PRAVAT KUMAR PANDA vs STATE OF ODISHA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.2754 of 2024
An application under Section 528 of the BNSS.
Pravat Kumar Panda . Petitioner
Represented By Adv.
Mr. Rajjeet Roy
-versus-
State of Orissa . Opposite Party
Represented By Adv.
Mr. N. Maharana, A.S.C.
CORAM:
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K.MOHAPATRA

Date of hearing : 27.02.2026 | Date of Judgment : 22.05.2026

A.K. Mohapatra, J. :
1. The present CRLMC petition has been filed by the Petitioner
invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the
BNSS, seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in the shape of
T.R. Case No. 213 of 2007, corresponding to VGR No. 05 of 1993, arising
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out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 05 of 1993, for the commission of
offences under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (hereinafter “PC Act”), and Sections 409, 420, 468, 471, 477A,
and 34 of the IPC, pending before the Court of the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Cuttack.
FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE
2. A brief run-down of the central facts of the present case, as
gathered from the FIR, the Chargesheet and the CRLMC petition, is as
follows; Initially, during the year 1990-91, the State Government introduced
a special programme for implementation of a centrally sponsored scheme,
for assistance to small and marginal farmers with a view to increase the
agricultural production. In furtherance of the said scheme, 150 Shallow
Point Tube Wells (hereinafter "SPTWs") along with an amount of
Rs.2,49,000/- were sanctioned for Raghunathpur Block, and placed at the
disposal of the BDO, Raghunathpur, for execution of the scheme. The
initiative entailed a hundred per cent government subsidy to beneficiaries,
with each beneficiary entitled to receive Rs. 3,000/- for the installation of
one SPTWs. The beneficiaries were to be first selected by the VLWs, Ward
Members, Sarpanch, and the BDO, and then approved by the DRDA,
Cuttack. Accordingly, Eighty-three (83) beneficiaries were duly selected
from different gram panchayats of the Block, and the list was sent to
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DRDA, Cuttack for approval. The execution of the work was first entrusted
to the CEO Biswanath Jena, and subsequently to the Additional CEO
Bhaskar Chandra Mohanty, who were to be assisted by JEs (Nandakishore
Pal, Pravat Kumar Panda, i.e. the present Petitioner, and Pitabash Mishra),
along with the VLWs of the concerned gram panchayats, as per the orders of
the BDO vide Letter No. 1740 dated 30.01.1991.
3. It is in the aforesaid background that that on 02.02.1993, a written
report was lodged before the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack
Division, Cuttack, alleging misappropriation of Government subsidy to the
tune of Rs.1,50,000/- in connection with the false installation of SPTWs in
Raghunathpur Block and, an inquiry was taken up pursuant to such report.
The inquiry revealed that out of 83 SPTWs which were sanctioned, only 33
were actually installed using PVC Pipe of 2" diameter, clearly violating the
prescribed instructions.
4. It has been alleged in the FIR that the VLWs, JEs, CEO, and
Additional CEO entrusted with the installation works in each of
Raghunathpur, Jagannathpur, and Adheikula gram panchayats had furnished
false completion reports regarding the installation of SPTWs, acted in
collusion with 49 beneficiaries to obtain fake cash memos in respect of
purchase of materials for the sinking of SPTWs and prepared false
completion certificates, thereby misappropriating subsidy to the tune of
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Rs.1,47,000/-, causing an equivalent loss to the Government. Subsequently,
on the basis of the aforesaid written report, an FIR, a copy of which is
available at Annexure-1, was registered vide Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case
No.05 dated 02.02.1993, against eight Government officials including the
present Petitioner, under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, and
under Sections 409, 420, 468, 471, 477A, and 34 of the IPC. Thereafter,
Chargesheet No.11 dated 30.06.1997, at Annexure-2, was filed against the
Petitioner and fifty five other individuals for commission of offences under
the aforementioned sections. Consequently, the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Bhubaneswar, by order dated 30.06.2001, took cognizance of
the offences under the PC Act and the IPC against all 56 charge-sheeted
accused persons including the Petitioner, and issued summons to the
accused persons for appearance on 06.09.2001. However, the case record
was later transferred to the Court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance),
Cuttack, on 02.02.2007, where it has been pending as T.R. Case No. 213 of
2007. It is in the aforesaid background that the Petitioner has filed the
present CRLMC application, with the prayer as mentioned hereinabove.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER
5. Heard Mr.Rajjeet Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the
Petitioner. The primary contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner is
that the continuation of the criminal proceeding against him, after the lapse
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of more than thirty-two years since the registration of the FIR on
02.02.1993, without the trial having so much as commenced and no charge
having been framed, constitutes grave and inordinate delay which directly
violates his right to speedy trial as guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. To corroborate the Petitioner’s stance, the learned
counsel for the Petitioner contended that the right of the accused to a speedy
trial has been long and firmly recognised as an essential ingredient of a
reasonable, fair, and just procedure, and is a necessary concomitant of the
overall right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Relying on the pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar , reported in 1980
(1) SCC 81 ; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , reported in 1978 (1) SCC
248 ; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka , reported in 2002 (4) SCC
578 , and Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar , reported in (2009) 3 SCC
355 , learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that it is the constitutional
obligation of the State to devise such a procedure as would ensure a speedy
trial to the accused. It was contended by the learned counsel that even
though no rigid outer time limit can realistically be prescribed for the
conclusion of criminal proceedings, the guidelines enunciated in A.R.
