STATE OF HP vs DEV RAJ

2026:HHC:28268
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
High Court of H.P.
Cr. Appeal No. 373 of 2014
Reserved on: 02.07.2026
Date of Decision: 13.07.2026
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Dev Raj ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Appellant/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the Respondent : Mr Mukul Sharma, Advocate, vice Mr
V.B. Verma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 24.03.2014 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate Kangra, District Kangra, HP (learned Trial Court) vide
which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were
acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
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before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal
are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial
Court against the accused for the commission of offences
punishable under Section 336 and 304A of the IPC. It was asserted
that Jyoti Bala (since deceased) was married to Rashpal Singh on
20.02.2007, as per Hindu Rites and Customs. Rashpal Singh went to
Bihar to undergo training on 28.02.2007. She told her father, Dev
Raj, that the accused Guddo Devi, her mother-in-law, did not treat
her properly. Jyoti Bala was sent to the house of the accused, Dev
Raj, her brother-in-law, on 15.05.2007. Dev Raj telephoned the
informant, Dev Raj (PW3), on 16.05.2007 at about 06.15 a.m., to
report that a snake had bitten Jyoti on the previous night at about
11 pm. The informant went to the house of Dev Raj and found Jyoti
unconscious. The informant tried to take Jyoti to the hospital, but
Dev Raj replied that he had taken Jyoti to a sorcerer who had
administered some medicine. The informant insisted on taking
Jyoti to the hospital. Dev Raj replied that Jyoti was his guest and he
was under an obligation to treat her properly. He insisted upon
taking Jyoti to the sorcerer. The informant accompanied him. The
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sorcerer stated that he had done whatever was possible, and Jyoti
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Bala could be taken wherever desired. Dev Raj carried Jyoti to
Guddo Devi instead of the hospital. Subsequently, Jyoti was taken
to the hospital, but she was declared dead. The informant made a
complaint (Ext.PW3/A) to the police, and the police registered FIR
(Ext.PW7/A). Ranjeet Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. He
prepared the site plan (Ext.PW7/B). Dr Vivek Sood (PW6)
conducted the post-mortem examination of Jyoti and found that
the cause of death was a snake bite. He issued the report
(Ext.PW6/A). The viscera of Jyoti were preserved and sent to the
SFSL. A report was issued stating that no poison/alcohol was found
in the blood of Jyoti. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per
their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the
challan was prepared and presented before the Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon
the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation
was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 304A of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its
case. Ashwani Kumar (PW1) is the neighbour of the accused Dev
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Raj. Vaneeta Devi (PW2) is Jyoti’s sister. Dev Raj (PW3) is Jyoti’s
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father. Tek Chand (PW4) was told about the snake bite and reached
the home of the accused Dev Raj. Buta Ram (PW5) is the sorcerer to
whom Jyoti was taken. Dr Vivek Sood (PW6) conducted the post-
mortem examination of Jyoti. Inspector Ranjeet Singh (PW7)
investigated the matter.
5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), admitted that Jyoti
was bitten by a snake. They denied the rest of the prosecution's
case. Dev Raj stated that he was beaten, and he remained confined
to bed for 15 days. A false case was made against him so that he
could not file a complaint with the police. The accused did not
produce any evidence in their defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the cause of death was a
snake bite. The act of the accused was not the proximate cause of
Jyo’i's death. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the
police. The statements of the prosecution’s witnesses contradicted
each other on material aspects. Hence, the learned Trial Court
acquitted the accused.
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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned
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Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the
learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly
proved on record that Jyoti was bitten by the snake in the house of
the accused Dev Raj. The accused Dev Raj took her to a sorcerer,
who advised him to take her to the hospital. The accused took Jyoti
to his home, and he did nothing to save her. The negligent conduct
of the accused was responsible for the death of Jyoti. Learned Trial
Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's case. Minor
discrepancies in the testimonies were used to discard the
prosecution's version. However, the minor contradictions are
bound to come with time. The delay in reporting the matter to the
police was seen as an adverse circumstance. However, the delay
was properly explained. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial
Court be set aside.
