DUNDAPPA vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
TH
DATED THIS THE 9 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO. 203718 OF 2026 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
DUNDAPPA S/O GURULING TELI
AGE: 41 YEARS, OCC: ENGLISH TEACHER
R/O MORARJI DESAI RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL
ATHARGA, TQ: INDI
DIST: VIJAYAPURA-586112.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. BAPUGOUDA SIDDAPPA., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION, M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU-560001
2. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
THE KARNATAKA RESIDENTIAL EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS SOCIETY, NO.8, M.S.B-1
TH TH
6 AND 7 FLOOR, KMF BUILDING
CONNINGHAM ROAD
VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU-560052
3.
THE HEAD MASTER
THE MORARJI DESAI RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL
ATHARGA, TQ: INDI
Digitally
signed by
NIJAMUDDIN
JAMKHANDI
Location:
HIGH COURT
OF
KARNATAKA
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DIST: VIJAYAPURA-586112.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.NARENDRA REDDY, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI.KRUPA SAGAR PATIL ADV., FOR R2 AND R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO, A)
ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND TO QUASH THE
ND
ENDORSEMENT PASSED BY THE 2 RESPONDENT IN
¸ÀASÉå:
E- VIDE
PÀªÀ²¸À¸ÀA/DqÀ½vÀ-3/¸ÉêÉ/ 57571/2025-26 ¢£ÁAPÀ: 25.08.2025
PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-D; B) ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI AND TO QUASH THE ENDORSEMENT PASSED BY
ND
THE 2 RESPONDENT IN E-
¸ÀASÉå: PÀªÀ²¸À¸ÀA/DqÀ½vÀ-3/¸ÉêÉ/ 57571/2026-27
VIDE PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-G; C) ISSUE
¢£ÁAPÀ: 07.08.2026
ANY OTHER WRIT OR ORDER OR DIRECTION TO MEET THE
ENDS OF JUSTICE UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE CASE.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
ORAL ORDER
This writ petition is filed seeking following prayers:
“a) Issue a writ of certiorari and to quash the
nd
endorsement passed by the 2 respondent in
¸ÀASÉå:
E- vide
PÀªÀ²¸À¸ÀA/DqÀ½vÀ-3/¸ÉêÉ/ 57571/2025-26 ¢£ÁAPÀ: 25.08.2025
produced at Annexure-D;
b) Issue a writ of certiorari and to quash the
nd
endorsement passed by the 2 respondent in
¸ÀASÉå:
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E- vide
PÀªÀ²¸À¸ÀA/DqÀ½vÀ-3/¸ÉêÉ/ 57571/2026-27 ¢£ÁAPÀ: 07.08.2026
produced at Annexure-G;
c) Issue any other writ or order or direction to meet
the ends of justice under the facts and circumstances
of the case”
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the petitioner has been acquitted from the criminal
proceedings. Thereafter, he was reinstated into service by
the respondent No.2 and thereafter, the petitioner sought
the payment of wages for the suspension period, which
was considered and ordered to pay wages, as per the
endorsement dated 25.08.2025 at Annexure-D. However,
very same authority vide endorsement dated 07.08.2026
by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court stated
that the petitioner would not be entitled to the wages for
the suspension period. Hence, he seeks to set aside the
impugned order and further seeks to issue direction to the
authorities to pay the wages for the suspension period.
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3. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance
on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
1
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed) and Ors. . It is submitted that
the very same authority has no power to take a different
stand or review its earlier order. Hence, he seeks to allow
the petition.
4. Per contra, Sri Krupa Sagar Patil, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3
submits that the endorsement at Annexure-D dated
25.08.2025 was incorrectly issued without examining the
legal position and on noticing the said mistake, the
authority immediately corrected the said mistake and
issued another endorsement dated 07.08.2026 at
Annexure-G, indicating that the petitioner would not be
entitled to the wages for the suspension period, as the
petitioner was suspended because of initiation of criminal
1
(2013) 10 SCC 324
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proceedings against him. He was dismissed from service,
as he was convicted by the Sessions Court and later in the
High Court he was acquitted and thereafter, he was
reinstated. Under such circumstances, the petitioner would
not be entitled to claim for wages for the suspension
period.
