Union Of India & Anr vs M/S Shriram Coconut Products (P) Limited & Ors

$~27
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 424/2014
UNION OF INDIA & ANR .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Brijesh Kumar Tamber,
Ms. Arani Mukherjee, Mr.Vinay Singh Bist
and Mr. Yashu Rustagi, Advocates

versus

M/S SHRIRAM COCONUT PRODUCTS
(P) LIMITED & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sanjay Gupta, Ms. Aditi
Pundhir and Mr. Rishabh Wahi, Advocates

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 12.03.2026

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

CM APPL. 82384/2025 (Restoration)
1. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the present appeal was
dismissed in default for non-prosecution on 26.11.2025.
2. Having heard the learned Counsel for the applicant and in the
interests of justice, we are inclined to allow the present application.
3. Accordingly, order dated 26.11.2025 is recalled and the appeal
is restored to its original position.

LPA 424/2014
4. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 03.09.2013
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passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby the order
dated 27.06.2005 passed by Respondent No. 2, i.e., Employees
1
Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal , was set aside.

5. The issue in controversy is short. We are only required to
consider whether the activities of the respondent would fall within
Schedule I to the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
2
Provisions Act, 1952 .

6. The present dispute emanates from a notice/letter dated
02.03.1998 issued by Appellant No. 1 to include Respondent No. 1
within the ambit of the EPF Act. This was contested by Respondent
No. 1 on the ground that it was engaged in the activity of desiccating
coconuts which did not fall under Schedule I of the Act.
Consequently, an enquiry under Section 7A of the Act was initiated
wherein it was held on 03.07.1998 that coconut was indeed a fruit and
accordingly, Respondent No. 1 fell under Schedule I of the Act.

7. Being adversely affected, Respondent No. 1 applied for the
review of the aforesaid order under Section 7B of the Act, which was
also dismissed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner in his
order dated 22.01.2001. It was observed as under:
“ 5. There is no dispute that as per the new Webster dictionary the coconut
is edible fruit. The process involved is dessication, Dessicate as per Webster
dictionary means to dry up, to dry to remove moisture from the dehydrate
etc.
I have also gone through the book of accounts of the establishment wherein
found that the final product is sold mostly to Biscuit companies and
confectionaries. The product is packed in polywoven bags packed in card

1
“EPFAT”, hereinafter
2
“EPF Act”/ “Act”, hereinafter
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board bags.
The removal of moisture from the coconut is to preserve the product for
longer period. As such the department has covered M/s. Sri Ram Coconut
Products Ltd. Batlagundu rightly under the Schedule head fruit & vegetable
preservation industry. Now, therefore I, Suthanthiraraman, Assistant
Provident Fund Commissioner, Madurai in exercise of the power conferred
on under Section 7B order that the provisions of the Act are applicable
w.e.f. 22,09.97 and accordingly M/s. Sri Ram Coconut Products Ltd. is
required to report compliance w.e.f. 22.09.97.”

8. Resultingly, Respondent No. 1 preferred a statutory appeal
before EPFAT, which came to be dismissed on 27.07.2005 holding
that coconut is deemed as a fruit for the purposes of the EPF Act.

9. Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 challenged this order before a
learned Single Judge of this Court and on 03.09.2013, vide the
impugned judgment, the order ofEPFATwas set aside on the ground
that coconut is not to be construed as a fruit for the purposes of EPF
Act.

10. By way of the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge
placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in
Shri Bharuch Coconut Trading Co. and Ors. v. The Municipal
3
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad , specifically to the following
passage therein:
“ 5. In P.A. Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Addl. Appellate Asstt.
Commissioner, Madurai and Anr. [1985] 60 STC 80 this Court was to
consider whether ripend coconut which is none other than watery coconut is
an exempted article as vegetable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax
Act (1 of 1959). This Court held that fresh fruits and vegetables being
household articles of everyday use for the table, these will have to be
construed in the popular sense, meaning the sense in which every
householder will understand them. Viewed from this angle, the most
apposite test would be an answer to a simple question: Would a householder

