The Central Public Information Officer Directorate Of Personal Services Air Headquarters Indian Air Force vs Commodore Lokesh K Batra Retd

$~10
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
% Date of Decision: October 15 , 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010336942020
+ W.P.(C) 10165/2020 & CM APPL. 32358/2020, CM APPL.
32359/2020
THE CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER
DIRECTORATE OF PERSONAL SERVICES AIR
HEADQUARTERS INDIAN AIR FORCE .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC
with Mr. Shailendra Kumar
Mishra, Advocates.
Mr. Anil Vashist from Air
Force.
versus
COMMODORE LOKESH K BATRA RETD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Prasanna S., Ms. Injila
Muslim Zaidi, Mr. Ashish
Reddy, Mr. Prasanna Balakumar
and Ms. Ishita Tulsyan,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
1. The present petition is filed under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India assailing order dated 08.07.2020 (hereinafter
‘ impugned order ’) passed by the learned Central Information
Commission in Appeal No. CIC/IAIRF/A/2018/632874 titled as
Commodore Lokesh K Batra (Retd.) V. CPIO, Directorate of Personal
Services, Air Headquarters .
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 1 of 12

2. Briefly stated, the respondent submitted an application dated
05.06.2018 under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (‘ RTI Act ’) to the
petitioner, seeking information in connection with each foreign visit of
the Prime Ministers of India undertaken on Indian Air Force Aircrafts
from 01.04.2013, till the date of the application.
3. The petitioner vide letter dated 10.07.2018 replied to the
respondent’s application dated 05.06.2018 thereby stating as under:-
"You were provided with the information regarding the visits of the
Hon'ble Prime Minister of India from 26.05.2014 onwards till
06.06.2016 by Indian Air Force aircraft vide this HQ letter No. AIR
HQ/23401/204/4/10795/E/PS dated 03.02.2017. It is informed that
there have been NIL air travel of former Hon'ble Prime Minister Sh.
Manmohan Singh from 01.04.2013 till 25.05.2014 by Indian Air
Force Aircraft. From 04.06.2016 till 09.07.2018, only three (3)
visits were undertaken by Hon'bie Prime Minister Sh. Narendra
Modi in Indian Air Force Aircrafts, copy of the travel information is
enclosed. Special Flight Returns (SFR) Part - I & Part - II, includes
details of aircraft and aircrew and many other details along with
entire entourage, including names of all the Special Protection
Group (SPG) personnel travelling with the Hon'bie Prime Minister,
appointed for his safety. The copies of Special Flight Returns (SFR)
Part - I & Part - // with regard to foreign visits by earlier and present
Hon'bie Prime Ministers of India (which are mainly utilised for
internal auditing and accounting of the lAF) holds sensitive details
and would prejudicially affect the security of the State and is further
held under fiduciary capacity, as no larger public interest is served
by such disclosure. Hence, the said information is denied under
Section 8(1)(a) & 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, 2005."
4. The respondent, not being satisfied with the denial of information
regarding copies of SFRs Part-I & Part-II, in respect of each foreign
visit of former Hon’ble Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and
Hon’ble Prime Minister Sh. Narendra Modi, undertaken by Indian Air
Force Aircrafts, from 01.04.2013 till the date of application, preferred
an appeal before the First Appellate Authority.
5. The First Appellate Authority vide order dated 20.09.2018
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 2 of 12

dismissed the said appeal noting that the petitioner had rightly denied
the said information under Section 8(1)(a) and Section 8(1)(e) of the
RTI Act.
6. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred a second appeal
before the learned Central Information Commission. The learned
Central Information Commission vide the impugned order allowed the
said appeal directing the petitioner to provide certified copies of
available and relevant SFR-II to the respondent.
7. Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been filed.
8. The learned CGSC for the petitioner submits that the information
sought by the respondent vide RTI application dated 05.06.2018
pertains to Part-II of the Special Flight Returns (SFR), containing
sensitive details of foreign visits of the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India,
including the names and particulars of passengers, aircraft, aircrew and
Special Protection Group (SPG) personnel accompanying the Prime
Minister.
9. She submits that the information was exempt from disclosure
under Sections 8(1)(a), 8(1)(g) of the Right to Information Act, 2005,
as it concerned matters of national security, could endanger the life and
physical safety of persons associated with the Prime Minister's security.
She submits that the information, when collated with details already
available in the public domain, could be utilised by forces inimical to
the security of the State and provide strategic and tactical advantages to
adversaries.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the information
sought under the RTI application pertains to expenditure incurred on
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 3 of 12