5. In support of his contention, he placed reliance
on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent
2
Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board and Another , and
the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the
case of Sri Rakhesh B. v. The Karnataka Power
3
Transmission Corporation Ltd., and Ors . Accordingly,
he seeks to dismiss the petition.
6. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel
for the petitioner, learned counsel appearing for the
2
(1996) 11 SCC 603
3
WP No.20577/2026 dt. 25.09.2026
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contesting respondents, learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for the state and perused the material
available on record.
7. The material on record indicates that the
petitioner was appointed as an English teacher in Morarji
Desai Residential School. He worked in different places
and he was kept under suspension, in view of registration
of criminal case against him. It is to be noticed that the
petitioner was convicted by the VII Additional Sessions
Judge, Belagavi sitting at Chikkodi in Sessions Case
No.192/2020 vide order dated 07.02.2022 for the offence
punishable under Sections 302, 307 and other offences of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner assailed the
said Judgment before the High Court of Karnataka in
Criminal Appeal No.100160/2022. The Division Bench of
this Court vide judgment dated 06.06.2025 allowed the
appeal of the petitioner and the judgment and sentence of
conviction was set aside and the petitioner was acquitted
from the charges leveled against him. The petitioner
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approached the employer and the petitioner was
reinstated into service. Thereafter, he has submitted a
representation seeking to pay the wages for the
suspension period, which was considered by the authority
and passed the endorsements, which are impugned in the
writ petition. Endorsement dated 25.08.2025 issued by the
respondent No.2 at Annexure-D, indicates that the
petitioner is entitled for the subsistence allowance for the
suspension period. However, very same authority issued
another endorsement dated 07.08.2026 at Annexure-G,
wherein it was held by referring to the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court that the petitioner is not entitled
to wages for the suspension period.
8. The petitioner has placed reliance on the
decision of Deepali Gundu Surwase referred supra,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph No.38 has
held as under:
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“38. The propositions which can be culled out from
the aforementioned judgments are:
38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back
wages is the normal rule.
38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that
while deciding the issue of back wages, the
adjudicating authority or the court may take into
consideration the length of service of the
employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if
any, found proved against the employee/workman,
the financial condition of the employer and similar
other factors.
38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose
services are terminated and who is desirous of
getting back wages is required to either plead or at
least make a statement before the adjudicating
authority or the court of first instance that he/she
was not gainfully employed or was employed on
lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid
payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and
also lead cogent evidence to prove that the
employee/workman was gainfully employed and was
getting wages equal to the wages he/she was
drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so
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because it is settled law that the burden of proof of
the existence of a particular fact lies on the person
who makes a positive averment about its existence.
It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to
prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee
shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on
the employer to specifically plead and prove that the
employee was gainfully employed and was getting
the same or substantially similar emoluments.
38.4. The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even
though the enquiry held against the
employee/workman is consistent with the rules of
natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if
any, but holds that the punishment was
disproportionate to the misconduct found proved,
then it will have the discretion not to award full back
wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not
at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer
had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample
justification for award of full back wages.
38.5. The cases in which the competent court or
tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross
violation of the statutory provisions and/or the
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principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising
the employee or workman, then the court or tribunal
concerned will be fully justified in directing payment
of full back wages. In such cases, the superior courts
should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136
of the Constitution and interfere with the award
passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because
there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on
the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full
back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the
same. The courts must always keep in view that in
the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service,
the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the
employee/workman and there is no justification to
give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings
by relieving him of the burden to pay to the
employee/workman his dues in the form of full back
wages.
38.6. In a number of cases, the superior courts have
interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory
authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation
has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases
the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack
of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause
for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the
litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would
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amount to grave injustice to an employee or
workman if he is denied back wages simply because
there is long lapse of time between the termination
of his service and finality given to the order of
reinstatement. The courts should bear in mind that in
most of these cases, the employer is in an
advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or
workman. He can avail the services of best legal
brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the
employee or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury
of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount
of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent
to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin
Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees [Hindustan Tin Works
(P) Ltd. (supra).
38.7. The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd.
v. K.P. Agrawal [(2007) 2 SCC 433 : (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 651] that on reinstatement the
employee/workman cannot claim continuity of
service as of right is contrary to the ratio of the
judgments of three-Judge Benches [Hindustan Tin
Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 :
1979 SCC (L&S) 53] , [Surendra Kumar Verma v.
Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
(1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] referred to
hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This
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part of the judgment is also against the very concept
of reinstatement of an employee/workman.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. The paragraph No.38 of the aforesaid judgment
clearly indicates that the termination of service of the
employee was wrongful in the said case. Hence, the said
decision would not help the petitioner in any way.
