru Ram v. Union of India )
6.3 Governor‟s power cannot be
exercised to suspend a sentence while a
particular case is subjudice before this Court;
( K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay )
6.4 The President under Article 72
can examine the merits of the matter. The
exercise of this power is executive in character.
( Kehar Singh v. Union of India )
6.5 The powers under Articles 72/161
are separate and distinct from statutory power
of remission under CrPC. ( Union of India v.
V. Sriharan )
6.6 The scope of judicial review is
limited to the following grounds:
(a) that the order has been passed without
application of mind;
(b) that the order is mala fide;
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(c) that the order has been passed on
extraneous or wholly irrelevant
considerations;
(d) that relevant materials have been kept
out of consideration;
(e) that the order suffers from arbitrariness.
( Epuru Sudhakar (supra); Pyare Lal v. State
of Haryana )”
59. In the said case, the Supreme Court also considered the power
to impose a sentence of imprisonment for remainder of natural life and
held as under:
“ 10 . In Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of
Karnataka , a Bench of three judges while
dealing with the question of sentence made
elaborate discussions and concluded that there
is a subset of cases where life imprisonment
which actually amounts to only 14 years of
imprisonment may be disproportionately light
and also that it may not meet the standard of
rarest of rare cases as enunciated in Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab , for these cases it
was observed as follows:
“ 91 . The legal position as enunciated in
Pandit Kishori Lal [(1944-45) 72 IA 1 : AIR
1945 PC 64], Gopal Vinayak Godse [AIR 1961
SC 600 : (1961) 3 SCR 440], Maru Ram
[(1981) 1 SCC 107 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 112],
Ratan Singh [(1976) 3 SCC 470 : 1976 SCC
(Cri) 428] and Shri Bhagwan [(2001) 6 SCC
296 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1095] and the unsound
way in which remission is actually allowed in
cases of life imprisonment make out a very
strong case to make a special category for the
very few cases where the death penalty might
be substituted by the punishment of
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term in excess of fourteen years and to put that
category beyond the application of remission.
92. The matter may be looked at
from a slightly different angle. The issue of
sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be
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excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly
disproportionately inadequate. When an
appellant comes to this Court carrying a death
sentence awarded by the trial court and
confirmed by the High Court, this Court may
find, as in the present appeal, that the case just
falls short of the rarest of the rare category
and may feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing
the death sentence. But at the same time,
having regard to the nature of the crime, the
Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life
imprisonment subject to remission normally
works out to a term of 14 years would be
grossly disproportionate and inadequate. What
then should the Court do? If the Court's option
is limited only to two punishments, one a
sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and
purposes, of not more than 14 years and the
other death, the Court may feel tempted and
find itself nudged into endorsing the death
penalty. Such a course would indeed be
disastrous. A far more just, reasonable and
proper course would be to expand the options
and to take over what, as a matter of fact,
lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast
hiatus between 14 years' imprisonment and
death. It needs to be emphasised that the Court
would take recourse to the expanded option
primarily because in the facts of the case, the
sentence of 14 years‟ imprisonment would
amount to no punishment at all.
93. Further, the formalisation of a
special category of sentence, though for an
extremely few number of cases, shall have the
great advantage of having the death penalty on
the statute book but to actually use it as little
as possible, really in the rarest of rare cases.
This would only be a reassertion of the
Constitution Bench decision in Bachan Singh
[(1980) 2 SCC 684 :1980 SCC (Cri) 580 : AIR
1980 SC 898] besides being in accord with the
modern trends in penology.”
(emphasis supplied)
(See: Shahjad Ali v. State of Uttarakhand ;
Ramesh A. Naika v. Registrar General )
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11. Subsequently, in Union of India v. V.
Sriharan , a Constitution Bench was dealing
inter-alia with this special category of
sentence i.e., imprisonment for remainder of
natural life without remission. A majority of
three judges found the special category of
sentence to be justified and well founded. The
minority held that placing sentences that are
for the remainder of natural life, beyond the
scope of remission to be unconstitutional. On
the question of meaning of the term „life
imprisonment‟ however, all five judges were ad
idem. The relevant discussion on this aspect is
as follows:
On the meaning of life imprisonment, it
was held:
F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla J. speaking for
Dattu, C.J., himself and Ghose, J
“ 177. Imprisonment for life in terms of
Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal
Code only means imprisonment for the rest of
the life of the convict. The right to claim
remission, commutation, reprieve, etc. as
provided under Article 72 or Article 161 of the
Constitution will always be available being
constitutional remedies untouchable by the
Court.”
…
Uday U.Lalit J. (as he then was) speaking for
himself and Sapre J.
“ 257. Section 53 IPC envisages
different kinds of punishments while Section 45
IPC defines the word “life” as the life of a
human being unless the contrary appears from
the context. The life of a human being is till he
is alive that is to say till his last breath, which
by very nature is one of indefinite duration. In
the light of the law laid down in Godse [Gopal
Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1961 SC 600 :(1961) 1 Cri LJ 736 : (1961) 3
SCR 440] and Maru Ram [Maru Ram v. Union
of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 : 1981 SCC (Cri)
112 : (1981) 1 SCR 1196], which law has
consistently been followed the sentence of life
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imprisonment as contemplated under Section
53 read with Section 45 IPC means
imprisonment for rest of the life or the
remainder of life of the convict. The terminal
point of the sentence is the last breath of the
convict and unless the appropriate
Government commutes the punishment or
remits the sentence such terminal point would
not change at all. The life imprisonment thus
means imprisonment for rest of the life of the
prisoner.