Antulay ’s case ( supra ) adequately protect the right to speedy trial of the
accused. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that it has been
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firmly held by the Apex court that in every case, upon examination of the
relevant factors relating to the length of the delay, the reasons therefor, the
nature of the offence and the prejudice caused to the accused, it might be
determined whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately
delayed as to be rendered oppressive and unwarranted. In the present case,
the learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that a period of over three
decades has elapsed since the registration of the FIR, charges are yet to be
framed, and the trial has not commenced. Therefore, the inordinate delay in
completion of the proceeding has clearly become oppressive and
unwarranted.
6. The learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that apart
from the inordinate delay in conclusion of the proceeding, even on the facts
as disclosed by the prosecution case, no prima facie case is made out against
the Petitioner. It was submitted that as per the investigation, the execution of
the scheme was entrusted by the BDO to the CEO and the Additional CEO.
The Petitioner, acting as a JE, was merely deployed in an assistive capacity
and has performed his duties in accordance with the directions of the BDO.
As such, no role in the alleged misappropriation can be attributed to the
Petitioner. Furthermore, learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that,
the BDO (one, Brajabandu Biswal), who bore overall charge of the scheme
and who admittedly did not conduct any spot inspection prior to
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disbursement of the subsidy amount, has been inexplicably not charge-
sheeted in the case. In such circumstances, learned counsel for the Petitioner
contended, the implication of the Petitioner in the present case is wholly
unfounded and baseless.
7. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, drew the
attention of this Court to the judgment dated 27.02.2024 passed by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court in CRLREV No.795 of 2014 and submitted
that the case of the present Petitioner is squarely covered by the aforesaid
judgment. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the aforesaid
criminal revision was filed by one Nanda Kishore Pal, who happens to be
one of the co-accused in the present Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.05 of
1993 and was entrusted with identical duties of JE at the time of occurrence
like the present Petitioner. It was stated that in the aforesaid CRLREV the
Court ruled in favour of the Petitioner therein by quashing the impugned
order refusing to discharge him, on the ground of non-framing of charge for
three decades without any fault of the petitioner, the prosecution's own
inability to specifically establish the petitioner's role and, the resultant
infringement of the Petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial under
Article 21 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended
that the primary ground upon which Nanda Kishore Pal was discharged, was
the unconscionable delay in the disposal of the criminal proceeding and that
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the present Petitioner suffers from an identical predicament. It was
submitted that since the present Petitioner stands in the exact same footing
as the Petitioner in the aforementioned CRLREV, with respect to the delay
in trial, he ought to be accorded the same relief as was extended to Nanda
Kishore Pal, i.e. the Petitioner in CRLREV No.795 of 2014.
8. Lastly, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that after three decades from the date of registration of the FIR,
not only has the trial not commenced, but there does not appear to be any
possibility of completion of the trial in the near future since most of the
accused persons and witnesses have passed away in the meantime. The
learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that seventeen (17) out of the
total fifty six (56) charge-sheeted persons have perished during pendency of
the case and the case against them has abated. Moreover, considering the
fact that the case has been pending for nearly three decades, the Petitioner
has suffered considerable mental, physical and financial difficulties.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner stated that any further continuance of the
present criminal proceeding will not serve any fruitful purpose other than
inflicting more misery on the Petitioner. As such, it was prayed that the
present criminal proceeding against the Petitioner be quashed in the larger
interest of justice.
