Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai vs Walter Bau Ag(I.I.)

Court
Bombay High Court

CNR No : HCBM020234562019

02-CARBP-1493 (2).DOC
JYOTI
RAJESH
MANE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
Digitally signed by
JYOTI RAJESH MANE
Date: 2026.11.20
12:40:17 +0530
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 1493 OF 2019
WITH
NOTICE OF MOTION IN COMMERCIAL DIVISION MATTERS (ST) NO.
2258 OF 2019
Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai
Mumbai (MCGM) through the Deputy
Municipal Commissioner (E), having
its office at Engineering Hib Building,
1st Floor, Dr. E. Moses Road, Worli,
Mumbai, India 411018. ...Petitioner
Versus
Walter Bau AG (i.I.), a company incorporated
under the laws of Federal Republic of
Germany, represented by the Insolvency
Administrator, Mr. Werner Schneider,
Shukla acting through his Power of Attorney holder
Mr. Anthony Moonjely, having its office at
Strabag India Private Limied, 406, Southern
Park, d2 District Centre, Saket,
New Delhi, India 110017 (Authorised
Representative of Dywidag
International GmbH) ...Respondent

WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 21373 OF 2024
IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 1493 OF 2019
_______
Mr. Yashodeep P. Deshmukh a/w. Mr. Shivprasad Borade and Ms. Pooja Yadav i/b.
Komal Punjabi, for Petitioner.
Mr. Zal Andhyarujina Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Gaurang Mehta a/w.Mr. Javed
Gaya a/w. Ms. Akansha Agrawal a/w. Ms. Rhea Mehta and Ms. Vidya Choudhari
i/b. Chamber of Javed Gaya, for the Respondent
_______
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02-CARBP-1493 (2).DOC
CORAM: AARTI SATHE , J.
RESERVED ON: 07 OCTOBER 2026
PRONOUNCED ON: 20 NOVEMBER 2026
P.C.
1. The present Petition, filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), challenges the arbitral
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award dated 6 March 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “impugned arbitral
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award”), the corrected arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 (hereinafter
referred to as the “corrected impugned arbitral award”), and the majority arbitral
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award dated 12 April 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the “impugned majority
arbitral award”), passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
2. By way of the aforesaid impugned arbitral awards, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal directed the Petitioner-Corporation to refund the amount of Rs.
5,50,00,000/- furnished as bank guarantee to the Respondent, together with
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interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 25 August 2006 until the date of
payment.
3. Briefly, the facts are as follows:
i) The Petitioner-Corporation is the Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai, popularly known as Brihanmumbai Mahanagarpalika Municipal
Corporation (MCGM), constituted under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act,
1888.
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02-CARBP-1493 (2).DOC
ii) The Respondent is a company incorporated under the laws of the Federal
Republic of Germany, represented by their Insolvency Administrator, Mr. Werner
Schneider, acting through his Power of Attorney holder, Mr. Anthony Moonjely.
iii) The Petitioner-Corporation undertook the Bombay Sewage Disposal
Project, which included civil works for the rehabilitation of the Bandra Collector
Tunnel (hereinafter referred to as the “civil works”). For the said purpose, the
Petitioner-Corporation invited bids from competent companies. The Respondent
was one of the bidders for the aforesaid civil works.
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iv) On 9 May 2000, the Petitioner-Corporation communicated the pre-
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qualification requirements for bidding. Thereafter, on 2 August 2000, the
Respondent submitted their bid for the aforesaid civil works, in accordance with
the requirements stipulated by the Petitioner-Corporation.
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v) On 16 October 2000, the Petitioner-Corporation issued a Letter of
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Acceptance (LOA) in favour of the Respondent. Thereafter, on 23 October 2000,
the Respondent commenced execution of the civil works.
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vi) On 20 December 2000, a formal contract (hereinafter referred to as the
“Contract”) was executed between the Petitioner-Corporation and the Respondent.
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The civil works were completed on 18 July 2003, and the Petitioner-Corporation
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issued the Completion Certificate (CC) for the same on 22 July 2003.
vii) Upon completion of the civil works, several disputes arose between the
Petitioner-Corporation and the Respondent, which were referred to various
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Arbitral Tribunals in accordance with the arbitration clauses contained in the
Contract.
viii) The disputes arising out of the contracts primarily concerned Contracts
2FF/3FF and the Contract and were referred to various Arbitral Tribunals. The
arbitral awards passed by the respective Arbitral Tribunals were subsequently
challenged before this Court by way of Arbitration Petition Nos. 591 of 2008, 592
of 2008, 593 of 2008, 226 of 2009, 227 of 2009, 228 of 2009, 1126 of 2010,
1137 of 2010, and 674 of 2011.
ix) The aforesaid Arbitration Petitions were allowed, and the respective arbitral
awards challenged therein were set aside. The aggrieved parties thereafter preferred
appeals against the aforesaid orders setting aside the arbitral awards before this
Court, which are presently pending adjudication.
x) In connection with the execution of the Contract, the Respondent, through
their predecessor entity, i.e., Dycherhoff & Widmann A.G. (hereinafter referred to
as “D&W”), made a claim regarding Extension of Time (EOT) from the Engineer,
Binnie Partners (India) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Binnie Partners”), in July
2003, as the civil works had not been completed within the stipulated period.
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xi) On 1 August 2003, Binnie Partners addressed a letter to the Petitioner-
Corporation, informing them that D&W had sought EOT. Binnie Partners in the
aforesaid letter further stated that in the event the extension was not granted to
D&W, the Petitioner-Corporation would be entitled to recover liquidated damages
amounting to approximately Rs. 5,50,00,000/-. Accordingly, Binnie Partners
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advised the Petitioner-Corporation in the aforesaid letter that it would be prudent
for the Petitioner-Corporation to retain the security amount until the request for
EOT was decided.
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xii) By a separate letter dated 1 August 2003, addressed to D&W, Binnie
Partners informed D&W that their claims for EOT were under consideration.
Binnie Partners, in the aforesaid letter, further stated that as of the said date, EOT
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had been granted to D&W only until 17 January 2003, and pending the grant of
any further extension, the Petitioner-Corporation might be entitled to recover
liquidated damages. Binnie Partners also informed D&W that they were advising
the Petitioner-Corporation to retain security equivalent to the amount of the
potential liquidated damages.
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xiii) On 11 August 2003, D&W addressed a letter to Binnie Partners in
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response to their letter dated 1 August 2003, contending that it would be
inappropriate to withhold any amounts under Clause 47.1 of the Contract. D&W
further reserved their right to claim costs for damages.
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xiv) On 12 August 2003, the Petitioner-Corporation through a letter of even
date requested D&W to furnish a bank guarantee for an amount of Rs.
5,50,00,000/- within seven days of receipt of the said letter, failing which the
Petitioner-Corporation would encash the Performance Bank Guarantee, which was
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due to expire on 31 August 2003.
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xv) On 13 August 2003, D&W responded to the aforesaid letter, contending
that the work under Section III of the civil works had been ready for
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commissioning since 18 July 2003, but had not been commissioned until that
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date. Accordingly, D&W asserted that no liquidated damages could be levied in the
absence of any resulting damage. D&W further requested the Petitioner-
Corporation to issue a Taking-Over Certificate (TOC) for the Section III civil
works, referring to the stipulated period of 21 days with reference to their letter
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dated 19 July 2003. D&W also stated that, under protest and without prejudice to
their rights and contentions, they would arrange to extend the validity of the
Performance Bank Guarantee for a further period of six months.
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xvi) On 25 August 2003, the Petitioner-Corporation addressed a letter to D&W,
stating that the renewed Performance Bank Guarantee would not be released until
the issue of liquidated damages was finally determined. The Petitioner-Corporation
further stated that the costs incurred towards the extension of the Bank Guarantee
would not be reimbursed if liquidated damages were found to be leviable.
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xvii) On 11 September 2003, Binnie Partners, in reply to the letter of D&W
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dated 11 August 2003 informed D&W that TOCs had been issued in respect of
all three Sections of the civil works. Binnie Partners further observed that there
appeared to be a gap between the period covered by the TOCs and the EOT
granted, thereby giving rise to the possibility of levying liquidated damages under
Clause 47.1 of the Contract. Thereafter, several letters were exchanged between
Binnie Partners, the Petitioner-Corporation, and D&W in relation to the aforesaid
issues.
xviii) In or about September 2005, a separate dispute relating to EOT and the
expenses incurred by the Respondent in completing the civil works under the
Contract was referred to an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of Mr. N.N. Shrikhande,
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Mr R.T. Atre, and Mr. Sharad Upasani (hereinafter referred to as the “Shrikhande
Tribunal”) for adjudication. During the pendency of the proceedings before the
Shrikhande Tribunal, various correspondences were exchanged between the
Petitioner-Corporation and D&W regarding the extension of the Bank Guarantee.
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xix) On 21 August 2006, the Petitioner-Corporation, by their letter of even
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date, invoked and encashed the Bank Guarantee furnished by D&W on 2
September 2004. It is the Respondent’s contention that the Bank Guarantee was
encashed while their claim for EOT in respect of the civil works was still pending
adjudication before the Shrikhande Tribunal.
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xx) On 23 August 2006, Bank of India addressed a letter to the Petitioner-
Corporation, informing them that D&W had requested an extension of the validity
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of the Bank Guarantee for a further period of one year, i.e., until 25 August 2007.
Bank of India further clarified that they were not questioning or disputing the
Petitioner-Corporation’s right to invoke the Bank Guarantee. However, it sought
the Petitioner-Corporation’s consent to the proposed arrangement, whereby a fresh
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Bank Guarantee, valid until 25 August 2007, would be furnished in lieu of the
existing guarantee.
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xxi) On 23 August 2006, Dywidag International GmbH, the successor to D&W,
also addressed a letter to the Petitioner-Corporation, alleging that the Petitioner-
Corporation had acted in breach of the contract and abused their powers by
instructing Bank of India to encash the Bank Guarantee, despite D&W having
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expressed their willingness to extend the same by their letter dated 21 August
2006. Dywidag International GmbH further contended that the Bank Guarantee
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02-CARBP-1493 (2).DOC
had been furnished as security for liquidated damages that might become
recoverable, and that the issue of such damages was linked to their claim for EOT,
which was then pending adjudication before the Shrikhande Tribunal. In the
aforesaid letter, Dywidag International GmbH further stated that the Petitioner-
Corporation had encashed the Bank Guarantee on the ground that Dywidag
International GmbH was allegedly not the legal successor of D&W, an issue which
was also sub-judice. Dywidag International GmbH in the aforesaid letter asserted
that the Petitioner-Corporation had been duly informed of the succession by a
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letter dated 18 April 2002.
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xxii) On 24 August 2006, the Petitioner-Corporation informed Bank of India
that they were not agreeable to the proposed extension of the Bank Guarantee.
Accordingly, the Petitioner-Corporation reiterated their request to Bank of India to
encash the Bank Guarantee and remit the sum of Rs. 5,50,00,000/- to them
forthwith.
xxiii) In view of the aforesaid encashment, Dywidag International GmbH filed an
application under Section 17 of the Act before the Shrikhande Tribunal, seeking an
order restraining the Petitioner-Corporation from encashing the Bank Guarantee
and directing them to accept the renewal thereof. Dywidag International GmbH
further sought a direction that in the event the Petitioner-Corporation encashed
the Bank Guarantee, the amount received thereunder be returned to them to
enable reinstatement of the Bank Guarantee.