10. The decision in the case of Ranchhodji
Chaturji Thakore referred supra, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court at paragraph No.3, held as under:
“3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the
service has already been ordered by the High Court.
The only question is whether he is entitled to back
wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the
crime that was taken into account for his not being in
service of the respondent. Consequent upon his
acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the
reason that his service was terminated on the basis
of the conviction by operation of proviso to the
statutory rules applicable to the situation. The
question of back wages would be considered only if
the respondents have taken action by way of
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disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to
be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully
prevented from discharging the duties. In that
context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case
requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this
case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a
crime, though he was later acquitted, he had
disabled himself from rendering the service on
account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under
these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to
payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge
and the Division Bench have not committed any error
of law warranting interference.”
11. The learned Single Judge in the case of Sri.
Rakhesh B., referred supra, referring to the various
decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
“10.3. Later, the Apex Court in the case of RAJ
NARAIN v. UNION OF INDIA (2019 SCC OnLine
SC 452), has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
5 . This Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore
[Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity
Board, (1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 491]
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considered the case of an employee who sought back
wages for the period he was kept out of duty during
the pendency of a criminal case for his involvement
in an offence under Section 302 IPC. The claim of the
petitioner therein was that he was entitled to full
wages on his acquittal by the criminal court. This
Court rejected the said submission by holding that
the question of payment of back wages would arise
only in case of termination of service, pursuant to
findings recorded in a departmental enquiry. In the
event of the dismissal order being set aside by the
Court, the delinquent employee would be entitled to
claim back wages as he was unlawfully kept away
from duty by the employer. This Court was of the
opinion that an employee against whom criminal
proceedings are initiated would stand on a different
footing in comparison to an employee facing a
departmental enquiry. The employee involved in a
crime has disabled himself from rendering his
services on account of his incarceration in jail.
Subsequent acquittal by an appellate court would not
entitle him to claim back wages.
6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore
[Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat
Electricity Board, (1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC
(L&S) 491] was followed by this Court in Union
of India v. Jaipal Singh [Union of India v. Jaipal
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Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 12]
to refuse back wages to an employee who was
initially convicted for an offence under Section
302 read with Section 34 IPC and later
acquitted by the High Court in a criminal
appeal. While refusing to grant relief to the
petitioner therein, this Court held that
subsequent acquittal would not entitle an
employee to seek back wages. However, this
Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution
is launched at the behest of the department
and the employee is acquitted, different
considerations may arise. The learned counsel
for the appellant endeavoured to distinguish
the prosecution launched by the police for
involvement of an employee in a criminal case
and the criminal proceedings initiated at the
behest of the employer. The observation made
in the judgment in Union of India v. Jaipal
Singh [Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1
SCC 121 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 12] has to be
understood in a manner in which the
department would become liable for back
wages in the event of a finding that the
initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala
fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases,
we do not see any difference between initiation
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of the criminal proceedings by the department
vis-à-vis a criminal case lodged by the police.
For example, if an employee is involved in
embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification,
the employer cannot be mulcted with full back
wages on the acquittal of the person by a
criminal court, unless it is found that the
prosecution is malicious.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, has
consistently enunciated that where an employee, on
account of his involvement in criminal proceedings
and the conviction that follows, incurs an inability to
render service and consequently, remains out of
employment, the subsequent acquittal would not, by
itself, entitle him to claim back wages for the
intervening period. Where such non-employment is
not attributable to the employer, the employer
cannot be mulcted with the liability to pay salary for
the period during which the services of the employee
could not be availed.
11. The Apex Court, while considering the
applicability of the principle of ‘no work, no pay’, has
drawn a distinction between a case where an
employee is kept out of service by the employer and
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a case where the employee himself remains out of
service, without the same being attributable to the
employer. Few of them are noticed.
11.1 The Apex Court in the case of UNITED INDIA
INSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SIRAJ UDDIN KHAN
(2019 SCC OnLine SC 846) , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
19. This Court held that there was no
justification whatsoever to grant any back
wages to the respondent on the general
principle that nobody could be directed to claim
wages for the period that he remained absent
without leave or without justification.
