R K Gautam vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited

$~69
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 25.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010400062026
+ LPA 669/2026
R K GAUTAM .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Siddharth Gautam and Mr.
Satyam Chauhan, Advocates.
versus
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED .....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
TEJAS KARIA, J. ( Oral )
CM APPL Nos. 57531/2026 and 57532/2026 ( Exemptions )
1. Exemptions are allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The Applications stand disposed of.
CM APPL Nos. 57530/2026 and 57533/2026 ( Condonation of delay )
3. The present Applications have been filed on behalf of the Appellant
seeking condonation of delay of 74 days in filing and 14 days in re-filing the
present Appeal respectively.
4. Having regard to the averments made in the Applications, the same
are allowed. The delay of 74 days in filing and 14 days in re-filing the
present Appeal is hereby condoned.
5. The Applications stand disposed of.
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 1 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

LPA 669/2026
6. The present intra court Appeal has been preferred by the Appellant
against the judgment dated 20.03.2026 (“ Impugned Judgment ”) passed in
W.P.(C) 12283/2019 (“ Writ Petition ”) filed by the Appellant, whereby
learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition as being bereft of merits.
7. The brief facts germane to the present Appeal are hereunder:
7.1. The Appellant joined the services of the Respondent on
09.04.1980 as Pharmacist Compounder-cum-Dresser in Grade IV
(“ Pharmacist ”) at the Mathura Refinery, Mathura, Uttar Pradesh
(“ Refinery ”).
7.2. On 23.10.1989, an incident occurred at the Refinery involving
certain pharmacists, including the Appellant, in relation to the
fixation of the duty rota by the doctors of the hospital operated by
the Respondent (“ 1989 Incident ”). Thereafter, the Respondent
filed complaint pursuant to which FIR No. 101/89 dated
24.10.1989 (“ FIR ”) was registered against the Appellant and 17
others under Sections 147, 149, 332, 336, 337, 342 and 504 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“ IPC ”).
7.3. Subsequently, by office order dated 27.10.1989 (“ Dismissal
Order I ”), the then Executive Director of the Refinery dismissed
the Appellant from service. In 1990, the Appellant instituted CWP
No. 3220/1990 before this Court, assailing Dismissal Order I.
7.4. The FIR came to be registered as Case No. 1125/2000 before
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mathura, in which the
Appellant was acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 149,
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 2 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

332, 336, 337 and 342 of the IPC, but convicted him under
Section 353 of the IPC and imposed a fine of ₹250/- vide order
dated 22.05.2001. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 32/2001 before learned Sessions Judge,
Mathura. By order dated 25.02.2002 (“ Acquittal Order ”), learned
Sessions Judge, Mathura acquitted the Appellant of the charge
under Section 353 of the IPC.
7.5. By judgment dated 24.09.2002 passed in CWP No. 3220/1990
(“ Quashing Order ”), this Court quashed Dismissal Order I on the
ground that it had been passed without jurisdiction. Pursuant
thereto, the Appellant was reinstated in service on 10.10.2002.
7.6. Thereafter, the Respondent issued chargesheet dated 24.12.2002
(“ Chargesheet ”) to the Appellant in respect of the 1989 Incident.
The Appellant submitted his reply thereto on 10.01.2003, denying
the charges and placing reliance on the Acquittal Order
7.7. In 2003, the Appellant filed W.P.(C) 6677/2003 before this Court,
seeking back wages for the period during which he remained
dismissed pursuant to Dismissal Order I. During the pendency of
the said writ petition, the Respondent initiated a departmental
enquiry on the basis of the Chargesheet, which commenced on
06.07.2004.
7.8. By order dated 18.01.2006, this Court disposed of W.P.(C)
6677/2003 and directed the Respondent to consider the
Appellant’s case in accordance with the applicable rules and
policies.
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 3 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

7.9. Upon conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the Enquiry Officer
submitted his report dated 31.10.2006 (“ Enquiry Report ”).
Acting thereon, the Respondent, by office order dated 31.07.2008
(“ Dismissal Order II ”), again dismissed the Appellant from
service with immediate effect and recorded that he would not be
entitled to any payment or benefit beyond what had already been
paid to him as on 27.10.1989.
7.10. By letter dated 11.08.2008 addressed to the Respondent, the
Appellant tendered an unconditional apology and sought
reconsideration of his case. He thereafter submitted a mercy
petition dated 22.01.2009 to the Director (Refineries). By letter
dated 23.07.2009, the Respondent accepted the apology and
offered re-employment as Pharmacist, subject to conditions
including waiver of wages / benefits for the dismissal period and
an undertaking not to raise monetary claims before any Court,
which conditions were accepted by the Appellant by letter dated
25.07.2009.
7.11. A further offer of employment dated 31.08.2009 placed the
Appellant on probation. The Appellant accepted employment as
Pharmacist at the Vadodara Refinery, Gujarat, with effect from
02.09.2009 and continued in service until his superannuation on
30.06.2016.
7.12. By letter dated 25.08.2016, the Appellant intimated the
Respondent of his retirement and requested issuance of a Post-
Retirement Medical Benefit (“ PRMS ”) card. By reply dated
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LPA 669/2026 Page 4 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

