MOKSH VERMA @ SAHIL VERMA vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010216262026 2026:CGHC:46967
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
The date when
The date when
the judgment is
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26.10.2026 05.11.2026 * 05.11.2026
CRA No. 1410 of 2026
1 - Moksh Verma @ Sahil Verma S/o Shashikant Verma Aged About 19 Years R/o
Village- Of Victim, (Not Mention In The Cause Titel- Village- Gatura), Police Station-
City Kotwali- Baloda- Bazar, District- Baloda-Bazar- Bhatapara, C.G.
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- City Kotwali- Baloda- Bazar, District- Baloda-
Bazar- Bhatapara, C.G.
... Respondent
( Cause title, as taken from CIS )
For Appellant : Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate
For State/Respondent : Mr. Anish Tiwari, Dy. Govt. Advocate.
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)
CAV Judgment
1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section
14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the “SC/ST Act”),

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challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
22.05.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Balodabazar,
District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh (henceforth referred to
as, “Special Court”), in Special Sessions Case No.16/2025, whereby
the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under :-
Sl.
Conviction u/S Jail Sentence Fine
Default
No.
Sentence
Stipulation
01. 109 (1), BNS R.I. for 5 years Rs.1000/- RI for 01 month
02. 25(1-B)(b), Arms
R.I. for 1 year Rs.500/- RI for 15 days
Act
03. 3(1)( ), SC/ST Act R.I. for 6 months Rs.500/- RI for 15 days
ध
All the sentences run concurrently.
2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 14.07.2025, at about 1:30
p.m., the complainant Sukhram Yadav (Upsarpanch) was informed that
the appellant, Moksh Verma @ Sahil Verma, had kept liquor at his
house. Upon receiving the said information, the complainant, along
with Sarpanch Bhagirathi Kurre, went to the house of the appellant to
inquire into the matter. It is alleged that, during the course of the
discussion, an altercation took place between the appellant and the
persons present there regarding the sale of liquor in the village. The
complainant and Bhagirathi Kurre intervened and attempted to resolve
the dispute. However, the appellant allegedly abused Bhagirathi Kurre
and made caste-related remarks against him. It is further alleged that,
thereafter, when Bhagirathi Kurre was proceeding towards
Balodabazar and reached near the motorcycle repair shop of Shilendra
Rajak, the appellant arrived there on his scooter. The appellant

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abused, threatened to kill and allegedly took out a knife and attacked
Bhagirathi Kurre inflicted injuries on his abdomen. The injured was
thereafter taken to the hospital for treatment. On the basis of the report
lodged by the complainant, an FIR (Ex.P-4) bearing Crime
No.679/2025 was registered at Police Station City Kotwali,
Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.), for the offences
punishable under Sections 296, 351(2) & 109 of the Bharariya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 (for short “BNS”) and Sections 25 & 27 of the Arms Act,
1959, and the investigation was taken up.
2.1 During the course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer
prepared the spot map (Ex.P-5), recorded the statements of the
witnesses, and collected the relevant medical documents. He also
recorded the memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-9),
pursuant to which, a knife was recovered at the instance of the
appellant and seized vide Ex.P-10. The blood-stained white-coloured
shirt and jeans worn by the injured were seized vide Exs.P-6 and P-7,
respectively. Other articles connected with the incident were also
seized. The appellant was arrested vide Ex.P-19. The seized articles
were sent to FSL for chemical examination, and the FSL report was
obtained vide Ex.P-39. Upon completion of the investigation, the police
filed the charge-sheet against the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 296, 351 (2) & 109 of the BNS, Section 25 & 27 of the
Arms Act and Sections 3(1)( ) & 3(2)(v- ) of the SC/ST Act.
ध क
3. Learned Special Judge framed charges against the appellant for the
offence under Sections 296, 351 (3) & 109 (1) of the BNS, Section 25

