BADRI NARAYAN LAL vs THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH VIGILANCE NOW ACB

2026:JHHC:32614
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Cr. M.P. No. 2763 of 2024

1. Badri Narayan Lal, aged about 78 years, son of D.N. Lal, R/o
704 Vasundra Apartment, Doranda, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S.
Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand
2. Mahendra Prasad Singh, aged about 79 years, son of late
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, R/o Ashok Kunj Apartment, Ashok
Kunj, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Argora, District Ranchi, Jharkhand
3. Sheo Dahin Prasad Singh @ Sheo Dahin Singh aged about 84
years, son of late Thakur Prasad Singh, R/o H /1, 207, Harmu
Housing Colony, Ranchi, Post Office Harmu, Police Station
Argora, District Ranchi, Jharkhand
… … Petitioners
Versus
The State of Jharkhand through Vigilance (now ACB)
… … Opposite Party
---
CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

---
For the Petitioners : Mr. A.K. Kashyap, Sr. Advocate
: Ms. Supriya Dayal, Advocate
For the Opposite Party : Mrs. Priya Shrestha, Spl.PP
---
CAV on 27.10.2026 Pronounced on: 03.11.2026

This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal
prosecution/proceeding including the order dated 27.09.2023 passed
by learned Special Judge (A.C.B), West Singhbhum at Chaibasa, in
connection with Vigilance Case No.21 of 1992 registered under
Section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, and Section 161/34 of
Indian Penal Code, arising out of Adityapur P.S. Case No.76/1992,
whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioners for offence
under Section 161 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 5 of the P.C. Act, which is now pending in the court of learned
Special Judge (A.C.B), West Singhbhum at Chaibasa.
2. Subsequently, one I.A. No.181 of 2025 was filed seeking to add
additional relief challenging the order framing charge dated
04.12.2024 whereby charge has been framed for alleged offence under
Section 7 (a) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amended) Act, 2018.
The charge was framed in the following manner:
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“ Name of the person hereby charge you as
follows: -
1. Badri Narayan Lal
2. Mahendra Prasad Singh
3. Sheo Dahin Singh
th
Firstly: -That you, on or about the 06 day of
June, 1992 at Govt. Polytechnic Adityapur being
a Public Servant (invigilator of Answer sheets of
Polytechnic Examination) take gratification of
various amounts such as Rs. 5,900/-(From
Badrinarayan Lal) & Mahendra Prasad Singh,
Sheodahin Singh other than legal remuneration
for evaluation of the answer sheets of the
aforesaid examination.
and thereby committed an offence
punishable under section 7(a) of Prevention of
Corruption (Amended) Act, 2018 and within my
cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by
me on the said charge.
The contents read over and explained
them in 'Hindi' to which they pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.”