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CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY-VIGILANCE
DEPARTMENT
9. Heard Mr. N. Maharana, learned Counsel appearing for the State-
Vigilance Department. It is the foremost submission of the Opposite Party-
Vigilance Department that the delay in the commencement and conclusion
of the trial in the present case is not, in any manner, attributable to the
Prosecution. On the contrary, the delay has been caused substantially by the
conduct of the accused persons including the Petitioner herein. Learned
counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance department submitted that after the
records of the case were transferred to the Learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Cuttack, several summons were repeatedly issued to the
accused persons to appear before the trial Court on the date fixed. However,
the accused persons did not appear before the Court below on the dates
fixed. It was only after a prolonged period that the accused persons
eventually appeared, and were served the police papers in compliance of
Section 207 of the Cr.P.C on 17.02.2014.
10. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance department
contended even after serving of the police papers, the accused persons
persistently sought successive adjournments on various pretexts, thereby
preventing the learned trial court from proceeding to frame charge. It was at
this point that one of the accused persons, namely Nanda Kishore Pal,
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further filed CRLREV No. 795 of 2014 before this Hon'ble Court, assailing
the rejection of his discharge petition dated 18.08.2014. The pendency of the
said criminal revision was pressed into service by the accused persons as an
additional ground for seeking repeated adjournments and for resisting the
framing of charge. Thereafter, the learned trial court issued NBWs against
several accused persons and, finally the case was split up, the charge was
framed therein on 20.01.2025, and the trial has since commenced.
Therefore, the learned counsel for the Prosecution-Vigilance department
contended that the inordinate delay in the present case is directly occasioned
by the conduct of the accused persons and not by any laches of the part of
the Prosecution.
11. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance department
further submitted that that the Petitioner, being one of 56 accused persons
who collectively contributed to the delay through non-appearance and
successive adjournments, cannot be permitted to take advantage of such
delay which is of the accused persons' own making. Learned counsel further
contended that the Petitioner ought to have availed the appropriate remedy
of seeking a split-up of the trial before the learned Trial Court, or of moving
this Hon'ble Court at an earlier stage for directions ensuring a speedy trial.
Having chosen neither and having instead participated in the conduct of the
accused persons that engendered the delay, the learned counsel for the
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Opposite Party-Vigilance department submitted that the Petitioner is
disentitled from invoking the self-same delay as a ground for quashing of
the criminal proceeding.
12. Controverting the contention of the Petitioner that the infringement
of his right to speedy trial bestows upon him the benefit of quashing the
criminal proceeding instituted against him, the learned counsel for the
Opposite Party-Vigilance department submitted that the jurisprudence on
the right to speedy trial, as authoritatively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, does not admit of mechanically considering the passage of time in
conclusion of trial as an invariable ground for quashing criminal
proceedings. Learned counsel for the Vigilance department further
contended that the law with regard to consideration of inordinate delay as a
ground to quash a criminal proceeding, as it stands, requires a careful
balancing of all the relevant factors of the case such as the actual reason for
the delay, complications involved in the case, the gravity of the offence
involved therein etc., and mere lapse of time does not, by itself, mandate the
termination of the criminal proceeding.
13. To further corroborate his contentions, the learned counsel for the
Opposite Party-Vigilance department placed reliance on the Apex Court’s
decision in A.R Antulay’s case ( supra ) and submitted that when a ground of
delay in conclusion of the trial is taken by the Petitioner, quashing of the
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criminal proceeding is not the sole outcome. Rather, it is open to the Court
to make such other appropriate order as may be deemed just and equitable in
the circumstances, including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed
time, or to reduce the sentence where the trial has already concluded.