07.09.2016, the Respondent informed the Appellant that he was
not eligible for PRMS benefits, as he had not rendered fifteen
years of continuous service, but had served in three distinct spells.
7.13. Vide Right to Information Application dated 01.07.2017 (“ RTI
Application ”), the Appellant sought information concerning
employees who were availing PRMS benefits without having
completed fifteen years of continuous service. In reply dated
03.08.2017 (“ Reply ”) to the RTI Application, the Respondent
disclosed that one Mr. Vindeshwari Singh, a co-accused in the
FIR, was availing such benefits despite not fulfilling the
requirement of fifteen years of continuous service. The Appellant
thereafter made a representation dated 05.05.2018 to the then
Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, followed by a legal notice
dated 08.09.2019 to the Respondent, which remained unanswered.
7.14. In 2019, the Appellant filed the Writ Petition before this Court
seeking grant of PRMS benefits from the Respondent. In the said
Writ Petition, this Court, by order dated 19.07.2022
(“ Interlocutory Order ”), directed the Chairman of the
Respondent to personally examine the matter and take a decision
within two weeks, to be placed on record along with the counter
affidavit.
7.15. By order dated 16.08.2022, the Executive Director, Internal
Committee, Human Resources of the Respondent held that the
Appellant’s earlier period of service could not be taken into
account for extending any benefit. Vide the Impugned Judgment,
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 5 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition, holding that the
Appellant’s earlier and subsequent periods of service could not be
aggregated for the purposes of a scheme requiring fifteen years of
continuous service. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has
preferred the present Appeal.
8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that:
8.1. The conditions imposed vide letter dated 23.07.2009, namely,
the waiver of wages and benefits for the period of dismissal and
the undertaking not to institute monetary claims before any
Court, operated as an impermissible restraint on legal
proceedings and were, therefore, void under Section 28 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“ Contract Act ”). It was further
submitted that the subsequent offer dated 31.08.2009
introduced a stipulation of fresh employment with probation,
thereby creating deliberate ambiguity with the object of
defeating continuity of service.
8.2. Since Dismissal Order I was quashed vide the Quashing Order
as being without jurisdiction, the intervening period was
required to be treated in continuity with the Appellant’s actual
service, which, if aggregated, exceeded the qualifying period of
fifteen years prescribed for PRMS benefits.
8.3. In the Reply to the RTI Application, the Respondent disclosed
that Mr. Vindeshwari Singh, a co-accused in the FIR who had
rendered lesser service, had nevertheless been extended PRMS
benefits. The denial of similar benefits to the Appellant was,
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 6 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

therefore, discriminatory, arbitrary, and violative of Article 14
of the Constitution of India, 1950 (“ Constitution ”).
8.4. Dismissal Orders I and II were alleged to have been selectively
directed against the Appellant, whereas similarly situated
employees were merely censured. It was further contended that
the Enquiry Report stood vitiated on account of the refusal to
admit the acquittal and quashing judgments and the denial of an
opportunity to examine witnesses.
8.5. Learned Single Judge failed to give due effect to the earlier
Interlocutory Order, which directed that a compassionate view
be taken of the Appellant’s service rendered between 1980 and
2008. The said direction was disregarded by the Respondent
vide order dated 16.08.2022.
8.6. The Appellant and his spouse, both stated to be senior citizens
and in poor health, were being denied PRMS benefits at an
advanced stage of life, in violation of their rights under Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution.
9. We have heard learned Counsel for the Appellant and have carefully
perused the material placed on record.
10. The principal issue that arises for consideration is whether the
Appellant’s service, upon his re-employment with effect from 02.09.2009,
can be treated as continuous with his earlier spells of service rendered
between 1980 and 2008, so as to confer upon him entitlement to PRMS
benefits under the scheme, which prescribes a minimum qualifying
requirement of fifteen years of continuous service.
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 7 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