3. The case records reveal that there were altogether 11 accused
persons and 7 were enlarged on bail and 4 remained absent. The
records as placed before this court reveals that a few persons had
expired and a report regarding their death was called for. The order
sheet dated 04.12.2024 reveals that the present three petitioners had
appeared before the court and two accused namely, Baldev Prasad
Sahu and Shakti Nath Jha, who were on bail, were absent.
Consequently, bail of Baldev Prasad Sahu and Shakti Nath Jha was
cancelled and non-bailable warrant was directed to be issued and the
case of present petitioners was split and charge was framed against the
petitioners. Thus, the case remained pending awaiting the appearance
of other co-accused persons.
4. The three accused persons against whom charge has been
framed are the petitioners before this Court.
5. The aforesaid interlocutory application was disposed of vide
order dated 15.05.2026 and the petitioners were permitted to challenge
the order framing charge against them.
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6. Subsequently, the following additional prayer was added vide
order dated 15.05.2026:
“ Further, for quashing of the entire criminal
prosecution/proceeding including the order dated
04.12.2024 passed by learned Special Judge (A.C.B) West
Singhbhum at Chaibasa, in connection with Vigilance
Case No.21 of 1992, corresponding to Special Case No.21
of 1992, whereby and whereunder charge has been framed
under Section 7 (a) of Prevention of Corruption (Amended)
Act, 2018 and the case is fixed for after charge evidence,
which is now pending in the court of learned Special Judge
(A.C.B) West Singhbhum at Chaibasa .”
Arguments of the petitioners
7. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as
per the F.I.R., the date of alleged offence is 06.06.1992 and the F.I.R.
was lodged on 07.06.1992, but it has been registered under Section 5
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 read with Section 161/34 of
Indian Penal Code (IPC) . He submits that on the date of occurrence as
well as on the date of lodging of F.I.R., the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947 stood repealed and replaced by the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and further by virtue of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 itself, the provision of Section 161 of IPC was also repealed.
8. He has further submitted that the charge sheet in the present
case was submitted on 25.04.2000 committing the same mistake for
alleged offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 read with Section 161 / 34 of IPC and cognizance was also taken
on 27.09.2023 for alleged offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and Section 161/34 of the 1947 Act, unmindful of the
fact that the said provisions under which cognizance have been taken,
were already repealed.
9. The learned counsel has further submitted that charge has been
framed during the pendency of this case under Section 7 (a) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act as amended in 2018 and has submitted
that the punishment prescribed under section 7(a) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, as amended in 2018, is much higher as compared to
the punishment prescribed under Section 7 (a) of the Prevention of
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Corruption Act, 1988. He has submitted that the charge could not have
been framed under Section 7 (a) of Prevention of Corruption
(Amended) Act, 2018 as the alleged incident involved in this case is
covered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
10. The learned counsel has further submitted that so far as the 3
petitioners are concerned, they were the examiners and there is an
allegation of taking illegal gratification in connection with correction
of answer sheets. The learned counsel has then submitted that there
has been inordinate delay in the matter inasmuch as the F.I.R. was
lodged on 07.06.1992 and the charge has been framed in the year 2024
i.e. after 31 years of registering the F.I.R. He submits that all the 3
petitioners are senior citizens and they are entitled for speedy trial and
their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been
violated. They have been facing the mental agony since the year 1992.
He further submits that the order sheet of the learned court reveals that
the case was adjourned from time to time awaiting the sanction order.
Therefore, continued criminal proceedings cannot be sustained.
11. He has referred to the judgements passed by Hon’ble Supreme
Court reported in ( 1998) 7 SCC 507 (Raj Deo Sharma Vs. State of
Bihar) ; (1999) 7 SCC 604 (Raj Deo Sharma Vs. State of Bihar) and
(2002) 4 SCC 578 (P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka)
paragraphs 21, 28 and 29. Paragraphs 21 and 29 of the judgement
reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578 (P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of
Karnataka) are quoted as under:
21. Is it at all necessary to have limitation bars terminating
trials and proceedings? Is there no effective mechanism
available for achieving the same end? The Criminal
Procedure Code, as it stands, incorporates a few provisions to
which resort can be had for protecting the interest of the
accused and saving him from unreasonable prolixity or laxity
at the trial amounting to oppression. Section 309, dealing with
power to postpone or adjourn proceedings, provides generally
for every inquiry or trial, being proceeded with as
expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the
examination of witnesses has once begun, the same to be
continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance
have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of
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the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons
to be recorded. Explanation 2 to Section 309 confers power on
the court to impose costs to be paid by the prosecution or the
accused, in appropriate cases, and putting the parties on
terms while granting an adjournment or postponing of
proceedings. This power to impose costs is rarely exercised by
the courts. Section 258, in Chapter XX CrPC, on trial of
summons cases, empowers the Magistrate trying summons
cases instituted otherwise than upon complaint, for reasons to
be recorded by him, to stop the proceedings at any stage
without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage
of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal
witnesses has been recorded, to pronounce a judgment of
acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, having
effect of discharge. This provision is almost never used by the
courts. In appropriate cases, inherent power of the High
Court, under Section 482 can be invoked to make such orders,
as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under the
Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of the
process of any court, or otherwise, to secure the ends of
justice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and consciously
exercised, can take care of almost all the situations where
interference by the High Court becomes necessary on account
of delay in proceedings or for any other reason amounting to
oppression or harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings.
In appropriate cases, the High Courts have exercised their
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of first
information report and investigation, and terminating criminal
proceedings if the case of abuse of process of law was clearly
made out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a case
being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench in A.R.
Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]
referred to such power, vesting in the High Court (vide paras
62 and 65 of its judgment) and held that it was clear that even
apart from Article 21, the courts can take care of undue or
inordinate delays in criminal matters or proceedings if they
remain pending for too long and putting an end, by making
appropriate orders, to further proceedings when they are
found to be oppressive and unwarranted.
………………………………………….
29. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in
Common Cause case (I) [(1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
589] [as modified in Common Cause (II) [(1996) 6 SCC 775 :
1997 SCC (Cri) 42] ] and Raj Deo Sharma (I) [(1998) 7 SCC
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507 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1692] and (II) [(1999) 7 SCC 604 :
1999 SCC (Cri) 1324] the Court could not have prescribed
periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case
or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must
mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or
discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold:
(1) The dictum in A.R. Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93] is correct and still holds the field.
(2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the
Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid
down as guidelines in A.R. Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC 225 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 93] adequately take care of right to speedy
trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions.
(3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay case [(1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] are not exhaustive but only
illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and-fast
rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their
applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case.
It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization
can be made.
(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially
permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion
of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of
limitation prescribed in the several directions made in
Common Cause (I) [(1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 589] ,
Raj Deo Sharma (I) [(1998) 7 SCC 507 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
1692] and Raj Deo Sharma (II) [(1999) 7 SCC 604 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 1324] could not have been so prescribed or drawn
and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to
terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of
lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in
Common Cause case (I) [(1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
589] , Raj Deo Sharma case (I) [(1998) 7 SCC 507 : 1998
SCC (Cri) 1692] and (II) [(1999) 7 SCC 604 : 1999 SCC (Cri)
1324] . At the most the periods of time prescribed in those
decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or
proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded
to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of
the case before them and determine by taking into
consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in
A.R. Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]
and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so
inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and
unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by
themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further
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continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily
obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or
discharge the accused.
(5) The criminal courts should exercise their available
powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy
trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be a
better protector of such right than any guidelines. In
appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC and Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or
suitable directions.
(6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of
India and the State Governments of their constitutional
obligation to strengthen the judiciary — quantitatively and
qualitatively — by providing requisite funds, manpower and
infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall
act.
We answer the questions posed in the orders of reference
dated 19-9-2000 and 26-4-2001 in the abovesaid terms.