Further, referring to Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali v. The State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi) , reported in (2012) 9 SCC 408 and Ranjan Dwivedi v. CBI
through Director General , reported in (2012) 8 SCC 495 , learned counsel
for the Opposite Party-Vigilance department submitted that the right to
speedy trial is in its very nature relative, and that each case of delay must be
examined on its own facts and circumstances and mere lapse of several
years since the commencement of prosecution does not, by itself, justify the
discontinuance of prosecution. Instead, the nature and gravity of the crime,
the persons involved, and the social impact must all be weighed before
taking a decision. In the aforesaid context, the learned counsel for the
Vigilance department has relied on Sajjan Kumar v. CBI , reported in
(2010) 9 SCC 368 ; Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty , reported in
(2007) 7 SCC 394 and Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan , reported in
(1990) (1) Scale 63 . The learned counsel, drawing the attention of this Court
to the offences alleged against the Petitioner and the statutory provisions
involved in the present case, contended that the provisions of the PC Act
carry immense social relevance and the legislative intent behind such
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legislation is to eradicate corruption and provide deterrent punishment. As
such, allowing the present criminal proceeding, which involves provisions
of the PC Act, to be quashed solely on the account of delay, without
scrutinising other relevant factors, would defeat the purpose of the
legislation and erode the faith of the people in the judicial system. In this
context, learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance department
referred to Niranjan Hermchandra Sashittal and Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra , reported in (2013) 4 SCC 642 and Ashok Tshering Bhutia v.
State of Sikkim , reported in (2011) 4 SCC 402 .
14. Addressing the claims of the Petitioner that he stands squarely in
the same footing as the Petitioner in CRLREV No.795 of 2014, learned
counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance department contended that the
Petitioner's reliance upon the judgment dated 27.02.2024 in the aforesaid
criminal revision involving his co-accused, is wholly misplaced. Learned
counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance department stated that proceeding
against Nanda Kishore Pal, i.e. the Petitioner in CRLREV No.795 of 2014,
was quashed not merely on the ground of delay, but also on the ground of
absence of sanction for prosecution against him, which is a distinguishing
circumstance that is entirely absent in the case of the present Petitioner
against whom a valid sanction order for prosecution exists. Furthermore,
Nanda Kishore Pal had assailed his rejection order of discharge beforehand.
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Whereas, the present Petitioner never availed any recourse of law seeking a
speedy trial or a split-up trial at any earlier stage, and instead, chose to raise
the grievance of delay only through the present application filed long after
the delay had already accumulated. Further, the learned counsel for the
Opposite Party-Vigilance department contended that the law is well settled
that once charge is framed the trial ought to be allowed to reach its logical
end by way of either conviction or acquittal. It was contended that a
criminal prosecution cannot be brought to an end without testing the
evidence after the charge is framed, even on the ground of delay. Learned
counsel for the Vigilance department further submitted that in the present
case, charge has been framed since 20.01.2025 and the trial has now
commenced. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot claim parity with Nanda
Kishore Pal, and the precedent of the judgement dated 27.02.2026 in
CRLREV No.795 of 2014 cannot be mechanically transplanted to the
present Petitioner's case.
15. In view of the aforesaid legal submissions, the learned counsel for
the Opposite Party-Vigilance department submitted that the prayer of the
Petitioner is unsustainable in law and, as such, the present CRLMC petition
is liable to be dismissed forthwith. It was further prayed that, instead of
quashing the present criminal proceeding, this Court may direct the learned
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Trial Court to proceed with and conclude the trial expeditiously in a time
bound manner.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
16. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the
petition, the FIR, chargesheet, case laws referred to by the parties and other
documents on record. So far as the present case at hand is concerned, it is
undisputed that the FIR was registered on 02.02.1993 and the chargesheet
was filed four years later on 30.06.1997. Four years thereafter, on
30.06.2001, the cognizance in the matter was taken. Six years after the
cognizance was taken, the case was transferred to the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Cuttack, on 02.02.2007. At the time of the filing of the present
CRLMC petition in 2024, nearly thirty-one (31) years had elapsed without
any charge being framed therein. It is in this background that the Petitioner
claims the relief as prayed for in the present CRLMC application.
17. The contours of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to quash
criminal proceedings stand authoritatively delineated in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal , reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , wherein it was held that
no rigid or exhaustive guidelines can be laid down and that such power must
be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and in the rarest of rare cases.
