VIRENDRANATH B. TIWARI vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

2026:BHC-AS:12760-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 2789 OF 2010
1. Virendranath B. Tiwari,
46, Islam Building, 16A,
st
1 floor, Veer Nariman Road,
Opp: Akbarally’s Fort,
Mumbai-400 023 …Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Maharashtra
Through the Public Prosecutor,
Bombay High Court
2. Chitra Shalunkhe
1B/1, Goodearth Society,
Road no. 2, Sindhi Society,
Chembur, Mumbai – 400 071
3. Commissioner of Police
Crawford Market,
Mumbai-400 001
4. Shri. Vilash Marathe,
Asst. Police Commissioner
Azad Maidan Police Station,
Mumbai
5. Shri. Arjun Shankar Kengar
Asst. Inspector of Police
Azad Maidan Police Station,
Mumbai
6. Senior Inspector of Police
MRA Marg Police Station
Mumbai ...Respondents
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Mr. Virendranath B. Tiwari, Petitioner – party in person.
Mr. Rizwan Merchant a/w Ms. Uma Nemlekar, Mr. Saurabh
Godbole i/b Mr. Sahil Mahajan, learned Advocates for the
Respondent No. 2.
Mr. Sukanta Karmakar, learned APP for the Respondent – State.
CORAM : ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.
th
Reserved on : 4 March, 2026
th
Pronounced on: : 16 March, 2026
JUDGMENT :
1. This proceeding is recorded in accordance with the
decision of this Court in Hema Suresh Ahuja & Ors v. State of
1
Maharashtra & Anr as the subject matter pertains to an offence
under the SC/ST Act.
2. Heard Mr. Virendranath Tiwari, Petitioner in person, Mr.
Sukanta Karmakar , learned APP for the Respondent – State, and
Mr. Rizwan Merchant, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
3. This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, together with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, is filed by the Petitioner to quash the FIR
1 (2024) SCC OnLine Bom 784
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bearing No. 121 of 2010 registered at Azad Maidan Police
Station, Mumbai (hereafter “impugned FIR”) for offences
punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
read with Section 3(1)(x) and (xi) of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
(hereafter “Atrocities Act, 1989"), along with the Chargesheet
bearing No. 237/PW/2014 pending before the Additional Chief
th
Metropolitan Magistrate, 37 Court, at Esplanade, Mumbai
(hereafter “Magistrate”), arising from the impugned FIR.
4. The Respondent No. 2 filed a statement dated 02.07.2010
with the Respondent No. 1, alleging that on 27.06.2007, at
around 11:30 a.m., in Siddharth Law College, when the
Respondent No. 2 was coming down from the lift, the Petitioner
hurled abuses at her and claimed that she possessed bogus
certificates. The Respondent No. 2 further alleged that a
conversation with the Petitioner led to an altercation during
which the Petitioner assaulted her with an umbrella, causing
injuries to Respondent No. 2. The impugned FIR was registered
based on the said statement.
5. The investigation was completed, and the Chargesheet
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bearing No. 237/PW/2014 was filed before the Magistrate
under under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read
with Section 3(1)(x) and (xi) of the Atrocities Act, 1989.
6. On 29.09.2010, this Court directed that no precipitous
steps be taken against the Petitioner. On 11.02.2011, Rule was
issued in the matter, and the earlier interim order was extended
until the disposal of this Petition.
7. The Petitioner, party in person, states that he raised an
issue regarding Respondent No. 2's claim to a reserved seat,
which Respondent No. 2 was not entitled to, leading
Respondent No. 2 to file false and malicious complaints against
him. He refers to the memo of the Petition and states that
Respondent No. 2 filed successive criminal complaints under the
Atrocities Act, 1989, against him. These complaints were
registered as SC/ST Special Case No. 2 of 2003 and SC/ST
Special Case No. 09 of 2007 before the Special Judge, Mumbai.
He submits that by order dated 16.09.2005, the Special Judge,
Mumbai, acquitted him of the offences punishable under Section
3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, in SC/ST Special Case No. 2
of 2003, and by order dated 25.03.2010, he was discharged in
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SC/ST Special Case No. 09 of 2007 of the offences punishable
under Section 3 (1) (ix). He further states that the present
petition concerns the third complaint filed by Respondent No. 2
on similar grounds, misusing the provisions of the Atrocities Act,
1989. He argues that the statement filed by Respondent No. 2,
besides being false, is motivated by ulterior motives and
revenge, as the Petitioner questioned the qualification and
certificate (B.A. Degree) of the Respondent No. 2. He asserts
that no offence, let alone one under Section 3(1) (x) and (xi) of
the Atrocities Act, 1989, has been established.
8. Mr. Sukanta Karmakar , learned APP, submits that the
Respondent No. 1, upon receipt of the statement from
Respondent No. 2, registered the impugned FIR, conducted the
investigation, and filed the chargesheet.