3
AIR 191 SC 494
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when asked to bring home some 'fresh fruits' and some 'vegetables' for the
evening meal, bring coconut too? Obviously the answer is in the negative.
Accordingly this Court held that ripend coconut is neither a fresh fruit nor
vegetable. The watery coconut is no doubt a ripend coconut used for several
purposes like offerings to a deity in a Hindu temple being broken or used on
auspicious occasions or used in preparation of the daily table food or in
confectionary like biscuits or in the extraction of oil when it is fresh or dried
kernel. When a person in the commercial market goes and asks for coconut
no one will consider brown coconut to be vegetable or fresh fruit, much less
a green fruit. No householder would purchase it as a fruit. No doubt in
some English Dictionary, coconut is called a fruit or nut but it is to be
understood in its ordinary commercial parlance. In Sri Krishna Coconut
Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Amalapuram, [1965] 16 STC 511 the
Andhra Pradesh High Court was to consider whether fully grown coconut
with well developed kernel containing water i.e. watery coconut could be
called tender or dried coconut. In that context considering the scope of an
explanation to Schedule III of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957 which
exempted tender coconut from the sales tax under the Act, it was held that in
a tender coconut, the kernel is hardly formed or is only in the initial stages
of formation. In a dried coconut the kernel has formed and fully developed
and further the water inside the coconut has dried up leading to the drying
of the kernel also. But a fully grown coconut with a well developed kernel,
which contains, water cannot be called either a tender or a dried coconut.
This is well-known that coconut is used for culinary purposes and on
auspicious occasions and as part of the offerings in temples. It was held in
that case that the watery coconuts are fully developed coconuts and they are
exigible to sales tax. In KunchiRajeshwara Sastry &Sons and Anr. v. Asstt.
Commnr. of Commercial Taxes, Kakinada, and Ors. [1976] 37 STC 399 the
division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was to consider whether
Copra is an oil-seed within the meaning of item (vi) of the list of declared
goods mentioned in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and
whether it is eligible to sales tax under the Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax Act,
1957. In that context it was held that Copra is an oil-seed and it is a
declared good within the meaning of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The
watery coconuts are made liable to tax at the point of last purchase and
that, therefore. Copra would be taxed till that period at the point of last
purchase and the coconut of all varieties would include Copra also.
Therefore, it is a declared goods. The Division Bench while considering
whether Copra is an oil-seed held thus: Coconut is understood in several
forms, namely, tender " coconut, watery coconut, dried coconut and Copra,
and all these come under the expression coconut. Except in the case of
tender coconut from which oil cannot be extracted, in all other cases, oil
can be extracted and all of them are regarded in common parlance as oil-
seeds. In Sri Lakshmi Coconut Industries v. The State of Karnataka and Anr.
[1980] 46 STC 404 the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court was to
consider whether desiccated coconut falls within the entry coconut, which is
one of the declared goods Under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act,
1956 and is also included at entry 5 of the Fourth Schedule to the
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Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. In that context the meaning of the word oil-
seeds was extensively examined by the Division Bench and held that
desiccated coconut is a coconut and a declared good Under Section 14 of
the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, In Deputy Commissioner of Agrl. Income-
tax and Sales-tax, Kerala v. A.P. Raman, [1960] 11 STC 263 the Kerala
High Court also took the same view. In Commissioner of Sales-tax v. Ram
Kumar Nand Kumar, [1973] 31 STC 321 the Allahabad High Court also
held that coconut is an oil-seed within the definition of Section 3-AA(l)(vi) of
the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948."

11. Following the extraction of the aforenoted passage from the
decision in Bharuch (supra) , the learned Single Judge holds thus:
“5. In my opinion, the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri
Bharuch Coconut Trading Co. and Ors. (supra) that we must
interpretexpression “coconut” and “fruit” in the layman’s language have to
beapplied even with respect to interpreting the relevant entry in the EPF
Actbecause when a person in the market goes and asks for coconut, no one
will consider the brown coconut to be a vegetable or a fruit, and definitely
not a green fruit . More importantly, the Supreme Court in the case of
ShriBharuch Coconut Trading Co. And Ors. (supra) observed that
nohouseholder would purchase the brown coconut as a fruit. Therefore, in
my opinion, taken in the layman’s meaning, the dry brown coconut
cannot be said to be a fruit and that meaning has to be taken for
interpretation of the relevant entry of the EPF Act . The issue in this case is
not free fromdifficulties because coconut is a natural product which is sold
in differentforms and for different purposes, as stated above, however in my
opinion, a dry brown coconut definitely is not a fruit as it is not so
understood in common parlance and which meaning has to also apply for
interpretation of the relevant entry in the EPF Act. ”
(emphasis supplied)

12. The learned Single Judge also noted the reliance placed by the
appellant on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State
4
Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. The Asst. Provident Fund Commissioner
and opined that unless this decision provided that the entries in the
EPF Act were to be given the widest meaning, it was of no avail to the
appellant.