8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the appellant/State and Mr Mukul Sharma, Advocate,
vice Mr V.B. Verma, learned counsel for the respondents/accused.
9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the appellant/State, submitted that the accused acted negligently
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in not taking Jyoti to the hospital, which led to her death. The
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Learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses due to minor discrepancies. Therefore, he
prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed
by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Mr Mukul Sharma, learned vice counsel representing
the respondents/accused, submitted that the snake bite and not the
act of the accused was the proximate cause of Jyoti Bala’s death.
There were many discrepancies in the testimonies of the
prosecution’s witnesses. Learned Trial Court had taken a
reasonable view while acquitting the accused. Hence, he prayed
that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of
acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of
acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of
evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no
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reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the
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evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page
438:
“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position
that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded
by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High
Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; and that no two
reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent
with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence
available on record.
13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer
Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743 , wherein it was observed:
21. We may note that the present appeal is one against
acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of
this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the
finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and
the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent
with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should
the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal.
Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the
acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the
appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment
of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the
judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh
Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .
14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of
Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed:
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“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it
can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the
Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible. The following
principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court
while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:
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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on
misreading/omission to consider the material
evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only
when there are “compelling and substantial reasons”
for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it
is a compelling reason for interference.’
(d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is
required to consider whether the view taken by the
trial court is a possible view which could have been
taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
(e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and
(f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible.”
15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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16. It is undisputed that Jyoti had died due to a snake bite.
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Dr Vivek Sood conducted the post-mortem examination and issued
a report (Ext.PW6/A) in which he stated that the cause of death was
a snake bite. He mentioned in the report that the probable time
between injury and death was not known. He was not cross-
examined regarding his opinion that the cause of death was a snake
bite, and this part of his testimony was accepted as correct.
17. The prosecution asserted that the accused failed to take
Jyoti to the hospital, which led to her death. The framers of the
2
Indian Penal Code stated that an omission would be punishable
when it is illegal, which means that it is in breach of some direction
of law or it is of such a nature as would furnish a good ground for
civil action. They observed:
“What we propose is this, that where acts are made
punishable on the ground that they have caused, or have
been intended to cause, or have been known to be likely to
cause a certain evil effect, omissions which have caused,
which have been intended to cause, or which have been
known to be likely to cause the same effect shall be
punishable in the same manner; provided that such
omissions were, on other grounds, illegal. An omission is
illegal ( see Clause 28 ) if it be an offence, if it be a breach of
some direction of law, or if it be such a wrong as would be a
good ground for a civil action.
2 A Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, and published by command of the
Governor General of India in Council, Printed at The Bengal Military Orphan Press, Calcutta:
1837
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We are sensible that in some of the cases which we have put
our rule may appear too lenient. But we do not think that it
can be made more severe, without disturbing the whole
order of society. It is true that the man who, having an
abundance of wealth, suffers a fellow creature to die of
hunger at his feet, is a bad man, —a worse man, probably,
than many of those for whom we have provided very severe
punishment. But we are unable to see where, if we make
such a man legally punishable, we can draw the line. If the
rich man who refuses to save a beggar's life at the cost of a
little copper is a murderer, is the poor man just one degree
above beggary also to be a murderer if he omits to invite the
beggar to partake his hard-earned rice? Again, if the rich
man is a murderer for refusing to save the beggar's life at
the cost of a little copper, is he also to be a murderer if he
refuses to save the beggar's life at the cost of a thousand
rupees? Suppose A to be fully convinced that nothing can
save Z's life, unless Z leave Bengal, and resides a year at the
Cape, is A, however wealthy he may be, to be punished as a
murderer because he will not, at his own expense, send Z to
the Cape? Surely not.