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xxiv) On 25 August 2006, Bank of India remitted the sum of Rs. 5,50,00,000/-
to the Petitioner-Corporation by way of a pay order towards the encashment of the
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Bank Guarantee. The Petitioner-Corporation received the aforesaid amount as
security against their potential claim for liquidated damages under the Contract.
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xxv) On 13 September 2006, the Petitioner-Corporation addressed a letter to
Dywidag International GmbH, stating that the Contract had been executed
between D&W and the Petitioner-Corporation, and that Dywidag International
GmbH had yet to establish their rights as the successor entity in respect of the
works under the Contract. The Petitioner-Corporation in the aforesaid letter
further contended that they had encashed the Bank Guarantee on the ground that
D&W had failed to extend its validity.
xxvi) The Petitioner-Corporation also filed their reply to the application under
Section 17 of the Act filed by Dywidag International GmbH before the Shrikhande
Tribunal, opposing the reliefs sought in the said application.
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xxvii) On 10 November 2009, Dywidag International GmbH, acting on behalf
of the Respondent, addressed a letter to the Petitioner-Corporation, demanding
repayment of the amount of Rs. 5,50,00,000/- and requesting the Petitioner-
Corporation to accept a fresh Bank Guarantee for the said amount. Dywidag
International GmbH also sought compensation on the ground that the encashment
of the Bank Guarantee was illegitimate, unwarranted, and hasty, claiming interest
at the rate of 12% per annum, compounded monthly.
th th
xxviii) On 19 March 2010, in response to the letter dated 10 November 2009,
the Petitioner-Corporation refused to refund the amount of Rs. 5,50,00,000/-,
contending that Dywidag International GmbH had no authority to raise such a
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demand on behalf of the Respondent. The Petitioner-Corporation further stated
that the issue was sub-judice, as the application under Section 17 of the Act filed by
Dywidag International GmbH was pending adjudication before the Shrikhande
Tribunal.
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xxix) On 8 July 2010, Shrikhande Tribunal rejected the application filed under
Section 17 of the Act. It held that the subject-matter of the application did not fall
within the scope of the reliefs contemplated before it.
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xxx) On 21 April 2011, Shrikhande Tribunal passed its final arbitral award in
respect of the dispute concerning the EOT, inter alia , granting EOT of 163 days for
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the period from 5 February 2003 to 18 July 2003. Aggrieved by the aforesaid
arbitral award, the Petitioner-Corporation filed Arbitration Petition No. 674 of
2011 before this Court.
xxxi) The Respondent also filed Arbitration Petition No. 700 of 2011, challenging
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certain findings in the arbitral award dated 21 April 2011 relating to the grant of
additional costs.
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xxxii) On 22 September 2011, Dywidag International GmbH on behalf of the
Respondent addressed a letter to the Petitioner-Corporation, contending that, in
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view of the Shrikhande Tribunal’s arbitral award dated 21 April 2011 granting
EOT in their favour, the amount of Rs. 5,50,00,000/- received by the Petitioner-
Corporation upon encashment of the Bank Guarantee ought to be refunded,
together with interest. Dywidag International GmbH also offered to furnish a fresh
Bank Guarantee for the said amount.
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xxxiii) On 24 January 2013, the learned Single Judge of this Court allowed
Arbitration Petition No. 674 of 2011 filed by the Petitioner-Corporation and set
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aside the arbitral award dated 21 April 2011 passed by the Shrikhande Tribunal.
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xxxiv) By a separate order dated 24 January 2013, this Court also decided
Arbitration Petition No. 700 of 2011 filed by the Respondent challenging certain
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findings of the arbitral award dated 21 April 2013. In the aforesaid order, this
Court observed as follows:-
ORAL JUDGMENT:
As the impugned award which is challenged by the Petitioner in this Arbitration
Petition itself is quashed and set aside by order dated 24 January 2013 in Arbitration
Petition No. 674 of 2011, therefore, the present Petition is accordingly dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
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xxxv) On 24 February 2014, arbitration proceedings in the present dispute
commenced upon invocation of arbitration by Dywidag International GmbH on
behalf of the Respondent by way of a letter addressed to the Petitioner-
Corporation.
xxxvi) Upon completion of the pleadings, the learned Arbitral Tribunal passed the
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impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 in respect of the encashment of the
Bank Guarantee by the Petitioner-Corporation. By the said arbitral award, the
Petitioner-Corporation was directed to refund the Bank Guarantee amount of Rs.
5,50,00,000/- together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of
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the claim, i.e., 6 August 2013 until payment.
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xxxvii) On 2 April 2018, the Respondent filed an application under Section 33
of Act, seeking correction of a typographical error in paragraph 25(c) of the
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impugned arbitral award. The Respondent contended that the date mentioned
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therein as 6 August 2013 ought to have been 25 August 2006.
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xxxviii) By an order dated 11 September 2018, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
allowed the Respondent’s application and corrected the aforesaid date. Aggrieved
by the said order, the Petitioner-Corporation also filed an application under Section
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33 of the Act on 5 October 2018.
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xxxix) On 12 April 2019 and 20th June 2019, the learned Arbitral Tribunal, by a
majority of 2:1 rejected the application preferred by the Petitioner-Corporation
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under Section 33 of the Act. Aggrieved by the impugned arbitral award dated 6
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March 2018, the corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018,
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and the subsequent impugned majority order dated 12 April 2019 passed by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal, the Petitioner-Corporation has filed the present Petition
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on 19 September 2019.
3. Learned counsel Mr. Yashodeep P. Deshmukh, along with Mr. Shivprasad D.
Borade and Ms. Pooja Yadav, instructed by Ms. Komal Punjabi, appeared on behalf
of the Petitioner-Corporation, while Mr. Zal Andhyarujina Senior Advocate, along
with Mr. Gaurang Mehta, Mr. Javed Gaya, Ms. Akansha Agrawal, Ms. Rhea Mehta,
and Ms. Vidya Choudhari, instructed by Chambers of Javed Gaya appeared on
behalf of the Respondent.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner-Corporation
submitted that four issues arose for consideration in relation to the challenge to the
impugned arbitral awards.
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5. On the issue of limitation, learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation
contended that the impugned arbitral award was patently illegal and erroneous,
inasmuch as the learned Arbitral Tribunal had failed to appreciate that the
Respondent’s claim for refund of the Bank Guarantee amount had been raised
almost nine years after the date of its encashment. It was submitted that the Bank
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Guarantee had been encashed on 25 August 2006, of which the Respondent was
admittedly aware. Therefore, if the Respondent considered such encashment to be
illegal and sought recovery of the amount, they ought to have invoked arbitration
within the prescribed period of limitation. The Petitioner-Corporation accordingly
contended that the Respondent’s claim was barred by limitation.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation submitted that the cause of
action for seeking refund of the encashed Bank Guarantee had arisen, or had at
least sufficiently accrued, when the Bank Guarantee was encashed by the
Petitioner-Corporation and when the Respondent allegedly suffered the
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corresponding loss. He contended that the arbitral award dated 21 April 2011
passed by the Shrikhande Tribunal did not give rise to a fresh cause of action, but
merely adjudicated a connected issue concerning the Respondent’s entitlement to

EOT. Learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner-Corporation further submitted
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that merely because the aforesaid arbitral award dated 21 April 2011 passed by the
Shrikhande Tribunal strengthened the Respondent’s case on merits, it did not
follow that the period of limitation commenced only from the date of the aforesaid
arbitral award. It was contended that a claimant could not ordinarily defer the
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commencement of limitation merely because the outcome of other proceedings
might yield findings favourable to its case.
7. It was further contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had erroneously
characterised the Respondent’s claim as inchoate, without identifying the legal
basis for such a conclusion or referring to any applicable provision of the
Limitation Act, 1963. He submitted that even if the adjudication of the claim for
EOT was relevant to determining whether the encashment of the Bank Guarantee
was justified, there was no legal impediment preventing the Respondent from
initiating arbitration proceedings in 2006 to challenge the encashment.
8. Learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner-Corporation further submitted
that the Respondent could have initiated separate arbitration proceedings or sought
to incorporate their claim concerning the Bank Guarantee into the pending arbitral
proceedings. Having failed to do so within the prescribed period of limitation, the
Respondent’s claim ought to have been dismissed as time-barred. It was therefore
contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had erred in entertaining a stale claim
and granting relief thereon, rendering the impugned arbitral award ex facie
contrary to the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the Act.
9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation further submitted that the
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impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 was contrary to Section 31(3) of the
Act, inasmuch as the learned Arbitral Tribunal had failed to record adequate
reasons in support of its decision to grant relief in favour of the Respondent. It was
particularly contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had failed to provide
reasons for awarding interest from a specific date. He submitted that the mere
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existence of the learned Arbitral Tribunal’s power to grant a particular relief could
not dispense with the statutory requirement of recording reasons for the same.
10. Learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner-Corporation further contended
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that the corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 travelled
beyond the scope of Section 33 of the Act. It was submitted that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal had not merely corrected a typographical error but had
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substantively modified the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 by
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replacing the date of 6 August 2013 with 25 August 2006 as the date from
which interest was payable, as recorded in paragraph 25(c) of the impugned arbitral
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award dated 6 March 2018. According to learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner-Corporation, this alteration substantially changed the financial and legal
consequences of the impugned arbitral award by extending the period for which
interest was payable by several years. He submitted that Section 33 of the Act
permits the correction of computational errors, clerical or typographical errors, and
errors of a similar nature, but does not authorise an Arbitral Tribunal to reconsider
its reasoning or substantially alter the relief granted under the guise of correcting an
error. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the
1
decision of the Supreme Court in Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd. ,
submitting that the power of correction under Section 33 of the Act is confined to
errors of arithmetical, clerical, or typographical nature, and could not be exercised
to introduce a substantive alteration to an arbitral award.
1 (2023) 1 SCC 153
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11. Learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner-Corporation further submitted
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that the date of 6 August 2013 in the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March
2018 was not a mere typographical error warranting correction by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. Rather, the said date was intrinsically connected with the learned
Arbitral Tribunal’s substantive reasoning concerning the point at which the
Respondent’s right to seek the relevant relief had crystallised. It was contended that
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substituting the aforesaid date with 25 August 2006 affected the commencement
of the interest period, the total interest payable, the relationship between the
findings on limitation and interest, and the overall legal and financial consequences
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of the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018.
12. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation further submitted that if
the learned Arbitral Tribunal intended to award interest from the date of the claim,
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the relevant date ought to have been 14 April 2015, being the date on which the
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claim was filed, and not 25 August 2006, being the date on which the Bank
Guarantee was encashed. It was contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had
failed to delete or suitably modify the words “from the date of claim” while
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substituting the date in the corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11
September 2018, thereby rendering the operative direction inconsistent.
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13. He also relied upon the minority opinion dated 12 April 2019 in support
of the Petitioner-Corporation’s contentions. It was submitted that the reasoning
contained in the minority opinion demonstrated that the substitution of the date
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6 August 2013 with 25 August 2006 was connected with a substantive
determination rather than a mere typographical correction, and had the effect of
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substantially enlarging the period for which interest was payable. It was further
contended that, since the learned Arbitral Tribunal had neither deleted nor
suitably modified the words “from the date of claim”, the corrected impugned
arbitral award suffered from a material inconsistency and had been passed without
properly considering the Petitioner-Corporation’s objections. He submitted that
any alteration of the date from which interest was payable required a
reconsideration of the arbitral award on its merits and was, therefore, impermissible
within the limited scope of Section 33 of the Act.