12. The learned counsel has submitted that the law in connection
with right of speedy trial and quashment of the criminal proceedings
in cases of inordinate delay has been ultimately summarized by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgement reported in (2002) 4 SCC
578 (supra) paragraph 21, 28 and 29 and has submitted that reference
to the judgement reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578 (supra) would be
sufficient to bring home the aforesaid point.
13. The learned counsel has also submitted that a balance has to be
maintained between the right of the prosecution to proceed against the
accused persons and the right of the accused persons to have speedy
trial. The essential factors would be the length of delay, justification
for delay, and the prejudice which has been caused to the accused.
14. The learned counsel has further submitted that the original
sanction order has not been placed before the trial court and what has
been placed is only a certified copy. He submits that in absence of
original sanction order, cognizance could not have been taken, and
therefore, the order taking cognizance itself is bad in law.
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15. For this proposition, he has relied upon the judgement passed
by this Court reported in 2013 (2) JCR 41 (Shailendra Prasad Vs.
State of Jharkhand) paragraphs 5 and 7 . The learned counsel
submits that in the said case decided by this Court, the photocopy of
sanction order was filed before the trial court and original was not
filed and it was asserted by the State that the original sanction order
will be produced at the time of trial. The learned counsel submits that
in the present case before the learned trial court the sanction order was
not produced for quite some time and subsequently a certified copy
has been produced on the basis of which cognizance has been taken.
He submits that in absence of original sanction order, cognizance
could not have been taken on the basis of any certified copy.
16. Learned counsel for the opposite party representing ACB has
referred to the order dated 04.12.2024 annexed along with I.A. No.181
of 2025 and has submitted that though the record was of the year 1992
but the co-accused remained absent, and therefore, their bail was
cancelled and non-bailable warrant was issued against them. She
submits that the delay, if any, is not attributable to the prosecution.
The learned counsel has also submitted that as per the F.I.R. itself, the
petitioners were caught while they were in the room where the answer
sheets were being corrected and money was also recovered during
search. The learned counsel has submitted that at the time of
conducting the raid, incriminating materials were found whereby the
name of the examinees were disclosed in a chit of paper with their
code number and the modus operandi of committing the offence had
also come to light. She has referred to the allegations made in the
F.I.R. itself which deals with the materials collected at the time of
raid. She submits that since incriminating materials were collected
during the raid itself, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners.
17. The learned counsel has also submitted that so far as the
framing of charge under Section 7 (a) of the Prevention of Corruption
(Amended) Act, 2018 is concerned, except for the extent of
punishment, the ingredients are one and the same. The learned counsel
for the State has also submitted that in case there is any irregularity in
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the order framing charge, the entire proceeding may not be quashed
and at best it can be remanded back to the court concerned for framing
fresh charge.
18. The learned counsel for the opposite party has relied upon the
judgment passed by this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 725 of 2025 (Dr.
Harendra Kumar Singh Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation) , dated
27.11.2025 and has submitted that, in the said case, the case was
registered as Vigilance Case No.10 of 2011 and by referring to the
new provisions of Section 218 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (BNSS), it has been held that as per the said provision, if the
prosecution sanction does not come within a period of 120 days, there
is a deemed sanction. She has submitted that once BNSS 2023 has
come into force, the concept of deemed sanction would apply in the
present case as the charges in the present case have been framed after
BNSS 2023 has come into force. Cognizance has been taken prior to
coming into force of BNSS 2023.
19. Learned counsel has also submitted that in order dated
25.04.2000, it was recorded that a communication was received vide
Letter No. 450 dated 18.03.1998 issued by Sri A.K. Upadhyay,
Additional Secretary, Department of Science and Technology,
Government of Bihar. However, the document which has been
forwarded by the concerned court pursuant to the order of this Court
reveal that the communication in connection with sanction has been
issued by A.K. Upadhyay, the Secretary of the Department of Science
and Technology. She has submitted that A.K. Upadhyay, the Secretary
of the Department of Science and Technology, was the competent
authority for grant of sanction and sanction order was already placed
on record. She has also submitted that charge have already been
framed and therefore, there is no illegality in the impugned proceeding
involved in the present case.
20. To this, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners submits
that not only the punishment but also the ingredients of Section 7 (a)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the provision of Section
7 (a) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended in 2018 are
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different. The order framing charge cannot be sustained in law as
explained above.
Findings of this Court
21. The prosecution story as mentioned in the FIR dated
07.06.1992 reveals that the case was initiated on the basis of the typed
report filed by one Pramanand Ram, Sub-divisional Officer, Seraikela
on 07.06.1992 lodged at Adityapur Police Station, which was
registered as Adityapur P.S.Case No. 76 of 1992 dated 07.06.1992
under sections 161 r/w section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and 5 of
the P.C. Act. It has been alleged therein that the Deputy
Commissioner, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa had received a secret
information that bribe amount was being taken from the examinees for
evaluation of their answer book in Adityapur Government
Polytechnic. On the instruction of the Deputy Commissioner, West
Singhbhum at Chaibasa, the informant along with other government
officials reached at the spot on 06.06.1992 at 16.45 hours along with
Officer-in-charge, Adityapur Police Station, where the allegations
were found true and incriminating articles were also recovered from
the place where the answer sheets were being corrected and the
petitioners and other co-accused persons were correcting the answer
sheets.
22. The FIR was registered under section 161 read with section 34
of IPC and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and charge
sheet dated 20.02.2000 was filed under section 161 read with section
34 of IPC and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and
cognizance was also taken under the same sections on 27.09.2023.
23. This Court finds that the entire allegation relates to offence
committed after coming into force of Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, by which Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as well as section
161 and other analogous sections of IPC, were repealed. However,
right from the FIR till the order taking cognizance, the sections
referred to were section 161 read with section 34 of IPC and section 5
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, but no specific mention was
made of whether it was Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or
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Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. However, the fact remains that
the offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was referrable
to section 5 and the offences under Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 were referrable to section 7. Thus, apparently, the FIR as well as
the cognizance was taken under repealed section 161 of IPC and also
under repealed section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
although the entire incident related to events when the aforesaid
provisions were already repealed and the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 was already enacted. However, the charge has been framed
under section 7 (a) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act,
2018 as amended in the year 2018 and there is no dispute that 2018
amendment is also not applicable in the present case.
24. Being faced with aforesaid situation, the learned counsel has
submitted that such irregularities will not vitiate the entire criminal
proceedings and the matter regarding framing of charge could be
remanded to rectify the errors.
25. There is no doubt that the learned special court had the
jurisdiction to deal with the case, be it under Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, or Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or Prevention of
Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018.
26. The records of the case reveal that the petitioners had filed one
Cr. Misc. Case No.837 of 2000 (R) challenging that investigation of
the case and vide order dated 20.09.2000 an order was passed
directing the Superintendent of Police to take necessary action in the
matter and to communicate the court the reason for the delay in
submission of the final form in the case. However, the final form was
submitted during the pendency of Cr. Misc Case No.837 of 2000 (R)
and the proceedings before this Court was dropped as the case had
become infructuous. The final form placed on record reveals that the
same was submitted against the 11 accused persons including the
petitioners for alleged offence under Section 161 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 of the P.C. Act. The order
dated 09.01.2001 is quoted as under: -
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“In this case the prayer of the petitioner is for quashing of
the investigation. Since the final form has already been
submitted, this application has become infructuous.
Accordingly, it is dismissed as such. However, the petitioner
will be at liberty to challenge the order taking cognizance if
an when the occasion arises.”