4
(2009) 10 SCC 123
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13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellant approached
this Court by way of the present appeal.

14. Admittedly, the respondents are engaged in desiccating
coconuts. Desiccation indisputably refers to the dehydrating of
coconuts so that the moisture is removed and they are rendered dry.

15. Thus, we are only required to consider whether the activities of
the respondent i.e., desiccating coconuts, would fall under Schedule I
of the EPF Act.

16. Mr. Brijesh Kumar Tamber, the learned Counsel for appellants,
submits that the learned Single Judge, despite considering the
dictionary meaning of coconut, erroneously applied its common
parlance meaningfor the purposes of EPF Act. It is argued that
coconut is a fruit and Respondent No. 1 is engaged in fruit
preservation. Reliance is placed on the definition of coconut in the
Coconut Development Board Act, 1979, Black‟s Law Dictionary and
Oxford Dictionary. It is contended that Respondent No. 1 squarely
falls under Schedule I of the Act under “(ix) any other unspecified
item relating to the preservation or canning of fruits and vegetables.”

17. It is further contended that desiccation of coconut amounts to
preservation since it extends the product‟s life. Further, thelearned
Counsel vehemently stresses that the reliance on Bharuch (supra) by
the learned Single Judge is erroneous,since the EPF Act cannot be
construed strictly akin to a fiscal statute, as also held in A.V.
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5
Fernandez v. State of Kerala , but instead, purposive interpretation
must be employed since it is a social welfare statute, as per
Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) . Lastly, it is
argued that Respondent No.1 was also dealing in coconut oil and
coconut milk, which are separately included under Schedule I of the
Act.

18. Per contra, Mr. Sanjay Gupta, on behalf of Respondent No.1,
submits that the definition of coconut cannot be determined merely by
the dictionary and must be understood from the perspective of a
layman for the purposes of the EPF Act, as also followed in various
6
decisions . It is submitted that coconut is an oilseed and not a fruit or
vegetable. By way of an example, it is argued that although cashew
nut is a fruit in the dictionary sense, it is treated as a separate industry
under Schedule I of the Act due to its use as a dry fruit; similarly,
coconut is a separate industry which ought to have been mentioned
separately. It is also submitted that desiccation does not amount to
“preservation” under Schedule I.

19. The learned Counsel argues that the EPF Act does not apply to
every industry and that one such exclusion is the coconut industry. It
is stressed that the term “that is to say” in the relevant entry indicates
an exhaustive list. It is submitted that the decision in Maharashtra
State Co-operative Bank (supra) does not mandate the widest

5
1957 SCR 837 : AIR 1957 SC 657

6
Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam vs M/s G.S. Pai & Co.,
(1980) 1 SCC 142 ; State of West Bengal & Ors. vs Washi Ahmed & Ors., (1977) 2 SCC 246 ; Motipur
Zamindary Co. (Private) Ltd. vs State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660 ; Porritts& Spencer (Asia) Ltd. vs State of
Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 82 ; M/s Shiva Traders, Bhilai vs Divisional Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Tax,
Durg, 2017 SCC OnLineChh 620
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possible interpretation of the Schedule I Entries, disregarding the
common parlance meaning. Reliance is placed on Sri Ram Saha v.
7
State of W.B. to contend that purposive interpretation only applies in
cases of ambiguity and any alternate construction must be within the
statute. It is argued that the clauses under the “fruit and vegetable
preservation industry” Entry are starkly distinct and that the residual
clause is to be read in accordance with the principle of ejusdem
generis.

20. Having heard the learned Counsels for both parties, this Court is
conscious that the scope in an LPA is correctional in nature and the
appellate court would intervene only if the judgment rendered by the
8
learned Single Judge suffers from any patent error.


21. It is admitted by both parties that as per various authoritative
dictionaries, coconut is a fruit. However, what remains contentious is
whether this interpretation is to be adopted for the purposes of the EPF
Act so as to include Respondent No. 1 within its ambit.

22. As per Black‟s Law Dictionary, „fruit‟ is defined as “ the
produce of a tree or plant which contains the seed or is used for food.
The edible reproductive body of a seed plant. The effect or
consequence of an act or operation ” . According to Cambridge
Dictionary, „desiccate‟ is “ to remove the moisture from something so
it becomes completely dry; to lose all moisture and become completely
dry” and „preservation‟ refers to “ the act of keeping something the

7
(2004) 11 SCC 497
8
Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple, (1996) 3 SCC 52 ; Delhi Transport Corporation v. Shri
Bahadur Singh , 2026:DHC:1912-DB
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same or of preventing it from being damaged ”. Additionally, we note
9
that desiccated coconut comes within the ambit of „coconut‟ .

