Prashant Vasant Koregaonkar And Ors. vs Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector And Anr.

2026:BHC-AS:21800
41-ARA-70-2024 -.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 70 OF 2024
Prashant Vasant Koregaonkar & Ors. …Appellants
Versus
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector & …Respondents
Anr.
WITH
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 60 OF 2024
Ashwashilp Agriculture Pvt. Ltd …Appellant
Versus
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector & …Respondents
Anr.
WITH
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 65 OF 2024
Rajendra M. Developers & D Builders Pvt. Ltd. …Appellant
Through Its Director Jitendra Manohardas Thakker
Versus
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector …Respondents
(LA) & Anr.
WITH
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 63 OF 2024
Ganga Developers And Godavari Developers
(A.O.P.)Through Its Member Jitendra Manohardas
Thakker
…Appellant
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector …Respondents
(LA) & Anr.
WITH
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ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 59 OF 2024
Kanaji Raghavji Thakkar (Deceased) Thr. LRS. Smt. …Appellant
Lalita Kanji Thakker
Versus
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector …Respondents
(LA) & Anr.
WITH
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 61 OF 2024
Jitendra Manohardas Thakker And Ors. …Appellants
Versus
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector …Respondents
(LA) & Anr.
WITH
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 62 OF 2024
Kavita Kanji Thakkar @ Mrs. Kavita Chintan …Appellant
Thakkar
Versus
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector …Respondents
(LA) Nashik & Anr.
WITH
ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 64 OF 2024
Chetan Giridharlal Bataviya …Appellant
Versus
Competent Authority Through Deputy Collector …Respondent
(LA) Nashik & Anr.
Mr. Pradeep J. Thorat a/w Ms. Aditi S. Naikare a/w Aniesh S. Jadhav ,
for the Appellant.
Mr. A. R. Patil, Addl. G. P. for the State/ Respondents.
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CORAM: SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.
DATE: APRIL 27 , 2026
Oral Judgement:
1. This bunch of Appeals invoke Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) to impugn arbitral awards in connection
with the acquisition effected for purposes of constructing National Highways
under the National Highways Act, 1956 (“Highways Act”) .
2. The facts of Arbitration Appeal No. 70 of 2024 would be instructive for
dealing with the contentions across these appeals. Therefore, reference to
dates is adopted on the basis of the dates obtaining in Arbitration Appeal
No.70 of 2024 which is marked as the lead matter.
3. The core issue that arises for consideration in all these Appeals is
whether this court, in the facts of this case, would have the ability to direct the
correction of a computation of compensation statutorily payable to the
Appellants in respect of solatium of 30% under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(“1894 Act”) .
4. Originally, Section 3G and Section 3Jof the National Highways Act, 1956
(“Highways Act”) excluded the provisions governing solatium as contained in
the 1894 Act in computation of compensation under the Highways Act.
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5. In the facts of this case, the notification for the land acquisition was
Notification No. 2250 issued on September 3, 2009. By this date, the Punjab
and Haryana High Court had struck down Section 3J and 3G of the National
Highways Act, 1956 as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India inasmuch as these provisions denied the statutory
benefit of solatium and interest envisaged in Section 23 and Section 28 of the
1894 Act, solely because the acquisition was for highways. This decision was
1
pronounced on March 28, 2008 in Golden Iron and Steel , nearly a year and
half before the notification in question.
2
6. Thereafter, the Supreme Court, in the case of Sunita Mehra , rendered a
decision on August 11, 2016, using March 28, 2008, as a cut-off date for
consideration of solatium in relation to land acquisitions under the Highways
Act. This date was chosen because that is the the date on which the Punjab and
Haryana High Court declared the law in Golden Iron and Steel . It was stated
that matters which had attained closure by that date could not be reopened,
but all acquisitions after March 28, 2008 would be entitled to solatium.

1 Golden Iron and Steel Forging v. Union of India and Ors.- 2008 SCC OnLine P&H Court
498
2
Sunita Mehra and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.- (2019) 17 SCC 672
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7. Thereafter, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the law again in
3
the case of Tarsem Singh by which time the 1894 Act had been replaced by
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“ 2013 Act ”), and ruled that
solatium would be payable in respect of land acquisitions under the Highways
Act, even when applying the 2013 Act .
8. The facts of this case fall squarely under the 1894 Act and what is
noteworthy is that the acquisition itself was notified after the law was declared
in Golden Iron and Steel and indeed well before the decision in Sunita Mehra.