20. We may further notice the judgment of this
Court, which has also been relied on by the
respondent in his counter-affidavit i.e. judgment of
this Court in Shobha Ram Raturi v. Haryana Vidyut
Prasaran Nigam Ltd. [Shobha Ram Raturi v. Haryana
Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 663 :
(2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 185] In the above case, the
appellant was retired from service on 31-12-2002,
even though he would have, in the ordinary course,
attained his date of retirement on superannuation,
only on 31-12-2005. The appellant assailed the order
of retirement, which was allowed [Shobha Ram
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Raturi v. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd., 2010
SCC OnLine P&H 13116] by the learned Single Judge.
The learned Single Judge has denied the back wages
to the appellant on the principle of “no work no pay”.
The order of the learned Single Judge was assailed
by the appellant by filing a letters patent appeal,
which too was dismissed [Shobha Ram Raturi v.
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd., 2011 SCC
OnLine P&H 17610]. This Court allowed the appeal of
the appellant and made following observations in
paras 3 and 4: (Shobha Ram Raturi case [Shobha
Ram Raturi v. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd.,
(2016) 16 SCC 663 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 185] , SCC
p. 664)
“3. Having given our thoughtful consideration to
the controversy, we are satisfied, that after the
impugned order of retirement dated
31-12-2002 was set aside, the appellant was
entitled to all consequential benefits. The fault lies
with the respondents in not having utilised the
services of the appellant for the period from 1-1-
2003 to 31-12-2005. Had the appellant been
allowed to continue in service, he would have
readily discharged his duties. Having restrained
him from rendering his services with effect from 1-
1-2003 to 31-12- 2005, the respondent cannot be
allowed to press the self-serving plea of denying
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him wages for the period in question, on the plea
of the principle of “no work no pay”.
4. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are
satisfied, that the impugned order passed by the
High Court, to the limited extent of denying wages
to the appellant, for the period from 1-1-2003 to
31-12-2005 deserves to be set aside. The same is
accordingly hereby set aside.”
21. This Court held in the above case that having
restrained the appellant from rendering his services
with effect from 1-1-2003 to 31-12-2005, the
respondent cannot be allowed to press the plea of
the principle of “no work no pay” for denying the
wages. In the above case, the appellant was
restrained from working due to order of retirement
dated 31-12-2002, due to which he could not work
till his normal retirement. When the order dated 31-
12-2002 was set aside, automatically, he became
entitled for back wages and the principle of “no work
no pay” was not attracted.
22. In the present case, as noted above, the
respondent was not kept away from work by any
order of the appellant. The order of termination of his
services/dismissal was passed on 26-6-2012, after
his retirement on 20-6-2012, which in no manner
prohibited the respondent from working. The
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respondent during submission has submitted that he
was illegally transferred to Branch Office, Jaunpur
from Allahabad. He was suffering from a disability of
more than 40 per cent and he could not have been
transferred to another place. There is nothing on
record to indicate that transfer of respondent from
Branch Office, Allahabad to Branch Office, Jaunpur
was at any time set aside or withdrawn. The salary
up to 14-5-2009 was allowed to the respondent on
account of setting aside of the order dated 14-5-
2009, which was with all consequential benefits but
with regard to entitlement of salary after 14-5-2009
to 20-6-2012, there has been no adjudication by the
High Court, which is apparent from judgment of the
High Court dated 3-7-2018 [Siraj Uddin Khan v.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine All
3217] , as extracted above.”
11.2 Later, the Apex Court in the case of EX. SQN.
LDR. R. SOOD v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(2026 SCC OnLine SC 590) , has held as follows:
nd
“39. The order of dismissal from service dated 22
September, 1993 stands set aside. Appellant having
since crossed the age of superannuation, he cannot
be reinstated in service. In law, however, he is
entitled to claim all consequential service benefits
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which would have accrued to him, had he not been
fastened with such illegal order of dismissal.
Appellant could not work beyond 22nd September,
1993 admittedly because of the illegal order of
termination and not owing to any fault on his part.