14. He further submitted that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had proceeded on
an erroneous basis that the Respondent’s claim was inchoate until the Shrikhande
Tribunal adjudicated the claim for EOT, and that the Respondent’s right to seek
refund of the Bank Guarantee amount crystallised only upon the passing of the
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arbitral award dated 21 April 2011 in its favour by the Shrikhande Tribunal.
15. It was further contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had erroneously
treated the Petitioner-Corporation’s continued retention of the encashed Bank
Guarantee amount as wrongful once the basis for claiming liquidated damages had
ceased to exist. Learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner-Corporation submitted
that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had consequently awarded interest from the date
of the claim as linked to the relevant arbitral award passed by the Shrikhande
Tribunal, without properly appreciating the circumstances in which the amount
had been retained. He emphasised that the Bank Guarantee had been furnished as
security to protect the Petitioner-Corporation against its potential claim for
liquidated damages arising from the delay in completion of the civil works. It was
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submitted that the encashment and retention of the amount had to be considered
in the context of the contractual purpose for which the Bank Guarantee had been
furnished, and the Petitioner-Corporation’s apprehension regarding their
entitlement to recover liquidated damages.
16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation further submitted that the
Respondent themselves had contended that the amount secured under the Bank
Guarantee would become due and payable to the Petitioner-Corporation under the
Contract upon the grant of an EOT. Until such determination, the amount could
not have been utilised by the Respondent for any other business purpose. On this
basis, it was contended that there was no justification for awarding interest from
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25 August 2006, being the date of encashment of the Bank Guarantee, until the
Respondent raised its claim following the arbitral award passed by the Shrikhande
Tribunal. He accordingly submitted that the date of encashment of the Bank
Guarantee could not, by itself, be treated as the determinative date for the
commencement of interest. It was further contended that, in the impugned arbitral
th
award dated 6 March 2018, the learned Arbitral Tribunal had consciously
refrained from granting the Respondent’s claim for interest in its entirety and in the
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form in which it had been sought. Therefore, substituting the date of 6 August
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2013 with 25 August 2006 by way of correction under Section 33 of the Act was
impermissible, and effectively altered the substantive relief originally granted.
17. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation further submitted that the
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corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 passed by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal on the Respondent’s application under Section 33 of the
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Act was unreasoned and a non-speaking order. It was contended that the parties
had not agreed to dispense with the requirement of recording reasons and,
therefore, the corrected impugned arbitral award was in violation of Section 31 of
the Act.
18. It was further submitted that the project concerned sewerage and public
infrastructure and was undertaken by the Petitioner as a public duty. He submitted
that it was not an income-generating or commercial investment project, and that a
high rate of post-award interest would therefore impose an excessive and
unjustified burden on public funds. He further submitted that the delay in the
proceedings was not solely attributable to the Petitioner, and that they had shown
readiness to proceed with final arguments from an early stage and should not be
penalized for periods of delay not caused by them.
19. Per contra , learned counsel Mr. Zal Andyarujina, Senior Advocate, appearing
on behalf of the Respondent submitted that the issue concerning the Respondent’s
locus standi to initiate arbitral proceedings, including the question of whether the
proceedings had been validly instituted, had already been considered and
adjudicated upon by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, which had returned a reasoned
finding in favour of the Respondent.
st
20. He further relied upon the order dated 31 October 2017 passed by the
learned Single Judge of this Court in Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 433 of
2014, which has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated
nd
22 December 2017 in Commercial Appeal (L) No. 92 of 2017, wherein it was
held that the Respondent was the successor of the original contractor, i.e., D&W,
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and was, therefore, entitled to initiate the arbitral proceedings. Learned counsel on
behalf of the Respondent further submitted that the aforesaid issue had
subsequently been conclusively decided in favour of the Respondent by an order
th
dated 26 August 2022 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in appeals
under Section 37 of the Act arising out of various arbitration petitions between the
parties to the present proceedings. It was contended that the said order had not
been challenged and had, therefore, attained finality. The relevant paragraphs of
nd
the order dated 22 December 2017 are reproduced below:-
31. The arbitral Tribunal was persuaded to frame points for consideration because,
as before us and equally before the learned Single Judge, the plea of the MCGM was
that the tender was received by one M/s. Dyckerhoff & Widmann A.G. of Germany
(D&W). That entity was informed that its tender was accepted. The contract sum in
respect of that contract was awarded to this entity which is styled as "original
contractor". The MCGM contended that it awarded work to this entity for it found
it to be fit for performing the work. It is then claimed by this entity that one
M/s.Dywidag International GmbH was formed as 100% subsidiary of the original
contractor. By the year 2000, one Walter Bau Holding Company, together with
other companies, allegedly acquired majority of shares in the original contractor.
With effect from 1s January, 2000, the business of the original contractor was
nd
allegedly transferred to M/s. Dywidag International GmbH. On 22 March, 2000,
a Contributory Agreement was alleged to have been executed by and between the
original contractor and M/s. Dywidag International GmbH. Thus, the plea was, if
the MCGM was not informed about any alleged Contributory Agreement by the
original contractor, nor was any prior consent of the MCGM obtained before
entering into the alleged Contributory Agreement, then, the subsequent events of
the original contractor merging with M/s. Walter Bau are of no consequence. The
agreement came to be entered into between the original contractor and M/s. Walter
th
Bau on 17 May, 2001 by virtue of which, the name of the original contractor has
been cancelled. Even all such arrangements were not to the knowledge of the
MCGM. It is in these circumstances, the original contractor addressed the letter to
the Chief Engineer of the MCGM. The Chief Engineer forwarded this letter to the
Project Manager and thereafter, a note was prepared for the MCGM's Legal
Department to render an opinion. The original contractor conveyed its desire to
transfer the project to M/s. Dywidag International GmbH and sought guidelines in
the matter. Thereafter, M/s. Dywidag International GmbH addressed a letter to the
Law Officer and claimed that the change in the names be recorded. Thus, there was
no application seeking permission for assignment of the contract, nor any
permission being granted to do so. The Law Officer had no power from the original
contractor to substitute M/s. Dywidag International GmbH, nor was any such
approval granted by the Law Officer. Once the original contractor ceased to exist,
having merged its identity with M/s. Walter Bau AG, then any correspondence by
the MCGM with the original contractor, much less the arrangements inter se would
not enable the original contractor/assignor to exercise the right to make a reference
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to arbitration. Some argument has been canvassed of M/s. Dywidag misusing the
letterheads of the original contractor and corresponding with the MCGM. Further,
there was another development, namely M/s. Dywidag International being acquired
by Bau Holding Strabage, an Austrian Company. We are not concerned with this, for
what we find is that though the MCGM may plead lack of knowledge about any
arrangements inter se by the parties, yet, it corresponded with the original contractor
and also entertained some correspondence with M/s. Dywidag International.
32. Yet it argued before the Tribunal and equally before the learned Single Judge
that the assignor could not have invoked the arbitration. The Tribunal has dealt
with these arguments in great details. It came to the conclusion that M/s. Walter Bau
AG is the legal successor of M/s. Dywidag International, that the Insolvency
Administrator has the necessary authority and power to pursue the claims arising
out of the contract and refer the disputes to arbitration by invoking the arbitration
agreement and that the Administrator has power to appoint Mr. Moonjely to pursue
and represent the Administrator in the arbitration proceedings. We must at once
clarify that we are not concerned with all the conclusions in para 16.2 of the award.
We only made a reference to the plea which was raised before the learned Single
Judge and equally reiterated before us. The plea on locus was that M/s. Walter Bau
could not have invoked the arbitration agreement and can it be said to be the legal
successor of the contractor. The learned Single Judge concluded that any arbitration
clause is in its nature assignable. If the underlying contract can be, and stands
assigned, there is no reason why an arbitration agreement forming part of it cannot
or would not. The learned Single Judge made a reference to the legal principles and
from the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Khardah Company Ltd.
vs. Raymon & Co. (India) Private Limited, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1810. In the
backdrop of this legal principle, the learned Single Judge held that the respondent
Walter Bau did not dispute before the arbitrators that it was the legal successor of
M/s. Dywidag International-the original contractor. In other words, the parties
proceeded on that footing. Both these entities were based in Germany and have,
after following the legal procedure in that law, merged with each other with effect
from 17h May, 2001. Thus, the original contractor merged its identity with Walter
Bau. The definition of the term "contractor" appearing in the contract was referred
to by the learned Single Judge to hold that even a legal successor in title is included
therein. Thus, the learned Single Judge applied the principle that it was not for this
Court to probe the merger of the two entities under German law. Once the arbitrator
came to the conclusion, based on the documents produced that there was a right to
pursue the claims vesting in the Walter Bau, therefore, the invocation was proper.
33. The MCGM however contended that though the original contract was with M/s.
Dyckerhoff & Widmann, it was Dywidag which took over the contract, and the
contract could not form the property of M/s. Dyckerhoff & Widmann. Hence,
Walter Bau could not succeed to it. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion
that the MCGM's own case is that it never gave its consent to the assignment of the
contract from the original contractor to M/s. Dywidag. The legal effect would,
therefore, be that the contract remained with M/s. Dyckerhoff & Widmann and its
ownership was never transferred to Dywidag. If that is so, Walter Bau is entitled to
succeed to this contract as an admitted legal successor of the original contractor.
Once the MCGM objected to the claim of Dywidag as a successor of the original
contractor on the basis of want of its consent, in its own Arbitration Petitions filed
from the earlier arbitration reference before the three-member arbitral tribunal, the
MCGM impleaded Walter Bau as the successor in interest of the original contractor,
then, it cannot now take a total somersault. Mr. Setalvad was critical of this
observation by the learned Single Judge in para 5 of the order under Appeal.
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However, we cannot pick one sentence from these observations and conclusions and
read them in isolation. It is not a somersault which negates the stand of the MCGM,
but the learned Single Judge in paras 5 and 6 analyzed the matter by referring to the
admitted facts. The Contribution Agreement inter se was referred and the learned
Single Judge came to this conclusion that if the original contractor remained bound
and liable under the contract and entitled to enforce it, then, its legal successor could
have stepped in and raised a dispute or exercised the right to seek arbitration.
34. We have perused carefully all the observations on this point from paras 4 to 7 of
the order under Appeal and we do not find the ultimate conclusion to be vitiated by
any legal principle to the contrary.
35. On the other hand, in the case of M.R. Engineers & Contractors Private Limited
vs. Som Datt Builders Limited, reported in (2009) 7 SCC 696, which decision has
been extensively referred by the another learned Single Judge in Arbitration Petition
No. 509 of 2011 decided on 20t July, 2016 (supra), it is evident that a reference does
not become bad or the invocation per se is not illegal if the contract work, though
assigned, that assignment has not been accepted by the employer. Thus, the
contractor's arrangements inter se were not, according to the MCGM, to their
knowledge, much less had their consent. The principle that there is no provision in
the contracts that even if the contracts were assigned in favour of a third party by any
of the party to the said contracts, the same could be of the entire contract excluding
the arbitration agreement is inapplicable, then all the more, the conclusion reached
by the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted. This is not a case where the learned
Single Judge proceeded on the assignment only. He agreed with the learned arbitral
Tribunal and in the Majority Award that if the MCGM disowns the assignment,
then, its questioning the locus of M/s. Walter Bau is on the footing that it is not a
legal successor to the original contractor. Having found the position to be quite
contrary on facts, the finding was recorded that M/s. Walter Bau was the legal
successor. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, when there was
continued correspondence, then, Walter Bau stepping in was not found to be of such
nature as would vitiate the invocation from the inception. This is again a finding of
fact and imminently possible from the materials produced before the Tribunal and
the learned Single Judge. We do not see any perversity in the same.