9. On earlier occasions, I had asked the Appellants to demonstrate that
they had indeed raised the issue of solatium right at the stage of their
reference before the Arbitral Tribunal and to show that they did not raise it for
the first time under Section 34 of the Act , which led to the impugned order.
10. Today, Learned Advocate on behalf of the Appellants tendered across
the bar a compilation to include the relevant references in each of the matters,
to indicate that indeed the issue of solatium was raised right at the stage of the
reference to arbitration and therefore the Learned Arbitral Tribunal squarely
had this issue before it for adjudication of the same. Arbitral award in the
instant case, was passed on January 6, 2018 by which date, the law declared
3 Union of India and Anr. v. Tarsem Singh and Ors.– (2019) 9 SCC 304
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in Sunita Mehra was quite clearly laid down, specifically taking the cut-off date
of March 28, 2008. The acquisitions in the instant case having been initiated
only on September 3, 2009, this matter was squarely covered by the law
declared in Sunita Mehra . Therefore, the Arbitral Award is in conflict with
the law declared by the Supreme Court.
11. Thereafter, it is also seen that even at the Section 34 stage, the ground of
solatium was indeed raised, but was rejected by the Learned District Judge on
the premise that allowing solatium would constitute a modification of the
arbitral award which was, in his opinion, impermissible.The law both on
modification of arbitral awards as well as the applicability of solatium in the
cases of National Highways is now crystallized and well declared. In Gayatri
4
Balasamy , the Supreme Court has specifically held that th modification of an
e
arbitral award would be restricted to computational, clerical or typographical
errors. In the case at hand, there is no dispute at all on the valuation of the
land. There is no controversy about the classification of the land or the
applicability of market value. The sole controversy is about computation of the
compensation payable, which, in terms of the law declared in Sunita Mehra
entailed a simple computation of 30% of the value of compensation already
arrived at.
4 Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. - (2025) 7 SCC 1
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12. Therefore, this is a case which would come within the ambit of rectifying
computational errors, there being no other element of the arbitral award that
would undergo a change by reason of the application of judgement in Sunita
Mehra and computing the 30% solatium, which is an integral part of the
compensation. The following extracts from Gayatri Balasamy are relevant:
V. Court can modify the award despite Sections 33 and 34(4)
47. Section 33 of the 1996 Act (Annexure A) empowers an arbitrator, upon request, to
correct and/or re-interpret the arbitral award, on limited grounds. This includes the
correction of computational, clerical or typographical errors, as well as giving
interpretation on a specific point or a part of the award, when mutually agreed upon
by the parties. Section 33(3) enables the Tribunal to suo motu correct any errors
within thirty days of delivering the award. Section 33(4) grants wider powers. It
permits the arbitral tribunal, upon compliance with specified manner of request, to
make an additional award on claims presented before the arbitral proceedings but
omitted from the arbitral award.
48. Section 33(7) states that Section 31 (Annexure A) shall apply where correction,
interpretation or any addition is made to the arbitral award. Section 31 deals with
form and content requirements for arbitral where correction, interpretation or any
addition is made to the arbitral awards. Consequently, an order passed by the arbitral
tribunal under Section 33 amounts to an arbitral award. Under Section 34(3), where a
request is made under Section 33, the limitation period for filing an application to set
aside the award commences from the date on which the arbitral tribunal disposes of
the Section 33 request.
49. Notwithstanding Section 33, we affirm that a Court reviewing an Award under
Section 34 possesses the authority to rectify computational, clerical, or typographical
errors, as well as other manifest errors, provided that such modification does not
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necessitate a merits-based evaluation. There are certain powers inherent to the Court,
even when not explicitly granted by the legislature. The scope of these inherent
powers depends on the nature of the provision, whether it pertains to appellate,
reference, or limited jurisdiction as in the case of Section 34. The powers are
intrinsically connected as they are part and parcel of the jurisdiction exercised by the
Court.
[Emphasis Supplied]
13. I must also mention that before the C onstitution Bench that rendered
the judgement in Gayatri Balasamy , a wider argument was made by some of
the parties in the context of the Highways Act and it was argued that Section
34 should be widely interpreted to permit modification of arbitral awards
passed under the Highways Act in view of such arbitration being statutory in
nature. That contention was repelled by the Supreme Court in Gayatri
Balasamy in the following terms:
71. It has been argued that Section 34 should be expansively interpreted to permit
modification of awards under the NHAI Act. In particular, it is suggested that courts
should be allowed to modify the quantum of compensation awarded, as the Act
involves statutory arbitration. This argument is, however, untenable. The jurisdiction
conferred under Section 34 does not distinguish between statutory and non-statutory
arbitration in terms of the scope of courts' power of review. Hence, this argument
stands rejected.
