THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, vs RAMU
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
ST
DATED THIS THE 1 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
MISC. FIRST APPEAL NO.207123 OF 2025 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
1. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
UKP, ALMATTI,
TQ. B. BAGEWADI
DIST. VIJAYAPURA
2.
THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
UKP, LAQ, NAVANAGAR,
Digitally signed
by B NAGAVENI
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
BAGALKOT.
3. THE COMMISSIONER
UKP, LAQ, NAVANAGAR,
BAGALKOT.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. NARENDRA M. REDDY, HCGP)
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AND:
1. RAMU S/O RUDU LAMANI,
AGED ABOUT YEARS, OCC- AGRICULTURE,
R/O MANAGULI VILLAGE,
TQ-BASAVANA BAGEWADI,
DIST- VIJAYAPURA.
…RESPONDENT
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 74 (1) OF RIGHT
TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND
ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT,
PRAYING TO ALLOW THE APPEAL AND TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 06.07.2023 IN
LAC.NO.2552/2021 PASSED BY THE LEARNED III ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT JUDGE AND ADDITIONAL LAND ACQUISITION,
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT AUTHORITY,
VIJAYAPURA.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal has been filed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, UKP, Almatti Tq: B. Bagewadi, on 13.08.2025.
2. This appeal is filed with delay of 691 days. I.A.No.01/2026
is filed on 01.09.2026 for condoning the said delay in filing the
appeal. The affidavit accompanying the application, filed by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer, UKP, Almatti Tq: B. Bagewadi
Dist: Vijayapura, seeks to explain the delay. The reasons
assigned are more or less identical to those furnished in
hundreds of matters filed by the appellants, attributing the delay
to administrative reasons and movement of files.
3. This Court finds that the affidavit is bald and do not
explain the delay.
4. This appeal appears to have been filed only with a view to
frustrate the execution proceedings.
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5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, time and again, held that
public authorities entrusted with public duties and public revenue
are expected to exercise due diligence and responsibility in
dealing with public issues, public funds, and public property. The
observations and directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court from time to time have, however, not resulted in any
discernible progress or improvement in the conduct of the
authorities or in the quality of litigation pursued by them.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the
principles governing condonation of delay, has held that it is not
merely the number of days of delay that is relevant, but whether
sufficient and reasonable cause has been made out for
condoning the delay. In appropriate cases, however, the length
of the delay may also assume significance. It has further been
held that the applicant seeking condonation of delay must
furnish a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for the delay.
It has also been held that Government authorities do not enjoy
any special privilege/treatment in matters relating to delay and
stand on the same footing as any other litigant before the Court.
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7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the
comprehensive principles on condonation of delay in filing
appeals. The relevant paragraph in the case of Shivamma v.
Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 reads
as under:
“ v. Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in matters
of delay on part of the State or any of its
instrumentalities.
228 . Limitation laws are themselves grounded in public
policy, as already discussed in the preceding paragraphs
of this judgment, it is based on the maxim ‘interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ i.e., “it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation”. Therefore,
public interest is better served by timely governmental
action than by condoning repeated lapses. State cannot
simultaneously seek to represent the interest of the public
and yet consistently fail to protect that very interest by
allowing limitation periods to lapse.
229. Public interest is best served by ensuring efficiency
and diligence in governmental functioning, rather than by
condoning its lapses as a matter of course. Thus, a liberal
inclination towards the State or any of its
instrumentalities, in matters of condonation of delay,
cannot be adopted, merely on the presumption that, if the
delay is not condoned, public interest runs the risk of
suffering, by a meritorious matter being thrown out.
Public interest lies not in condoning governmental
indifference, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility,
and timely action.
230. To permit condonation of delay to become a matter
of course for the Government would have the deleterious
effect of institutionalising inefficiency. It would, in
substance, incentivise indolence and foster a culture
where accountability for delay is eroded. If the State is
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assured that its lapses will invariably be excused under
the rubric of “public interest,” there would remain little
incentive for its officers to act with vigilance or for its
instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely
action. The consequence would not be the advancement
of public interest but rather its betrayal.
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in condoning
governmental negligence, but in compelling efficiency,
responsibility, and timely decision-making. This Court has
time and again emphasised that liberal condonation of
delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that
refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially
meritorious matter, is a misplaced proposition. Public
interest is not synonymous with the cause of the
Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the
enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal rights, and
an administrative machinery that functions with diligence
and accountability.
232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding
principle is not the protection of governmental
indifference but the promotion of responsible governance.
The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in
every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private
capacity, but as the trustee of the people’s interest.
Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on
grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to
eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are
enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of
finality, certainty, and public order.
233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the sound
public policy embodied in the Limitation Act and fail in
enthusing efficiency in administration, and bring a balance
between accountability and autonomy of action, It would
result in giving immunity or carte blanche power to act as
it pleases with the public at whim or vagary and inevitably
spell doom all over the collective responsibility that the
State and its instrumentalities are entrusted with. Thus,
we are of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be
condoned, merely because not doing so would result in
non-suiting the State and thereby run the ostensible risk
of public interest suffering. Such by no stretch can be the
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sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the
provision of Section 3 and the overarching public policy of
giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of
the Limitation Act.