…
260. The sentence of life imprisonment means
imprisonment for the rest of the life or the
remainder of the life of the convict. Such
convict can always apply for obtaining
remission either under Articles 72 or 161 of
the Constitution or under Section 432 CrPC
and the authority would be obliged to consider
the same reasonably.”
On the special category of sentence, it was
observed by F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla J . for the
majority in para 178 as under:
“Question 52.1 : Whether imprisonment for
life in terms of Section 53 read with Section
45 of the Penal Code meant imprisonment for
rest of the life of the prisoner or a convict
undergoing life imprisonment has a right to
claim remission and whether as per the
principles enunciated in paras 91 to 93 of
Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy
Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka,
(2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113],
a special category of sentence may be made
for the very few cases where the death penalty
might be substituted by the punishment of
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term in excess of fourteen years and to put
that category beyond application of
remission?
Answer
…
178. We hold that the ratio laid down in
Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy
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Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka,
(2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113]
that a special category of sentence; instead of
death can be substituted by the punishment of
imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding
14 years and put that category beyond
application of remission is well founded and
we answer the said question in the
affirmative.”
Uday U.Lalit J. (as he then was) for the
minority, answers the reference in para 287:
…
“Sub-question (b). Whether as per the
principles enunciated in paras 91 to 93 of
Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy
Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka,
(2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113],
a special category of sentence may be made
for the very few cases where the death penalty
might be substituted by the punishment for
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term in excess of fourteen years and to put
that category beyond application of
remission?
Answer
287. In our view, it would not be open to the
Court to make any special category of
sentence in substitution of death penalty and
put that category beyond application of
remission, nor would it be permissible to
stipulate any mandatory period of actual
imprisonment inconsistent with the one
prescribed under Section 433-A CrPC.”
12. Given the conclusion of the majority as
extracted above, we only wonder how the
petitioners have raised this contention. A five-
judge Bench has said that sentences for the
remainder of natural life are valid. Where does
the scope arise for it to be contended that such
sentences are invalid/unconstitutional or
trample upon statutorily granted rights in the
form of Section 432 CrPC, that too before a
Bench of two judges? We can only say that
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such an endeavour is a misuse, if not the abuse
of process of law. This is even more so in view
of the fact that the ground under CrPC that is
raised has also been answered by the
Constitution Bench. The paragraphs
reproduced by us above clearly stipulate that
when a sentence awarded is for imprisonment
for life without the categorical addition of
„without remission‟, the power of the State
under Section 432 Cr.PC is unaffected and
such an application would be maintainable. In
those select few cases where the „without
remission‟ condition is utilised, which is
obviously done so, in the attending facts of
that case keeping in view the gravity of crime,
nature of offence and the fact that reduction of
the sentence therein to an „ordinary sentence‟
would be unjust, the statutory right being
denuded, cannot be termed to be offensive to
the Constitution.”
60. Considering the present petition on the above parameters of
limited scope of judicial review, in the present case, there can be no
dispute that there has been an inordinate delay in deciding the Mercy
Petition of the petitioner. From the facts which have been narrated by
us hereinabove, it would be evident that the Mercy Petition filed by
the petitioner on 27.06.2001 came to be decided only on 18.09.2016
and communicated to him vide the letter dated 15.10.2016, that is,
after a delay of more than 15 years. In the meantime, the proverbial
sword of death kept hanging on the head of the petitioner. The
petitioner has also contended that he was kept in solitary confinement
during this period.
61. The above may have been a sufficient ground to commute the
death sentence of the petitioner to one of life, however, from a perusal
of the file produced by the learned Central Government Standing
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Counsel, it is also evident that the Hon‟ble President was aware of this
period of delay. It was for this reason that the Hon‟ble President
expressly asked for the advice of the then Attorney General regarding
the applicability of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Shatrughan Chauhan (supra). The learned Attorney General, in fact,
advised in favour of the petitioner and recommended commutation of
his death sentence to life imprisonment. The Hon‟ble President then
had the benefit of the inputs from the Ministry of Home Affairs which,
in fact, recommended the rejection of the petitioner‟s Mercy Petition.
The Hon‟ble President proceeded to consider both these views and
finally passed the Impugned Order whereby, while the death sentence
of the petitioner has been commuted, a sentence for the remainder of
the natural life with no remission has been directed against the
petitioner. We have already noted hereinabove that such power does
exist and vest with the Hon‟ble President.
62. We have also noted hereinabove the limited scope of judicial
review that this Court can exercise over the order passed by the
Hon‟ble President. It is not the order passed by the Hon‟ble President
or the Hon‟ble Governor which can be made a subject of judicial
review, but only the manner of exercise of such power that can be
considered by the Court.
63. Once we find that the Hon‟ble President of India had all the
relevant inputs and took into consideration all the relevant factors
before passing the Impugned Order, this Court cannot substitute the
opinion of the Hon‟ble President of India only on the ground that it
itself may have decided the Mercy Petition in a different manner. The
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power exercised by this Court is not of appeal but of judicial review,
and the Court must remain alive to the distinction between the two
concepts and their scope.
64. Keeping in view the above, we find no merit in the present
petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. The pending application
also stands disposed of as infructuous.
65. The record relating to consideration of the petitioner‟s mercy
petition retained by us on the last date, be returned by the Court
Master to Mr. Sunil Kumar Singh, Under Secretary (Judicial), MHA
forthwith.
66. There shall be no orders as to costs.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
NOVEMBER 17, 2026/sg/Yg
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