27. Upon submission of charge-sheet (final form) dated
24.04.2000, the charge sheet was perused by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance) Ranchi on 25.04.2000, who observed that the original
sanction order against the accused persons accorded by the competent
authority was not on record and what was placed on record was only a
communication letter issued vide letter no.450 dated 18.03.1998 under
the signature of Additional Secretary, Department of Science and
Technology, Government of Bihar addressed to Superintendent of
Police, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa and was filed along with the case
diary. The court was of the view that since the original sanction order
accorded by the competent authority against the accused persons was
not on record, and in absence of valid sanction order on record, no
cognizance could be taken. In such circumstances, the Special Judge
had written a letter to the Secretary, Science and Technology, Govt. of
Bihar as well as Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum and Dy.
S.P. Seraikella and I.O. of the case to produce the original sanction
order accorded by the competent authority so that cognizance could be
taken.
28. The order dated 25.04.2000 is quoted as under:
“Perused the final form report filed in Adityapur P.S.
Case no.76/92 dated 7.6.92 out of which special case
21/92 arises. From the perusal of the final form report and
the original case diary it transpires that the I.O. i.e.
Dy.S.P. Saraikella has submitted chargesheet u/s 161 read
with 34 I.P.C. and u/s 5 of the P.C. Act against 11 accused
persons mentioned in the chargesheet. From the perusal of
the case diary it transpires that the original sanction order
against the accused persons granted by the competent
authority is not on the record and only a communication
issued vide letter no.450 dated 18.3.98 issued under the
signatures of A.K.Upadhyay, Addl. Secretary, Department
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of Science and Technology, Govt. of Bihar addressed to
the S.P., West Singhbhum, Chaibasa is filed alongwith the
case diary. From the perusal of the aforesaid letter it
transpires that the competent authority has granted
sanction in terms of P.C. against all the 11 accused
persons for prosecution in the case but the original
sanction order accorded against all the accused persons is
not with the record. In this view of the matter in absence
of valid sanction, no cognizance can be taken against the
accused persons at this stage. Office to write a letter to the
Secretary, Science and Technology Govt. of Bihar, Deputy
Commissioner, West Singhbhum Chaibasa S.P. Chaibasa
and Dy. S.P. Seraikella, the I.O. of the …. Obtain the
original sanction order from…… authority against all the
accused persons forthwith transmit the said sanction order
to this court so that the cognizance in the case can be
taken. From the perusal of the record submitted by the
I.O. alongwith the case diary it further transpires that the
I.O. of the case have submitted photo copy of the seizure
list and the original seizure list is kept with the record of
the case. List this case on 24.5.2000 waiting original
sanction order against all the 11 accused persons for
cognizance.”

29. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the court of learned
Special Judge (ACB) West Singhbhum at Chaibasa.
30. The order sheet further reveals that the case was adjourned from
time to time awaiting the sanction order from the competent authority,
the Secretary, Science and Technology Govt. of Bihar, to whom letter
was issued pursuant to order dated 25.04.2000. The order dated
10.08.2023 again records adjournment of the case to 27.09.2023
awaiting sanction order.
31. Cognizance dated 27.09.2023, has been taken against 11
accused persons on the basis of certified copy of the letter issued by the
Department of Science and Technology, Govt. of Bihar vide Letter No.
450 dated 18.03.1998, addressed to the S.P, West Singhbhum at
Chaibasa treating the same as the sanction for prosecution.
32. It is the specific case of the petitioners in paragraph 16 of the
petition that the case was pending since 2000 awaiting the original
sanction order and suddenly without receiving the original sanction
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accorded by the competent authority against the accused persons, the
Special Judge, (ACB), West Singhbhum, Chaibasa has taken
cognizance after 31 years.
33. On 05.10.2026, this court recorded the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioners who stated that still the sanction
order is not on record. In such circumstances, this Court has passed an
order dated 05.10.2026 directing the office to call for a copy of the
certified copy of the sanction order which has been received by the
learned court vide letter no.1509 / Patna dated 08.07.2015 of the
Assistant Director, Department of Science and Technology, Bihar
Patna as has been mentioned in the order dated 27.09.2023.
34. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 05.10.2026 passed by this
court, the learned court has placed on record the following documents
through letter no.137 /2026 dated 08.10.2026.