(Emphasis supplied)
Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the Petitioner-
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Corporation had not challenged the aforesaid decision dated 26 August 2022 of
this Court and, therefore, could not seek to reopen the issue in the present
proceedings.
21. With regard to the issue of limitation, learned counsel for the Respondent
submitted that the learned Arbitral Tribunal had considered the issue in detail and
had returned a reasoned finding that the present arbitral proceedings were
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instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. It was contended that the
st
learned Arbitral Tribunal had rightly relied upon the order dated 31 October 2017
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, which was subsequently affirmed
nd
by the Division Bench by its order dated 22 December 2017. He therefore
submitted that the issue of limitation stood concluded in favour of the Respondent
in view of the aforesaid judicial determinations. Relevant paragraphs of the
th
impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 as modified by the corrected
th
impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 on the issue of limitation are
reproduced below:-
23. That takes us to the 2nd point mentioned in paragraph 13 above i.e. the
Arbitration proceedings are barred by limitation and therefore liable to be dismissed
on that ground alone. It should be noted that after a denial of time of extension by
the Engineer the Claimant went in for arbitration. The arbitration award has come
and it has held that the denial of extension of time was illegal and therefore
extension was fully granted. The real contention is the Bank Guarantee was invoked
in the year 2006 and the dispute is commenced in the year 2014, when the Claim
was lodged. At the time when the claim was lodged in the year 2014, Award dated
st
21 April 2011was passed and the contention of the Claimant that it was entitled to
extension of time was fortified by the Tribunal and therefore dispute filed
immediately thereafter is not barred by limitation. The claim of the Claimant till the
award of Shrikhande Tribunal was inchoate claim during the pendency of arbitration
before the Shrikhande Tribunal and it has become contractual right of the Claimant
on passing of the award. Any lodgement of claim in this regard prior to crystallising
the rights would be premature and initiation of arbitration proceedings immediately
after the encashment of the Bank Guarantee would have probably defeated the claim
of the Claimant. This aspect also needs no more consideration because the Hon'ble
Bombay High Court by the above stated judgment have held that the dispute was
within limitation and therefore we are fortified in our view that the limitation bar
does not arise in the present case.
th
22. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that as on 25
August 2006, when the Bank Guarantee was invoked by the Petitioner-
Corporation, there had been no final determination of the disputes between the
parties concerning the change in the method of construction or the claim for EOT.
It was contended that, at that stage, no liability towards liquidated damages or any
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other amount had crystallized or become payable by the Respondent. Accordingly,
the Respondent’s right to seek relief against the wrongful invocation of the Bank
Guarantee remained inchoate owing to the pendency of the disputes before the
Shrikhande Tribunal, which was adjudicating the aforesaid issues.
th
23. He further submitted that the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March
2018 was supported by adequate reasons on all material issues, as was evident from
a plain reading thereof. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the
decision of the Supreme Court in Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton
2
Greaves Ltd. , wherein the Court discussed the requirements of a reasoned arbitral
award. He submitted that in assessing whether an arbitral award contains adequate
reasons, the Court must examine whether the reasoning is proper, intelligible, and
th

adequate. He therefore contended that the impugned arbitral award dated 6
March 2018 could not be set aside on the grounds of patent illegality or perversity,
as the Petitioner-Corporation had failed to establish any such defect in the findings

or reasoning of the learned Arbitral Tribunal. He submitted that the impugned
th
arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 was not of such a nature as to be unreasonable
or to shock the conscience of this Court. He contended that, on a plain reading, the
impugned arbitral award contained adequate reasons in support of the findings
recorded by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. Accordingly, it was submitted that the
Petitioner-Corporation had failed to make out any ground for setting aside the
impugned arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act.
2 (2019) 20 SCC 1
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24. With regard to the grant of interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
date of invocation of the Bank Guarantee, learned counsel on behalf of the
Respondent submitted that the corrected impugned arbitral award was consistent
with the relief sought in the Respondent’s Statement of Claims in the arbitral
proceedings. It was contended that the Respondent had claimed interest on the
th
amount of Rs. 5,50,00,000/- from 25 August 2006, being the date on which the
Bank Guarantee was encashed, until the date of payment. He submitted that,
however, the Respondent had sought interest at the rate of 10% per annum,
whereas the learned Arbitral Tribunal awarded interest at the rate of 12% per
annum.
th
25. It was further submitted that in the impugned arbitral award dated 6
th
March 2018, the learned Arbitral Tribunal had inadvertently recorded 6 August
2013 as the date from which interest was payable. It was contended that the said
date was a typographical error, which was subsequently corrected by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal upon allowing the Respondent’s application under Section 33 of
the Act. Learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent submitted that it was only
after the Respondent’s application under Section 33 of the Act had been allowed
and the aforesaid date was corrected that the Petitioner-Corporation filed a separate
application under Section 33, contending that interest ought to have been awarded
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from the date of filing of the Statement of Claim, i.e., 14 April 2015. He further
submitted that the Petitioner-Corporation’s application under Section 33 of the
Act was rejected by a majority of the learned Arbitral Tribunal after considering the
respective submissions of the parties and by recording detailed reasons in the
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majority order. It was therefore contended that the Petitioner-Corporation’s
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challenge to the correction of the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018
was without merit.
26. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the Petitioner-
Corporation had failed to file its application under Section 33 of the Act within the
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prescribed period of 30 days from the date of the impugned arbitral award dated 6
th
March 2018, i.e., by 6 April 2018. Instead, the Petitioner-Corporation filed the
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said application belatedly on 5 October 2018, after the learned Arbitral Tribunal
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had passed the corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018
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correcting the typographical error in the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March
2018. It was further contended that the Petitioner-Corporation had neither filed a
response, nor raised any objection to the corrections sought by the Respondent
th
before the order dated 11 September 2018 was passed. It was submitted that only
after the Respondent’s application for correction had been allowed did the
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Petitioner-Corporation seek to introduce a different date, namely, 14 April 2015,
being the date of filing of the Statement of Claims in the arbitral proceedings, as
the date from which interest ought to have been awarded. It was therefore
submitted that the aforesaid conduct of the Petitioner-Corporation demonstrated
their failure to comply with the requirements of Section 33 of the Act. Hence, it
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was contended that the impugned majority order dated 12 April 2019, rejecting
the Petitioner-Corporation’s application under Section 33 of the Act was justified
and warranted no interference by this Court.
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27. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the interest
awarded for the period during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings could not
be modified by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Act. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the decision of the
3
Supreme Court in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. . It was
contended that the rate of interest awarded by the learned Arbitral Tribunal fell
within its discretion and that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties
permitting otherwise, the corrected impugned arbitral award would either have to
be sustained or set aside in its entirety, rather than being modified by substituting a
different rate or period of interest.
28. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the Petitioner's
submissions that they were a contractor for a project concerning public
infrastructure, and that the project was undertaken by the Petitioner as a public
duty, is irrelevant, as the project was a commercial contract. It was further
submitted that even on the grounds of equity, wrongful invocation of a bank
guarantee creates severe financial and legal inequity to the party who issues the
bank guarantee. The moment a guarantee is invoked, the bank deducts funds
directly from the guarantor's account which instantly paralyzes business'
operational liquidity, and hence, this warrants compensation and payment of
interest.
29. Learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent also sought to distinguish the
judgments relied upon by the Petitioner-Corporation, and the same shall be
3 (2025) 7 SCC 1
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considered later in this judgment. Learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent
therefore submitted that in the facts of the present case no interference was
warranted under the provisions Section 34 of the Act in respect of the impugned
arbitral awards.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
30. I have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties at length
and, with their assistance, perused the pleadings, the documents on record, and the
proceedings, including the impugned arbitral awards.
31. At the outset, it is necessary to observe that the scope of interference with
an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act is limited. The statutory provisions,
as interpreted by various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, permit
interference with an arbitral award only in the circumstances contemplated under
Section 34 of the Act. It is within these limited parameters that I proceed to
examine the rival submissions advanced by the Petitioner-Corporation and the
Respondent.
32. The principal grounds on which the Petitioner-Corporation has challenged
the impugned arbitral awards may be summarised as follows:-
i) The Respondent’s claim for refund of the amount realised under the Bank
Guarantee was barred by limitation.
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ii) The impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 is not a reasoned award
and, therefore, is contrary to the requirements of Section 31(3) of the Act.
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iii) The corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 travels
beyond the scope of Section 33 of the Act, inasmuch as the correction made by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal amounts to a substantive modification of the impugned
th
arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 rather than the correction of a clerical or
typographical error.
iv) The rate of post-award interest awarded at 12% per annum is excessive and
ought to be reduced to a rate between 6% and 8% per annum.
33. I am of the view that the first objection raised by the Petitioner-Corporation,
th
namely, that the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 fails to properly
consider the issue of limitation, does not warrant interference. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal has rightly relied upon the orders passed by this Court in other arbitration
proceedings between the Petitioner-Corporation and the Respondent. In particular,
the issue of limitation had been considered by this Court in Arbitration Petition
No. 433 of 2017, and the same was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in
nd
the Commercial Appeal (L) No. 92 of 2017 by the order dated 22 December
2017.
34. It is on the basis of the aforesaid judicial decisions, and having regard to the
fact that the dispute concerning the Respondent’s claim for EOT was pending
adjudication before the Shrikhande Tribunal, that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
concluded that the Respondent’s claim remained inchoate until the arbitral award
st
dated 21 April 2011 was passed by the Shrikhande Tribunal. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal, upon an appreciation of the facts and circumstances, rightly concluded
that when the Bank Guarantee was invoked by the Petitioner-Corporation, no
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liability towards liquidated damages had crystallised in its favour. In these
circumstances, the learned Arbitral Tribunal rightly held that the initiation of
separate arbitration proceedings concerning the encashment of the Bank Guarantee
during the pendency of the proceedings before the Shrikhande Tribunal could
have prejudiced the Respondent’s claim. The finding of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal on the issue of limitation is, therefore, consistent with the aforesaid
judicial determinations and does not warrant interference under Section 34 of the
Act.
35. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission advanced on behalf of the
Petitioner-Corporation that since the Shrikhande Tribunal rejected the
th
Respondent’s application under Section 17 of the Act on 8 July 2010 seeking to
restrain the Petitioner-Corporation from encashing the Bank Guarantee or to
secure its restoration by permitting an extension of its validity, the Respondent
ought to have challenged the said order or initiated separate arbitration
proceedings at that stage. The rejection of the interim application did not, by itself,
require the Respondent to commence separate arbitral proceedings concerning the
refund of the encashed Bank Guarantee while the underlying dispute regarding
EOT remained pending adjudication. This in view of the fact that this Court in the
other arbitration proceedings, which have been relied upon by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the present Arbitration proceedings were
filed well within time, is a finding which need not be disturbed.
36. In any event, this Court is of the view that the proceedings under
Section 34 of the Act are not proceedings which require re-appreciation of the facts
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and evidence, and the learned Arbitral tribunal, being the master of facts before it,
is entitled to come to a possible conclusion, which conclusion need not be
substituted by the view of this Court, unless the finding thereon is shown to be
arbitrary or perverse. In the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that the
proceedings concerning the Respondent’s claim for EOT for completion of the
civil works were pending adjudication before the Shrikhande Tribunal. In these
circumstances, the invocation and encashment of the Bank Guarantee by the
th
Petitioner-Corporation on 25 August 2006 did not, by itself, give rise to a
crystallised claim in favour of the Respondent, particularly when the underlying
dispute concerning the EOT had not yet been adjudicated. The Respondent’s
entitlement to seek a refund of the amount encashed under the Bank Guarantee
was dependent upon the determination of the said dispute.