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(1-B)(b) of the Arms Act and Sections 3(1)( ) & 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
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Act, who abjured his guilt and entered into trial.
4. In order to prove the charges, prosecution examined 18 witnesses and
exhibited 39 documents. Statement of the appellant was recorded, in
which he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against
him and pleaded innocence. The appellant has not examined any
witness in his defence but exhibited 10 documents.
5. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution, the learned Special Court, vide the impugned judgment
dated 22.05.2026, convicted and sentenced the appellant as
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the dispute arose when
the victim alleged that the appellant used to sell illicit liquor from his
house. The victim also searched the appellant's house, but nothing
was found. He further submits that, on account of the said issue, the
appellant assaulted the victim only once. It is further submitted that,
although the victim sustained an injury on his abdomen, no vital
internal organ was affected. Learned counsel further submits that even
if the appellant is held guilty of the said assault, the offence would, at
the most, fall under Section 115(2) of the BNS. So far as the conviction
of the appellant under Section 109(1) of the BNS is concerned, learned
counsel submits that the incident involved only a single blow/injury.
Though the injury sustained by the victim was on the abdomen, but it
was not grievous in nature. Hence, learned counsel prays that the
conviction of the appellant be modified. He further submits that the
appellant has remained in jail for more than 15 months; therefore, his

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sentence be reduced to the period already undergone. In support of his
submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decisions
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana ,
reported in (2015) 11 SCC 366, and Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana
and Another , reported in 2026 INSC 524.
7. Per contra , learned State counsel submits that the victim sustained an
injury on a vital part of his body, i.e., the abdomen, due to which his
intestine was also injured. He further submits that PW-18, Dr. Nitin
Tiwari, has opined that if timely medical treatment had not been
provided to the victim, the injury sustained by him would have been
sufficient to cause his death. He further submits that the impugned
judgment does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. Hence, he
prays that the appeal be dismissed.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record along with record of the Special Court.
9. PW-1 is victim. He has stated in his deposition that he belongs to
Scheduled Castes community and the appellant belongs to the Kurmi
OBC category. He has further stated that, on the date of the incident, at
about 1:30 pm, upon receiving information that the appellant had kept
liquor in his house, he, along with Sukhram Yadav (PW-2), went to the
house of the appellant, where Doojram Dhruw (PW-3), Sukhnandan
Sahu (PW-7), Bhushan Verma and Sevak Ram Verma also arrived.
They asked the appellant to bring liquor kept in his room, whereupon
the appellant abused them. When the victim stated that he would call
the police, the appellant brought the liquor from the room and threw it
in the courtyard ( ). He has further stated that the appellant also
आँगन

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abused him by referring to his caste and threatened to kill him. He has
further stated that, after some time, when he was present near the
motorcycle shop of Shilendra Rajak (PW-4), along with Sukhram Yadav
(PW-2), for filling air in his motorcycle, the appellant rushed towards
him, abused him by referring to his caste and stabbed him thrice in his
stomach, due to which blood was oozing from injuries. Thereafter,
Akash Burman and PW-2 took him on a motorcycle to Chanda Devi
Hospital, Balodabazar, where he was admitted for treatment.
10. Sukhram Yadav (PW-2), Shilendra Rajak (PW-4), Jeevan Lal Rajak
(PW-6) and Numesh Kumar (PW-8), who were also present at the
place of occurrence when the appellant stabbed the victim, have
supported aforesaid facts in their respective depositions. PW-2,
Doojram Dhruw (PW-3) and Sukhnandan Sahu (PW-7), who had also
gone to the house of appellant when victim went there to make him
understand, have also supported the statement of victim (PW-1) that,
when victim went to the house of the appellant, the appellant abused
and threatened him.
11. During their cross-examination, the victim and the aforesaid witnesses
have categorically denied the suggestion put forth by learned defence
counsel that, since the appellant belonged to the rival party of the
victim in the Panchayat election, he has been falsely implicated in the
present case. They have also categorically denied the suggestion that
the victim had apprehended some other persons who were selling
liquor near the pond and that those persons had inflicted the injuries
upon him. They have further denied the suggestion put forth in their
cross-examination that, since there was a property dispute between