foreign visits of the Hon’ble Prime Minister using public funds and is,
therefore, a matter of significant public interest. He submitted that the
respondent was interested in obtaining details of private persons
accompanying the Prime Minister at public expense and not the
identities of security personnel.
11. I have heard the arguments and perused the record.
12. At the outset, it is necessary to recognise that though the RTI Act
seeks to promote transparency and accountability in the functioning of
public authorities, the right to information is not absolute and must be
balanced against other rights and interests protected by law, including
the right to privacy. The purpose of the RTI Act is though to bring
about transparency and accountability of public authorities, the same
ought to be balanced with other public interests including
confidentiality of sensitive information. Reference in this regard may
be drawn to the judgment in CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay : (2011) 8
SCC 497 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:
“61. Some High Courts have held that Section 8 of the RTI Act is in
the nature of an exception to Section 3 which empowers the citizens
with the right to information, which is a derivative from the freedom
of speech; and that, therefore, Section 8 should be construed strictly,
literally and narrowly. This may not be the correct approach. The
Act seeks to bring about a balance between two conflicting interests,
as harmony between them is essential for preserving democracy.
One is to bring about transparency and accountability by providing
access to information under the control of public authorities. The
other is to ensure that the revelation of information, in actual
practice, does not conflict with other public interests which include
efficient operation of the Governments, optimum use of limited fiscal
resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive
information. The Preamble to the Act specifically states that the
object of the Act is to harmonise these two conflicting interests.
While Sections 3 and 4 seek to achieve the first objective, Sections
8, 9, 10 and 11 seek to achieve the second objective. Therefore, when
Section 8 exempts certain information from being disclosed, it
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 4 of 12

should not be considered to be a fetter on the right to information,
but as an equally important provision protecting other public
interests essential for the fulfilment and preservation of democratic
ideals.
62. When trying to ensure that the right to information does not
conflict with several other public interests (which includes efficient
operations of the Governments, preservation of confidentiality of
sensitive information, optimum use of limited fiscal resources, etc.),
it is difficult to visualise and enumerate all types of information
which require to be exempted from disclosure in public interest. The
legislature has however made an attempt to do so. The enumeration
of exemptions is more exhaustive than the enumeration of
exemptions attempted in the earlier Act, that is, Section 8 of the
Freedom to Information Act, 2002. The courts and Information
Commissions enforcing the provisions of the RTI Act have to adopt
a purposive construction, involving a reasonable and balanced
approach which harmonises the two objects of the Act, while
interpreting Section 8 and the other provisions of the Act.”
13. The petitioner has contended that the SFR contains sensitive
information relating to the foreign visits of the Hon’ble Prime Minister
of India, including details of the aircraft, aircrew, passengers and
accompanying entourage. It is submitted that even if the names of
security personnel are redacted, disclosure of the remaining particulars,
when collated with information already available in the public domain,
could reveal sensitive aspects of the security arrangements of the
Hon’ble Prime Minister.
14. It has been contended that the prescribed SFR-II format under
AFO No. 24/2017 contains not merely the names of passengers but also
their designations, appointments, identification numbers, flight
references, passenger strength and agency particulars. These details are
interconnected and, when read together or correlated with publicly
available information, may facilitate the identification of security
personnel, reveal the composition of the Prime Minister’s entourage
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 5 of 12

and enable inferences to be drawn regarding patterns of security
deployment.
15. Section 8 of the RTI Act lays down the information which is
exempted from disclosure under the RTI Act, the same is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“8. Exemption from disclosure of information.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no
obligation to give any citizen—
(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific
or economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead
to incitement of an offence;
(b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published
by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may
constitute contempt of court;
(c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of
privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature;
(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or
intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the
competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority
is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such
information;
(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship,
unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public
interest warrants the disclosure of such information;
(f) information received in confidence from foreign Government;
(g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or
physical safety of any person or identify the source of information
or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security
purposes;
(h) information which would impede the process of investigation or
apprehension or prosecution of offenders;
(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 6 of 12