37. I am, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the finding returned by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal on the issue of limitation, and the said objection raised
by the Petitioner-Corporation is accordingly rejected.
38. The relevant paragraphs of the decision of the learned Single Judge in
Arbitration Petition No. 433 of 2017, the decision of the Division Bench in
Commercial Appeal (L) No. 92 of 2017, dealing with the aforesaid issue are
reproduced hereinbelow:-
st
Order dated 31 October 2017 in Arbitration Petition No. 433 of 2017
8. Coming now to the issue of limitation, the majority arbitrators' reasoning
for holding in favour of the contractor may be outlined thus: (a) Sub-clauses 60.9 to
60.14 of the contract, which bear on the subject, imply that the agreement between
the parties was to keep open all rights and obligations under the contract till a stage
was reached where all disputes were resolved and settled; the documents produced
before the tribunal showed that that stage was never reached; (b) it was clear from
the evidence on record that both parties to the contract consented to the waiver of
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the requirement of clause 60.10 of the contract for submission of the statement at
completion within the meaning of clause 60.10 within the originally stipulated
period; the statement submitted under clause 60.11, calling it a draft final bill, on 22
July, 2003, was, thus, in order; (c) the procedure to be followed upon submission of
a statement under clause 60.11, namely, consultation between the contractor and the
Engineer so as to reach the stage of an agreement on the sums to be paid to the
contractor and the sums on which there was a dispute, was not completed till March
2006; it was only in March 2006 that the contractor and the Engineer could be said
to have reached an agreement upon the sums claimed by the contractor under the
draft final bill, though there still were two outstanding issues, which came in the way
of submission of a final statement, namely, (i) appointment of its employee as
'Engineer' by the Petitioner and (ii) three pending disputes before the earlier arbitral
tribunal concerning interim payments. These disputes were resolved only when
awards were delivered by the earlier arbitral tribunal on the three disputes; and
accordingly, the final statement submitted on 24 October, 2009 and invocation of
the reference on 2 February, 2010 were both within time.
9. The arbitrators' reasoning and conclusion on this issue represent a fair and
reasonable view on the subject. The scheme of clauses 60.10 to 60.14 of the contract
envisages submission of a statement at completion (Cl.60.10) not later than 84 days
after the issue of the Taking-over Certificate. This statement is to contain the final
value of all work done upto the date stated in the Taking-over Certificate. The
Engineer is thereupon expected to certify payment. The next stage is of a draft final
statement to be submitted under Cl.60.11 not later than 56 days after the issue of
Defects Liability Certificate. After following the procedure in Cl. 60.11, a final
statement is prepared. This statement is on the basis of the agreement/disagreement
between the Engineer and the Contractor after following the procedure under
Cl.60.11. The final statement in the present case (termed as 'draft final statement)
was submitted on 24 October, 2009. No document submitted earlier could be
termed as the final statement. [It is pertinent to note that this statement is in fact
considered as the draft statement within the meaning of Clause 60.11 by the
Petitioner (see para 55 of the petition).] The crucial question is, whether the
submission of this statement on 24 October 2009 is in order and in accordance with
the contract between the parties. If this statement is in order and within time, the
invocation of the arbitration agreement on 2 February, 2010 is clearly within time. It
is important to remember in this behalf that the contract work was taken over by the
Petitioner with effect from 30 March, 2001. (Even the extended Defects Liability
Period expired with effect from 27 May, 2003 under the certificate issued on 13
June, 2003.) And yet the statement at completion referred to in clause 60.10 of the
contract was not issued within 84 days of the issue of the Taking-over Certificate. So
also, no final statement was issued within 56 days of issue of the Defect Liability
Certificate. What was issued at that time was a running account bill, being R.A. Bill
No.67. The Petitioner not only accepted this interim bill, but the same was even
certified by the Engineer by way of an interim payment certificate, namely, IPC 69A
and 69B. If that is so, it is clearly reasonable to hold that both parties mutually did
away with the requirement of clause 60.10 and waived the same. The claimant,
thereafter, submitted what it termed as draft final bill on 22 July, 2003. Even if one
were to treat this as a draft final statement under clause 60.11 of the contract, what
the contract contemplates is that after this submission, the Engineer and the
Contractor would consult each other, during which consultation, further
information or changes in the draft, as may be required by the Engineer, would be
made by the Contractor, and finally, the parties would reach a stage where there is an
agreement between them on the sums to be paid to the Contractor or they arrive at
sums, which they agree and other sums, about which there is a dispute. If there is
any dispute, the Engineer is required to submit an interim payment certificate for
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those parts of the draft final statement, which are not in dispute. It is only then that
the disputes are required to be settled in accordance with clause 67 of the contract,
that is to say, by arbitration. As noted by the arbitrators, the consultation stage itself
clearly lasted till about March 2006. The stage of agreement on those parts of the
draft final statement, which were not in dispute, could be said to have been arrived
at when the Engineer's decision reached the contractor. Even at that stage, however,
there were outstanding issues, which prevented the stage of final statement, as noted
by the arbitrators. These issues pertained to the appointment by the Petitioner of its
own officer as the 'Engineer', which was contested by the Respondent and the
interim bills which were in dispute before the earlier arbitral tribunal. The awards on
these bills were finally delivered on 10 July, 2008 and 14 November 2008 by the
arbitral tribunal. There was no case for submission of any final statement till then.
The final statement submitted on 24 October, 2009 can, thus, be said to be within
the terms of the contract between the parties. It was submitted by the Respondent to
the Engineer, after the consultative process referred to in clause 60.11 was gone
through and the issue concerning those parts of the draft final statement, which were
not in dispute, was resolved through the process of arbitration concerning interim
certificates. Since no final certificate was issued to the Contractor, or no payment was
made in response to the final statement, the Contractor duly issued a notice of
arbitration invoking the arbitration agreement.
10. As held by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Mc.
Nally Bharat Engineering Ltd. vs. Benoy Krishna Bose, and as noted by the arbitral
tribunal, limitation is to be computed not from the date on which the bill was
submitted, but from the date on which the employer refused to pay the bill. The
dispute could be said to have arisen on and from the date of such refusal or non-
payment. By all accounts, in the present case, a bill in the form of a final statement
was submitted on 24 October, 2009. The Petitioner failed and neglected to pay this
bill and, as a result, the Contractor invoked the arbitration clause by nominating its
arbitrator on 2 February, 2010. The Petitioner reiterated its refusal to pay by its
communication dated 10 February 2010, in reply to the arbitration notice of 2
February, 2010. In the premises, the event of terminus a quo, which is by invocation
of the arbitration agreement, was within limitation.
nd
Order dated 22 December 2017 in Commercial Appeal (L) No. 92 of 2017
22. The arbitrators found that if Sub-clause 60.11 has to work, firstly, there has to be
an Engineer. Secondly, the mechanism provided by that Sub-clause would require
the contractor submitting a draft and the consultation on the draft and discussions
between the Engineer and the contractor. Thirdly, pursuant to such discussions and
consultations, if any changes are proposed, then, those changes have to be
incorporated. Nextly, when these changes are brought, the Engineer has to take
requisite steps. It is therefore, clear that for this Sub-clause to work, the requirements
stipulated therein have to be satisfied. It was not workable if the Engineer was not in
picture. The arbitral Tribunal, taking an overall view of the same, did not hold that
the bar of limitation is saved by the communication of 27" October, 2009. On the
other hand, the arbitral Tribunal, in dealing with the rival contentions on this point,
came to the conclusion that the Running Account Bill 67 was submitted for the
st
work done till 31 March, 2003. That was certified by the Engineer. Thus, all the
parties agreed that Statement at Completion would not be submitted upon taking
over of the works. However, the MCGM could not show any evidence that any
complaint was made either by the Engineer or the MCGM complaining to the
contractor that Sub-clause 60.10 was not followed. Hence, by the implied consent
and clearly waiving the requirement of Sub-clause 60.10, the contractor submitted
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under Sub-clause 60.11, a Draft Final Bill. That was submitted on 22nd July, 2003.
Thus, the finding in para 17.3 of the Majority Award relies upon the admitted
documents. Then, in para 17.4, the Tribunal analyzes that when statement under
Sub-clause 60.11 is submitted, there is a procedure prescribed. That procedure with
reference to the said Clause is then set out and it is stated that the document showed
th
that not till 4 March, 2006, the stage contemplated by Sub-clause 60.11 was
reached. In the sense, it was only in March, 2006 that the contractor and the
Engineer could be said to have reached an agreement on the sums claimed by the
contractor under the Draft Final Bill. Mr. Setalvad contended in the alternate that
the invocation on 2nd February, 2010 is clearly time barred if we reckon this date,
th
namely of 4 March, 2006. Thus, within a period of three years from this date at
least, the arbitral reference could have been made. The claim was therefore, barred
th
by time once the date of 24 October, 2009 is reckoned. We do not think that there
is any substance in this contention.
23. The arbitral Tribunal, in the impugned Majority Award, makes reference to the
th
contents of this letter of 24 October, 2009, but it having been brought to our
notice, we cannot omit the same from consideration. If this document, namely this
letter is read as a whole, it would be evident that there was an Engineer but post
22nd July, 2003 its services were terminated. At that time, namely from July 2003
till October 2004, the Engineer was reaching its final views on the quantification of
the appellant's claims. He was also busy in rendering a decision on Extension of
Time of 45 days. He was considering the claims raised during such extended period.
While the claimant communicated its agreement with the Engineer's decision, the
MCGM by its letter dated 24th May, 2006 communicated its disagreement. It
announced that it will be taking further action as per the contract provisions at its
earliest, but did not allow that Clause to operate further or work it out otherwise, as
stated. Thus, the Engineer's services were terminated before he could complete the
process of consultation and equally, the MCGM did not take any steps in terms of
Clause 60.11. It is in these circumstances that when the MCGM relies upon its
th
communication dated 4 March, 2006, it is equally imperative that we take note of
the stand of the claimant- respondent. The claimant-respondent has brought to the
th

notice of not only the Tribunal, but the MGM itself, its letter of 4 March, 2006,
treating the recommendations of the Engineer as decisions of the Engineer and its
disagreement therewith. It is in these circumstances that when Sub-clause 60.11 was
not being worked out and that makes in the later part a reference to the Interim
Payment Certificate, that the Tribunal, in para 17.4 made reference to the same.