9. Mr. Rizwan Merchant, learned Advocate for Respondent
No. 2, has, in addition to his oral arguments, submitted bullet
points/submissions on record. He fairly states that the contents
of the impugned FIR do not reveal any caste-based humiliation
or insults denigrating the caste, and therefore, the provisions of
Section 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, do not apply to the
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case at hand. He submits that the statements of Respondent No.
2 reveal the Petitioner using abusive language while addressing
Respondent No. 2, which would invoke the provisions of Section
3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, as it constitutes an insult to
Respondent No. 2 by the Petitioner publicly with the intent to
humiliate. He further submits that the statement mentions
threats and intimidation directed at Respondent No. 2 with the
aim of humiliating her. He submits that although the impugned
FIR does not record the commission of offences punishable
under Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, the contents
of the statement dated 02.07.2010 of Respondent No. 2 record
an overt act committed by the Petitioner in assaulting
Respondent No. 2 with an umbrella, causing her injury.
Therefore, in his submission, an offence as referred to in the
schedule to Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, is
established. He submits that, although the injury is a simple
hurt, the core of the offence lies in the offences referred to in the
schedule to Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, 1989,
especially Section 319 read with Section 323 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. He argues that the impugned FIR shows that the
Petitioner's intention was to outrage the modesty of Respondent
No. 2, which is punishable under Section 354 of the Indian
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Penal Code, 1860. He submits that intention is a state of mind
that must be proved from the reading of the evidence, and its
existence or non-existence must be recorded during the trial as
the evidence is examined. He references the statements of
witnesses on pages 695, 696, and 697 of the Petition paper
book. He states that Respondent No. 2 has a valid Caste
Certificate. For all these reasons, he requests dismissal of this
petition.
10. Heard arguments. Examined the records.
11. From the differing arguments of the parties, the key
question is whether the allegations in the impugned FIR and the
material collected after its registration indicate the commission
of a cognizable offence and whether the allegations meet the
ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) and (xi) of the Atrocities Act,
1989 { now Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act,
1989 (as amended)}.
12. Section 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xi) of the Atrocities Act 1989, as
originally enacted, read as follows:
3. Punishments for offences atrocities. -
[(1) Whoever, not being a member of a
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Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates
with intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in
any place within public view;
(xi) assaults or uses force to any
woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe with intent to
dishonour or outrage her modesty;
13. Section 3(1) (r) and 3(1) (s) of the Atrocities Act 1989 (as
amended) read as follows:-
3. Punishments for offences atrocities.—3
[(1) Whoever, not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with
intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in
any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste
name in any place within public view;
14. The impugned FIR and the material collected on record do
not reveal the ingredients for an offence under Section 3(1)(s)
of the Atrocities Act, 1989. Mr. Rizwan Merchant has fairly and
rightly stated that the contents of the impugned FIR do not
demonstrate any caste-based humiliation or insult denigrating
towards caste.
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15. To attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, the
impugned FIR or material on record needed to show that the
Petitioner intentionally insulted or intimidated Respondent No.
2 (a member of a Scheduled Caste), and that he did so with the
intent to humiliate Respondent No. 2 at a place within public
view.
16. The allegations in the impugned FIR, the statement dated
02.07.2010 of Respondent No. 2, and the material on record
relate to the Petitioner allegedly abusing and threatening
Respondent No. 2. The allegations are that the Petitioner hurt
Respondent No. 2 with an umbrella, causing simple injury.
However, the allegations do not indicate that the abuses
included using a caste name or that a caste name was hurled as
an insult or to humiliate Respondent No. 2 by caste. Mr. Rizwan
Merchant, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 2, was unable
to identify such material in the record.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshaw Mahto
2
@ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar & Anr. , while
examining the provisions of Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act,
1989, has made observations in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, and
2 SLPetition (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025
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14 as follows:
10. We shall first proceed to examine whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the offence
under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST
Act respectively are disclosed on a plain reading
of the FIR and the chargesheet. The sections read
as under:- “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.
— [(1) Whoever, not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— xxx (r)
intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place
within public view;”
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria v. The State of
Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid
down the ingredients to constitute an offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads
thus:- “55. The basic ingredients to constitute the
offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
are: a. Accused person must not be a member of
the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b.
Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a
member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe; c. Accused must do so with the intent to
humiliate such a person; and d. Accused must do
so at any place within public view.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason
for the intentional insult or intimidation by the
accused is that the person who is subjected to is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section
3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the
informant/complainant is a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the
insult or intimidation is with the intention to
humiliate such a member of the community.
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13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the
complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly,
any insult or intimidation towards the
complainant must be on the account of such
person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend
clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that
even mere knowledge of the fact that the
complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract
Section 3(1)(r).
18. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Keshaw Kumar Mahto (supra), mere knowledge of the Petitioner
that Respondent No. 2 is a member of the Scheduled Caste or
the Scheduled Tribe is not enough to invoke Section 3(1)(r) of
the Atrocities Act, 1989.
19. Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 reads as
under:-
324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous
weapons or means.—Whoever, except in the
case provided for by section 334, voluntarily
causes hurt by means of any instrument for
shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any
instrument which, used as a weapon of
offence, is likely to cause death, or by means
of fire or any heated substance, or by means
of any poison or any corrosive substance, or
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by means of any explosive substance or by
means of any substance which it is deleterious
to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or
to receive into the blood, or by means of any
animal, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.
20. The allegations in the impugned FIR, taken at face value,
do not meet the ingredients of Section 324 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860. Respondent No. 2 has also stated that the injury
caused is simple in nature.
21. Mr. Rizwan Merchant's attempt to justify the case by
arguing that the offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities
Act, 1989, as referred to in the schedule mentioned in that
section, would apply, is not acceptable for multiple reasons.
First , the contents of the statement dated 02.07.2010 by
Respondent No. 2, the impugned FIR, or the material collected
do not establish such a case. Second , Respondent No. 1 has not
charged an offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act,
1989. Third, and most importantly, the offence in this case is
alleged to have been committed on 27.06.2007. Section 3(2)
(va) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, was inserted by Act 1 of 2016,
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th
Section 4 (w.e.f. 26.01.2016, vide S.O. 152(E), dated 18

January, 2016.)
22. Mr. Virendranath Tiwari strongly argued that the
statement filed by Respondent No. 2, which led to the
registration of the impugned FIR, was made with ulterior
motives and as an act of revenge driven by a personal grudge.
To support this claim, he pointed to two earlier instances where
Respondent No. 2 implicated the Petitioner in criminal cases
with similar, if not identical, allegations under the Atrocities Act,
1989, which the Court dismissed. Additionally, by referring to
the allegations in the memo of petition and the record placed
before this Court, he contended that the revenge was linked to
the Petitioner raising an issue regarding Respondent No. 2's
appointment to a post, even though she was not eligible for it.
23. Be that as it may, regardless of the reasons Respondent
No. 2 filed the complaints against the Petitioner, the fact
remains that on two previous occasions (SC/ST Special Case No.
2 of 2003 and SC/ST Special Case No. 09 of 2007), Respondent
No. 2 made allegations against the Petitioner invoking
provisions of the Atrocities Act, 1989, similar to those in the
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impugned FIR. The Petitioner was acquitted in SC/ST Special
Case No. 2 of 2003 and discharged in SC/ST Special Case No.
09 of 2007, which is not disputed.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case of Mahmood Ali &
3
Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. in paragraph Nos. 11, 12
and 13 has observed as under:
11. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused
comes before the Court invoking either the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal
proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly
frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then
in such circumstances the court owes a duty
to look into the FIR with care and a little
more closely.
12. We say so because once the complainant
decides to proceed against the accused with
an ulterior motive for wreaking personal
vengeance etc. then he would ensure that the
FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would
ensure that the averments made in the
FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough
for the Court to look into the averments made
in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of
3 (2023) 15 SCC 488
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ascertaining whether the necessary
ingredients to constitute the alleged offence
are disclosed or not.
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the
Court owes a duty to look into many other
attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the
lines. The Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article
226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself
only to the stage of a case but is empowered
to take into account the overall circumstances
leading to the initiation/registration of the
case as well as the materials collected in the
course of investigation. Take for instance the
case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances the
registration of multiple FIRs assumes
importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged.
25. Based on the order dated 16.09.2005 passed by the Court
in SC/ST Special Case No. 2 of 2003 and order dated
25.03.2010 passed by the Court in SC/ST Special Case No. 09 of
2007, which exonerate the Petitioner in those criminal
proceedings, and considering the nature of the allegations made
in the impugned FIR, Mr. Virendranath Tiwari, a senior citizen
aged 74, is justified in arguing that the proceedings initiated by
Respondent No. 2 for the third time are an act of vengeance
aimed at causing harassment and humiliation to him.
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26. At face value, the allegations in the impugned FIR/
Chargesheet do not disclose any of the ingredients of Section
324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 3(1)(x)
and (xi) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 { now Section 3(1)(r) and
3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act, 1989.
27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of
4
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal in paragraph 102, observed as follows:-
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we have given the following categories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.
28. The present case clearly falls within the principles
established in Bhajan Lal (supra) for exercising powers under
Section 482 of the Cr. PC to quash the impugned FIR and the
chargesheet arising from it, to prevent abuse of the process of
law.
29. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. Rule in this Petition is
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made absolute in terms of prayer clause (i) and (ib).
Consequently, the impugned FIR bearing No. 121 of 2010 and
the chargesheet bearing No. 237/PW/2014 pending on the file
th
of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37 Court, at
Esplanade, Mumbai, are quashed.
30. There shall be no orders as to cost.
[ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.]
Digitally
signed by
ARJUN
KRISHNA
RODGE
Date:
2026.03.16
21:53:33
+0530
ARJUN
KRISHNA
RODGE
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