of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers:
Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons
thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were
taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the
matter is complete, or over:
Provided further that those matters which come under the
exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed;
(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure
of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or
which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State
Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case
may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the
disclosure of such information:
Provided that the information which cannot be denied to Parliament
or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 nor
any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section
(1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public
interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.
(3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of sub-section
(1), any information relating to any occurrence, event or matter
which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before
the date on which any request is made under Section 6 shall be
provided to any person making a request under that section:
Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which
the said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of
the Central Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals
provided for in this Act.”
16. Section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act specifically exempts information,
the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and
integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests
of the State, its relations with foreign States, or lead to incitement of an
offence. Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act specifically exempts
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 7 of 12

information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical
safety of any person.
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Supreme Court of India v. Subhash
Chandra Agarwal : (2020) 5 SCC 481 , while examining the scope of
exemptions under Section 8 of the RTI Act, observed that the right to
information is subject to the statutory exemptions and that clauses (a),
(b), (c), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of Section 8(1) constitute absolute
exemptions, which do not permit disclosure merely on the ground of
larger public interest. The Court further clarified that Section 8(2) vests
a discretionary power in the public authority to disclose exempt
information where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm
to the protected interests, but does not confer an enforceable right upon
a citizen to seek such disclosure. The relevant extract of the same is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“33. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 begins with a non obstante clause
giving primacy and overriding legal effect to different clauses under
the sub-section in case of any conflict with other provisions of the
RTI Act. Section 8(1) without modifying or amending the term
“information”, carves out exceptions when access to
“information”, as defined in Section 2(f) of the RTI Act would be
denied. Consequently, the right to information is available when
information is accessible under the RTI Act, that is, when the
exceptions listed in Section 8(1) of the RTI Act are not attracted. In
terms of Section 3 of the RTI Act, all citizens have right to
information, subject to the provisions of the RTI Act, that is,
information “held by or under the control of any public authority”,
except when such information is exempt or excluded.
34. Clauses in sub-section (1) to Section 8 can be divided into two
categories : clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (h) and (i), and clauses (d),
(e) and (j). The latter clauses state that the prohibition specified
would not apply or operate when the competent authority in clauses
(d) and (e) and the PIO in clause (j) is satisfied that larger public
interest warrants disclosure of such information. [ For the purpose
of the present decision, we do not consider it appropriate to decide
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 8 of 12

who would be the “competent authority” in the case of other public
authorities, if sub-clauses (i) to (v) to clause (e) of Section 2 are
inapplicable. This “anomaly” or question is not required to be
decided in the present case as the Chief Justice of India is a
competent authority in the case of the Supreme Court of India.]
Therefore, clauses (d), (e) and (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act
incorporate qualified prohibitions and are conditional and not
absolute exemptions. Clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (h) and (i) do not
have any such stipulation. Prohibitory stipulations in these clauses
do not permit disclosure of information on satisfaction of the larger
public interest rule. These clauses, therefore, incorporate absolute
exclusions.
35. Sub-section (2) to Section 8 states that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 or any of the exemptions
permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority
may allow access to information if the public interest in disclosure
outweighs the harm to the protected interests. The disclosure under
Section 8(2) by the public authority is not a mandate or compulsion
but is in the form of discretionary disclosure. Section 8(2)
acknowledges and empowers the public authority to lawfully
disclose information held by them despite the exemptions under sub-
section (1) to Section 8 if the public authority is of the opinion that
the larger public interest warrants disclosure. Such disclosure can
be made notwithstanding the provisions of the Official Secrets Act.
Section 8(2) does not create a vested or justiciable right that the
citizens can enforce by an application before the PIO seeking
information under the RTI Act. PIO is under no duty to disclose
information covered by exemptions under Section 8(1) of the RTI
Act. Once the PIO comes to the conclusion that any of the exemption
clauses is applicable, the PIO cannot pass an order directing
disclosure under Section 8(2) of the RTI Act as this discretionary
power is exclusively vested with the public authority.”
18. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bihar Public Service
Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi : (2012) 13 SCC 61
observed that if, in the opinion of the concerned authority, there is
danger to life or possibility of danger to physical safety, the CPIO
would be entitled to bring such case within the exemption of Section
8(1)(g) of the RTI Act. The relevant extract of the same is reproduced
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 9 of 12