These outstanding issues came in the way of submitting final statement withing the
meaning of Sub-clause 60.11, is the conclusion reached. That is how the plea of bar
of limitation and raised by the MCGM was not accepted by the Tribunal. We do not
think that the Tribunal traveled beyond any contractual terms or the terms of the
reference and somehow or the other saved the bar of limitation. Once the Tribunal
has emphasized that the two outstanding issues prevented or came in the way of
submitting the draft final statement, then the reasoning is not perverse at all. We are
not in agreement with Mr. Setalvad that the learned Single Judge merely reinforced
these findings without any application of mind. We think that the learned Single
Judge noted the admitted dates and events, the contention on the plea of limitation
in paragraph 3 and gave his independent reasoning. The discussion by the learned
Single Judge from paragraph 6 refers to the admitted dates and events. The learned
Single Judge, in paragraph 8, made extensive reference to Clause 60.11, broke it up
and dealt with it independent of what the arbitral Tribunal's construction. The
learned Single Judge reached a correct finding in paragraph 9 that the final
th
statement in the case termed as 'draft final statement' was submitted on 24
October, 2009, and no document submitted earlier answered this description. We
do not think that the learned Single Judge has failed in his duty in considering the
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challenge to the arbitral award on the ground that it violates public policy, in the
sense that it allows patently time barred claims. The arbitral Tribunal does nothing
of this kind, but accepts an interpretation of the contractual term by the respondent
and which is reasonable as well. The interpretation cannot be said to be perverse or
such that no reasonable person placed in the position of an adjudicator or as an
arbitral Tribunal would not arrive at it. We therefore do not think that the learned
Single Judge's judgment can be said to be erroneous or illegal or suffering from such
a serious legal infirmity warranting interference in our appellate jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)
th
39. The relevant finding in the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March
th
2018 and the corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 on this
issue have been reproduced in paragraph no. 21 above. In so far as the next
contention on which the Petitioner-Corporation has sought to challenge the
th
impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 is concerned, I am of the view that
provisions of Section 31 of the Act are to be considered, and particularly, the
provisions of Section 31(3) ought to be considered first. It would be beneficial to
reproduce the provisions of Section 31 of the Act, which read as follows:-
31. Form and contents of arbitral award.-(1) An arbitral award shall be made in
writing and shall be signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), in arbitral proceedings with more than one
arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all the members of the arbitral tribunal
shall be sufficient so long as the reason for any omitted signature is stated.
(3) The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless-
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under section 30.
(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place of arbitration as determined
in accordance with section 20 and the award shall be deemed to have been made at
that place.
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the arbitral proceedings, make an.
interim arbitral award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final
arbitral award.
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(7) (a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and in so far as an arbitral
award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for
which the award is made interest, at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or
any part of the money, for the whole or any part of the period between the date on
which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made.
(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise
directs, carry interest at the rate of two per cent. higher than the current rate of
interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date of award to the date of
payment.
Explanation. -The expression "current rate of interest" shall have the same meaning
as assigned to it under clause (b) of section 2 of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978).
(8) The costs of an arbitration shall be fixed by the arbitral tribunal in accordance
with section 31A.
(Emphasis supplied)
On a plain reading of Section 31, and particularly Section 31(3) of the Act, it is
evident that an arbitral award must state the reasons upon which it is based, unless
the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an arbitral
award on agreed terms under Section 30 of the Act.
40. In the facts of the present case, the Petitioner-Corporation has failed to
th
make out any ground to assail the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018
on the basis that it does not contain reasons or findings on the issues raised before
the learned Arbitral Tribunal. On the contrary, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has
relied upon the orders passed by this Court concerning the limitation of the claim
of the Respondents’ and the Respondent’s locus standi to invoke arbitration, and
has thereafter arrived at a reasoned conclusion that the Respondent was entitled to
initiate the arbitral proceedings, and that the claim was within the prescribed
period of limitation
41. Further, the Petitioner-Corporation has miserably failed to point out or
th

even aver on what basis they seek to assail the impugned arbitral award dated 6
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March 2018 as being an unreasoned or an unintelligible award. The learned
Arbitral Tribunal has, in fact, correctly held that till the dispute in respect of EOT
was pending before the Shrikhande Tribunal, the claim of the Respondent was
inchoate, and hence, once a finding to that effect was made by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, then the encashment of the bank guarantee in August 2006 by the
Petitioner-Corporation being illegal was a logical corollary which the learned
Arbitral Tribunal had rightly decided in favour of the Respondent. I am therefore,
of the view that the reliance by learned counsel on behalf of the Respondent on the
case of Dyna Technologies (supra) would be apposite to the facts of the present
case, inasmuch as in the aforesaid case it has been held that when the fulfilment of
the requirements of a reasoned order had to be taken into consideration, three
characteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed, i.e., the same has to be proper,
intelligible, and adequate.
42. In the facts of the present case, I am of the view that the impugned arbitral
th
award dated 6 March 2018 does not suffer from any infirmity on the ground that
its reasoning is improper, unintelligible, or inadequate. It sets out the basis for the
conclusions reached at by the learned Arbitral Tribunal and does not warrant
interference on the ground that it is an unreasoned award. Relevant paragraphs of
th
the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 setting out the reasons for the
findings enumerated therein are reproduced below:-
24. That takes us to the 3rd point as mentioned in paragraph 13 above.
According to the Corporation there is no merit in the claim because certain
extension of time was granted by the Engineer and rest denied extension period was
pending in dispute before the Shrikhande Tribunal. We need not direct much on
this. No merit issue for the reason that Shrikhande Tribunal awarded the claim of
the Claimant completely and the matter was challenged before the Hon'ble Bombay
High Court as mentioned above in Arbitration Petition No.433 of 2017. There the
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Tribunal held that the denial of extension period claimed by the Claimant was
wrong and entire extension time claimed by the Claimant was granted by the
Tribunal and this fact is confirmed by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court by
dismissing the petition challenging the award made by Shrikhande Tribunal. In our
opinion we are bound by the view taken by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court and
the contention raised by the Respondent that there is no merit in the claim is liable
to be rejected in toto. It should also be noted that the fact of encashment of the Bank
Guarantee by the Respondent is not even disputed, on the contrary the Respondent
has justified the encashment. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the
Claimant has proved that the encashment of Bank Guarantee was unwarranted,
unjustified and therefore illegal. Consequently, the Claimant has proved that the
encashment of Bank Guarantee by the Respondent was wholly illegal.
(Emphasis supplied)
43. I am further of the view that interference under Section 34 of the Act on
the ground of patent illegality is permissible only where the illegality goes to the
root of the matter and is of such a nature that the arbitral award is manifestly
arbitrary or unreasonable. The threshold for interference is not met merely because

another view of the facts or the law may be possible. In this regard, the reliance
placed by learned counsel for the Respondent on the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways
4 5

Authority of India and Union of India v. Recon , Mumbai is apposite to the facts
of the present case. Applying the principles laid down therein, I find that the
th
impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 cannot be set aside merely on the
allegation that it lacks reasons or fails to record a finding on material documents or
a contentious issue raised by the parties. The Petitioner-Corporation has not
th
established any such deficiency in the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March
2018 which would justify interference under Section 34 of the Act.
4 (2019) 15 SCC 131
5 2020(6) Mh.L.J.
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44. The principles laid down in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development
6
Authority have also been considered in Ssangyong Engineering (supra), wherein
the Supreme Court explained the circumstances in which an arbitral award may be
interfered with on the ground of patent illegality, including circumstances where
the arbitral award fails to provide reasons when reasons are required by law. In the
th
present case, as discussed hereinabove, the impugned arbitral award dated 6
March 2018 does not suffer from the vice of being unreasoned, and no ground for
interference is made out on this count.
th
45. The third ground of challenge concerns the award of interest from 25
August 2006 until the date of payment. The Petitioner-Corporation has
vehemently contended that, by allowing the Respondent’s application under
Section 33 of the Act the learned Arbitral Tribunal travelled beyond the scope of
its jurisdiction under the said provision. This objection must be examined in light
of the statutory limits governing the correction and interpretation of arbitral

awards under Section 33 of the Act. It would, therefore, be appropriate to
reproduce Section 33 of the Act, which reads as follows:-
33. Correction and interpretation of award; additional award.-(1) Within thirty days
from the receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time has been agreed
upon by the parties-
(a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to correct
any computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a
similar nature occurring in the award;
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the
arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award.
(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under sub-section (1) to be
justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within thirty days
from the receipt of the request and the interpretation shall form part of the arbitral
award.
6 (2015) 3 SCC 49
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(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type referred to in clause (a) of
sub-section (1), on its own initiative, within thirty days from the date of the arbitral
award.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party with notice to the other party,
may request, within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, the arbitral
tribunal to make an additional arbitral award as to claims presented in the arbitral
proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award.
(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under sub-section (4) to be
justified, it shall make the additional arbitral award within sixty days from the
receipt of such request.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of time within which it
shall make a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional arbitral award
under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5).
(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or interpretation of the arbitral award or to
an additional arbitral award made under this section.
46. On a plain reading of Section 33 of the Act, it is evident that a party may,
within thirty days of receipt of the arbitral award, request the Arbitral Tribunal to
correct any computational, clerical, or typographical error, or any error of a similar
nature occurring in the arbitral award, unless another period has been agreed upon
by the parties. The scope of Section 33 is therefore confined to the corrections
contemplated therein and does not extend to a substantive review or
reconsideration of the arbitral award on its merits.
47. In the facts of the present case, upon receipt of the impugned arbitral award
th
dated 6 March 2018, the Respondent filed an application under Section 33 of the
Act seeking correction of an alleged typographical error in paragraph 25(c). The
th th
date mentioned therein as 6 August 2013 was sought to be corrected to 25
August 2006. The learned Arbitral Tribunal, after hearing both parties, allowed the
application and made the aforesaid correction. It is pertinent to note that during
the hearing of the Respondent’s application under Section 33 of the Act, the
Petitioner-Corporation did not raise any objection to the correction sought by the
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Respondent. The same is recorded in the corrected impugned arbitral award dated
th
11 September 2018 passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal, whereby the
correction was allowed.
48. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the Petitioner-Corporation’s
contention that the aforesaid order was passed beyond the scope of Section 33 of
the Act cannot be accepted merely on the ground that the date of commencement
of interest was altered. The correction was sought by the Respondent as a
typographical correction, and the Petitioner-Corporation, having raised no
objection to the same during the hearing of the application cannot be disregarded.
The question, however, remains that whether the correction was in fact within the
limited scope of Section 33, which must be determined by examining the nature
and effect of the error corrected.
49. I am of the view that the learned Arbitral Tribunal acted within the scope of
its powers under Section 33 of the Act in correcting the aforesaid error, as the same
was treated as a typographical, clerical, or other error of a similar nature occurring
in the impugned arbitral award. The correction was, therefore, within the category
of errors contemplated under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act. The contention
advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal failed to record reasons for allowing the correction does not
warrant acceptance. Section 33(1)(a) of the Act does not expressly prescribe a
separate requirement to record reasons for every correction of a clerical,
computational, or typographical error falling within its scope. Accordingly, the
absence of elaborate reasons in the order allowing such a correction does not, by
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itself, render the corrected impugned arbitral award invalid. The decisive question
is whether the correction was of a nature permissible under Section 33 of the Act.
50. The correction in question was treated by the learned Arbitral Tribunal as
relating to an error apparent on the face of the impugned arbitral award, falling
within the categories of errors contemplated under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act.
The contention advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation,
relying on Section 31(7) of the Act to submit that reasons were required even for
the aforesaid correction, cannot be accepted. Section 31 deals with the form and
contents of an arbitral award, whereas Section 33 specifically provides for the
correction of computational, clerical, and typographical errors, and errors of a
similar nature. The absence of elaborate reasons for a correction falling within
Section 33 does not, by itself, invalidate the corrected impugned arbitral award.
51. I am further of the view that the Petitioner-Corporation did not object to
the correction sought by the Respondent during the hearing of the application
under Section 33 of the Act. The validity of the correction must ultimately be
determined by reference to the nature of the error and the scope of the power
conferred upon the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act. In these
circumstances, I am of the considered view that the correction made by the learned
th th
Arbitral Tribunal, whereby the date of 6 August 2013 was replaced with 25
August 2006 as the date from which interest was payable under paragraph 25(c) of
th
the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018, did not constitute a substantive
modification of the arbitral award, but was rather a correction of a typographical
error within the scope of Section 33 of the Act.