S.
No.
Documents No. of
Sheet
Annexure
1 Copy of order dated 09.01.2001 passed by the
Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand Ranchi in Cr.
Misc. No.837 of 2000
01 Annexure – A
(Page No.1)
2. Copy of Memo No.4495 dated 20.02.2001 of
the Hon’ble Court through which the aforesaid
order received.
01 Annexure – A
(Page No.2)
3 Copy of Certified copy of sanction order 01 Annexure – B
(Page No.1)
4 Copy of Memo No.1509/Patna, dated
08.07.2015 of the Dy. Director, Science and
Technology Department Bihar Patna
01 Annexure – B
(Page No.2)


35. The enclosure to the said letter contained in Memo
No.1509/Patna, dated 08.07.2015 of the Dy. Director, Science and
Technology Department, Bihar, Patna reveals that the copy of the
certified copy of the sanction order is the same letter no. 450 dated
18.03.1998 which has been referred to in the earlier order dated
25.04.2000 produced before the court along with the case diary. In
the order dated 25.04.2000, the learned trial court did not record that
the original of letter no. 450 dated 18.03.1998 was not placed on
record but recorded that the said letter was issued under the signature
of A.K. Upadhyay, Additional Secretary, Department of Science and
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2026:JHHC:32614
Technology, Government of Bihar and that it was only a
communication but the required sanction of the competent authority
i.e. Secretary, Science and Technology, Government of Bihar was not
placed on record.
36. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the opposite
party that there appears to be an error committed by the learned trial
court in order dated 25.04.2000 itself. It has been rightly pointed out
that the letter no. 450 dated 18.03.1998 was issued by the Secretary of
the Department and not by the Additional Secretary of the Department
of Science and Technology. Upon perusal of the certified copy of the
said letter no.450 dated 18.03.1998 as forwarded by the learned court
pursuant to the order of this Court, it reveals that the letter was issued
by the Secretary, Science and Technology Department, Government
of Bihar mentioning about grant of sanction for prosecution to all the
11 accused persons and the same was not just a communication under
the signature of A.K. Upadhyay, Additional Secretary, Department of
Science and Technology. The designation of A.K. Upadhyay as
Additional Secretary, Department of Science and Technology,
Government of Bihar has been wrongly mentioned in the order dated
25.04.2000 while referring to letter no. 450 dated 18.03.1998. Under
such error, it appears that the trial court proceeded waiting for the
order of sanction issued by the Secretary, Science and Technology
Department Government of Bihar and also made communications to
the Secretary, Science and Technology Department Government of
Bihar asking the said authority to forward the sanction order. It was
this very letter whose certified copy was again forwarded to the court
concerned vide letter contained in Memo No.1509 dated 08.07.2015
and upon perusal of certified copy of letter no. 450 dated 18.03.1998,
the learned court has taken cognizance and has proceeded with the
case.
Upon perusal of the said letter, it reveals that it was issued by the
Secretary, Science and Technology Department stating that the
sanction for prosecution has been given with respect to all the 11
15

