Ram Roop Jain & Anr. vs Kalpana Jain & Anr.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 16.10.2026
Date of Decision: 27.10.2026
Date of Uploading: 27.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010507572026
+ CM(M) 2311/2026, CM APPL. 73061/2026 & CM APPL.
73062/2026
RAM ROOP JAIN & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. P.K. Rawal and Mr. Tarun
Agarwal and Mr. Akhil Singh,
Advs.
versus
KALPANA JAIN & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anil Soni, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Lalit Gupta, Mr. Ashish
Kumar, Ms. Pooja Sharma and
Ms. Pearl Sharma, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
J U D G M E N T
%
1. Through the present petition, the petitioners/tenants impugn the order
dated 06.10.2026, passed by the learned ARC-02 (Central), Tis Hazari Courts,
1 2
Delhi, in RC ARC 582/25 , titled “Kalpana Jain v. Ram Roop Jain” ,
whereby the learned Trial Court dismissed the application of the petitioners
3
under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , seeking to place
certain documents on record.
1
Hereinafter „Trial Court‟
2
Hereinafter „underlying proceedings‟
3
Hereinafter „CPC‟
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Signed By:ANKITA RAI
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2. The facts, shorn of unnecessary details, are as follows, the
respondents/landlords instituted the underlying proceedings under Section 14
4
(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 qua Shop
No. 1219/07, Ground Floor, Municipal No. 1217- 1221, Katra Sat Narayan,
5
Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 .
3. Pursuant thereto, summons got served on 23.09.2025 and application
for leave to defend was filed on 06.10.2025. The respondents filed a reply
thereto, followed by a rejoinder on behalf of the petitioners.
4. On 05.10.2026, when the matter was listed for arguments on the leave
to defend application, the subject application under Section 151 CPC was
moved by the petitioners, seeking to place on record, details of purported
subsequent events along with a list of documents and an affidavit under
Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
5. The learned Trial Court vide the impugned order dated 06.10.2026
dismissed the aforesaid application of the petitioners.
6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondents did
not act in accordance with Direction 2 contained in Chapter 22 - Directions
for Streamlining the Procedure for Speedy Disposal of Cases under DRC Act,
High Court Rules & Orders, Volume I, inserted vide Notification No.
99/Rules/DHC dated 15.03.2010. Under this direction, landlords filing a
petition under the DRC Act are mandated to furnish inter alia details of
pending litigation between the same parties or between different parties qua
the same property. It is submitted that a copy of the aforesaid notification was
handed over to the learned Trial Court, yet the same remains
4
Hereinafter „DRC Act‟
5
Hereinafter „subject property‟
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unaddressed/unexamined in the impugned order.
8. In respect of the above, it is stated that the petitioners have instituted
numerous eviction petitions against occupants of other shops within the same
premises as the subject property, many of which have been withdrawn or
disposed, thereby negating the bona fide requirement contention of the
respondents. It is added that the petitioners sought to only place on record
judicial records of the aforementioned proceedings, as the general omnibus
disclosure in the eviction petition about the pendency of these matters is not
meaningfully transparent.
9. Emphasis is laid on the fact that the withdrawals/disposals of several
other eviction petitions are “subsequent developments”, which could not have
been manufactured, invented or retrospectively pleaded by the petitioners
while filing the application for leave to defend.
10. It is further urged that the respondents have, subsequent to filing of the
petitioners‟ application for leave to defend, displayed banners/posters stating
“SHOP AVAILABLE FOR RENT”, along with the names of “Kalpana Jain”
and “Kamal Jain”, which corroborates that the respondents intended to secure
vacant possession of the other shops within the premises for commercial
exploitation only. It is stated that the cumulative effect of these “subsequent
developments”, raises a question over the credibility of bona fide requirement.
11. Reliance is placed on Rajiv Puri v. Jagdish Kumar (Since Deceased)
6 7
Thr Lrs and Others and Qamruddin v. Ziauddin , to contend that a hyper-
technical approach ought not to be taken while considering to take on record
additional documents/pleadings concerning subsequent developments,
including facts of which knowledge was acquired subsequent to filing of the
application for leave to defend.
6
2020 SCC OnLine Del 311
7
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2575
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12. The petitioners have also relied upon Gulab Singh v. Sher Singh and
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Punjab Stainless Stell House and Another v. Sangeeta Kedia , to contend
that material subsequent developments which transpire after the application
for leave to defend has been moved, ought to be taken on record.
13. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
unequivocal disclosures qua the other eviction petitions and the fact that the
respondents sought the entire premises for their bona fide use, were made in
paragraph 31 of the eviction petition and reiterated in paragraph 15 of the
respondents‟ reply to the application for leave to defend.
14. It is further submitted that the photographs showing the banners
reading “SHOP AVAILABLE FOR RENT”, which are sought to be
introduced by the petitioners, are fabricated/staged by the petitioners
themselves and demonstrate their malice. It is stated that these banners were
affixed by the petitioners and/or their agents when the market was closed and
it is evident that the respondents had no reason to affix these banners as 5 out
of the 8 shops where such banners have been affixed, are still within the
possession of the respective tenants and are subject to litigation.