hereinbelow:
“27. Now, let us examine the provisions of Section 8(1)(g) with
greater emphasis on the expressions that are relevant to the present
case. This section concerns with the cases where no obligation is
cast upon the public authority to furnish information, the disclosure
of which would endanger (a) the life, (b) physical safety of any
person. The legislature, in its wisdom, has used two distinct
expressions. They cannot be read or construed as being
synonymous. Every expression used by the legislature must be given
its intended meaning and, in fact, a purposeful interpretation. The
expression “life” has to be construed liberally. “Physical safety” is
a restricted term while “life” is a term of wide connotation. “Life”
includes reputation of an individual as well as the right to live with
freedom. The expression “life” also appears in Article 21 of the
Constitution and has been provided a wide meaning so as to inter
alia include within its ambit the right to live with dignity, right to
shelter, right to basic needs and even the right to reputation. The
expression “life” under Section 8(1)(g) of the Act, thus, has to be
understood in somewhat similar dimensions. The term “endanger”
or “endangerment” means the act or an instance of putting someone
or something in danger; exposure to peril or such situation which
would hurt the concept of life as understood in its wider sense [refer
to Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn.)]. Of course, physical safety
would mean the likelihood of assault to physical existence of a
person. If in the opinion of the authority concerned there is danger
to life or possibility of danger to physical safety, the State
Information Commission would be entitled to bring such case within
the exemption of Section 8(1)(g) of the Act. The disclosure of
information which would endanger the life or physical safety of any
person is one category and identification of the source of
information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement
or security purposes is another category. The expression “for law
enforcement or security purposes” is to be read ejusdem generis
only to the expression “assistance given in confidence” and not to
any other clause of the section. On the plain reading of Section
8(1)(g), it becomes clear that the said clause is complete in itself. It
cannot be said to have any reference to the expression “assistance
given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes”.
Neither the language of the section nor the object of the section
requires such interpretation. It would not further the cause of this
section. Section 8 attempts to provide exemptions and once the
language of the section is unambiguous and squarely deals with
every situation, there is no occasion for the court to frustrate the
very object of the section. It will amount to misconstruing the
provisions of the Act. The High Court though has referred to Section
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 10 of 12

8(1)(j) but has, in fact, dealt with the language of Section 8(1)(g).
The reasoning of the High Court, therefore, is neither clear in
reference to the provisions of the section nor in terms of the
language thereof.”
19. The petitioner has specifically pointed out that the mere redaction
of names and other direct identifiers would not necessarily eliminate
the potential security risks arising from disclosure of SFR-II. In
particular, the disclosure of successive passenger manifests may enable
sensitive aspects of the security arrangements to be reconstructed by
correlating the disclosed particulars with other information in the public
domain. The potential implications of such disclosure for national
security and the security apparatus accompanying the Hon’ble Prime
Minister cannot be disregarded.
20. Once the concerned authority was of the view that revealing
certain information could jeopardise national security and the security
of the Hon’ble Prime Minister, it was entitled to invoke the exemption
under Section 8(1)(a) and Section 8(1)(g).
21. This Court or the CIC cannot sit in appeal over the subjective
satisfaction of the competent security agencies as to whether disclosure
of particular information could jeopardise national security or endanger
the life and physical safety of the Hon’ble Prime Minister. Such an
assessment falls primarily within the domain of the agencies entrusted
with the responsibility of ensuring the security of the Hon’ble Prime
Minister and this Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of
the competent security agencies. (Ref: Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh (Retd.) v.
Union of India : W.P.(C) 7671/2010 )
22. Additionally, in the present case, no sufficient larger public
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 11 of 12

interest has been demonstrated to warrant disclosure of the particulars
in question. The mere fact that public funds have been expended on the
foreign visits of the Hon’ble Prime Minister does not, by itself, justify
disclosure of information which may compromise the security
arrangements put in place for such visits. In the absence of any
demonstrated larger public interest that outweighs these concerns,
disclosure of the information sought cannot be directed.
23. In view of the above, in the opinion of this Court, the learned CIC
erred in directing disclosure of the SFR-II relating to the foreign visits
of the Hon’ble Prime Minister after redaction of the names and
identifying particulars of security personnel. The petitioner was
justified in invoking the exemptions under Sections 8(1)(a) and 8(1)(g)
of the RTI Act to deny disclosure of the aforesaid information, in view
of the potential implications for national security and the life and
physical safety of the Hon’ble Prime Minister, as specifically pointed
out by the petitioner.
24. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the impugned
order is set aside.
25. Pending applications (if any) also stand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
OCTOBER 15, 2026
DU
W.P.(C) 10165/2020 Page 12 of 12