[Emphasis Supplied]
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14. Therefore, Arbitral Awards passed under the Highways Act, 1956 has
been given treatment on par with Arbitral Awards in any other arbitration
proceedings. Seen in this light, the question to ask is whether there was an
error in the Arbitral Award that necessitated correction of a computational
error. If the answer is in the affirmative, such error is capable of correction by
the Section 34 Court. Likewise, it is trite law that the jurisdiction of the Section
37 Court is co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the Section 34 Court.
Therefore, the core question that arises is whether there would be a resort to
rectification of only a computational error when one applies the computation
of solatium bearing in mind the law declared by the Supreme Court in Sunita
Mehra and Tarsem Singh .
15. It is imperative that I also discuss another matter before me on an
5
earlier occasion in the case of Sumanbai Bachchav , which too had raised the
issue of solatium but had a differently nuanced factual matrix. In that case, in
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act, I had refused to interfere.
The reasons for not interfering in that case can be essentially discerned from
the following paragraphs:
23. I am unable to agree. Indeed, Mr. Punjabi is right in pointing out that even the
NHAI has acknowledged that solatium is payable. The process for doing so is not
5 Sumanbai Shantaram Bachchav v. Arbitrator & Additional Commissioner National
Highway Authority Of India & Ors - J udgement dated June 9, 2025 in a bunch of Section 37
Petitions led by Arbitration Appeal (ST) No. 22121 of 2023
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through the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. I am duty-bound to abide by the
ruling of the Learned Division Bench in Rishabhkumar, which has also been passed
after Sarjuprasad. In fact, Rishabhkumar has noticed Sarjuprasad and has not adopted
that approach. On the contrary, it has held that the Section 34 Court did not have the
power to effect the enhancement of compensation by way of solatium.
24. I am in respectful agreement with the reasoning in Rishabhkumar. The Section
34 jurisdiction is not one in which this entitlement (indeed a valid and legal
entitlement) can be executed. That apart, in sharp contrast with these two cases, in the
instant case, there is no incumbent direction to pay solatium that forms part of the
Impugned Judgement. What is sought here is a declaration that the Section 34 Court
was wrong in not adopting the approach adopted in Sarjuprasad. The Learned District
Court, Nashik could not have adopted such an approach since the issue had been
squarely dealt with in Rishabhkumar.
25. It is also noteworthy that the law declared in Rishabhkumar about the lack of
power for the Section 34 Court to modify arbitral awards, is consistent with the law
now declared in Gayatri Balasamy by a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court.
26. It would also be seen from the Original Award and the Arbitral Award, that
each was rendered when Section 3J of the Highways Act was validly in existence on
the statute book i.e. when nothing contained in the Acquisition Act applied to
computing compensation under the Highways Act. Therefore, the challenge to the
Original Award (in 2008) in the arbitration under Section 3G of the Highways Act,
had not been on the basis that solatium was applicable, but was wrongly denied. The
Arbitral Award (made in 2019 but before Tarsem Singh) did not had no reason to
consider the facet of solatium. Tarsem Singh declared the law later (on September 19,
2019) and effaced Section 3J of the Highways Act, thereby explicitly entitling land-
losers to solatium in all land acquisition matters initiated under the Highways Act
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after Section 3J was introduced and before the 2013 Acquisition Act was made
applicable to acquisition for highways.
[Emphasis Supplied]
16. In Sumanbai Bachchav , the issue of solatium was not at all raised in the
arbitral proceedings. In sharp contrast, in the instant case, the issue of
solatium far from being left out at both forums (the arbitration and the Section
34 Court), was in fact tabled in each forum. At the time of the original award,
during the land acquisition, the law as declared in Golden Iron and Steel
ought to have been applied by the Acquisition Officer to compute solatium.
Indeed, the element of solatium formed the subject matter of the grounds on
which the reference was made to the Arbitral Tribunal, and yet the Arbitral
Tribunal did not deal with the same.
17. Therefore, when Section 34 Court was presented with the error on the
part of the Arbitral Tribunal in not granting solatium, as reflected in the
grounds taken up in the Section 34 Petition, it failed to correct the same.
Therefore, it is clear that the error in denial of solatium was squarely a point in
issue before the Learned Arbitral Tribunal.