The Court clarified that, at this stage, the allegations in the FIR/complaint
are to be taken at their face value, without embarking upon an enquiry into
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their reliability or evidentiary worth. While observing thus, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in para 102 thereof, laid down seven illustrative categories
where quashing may be justified. Such principles are anchored in the
Hon’ble Apex Court’s earlier pronouncement in R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab , reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 , and consistently reiterated in
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra , reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551 ,
which emphasize that the inherent power of this Court is to be invoked only
to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure the ends of justice, and
not in an instance where specific statutory remedies are available or in
contravention of express legal bars. The Supreme Court has, in more recent
decisions such as Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra , reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401 and CBI v. Aryan Singh ,
reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 , reaffirmed that such jurisdiction
does not permit a “mini-trial”, and that the Court must confine itself to
examining whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose a prima
facie offence. Thus, while the power to quash is wide, its exercise remains
applicable to exceptional cases where non-interference would result in
miscarriage of justice or perpetuate abuse of the judicial process
18. In the case at hand, the Petitioner has clearly staked his claim to the
relief prayed herein on the primary contention that his right to speedy trial
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated
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owing to the inordinate delay in concluding the criminal proceeding against
him. There is no denying that a lackadaisical investigation over a prolonged
period causing unreasonable and substantial delay in conclusion of the
proceeding, results in in grave prejudice to the accused. Article 21 of the
Constitution of India confers a fundamental right on every person not to be
deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by
law. Such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the
procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just' and therefrom flows, without
doubt, the right to speedy trial. A procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial cannot be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it
would fall foul of Article 21 (see Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India &
Anr reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 and Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs.
Home Secretary, State of Bihar , reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81 ).
19. The aforesaid position was again considered by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak , reported in (1992) 1 SCC
225 (which was later reaffirmed by the Constitution Bench in P.
Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka , reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578 )
wherein eleven propositions (non-exhaustive) were formulated recognising
that fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of our
Constitution creates a right in an accused to be tried speedily. The Hon’ble
Apex Court observed that where such right is found to have been infringed,
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quashing of charges or conviction may be an appropriate relief. However,
having regard to the nature of the offence and other attending circumstances,
any other appropriate orders may be passed as the interests of justice
demand.
20. In a similar vein, in Vakil Prasad v. State of Bihar , (2009) 3 SCC
355 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the right to a speedy trial
is a fundamental right and that excessive delay in investigation or trial
would compromise the fairness of the trial itself. It was further clarified that
speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article
21. In Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar and Ors, reported in 2002 (1)
SCC 149 it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that prosecution delay
beyond a reasonable period is not only detrimental to the accused but also
undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system. The Court
stated that inordinate delay causes not only personal hardship to the accused
but also societal harm by rendering the process of justice ineffective. It was
further observed that;
“ 7. In cases of corruption the amount involved is not material but
speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in the
interests of the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating
to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without
delay. As and when delay is found to have been caused during the
investigation, inquiry or trial, the concerned appropriate
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authorities are under an obligation to find out and deal with the
persons responsible for such delay. The delay can be attributed
either to the connivance of the authorities with the accused or used
as a lever to pressurise and harass the accused as is alleged to have
been done to the appellant in this case…
9. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, we are inclined to quash the proceedings against the
appellant as permitting further prosecution would be the travesty of
justice and a mere ritual or formality so for as the prosecution
agency is concerned, and unnecessary burden as regards the
courts.”
(Emphasis supplied)

21. Likewise, while entertaining an appeal against the decision of the
High Court to quash a criminal proceeding, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Santosh De Vs. Archana Guha & Ors. , reported in (1994) 1 SCC 421
accepted the findings of the High Court that the delay of eight years was
entirely and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution and
declined to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court and
observed that unexplained delay of eight years in commencing the trial by
itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. In Directorate of
Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia , reported in (2008) 2 SCC 370 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 18 thereof, has held that one of the
mandates of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is that a person should
not be disturbed except on sufficient grounds. The Hon’ble Apex Court
emphasised the need to balance the law enforcement powers of the State
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with the protection of citizens from injustice and harassment, observing that
while the State has a duty to ensure that no crime goes unpunished, it also
owes a duty to ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed
(paras 19-20).
22. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pankaj Kumar v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (2008) 16 SCC 117 quashed the criminal
proceedings on account of “unwarranted prolonged investigations” that
caused inordinate delay. It was held that;
“ 24. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles, enumerated
above, we are of the opinion that in the instant case, the appellant's
constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution
stands violated. It is common ground that the first information
report was recorded on 12-5- 1987 for the offences allegedly
committed in the year 1981, and after unwarranted prolonged
investigations, involving aforestated three financial irregularities;
the charge-sheet was submitted in court on 22-2-1991. Nothing
happened till April 1999, when the appellant and his deceased
mother filed criminal writ petition seeking quashing of proceedings
before the trial court.
25. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to inordinate delay
in investigations and trial has been raised before us for the first
time but we feel that at this distant point of time, it would be unfair
to the appellant to remit the matter back to the High Court for
examining the said plea of the appellant. Apart from the fact that it
would further protract the already delayed trial, no fruitful purpose
would be served as learned counsel for the State very fairly stated
before us that he had no explanation to offer for the delay in
investigations and the reason why the trial did not commence for
eight long years. Nothing, whatsoever, could be pointed out, far
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from being established, to show that the delay was in any way
attributable to the appellant.
*
27. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed to show any
exceptional circumstance, which could possibly be taken into
consideration for condoning the prolongation of investigation and
the trial. The lackadaisical manner of investigation spread over a
period of four years in a case of this type and inordinate delay of
over eight years (excluding the period when the record of the trial
court was in the High Court), is manifestly clear.
28. Thus, on facts in hand, we are convinced that the appellant
has been denied his valuable constitutional right to a speedy
investigation and trial and, therefore, criminal proceedings
initiated against him in the year 1987 and pending in the Court of
the Special Judge, Latur, deserve to be quashed on this short
ground alone. ”
(Emphasis supplied)

23. Recently, in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar ,
reported 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511 , the appellant had primarily contented
that the prolonged pendency of the proceedings violated his fundamental
right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
Hon’ble Court, taking into consideration the pronouncement in Sovaran
Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P. , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 351 ,
wherein it was held that the process of investigation and trial must be
completed with promptitude, and CBI v. Mir Usman , reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 2066 along with its other earlier decisions, surveyed the
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constitutional jurisprudence on speedy trial and held that inordinate and
unexplained delay in conclusion of criminal proceedings, particularly where
it is attributable to the State, renders the prosecution oppressive and
violative of Article 21, and may warrant quashing of the proceedings
notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations. The Court further
emphasised that constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene where the
criminal process itself becomes punitive by the passage of time. Relevant
portion thereof is quoted hereinbelow:
“ 19. ...When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter
of investigation by the time permission was taken as above - 11
years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is
forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at
the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such
chargesheet. In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a
criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years. The
judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that
investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also
held therein, that violation of this right can strike at the root of the
investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time, it
must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an
investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed
within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close.
…Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation
where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature,
can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a
large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer
endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual
trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence.
*
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21…(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the
machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness,
transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court
finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to
substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the
first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is
bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and
satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.
The direction above does not come based on this case
alone. This Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that
there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc.
This Court has time and again, in its pronouncements underscored
the necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being important
for the accused, victim and the society. However, for a variety of
reasons there is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into
a reality. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Reverting to the case at hand, the learned counsel for the State-
Vigilance Department has submitted that on 20.01.2025, i.e. after the
present CRLMC petition was filed, the charges were framed in the present
case and the trial has now commenced. The report of the learned Special
Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack, at Flag-B, substantiates the contention of the
learned counsel for the Vigilance Department. Therefore, it is an
incontrovertible fact that the trial in the present case has commenced after
an inordinate delay of more than thirty years since the FIR was first
registered.
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25. Now, the Vigilance department has stated that such delay is
attributable to the accused persons, including the Petitioner, since after filing
of the chargesheet and the transfer of the records to the learned Special
Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack, the accused persons failed to appear before the
trial Court on the dates fixed. When the accused person did finally appear,
they were served the police papers, after which they have sought successive
adjournments. It is the Vigilance counsel’s stance that the onus was on the
Petitioner to either seek a direction for splitting up of the trial so that the
trial in his regard might have continued irrespective of the absentee accused
persons, or to move the High Court for a direction to conclude the trial.
Since the Petitioner has not sought for such remedies earlier, the learned
counsel for the Vigilance department claims that the Petitioner cannot now
rely on the ground of delay. The learned Vigilance counsel has also relied
on the objectives of the PC Act to contend that that present criminal
proceeding be allowed to reach its natural conclusion despite the delay of
more than three decades in commencement thereof.