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52. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission advanced by learned
counsel for the Petitioner-Corporation that the aforesaid correction was
impermissible, or that the learned Arbitral Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in
making the same. In fact, the Respondent, in their Statement of Claim had
th
specifically sought interest on the amount of Rs. 5,50,00,000/- from 25 August
2006 until the date of payment, at the rate of 10% per annum, compounded
annually. The relevant prayer appears at Page No. 26 of the Compilation of
Documents tendered by the Petitioner. This supports the Respondent’s contention
th th
that interest was claimed from 25 August 2006, and that the reference to 6
th
August 2013 in the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 was an
inadvertent error which the learned Arbitral Tribunal subsequently corrected in
exercise of its powers under Section 33 of the Act. The objection raised by the
Petitioner-Corporation on this ground is accordingly rejected.
53. I further find that it was only after the aforesaid correction was made by the
th
learned Arbitral Tribunal by its order dated 11 September 2018 that the
Petitioner-Corporation filed its application under Section 33 of the Act, seeking to
th
modify the commencement date for the payment of interest to 14 April 2015,
being the date of filing of the Statement of Claim by the Respondent before the
th
learned Arbitral Tribunal, instead of 25 August 2006. The Petitioner-
Corporation’s application was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation
under Section 33 of the Act. The learned Arbitral Tribunal, after considering the
submissions advanced by the Petitioner-Corporation, rejected the application by a
reasoned majority decision.
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54. In my view, the aforesaid decision does not warrant interference under
Section 34 of the Act. The learned Arbitral Tribunal acted within the scope of its
jurisdiction in considering and deciding the applications for correction, and this
Court cannot undertake a fresh appraisal of the factual issues merely because the
Petitioner-Corporation seeks a different conclusion. Such an exercise would be
inconsistent with the limited scope of judicial review under Section 34 of the Act. I
am, therefore, of the view that no interference is warranted with the aforesaid
findings of the learned Arbitral Tribunal. To grant the relief sought by the
Petitioner-Corporation would, in the circumstances of the present case, amount to
rewriting the terms of the impugned arbitral awards, which is impermissible in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
55. Insofar as the final ground of challenge concerning the reduction of post-
award interest, is concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between interest awarded
for the period during which the arbitral proceedings were pending and interest

awarded after the passing of the arbitral award. The grant of interest for the period
during which the arbitral proceedings are pending (pendente lite interest) falls
within the discretionary powers of the Arbitral Tribunal, subject to the provisions
of the Act and any agreement between the parties excluding or restricting the
award of interest. In the present case, there is no contractual prohibition on the
grant of interest that would preclude the exercise of such discretion.
56. Section 31(7)(a) of the Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, to award interest at such rate as it considers
reasonable on the whole or any part of the money awarded, for the whole or any
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part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date
on which the arbitral award is made. In the facts of the present case, I am of the
view that the learned Arbitral Tribunal exercised its discretion in awarding interest
in accordance with the aforesaid provision, and no ground has been made out for
interference with the award of pendente lite interest.
57. In respect of post-award interest, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
leading case of Gayatri Balasamy (supra) has held that post-award interest granted
by the Arbitral Tribunal can be modified by the Court. The relevant paragraphs of
the aforesaid decision on the severability of arbitral awards and the modification of
post-award interest by the Court are reproduced below:-
32. In the present controversy, the proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) is particularly
relevant. It states that if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which
contains decisions on matters non-submitted may be set aside. The proviso,
therefore, permits courts to sever the non-arbitrable portions of an award from
arbitrable ones. This serves a twofold purpose. First, it aligns with Section 16 of the
1996 Act, which affirms the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, that is, the
arbitrators' competence to determine their own jurisdiction. Secondly, it enables the
Court to sever and preserve the "valid" parts) of the award while setting aside the
"invalid" ones.- Indeed, before us, none of the parties have argued that the Court is
not empowered to undertake such a segregation.
33. We hold that the power conferred under the proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) is
clarificatory in nature. The authority to sever the "invalid" portion of an arbitral
award from the "valid" portion, while remaining within the narrow confines of
Section 34, is inherent in the Court's jurisdiction when setting aside an award.
34. To this extent, the doctrine of omne majus continet in se minus-the greater
power includes the lesser-applies squarely. The authority to set aside an arbitral
award necessarily encompasses the power to set it aside in part, rather than in its
entirety. This interpretation is practical and pragmatic. It would be incongruous to
hold that power to set aside would only mean power to set aside the award in its
entirety and not in part. A contrary interpretation would not only be inconsistent
with the statutory framework but may also result in valid determinations being
unnecessarily nullified.
35. However, we must add a caveat that not all awards can be severed or segregated
into separate silos. Partial setting aside may not be feasible when the "valid" and
"invalid" portions are legally and practically inseparable. In simpler words, the
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"valid" and "invalid" portions must not be interdependent or intrinsically
intertwined. If they are, the award cannot be set aside in part.
…
40. A core principium of arbitration, an alternative dispute resolution (hereinafter
referred to as "ADR") mechanism, is to provide a quicker and cost-effective
alternative to courtroom litigation. While this suggests minimal judicial interference,
the role of domestic courts remains crucial, as they function in a supportive capacity
to facilitate and expedite the resolution of disputes. Therefore, it follows that judicial
intervention is legitimate and necessary when it furthers the ends of justice,
including the resolution of disputes.
41. To deny courts the authority to modify an award—particularly when such a
denial would impose significant hardships, escalate costs, and lead to unnecessary
delays—would defeat the raison d'être of arbitration. This concern is particularly
pronounced in India, where applications under Section 34 and appeals under
Section 37 often take years to resolve.
42. Given this background, if we were to decide that courts can only set aside and
not modify awards, then the parties would be compelled to undergo an extra round
of arbitration, adding to the previous four stages: the initial arbitration, Section 34
(setting aside proceedings), Section 37 (appeal proceedings), and Article 136 (SLP
proceedings). In effect, this interpretation would force the parties into a new
arbitration process merely to affirm a decision that could easily be arrived at by the
Court. This would render the arbitration process more cumbersome than even
traditional litigation.
43. Equally, Section 34 limits recourse to courts to an application for setting aside
the award. However, Section 34 does not restrict the range of reliefs that the Court
can grant, while remaining within the contours of the statute. A different relief can
be fashioned as long as it does not violate the guardrails of the power provided
under Section 34. In other words, the power cannot contradict the essence or
language of Section 34. The Court would not exercise appellate power, as envisaged
by Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Code").
44. We are of the opinion that modification represents a more limited, nuanced
power in comparison to the annulment of an award, as the latter entails a more
severe consequence of the award being voided in toto. Read in this manner, the
limited and restricted power of severing an award implies a power of the Court to
vary or modify the award. It will be wrong to argue that silence in the 1996 Act, as
projected, should be read as a complete prohibition.
45. We are thus of the opinion that the Section 34 Court can apply the doctrine of
severability and modify a portion of the award while retaining the rest. This is
subject to parts of the award being separable, legally and practically, as stipulated in
Part Il of our Analysis.
46. Mustill and Boyd have observed that an order varying an award is not equivalent
to an appellate process.30 The authors suggest that a modification order would only
be appropriate where the modification, including any adjustment of costs, follows
inevitably from the tribunal's determination of a question of law. This approach
would be beneficial, as it would reduce costs and delays. The courts need not engage
in any fact-finding exercise. By acknowledging the Court's power to modify awards,
the judiciary is not rewriting the statute. We hold that the power of judicial review
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under Section 34, and the setting aside of an award, should be read as inherently
including a limited power to modify the award within the confines of Section 34.
…
73. The next question that arises is: Do courts possess the power to declare or
modify interest, especially post-award interest? In respect of pendente lite interest,
Section 31(7)(a) (Annexure A), states that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
Arbitral Tribunal may include in its sum for the award, interest, at such rate it deems
reasonable on whole or part of the money for whole or part of the period on which
the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. In respect of
post-award interest, Section 31(7)(b) (Annexure A) states that unless an award
provides for interest on a sum directed to be paid by it, the sum will carry an interest
at a 2% higher rate than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the
award, from the date of the award till the date of payment. The Explanation defines
the expression "current rate of interest".
74. There can be instances of violation of Section 31(7)(a), and the pendente lite
interest awarded may be contrary to the contractual provision. We are of the opinion
that, in such cases, the Court while examining objections under Section 34 of the
1996 Act will have two options. First is to set aside the rate of interest or second,
recourse may be had to the powers of remand under Section
75. For the post-award interest in terms of Section 31(7)(b), the courts will retain
the power to modify the interest where the facts justify such modification. This is
why the standard rate stipulated in clause (b) applies when the award itself does not
specify the applicable post-award interest. There can be a situation where the party
to be paid money is at fault and is guilty of delay which may require a modification
in the rate of interest. In the absence of grant of post-award interest in the award, the
Court also possesses the power to grant post-award interest. Clearly, as per the
legislative mandate, it is not the sole prerogative of the arbitrator.
76. Compare Section 31 of the 1996 Act with Section 31 of the Model Law. While
both sections are titled similarly-"Form and Contents of Award"-only the 1996 Act
addresses interest in Section 31(7). The Model Law does not provide standards
governing the determination of interest rates. Thus, Section 31(7) is a unique
creation of the Indian legislature. It was not borrowed from the Model Law.
Specifically, under Section 31(7)(b), the legislature has established a standard rate of
interest to guide the arbitrator's discretion when it comes to determining the post-
award interest rate. While the arbitrator retains his flexibility based on facts and
circumstances of the case, the standard set by the legislature must weigh in on their
consideration. Further, as there is a standard prescribed by the legislature, the post-
award interest awarded can be scrutinised by courts against the standards prescribed.
77. Our reasoning is bolstered when considering the practical aspects. Ine Arbitral
Tribunals, when determining post-award interest, cannot foresee future issues that
may arise. Post-award interest is inherently future-oriented and depends on facts and
circumstances that unfold after the award is issued. Since the future is unpredictable
and unknown to the arbitrator at the time of the award, it would be unreasonable to
suggest that the arbitrator, as a soothsayer, could have anticipated or predicted future
events with certainty. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Section 34 Court to have
the authority to intervene and modify the post-award interest if the facts and
circumstances justify such a change.
78. Inherent in the discussion above, is the Court's power to both increase or
decrease the post-award interest rate. It would be incorrect to state that the Court's
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power to interfere with this interest rate is limited solely to decreasing the interest
rate. Situations may arise where the rate should be increased due to delays or
obstructions in the execution of the award. Interest rates may also fluctuate over
time.
79. However, the Court, while exercising this power, must be cautious and mindful
not to overstep its role by altering the interest rate unless there are compelling and
well-founded reasons to do so. In exercising this power, the Court is not acting in an
appellate capacity, but rather under limited authority. For instance, the 1996 Act
stipulates a standard post-award interest rate. When the statute itself benchmarks a
standard, unless there are special and specific reasons, the rate of interest stipulated
by the statute should be applied.
80. Nevertheless, this limited power is significant, as it can help avoid further rounds
of litigation. Without it, the Court may be forced to set aside the entire award or
order a fresh round of arbitration because of an erroneous interest rate rather than
simply adjusting this rate.