234. Even otherwise, it is no more res-integra, that law of
limitation has to be applied all but the same and with all
its rigour, even if it may harshly affect a particular
party. In Basawaraj (supra) this Court observed that a
result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil.
A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.
Even if the statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party the court has no
choice but to give full effect to the same. It is based on
the legal maxim dura lex sed lex i.e., “the law is hard but
it is the law”. The relevant observations read as under: -
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to
a particular party but the court has no choice but
to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law
is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse
of time become stale. [...]” (Emphasis supplied)
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235. An application seeking condonation of delay is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this
Court. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, on lofty ideals amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions
and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
statute.”
xxx
249 . Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder
the same responsibilities and abide by the same
limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to
evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea
that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to
diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining
their very object. Such an approach would not only
privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would
also perpetuate a culture of indifference and
irresponsibility within the administration.
xxx
254 . We say so because if such observations by the High
Court, to condone delay in the interest of a State-
machinery, were allowed to be sustained by us, it would
allow the State-machineries a leeway to systematically
orchestrate delays in the guise of laxity exhibited by their
authorities. Given the majesty and colossality a State-
machinery would hold against a private litigant, it would
be grossly unfair to a litigant, who would be perpetually
entangled in the clutches of litigation, if enormous delays,
like that of almost 11 years in the present case, are
permitted to be condoned. This Court has never turned a
blind eye to the gradients of substantive justice.
xxx
258 . The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the
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tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on merits because
of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to
be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the
case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for condonation
of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the
main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid
the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
259 . We are of the view that the question of limitation is
not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx
V. CONCLUSION
261 . Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order
of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we
proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to
make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and
laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for
condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic
message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be
condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a
proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the
State-machinery is able to establish that it acted
with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.
Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said.
But courts, and more particularly the constitutional
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courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating
State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of
limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.
262 . The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect
to such callous attitude of State authorities or its
instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the
party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority.
They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant
of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants
cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations,
wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders
are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate
this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to
notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until
sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add
insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under
Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already
limited to questions of law.
263 . Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than
the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the
plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest
against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-
exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be
disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party
litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable
to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the
present case, it reopens the lis for another round of
litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As
courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure
that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek
justice.
264 . No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to
misuse the process of law.”
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8. Identical view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of
Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191 . The
same reads as under:–
“16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were
consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a
different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with
applications for condonation of delay during the last
decade and a half became discernible starting with the
decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Limited11, where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant
special leave petition was not condoned. University of
Delhi v. Union of India12 is another decision (of a three-
Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was
not condoned. While upholding the decision of the
relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone
the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs
of a deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati
Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated
that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the
object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no
litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits
of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
considering the application for condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a
coordinate Bench adopted the view taken
in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an
order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought
to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that
is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also
emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted
while this Court is considering an application for
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condonation of delay in presentation of an
appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a
discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer
for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question
whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.
Xxxxxxx
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down
in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with
much optimism that matters would improve. Their
Lordships, however, found no visible support for such
optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to
the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which
even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference
is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High
Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its
appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court,
this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha
four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter
of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether
or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is
shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the
cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is
not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for
exercise of discretion has been set up.”
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9. If the affidavit explaining the reasons assigned for seeking
condonation of delay is examined in the light of the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred
to (supra), no relevant dates are forthcoming. Largely, the
explanation relates to the movement of files and administrative
approvals. The explanation can only be said to be an excuse and
not bona fide . Any bona fide effort to prefer the appeal within
the prescribed period of limitation is completely absent.
Administrative delay and inter-departmental correspondence
cannot be considered sufficient cause. As held by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, the Government and its instrumentalities are
required to act with a higher degree of diligence, accountability,
and promptitude. The explanation furnished must be reasonable,
satisfactory, bona fide , and cover the entire period of delay. In
the present case, the explanation can neither be said to be
reasonable, satisfactory, nor bona fide , nor does it cover the
entire period of delay.
10. There is no explanation or ground made out as to what
prevented the appellants from approaching this Court within the
prescribed period of limitation. The affidavit has not even made
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an attempt to explain the delay. In the light of the above
findings, and in the absence of any satisfactory, reasonable, and
bona fide explanation for the delay, this Court finds that the
application does not merit consideration and is liable to be
rejected.
Accordingly, I.A.No.01/2026 is dismissed. Consequently
the appeal also stands dismissed .
In view of the disposal of the main appeal, the pending
I.As. if any, do not survive for consideration, hence, they are
also disposed of.
Sd/-
(K V ARAVIND)
JUDGE
KJJ
List No.: 3 Sl No.: 96
CT;PK