18. The jurisdiction of the Section 37 Court is co-extensive and co-terminus
with the powers of the Section 34 Court. In view of the law, declared in Gayatri
Balasamy, the denial of an additional 30% amount of compensation towards
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solatium is purely computational in this case since the Appellants embrace
each and every other facet of the Impugned Order and the Arbitral Award at
this stage. All that is sought is to compute the solatium, which according to
the law declared by the Supreme Court at the relevant time (this acquisition
being after March 28, 2008) can be said to fall in the realm of a computational
error.
19. On earlier occasions, each time this matter came up, advocates
appearing for the Respondents would submit that the Court should defer the
hearing because yet another review of Tarsem Singh had been initiated and
was pending in the Supreme Court. It is now apparent that such review has
been considered and a detailed and reasoned order has been passed by the
Supreme Court as to why the review could not be entertained. In this
6
judgement, . the following extracts are noteworthy:
5.4. As stated earlier, similar challenges were made before other High
Courts as well, resulting in two noteworthy decisions:
(i) Judgement dated 28.03.2008 passed by a Division Bench of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana, titled Golden Iron and Steel Forging v. Union of
India; and
(ii) Order dated 04.03.2011 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras, titled T. Chakrapani v. Union of India.
6 National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh - 2026 SCC Online SC 481
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5.5. These decisions assume significance for the reason that, rather than
striking down Section 3-J of the NH Act in its entirety, the High Courts adopted a
calibrated approach. While preserving the distinct acquisition framework under
the NH Act, they held the statutory scheme to be unconstitutional to the limited
extent that it denied land-losers the benefit of 'solatium' and 'interest'. In effect,
Sections 3-G and 3-J of the NH Act were read down to align with the
compensatory principles embodied in Section 23(1-A) and Section 23(2) of the
1894 Act. The result was that, notwithstanding the separate statutory regime,
landowners under the NH Act were also held entitled to 'solatium' and 'interest' on
parity with acquisitions under the 1894 Act. These decisions, along with similar
pronouncements by other High Courts, were subsequently carried in appeal
before this Court.
5.6. While the aforesaid appeals were pending consideration, the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) came into force with effect from 01.01.2014,
replacing the 1894 Act. Thereafter, by way of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2014 (2014 Ordinance), the compensation framework under the 2013
Act was extended to acquisitions under the NH Act, with effect from 01.01.2015.
Although the said Ordinance subsequently lapsed, the Union of India, in exercise
of its powers under Section 113 read with Section 105 of the 2013 Act, issued a
notification dated 28.08.2015, thereby continuing the applicability of the
compensation provisions of the 2013 Act to acquisitions under the NH Act.
5.7. The net effect of this entire rigamarole was that a distinct class of land-
losers came to be excluded from the benefit of 'solatium and 'interest'. To be
specific, the acquisitions undertaken under the NH Act during the interregnum,
namely, after the insertion of Section 3-J in 1997 and till the beneficial
compensation regime of the 2013 Act was made applicable to the NH Act w.e.f.
01.01.2015, remained outside the fold of entitlement to 'solatium' and 'interest'.
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This resulted in an anomalous situation, where similarly situated landowners,
differing only in the timing or statutory route of acquisition, were subjected to
materially unequal compensatory frameworks.
5.9. Similarly, in Sunita Mehra v. Union of India, a two-Judge Bench of
this Court, disposed of the NHAI's appeals against other comparable judgements
of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, with the directions that the benefit of
'solatium' and 'interest' shall be available to land-losers in all such cases where the
proceedings for computation of compensation were pending as on 28.03.2008. In
doing so, this Court clarified that while future acquisitions would be covered by
the 2013 Act and its benefits, those cases which had been decided prior to the said
date and, thus, stood concluded ought not to be reopened. Here, it may be noted
for clarity that this cut-off date was derived from the date on which the judgement
in Golden Iron and Steel (supra) was pronounced by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana.
5.10. Following the aforesaid developments, the NHAI chose to withdraw its
appeals pending before this Court in which the judgement of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana in Golden Iron and Steel (supra) was under challenge.
5.11. It is in this backdrop that a two-Judge Bench of this Court, including
one of us (Surya Kant, J., as he then was), in Tarsem Singh-I held that the benefit
of 'solatium' and 'interest' must be extended to landowners even in respect of
acquisitions made during the period between 1997, when Section 3-J was
introduced into the NH Act, and 2015, when the compensation scheme of the
2013 Act was made applicable to the acquisitions under the NH Act. With this in
mind, Section 3-J was declared unconstitutional to the extent that it denied
solatium and interest, and landowners were held entitled to such benefits in terms
of Section 23(1-A) and Section 23(2), along with interest under the proviso to
Section 28 of the 1894 Act.