Question therefore arises, whether the
principle of ‘no work, no pay’ would be
attracted? In view of the recent decisions of
this Court in Ramesh Chand v. Management of
Delhi Transport Corporation and Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo
Krishna Naik, the requirement for being
entitled to 100% back wages is a statement on
affidavit that the employee concerned has not
been reemployed since illegal termination of
service. Though a negative burden, such burden
has to be discharged whereupon the onus
would shift to the employer to deny/dispute
such statement. Here, there is no material on
record to show that the appellant did not take
up any employment/was not employed after
22nd September, 1993. We, therefore, propose
reduction of the claim to the extent of 50%.”
11.3 The Apex Court in the case of UNION OF
INDIA AND OTHERS v. BALI RAM
No.850808321 (2026 SCC OnLine SC 1319) ,
holds as follows:
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“…. …. ….
73. Having thus noticed the facts and the law, the
test is simple: did the facts and circumstances
warrant the relief granted by the Single Judge?
74. The statutory mandate of Section 47, PwD
Act is too peremptory to be ignored. The title of
the PwD Act says it all. It is an enactment for
persons with disabilities intended to guarantee
them equal opportunities and full participation
apart from protection of rights. Section 47,
importantly, starts with “No”. Negative words
in a statute convey a clear prohibition. It is a
legislative device to make a statute imperative.
An employee like the respondent, while
retaining the status of a public servant, is
entitled to security of service. A physical
disability that he acquires while in service
rendering him unfit for the work assigned to
him has to be dealt with by the employer in the
manner ordained by Section 47. Either he is
shifted to some other post carrying same pay
and service benefits, or, if it is not possible, the
employer is under a duty to adjust him on any
other post. If that too is not possible, a
supernumerary post has to be created for him
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which, for all intents and purposes, would be
personal to him.
75. The PwD Act came into force in the year
1995, whereas the respondent was medically
invalidated from service in 1998. The
NOTIFICATION saw the light of the day as late
as in 2002. The duty imposed by the PwD Act
being mandatory and not discretionary, the law
did not leave the appellants with an option to
discharge their duty at their convenience.
Appellants were required to find a chair for the
respondent, and not wait for the respondent to
beg for one. By not offering alternate posting,
the appellants failed in their role as a model
employer and converted a welfare provision
into a dead letter.
76. The point as to whether or not the impaired
vision from which the respondent suffered was
attributable to and/or aggravated by service in
the CRPF need not detain us for long. Nothing
has been brought on record by the appellants
to suggest that the respondent had been
suffering from an ophthalmic condition since
his enrolment in the CRPF. Medical fitness of
the respondent must have been assessed at the
time of his enrolment and appointment as a
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driver. Had he been found short of the required
standards, we wonder whether the recruitment
process would have resulted in an appointment
in the first place. Even if it is assumed that the
ophthalmic condition was neither attributable
to nor aggravated by service in the CRPF,
nothing turns on it. Parliament did not limit
Section 47 to disabilities attributable to service;
the protection is unqualified and unconditional.
It operates irrespective of how the disability
was acquired. The relevant question is not
hypothetical fitness at appointment, but
whether the appellants explored alternatives
before ending the respondent's service. More
than ten years of unblemished driving followed
by an acquired ophthalmic condition, indeed,
provided a case for accommodation or alternate
posting, not medical invalidation. Service
jurisprudence distinguishes between initial
disqualification and subsequent disability, and
the law ought to lean towards retention over
ouster from service unless, of course, ouster
becomes inevitable.
77. It would not be inapt to dwell on another aspect,
before we conclude. It is intriguing that the CRPF,
being a force constituted under the Central Reserve
Police Force Act, 1949 and functioning under the
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administrative control of the Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India, failed to respond in
time. Being an instrumentality of the State, it was
expected to be fully cognizant of the provisions of
the PwD Act and the statutory protection conferred
upon the respondent under Section 47 thereof. In
such circumstances, we find it difficult to
comprehend how the order of medical invalidation
came to be passed in the first place, particularly
when at the relevant point in time no notification
exempting the CRPF from the operation of the PwD
Act had been issued. The action of the appellants,
therefore, appears to have been taken in disregard of
the statutory mandate then in force.
78. We are, thus, not persuaded to accept Mr.
Banerjee's contention that the provisions of the PwD
Act are inapplicable on facts and in the
circumstances of the present case.
79. For all the reasons aforesaid, we are
unhesitatingly of the opinion that the Single Judge
was perfectly justified in finding the appellants to be
remiss. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that the civil appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to
be dismissed.