High Court of H.P.
Yet it will be difficult to say on what principle we can punish
A for not spending an anna to save Z's life, and leave him
unpunished for not spending a thousand rupees to save Z's
life. The distinction between a legal and an illegal omission
is perfectly plain and intelligible. But the distinction
between a large and a small sum of money is very far from
being so; not to say that a sum which is small to one man is
large to another. The same argument holds good in the case
of the Ford. It is true that none but a very depraved man
would suffer another to be drowned when he might prevent
it by a word. But if we punish such a man, where are we to
stop? How much exertion are we to require? Is a person to
be a murderer if he does not go fifty yards through the sun
of Bengal at noon in May in order to caution a traveller
against a swollen river? Is he to be a murderer if he does not
go a hundred yards? —If he does not go a mile? -If he does
not go ten? What is the precise amount of trouble and
inconvenience which he is to endure? The distinction
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between the guide who is bound to conduct the traveller as
safely as he can, and a mere stranger, is a clear distinction.
But the distinction between a stranger who will not give a
halloo to save a man's life, and a stranger who will not run a
mile to save a man's life is very far from being equally clear.
High Court of H.P.
It is, indeed, most highly desirable that men should not
merely abstain from doing harm to their neighbours, but
should render active services to their neighbours. In
general, however, the penal law must content itself with
keeping men from doing positive harm, and must leave to
public opinion, and to the teachers of morality and religion,
the office of furnishing men with motives for doing positive
good. It is evident that to attempt to punish men by law for
not rendering to others all the service which it is their duty
to render to others would be preposter- We must grant
impunity to the vast majority of those omissions which a
benevolent morality would pronounce reprehensible, and
must content ourselves with punishing such omissions only
when they are distinguished from the rest by some
circumstance which marks them out as peculiarly fit objects
of penal legislation.
Now, no circumstance appears to us so well fitted to be the
mark as the circumstance which we have selected. It will
generally be found in the most atrocious cases of omission;
it will scarcely ever be found in a venial case of omission,
and it is more clear and certain than any other mark that
has occurred to us. That there are objections to the line
which we propose to draw, we have admitted. But there are
objections to every line which can be drawn, and some line
must be drawn.
18. In the present case, the prosecution has not proved that
the omission of the accused was in breach of some direction of
law or would constitute a good ground for the civil action.
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19. Buta Ram (PW5) stated that Jyoti was brought to him on
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15.05.2007 at 12.30 a.m. with the history of a snake bite. He
checked Jyoti and saw that there was no mark of a snake bite. He
advised the accused to take her to the hospital. It was submitted
that the accused had not taken Jyoti to the hospital despite the
advice of Buta Ram (PW5), and had Jyoti been taken to the
hospital, her life would have been saved. This submission cannot
be accepted. Dr Vivek Sood never stated that Jyoti’s life could have
been saved by bringing her to the hospital. Therefore, there is no
expert opinion that the life of Jyoti could have been saved had she
been brought to the hospital. Dev Raj (PW3) found abrasions
beneath the knee, and as per him, the doctor said that these
abrasions were not caused by the snake bite. His testimony shows
that the doctor was also not sure about the course of treatment to
be administered to Jyoti Devi. Hence, in these circumstances, the
prosecution's version that the life of Jyoti would have been saved
had she been taken to the hospital cannot be accepted. In Queen vs
Morby [L.R.] 8 Q.B.D. 571, the father had not taken the child to the
doctor, and the child died. The doctor stated that the child’s life
could have been saved by medical treatment, or it could not have
been. It was held that the prosecution must prove that neglect had
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the effect of shortening life, and the mere possibility that the life
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could have been saved is not sufficient. Lord Coleridge CJ said:
“It is not enough to shew neglect of reasonable means for
preserving or prolonging the child's life, but to convict of
manslaughter, it must be shewn that the neglect had the
effect of shortening life. The medical witness called for the
prosecution gave his evidence clearly and well, and under a
high sense of his duty and responsibility, and what he stated
was, that in his opinion the chances of life would have been
increased by having medical advice, that life might possibly
have been prolonged thereby, or, indeed, might probably
have been, but that he could not say that it would, or indeed
that it would probably, have been prolonged thereby. In
order to sustain the conviction, affirmative proof is required.