[Emphasis Supplied]
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20. Having analysed this history, the Supreme Court specifically concluded
as follows:
D. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
14. Considering the facts and circumstances explained in the instant
proceedings along with the various submissions placed on record and with a view
to balancing the equities regarding delay and the entitlements of the landowners,
we issue the following directions:
i) All landowners whose claims re: the quantum and/or components of
compensation for their lands acquired under the NH Act were alive on or after
28.03.2008, i.e., they were pending before one of the prescribed fora, shall be
entitled to seek addition of ‘interest', 'solatium', and 'interest on the solatium' to
their compensation claim;
(ii) In the cases where compensation claims are alive on the aforesaid date,
but the landowner has claimed 'interest’, 'solatium', and 'interest on solatium' after
28.03.2008, no interest on both components shall be payable for the period of
delay. Such landowner shall be entitled to 'interest' and 'interest on solatium' only
from the date on which such claims were raised; and
(iii) If the claims of the landowners stood concluded prior to 28.03.2008,
with no further appeal, Writ Petition, Special Leave Petition, etc., then such
landowners are not entitled to seek reopening, review, or modification of the said
decision for the purpose of claiming 'solatium' or 'interest'.
[Emphasis Supplied]
21. The indisputable position in the instant case is that the acquisition of
the Appellants’ land falls squarely in the domain of matters which were not
even born as of March 28, 2008. The compensation that was payable was after
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that date because the very notification was issued after that date and therefore
the Appellants were entitled to solatium in terms of the law declared in Golden
Iron and Steel and Sunita Mehra . This facet of the matter ought to have been
gone into by the Learned Arbitral Tribunal and by the Section 34 Court. That
not having been done, the correction of this mistake falls within the domain of
the Section 37 Court. Evidently, there is no outstanding challenge or dispute to
the Arbitral Award. The law declared by the Supreme Court renders the
computation of the solatium as imperative. Such computation is merely
computation of 30% of the value of the compensation. The error in the
Arbitral Award is clearly a computational error. Correcting this error would
not undermine or impact any other component of the Arbitral Award.
Therefore, the mere computation of the 30% amount payable on the
compensation awarded for the land acquisition in question, in my opinion, in
the facts of this case, falls within the ambit of a computational error.
22. No adjudication of any facet is necessary. The correction is
computational and has to be applied to the accepted compensation amount.
Simply put, the application of 30% of solatium on the amounts awarded in the
arbitral award would need to be added to these arbitral awards, without
disturbing any other facet of the Arbitral Award. Therefore, in reliance upon
the law declared in Gayatri Balasamy, such modification is hereby effected.
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23. For completeness, I must state that the earlier decision in Sumanbai
Bachchav significantly relied upon the view taken by a Division Bench of this
7
court in Rishabhkumar , which had been rendered on November 26, 2021. In
that matter there seems to be no reference to Golden Iron and Steel .
Nevertheless, a decision by a Division Bench of one High Court need not bind
the Division Bench of another High Court and would be merely of persuasive
value. That apart, the law declared in Sunita Mehra too does not appear to
have been placed before the Court. Be that as it may, all these decisions have
run their course and eventually, the law as it now stands, in view of the latest
review order passed by the Supreme Court makes it clear that solatium would
simply have to be paid on the compensation amount. More importantly, the
factual matrix in Sumanbai Bachchav was different since the issue of solatium
was never a point in issue in the arbitration and it was introduced for the first
time in the Section 34 proceedings seeking enforcement of a statutory
entitlement in that jurisdiction. In sharp contrast, in the instant case, the issue
was raised at every stage of the matter and it was clearly open to the Section
34 Court to correct the patent illegality. Indeed, Gayatri Balasamy now being
available as the declared law, this Court in the Section 37 jurisdiction can do
what the Section 34 Court failed to do.
7 Rishabhkumar Jejani v. Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport
and Highways - (2022), 1 Bom CR 659
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24. It would only be appropriate to effect the computational error that calls
out for correction. Therefore, all the captioned Appeals are disposed of with a
simple modification that solatium at the rate of 30% on the compensation
amounts, in terms of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would
need to be computed and paid as being applicable for the land acquisitions in
question.
25. With the aforesaid directions, all the captioned Appeals are allowed in
the aforesaid terms and finally disposed of. The computation of solatium and
payment of the same shall be effected within a period of twelve weeks from the
upload of this judgement on the Court’s website.
26. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall be taken
upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this Court’s website.
[ SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.]
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