23. It is no longer res integra that welfare legislations are to be
construed liberally and an interpretation which escapes the protection
10
of the statute is to be avoided .

24. Needless to say, the EPF Act is a social welfare legislation
enacted to protect the interests of workmen in organized industries in
11
the absence of any social security scheme in the country.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Provident Fund Office v.
12
Godavari Garments Ltd. held that the EPF Act is beneficial social
welfare legislation and is to be interpreted for the benefit of workmen.

13
25. Further, in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob , the Supreme
Court held that while purposive construction is to be given to welfare
legislations, the exclusionary provisions therein should be construed
.
narrowly to give a wide import to the primary object of the legislation

26. Since the learned Counsel has argued that the residuary clause
(ix) must be construed by applying ejusdem generis we deem it
relevant to note that ejusdem generis is a rule of construction whereby
words in a statute, which may otherwise have a wide meaning, when
used alongside more limited words, are interpreted narrowly to

9
State of Karnataka v. Sri Lakshmi Coconut Industries , (1997) 11 SCC 621
10
Kerala Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food , (1995) 4 SCC 341; Bombay Anand Bhavan
Restaurant v. ESI Corpn. , (2009) 9 SCC 61 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran
Vijaya Kumar , (2008) 9 SCC 527 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 813; Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre ,
(1986) 2 SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335; Workmen v. American Express International Banking Corpn. ,
(1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940
11
Shree Vishal Printers Ltd. v. Provident Fund Commr., (2019) 9 SCC 508
12
(2019) 8 SCC 149
13
Para 13, (2020) 14 SCC 126
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include only matters of the same genus or class as the preceding
words. These preceding words, which control and limit the meaning of
the subsequent words, must represent a genus or a family which
admits of a number of species or members. If there is only one species
14
it cannot supply theidea of a genus. This doctrine applies when (i) the
statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of
the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or
category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term
follows the enumeration and (v) there is no indication of a different
15
legislative intent.

27. Adverting to the facts of the present case and in view of the
foregoing legal position, we find that the relevant Entry under
Schedule I of the EPF Act ought to be construed for the benefit of the
workers and that strict interpretation, as required in respect of taxation
statutes should not be adopted since it would dilute the protective
ambit of beneficial legislations.

28. It is evident from the record that the learned Single Judge,
without cogent justification,adopted the common parlance meaning of
coconut for the purposes of the EPF Act, opining that in a market, “ no
one will consider the brown coconut to be a vegetable or a fruit ”.
Further, the learned Single Judge, after noting the decision in
Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) , erred in holding
that in the absence of a clear mandate that the Entries were to be given
widest possible interpretation irrespective of their ordinary meaning,

14
Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India , (1989) 2 SCC 458 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 297 : (1989) 75
STC 75 : 1989 SCC OnLine SC 62
15
Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura , (1972) 2 SCC 442 : 1972 SCC OnLine
SC 281
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coconut could not be considered as a fruit in ordinary sense and
consequently, Respondent No. 1 did not fall under the Act. This
interpretation, in our opinion, deprives the employees of Respondent
No.1 from the benefit of the EPF Act and hence, warrants our
interference.

29. As per authoritative dictionaries, coconut is a fruit. However, as
per P.A. Thillai Chidambara Nadar (supra) and Bharuch (supra) , in
commercial use and in common parlance, it may not be treated as a
fruit or vegetable. It is time and again reiterated that a judgment is to
be considered along with its surrounding facts and circumstances, not
16
as Euclid‟s theorem. These decisions were rendered with respect to
taxation where strict classification is necessary to determine tax
liability, whereas in welfare statutes, the approach is to expand
coverage and not restrict it. It is unclear to us as to how the threshold
of common parlance is to apply to the EPF Act,a social welfare
legislation, in a manner which would confine its ambit.

30. The EPF Act neither provides a definition for „fruit‟ nor
indicates that its understanding in common parlance, as opposed to the
ordinary dictionary meaning, ought to be applied. In the absence of
such indication, and the material on record not being sufficient to
persuade this Court to adopt the alleged common parlance meaning
over the dictionary meaning, this Court deems it appropriate to adopt
the latter meaning to give the beneficial statute a wider import.