2026:JHHC:32614
accused persons and the letter is addressed to the Superintendent of
Police, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa and also to the public prosecutor.
37. Accordingly, it cannot be said that sanction order has not been
placed on record as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
This court is of the considered view that the learned court has
committed no error by recording that sanction order has been placed
on record.
38. So far as the judgment reported in 2013 (2) JCR 41 (Jhr)
(Shailendra Prasad Vs. State of Jharkhand) is concerned, the same
does not apply to the facts of the case. A reference has been made by
the learned counsel for the petitioners to paragraph 7 of the said
judgment. The case arises out of Railway Property Unlawful
Possession Act, 1966 and the order refusing discharge was under
challenge. In paragraph 7 of the said judgment, it was submitted by
the petitioner that the court had committed grave error in law by
treating photocopy of the letter dated 31.07.1996 issued by Chief
Security Commissioner granting permission for lodging the complaint
against the accused persons before the court of law to be amounting to
the order of sanction against the petitioner and consequently it was
submitted that in absence of proper sanction order issued by the
competent authority, cognizance could not have been taken against the
petitioner, who was the public servant.
The said judgement does not apply to the present case. In the present
case, the sanction order on the basis of which cognizance has been
taken, was issued by the Secretary of the Science and Technology
Department. By referring to Adityapur P.S. case No.76 of 1992 dated
07.06.1992, sanction has been granted with respect to prosecution of
all the 11 accused persons in the case. The said letter No. 450 dated
18.03.1998 has been issued by the Secretary, Science and Technology
Department, Government of Bihar, Patna and addressed to the
Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa.
39. Further in the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court
reported in (2014) 16 SCC 807 (State of Punjab Vs. Labh Singh), it
has been held that if the public servant has already attained the age of
16

2026:JHHC:32614
superannuation on the date of cognizance by the court, sanction for
prosecution is not required. Admittedly, in the present case, all the
accused persons have attained the age of superannuation.
40. In view of the aforesaid discussions the order taking
cognizance does not call for any interference for want of sanction
for prosecution.
41. Further challenge to the order taking cognizance is that the
cognizance has been taken under the repealed provisions and the case
relates to the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the
present case, cognizance has been taken for the alleged offence under
Section 161/34 IPC and also under Section 5 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, but both of which stood repealed vide
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. However, the petitioners were
being proceeded for having taken illegal gratification for the purpose
of correction of answer sheets and the petitioners very well know
about the allegations against them. It is not the case of the petitioners
that there are no provisions under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 so as to cover the alleged offence. In such circumstances, this
Court is of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the
petitioners by virtue of cognizance having been taken by mentioning
wrong provisions of law. It is further not in dispute that the concerned
court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance under the provisions of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Thus, in spite of there being
irregularity in the order taking cognizance inasmuch as repealed
provisions have been mentioned and not the corresponding provisions
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the order taking
cognizance does not call for any interference.
42. This is over and above the fact that the stage of the case has
also changed and charge has been framed for alleged offence under
section 7 (a) of Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018.
The order framing charge is also under challenge by arguing that the
entire criminal case falls during the period when the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 was in existence. This Court is of the considered
view that such irregularity cannot be a reason for quashing the entire
17

