SUDAM SAHOO vs NALINI DEBNATH AND ORS

Form No. J(2)
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present: The Hon’be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Justice Sandip Kumar De
F.M.A. 967 of 2026
IA No: CAN 1 of 2026
Sri Sudam Sahoo
Vs.
Nalini Debnath and others
For the appellant : Mr. Amitava Ghosh
Mr. Tapas Kumar Dey
Ms. Saswati Ghosh Sinha
For the respondent no.1 : Mr. Tanmoy Mukherjee
Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya
Mr. Sounak Mandal
For the respondent
nos.18 to 29 : Mr. Kamlesh Jha
Mr. Deptendu Paul
Mr. Sourasis Roy
Heard on : 02.09.2026
Judgment on : 02.09.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

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1. We admit the appeal and take up the same for hearing in view of
the short questions involved.
2. The present appeal has been preferred against an order of
temporary injunction granted in a partition suit filed by the
plaintiff/respondent no.1.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant no.5/appellant
argues that Aparna, the alleged vendor of the
plaintiff/respondent no.1, sold a demarcated property to the
plaintiff/respondent no.1. Accordingly, the suit property is not
joint, as claimed in the partition suit.
4. Moreover, it is argued that the appellant has invested huge
amounts of money and obtained a sanction plan for making a
construction over his portion of the property, which is also a
demarcated portion.
5. By virtue of the impugned injunction order, the learned Trial
Judge restrained any change in the nature and character of the
suit property, thereby causing immense hardship to the
appellant as well as financial loss.
6. Learned counsel further argues that the impugned order does
not satisfy the three tests of grant of injunction inasmuch as
there is no specific recording as to a prima facie case having
been made out, balance of convenience and inconvenience being

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in favour of grant of injunction and/or that any irreparable
injury would occur in the event injunction is not granted.
7. Learned counsel further argues that the plaintiff/respondent
no.1 resorted to incorrect averments in the plaint.
8. In view of the relief in the appeal having been sought only
against the plaintiff/respondent no.1, we dispense with service
of notice on the other respondents apart from respondent nos.18
to 29, who are already represented before us through counsel
and, as such, are deemed to have notice.
9. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent no.1 contends, by
placing reliance on paragraph no. 7 of the injunction
application, that by dint of attempted construction, the
appellant is seeking to destroy as well as encroach upon a
passage adjacent to the property exchanged by Aparna, one of
the original co-owners, in favour of the plaintiff/respondent
no.1.
10. As such, in the event the construction is permitted, the
respondents will be deprived of such passage.
11. Even otherwise, learned counsel points out that in paragraph
no.17 of the written objection filed by the defendant
no.5/appellant to the injunction application, it has been alleged
that the registered deed of exchange executed in favour of the
plaintiff/respondent no.1 by Aparna Das is a fraudulent deed.

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12. It is contended that hence, the appellant has implicitly admitted
the existence of the deed but assails the same on the ground
that it is fraudulent, which is a subject-matter of trial.
13. Learned counsel further argues that since Aparna Das herself
was a co-owner of the subject property, although she has
transferred a demarcated portion of the property in favour of the
plaintiff by dint of the deed of exchange, in the absence of any
partition of the property by metes and bounds, it cannot be said
that either of the parties has exclusive title in any portion of the
property.
14. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the appellant
cites Sm. Labanya Bala Debi vs. Sm. Parul Bala Debi and others
reported at 77 CWN 272 , where a learned Single Judge of this
court had observed, inter alia, that in the said case, there was a
common owner who had transferred specific portions out of the
entire plot with defined areas and boundaries to different
purchasers on different dates although mentioning his
proportionate share with reference to the entire jama.
15. It was further held that it is well-settled that to establish
jointness, that is, in the said case a tenancy in common, all co-
owners must have equal rights of possession co-extensive with
the entire property although their shares may be either defined
or undefined.

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16. Learned counsel also cites Sk. Samser Ali vs. Serina Bibi
reported at 2012 (2) CHN 694 , where another learned Single
Judge of this court had observed, inter alia , that a well-
demarcated portion was sold in the said case and when an
original owner has sold the well-demarcated portion it does not
attract Section 14 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955
(for short “the 1955 Act”).
17. However, with respect, none of the said judgments or the
propositions laid down therein are applicable to the present
case.
18. In view of Section 14 of the 1955 Act, unless a property is
partitioned by metes and bounds, either by way of a partition
decree passed by a competent civil court or a registered deed of
partition, the jointness of the property is not disturbed,
irrespective of any of the co-owners having sold a portion of the
property with demarcation.
19. Insofar as the judgments in Labanya Bala Debi (supra) and Sk.
Samser Ali (supra) are concerned, in both the said cases, there
was a single original owner who had transferred specific portions
out of his total property to different purchasers.
20. As such, the question of Section 14 of the 1955 Act being
attracted did not arise, as a single owner, in any event, has the

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right to demarcate and segregate portions of his total property
and sell those separately to third parties.
21. However, in the present case, the plaintiffs have categorically
made out a case on oath that Aparna Das, the original co-owner
who had exchanged her share of the suit property with the
plaintiff, was herself a co-owner in respect of the total property.
22. Thus, the jointness of the total property, of which Aparna herself
was a co-owner, was never severed.
23. Although the defendant no.5 has every right to controvert such
contentions by bringing on record cogent evidence in the suit,
fact remains that it is a subject-matter of trial on evidence and
cannot be conclusively decided at the stage of disposal of the
injunction application.
24. Insofar as the defendant no.5/appellant having obtained a
sanction plan is concerned, upon query of the court, we are
apprised by learned counsel for the appellant that no
construction has yet been commenced in terms of the said
sanction plan.
25. Thus, the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour
of grant of injunction, particularly in the teeth of the plaintiffs’
allegation that if such construction is permitted to be
undertaken by the defendant no.5/appellant, the common
passage adjacent to the plaintiffs’ property would be encroached.

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26. Although the trial court, while coming to its conclusion, was
somewhat deficient in categorically adverting to the three tests
for grant of injunction in specific words, it is trite law that the
Appellate Court, if agreeable with the conclusion arrived at by
the trial court, can supply further reasons.
27. Even otherwise, the trial court dealt with the respective
contentions of the parties and the germane materials on record
and passed a reasoned order.
28. Hence, on the additional grounds as attributed above, we find
that the learned Trial Judge was justified in grant of injunction,
since not only has a prima facie case to go for trial been made
out by the plaintiff/respondent no.1, the balance of convenience
and inconvenience is in favour of grant of injunction in the light
of the above discussions.
29. Also, in the event a construction is permitted to be made by the
defendant no.5/appellant on a portion of the suit property of his
choice, the plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury and the
situation may turn irreversible when the partition suit is
ultimately decided finally.
30. Thus, we do not find any scope of interference with the
impugned order.
31. Accordingly, FMA 967 of 2026 is dismissed on contest against
the plaintiff/respondent no.1, thereby affirming the impugned

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order, bearing Order No.7 dated June 8, 2026 passed by the
learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Second Court at Contai,
District-Purba Medinipur in Title Suit No.210 of 2026.
32. CAN 1 of 2026 is also disposed of accordingly.
33. In view of the urgency involved on the part of the defendant
no.5/appellant, we express hope and trust that the learned Trial
Judge shall endeavour to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as
possible, preferably within one year from the date of
communication of this order to the learned Trial Court.
34. There will be no order as to costs.
35. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for,
be made available to the parties upon compliance with the
requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Sandip Kumar De, J.)
AD-13
AK