16
C. Ronald v. UT, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, (2011) 12 SCC 428; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R.
Vairamani , (2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778; Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University ,
(2008) 9 SCC 284 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 887 : JT (2008) 8 SC 621; HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Value Added Tax, Delhi , 2023:DHC:8906-DB
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31. The relevant Entry under Schedule I is titled “fruit and
vegetable preservation industry”, which focuses on the nature of the
industrial activity i.e., preservation of fruits and vegetables, and not
on the precise classification or definition of a particular item as a fruit
or vegetable. This construction is further strengthened by the residuary
clause “(ix)any other unspecified item relating to the preservation or
canning of fruits and vegetables”, which demonstrates the legislative
intent to prevent restrictive interpretation which could exclude similar
industries engaged in similar processes merely because the product is
not expressly enumerated. Consequently, adopting a common parlance
meaning would artificially limit the scope of the Schedule entry and
undermine the object of the Act.


32. We reiterate that it is well settled for beneficial legislations that
a purposive interpretation is to be adopted, and the EPF Act is to be
construed for the benefit of employees thereunder. Any interpretation,
which seeks to circumscribe the scope of such legislations is to be
discarded. To say that the legislative intent, while inserting the Entry
for fruit and vegetable preservation industry under Schedule I was to
exclude coconuts, is an interpretation which aims to escape the
legislation and is not in consonance with the purpose and the object of
the Act. Additionally, while the coconut industry is not specifically
stipulated, we note that it is also not explicitly proscribed.

33. Therefore, this Court does not see any obstacle in construing the
dictionary meaning of „coconut‟ and „desiccate‟ for the purposes of
EPF Act. It is also reiterated that „coconut‟ also includes desiccated
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coconut as per Sri Lakshmi Coconut Industries (supra) . The
desiccation of coconut increases its shelf life, which can be safely
assumed to amount to „preservation‟, as also duly appreciated by the
Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner in his order dated
22.01.2001.

34. Thus, in our view, considering the object of the Act along with
the extensive Entries under Schedule I andthe residuary clause (ix),we
find that „coconut‟ has to be construed as a fruit for the purposes of
EPF Act. We deem it fit to reject the narrow common parlance
meaning employed by the learned Single Judge as it confines the
scope of the Act to the detriment of employees in light of the decision
in Provident Fund Office (supra) .


35. In view of the above discussion, we find that the learned Single
Judge erred in relying on decisions rendered in the sphere of tax
jurisprudence to import the common parlance meaning, thereby
circumscribing the ambit of the EPF Act instead of interpreting it
purposively as is required for a welfare statute.

36. The contention of Respondent No. 1 that cashew nut being a
fruit, is stipulated separately under the Schedule, hence, coconut also
ought to be mentioned separately, is of no avail in the light of the
residuary clause (ix). As regards the contention that the coconut
industry is excluded from the Act, in our view, there is no explicit
exclusion or proscription in the Act to that effect; and even assuming
arguendo that such exclusion should be implied,exclusionary
provisions in welfare legislations are to be interpreted narrowly to
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ensure that the object of the statute is broadly realised, as held in K.H.
Nazar (supra) . For the application of the rule of ejusdem generis , the
existence of a genus is a pre-requisite as reiterated in Siddeshwari
Cotton Mills (supra) and Amar Chandra Chakraborty (supra) . To
buttress, the residuary clause uses the expression “any other
unspecified item” , which aims to include within its ambit any fruit and
vegetable relating to preservation or canning which is not specifically
stipulated therein; hence, it can be safely assumed that the legislative
intent is to provide a wide interpretation.

17
37. Lastly, the reliance placed on various decisions to contend that
common parlance meaning is to be adopted under the EPF Act is
misplaced since these decisions pertain to tax jurisprudence and hence
do not come to the rescue of the respondent in light of foregoing
discussion.

38. For the afore-noted reasons, we are unable to sustain the
impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge.

39. We accordingly hold that the industry in which the respondents
are engaged is covered by the afore-extracted definition in Schedule I
to the EPF Act.

40. We accordingly uphold the decision of the EPFAT and set aside
the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. Consequences in
law would follow.

17
Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (supra); State of West Bengal (supra); Motipur Zamindary Co. (Private)
Ltd. (supra); Porritts& Spencer (Asia) Ltd. (supra); M/s Shiva Traders, Bhilai(supra)
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41. The appeal is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms with
no orders as to costs.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.


C.HARI SHANKAR, J.

MARCH 12, 2026 /

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