This the skilled witness called, and upon whose evidence the
matter rests, cannot, from the nature of the case, give and,
indeed, properly declines to give. The direction of the learned
judge, though right in point of law, is not applicable to the
facts proved. The conviction cannot be sustained.”
20. Lord Grove J concurred and observed:
The judge seems to have considered that proof of the mere
possibility of medical aid being of use in cases such as the
one in question was not enough, that “might,” in fact, was
not enough, and leaves the matter to the jury, asking them to
answer the question which the skilled witness said he could
not. This they do, but there really was no satisfactory
evidence for them, and the conviction ought not to stand.
21. It was held in Regina v. Broughton, [2021] 1 WLR 543, that
the prosecution has to prove that the act or omission of the accused
was a significant contributory cause of death. It was observed:
14  The test for causation in homicide cases has long been
that it is sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the act
(or omission) of the accused was a significant contributory
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cause of death, rather than the sole or principal cause of
death. That reflects the obvious reality that there can be
concurrent causes of death. In most cases, the issue will not
arise. Most homicides resulting from an assault provide no
difficulty because the injury is the undoubted cause of death.
That will also be true in gross negligence manslaughter cases
where the deceased suffers a traumatic death. Nonetheless,
even in cases of assault causing injury, there may be
examples of concurrent causes of death. They include an
assault which provokes a fatal heart attack or an assault
from which the victim dies in circumstances where medical
treatment should have saved him, but did not because it was
negligently administered.
15  In cases of gross negligence manslaughter which arise in
the context of medical treatment, there will frequently be an
underlying condition which causes death. The issue will be
whether the breach of duty was also a substantial cause of
the death. The same will apply when the allegation at the
heart of the prosecution of manslaughter is that the health
professional failed to provide treatment that should have
been provided, or a person who owed the deceased a duty of
care failed to secure medical treatment.
22. In the present case, there is no expert opinion that
Jyoti’s life could have been saved by taking her to the hospital;
hence, the accused cannot be convicted of the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.
23. Buta Ram (PW5) stated that he was running a shop in
the village. He used to treat the victims of snake bites. He
admitted in his cross-examination that he had been treating the
victims of snake bites for about 30-40 years, and received 5-10
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cases per week. He admitted that he was famous in the area for
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treating patients of snake bites.
24. The testimony of this witness shows that, even though
he is a sorcerer, the people visited him for cases of snake bite.
Thus, the people had faith in him, and the accused cannot be
faulted for reposing faith in him.
25. Ashwani Kumar (PW1) stated that Guddo Devi was
illiterate. He admitted that the accused were residing in a kaccha
house. He also admitted that many people used to take the victims
of snake bites to the sorcerer.
26. Vaneeta Devi (PW2) stated that the accused has a kaccha
house, and Dev Raj used to work as a hairdresser.
27. Dev Raj (PW3) stated in his cross-examination that he
could not say whether the accused Dev Raj had money for the
treatment of Jyoti or not. Dev Raj was working as a hairdresser.
28. These statements show that the economic condition of
the accused is not sound, and if they hesitated in taking Jyoti to
the hospital, they cannot be faulted.
29. Therefore, the prosecution had not succeeded in
establishing that failure to take Jyoti to the Doctor was the
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proximate cause of her death. Learned Trial Court had taken a
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reasonable view that could have been taken, and no interference is
required with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if
another view is possible,
30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is
dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
31. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds
in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each of the like
amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of
this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six
months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave
Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave,
the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
32. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the
learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
th
13 July, 2026
(Nikita)
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