…
87. Accordingly, the questions of law referred to by Gayatri Balasamy- are answered
by stating that the Court has a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996
Act to modify the arbitral award. This limited power may be exercised under the
following circumstances:
87.1. When the award is severable, by severing the "invalid" portion from the "valid"
portion of the award, as held in Part II of our Analysis;
87.2. By correcting any clerical, computational or typographical errors which appear
erroneous on the face of the record, as held in Parts IV and V of our Analysis;
87.3. Post-award interest may be modified in some circumstances as held in Part IX
of our Analysis; and/or
87.4. Article 142 of the Constitution applies, albeit, the power must be exercised
with great care and caution and within the limits of the constitutional power as
outlined in Part XII of our Analysis.
(Emphasis supplied)
58. In view of the aforesaid findings in the case of Gayatri Balasamy
(supra), where Courts have been empowered to modify post-award interest, it
would be relevant to examine the provisions governing post-award interest under
the Act. The same are reproduced below:-
Section 31(7)(b) of the Act prior to its substitution by Act 3 of 2016
"(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise
directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per centum per annum from the date of
the award to the date of payment.”
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Section 31(7)(b) of the Act post amendment by Act 3 of 2016
(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise
directs, carry interest at the rate of two per cent. higher than the current rate of
interest prevalent on the date of award, from the date of award to the date of
payment.
Explanation- The expression "current rate of interest" shall have the same meaning
as assigned to it under clause (b) of section 2 of the Interest Act, 1978 (14 of 1978).
On a reading of the amended and the unamended provisions, it is clear that prior
to amendment, the arbitrator could direct future interest at the rate of 18% per
annum from the date of the arbitral award to the date of payment. However, the
amended section carries interest at a rate 2% higher than the current rate of
interest prevalent from the date of the arbitral award till the date of payment. In
the facts of the present case, the learned Arbitral Tribunal has correctly awarded
post-award interest as per the mandate of Section 31(7)(b) of the Act, however, to
my mind, it has mistakenly applied the rate of 12% per annum. In the facts of the
th
present case, the date of the award is 6 March 2018, and the same will therefore
be governed by the amended provisions of Section 31(7)(b) of the Act, and hence
in my view the rate of interest would be 10% per annum, considering that the date
th
of award is 6 March 2018 and the rate of interest prevalent on the date of award
was roughly 8.35%, and Section 31(7)(b) allows the Arbitral Tribunal to charge
interest at a rate 2% higher than the prevalent rate of interest. Hence, to that
extent, the impugned arbitral award is modified, and instead of an interest rate of
12% per annum from the date of the impugned arbitral award till the payment and
realization of the awarded amount, an interest rate of 10% per annum would be
charged.
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59. Further, the decisions as relied upon by learned counsel on behalf of
the Petitioner-Corporation are also not apposite to the facts of the case, as they
have been rendered in a different fact pattern. The same are discussed in the
subsequent paragraphs.
60. The decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Emmson Gulf
7
DMCC v. National Coop. Consumer Federation of India Ltd. is not apposite to
the facts of the present case, as the same has been rendered in a different fact
pattern. In the aforesaid case, the Arbitral Tribunal had rejected the claim of the
Petitioner therein for pendente lite interest but had failed to record reasons for the
same in the arbitral award as per the requirements of Section 31(3) of the Act. The
Court had therefore held that Section 31(3) of the Act casts an obligation on the
Arbitral Tribunal to state the reasons upon which the arbitral award is based, unless
the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an arbitral
award on agreed terms under Section 30 of the Act, and that since the exceptions
to the giving of reasons by the Arbitral Tribunal were not attracted, the Arbitral
Tribunal was under an obligation to give reasons for rejecting the claim of grant of
interest. However, in the facts of the present case, the impugned arbitral award
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dated 6 March 2018 is a well-reasoned award as held by me above. Further, the
th

learned Arbitral Tribunal, in the corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11
September 2018 while adjudicating upon the application under Section 33 of the
Act was not required to state reasons for changing the date from which interest was
th th
to be awarded from 6 August 2013 to 25 August 2006 , as the same was a
7 2023 SCC OnLine Del 920
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typographical error sought to be corrected under Section 33 and therefore did not
fall within the ambit of Section 31(3) of the Act.
61. Further, I am not in agreement with the reliance placed by learned
counsel on behalf of the Petitioner-Corporation on the decision of the Supreme
8
Court in Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd. . The arbitrator in the
aforesaid case had passed an arbitral award in favour of the Respondent therein,
directing the Appellant to return 3648.80 grams of pure gold to the Respondent or
in the alternative pay the market value of the same, calculating the value of gold at
Rs. 740/- per gram. The Respondent had thereafter filed an application under
Section 33 of the Act before the arbitrator seeking modification of the value at
which the market value of the gold was calculated from Rs. 740/- per gram to Rs.
20,747/- per 10 grams, which was allowed by the Arbitrator. Thereafter, the
Appellant therein had filed an application to set aside the arbitral award before the
City Civil Court, which was dismissed, and upon the same being challenged before
the High Court of Karnataka under Section 37 of the Act, the High Court also
dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court however held that the original award was
passed considering the claim made by the Respondent as per its original claim, and
therefore, subsequently allowing the application under Section 33 of the Act to
modify the original award in exercise of powers under Section 33 of the 1996 Act
was not sustainable. The Court held that only in a case of arithmetical and/or
clerical error, the award can be modified, and such errors only can be corrected, and
that it could not be said that there was any arithmetical and/or clerical error in the
8 (2023) 1 SCC 153
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original award passed by the arbitrator. Therefore, in the aforesaid case, the
correction made in the original arbitral award amounted to a substantial
modification, changing the computation of the value of gold from Rs. 740/- per
gram to Rs. 20,747/- per 10 grams, with the latter value not being a part of the
Statement of Claims filed by the Respondent before the arbitrator. This
modification was therefore not in respect of a typographical error under section 33
of the Act. In the facts of the present case, the date from which interest was to be
th
awarded was changed to 25 August 2006, and the Respondent in their Statement
of Claims before the learned Arbitral Tribunal had sought interest from the same
date. Therefore, it is correct to infer that same amounted to the correction of a
typographical error, and therefore the decision in Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan
Industries Ltd. (supra) is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
62. The decision of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Water Supply &
9
Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics (P) Ltd. is also not apposite to the facts of the
present case. In the aforementioned case the Arbitral Tribunal had passed an
arbitral award partly allowing the claims made by the Respondent therein and
awarded simple interest on the awarded amount at the rate of 21.675%. The
Appellant-Board had thereafter filed an application under Section 34 of the Act
before the Commercial Court, and thereafter the Respondent had filed an
application under Section 33 of the Act before the Arbitrator seeking substitution
of the words “simple interest” in the arbitral award to “compound interest”, upon
which the arbitrator had held that since proceedings under Section 34 had been
9 2026 SCC OnLine SC 944
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initiated and were pending, the same ought to be filed before the Commercial
Court. The Commercial Court thereafter dismissed the application filed by the
Respondent, who then filed a Review Application for restoration of its application.
The Commercial Court had then modified the arbitral award and granted
compound interest instead of simple interest and also rejected the application
under Section 34 filed by the Appellant-Board. The Appellant-Board thereafter
challenged the modification of the arbitral award and the dismissal of its
application before the Gujarat High Court, which was also dismissed. Upon appeal,
the Supreme Court had held that the substitution of “simple interest” with
“compound interest” for the pendente lite period was not, by any stretch of legal
reasoning, a correction of a computational, clerical, or typographical error. It held
that the characterisation of the mode of interest - whether simple or compound,
went to the very root of the arbitrator's assessment of the equities of the case and
reflected a substantive determination on the merits, and that it was neither a slip of
the pen, nor an inadvertent arithmetical mistake, nor a clerical oversight that could
be remedied under Section 33(1)(a). However, in the facts of the present case the
th
correction through the corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September
2019 was only in respect of a typographical error, and the correction granted was in
accordance with the Statement of Claims filed by the Respondent before the
learned Arbitral Tribunal.
63. Further, the reliance placed by learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner
on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Virender Khanna & Associates v.
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10
Airport Authority of India to contend that the cause of action in a dispute arises
when the right to sue first accrues is distinguishable from the facts of the present
case, inasmuch as the same has been rendered in a fact pattern that is distinct from
the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid case, the Petitioner-Contractor had
challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the Arbitral Tribunal had failed to
grant the Petitioner-Contractor’s claim regarding encashment of bank guarantee
and that the Arbitral Tribunal had granted interest from the date of reference of the
dispute to arbitration rather than from the date on which the cause of action arose.
The Delhi High Court in the aforesaid case had held that that cause of action had
arisen when the Petitioner-Contractor had submitted their final bid and demanded
the amounts due to them. This reasoning would however, in the facts of the present
case, not aid the Petitioner in their contention that the claims of the Respondent
were barred by limitation, as the same is no longer res integra , and as held by me
above, has been adjudicated upon in finality in Arbitration Petition No. 433 of
2017, with the same being affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in the
nd
Commercial Appeal (L) No. 92 of 2017 by the order dated 22 December 2017.
64. I am further not inclined to accept the reliance placed by learned
counsel on behalf of the Petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in
11
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati , wherein it has been held that the review of a dispute
is maintainable only on the grounds of discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of
10 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8677
11 (2013) 8 SCC 320
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the Petitioner or could not be produced by him, a mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. The Court further held that the
phrase “any other sufficient reason” meant “a reason sufficient on grounds at least
analogous to those specified in the rule". However, the aforesaid decision has been
rendered in a different fact pattern, and the rationale adopted by the Court would
not be applicable in the facts of the present case, inasmuch as there has been no
review of the dispute in the facts of the present case, and the application filed by
the Respondent under Section 33 of the Act, along with the subsequent corrected
th
impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 were only in respect of a
typographical error.
65. Further, the decision of this Court in TJSB Sahakari Bank Ltd. v.
12
Amritlal P Shah is not apposite to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in the
aforesaid case the Court had held that the entire arbitral award need not be set
aside merely because the rate at which interest had been awarded was erroneous. In
the facts of the present case however, as held by me above, pendente lite interest
has been awarded at a correct rate, as per discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal
warranting no interreference in that regard. Insofar as post-award interest, as held
by me in paragraph No. 58 above, the same is modified by applying the principles
in the case of Gayatri Balasamy (supra).
66. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
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detailed findings recorded in the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018,
and the subsequent corrections made thereto by way of impugned arbitral awards
12 Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 370 of 2024
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th th
dated 6 March 2018 and 11 September 2018 in accordance with Section 33 of
the Act, I am of the view that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has adopted a plausible
view of the matter. The Petitioner-Corporation has failed to establish any ground
warranting interference with the impugned arbitral award within the limited scope
of Section 34 of the Act, except in respect of post-award interest.
th
67. Accordingly, the impugned arbitral award dated 6 March 2018 and the
th
corrected impugned arbitral award dated 11 September 2018 are modified to the
extent as provided for in paragraph No. 58 above in respect of post-award interest.
The remaining findings and portions of the award do not warrant interference
under Section 34 of the Act and are therefore not set aside or modified. Therefore,
the Petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
68. All pending Interim Applications, if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
69. Any amount deposited in this Court shall be released in accordance with
law within one month from the date on which this Judgment is uploaded on the
official website of this Court.
70. The Arbitration Petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
( AARTI SATHE , J.)
71. After pronouncing the Judgment, learned counsel for the Petitioner has
requested for stay of the Judgment, to approach higher Court. The request is
opposed by the learned counsel for the Respondent. The effect of operation of the
Judgment is stayed for a period of four weeks from today.
( AARTI SATHE , J.)
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