15. Reliance is placed on the landmark judgment of Gaya Prasad v.
10
Pradeep Srivastava , whereby the Hon‟ble Supreme Court cautioned against
taking routine cognizance of “subsequent events” in rent litigation, unless
such “subsequent events” genuinely eclipse the relief sought by the party
seeking eviction, which is not the case herein.
16. This Court has considered the rival submissions and perused the
material on record.
17. The narrow question which arises for consideration is whether at the
8
2015 SCC OnLine Del 9295
9
2014 SCC OnLine Del 7692
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(2001) 2 SCC 604
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stage where the application for leave to defend was listed for arguments,
could the petitioners have been permitted to introduce the material cited in
their application under Section 151 CPC.
18. In the present case, the petitioners wish to bring on record two sets of
documents namely, details of eviction petitions filed by the respondents
against occupants of other shops within the premises where the subject
property is situated and photographs displaying advertisement banners affixed
outside such shops. The explanations proffered by the petitioners for
introducing this material at a belated stage are firstly, the existence of these
other petitions was discovered only during an online inspection of judicial
records and the settlements/withdrawals therein occurred after the application
for leave to defend was filed and secondly, the existence of these banners
came to the knowledge of the petitioners after the respondents obtained
vacant possession of such shops. These explanations, in the considered view
of this Court, are vague and not maintainable.
19. A bare reading of paragraph 31 of the eviction petition and paragraph
15 of the reply to the application for leave to defend, reveals that the
respondents seek the entire premises for their bona fide requirement and have
in pursuance thereof, instituted other eviction petitions as well. Even
otherwise, records of these petitions i.e., the withdrawals/disposals, are
readily accessible through a search on the e-courts portal. So, the assertion
that these judicial records came to the petitioners‟ knowledge at a belated
stage, does not inspire confidence.
20. Turning next to the photographs, the petitioners contend that the
respondents intend to commercially let out the other shops in the premises, for
which vacant possessions have been obtained by citing bona fide requirement.
However, not one shred of proof, for instance, any record of correspondence
between prospective tenants and the respondents etc., has been brought forth
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by the petitioners to substantiate that the respondents either intend to or have
let out these other shops.
21. Even if for the sake of the argument, it is presumed that the respondents
have actually let out these shops, even then the rights of the evicted tenants
would be protected by the statutory remedy provided under Section 19 DRC
Act. Moreover, in the event that the respondents commercially let out the
subject property herein, even the petitioners would be at liberty to seek the
remedy under Section 19 DRC Act. However, in the sheer absence of any
evidence of violation on the part of the respondents, the petitioners cannot be
permitted to introduce these photographs as “subsequent developments”, as
these “developments” mentioned by the petitioners are baseless and have not
even occurred. Additionally, the authenticity of these photographs remains
11
heavily disputed. Reference is made to Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua ,
where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court shed light on the scope of Section 19 DRC
Act as a remedy for dispossessed tenants where there is a non-compliance on
part of the landlord after eviction. The relevant portion of the judgment is
extracted hereinbelow:
“ 19. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty-bound to
place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It
is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts
on the tenant. The object of Section 14(1)( e ) vis-à-vis Section 25-B
has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under
Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant
for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the
landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the
intended purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who
stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord
invoking Section 14(1)( e ) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter
alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a
speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to
Section 25-B(8), denying a right of appeal.”
11
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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22. Importantly, Direction 2 of the Notification dated 15.03.2010, cited by
the petitioners, only mandates a landlord to furnish details of its ongoing
litigation with the same parties as the eviction petition or with different parties
in respect of the same property. Although the shop forming the subject matter
of the present petition is situated within the same premises as the other shops
qua which the respondents have instituted eviction petitions, these others
shops are clearly not the “same property” as the shop herein, in terms of the
said direction. Therefore, the reliance of the petitioners on the said
notification is misplaced.
23. At this juncture, it is germane to point out that the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Gaya Prasad (supra) , has clarified the scope of “subsequent events”
vis-à-vis rent/eviction litigation. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
judgment is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:
“ 13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the
genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a
dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party
should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent
events . A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti
Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770]
which pointed to the need for remoulding the reliefs on the strength
of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of
rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such
subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. This is what
learned Judges of the Bench said then: (SCC pp. 772-73, para 4)
“We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy
claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and
factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in
many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and
developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding
provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously
obeyed.
14. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which approved and
followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad
[(1981) 3 SCC 103] has taken care to emphasise that the
subsequent events should have “wholly satisfied” the
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requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the
ground of personal requirement . The relevant passage is
extracted below: (SCC pp. 113-14, para 14)
“Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is
sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the
requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date
of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for
eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which
would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied then
in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is
incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed
against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into
consideration subsequent events .””