2026:JHHC:32614
criminal proceedings, but the order framing charge is fit to be set-
aside and the matter is to be remanded for passing fresh order on the
point of charge.
On the point of prolonged criminal case and quashment of
prosecution
43. So far as the argument of the petitioners with respect to
prolonged criminal case against the petitioners is concerned, this
Court finds no reason to quash the criminal case on the ground of
delay when seen in the light of the judgement reported in (2002) 4
SCC 578 (P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka), para 29 as
quoted above and the following reasons:
A. The petitioners had challenged the entire criminal
proceeding and its investigation earlier in Criminal
Miscellaneous Case No.837 of 2000 (R), and the same was
said to be infructuous upon filing of charge sheet, and liberty
was reserved with the petitioners to challenge the order taking
cognizance. This happened in the year 2000.
B. Thereafter, the trial court recorded that final form along
with case diary and a communication issued by the Additional
Secretary, Department of Science and Technology, Mr. A.K.
Upadhyay vide letter No. 450 dated 18.03.1998 was available.
While passing the aforesaid order, the trial court committed
serious error of record inasmuch as the said Letter No. 450
dated 18.03.1998 was not issued by the Additional Secretary of
Science and Technology Department, but was issued by the
Secretary, Science and Technology Department himself, stating
grant of prosecution sanction. On account of such error, the
court adjourned the matter for want of original sanction letter
from Secretary, Science and Technology Department and sent
letters to the investigating officer as well as to the sanctioning
authority, that is, Secretary, Science and Technology
Department, Government of Bihar asking them to forward the
order granting sanction for prosecution, and the case remained
pending. Ultimately when the certified copy of the same Letter
18

2026:JHHC:32614
No. 450 dated 18.03.1998 was forwarded to the trial court, the
trial court found that it was a certified copy of the sanction for
prosecution by the competent authority-Secretary, Science and
Technology Department, Government of Bihar and took
cognizance of offence by the impugned order dated
27.09.2023.
By virtue of the orders passed by this Court, the relevant
records were called for and this Court also finds that Letter No.
450 dated 18.03.1998 was issued by the Secretary, Science and
Technology Department and not by Additional Secretary,
Science and Technology Department as discussed above.
Thus, the error of record committed by the trial court in the
year 2000 continued for a long time and ultimately the
cognizance was taken vide order dated 27.09.2023 when
certified copy of the same letter Letter No. 450 dated
18.03.1998 was forwarded to the trial court.
C. This Court further finds that the case was still pending
for appearance of the co-accused persons.
D. The allegations against the petitioners are very serious,
inasmuch as they are alleged to be involved in taking illegal
gratification while correcting answer sheets and incriminating
articles were also seized during the raid from the same place
where they were correcting the answer sheets.
The petitioners throughout enjoyed the privilege of bail and the
charge sheet was submitted as back as in the year 2000.
Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, this Court
is of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the
petitioners by virtue of any delay and whatever was required to
be done by the prosecution so far as the submission of charge
sheet and the letter issued by the Secretary, Science and
Technology Department, Government of Bihar in connection
with sanction for prosecution, was already placed on record.
In such circumstances, this Court is not inclined to quash the
entire criminal proceedings on the ground of delay.
19

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44. Summary:
a) The order taking cognizance does not call for
interference.
b) The order framing charge for alleged offence under
the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act,
2018 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as the
entire case relates to the period when the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 was in force.
c) The prayer to quash the entire criminal proceedings
on the ground of delay/prolonged litigation is also
rejected.
45. Consequently, the matter is remanded to the learned trial court
for passing fresh order on framing charge, taking into consideration
that the entire alleged offence relates to the period during which the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was in force and the provision of
Section 161 of Indian Penal Code was repealed.
46. The petitioners are directed to appear before the learned court
on 01.12.2026 at 11.30 a.m. Since this is an old case relating to FIR

of the year 1992 and the petitioners are senior citizens, the parties to
cooperate with the proceedings so that the case is taken to a logical
end at the earliest.
47. By the impugned order, the case of two co-accused persons
have been split and their bail bonds have been cancelled and they are
not the petitioners before this Court. It will certainly be open to the
learned court to pass a similar order of splitting the case, if otherwise,
there is no legal impediment.
48. This petition is partly allowed to the extent it relates to order
framing charge.
49. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not
pressed.

(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
Date of Pronouncement: 03.11.2026
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