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Sanat Verma (father of the appellant) and Bhushan Verma (uncle of the
appellant), and the witnesses were on the side of Bhushan Verma, they
had deposed against the appellant. Nothing has been elicited in the
cross-examination of the aforesaid witnesses which would warrant
discarding their statements supporting the deposition of the victim.
12. Dr. Nitin Tiwari (PW-18), who was a doctor at Chanda Devi Hospital,
Balodabazar, and had examined and treated the victim on the same
day, i.e., 14.07.2025, also found one stab injury on the abdomen,
measuring 1.5 cm x 1 cm x 3 cm, on the lower part of the navel, from
which blood was oozing. He has further stated that, on account of the
said stab injury, the intestine of the victim was also damaged.
Therefore, an operation was performed on the same day. His
statement also finds support from the MLC report (Ex.P-33) prepared
by him. Though he has admitted the suggestion of learned defence
counsel that, if a person falls from a motorcycle and some object
enters his stomach, he may sustain an injury similar to the one
sustained by the victim, he has also admitted that such an injury may
be self-inflicted. However, nothing has been brought on record during
the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses to show that the
appellant had fallen from a motorcycle on the date of the incident or on
any date around that time. Therefore, the aforesaid admissions made
by the doctor are of no assistance to the appellant. The blood-stained
clothes of the victim were also seized. Further, a sharp-edged iron
knife measuring 13.5 inches in length and having a width of 1 inch at
the middle of its blade was also recovered at the instance of the
appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement (Ex.P-9) and seized
vide seizure memo (Ex.P-10). Seizure of the aforesaid articles has also

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been proved by the Investigating Officer, Malik Ram Bhardwaj (PW-
15).
13. Though the victim (PW-1), Sukhram Yadav (PW-2), Shilendra Rajak
(PW-4) and Jeevan Lal Rajak (PW-6) have stated in their depositions
that the appellant abused the victim by referring to his caste, as the
victim belongs to the Scheduled Castes category whereas the
appellant belongs to the OBC category, however, in the FIR (Ex.P-4)
lodged by PW-2 and his first police statement (Ex.D-3), he had not
stated that the appellant had abused the victim by referring to his
caste. Rather, in his subsequent statement (Ex.D-4), recorded after
about 2½ months, he stated that the appellant had abused the victim
by referring to his caste. The police statement (Ex.D-2) of the victim
was also recorded subsequent to the date of the incident. Sukhram
Yadav (PW-2) had accompanied the victim both to the house of the
appellant and to the motorcycle repair shop, where the appellant
assaulted the victim with a knife. Had the appellant abused the victim
by referring to his caste, the said fact would not only have found
mention in the FIR but also in the first police statement (Ex.D-3) of PW-
2. Therefore, it is found that the allegation against the appellant
regarding abuse of the victim by referring to his caste is an
exaggeration and an afterthought. Hence, the said allegation cannot be
held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the
conviction of the appellant recorded by the learned Special Court for
the offence under Section 3(1)( ) of the SC/ST Act is not sustainable
ध
and is, accordingly, set aside.

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14. As discussed above, the prosecution has proved the fact that the
appellant assaulted the victim by means of a knife on his abdomen.
Though the victim and PW-2 have stated that the appellant assaulted
the victim thrice, but as per the medical evidence of Dr. Nitin Tiwari
(PW-18), only a single stab wound measuring 1.5 cm x 1 cm x 3 cm
was found on the left side of the abdomen, below the navel. Thus,
though there is some exaggeration with regard to the number of blows,
but the medical evidence also establishes that the victim sustained a
single stab wound on his abdomen, as stated by him and the other
eye-witnesses. Therefore, this Court finds that the learned Special
Court has not committed any illegality in convicting the appellant for the
offence under Section 25(1-B)(b) of the Arms Act. Accordingly, the
conviction of the appellant for the said offence is upheld.
15. The principal question which arises for consideration before this Court
is whether the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section
109(1) of the BNS is sustainable or not.
16. Section 109 of the BNS reads as under:
“109. Attempt to murder.- (1) Whoever does
any act with such intention or knowledge,
and under such circumstances that, if he by
that act caused death, he would be guilty of
murder, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable
to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by
such act, the offender shall be liable either to
imprisonment for life, or to such punishment
as is hereinbefore mentioned.
(2) When any person offending under sub-