26. This Court, after a careful contention of the aforesaid submissions
against the undisputed facts of the case, is unable to accept the same. The
contention of the learned Counsel for the Vigilance Department that the
onus was on the Petitioner to pursue to the trial seems to be misplaced. The
learned counsel has mistakenly presupposed that it is the accused who bears
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the duty to pursue the criminal proceedings brought against him. Instead, in
a criminal trial, it is the judicial and prosecutorial machinery of the State
that shoulders the onus of ensuring that the trial is concluded in a timely
manner by utilizing it’s vested powers to procure the attendance of absentee
accused persons, or splitting up the trial. Similarly, it is unquestionable that
the PC Act is special legislation aimed at curbing the menace of corruption
in our society. However, it is precisely because of such objective of the
statute that the law places an even heavier obligation upon the prosecution
to ensure that cases involving provisions of the PC Act are conducted with
diligence and concluded expeditiously. Any failure to do so, i.e. an
inordinate delay of more than three decades, subverts the very purpose
which the legislation seeks to achieve and affects not only the established
right to speedy trial of the accused but also tarnishes the sanctity of the
criminal process while eroding public faith in the administration of justice.
27. The Petitioner, to corroborate his case, has also relied on the
judgement dated 27.02.2024 in CRLREV No. 795 of 2014 involving one of
the co-accused persons. The Petitioner claims to be on an identical footing
to the Petitioner in CRLREV No. 795 of 2014. On a perusal of the aforesaid
judgement dated 27.02.2024, it is revealed that the learned revisional Court
quashed the impugned order and discharged the Petitioner therein (Nanda
Kishore Pal) of the alleged offences on the combined weight of two main
Page 25 of 28

grounds; the administrative failure to obtain or refuse sanction within any
reasonable time, and the non-framing of charge for 31 years resulting in the
infringement of the Petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial under
Article 21. So far as the present Petitioner is concerned, there are no qualms
regarding the sanction for prosecution accorded in his favour. While it is
true that the Petitioner in the aforesaid revision application was one of the
co-accused in the present case involving the present Petitioner, it cannot be
said that the present Petitioner stands in a entirely similar footing with
Nanda Kishore Pal. Having said that, it must also be mentioned that the
ground of delay which the present Petitioner relies on, was also considered
at length by the revisional Court while passing the aforesaid judgement
dated 27.02.2024, and forms the second primary ground on which the
aforesaid judgement was rendered. As such, this Court is of the considered
view that so far as exclusively the ground of inordinate delay is considered,
the present Petitioner and the Petitioner in the aforesaid revision stand in a
similar footing.
28. Additionally, as per the report of the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Cuttack, out of the fifty six (56) charge-sheeted accused
persons, twenty four (24) accused persons have perished during the
pendency of the trial and the cases against them have stood abated. The
Petitioner has also claimed that several relevant witnesses have also
Page 26 of 28

perished in the meanwhile. The Prosecution has not specifically countered
the aforesaid contention of the Petitioner. Moreover, the present Petitioner
was involved in the execution of the scheme regarding SPTWs in an
assistive capacity as a JE and worked under the directions of the BDO. The
BDO, who was charged with the overall execution of the scheme and failed
to conduct the spot-verification of the work executed, has inexplicably not
been charge-sheeted in the present case. The evidentiary landscape in which
the trial would now proceed is, due to the aforesaid anomalies, wholly
different from that which existed when the FIR was registered, when the
charge sheet was filed, or even when cognizance was taken. Any trial which
proceeds on such anomalies, inordinate delays and crumbled evidentiary
foundations, cannot be described as fair trial. A criminal trial that cannot be
fair is a proceeding that this Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers, is
duty-bound to bring to an end.
29. In view of all foregoing analysis, the magnitude of inordinate delay
in initiation and conclusion of trial affecting the constitutional right of the
Petitioner to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 and the
improbability of a fair trial, given the death of several accused persons,
witnesses and sheer delay in initiation of the proceeding, this Court is of the
considered view that the continuation of the impugned criminal proceeding
against the Petitioner would constitute a manifest abuse of the process of the
Page 27 of 28

Court and would not be in the larger interests of justice. As such, the
impugned criminal proceeding bearing T.R. Case No. 213 of 2007
corresponding to VGR No. 05 of 1993 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S.
Case No. 05 of 1993, pending before the learned Special Judge (Vigilance),
Cuttack, is hereby quashed insofar as it relates to the present Petitioner.
30. The CRLMC application is allowed. There shall be no order as to
costs.

(Aditya Kumar Mohapatra)
Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack
nd
The 22 May, 2026/ S.K. Rout, Jr. Stenographer

Signature Not Verified
Page 28 of 28

Digitally Signed
Signed by: SANTANU KUMAR ROUT
Reason: Authentication
Location: OHC
Date: 27-May-2026 11:24:07