24. In view thereof, this Court believes that the reliance of the petitioners
on Gulab Singh (supra) and Punjab Stainless Stell House and Another
(supra) , is misplaced. In Gulab Singh (supra) , the eviction petition was
instituted by the landlord on the plea of bona fide requirement to establish a
physiotherapy clinic for his daughter; however, subsequent to the filing of the
application for leave to defend, his daughter got married and relocated to
another state, and meanwhile other shops belonging to the him became vacant
and were re-let. In Punjab Stainless Stell House and Another (supra) , as
many as seven shops became available to the landlady pursuant to other
eviction orders after the application for leave to defend was filed, thereby
satisfying the projected bona fide need. In both of these decisions, the bona
fide requirement was fully eclipsed by material subsequent events. The
aforementioned cases are therefore distinguishable on facts from the present
case and lend no assistance to the petitioners.
25. Undoubtedly, subsequent events that arise after the application for
leave to defend is preferred can be taken into consideration by the Court,
however, in the case at hand, the purported developments pointed out by the
petitioners, fail to meet the threshold of “subsequent developments” as held in
Gaya Prasad (supra) .
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26. Furthermore, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh v. Satpal
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Singh (dead) through its LRs has laid down that the prescribed period of 15
days for filing an application for leave to defend cannot be extended. And, it
is clear that the subject application is a dilatory tactic deployed by the
petitioners, who have anyway continually attempted to delay the underlying
proceedings. The learned Trial Court vide the impugned order has also made
the following observations with regards to the petitioners‟ conduct:
“Further it is pertinent to note that the matter is at the stage of
arguments on leave to defend. Record shows that matter was listed
for arguments on leave to defend for 04.08.2026. At request of
respondents herein time for filing of rejoinder was also extended
vide order dated 04.08.2026 thereby granting 15 days‟ time to file
rejoinder. As per record on the NDOH, i.e. 29.08.2026,
adjournment was sought on behalf of respondents. Still in the
interest of justice matter was adjourned by way of final opportunity
and was fixed for 21.09.2026. On 21.09.2026, none appeared
however considering that lawyers were abstaining from work, no
adverse orders were passed and matter was fixed for today with
clear directions that no adjournment shall be granted to either party
for arguments on leave to defend. Despite that, respondents came
up with instant application without even supplying an advance
copy to other party.”
27. It is apposite to clarify that the inherent powers of the Court under
Section 151 CPC are intended to meet the ends of justice and albeit the Court
is not powerless to take material pertaining to “subsequent events” on record
but such developments must be satisfactorily explained and shown to have a
material bearing on the core controversy between the parties. The inherent
powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be routinely invoked to provide
successive opportunities to the petitioners to supplement their grounds, after
the application for leave to defend has already been filed.
28. Recently, this Court in Manpreet Singh v. Parmod Kumar Gupta and
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(2010) 2 SCC 15
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Another , while dealing with a similar challenge, declined to interfere with
the dismissal of an application under Section 151 CPC seeking to place
additional documents on record after the application for leave to defend had
been filed. This Court observed that the summary procedure under Section
25-B DRC Act does not contemplate successive opportunities to improve
and/or supplement the grounds already disclosed in the application for leave
to defend and inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to
circumvent the scheme of Section 25-B DRC Act. The ratio laid down therein
applies to the facts of the present case and consequently, the petitioners herein
cannot be permitted to bolster their defence belatedly under the garb of
introducing additional documents.
29. Additionally, the contention of the petitioners in paragraph 30 of this
petition, that no prejudice would be caused to the respondents if the proposed
material is taken on record, is not determinative. The mere absence of
prejudice cannot circumvent the statutory procedure prescribed under Section
25-B DRC Act.
30. It is equally important to emphasize on the scope of Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. It is no longer res integra that this Court in exercise of
its supervisory jurisdiction, can neither act as an appellate court nor substitute
its view where a plausible view has been taken by the courts/tribunals over
which it exercises such supervisory jurisdiction. This Court is not empowered
to correct every error of fact/law committed by such subordinate
courts/tribunals while acting within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction is confined to cases of blatant violation of
fundamental tenets of law, where failure to intervene would occasion a grave
miscarriage of justice. Coming to the present case, this Court cannot lose sight
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2026 SCC OnLine Del 7086
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of the fact that the learned Trial Court has, while dismissing the petitioners‟
subject application, taken a plausible and well-reasoned view. Thus, in light
of the facts and circumstances of this case, as well as the scope of the
supervisory jurisdiction as iterated above, this Court does not believe that the
impugned order is riddled with any perversity or patent illegality warranting
interference.
31. Thus, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds the present
petition to be devoid of substance. The summary procedure envisaged under
Section 25-B DRC Act cannot be bypassed under Section 151 CPC to grant
successive opportunities to the petitioners to supplement or improve upon
their application for leave to defend. Neither the withdrawal/disposal of other
eviction petitions has any material bearing over the respondents‟ bona fide
requirement, nor can the disputed photographs be permitted to derail the
underlying proceedings, particularly when Section 19 DRC Act provides an
adequate safeguard in the event of re-letting.
32. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no infirmity in the
impugned order dated 06.10.2026 passed by the learned Trial Court
dismissing petitioners‟ application under Section 151 CPC.
33. The present petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s),
if any, stand disposed of.
34. Needless to clarify, the aforesaid observations are confined to the
present petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the
merits of the case.
35. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
AJAY DIGPAUL, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/ AS/as
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