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section (1) is under sentence of
imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is
caused, be punished with death or with
imprisonment for life, which shall mean the
remainder of that person’s natural life.”
17. Thus, from a bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it appears that, in
order to constitute an offence under Section 109 of BNS , two elements
are essential to be established. Firstly, the intention or knowledge to
commit murder. Secondly, the actual act of trying to commit the murder.
And, it must have both the necessary mens rea and actus reus . Hence,
to sustain a conviction under this section, it is necessary to establish
that, had the accused succeeded in his attempt and had the victim met
his death because of such act, the offence of murder punishable u/s
103(1) of BNS would be established.
18. It is settled law that, an accused charged u/s 109 of BNS cannot be
acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the
nature of simple hurt, as the determinative factor is intention or
knowledge and not the nature of the injury. This principle was
discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the
relevant paragraph of which reads hereunder:
“ 12. To justify a conviction under this section, it
is not essential that bodily injury capable of
causing death should have been inflicted.
Although the nature of injury actually caused
may often give considerable assistance in
coming to a finding as to the intention of the
accused, such intention may also be deduced

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from other circumstances, and may even, in
some cases, be ascertained without any
reference at all to actual wounds. The section
makes a distinction between an act of the
accused and its result, if any. Such an act may
not be attended by any result so far as the
person assaulted is concerned, but still there
may be cases in which the culprit would be
liable under this section. It is not necessary that
the injury actually caused to the victim of the
assault should be sufficient under ordinary
circumstances to cause the death of the person
assaulted. What the court has to see is whether
the act, irrespective of its result, was done with
the intention or knowledge and under
circumstances mentioned in the section. An
attempt in order to be criminal need not be the
penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is
present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof.” Nevertheless, the nature of
injury actually caused does render considerable
assistance to the court in ascertaining the
intention of the accused. However, courts may
also ascertain the intention from other
circumstances, even without reference to actual
wounds. The aforesaid principle stands
reiterated in the case of Bipin Bihari v. State of
M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799, as follows:
“9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction
under Section 307 if there is present an
intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof. It is not essential that
bodily injury capable of causing death
should have been inflicted. Although
the nature of injury actually caused may
often give considerable assistance in

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coming to a finding as to the intention
of the accused, such intention may also
be deduced from other circumstances,
and may even, in some cases, be
ascertained without any reference at all
to actual wounds. The section makes a
distinction between the act of the
accused and its result, if any. The court
has to see whether the act, irrespective
of its result, was done with the intention
or knowledge and under circumstances
mentioned in the section. An attempt in
order to be criminal need not be the
penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if
there is present an intent coupled with
some overt act in execution thereof.”
19. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, the issue which now requires
consideration is whether the injuries in question were inflicted to the
victim with the requisite intention or knowledge and under such
circumstances that, had death ensued, the act would have amounted
to murder.
20. The words ‘such intention’ found in Section 109 of BNS, refer to the
intention referred to in Section 101 of BNS. It means: (i) intention to
cause death; (ii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which the
offender knows is likely to cause death; (iii) intention to cause such
bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. Thus, the essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to
murder is the intention to cause death. Such intention exists prior to the
actual attempt and must be established independently of the act itself