11. Insofar as the Appellant’s contention that the conditions imposed vide
letter dated 23.07.2009 are void under Section 28 of the Contract Act, being
in restraint of legal proceedings, we are of the view that learned Single
Judge correctly appreciated that the said conditions did not arise in isolation,
but were the direct consequence of the Appellant’s own mercy petition,
wherein he accepted his role in the 1989 Incident and sought re-entry into
service on terms falling short of full restoration. Having accepted the said
conditions in writing, acted upon them, and continued in service on that
basis for nearly seven years until his superannuation without demur or
challenge, the Appellant cannot, at this belated stage, be permitted to resile
from the consequences of an arrangement voluntarily accepted by him and
from which he derived continued benefit.
12. As regards the submission that the period of dismissal ought to be
reckoned in continuity with the Appellant’s service on the ground that
Dismissal Order I was quashed for want of jurisdiction, we are unable to
accept the same. The Quashing Order did not, by itself, restore the
Appellant’s service for all purposes. This very issue was considered by this
Court in W.P.(C) 6677/2003, wherein it was held vide order dated
18.01.2006 that the Appellant had no absolute right to back wages for the
said period, and that the matter was required to be considered by the
Respondent in accordance with its applicable rules, policies, and practices.
13. Thereafter, this Court expressly left it open to the Respondent to
proceed departmentally against the Appellant, pursuant to which a fresh
enquiry was conducted, culminating in Dismissal Order II. The Appellant
did not rejoin service pursuant to any judicial direction restoring his earlier
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 8 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

position, but he rejoined only after tendering an unconditional apology and
seeking mercy.
14. The offer of employment dated 31.08.2009, which was accepted by
the Appellant without protest, expressly recorded that the arrangement was
in the nature of fresh employment and that his past service would not be
counted for any purpose whatsoever. The Appellant rejoined service and
continued thereunder for nearly seven years on this express understanding.
In these circumstances, it is not open to him to contend that the intervening
period ought to be treated as continuous service.
15. Consequently, the only period of continuous service available to the
Appellant for the purposes of the PRMS benefits is from 02.09.2009 to
30.06.2016, which admittedly falls short of the qualifying requirement of
fifteen years prescribed thereunder. Learned Single Judge, in our considered
view, rightly held that the earlier and later spells of service could not be
aggregated for the purposes of a scheme which expressly mandates fifteen
years of continuous service.
16. Insofar as reliance is placed on the case of Mr. Vindeshwari Singh, a
co-accused in the FIR, to allege discrimination violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution, we find no merit in the said submission. The Appellant’s
entitlement to PRMS benefits must be examined with reference to the terms
of his own re-employment and the eligibility conditions of the scheme, and
not by reference to the manner in which the case of another employee may
have been dealt with by the Respondent, particularly where the Appellant’s
own terms of re-employment dated 02.09.2009 expressly exclude
aggregation of his earlier service.
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 9 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

17. The submissions alleging mala fides in Dismissal Orders I and II, as
well as infirmities in the Enquiry Report, also do not advance the case of the
Appellant. Dismissal Order I had already been quashed. Dismissal Order II
was never assailed by the Appellant before any competent forum. Instead,
the Appellant elected to seek condonation thereof through a mercy petition
and thereafter accepted re-employment on specific terms. Having adopted
this course, it is no longer open to him to question the legality of the very
enquiry and dismissal which he sought to have condoned rather than set
aside. Likewise, the Appellant’s acquittal vide the Acquittal Order arising
from the 1989 Incident does not, by itself, vitiate the departmental action,
since criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings operate in distinct
fields and are governed by different standards of proof.
18. As regards the Interlocutory Order, we find that the same was passed
at an interlocutory stage while granting time to the Respondent to file its
Counter Affidavit. Although it observed that the Respondent ought to take a
compassionate view of the Appellant’s service between 1980 and 2008, it
did not, and could not, finally determine the Appellant’s entitlement to
PRMS benefits. The direction was confined to reconsideration at the level of
the Chairman of the Respondent, which was duly complied with vide order
dated 16.08.2022. The Interlocutory Order cannot, therefore, be construed as
having concluded the issue in favour of the Appellant.
19. While we are mindful of the advanced age and medical condition of
the Appellant and his spouse, the express terms of engagement, having been
voluntarily accepted and acted upon by the Appellant for several years,
remain binding upon him. Such considerations cannot override or dispense
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 10 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46

with the specific eligibility requirement of fifteen years of continuous
service prescribed under the PRMS scheme. The plea founded on Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution, therefore, cannot exempt the Appellant from
compliance with the eligibility conditions stipulated under the PRMS
scheme.
20. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that the Appellant has
failed to make out any ground warranting interference with the Impugned
Judgment dated 20.03.2026. The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed. The
pending Applications, if any, stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to
costs.
TEJAS KARIA, J
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
AUGUST 25, 2026
N
Signature Not Verified
LPA 669/2026 Page 11 of 11
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
Signing Date:31.08.2026
18:38:46