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THE RELIEF
80. By an interim order passed in the present
proceedings on 20th May, 2026, we directed Mr.
Banerjee to place on record the quantum of salary
and allowances that the respondent would have
drawn had he continued in service till his
superannuation. Pursuant thereto, a calculation sheet
has been furnished by the appellants. As per the said
calculation, which we do not doubt for a moment,
had the respondent remained in service until the
date of his superannuation, the total salary and
allowances payable to him would be an amount of
Rs. 82,80,195/- excluding any adjustment on
account of the invalidation pension received by him.
The calculation further indicates that had the
respondent continued in service only up to 10th
September 2002, i.e., the date on which the
NOTIFICATION came into force, the salary and
allowances payable to him would amount to a
meagre Rs. 2,66,180/-. We see no reason to accept
Mr. Banerjee's prayer that the respondent is entitled,
if at all, to such sum till the NOTIFICATION was
issued.
81. Pertinently, the respondent is now a
sexagenarian. Consequently, the question of his
reinstatement in service does not arise and the
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relief granted to the respondent by the Single
Judge warrants suitable modification. We are
conscious that an award of full back wages
would impose a substantial burden on the State
exchequer, but the fault for the mess rests
solely on the appellants. We have noticed that
the quantum of post medical invalidation
benefits given to the respondent is a pittance.
He has been made to suffer the pangs of
deferred justice and economic destitution
despite the favourable verdict of the Single
Judge dating back to 11th August, 2008.
Respondent having suffered visual impairment,
the possibility of his gainful employment as a
driver stood foreclosed. Given the nature of his
disability, we presume that his other
employment prospects were also rendered
bleak. No evidence of the respondent's gainful
employment has been placed on record.
Appellants, having failed to provide an
alternate post commensurate with the
respondent's disability as mandated by Section
47, PwD Act, cannot be permitted to take
shelter behind the principle of ‘no work, no
pay’. The situation of non-employment of the
respondent is entirely the appellants' creation.
Respondent is, thus, entitled to full back wages
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and the appellants must bear the consequences
of their own inaction. The preambular promise
of the Constitution cannot remain symbolic.
Restitution of status with full back wages,
interest and costs for the indignity of delay are
the minimum we ought to order.”
The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments,
delineates the applicability of the principle of ‘no
work, no pay’ with reference to the circumstance on
account of which the employee remains out of
service. Where the non-performance of duties is
attributable to any act or omission on the part of the
employer, the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ would
not apply. Conversely, where the employee himself
incurs ineligibility to discharge his duties and the
circumstance resulting in his remaining out of service
is not attributable to the employer’s accord, the
employer cannot be mulcted with the liability to pay
salary for such period.
11. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex
Court, I deem it appropriate to hold that the period
of 18 months, from 21.03.2024 to 02.11.2025,
during which the petitioner was out of service, was
not on account of any order passed by the
respondents of their own accord, but on account of
the ineligibility incurred by the petitioner himself.
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Therefore, the principle of 'no work, no pay' would
be applicable to the case of the petitioner.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, finding no warrant to
interfere with the endorsement issued by the third
respondent, it is observed that the petitioner would
not be entitled to salary for the period from
21.03.2024 to 02.11.2025. “
12. Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, I am
of the considered view that the authority has rightly taken
a decision, rejecting the petitioner's prayer to pay
wages/subsistence allowance during the suspension period
by applying the principle of ‘no pay no work’. I do not find
any error in the decision taken by the authorities in issuing
the impugned endorsement dated 07.08.2026 at
Annexure-G.
13. Insofar as the contention that the said authority
has reviewed its decision later has no merit. The said
decision is an administrative decision taken by the
authority. On earlier occasion the endorsement was issued
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without referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and later on noticing that the law is in favour of the
authority and against the petitioner with regard to the
payment of wages for the suspension period, when the
suspension is not because of the fault of the employer, or
wrongful termination the second endorsement was issued.
It is trite law that the petitioner has no right whatsoever to
seek payment of wages during the period of suspension or
conviction period, as admittedly the suspension was not
wrongful act of the employer.
14. For the aforementioned reasons, I do not find
any good ground to interfere with the impugned
endorsement. The writ petition is devoid of merits and the
same is rejected .
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
NJ
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 48