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or the actus reus . Once the requisite intention to commit murder is
proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes irrelevant,
unless the attempt culminates in death, in which case the offence
would fall within Section 101 of BNS. In the absence of proof of
intention, a conviction under this provision cannot be sustained.
21. It is well-settled that the intention of an accused cannot be ascertained
by directly examining his state of mind; rather, it has to be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances, such as the type of weapon employed,
the words spoken by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive
behind the act, the parts of the body targeted, the nature and extent of
the injuries inflicted, as well as the force and manner in which the
blows were delivered.
22. In the light of the aforesaid settled law, if the facts and circumstances of
the present case are examined, it is evident that no prior enmity
between the appellant and the victim has been established. However,
the victim (PW-1) and the eyewitness Sukhram Yadav (PW-2) have
categorically stated that, when they were present at the appellant's
house to make him understand, the appellant not only abused the
victim but also threatened him by saying that whoever called the police
would be beaten up one by one. It has further been established from
their depositions that, after some time, when the victim and PW-2 were
present near the motorcycle repair shop of Shilendra Rajak (PW-4),
and Jeevan Lal Rajak (PW-6), the appellant arrived there on his
scooter and assaulted the victim with a knife on his abdomen, which is
a vital part of the human body. As per the bed-head ticket (Ex.P-29),
the victim had sustained a single penetrating clear lacerated wound

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just below left to umbilicus of abdomen 1.5 cm x1 cmx3 cm with active
bleed penetrating due to peritoneum . The treating doctor, Dr. Nitin
Tiwari (PW-18), has opined that, if timely treatment would not have
been provided, the said injury was sufficient to cause the death of the
victim. Thus, the evidence establishes that the appellant had initially
threatened the victim with dire consequences and, after some time, left
his house, reached the place where the victim was present and
inflicted a knife injury on his abdomen, which is a vital part of the body.
The sequence of events, particularly the intervening interval between
the initial altercation and the subsequent assault, assumes
significance. The assault was not inflicted during the course of the
initial quarrel; rather, the appellant went to the place where the victim
was present and attacked him with a knife. In these circumstances, the
act of the appellant cannot be treated as a mere assault committed in
the heat of the moment. The nature of the weapon used, the part of the
body targeted, the medical evidence regarding the depth and nature of
the injury, the opinion of the treating doctor and the conduct of the
appellant preceding the assault, when considered cumulatively, clearly
establish the requisite intention and knowledge contemplated under
Section 109(1) of the BNS. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the learned Special Court has not committed any illegality
in holding the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section
109(1) of the BNS. The conviction of the appellant for the said offence,
therefore, deserves to be affirmed.
23. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant are
distinguishable on facts, as the injuries sustained by the victims in
those cases were inflicted on different parts of the body and the factual

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circumstances were also different. In the present case, the appellant
inflicted a knife injury on the abdomen of the victim, which is a vital part
of the body, resulting in damage to the intestine and requiring
immediate surgical intervention. Therefore, the aforesaid judgments
are of no assistance to the appellant.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings recorded
hereinabove, this Court holds that the prosecution has successfully
established the guilt of the appellant for the offences punishable under
Section 109(1) of the BNS and Section 25(1-B)(b) of the Arms Act.
However, the prosecution has failed to establish the charge under
Section 3(1)( ) of the SC/ST Act beyond reasonable doubt.
ध
Consequently, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed to the
aforesaid extent.
25. Accordingly, the present criminal appeal is partly allowed . The
conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section
3(1)( ) of the SC/ST Act is hereby set aside, and he is acquitted of the
ध
said charge by extending him the benefit of doubt. The conviction of
the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 109(1) of the
BNS and Section 25(1-B)(b) of the Arms Act is hereby affirmed.
However, having regard to the fact that the appellant inflicted only a
single blow and the prosecution has failed to establish that he made
any further attempt to inflict another blow, as well as the overall
circumstances in which the incident occurred, the sentence of rigorous
imprisonment imposed upon the appellant for the offence under
Section 109(1) of the BNS is reduced from five years to three years.
The fine amount and the default sentence imposed by the learned

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Special Court shall remain intact. The sentence imposed for the
offence under Section 25(1-B)(b) of the Arms Act shall also remain
intact. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. The impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence shall stand modified to
the extent indicated hereinabove.
26. The appellant is reported to be in jail therefore there is no need to pass
any order regarding his arrest, surrender etc.
27. Record of the Special Court along with copy of this judgment be sent
back immediately to the Special Court concerned for compliance and
needful, if any.
28. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
Sd/-
(Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)
Judge
Rukhsar